Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.

217126-27, November 10, 2015

Doctrinal Rulings:
1.
The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the office's jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of
Congress, and the Judiciary.121 Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any
serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the
purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.122 Note that the Ombudsman
has concurrent jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or
omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
In this relation, it stated that while "a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially
filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts." Further, the
Court upheld  Barata v. Abalos, Jr.155 (June 6, 2001), wherein it was ruled that the remedy against
final and unappealable orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case was a Rule
65 petition to the CA.
2.
As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of Ombudsman's
independence covers three (3) things:

First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its
constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless
the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made;cralawlawlibrary

Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to
use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions; 168hence, its budget cannot be
strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to impair said
functions; and

Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks
of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.
That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to
insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are
apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence,
the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a
provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the
concept's rationale of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.
3.
With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or
WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court's
constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature, provisional reliefs
and auxiliary writs created under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of
procedure which belong exclusively within the province of this Court.
4.
In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of
an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation, namely:
(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and
(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement.
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty;
(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
5.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of
accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of
office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense,
and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that
an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an
offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses
may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Ombudsman v. Vergara, G.R. No. 216871, December 6, 2017

Doctrinal Rulings:
Considering that the present case was instituted prior to the above cited ruling of this Court, the
doctrine of condonation may still be applied.
From the above ruling of this Court, it is apparent that the most important consideration in the
doctrine of condonation is the fact that the misconduct was done on a prior term and that the
subject public official was eventually re-elected by the same body politic. It is inconsequential
whether the said re-election be on another public office or on an election year that is not
immediately succeeding the last, as long as the electorate that re-elected the public official be the
same. In this case, the respondent was re-elected as mayor by the same electorate that voted for
him when the violation was committed. As such, the doctrine of condonation is applied and the CA
did not err in so ruling.

Bagaoisan v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 242005, June 26, 2019

Doctrinal Rulings:
The prohibitory norm against nepotism in the public service is set out in Section 59, Chapter 8, Title I-
A, Book V of EO 292.31 "Nepotism" is defined therein as follows:

Section 59. Nepotism. — (1) All appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal
governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief
of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby
prohibited.

As used in this Section, the word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those related
within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.

(2) The following are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in
a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such appointment shall
be made to the Commission.
Under the foregoing definition, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a
relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (a) appointing
authority; (b) recommending authority; (c) chief of the bureau or office; and (d) person exercising
immediate supervision over the appointee.

Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it is of no consequence that petitioner appointed/designated

Nelita to non-plantilla positions in the Cortes Municipal Hospital or that he merely "designated" her
to perform "additional functions," as opposed to an existing government position. Neither is it
material that Nelita did not receive compensation as a result of said appointments nor that
petitioner acted in good faith in issuing the Office Orders creating the said positions. The
Ombudsman pointed out that it was rather dubious why petitioner had to designate his wife to
perform additional functions notwithstanding its non-existence in the plantilla; indeed, there is no
reason why said additional functions cannot be performed by other qualified employees who are not
relatives of petitioner and thus, insuring his objectivity. It bears to stress that the prohibition applies
without regard to the actual merits of the proposed appointee and to the good intentions of the
appointing or recommending authority, and that the prohibition against nepotism in appointments,
whether original or promotional, is not intended by the legislative authority to penalize faithful
service.

Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014

Doctrinal Rulings:
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as
agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be
expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she
is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for
complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines
where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these reasons, Section
8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be
declared void.

While the preceding discussion already suffices to address this concern, it should be added that this
concern stands on shaky grounds since it ignores the existing checks and balances already in place.
On the one hand, the Ombudsman’s Deputies cannot protect the Ombudsman because she is subject
to the impeachment power of Congress. On the other hand, the Ombudsman’s attempt to cover up
the misdeeds of her Deputies can be questioned before the Court on appeal or certiorari. The same
attempt can likewise subject her to impeachment.

Given this legislative history, the present overall legal structure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
both under the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770, militates against an interpretation that would
insulate the Deputy Ombudsman from the disciplinary authority of the OP and yet expose the Special
Prosecutor to the same ills that a grant of independence to the Office of the Ombudsman was
designed for.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio, G.R. No. 165132, March 7, 2012

Doctrinal Rulings:
The Ombudsman has the power to directly impose administrative penalties, including removal from
office
The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of its administrative
disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsman’s power to impose these penalties, on the
allegation that the Constitution only grants it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by
this Court.

In Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, the Court defined misconduct as "a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a
public officer." We further stated that misconduct becomes grave if it "involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must
be established by substantial evidence."50 Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Therefore, "[a]
person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct
does not involve any of the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave."

Ombudsman v. Quimbo, G.R. No. 173277, February 25, 2015

Doctrinal Rulings:
The issue of whether or not the Ombudsman possesses the requisite legal interest to intervene in
the proceedings where its decision is at risk of being inappropriately impaired has been laid to rest in
Ombudsman v. De Chavez. In the said case, the Court conclusively ruled that even if the Ombudsman
was not impleaded as a party in the proceedings, part of its broad powers include defending its
decisions before the CA. And pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court,  the Ombudsman
may validly intervene in the said proceedings as its legal interest on the matter is beyond cavil. The
Court elucidated, thus:
x x x the Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different from other investigatory and
prosecutory agencies of the government because the people under its jurisdiction are public officials
who, through pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations directed against
them. Its function is critical because public interest (in the accountability of public officers and
employees) is at stake.

Samson v. Restrivera, G.R. No. 178454, March 28, 2011

Doctrinal Rulings:
On the first issue, we agree with the CA that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondent’s
complaint against petitioner although the act complained of involves a private deal between them.
Section 13(1),13 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman can investigate on its
own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official or employee when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper. Under Section 1614 of R.A. No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses
all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any public officer or employee
during his/her tenure. Section 1915 of R.A. No. 6770 also states that the Ombudsman shall act on all
complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which are unfair or irregular. Thus, even if
the complaint concerns an act of the public official or employee which is not service-connected, the
case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal
act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not
require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of
official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

On the second issue, it is wrong for petitioner to say that since the estafa case against her was
dismissed, she cannot be found administratively liable. It is settled that administrative cases may
proceed independently of criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the
criminal charges.

Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018

Doctrinal Rulings:
Unlike the constitutional commissions in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the Ombudsman and the
deputies do not make a collegial body thus, making it implausible to apply the regular rotation or
cycle in its membership. The Ombudsman and the deputies, in contrast to the constitutional
commissions, do not decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before
the Office of the Ombudsman. To stress, the Ombudsman and the deputies have their respective
jurisdiction; hence, they could not have common responsibility relative to the discharge of their
separate and distinct functions.

On the one hand, Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Sec. 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without
reappointment.1âwphi1 They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately
succeeding their cessation from office.

The quoted provision of the Constitution is clear and explicit: (a) the Ombudsman and the deputies
shall serve the term of seven years; (b) that the Ombudsman and the deputies shall not be
reappointed; and (c) the Ombudsman and the deputies shall not run for any office in the election
immediately succeeding their cessation from office.

Contrary to the position of the petitioner, Sec. 11, Art. XI by itself is clear and can stand on its own.
Notably, the framers plainly provided for a seven-year term of the Ombudsman and the deputies. For
sure, nowhere in the Constitution can it be gathered that the appointment to any vacancy for the
position of Ombudsman and the deputies shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.
This can only mean that it was the intent of the framers that the appointment to the positions of the
Ombudsman and the deputies, whether it be for the expired or unexpired term of the predecessor,
shall always be for a full term of seven years. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should
not distinguish.110 Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce exceptions or
conditions where none is provided from considerations of convenience, public welfare, or for any
laudable purpose; neither may it engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated.

City of Batangas v. Pilipinas Shell, G.R. No. 195003, June 7, 2017

Doctrinal Rulings:
The requisites for a valid ordinance are well established. Time and again, the Court has ruled that in
order for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the concerned
LGU to enact, but must also be passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.
Moreover, substantively, the ordinance (i) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (ii)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (iii) must not be partial or discriminatory; (iv) must not prohibit,
but may regulate trade; (v) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (vi) must not be
unreasonable.

The Water Code governs the ownership, appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development,
conservation and protection of water resources. Conversely, the power to modify, suspend, cancel or
revoke water permits already issued also rests with NWRB.
There is no doubt, therefore, that the Assailed Ordinance effectively contravenes the provisions of
the Water Code as it arrogates unto Batangas City the power to control and regulate the use of
ground water which, by virtue of the provisions of the Water Code, pertains solely to the NWRB. By
enacting the Assailed Ordinance, Batangas City acted in excess of the powers granted to it as an LGU,
rendering the Assailed Ordinance ultra vzres.

Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 03, 2018

Doctrinal Rulings:
The national taxes to be included in the base for computing the just share the LGUs should not be
limited to the national internal revenue taxes (NIRTs) but should include other national taxes such as
tariff and customs duties, excise taxes, documentary stamp taxes, and franchise taxes. -- There is no
issue as to what constitutes the LGUs' just share expressed in percentages of the national taxes (i.e.,
30%, 35% and 40% stipulated in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of Section 284). Yet, Section 6,
mentions national taxes as the source of the just share of the LGUs while Section 284 ordains that
the share of the LGUs be taken from national internal revenue taxes instead. Has not Congress
thereby infringed the constitutional provision? Garcia contends that Congress has exceeded its
constitutional boundary by limiting to the NIRTs the base from which to compute the just share of
the LGUs. We agree with Garcia's contention. The phrase national internal revenue taxes engrafted in
Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the term national taxes written in Section 6. As
such, Congress has actually departed from the letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that national
taxes should be the base from which the just share of the LGU comes. Such departure is
impermissible. Equally impermissible is that Congress has also thereby curtailed the guarantee of
fiscal autonomy in favor of the LGUs under the 1987 Constitution.

Taxes are classified into national and local. National taxes are those levied by the National
Government, while local taxes are those levied by the LGUs. What the phrase national internal
revenue taxes as used in Section 284 included are all the taxes enumerated in Section 21 of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended by R.A. No. 8424, viz.: “Section 21. Sources of
Revenue. — The following taxes, fees and charges are deemed to be national internal revenue taxes:
(a) Income tax;
(b) Estate and donor's taxes;
(c) Value-added tax;
(d) Other percentage taxes;
(e) Excise taxes;
(f) Documentary stamp taxes; and
(g) Such other taxes as are or hereafter may be imposed and collected by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.”
In view of the foregoing enumeration of what are the national internal revenue taxes, Section 284
has effectively deprived the LGUs from deriving their just share from other national taxes, like the
customs duties. It is clear from the foregoing clarification that the exclusion of other national taxes
like customs duties from the base for determining the just share of the LGUs contravened the express
constitutional edict in Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution.
In recapitulation, the national taxes to be included in the base for computing the just share the LGUs
shall henceforth be, but shall not be limited to, the following: the national internal revenue taxes
(NIRTs) enumerated in Section 21 of the NIRC, as amended, to be inclusive of the VATs, excise taxes,
and DSTs collected by the BIR and the BOC, and their deputized agents; tariff and customs duties
collected by the BOC; 50% of the VATs collected in the ARMM, and 30% of all other national taxes
collected in the ARMM; the remaining 50% of the VATs and 70% of the collections of the other
national taxes in the ARMM shall be the exclusive share of the ARMM pursuant to Section 9 and
Section 15 of R.A. No. 9054; 60% of the national taxes collected from the exploitation and
development of the national wealth; the remaining 40% will exclusively accrue to the host LGUs
pursuant to Section 290 of the LGC; 85% of the excise taxes collected from locally manufactured
Virginia and other tobacco products; the remaining 15% shall accrue to the special purpose funds
pursuant created in R.A. No. 7171 and R.A. No. 7227; the entire 50% of the national taxes collected
under Section 106, Section 108 and Section 116 of the NIRC in excess of the increase in collections
for the immediately preceding year; and 5% of the franchise taxes in favor of the national
government paid by franchise holders in accordance with Section 6 of R.A. No. 6631 and Section 8 of
R.A. No. 6632.

Boracay Foundation v. Province of Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012

Doctrinal Rulings:
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects
and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that:
(1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-
renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may
eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects or
programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where
these will be implemented. Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by the introduction of
lotto in the province of Laguna.

Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a national project
that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented:
prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the
appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project’s
implementation is illegal.

Based on the above, therefore, prior consultations and prior approval are required by law to have
been conducted and secured by the respondent Province. Accordingly, the information dissemination
conducted months after the ECC had already been issued was insufficient to comply with this
requirement under the Local Government Code. Had they been conducted properly, the prior public
consultation should have considered the ecological or environmental concerns of the stakeholders
and studied measures alternative to the project, to avoid or minimize adverse environmental impact
or damage. In fact, respondent Province once tried to obtain the favorable endorsement of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Malay, but this was denied by the latter.

Umali v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014

Doctrinal Rulings:
Conversion will lead to material change in the political and economic rights of not only of the
component city but of the entire province. -- Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution states: “No province,
city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.” The creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units involve a material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government units directly affected as well as the people therein. Thus, the Constitution requires the
approval of the people “in the political units directly affected.” Similarly, conversion will lead to
material change in the political and economic rights of not only of the component city but of the
entire province.
The conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries. --
“Substantial alteration of boundaries” involves a change in the geographical configuration of a local
government unit or units. However, “boundaries” should not be limited to the mere physical one, but
also to its political boundaries. With the city’s newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight
powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What once
formed part of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the province. In more concrete
terms, Nueva Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City’s
severance from its mother province. This is equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva Ecija’s
5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the alteration be “substantial.”
Thus, the conversion to an HUC is substantial alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X
and resultantly, said provision applies, governs and prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC.

Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014

Doctrinal Rulings:
We agree with petitioner’s contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact
ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing,
however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and
order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a
nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial
condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such.
Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.If a thing, be in fact, a
nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere
resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We still find in this case that
the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of
police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government.

The rights granted to petitioner under the FLAgT are not unbridled. Forestlands, although under the
management of the DENR, are not exempt from the territorial application of municipal laws, for local
government units legitimately exercise their powers of government over their defined territorial
jurisdiction.

The fact that the building to be demolished is located within a forestland under the administration of
the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is not an issue on
environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, and the maintenance of ecological
balance, but the legality or illegality of the structure.

Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018

Doctrinal Rulings:
For purposes of sharing in the proceeds of the utilization of national wealth in their respective areas,
the territorial jurisdiction of an LGU refers to territorial boundaries as defined in the LGU's charter.
An LGU's territorial jurisdiction pertains to its physical location or area, as identified by its
boundaries.-- The question principally raised here is whether the national wealth, in this case the
Camago-Malampaya reservoir, is within the Province of Palawan's "area" for it to be entitled to 40%
of the government's share under Service Contract No. 38. The issue, therefore, hinges on what
comprises the province's "area" which the Local Government Code has equated as its "territorial
jurisdiction." The Local Government Code does not define the term "territorial jurisdiction."
Provisions therein, however, indicate that territorial jurisdiction refers to the LGU's territorial
boundaries. The intention of the Local Government Code is to consider an LGU's territorial
jurisdiction as pertaining to a physical location or area as identified by its boundaries. This is also
clear from other provisions of the Local Government Code, particularly Sections 292 and 294, on the
allocation of LGUs' shares from the utilization of national wealth, which speak of the location of the
natural resources. By definition, "area" refers to a particular extent of space or surface or a
geographic region.

Rights of LGUs to enable it to have resources to discharge its responsibilities: 1) the right to create
and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes,
such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its
equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if any,
within its territorial boundaries.

Territorial jurisdiction is defined, not by the local government, but by the law that creates it; it is
delimited, not by the extent of the LGU's exercise of authority, but by physical boundaries as fixed in
its charter.

The UNCLOS did not confer on LGUs territorial jurisdiction over different maritime zones and the
continental shelf. -- The concept of continental shelf under the UNCLOS does not, by the doctrine of
transformation, automatically apply to the LGUs. The UNCLOS are specific in declaring the rights and
duties of a state, not a local government unit. The UNCLOS confirms the sovereign rights of the
States over the continental shelf and the maritime zones. The UNCLOS did not confer any rights to
the States' local government units.