Incitement, conspiracy and attempt are inchoate offences because they criminalise

conduct which may be described as working towards the commission of a particular

offence. For example, the complete offence of murder requires the wrongful killing of a
human being; whereas the offence of attempted murder caters for cases where the
accused tries, but fails, to kill the victim. Similarly, the offences of conspiracy to murder and
incitement to murder provide for cases where the accused has made an agreement to kill
(conspiracy), or has sought to persuade someone else to kill (incitement). Prosecutions for
incitements, conspiracies and attempts are relatively infrequent compared to prosecutions
for the offences to which they relate, but charges such as incitement to murder (usually
called solicitation), conspiracy to defraud and attempted robbery remain an important part
of the criminal law.
Following are general rules regarding inchoate crimes:
1. A person cannot be charged with an inchoate offense and the actual crime at the same
time. For example, a person cannot be charged at the same time with attempted
murder as well as murder. The person can only be charged with one or the other at the
same time. However, conspiracy is an exception to this common rule. Accordingly, a
person can be charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder at the same
time.

2. To be convicted of an inchoate crime, it must be proven that the person to be convicted

had the specific intent (mens rea) to commit or contribute to the actual crime.

3. Inchoate crimes must involve some outward action or a substantial step in the
completion of the crime. The person to be convicted should have done some act in
furtherance of the crime
The term inchoate crime refers to actions that are taken
in order to begin or further a crime…

Incomplete Crimes
When most people think about crime, it is often assumed that the accused person has
completed the crime, and is at the point of prosecution and punishment. There are certain
phases a person goes through before the actual accomplishment of a criminal act.

1. Idea – the wrongdoer comes up with an idea for an illegal act.

2. Evaluation – the wrongdoer considers the pros and cons of the idea, and decides
whether or not to proceed.
3. Decision – the wrongdoer decides to move forward with the idea or plan.
4. Preparation – the wrongdoer makes preparation to commit the crime or wrongful act,
perhaps creating falsified documents, contacting potential victims, or obtaining a
weapon.
5. Commencement – the wrongdoer launches the plan.
6. Completion – the wrongdoer completes the plan, or obtains the objective.

The law does not punish people for the ideas that float through their heads – even if they
put in the effort to refine them, with the idea of committing the act. It does, however, punish
people for completing an illegal act. Incomplete crimes encompass the steps in the middle
of the process
 INCITEMENT

Section 59 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 abolishes the common law offence of incitement
with effect from 1 October 2008.
For offences committed before that date, incitement occurs when a person seeks to
persuade another to commit a criminal offence. A person is guilty of incitement to commit
an offence or offences if:
a. s/he incites another to do or cause to be done an act or acts which, if done, will involve
the commission of an offence or offences by the other; and
b. s/he intends or believes that the other, if he acts as incited, shall or will do so with the
fault required for the offence(s) (R v Claydon [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. 20).
It is not a defence to a charge of incitement that the other person, for whatever reason,
does not commit the offence, or commits a different offence to that incited.
The prosecution must show that the person accused of incitement intended or believed
that the person incited would, if acted as incited to do so, do so with the mens rea
appropriate to the offence.
Incitement is usually a common law offence. Where a person has been charged with
incitement, the venue for trial is the same as for the offence incited. Therefore, incitement
to commit a summary offence is only triable summarily and incitement to commit an
indictable only offence may only be tried on indictment.

R -v- Higgins 102 ER 269)

Lawrence J said: ‘All offences of a public nature, that is, all such acts were attempts to
lead to the prejudice of the community, are indictable.’ . .

Invicta Plastics Ltd v Clare [1976]

The defendant had advertised a device with a photograph showing a view of a speed
restriction sign, implying that it could be used to detect police radar traps. It was not an
offence to own one of these devices, but it was an offence to operate one without a
licence. In confirming the company's conviction for inciting readers of the adverts to
commit breaches of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949, the Divisional Court held that the
mens rea involved not only an intention to incite, but also an intention that the incitee
should act upon the incitement.

R v Curr [1968] 2 QB 944

The defendant ran a loan business whereby he would lend money to women with children
in return for their handing over their signed family allowance books. He would then use
other women to cash the family allowance vouchers. He was convicted of inciting the
commission of offences under s9(b) of the Family Allowance Act 1945, which made it an
offence for any person to receive any sum by way of family allowance knowing it was not
properly payable.
He appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal, where it was held that the trial judge had
erred in not directing the jury to consider whether these women, who were being incited to
use the signed allowance books to collect money on behalf of the defendant, had actually
known that what they were being asked to do was unlawful. It would have been more
appropriate to have charged the defendant as the principal offender relying on the doctrine
of innocent agency.
 Attempt to Commit a Crime
An attempt to commit a crime involves trying to commit an unlawful act, but failing. Failure
might be due to unforeseen circumstances interfering with the attempt, or simply a change
of mind. The most necessary element in proving an attempt to commit a crime is intent.
The individual must have had a specific intent to engage in that particular activity, or to
commit a certain crime. The individual must have actually taken some type of action in
furtherance of the crime. Finally, the actual crime must not have been committed or
finalized. Had the individual actually completed the crime, this would not be an example of
inchoate crime, as he would be charged with that crime, rather than an attempt to commit
a crime.

A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when such person, with the intention to
actually commit the crime, does an act which is a substantial step toward the commission
of the crime, but not the actual commission of the crime.  Therefore, an attempt to commit
a crime consists of two elements:
(1) an intent to engage in crime; and
(2) a conduct constituting a substantial step towards commission of the crime.
A statute may forbid an attempt to commit a specified crime.   An attempt to commit a
crime, when punishable, is an offense that is separate and distinct from the crime that was
attempted.  To qualify as a substantial step, something more than mere preparation should
be done.  Preparation alone, or a mere statement of the person’s intent to commit a crime,
is not sufficient to constitute an attempt.  However, the step should be lesser than the
actual commission of the crime.   To establish attempt, the alleged conduct must support
the person’s criminal intention to commit the crime.  The person must have engaged in
some activity that is a substantial portion of the crime.  An attempt must be an action on
the part of the person that comes very close to the accomplishment of the desired results.
 A person who fails to commit the attempted crime is also regarded to have attempted to
commit the crime.
Intent is an important element when determining whether an attempt to commit a crime
has occurred.  The person making the attempt should have the intention to complete the
acts that constitutes the crime.  It is the intent to commit the crime, not the possibility of
success that determines whether the person’s act or omission constitutes the crime of
attempt.   A person can be convicted for an attempt to commit a crime only when such
person has a direct and specific intent.  Therefore, acts done as a result of negligence or
recklessness cannot be considered as an attempt to commit the crime as there is no
intention to commit the crime.

Haughton v Smith [1975]

A van containing stolen goods was stopped by the police. It transpired that the van was
proceeding to Hertfordshire where the defendant was to make arrangements for the
disposal of the goods in the London area. In order to trap the defendant the van was
allowed to proceed on its journey with policemen concealed inside. The van was met by
the defendant who began to play a prominent role in assisting in the disposal of the van
and its load. Finally the trap was sprung and the defendant was arrested. The prosecutor
was of the opinion that, once the police had taken charge of the van, the goods had been
restored to lawful custody, and were therefore, no longer stolen goods. Accordingly the
defendant was not charged with handling 'stolen goods', contrary to s22 Theft Act 1968,
but with attempting to handle stolen goods.
The House of Lords held that a person could only be convicted of an attempt to commit an
offence in circumstances where the steps taken by him in order to commit the offence, if
successfully accomplished, would have resulted in the commission of that offence. A
person who carried out certain acts in the erroneous belief that those acts constituted an
offence could not be convicted of an attempt to commit that offence because he had taken
no steps towards the commission of an offence. In order to constitute an offence under s22
of the Theft Act 1968 the goods had to be stolen goods at the time of the handling; it was
irrelevant that the accused believed them to be stolen goods. It followed that, since the
goods which the defendant had handled were not stolen goods, he could not be convicted
of attempting to commit the offence of handling stolen goods.

Anderton v Ryan [1985]

The defendant had bought a video recorder, but later confessed to the police that she
believed it to have been stolen property when she bought it. The defendant was charged
with attempting to handle stolen goods, although the prosecution was unable to prove that
the video recorder had in fact been stolen property.
The House of Lords (by a majority of 4-1) quashed the defendant's conviction on the
ground that she could not be guilty of attempting to handle stolen goods unless such
property was shown to have existed. A majority of their Lordships refused to accept that
the defendant's belief that goods were stolen was sufficient of itself to result in liability.
Such a result may have been the aim of the 1981 Act but their Lordships felt that
Parliament would have to express its intentions more clearly before the courts would be
willing to impose liability solely on the basis of what the defendant had thought she was
doing, as opposed to what she was actually doing.

R v Shivpuri ]1986]

The defendant was paid to act as a drugs courier. He was required to collect a package
containing drugs and to distribute its contents according to instructions which would be
given to him. On collecting the package the defendant was arrested by police officers, and
he confessed to them that he believed its contents to be either heroin or cannabis. An
analysis revealed the contents of the package not to be drugs, but a harmless vegetable
substance. The defendant was convicted for attempting to be knowingly concerned in
dealing with and harbouring a controlled drug, namely heroin.
His appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed. Lord Bridge said, in applying s1 of the
Criminal Attempts Act 1981 to the facts of the case, the first question to be asked was
whether the defendant intended to commit the offence. The answer was plainly yes. Next,
did he do an act which was more than merely preparatory to the commission of the
offence? The acts were more than merely preparatory to the commission of the intended
offence. This analysis lead to the conclusion that the defendant was rightly convicted.
 Conspiracy to Commit a Crime
Conspiracy to commit a crime occurs when two or more people work together – even if it is
only in planning and preparing – to commit a crime. A criminal charge of conspiracy does
not require that an actual attempt to commit the crime, as it is illegal to conspire together to
commit a crime. In fact, an person can be charged with both an actual crime, and
conspiracy to commit that crime. What it does require is more than one participant, as a
person acting alone cannot be charged with conspiracy with himself.
What is Conspiracy

A conspiracy is an agreement or plan, made between two or more people, to engage in an

illegal act, to obtain an unlawful objective, or to deprive another person of his legal rights. A
conspiracy may be engaged in to move a plan forward, each person involved aware of his
or her part. It is not necessary for each person involved in a conspiracy to engage in – or
even be aware of – each stage or act involved in gaining the objective.
The criminal act of conspiracy may be charged if:
1 Legal means are used to accomplish an illegal result; or

2 Illegal means are used to accomplish a legal result.

Following are the elements required for a conspiracy to take place:

1. there should be an agreement between two or more persons. The agreement must be
made voluntarily and with intent to participate in furthering a common illegal purpose;
2. the conspirators should have done the acts with a criminal intent. Both the parties
must intend to and agree to engage in the unlawful act. Either the purpose of the
agreement or the means by which it is accomplished must be illegal. One who
provides services to conspirators will not be guilty of conspiracy if that person has not
participated in the agreement and does not know that a conspiracy exists; and
3. an overt act should have been committed. The overt act must follow the agreement
and must be executed with intent to carry out the purpose of the conspiracy.
When measures are taken to conceal evidence of the crime, the act also amounts to
conspiracy. A person who did not participate in the original agreement can become a
coconspirator after the actual criminal act if the person joins in the concealment of the
conspiracy.

Defenses to Inchoate Crime

A person charged with an inchoate crime may have several options to present a defense.
Possible defenses to inchoate crime.

Abandonment
An individual may claim, as a defense to inchoate crime charges, that he had abandoned
his efforts to commit the crime, even though he may have engaged in some amount of
planning. He may argue that he did not conspire, nor attempt, to commit the crime. In
order to prove abandonment as a defense to inchoate crime, it must be shown that he had
voluntarily and completely abandoned his efforts toward committing the crime. In fact, to
successfully prove abandonment as a defense to an inchoate crime, the defendant must
prove that he did at least one of the following:

▪ Ceased all actions toward the crime

▪ Took action in an attempt to stop the crime as it was going on
▪ Attempted to convince others involved in commission of the crime to stop
▪ Reported the crime to the police or other law enforcement authorities

Impossibility
An impossibility defense relies on the defendant’s claim that whatever illegal act he had
been planning simply could not be accomplished because of some unforeseen event.
Impossibility can be divided into two basic categories: legal impossibility, and factual
impossibility.
It should be noted that a defense of impossibility is not valid if the condition making it
impossible is not known to the defendant at the time. For example, attempting a steal a
wallet from a pocket cannot be defended through impossibility simply because the pocket
turned out to be empty. There is no way the thief knew that before he stuck his fingers into
the pocket.

Legal impossibility
If a defendant argues that what he had intended to do turned out to not be a crime after all,
he is taking a legal impossibility defense.
For example:
Darren is up in arms about the deer that have been grazing in his garden. One evening,
when the deer show up to the ersatz buffet, Darren fires off a round with his hunting rifle,
intending to scare the herd away. The bullet, which went wide of a large doe, hit a tree,
narrowly missing his neighbor’s head.
Darren is charged with attempted murder for the shot that nearly scared his neighbor to
death – not to mention the near-death experience. Darren may offer a defense to the
inchoate crime of attempted murder, claiming that the charge is a legal impossibility.
This is because Darren’s intent was to scare off the deer, not to shoot his neighbor. Had he
actually shot his neighbor, he might have been charged with something very serious, such
as manslaughter. This is where intent is so important in any criminal charge.

Factual Impossibility
A defendant may claim a defense of factual impossibility if circumstances made it
impossible for him to have completed the crime he intended to commit. For instance, no
amount of planning will enable a thief to steal a diamond watch when, the day prior to the
heist, a tornado ripped off the part of the house containing the safe. Even though the
defendant planned on, and attempted to, steal the diamond, it was factually impossible to
do so.
 ACCCOMPLICE LIABILITY

Until the Supreme Court gave its landmark judgment in R. v. Jogee on 18 February, it was
possible for someone to be convicted of a crime which they did not personally commit or
intend to commit, under the common law doctrine of joint enterprise. If they were involved
with an accomplice in one offence, and they foresaw that the accomplice might go on
intentionally to commit another, they could be found guilty of the second offence without
having taken part in it. So if there was a fight between two groups of teenagers, and
someone was killed, then one of the teenagers could be found guilty of murder if, without
intending it himself, he realised that someone else in his group might intentionally kill one
of their opponents. He might be a long way off, out of sight and unarmed when the killing
took place, but if it could be proved that he had the requisite foresight when he took part in
the fight, it would be enough to get a conviction and a life sentence.
The legal term for people not directly involved in offences is ‘secondary parties’, and there
are various ways of proving their criminal liability, including joint enterprise. The question
the Supreme Court considered was whether joint enterprise over-criminalises secondary
parties, and it has found that it does.

Opposition to the law had been growing in recent years: campaign groups,
parliamentarians and even some judges (in retirement at least) all voiced anxiety about its
potential for injustice. ＊ It was seen to operate indiscriminately as a drift net, putting

people on trial for the most serious offences when their involvement – if any – was too
remote to expose them fairly to criminal liability. Young black men made up an alarming
and disproportionately high number of those found guilty of murder on this basis.

In October the Supreme Court heard Ameen Jogee’s appeal against his 2010 murder
conviction (the same judges, sitting as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, heard
an appeal from Jamaica, R. v. Ruddock, at the same time). This was the third time in six
years that the UK’s highest court – whose judgments command great respect and are
cited as authorities in jurisdictions across the world – had to consider the law of joint
enterprise; but it was the first time that it had been asked to examine the history of the law
in detail, and the first time it was shown that a basic error in a case decided in 1984 had
taken the law in the wrong direction. Lords Toulson and Hughes (who gave the joint
judgment, with which the other justices agreed) said the court had had ‘the benefit of a far
deeper and more extensive review of the topic of so-called “joint enterprise” liability than
on past occasions’.
The appellants were joined by two ‘interveners’ – interested parties whom the court
decided had sufficient standing to make their own arguments and submissions in the
appeal. They were the campaign group JENGBA (Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by
Association), which supports prisoners and their families, and Just for Kids Law, a charity
that provides legal representation to children and young people, for which I acted.
The court received arguments in writing and heard oral submissions. Reports of 249 cases
from the UK and elsewhere were examined, along with an abundance of academic and
other material including neuropsychological evidence used in death penalty appeals in the
US Supreme Court, in cases where it was argued that the way adolescents’ brains develop
can impede their ability to see things from another person’s point of view (as any parent of
teenagers already knows). This makes the requirement that they should foresee what
someone else might intend especially problematic.
The court commented that a bank robber, who ‘may have leisure to think before going out
to rob a bank’, and may well contemplate the use of lethal force by an accomplice, may
reasonably be considered a ‘secondary party’ to a killing during the robbery. ‘But the same
is not true in many other cases (for example, of young people who become suddenly
embroiled in a fight in a bar and may make a quick decision whether or not to help their
friends).’ The court recognised that the emphasis on foresight placed an unfair burden on
young people. Over-criminalisation runs contrary to social and legal policy on the rights of
children, who are protected by principles enshrined in the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child and in UK law in general. Criminal law is supposed to regulate behaviour: one
reason for not driving when drunk is that you know you are not allowed to. But if the rule of
conduct is one that you can’t reasonably be expected to understand, or that you lack the
capacity to heed, it makes bad law. It’s not reasonable to expect everybody in all
circumstances to foresee what someone else might have in mind.
The appellants’ lawyers performed a feat of forensic archaeology, digging through the
layers of decisions over five centuries, to reveal the origins and development of the law of
secondary liability, whereby those indirectly involved in crime can be found guilty along
with the principal offenders. The cases referred to included duellists, apple thieves killing
watchmen, poachers shooting gamekeepers and a murder case tried by Chief Justice
Saunders in 1556.
The common theme that ran through the jurisprudence was that proof of the accused’s
intention was critical (including a conditional intention – if the gamekeeper threatens us,
we will kill him). This was the case until the Hong Kong appeal of Chan Wing-Siu came
before the Privy Council in 1984. Here the law made its wrong turn. Sir Robin Cooke, a
senior judge from New Zealand who was later given a peerage and sat as a judge in the
House of Lords, laid down foresight of what the accomplice might intend to do as the test
of criminal liability in joint enterprise cases: he did so because he had not grasped that
although foresight may be evidence of intention, it had never previously been treated as a
substitute for intention, and should not be confused with it. Nevertheless, in the long line of
appeal cases that followed Chan Wing-Siu’s, and in countless trials, Cooke’s words were
held as authority, and the doctrine took root. No one knows how many people have been
found guilty under the Chan Wing-Siu rule who would not have been before Cooke
changed the law.
During the October hearing, Lord Toulson pointedly asked the counsel for the prosecution
(who was trying to defend the law as it then stood) what had changed so dramatically in
society at the time of Chan Wing-Siu to warrant so great a change in the law; history, and
the cases going back over the centuries, showed that people had not started committing
offences in groups in 1984. The counsel found it difficult to answer. In its judgment the
court declared that ‘there does not appear to have been any objective evidence that the
law prior to Chan Wing-Siu failed to provide the public with adequate protection.’ With
those words it knocked away the spurious public policy defence of the rule, which held that
there was a pressing social need to treat group violence with a broad legal brush, and
which has disfigured judicial thinking about joint enterprise for three decades.
Judges are masters of diplomatic language. Criticism tends to be muted, but is no less
powerful for it. When a judge calls an argument ‘bold’ or ‘novel’, they really mean it’s
barking mad. So when the Supreme Court bluntly says Chan Wing-Siu was an ‘error’ and
‘the correction of the error … brings the common law back into recognition of the
difference between foresight and intent’, the gloves are off. Cooke screwed up, it means.
The doctrine of precedent cemented the error into law, until now.
The correction will not make it harder for the guilty to be convicted. Where there is
sufficient evidence of an intention to commit a crime, a conviction will follow. Where there
is evidence of foresight it will regain its proper place, as evidence of intent. If there is
proof that a member of a gang foresaw that one of his accomplices might kill someone in a
fight, and he stuck around, it’s a short step to infer (meanining a jury may find Matthews
and Alleyne) that he did so to make up the numbers and lend his continuing support to the
killer – therein lies proof of intent. Getting the law right means no less protection for victims
of crime. Putting the wrong people in jail for the wrong offences does nothing for them.

The Supreme Court has had the integrity to look at 32 years of law and say it was wrong. It
rejected the idea that this was a matter for Parliament to deal with: it said that as the
judges had made the error, it was up to the judges to put it right.( think about The
doctrine of stare decisis this is an example of when judges break the rule in
extreme cases)
There is something admirable about our imperfect legal system that has shown enough
self-confidence to admit and put right its own mistakes.

What the privy council judges decided more than 30 years ago was that if two people set
out to commit an offence (crime A) – and in the course of it one of them commits a different
crime (crime B) – the second person is guilty as an accessory to crime B if he foresaw it as
a possibility but did not necessarily intend it.

The judges’ error in 1984 was to equate foresight with intent to assist.
The correct approach, according to the supreme court, is to treat foresight as evidence of
intent

As Lord Neuberger, president of the supreme court, said in his summary of the unanimous
judgment, the effect of the ruling “is to bring the mental element required of a secondary
party back into line with that which is required of the principal – and to bring the law back
to the principles which had been established before the law took a wrong turn”.

The Court held that the mens rea in cases of alleged secondary participation is that the
accessory intended, be it conditionally or otherwise, to encourage or assist D1 to commit
the crime, acting with whatever mental element the offence requested of D1.
The Court then went on to elucidate how intent might be inferred in the scenarios of prior
joint criminal ventures, spontaneous outbreaks of multi-handed violence, escalating
violence which results in death and cases of indeterminable weaponry.

Implications of the Judgement

The separate limb of joint enterprise liability has now been severed, leaving two forms of
secondary liability: firstly, as a principal or joint principal, and, secondly, as an accessory
under the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861. The overarching consequence of R v Jogee
is that the mental element for accessories has now been brought back into line with that
which is required by principal offenders, prior to Chan Wing-Siu. The mere existence of
foresight is no longer conclusive of guilt. A properly directed jury will instead be informed
that foresight is evidence upon which intent may be inferred. This marks a huge sea
change in the burden for the prosecution, by which defendants may no longer find
themselves convicted for the most serious of crimes based on dubious evidence of
participation.

The extent to which the law can be regarded as fair

‘parasitic accessorial liability’ PAL has been criticised as unfair on a number of grounds.
During proceedings, the appellants emphasised that the overriding objective of the law
ought to be justice, not prosecutorial convenience or judicial reputation. It is evident that
the doctrinal basis of PAL, as borne out by previous authorities, was to cast a wide net
over those involved in criminal ventures, particularly those caught up in gang-related
violence. By restoring the level of mental culpability required by accessories to the same
level as principal offenders, the Supreme Court has signalled its intention to prevent
further injustices, whereby individuals lacking the requisite intent have been handed life
sentences for committing the most serious of crimes. The judgment must also be viewed
through the lens of fair labelling, as now juries will have a wider scope, when determining a
defendant’s intent, to classify conduct as either murder or manslaughter, allowing
convictions to better reflect public expectations of justice.
It is also noteworthy that the Court, when restating the correct principles governing liability,
did not alter the position surrounding cases where it is unclear whether the defendant was
a principal or accessory [88]. In such cases, the prosecution need only prove that the
defendant possessed the requisite mens rea and caused the end result, be it as a principal
or accessory. This principle, restated in R v Giannetto [1997] 1 Cr App R 1, has attracted
strong criticism on the grounds that the dissimilarity between principal and accessory is
one of strikingly different factual positions, thereby breaching the cardinal principle that the
jury must be agreed on the basis on which they find a defendant guilty. In such cases,
however, where the legal definition of the crime itself does not distinguish between the
positions of principal and accessory, both ingredients of an offence can nonetheless be
satisfied: that the defendant has caused, by whatever means, and intended harm.
The applicants also submitted that the incoherence of PAL breaches the principle of
legality, reflected in ECHR, art.7, that an individual ought to have sufficient certainty as to
what conduct will attract criminal liability. The applicant drew attention to the particularly
nebulous concepts of ‘participation’, ‘foresight’ and ‘withdrawal’. To this end, the Court
evidenced a clear intention to adopt a uniform approach in its use of terminology, which
must now be followed by lower courts to ensure that the precise contours of criminal
venture liability are readily ascertainable.
Lacking from the Court’s judgment was discussion regarding the written submissions
made on behalf of JfKL and JENGbA, which demonstrated the ways in which the
shortcomings of PAL were compounded when applied to children and young people.[4]
The empirical research of conviction rates, provided by JfKL, illustrated that the law
disproportionately affected young people caught up in gang-related violence, which
suggests considering responses other than recourse to the criminal justice system to
rehabilitate. To this end, it seems that young people will likely remain the key audience of
criminal venture liability.