Neutral Monism

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Neutral Monism
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Stanford Encyclopedia Neutral monism is a monistic metaphysics. It holds that ultimate

reality is
all of one kind. To this extent neutral monism is in
agreement with the
of Philosophy more familiar versions of monism: idealism and
materialism. What
distinguishes neutral monism from its monistic
rivals is the claim that the
intrinsic nature of ultimate reality is
neither mental nor material but rather,
in some sense, neutral between
the two.
Neutral monism is compatible with the existence of many neutral

entities
Co-Principal Editors: Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman or kinds. And neutral monism is compatible with the existence
of non-
Associate Editors: Colin Allen, Hannah Kim, & Paul Oppenheimer neutral entities or kinds—mental and material ones, for
example—
Faculty Sponsors: R. Lanier Anderson & Thomas Icard provided that they are, in some sense, derivative of
ultimate reality’s
Editorial Board: https://plato.stanford.edu/board.html neutral intrinsic nature. Most versions of
neutral monism have been
Library of Congress ISSN: 1095-5054 pluralist in both these respects. They were
conceived as solutions to the
mind-body problem. Their goal was to
close the apparent chasm between
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Copyright © 2023 by the publisher
The Metaphysics Research Lab
Department of Philosophy 1. Neutral Monism
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 1.1 Neutrality
Neutral Monism 1.2 Monism
Copyright © 2023 by the authors 1.3 Mind and Matter Revisited
Leopold Stubenberg and Donovan Wishon
2. Traditional Versions of Neutral Monism
All rights reserved.
2.1 Ernst Mach
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1
Neutral Monism Leopold Stubenberg and Donovan Wishon
2.2 William James 1. Neutral Monism

2.3 Bertrand Russell
2.4 Some Other Early Neutral Monists 1.1 Neutrality
3. The Case for Neutral Monism
3.1 Parsimony Both of the terms that make up the label “neutral monism”
are
3.2 The Mind-Body Problem problematical. Because the questions to which the notion of
neutrality
3.3 Perceptual Evidence for Physics gives rise are unique to neutral monism, they need to be
addressed first.
3.4 Knowledge of the External World Most versions of neutral monism assume a plurality of
basic, neutral
3.5 Unity of Science entities (these could be substances, events, tropes,
universals, etc.,
4. Objections to Neutral Monism depending on the specific form of the view). What
does it mean for an
4.1 Reduction and the Threat of Elimination entity to be neutral? Here are five proposals:
4.2 The Mentalism Suspicion
4.3 The Materialism Suspicion 1. The Neither View: A basic entity is neutral just in case
it is
4.4 The Problem of Experience intrinsically neither mental nor physical.
4.5 The Problem of Emergence 2. The Actual Constituent View: A basic entity is neutral
just in case it is
4.6 The Dualism Suspicion a constituent of both physical and mental non-basic
entities.
4.7 Error 3. The Possible Constituent View: A basic entity is neutral
just in case it
5. New Directions for Neutral Monism can be a constituent of both physical and mental
non-basic entities.
5.1 Information as Ultimate Reality 4. The Law View: A basic entity is neutral just in case both
mental laws
5.2 Mind & Matter: A Merely Conceptual Distinction and physical laws are applicable to it.
5.3 Complex Basic Entities 5. The Both View: A basic entity is neutral just in case it
is intrinsically
5.4 Russellian Monism, Panprotopsychism, and Panqualityism both mental and physical.
5.5 Realistic Empiricism: Powerful Qualities
(1)–(5) are not always clearly distinguished; but even when they
are, two
6. Concluding Remarks
or more of these criteria may be used concurrently. This
invites confusion
Bibliography
on the part of the neutral monists, as well as their
critics.
Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources Questions arise about the relationships between (1)–(5). (1) and
(5) are
Related Entries similar in letting the question of an entity’s
neutrality be settled by its
intrinsic nature. (2)–(4) answer
this question by looking at the
relationships of a given entity to
other things: to the nature of larger
groups of entities of which the
given entity is/can be a member: are these
2 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2023 Edition 3

groups mental or material?

Or by looking to the kinds of laws that govern (4) is present in the thought of Mach and James. But it plays a
prominent
the entity in question:
are the laws mental or physical? If one is inclined to part in Russell’s thought. In the opening chapter of
his 1921 The Analysis
think that
neutrality is a matter of intrinsic nature alone, (2)–(4) will
seem of Mind, Russell remarks:
misguided. (2)–(4) still might have a place as epistemic
criteria—as ways
of finding out whether a given entity is
neutral. The friends of (1) and (5) There are, it seems to me, prima facie different kinds of
causal
can agree that a given
entity’s ability to actually or possibly belong to a laws, one belonging to physics and the other to psychology. The
certain
group, or to be governed by certain laws, is due solely to its law of gravitation, for example, is a physical law, while the law of
intrinsic nature. Their disagreement concerns only the question
whether association is a psychological law. Sensations are subject to both
this ability is conferred on that entity by its being both
mental and physical kinds of laws, and therefore are truly “neutral” in
[Edwin] Holt’s
or neither mental nor physical. In either case
(2)–(4) can only be used to sense. But entities subject only to physical
laws, or only to
discover which things are the
neutral entities. psychological laws, are not neutral, and may be
called respectively
purely material and purely mental. (Russell 1921:
25–26)
The traditional versions of neutral monism—those developed by
Ernst
Mach, William James, and Bertrand Russell—accept (1) and
reject (2). His use of (1) in conjunction with (4), especially in Russell 1921, is
Russell, for instance, describes neutral monism as the
view that “both confusing, and it has led a number of his critics (Stace 1946; Bostock
mind and matter are composed of a neutral-stuff
which, in isolation, is 2012) to argue that his neutral monism is best understood as a form of
neither mental nor material” (Russell
1921: 25). But some critics of dualism (at least in his early writings).
neutral monism, notably Bostock (2012:
190, 195–6), interpret neutral
A more general issue with criteria (2)–(4) is that they make
neutral
monism as committed to (2). Based
on this interpretation of neutrality,
monism compatible with materialism, idealism, and/or dualism,
as
Bostock arrives at the striking
conclusion that “Russell’s version of neutral
traditionally understood. So long as the basic entities, no
matter what their
monism was
never properly ‘neutral’ or ‘monistic’”
(Bostock 2012: 190).
intrinsic nature may be, satisfy the criteria
specified in (2), (3), or (4) they
It can be argued that none of the traditional neutral monists accept
(3). All are, according to these criteria,
neutral. Gregory Landini, for instance,
of them would agree that neutral entities can be a
constituent of both assumes that (3) captures
Russell’s idea of neutrality and concludes that he
physical and mental non-basic entities. But it is
doubtful whether any of is a
physicalist and a neutral monist (Landini 2011: ch.6).
According to
them would agree that the fact that a basic
entity can be a constituent of Landini, Russell is a neutral monist because every basic
entity can be a
both physical and mental non-basic
entities is sufficient to make it neutral. constituent of both physical and mental non-basic
entities; and Russell is a
For it is conceivable that
a basic entity that fails to be neutral (according to physicalist because all basic entities of
his system are physical.
(1), the
Neither View) should figure in the construction of both
physical
The traditional neutral monists reject (5), but many of their
formulations
and mental non-basic entities.
suggest otherwise. It is easy to find passages saying
that a given neutral
entity is both physical and mental:

If we admit—as I think we should—that the patch of color

may be “being a c-fiber stimulation”, for example, pick out the
very same
both physical and psychical, the reason for distinguishing the property, aspect, or state rather than two distinct and
irreducible ones (see
sense-datum from the sensation disappears, and we may say that sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.6 below). In contrast,
the Neither View idea of
the
patch of color and our sensation in seeing it are identical. neutrality allows us to understand
neutral monism as a distinct type of
(Russell
1921: 143) theory, and so is in this respect
preferable.
A sympathetic reading of passages such as these suggests that they are There are, however, a number of complications shared by (1)–(5).
For one
best understood as an abbreviated way of saying that the given neutral thing, they all use the concepts “mental” and
“physical” to specify the
entity is a member of two groups of neutral entities, one of which
counts notion of neutrality. And since
these terms are used in different ways, the
as physical, the other of which counts as mental. In fact, many
neutral notion of the neutral
varies accordingly. In the case of the term “mental”,
monists hold that the terms “physical” and
“mental” apply only to groups most
neutral monists understand it as picking out entities in terms of
of neutral entities, not
individual ones: features traditionally associated with mental phenomena, such as
intentionality, experientiality, subjectivity, qualitativity, unity,
The stuff of which the world of our experience is composed is, in purposiveness, and so on. But there are diverging views among neutral
my
belief, neither mind nor matter, but something more primitive monists about which of these features are unique to and/or possessed
by
than
either. Both mind and matter seem to be composite, and the mental phenomena. Similarly, there is no consensus about whether
the
stuff of
which they are compounded lies in a sense between the term “physical” is restricted to those aspects of
reality that can be fully
two, in a sense
above them both, like a common ancestor. (Russell captured by the descriptions of physics or
extends beyond such descriptive
1921: 10–11) resources (Stoljar 2001). And while
some use the terms “material” and
“physical”
interchangeably, others see “material” as applying to
entities
But a number of contemporary discussions of neutral monism employ the
with the features traditionally ascribed to matter (such as
occupying space,
Both View. This view has, for instance, been attributed to
Thomas Nagel
crowding out other such entities, and enduring
through changes in
(Godfrey-Smith 2013: 1–2; Skrbina 2005:
237).[1]
The Both View has the
features) whereas “physical” might pick
out entities lacking one or more
advantage of capturing one intuitive
notion of neutrality: that which is
of them. Most pressingly, if
“mental” and “physical” are defined as
both mental and material is biased
towards neither and hence neutral
complements of each other, thereby ruling out the possibility of
entities to
between them.
which neither term applies, then there cannot be
any neutral entities (at
Despite this appeal, the Both View idea of neutrality
conflates (or at least least in the neither sense).
invites conflation of) neutral monism with
other theories from which it
Another worry is that (1)–(4) don’t say anything about the
nature of the
should be distinguished. Indeed,
depending on how the claim that the
neutral entities. (1) says only what they are not;
(2)–(4) specify certain
basic entities are intrinsically
both mental and physical is understood,
roles that neutral entities can play,
without telling us anything about the
neutral monism becomes
difficult to distinguish from panpsychism, dual-
nature of the role occupants.
(5) may fare better in this regard; but it
aspect theory, and
even the identity theory—since “being a pain” and

arguably cannot distinguish

basic neutral entities from those of monism have been pluralist on both these counts: they work
with a
panpsychism, dual-aspect
theory, or the identity theory. Some versions of plurality of basic neutral entities; and, given their focus on
the mind-body
neutral monism
embrace this agnosticism about the nature of the neutral problem, they recognize at least mental and physical
kinds of entities in
base. But
others have been more forthcoming, offering examples of addition to the neutral ones (though some
describe them as useful fictions).
neutral
entities with which we are familiar. All entities belonging to such
non-neutral kinds must, however, count as
derivative. In the final
analysis, all entities must be basic neutral entities or
The three traditional neutral monists—Ernst Mach, William James,
and complexes of
such entities.
Bertrand Russell—all pointed to entities encountered in
experience as
examples of neutral phenomena. Mach speaks of
“sensations”, James of The talk about basic entities indicates another pluralist dimension:
the
“pure experience”, and
Russell of “sensations” and “percepts”. known versions of neutral monism work with a layered picture of
reality.
Predictably, this has fueled the suspicion that neutral monism is
nothing Basic neutral entities form the bottom level of the
hierarchy; the non-
but rebranded phenomenalism. Others have sought the neutral
base in the basic, non-neutral entities at the higher levels
are composed of, or are in
realm of the abstract. Kenneth Sayre, for example, turns
to the some sense derivative from, those lower
level neutral entities. So we are
mathematical theory of information and suggests that the
neutral base is to dealing with an ontology that
recognizes a plurality of levels or layers in
be understood as the “ontology of
informational states” (Sayre 1976: 16) reality.
that this theory
presupposes (see section 5.1 below). What is clear is that it
is no
easy task to characterize basic entities in a way that is both And even within the level of the basic neutral entities we can
distinguish
substantive and incontrovertibly neutral. those versions of neutral monism that hold that all basic
entities belong to
a single category, from those that distinguish two
or more categories of
1.2 Monism neutral entities. Russell’s later version
of neutral monism seems to be
monistic (in this particular sense): all
neutral entities are
events.[2]
But it is
There is, then, considerable disagreement about how to interpret the
notion easy to envision a neutral monism that countenances neutral
substances
of neutrality. The notion of monism raises its own problems.
But as these and neutral properties among the basic neutral
entities.[3]
are questions faced by all forms of monism, they are,
perhaps, not quite as
pressing. As with the case of the notion of
neutrality employed, it is 1.3 Mind and Matter Revisited
possible to distinguish different versions
of neutral monism based on the
various ways they understand the notion
of monism (see Schaffer 2016). Most extant versions of neutral monism seem to acknowledge that, in
Neutral monism might, for example, be
interpreted as a form of existence addition to the basic neutral entities, there exist derivative,
non-basic, and
monism—the view that only a
single concrete thing exists; but it might non-neutral ones—mental and physical entities,
for example. This raises
also interpreted as a
monism about the kinds of things there are—the view the question about the relationship between
these two kinds of entities.
that
concrete things, be they simple or complex, are of the same neutral Every answer to this question faces two
challenges. On the one hand there
kind. The evidence suggests that all past and present versions of
neutral is the threat of elimination of the
non-basic entities (see section 4.1); on

the other hand there is the

threat that the non-basic, non-neutral entities substance, and it is neutral because he describes the one substance
turn into elements of
ultimate reality, thereby putting an end to neutral as
both a body and a mind. (Rosenkrantz and Hoffman 2011: 287)
monism.
To classify Spinoza as an existence monist may be permissible. But the
The question of the relationship between basic and non-basic entities
is a neutrality claim is based on the problematical both view of
neutrality. This
contested topic among the traditional neutral monists (Wishon
2021). suggests that it is best to classify Spinoza as a
double aspect theorist.
James holds that “pure experience” constitutes an
interconnected Hume’s case is more difficult to assess.
It has been said that the prevalent
continuum out of which different portions become
“mental” or “material” 20th century
interpretation of Hume has been neutral monist (see Flage
depending on their
context, their relations to other such portions, and the 1982: 527).
H.H. Price’s case for this view has been particularly
influential
purposes they
serve and/or effects they result in (see 2.2 below). In (see Price 1932: 105–6). On the other hand, the
neutral monist
contrast, Mach
and Russell arguably hold that the non-basic entities are interpretation of Hume has been vigorously resisted
(Flage 1982;
composed
of—or perhaps merely practical groupings of—a multitude of Backhaus 1991).
discrete neutral entities organized by physical and/or psychological
causal-
functional relations. In light of these difficulties it is best to start the genealogy of
neutral
monism with the big three: Ernst Mach, William James,
and Bertrand
Most contemporary neutral monists agree that the basic neutral
entities are Russell. Of the three, only Russell uses the label
“neutral monism” (a term
related to the non-basic, non-neutral ones by way of
grounding relations. seemingly coined by his teacher
James
Ward).[5]
But there is widespread
But many questions remain about the precise
nature of these grounding agreement that Mach, James, and Russell are
the three most important
relations and of their relata. In any case,
neutral monists face the daunting philosophers in this tradition. A striking
feature of traditional neutral
challenge of explaining (or
explaining away) the features associated with monism—a reflection of the
empiricist leanings of its protagonists—is the
both mental and physical
entities solely in terms of the basic neutral ones, close tie between
the neutral entities and experience. This connection has
their aspects, and
their relations. given rise to
one of the most enduring criticisms of neutral monism: that it
collapses into phenomenalism. It is therefore important to note that
this
2. Traditional Versions of Neutral Monism salient feature of traditional neutral monism need be no part of
it.
Baruch Spinoza (1632–77) and David Hume (1711–76) are

often 2.1 Ernst Mach
identified as the originators of neutral
monism.[4]
The case for including
Spinoza runs as follows: Ernst Mach (1838–1916) occupies a central position in the
history of
neutral monism. He influenced William James and Bertrand
Russell and,
Spinoza’s metaphysics of substance has been called neutral through them, all of the writers on neutral monism in the
English-speaking
monism; it is a form of monism because it allows for only one world. His importance for the development of the view
in the German-
speaking world is hard to overestimate. Among the
philosophers to build

on Mach’s ideas was Rudolf Carnap in his

Aufbau (1928). As a physicist for material objects, this reads:
who also did physiological and
psychological research, Mach strove to
adopt an inclusive and
economical framework that would allow him to thing, body, matter, are nothing apart from the combinations of the
pursue all of these
inquiries in a unified and coherent fashion. In the elements,—the colors, sounds, and so forth—nothing apart
from
simple components
of experience—colors, sounds, pressures, intensities, their so-called attributes. (Mach 1886: 7)
times,
spaces, motor sensations, etc.—he finds typical examples of a
much
And the fate of the ego is similar:
larger group of elements whose functional interrelations are
studied by the
various sciences (see Banks 2014, ch. 1 on the resolute
realism of Mach’s The primary fact is not the ego, but the elements
(sensations)…The
view). While a given element is,
intrinsically, neither mental nor physical, elements constitute the I. I have the
sensation green, signifies that
the various groups to
which it belongs may display functional the element green occurs in a given
complex of other elements
relationships that are
characteristic of physics or of psychology. In this (sensations, memories). When I
cease to have the sensation green,
case the neutral
element forms part of the subject matter of physics and of when I die, then the
elements no longer occur in the ordinary,
psychology,
respectively. In the following quotation Mach uses a color and familiar association. That
is all. Only an ideal mental-economical
our
perception of it to illustrate this point. A single neutral
element—the unity, not a real unity, has
ceased to exist. (Mach 1886: 23–24)
color—gets to be both the physical color of a
physical object and our
mental perception/sensation of it. The color
can be called physical, qua For Mach the world presents itself as “a viscous mass [of
elements], at
constituent of the one group, and
mental, qua constituent of the other certain places (as in the ego) more firmly coherent than
in others” (Mach
group, but is the same
unchanging and intrinsically neutral element that 1886: 17). The neutral elements (only a minute
fraction of which are
figures in these two
different contexts: sensations) and their relations are the basic
reality. We draw boundaries
around certain groups of elements that are
related to each other in
Thus the great gulf between physical and psychological research interesting ways, because this serves our
biological, scientific, and/or
persists only when we acquiesce in our habitual stereotyped practical purposes. We can continue to
talk about material things and
conceptions. A color is a physical object as soon as we consider its selves; it is economical to do so. But,
strictly speaking, “both [object and
dependence, for instance, upon its luminous source, upon other ego] are provisional
fictions of the same kind” (Mach 1905: 9).
colors,
upon temperatures, upon spaces, and so forth. When we
consider,
however, its dependence upon the retina…it is a The primary source for Mach’s views on neutral monism are a
number of
psychological
object, a sensation. Not the subject matter, but the essays and chapters contained in his books originally
published in 1883,
direction of
investigation, is different in the two domains. (Mach 1886, 1894, and 1905. The size of these books grew
significantly as they
1886:
17–18) went through numerous editions. Some of the
important papers on neutral
monism are not contained in the available
English translations of these
In this way material objects and the ego are dissolved into works.
elements/sensations that are related in certain complex ways. Spelled
out

2.2 William James subject as yet. For the time being, it is plain,
unqualified actuality,
or existence, a simple that. (James 1904b: 23)
William James (1842–1910) uses the term “radical
empiricism” for the
view he sets forth in James 1912—the
view that has become a paradigm of Mind and matter, knower and known, thought and thing, representation
neutral monism. His critique of the
relational account of experience— and represented are then interpreted as resulting from different
functional
according to which the self
directs an act onto an object—was the model groupings/carvings of the continuous flux of pure
experience for different
upon which Russell
later shaped his analysis of experience. James presents purposes (see James 1905: 64).
this argument
as an attack on a particular conception of consciousness
In perceptual knowledge perceiver and perceived fuse or merge (James
present in
various forms in the Neo-Kantian, early analytic, and
uses both terms): one bit of pure experience is the thing perceived as
well
phenomenological
traditions. Roughly, it is the notion of consciousness as
as the perceiving of this thing. The difference lies only in how
this single
a diaphanous
or transparent relation, medium, or container by means of
portion of pure experience is related to other portions of
pure experience:
which the
objects of consciousness are presented or represented to us. But
the
consciousness that makes this kind of object presentation possible The paper seen and the seeing of it are only two names for one
eludes our grasp. This thin notion of consciousness is the one James
wants indivisible fact which, properly named, is the datum, the
to eliminate: phenomenon, or the experience. The paper is in the mind and the
mind is around the paper, because paper and mind are only two
I believe that ‘consciousness,’ when once it has
evaporated to this
names
that are given later to the one experience, when, taken in a
estate of pure diaphaneity, is on the point of
disappearing
larger
world of which it forms a part, its connections are traced in
altogether. It is the name of a nonentity, and has no
right to a place
different directions. To know immediately, then, or intuitively,
is for
among first principles. Those who still cling to it
are clinging to a
mental content and object to be identical. (James 1895:
110)
mere echo, the faint rumor left behind by the
disappearing ‘soul’
upon the air of philosophy. (James
1904b: 2) Conceptual knowledge is more complex. In the simplest case of
conceptual representation we are dealing with
His radical proposal is to simply discard this shadowy something and
to
make do with what remains, with what used to be the object of the two pieces of actual experience belonging to the same
subject,
conscious act. He introduces the term “pure experience” to
stand for this with definite tracts of conjunctive transitional experience
between
datum. Prior to any further categorization, pure
experience is, according to them. (James 1904a: 53)
James, neutral—neither mental nor
physical:
The first piece of pure experience is the thought—the episode of
thinking
The instant field of the present is at all times what I call the
‘pure’ as well as the content that is thought—perhaps about
Harvard’s Memorial
experience. It is only virtually or potentially
either object or Hall, as in James’s famous example (see
James 1904a: 55ff). And, in the
simplest case, the second piece of
pure experience is the thing—Memorial

Hall—that was
thought of, as well as the perceiving of Memorial Hall. decades of the twentieth century is massive
(see 2.4 below). The primary
The thought
has, let’s suppose, led us to Memorial Hall and now we stand source for James’s views on neutral
monism are the essays collected in his
in
front of it and see it. It is this function of leading (about
the details of 1912.
which James has much to say) that constitutes the
thought’s intentionality,
that constitutes the fact that the
thought was a thought about a certain 2.3 Bertrand Russell
thing. Once the thought has led
one to the Hall,
Following a series of critical engagements with neutral monism (see
the percept not only verifies the concept, proves its
function of especially Russell 1914a,b), Russell adopted it in 1918 and remained a
knowing that percept to be true, but the percept’s
existence as the neutral monist for the rest of his long career: “I am conscious
of no major
terminus of the chain of intermediaries
creates the function. change in my opinions since the adoption of neutral
monism” is what he
Whatever terminates that chain was,
because it now proves itself to says in an interview from 1964 (Eames 1969:
108). But the question of
be, what the concept ‘had in
mind’. (James 1904a: 60–1) whether Russell’s neutral monism is
best seen as a single theory or as a
sequence of related but
significantly different theories, as well as the
This is James’s way of reconstructing the idea of representation
in a way
question of which, if
any, of these different doctrines should count as
that does not invoke suspect mental powers of intrinsic
intentionality. He
versions of neutral
monism, have been much debated (see Wishon 2015;
values this as a signal achievement of his radical
empiricism:
Pincock 2018; Bostock
2012; Stace 1946). Russell’s 1919 and 1921 are
The towering importance for human life of this kind of knowing generally
considered to represent the early versions of his neutral monism.
lies in
the fact that an experience that knows another can figure as Russell’s 1927a and 1927b contain the mature doctrine. In his
later works
its
representative, not in any quasi-miraculous
‘epistemological’ —Russell 1948 and 1956a—he no longer used the
term “neutral monism”.
sense, but in the definite practical
sense of being its substitute in But the doctrine seems largely
unchanged.
various operations,
sometimes physical and sometimes mental,
Here is a succinct first pass at describing the core of
Russell’s neutral
which lead us to its
associates and results. (James 1904a: 61)
monism:
Not all conceptual experience results in knowledge. If the process of
Russell argued that the traditional distinction between
“mind” and
leading does not get started, or fails to arrive at an experience of
“matter” is unfounded and that the
subject matter of both physics
termination, there is nothing that the first piece of experience gets
to know.
and psychology concerns collections of
causally ordered events in
In that case the representation is empty or false.
space-time. Some of these events, ones
occurring in the brains of
The essays in which James sets out his radical empiricism are among
the complex creatures like us, are the mental
episodes that we are
most influential and most readable documents of the neutral
monistic directly aware of in having conscious experience.
These very same
literature. It is probably fair to say that James converted
Russell to neutral events can also be described in abstract structural
terms by physics
monism. And his influence on American neutral
monists during the early and neuroscience. Regarding the rest of the
(extracranial) events in

nature, Russell maintained that our knowledge

of them is indirect Neutral monism holds out the alluring promise that such constructions
can
and limited entirely to the abstract structural
descriptions provided be found for all of the inferred entities of physics, psychology,
and
by the various physical sciences. (Wishon 2016:
64) common sense. All of these bodies of knowledge are preserved, but
at a
hugely reduced epistemic cost. These are the considerations that
drive
Unsurprisingly, this brief summary leaves out many key details that
are Russell to embrace neutral monism: it is a perfect fit with his
longstanding
important for understanding the character of Russell’s
neutral monism. commitment to the program of logical construction. An
added benefit of
substituting constructions of neutral entities for
physical and mental
2.3.1 Logical Constructionism and Neutral Monism entities is an elegant solution to the mind-body
problem.
When Russell looks at neutral monism, he sees a theory that embodies

the Logical construction is a process of discovery, not of manipulation:
to
spirit of the “supreme maxim in scientific
philosophising” (Russell 1914c: logically construct xs out of ys is to discover
that ys, when they manifest a
155) in an especially striking
way. This maxim is Occam’s Razor: entities certain type of structure, can
play the role of xs. Russell’s constructions of
are not to be
multiplied without necessity. In one of Russell’s formulations a point
in space, an instant in time, a table, and of a belief may illustrate
it reads: “Wherever possible, substitute constructions out of
known entities the procedure. (i) A Russian doll is a good model of how Russell
for inferences to unknown entities” (Russell
1924: 326). Known entities (following Whitehead) proposes to construct a point in space. The
rough
are those that we know directly or
noninferentially; unknown entities are idea is to take “the class of all those objects which, as
one would naturally
ones we accept only on the
basis of inferences from known entities. say, contain the point” (Russell 1914a: 117)
and to substitute this class of
Russell’s maxim
encourages us to discover complex structures of known nested objects (the structure of
ys) for points in space (the xs). (ii)
entities that
can play the role the inferred entities were supposed to play. Experienced
instants in time (the xs) are constructed by discovering that
Upon
substituting these complex structures—the
constructions—for the the experiences of a person, each of which is extended in time, can
overlap
inferred entities, everything continues to
work as before. The point of this each other in ways that converge on an instant. It is
complicated procedure is primarily
epistemic: we are now no longer
a group of events, all belonging to his experience, and having the
burdened with the risky inference to
the inferred entities, and thus the risk
following two properties: (1) any two of the events overlap; (2) no
of error is reduced. Strictly
speaking, Russell remains agnostic as to the
event outside the group overlaps with every member of the group.
existence of the original
entities targeted by the construction. They are
(Russell 1927b: 288)
neither identified
with nor eliminated by the corresponding construction.
Still, the
constructions make it possible to arrive at a simplified account of (iii) Rather than viewing a table as the cause of our table
sensations,
what there is that fits our empirical evidence and exhibits various
other Russell proposes (again just as a first approximation) to
view the table as
theoretical virtues such as greater continuity, causal
uniformity, and so on. “the set of all those particulars which would
naturally be called ‘aspects’
Thus, the resulting metaphysical theory
deserves our provisional assent of the table from different
points of view” (Russell 1921: 98). (iv) The
over competing ones to a degree
proportional to such non-demonstrative
grounds.

logical
construction that is to take the place of beliefs consists of the of sensing directed at a non-mental
object—was, however, a pivotal part
following three components: of his earlier view. But
then his views changed:
We have a proposition, consisting of interrelated images, and I formerly believed that my own inspection showed me the
possibly
partly of sensations; (b) we have the feeling of assent, distinction
between a noise [the object] and my hearing of a noise
which is
presumably a complex sensation demanding analysis; (c) [the act of
sensing], and I am now convinced that it shows me no
we have a
relation, actually subsisting, between the assent and the such thing, and
never did. (Russell 1918b: 255)
proposition,
such as is expressed by saying that the proposition in
question is
what is assented to. (Russell 1921: 251) All that Russell now finds upon introspecting a sensory episode is a
single
item: a sensory quality “which may be called
indifferently a noise or
As these examples show, there is no single method of construction, no hearing a noise” (Russell 1918b: 255).
Switching the example to colors, he
single type of structure, suitable for different projects of logical writes that
construction. The nature of the xs (the targets of
construction) and of the
ys (the construction materials)
guide the search for structures that will the sensation we have when we see a patch of colour simply is
that
work in the case at
hand. patch of colour…the patch of colour and our sensation in
seeing it
are identical. (Russell 1921: 142–3)
2.3.2 Known Neutral Entities And since noises and patches of color are not intentional—they
are not
directed at anything, they are simply there—they are
intrinsically non-
The initial stock of known entities with which Russell proposes to
carry mental. They constitute “sensations”
only when related to other such
out this grand project of logical construction seems frightfully
small and entities in an organized system such
that they play the right causal role
strikingly non-neutral. It consists of his sensations and
images—these (Russell 1996; Wishon
2020, 2021). This establishes the neutrality of
loom large in Russell 1919, 1921—and his
perceptions (percepts)—these sensations. And
because images have the same intrinsic nature as
play a prominent role in Russell
1927a, 1927b, 1948. Everything else— sensations (cf.
Russell 1921: 117, 121, 154, 156, 287, 297), they too are
electrons, apples, galaxies,
experiences, and selves, etc.—is in need of neutral.[6]
Percepts are composed of elements playing the roles of
logical
construction. sensations and
images and are likewise intrinsically neutral.
For an entity to be neutral is to “have neither the hardness and

indestructibility of matter, nor the reference to objects which is
supposed 2.3.3 More Neutral Entities: Realism
to characterize the mind” (Russell 1921: 36; cf. 124).
Russell never
suspected sensations of being material (in this sense).
That sensations Russell’s focus on sensations, images, and percepts explains why
Russell’s
contain a mental element (in this sense)—that
they consist of a mental act neutral monism has often been dismissed as a form of
phenomenalism.
But in the preceding section we have seen how Russell
argued for the

intrinsic nonmentality of these items. Moreover, this

criticism overlooks teaches that events “just happen,
and do not happen ‘to’ matter or ‘to’
that Russell worked with a vastly expanded set of
construction materials. anything
else” (Russell 1927b: 289). This means that we must not think of
He allows for the enlargement of the realm of
the known by a series of mental events (or any events) “as consisting of motions of bits
of matter”
cautious
inferences.[7]
In a first step he argues that “all our percepts are (Russell 1927b: 292), for “matter in
motion…is not an event in our sense”
composed
of imperceptible parts” and have imperceptible structure (Russell 1927b:
296).
(Russell 1927a: 282, 386; Wishon 2020, 2021); second, there are
sensations, images, and percepts that are not our own; third, and most Russell’s neutral monist universe is a plenum of (absolute)
events—a vast
importantly, we can infer the existence of vast numbers of entities
that “do assemblage of overlapping small occurrences which,
given their short
not form part of any experience” (Russell 1921:
25).[8]
In this way Russell lifespan, are constantly replaced by new ones. This
mass of ever-changing
arrives at the view “that the world is very
full of events” (Russell 1927a: events manifests all sorts of complex dynamic
patterns. We have not yet
258), only a vanishingly small
number of which are his own experiences. discovered the laws that govern these events
and give rise to the formation
of these complex dynamic patterns. But
we have physics, which describes
Our own percepts, images, and
sensations[9]
occupy a privileged place in the behavior of certain groups of
law-governed events under the name of
this system of entities—they are
“what is most indubitable in our “matter”. And we
have psychology, which describes a set of quite different
knowledge of the world”
(Russell 1927b: 139). This knowledge is of a regularities
that obtain in very specific regions of this plenum of
events—
“more intimate
qualitative” (Russell 1927a: 389) kind; it reveals viz. in those regions that are filled by the pieces of
matter that are called
something of
the intrinsic character of these
entities.[10]
But our “brains”. But all the building
blocks of the logical constructions that are
knowledge of the physical world [as described by physical
science] is matter, and all the
building blocks of the logical constructions that are
(almost) entirely abstract: “we know certain logical
characteristics of its mental episodes,
have the same nature—they are neutral events.
structure, but nothing of its intrinsic
character” (Russell 1927b:
306–307).
[11]
In this sense, physics merely describes the “causal skeleton of
the 2.4 Some Other Early Neutral Monists
world” and leaves us in the dark as to the intrinsic quality
of the events
that make it up (Russell 1927a: 388, 391). There are, of course, many other philosophers whom one might want to
include in the list of neutral monists. In the German-speaking world,
we
Russell takes all of these different entities to be neutral (in the
sense of the find Richard Avenarius (1843–96), who was in contact with
Mach, and
Neither View); and he takes all of them to be
events[12],
where an event is Joseph Petzoldt (1862–1929), who built on the work of
Avenarius.
understood as “something occupying a small
finite amount of space–time” Avenarius’s main reflections on neutral monism are
contained in his
(Russell 1927b: 287). The
noise and the color patch considered above are 1888/90, 1891, and 1894/95. Petzoldt’s relevant
works are his 1900, 1904
typical examples of
events. A Russellian event is absolute, in C.D. Broad’s and 1906. In the English-speaking world,
neutral monism thrived within
sense:
“it should not itself be a state of invariance or of
change in the the movement of American new realism.
Arguably, John Dewey (1859–
qualities or relationships of any thing” (Broad
1959: 739; see also 1952) was the most eminent figure in
this group of neutral monists, but
Maxwell 1978: 385–6 on pure events).
According to Russell, physics Ralph Barton Perry
(1876–1957)—a student and friend of James—is the

one
most closely associated with the
view.[13]
Perry’s 1912 is the main First on the list of “metaphysical entities” (Mach 1905:
13) that have to go
source for his views about neutral
monism. Edwin B. Holt (1873–1946) are “the ‘unfathomable’ thing
and the equally ‘unexplorable’ ego” (Mach
developed an ambitious neutral
monist program in his 1912 and 1914. 1905: 8).
And James concurs: “Consciousness as it is ordinarily
Other notable early neutral
monists include Alois Riehl (1844–1924), understood
does not exist, any more than does Matter” (James 1905: 63).
Alexander Bogdanov
(1873–1928), Moritz Schlick (1882–1936), and (for
a time)
Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) and Alfred Ayer (1910–89), among 3.2 The Mind-Body Problem
others.
Mach, James, and Russell agree that neutral monism solves the
mind-body
3. The Case for Neutral Monism problem. Russell’s account of experience (of
perceptual consciousness)
may serve as an illustration of the point.
Russell frequently emphasized
The case for neutral monism is best made by enumerating its
virtues. the miracle or mystery involved in
traditional dualist accounts of
perception (1927b: 147, 154; 1927a:
275, 400). At the end of a purely
3.1 Parsimony physical chain of causes there
mysteriously arises something of a
completely different nature: an
experience (a sensation of red, say). This
For starters, neutral monism shares the virtues of idealism and
materialism raises difficult questions
about how exactly these two seemingly different
in pairing down the kinds of basic entities to which we
must be aspects of
reality—matter and mind—are related to one another and how
committed. Whereas dualism posits that there are basic
entities of two they could be causes and/or effects of each other.
fundamentally different kinds—matter and
mind—neutral monism posits
that the basic entities are all of a
single, neutral kind. On many such views, Materialism holds that mind is wholly grounded in basic material
entities
there are also non-basic
entities (such as minds and matter) grounded in or features of reality and thus that mind-body causal
relations are
the basic ones. But on
others, “mind” and “matter” are merely
convenient ultimately a matter of physical causal relations. But
there are longstanding
groupings of the basic entities and there are no non-basic
ones. worries about whether properties of mental
phenomena such as
qualitativity, intentionality, and/or subjectivity
can be wholly grounded in
The “immense simplification” neutral monism affords is
what most material entities or properties. Idealism,
in contrast, holds that matter is
attracted Russell to neutral monism (Russell 1959: 252). For
Mach and wholly grounded in basic mental
entities or features of reality and that
James, it also promises to free us from any commitment to the
existence of mind-body causation is
ultimately a matter of mental causal relations. But
extra-empirical kinds of entities: critics question
whether material phenomena can be adequately accounted
for wholly in
terms of mental phenomena.
nothing is important except what can be observed or is a datum for
us,
and everything hypothetical, metaphysical and superfluous, is Neutral monism can be an attractive alternative for those who see the
to be
eliminated. (Mach 1886: 27–28) challenges faced by these traditional positions as
insurmountable.[14]
In
some cases, such interest in neutral monism is, perhaps, best seen
as part

of the general movement to explore all possible options in the

metaphysics monism is the primary
inspiration for the assortment of “Russellian
of mind. As Jerry Fodor puts it, “the form of a
philosophical theory, often monist”
views that have been hotly debated in recent years (see 5.4
enough, is: Let’s try looking
over here” (Fodor 1981: 31). But others see below).
neutral monism
as having resources the traditional positions lack and
perhaps can
make use of themselves. 3.3 Perceptual Evidence for Physics
Neutral monism addresses the mind-body problem by asserting that mind The Analysis of Matter (Russell 1927a) is widely regarded as
the most
and matter are not as different as they might first appear. On the
both view, important text of the neutral monist literature. Chapter one
of this book,
this is because the basic neutral entities are
intrinsically both mental and entitled “The Nature of the Problem”, states
it as follows:
material. But it is difficult to see how
such a view avoids collapsing into a
form of panpsychism, dual-aspect
theory, idealism, or materialism. On the the world of physics is, prima facie, so different from the
world of
neither view, the apparent
“gap” between mind and matter is narrowed by perception that it is difficult to see how the one can afford
evidence
the fact that
both are grounded in, or merely convenient groupings of, the for the other; moreover, physics and physiology themselves
seem
same
basic entities which are themselves intrinsically neither mental nor to give grounds for supposing that perception cannot give very
material. Accordingly, mind-body causal relations are ultimately just
a accurate information as to the external world, and thus weaken the
matter of causal relations among different groups of the basic
neutral props upon which they are built…We must therefore find an
entities.[15] interpretation of physics which gives a due place to perceptions; if
not, we have no right to appeal to the empirical evidence. (Russell
One of the chief attractions of neutral monism is its promise for 1927a: 6–7; see also Russell 1948: Part III, Ch. IV)
integrating qualitative entities or properties into the natural world
without
positing experientiality among its most basic constituents. In
doing so, it The previous remarks addressed to the mind-body problem in general,
and
has the potential to vindicate both naturalists who hold
that mental to the problem of perceptual experience in particular, contain the
core of
phenomena such as consciousness arise only in the context
of complex the solution Russell proposes. By “bridging the gulf
between physics (as
systems of elements and those who see no hope of grounding
the commonly interpreted) and perception”
(Russell 1927a: 7), neutral
qualitative aspects of consciousness wholly in non-qualitative
material monism promises to solve this
problem—a problem that Russell took to be
entities or properties. There is, of course, an open question
about whether difficult and largely
unnoticed (see Russell 1948: 175–176).
neutral monism can deliver on such promise.
3.4 Knowledge of the External World
Many philosophers of mind who are in some ways sympathetic to neutral
monism also find Russell’s views that physical theories
abstractly describe Mach and James understand neutral monism as an especially radical form
the structure of physical reality while leaving us
ignorant about its of achieving perceptual contact with the world. It might be understood
as a
intrinsic nature especially attractive. In fact,
this aspect of Russell’s neutral limiting case of naïve realism—a case in which the
relation between the

subject and its perceptual object becomes the

identity relation. In James and puts a
version of representative realism in its place. The
perception “subject and object
merge” (James 1905: 57). A single reality problem of our
knowledge of the external world is thereby reintroduced in
—a red patch,
say, when we see a tomato—is a constituent of two groups full
force.[16]
of
neutral entities: the group that is the perceiver, and the group that
is the
tomato. The mind and its object become one. In James’s
words: 3.5 Unity of Science
A given undivided portion of experience, taken in one context of Mach operates on the assumption that all sciences form a whole (see
Mach
associates, play[s] the part of the knower, or a state of mind, or 1886: 30). The great virtue of neutral monism is that it affords
a unified
“consciousness”; while in a different context the same
undivided perspective from which scientific inquiry can be
undertaken:
bit of experience plays the part of a thing known, of an
objective
“content”. In a word, in one group it figures as
a thought, in what I aimed at was merely to attain a safe and clear philosophical
another group as a thing. (James 1904b: 9–10) standpoint, whence practicable paths, shrouded in no metaphysical
clouds, might be seen leading not only into the field of physics but
Some have seen this epistemic achievement as the most important reward also into that of psycho-physiology. (Mach 1886: 47)
of neutral monism.
The idea of neutral monism as a bridge between different sciences is
also
But Russell dissented. There are well known problems surrounding present in Russell. He presents neutral monism as
accounts of perception that conceive it as a form of direct contact
with the
world. Among them are the problems arising from the fact that
an object an attempt to harmonize two different tendencies, one in
can present different and incompatible appearances to
different observers, psychology,
the other in physics…[viz.]…the materialistic
or even the same observer in different
circumstances. Some neutral tendency
of psychology and the anti-materialistic tendency of
monists concluded that “nature is a
seething chaos of contradiction” (Holt physics. (Russell
1921: 5–6)
1914: 276). But Russell
chose to abandon the view that in perception
“subject and object
merge”. Instead he locates the red patch you see when 4. Objections to Neutral Monism
looking at
a tomato in your brain, and distinguishes it from the tomato
(from the
group of events that constitute the tomato). That is why he can 4.1 Reduction and the Threat of Elimination
assert
that what is happening in his brain is “exactly what naïve
realism
thinks it knows about what is happening in the outside
world” (Russell Every version of reductionism must deal with the question of the
1927b: 138). This solves the problem of
different and incompatible ontological status of the entities it reduces: are they retained or
appearances: compatibility is restored by
moving the conflicting features eliminated? Both of these components are typically present in
traditional
away from the single physical object
and into the brains of the percipients. neutral
monism.[17]
Mach, for instance, alternates between claims such as
But in making this move
Russell abandons the naïve realism of Mach and that “the
supposed unities ‘body’ and ‘ego’ are only
makeshifts, designed
for provisional survey and for certain practical
ends” and claims that they

are composites constituted by

“a more strongly coherent group of elements suspicion”—has been
articulated by a diverse group of philosophers,
[that is] less
strongly connected with other groups of this kind” (Mach among them: (Lenin
1909: 34; Hartshorne 1937: 221–2; Stace 1946; Ayer
1886:
20–21). Similarly, alongside Russell’s many logical
constructions of 1971; Feigl
1958: 426, 1975: 26–7; Maxwell 1976: 354; Popper & Eccles
various mental phenomena are remarks such as
this: 1977: 199; Strawson 1994: 97; Chalmers 1996: 155; Tully 2003: 355,
369).
There are a number of words which I think should disappear from
the
psychological vocabulary: among these I should include The prima facie plausibility of this objection is beyond
doubt. But Mach,
knowledge, memory, perception, and
sensation. (Russell 1996: James, and Russell were acutely aware of the problem
and took
295) themselves to have responded in a satisfactory manner. They
reject the
view that a sensation or an experience consists of a
subject directing a
What is clear is that neutral monism dispenses with mind as
traditionally mental act—awareness, consciousness,
acquaintance—onto an object.
conceived by dualists and idealists and matter
as traditionally conceived Dispensing with the subject and the
act, they are left with what used to be
by dualists and materialists.
There is no need to suppose that there are the object—a red patch,
say. And they hold that there is nothing
“solid persistent
objects moving through space” or states with an inbuilt intrinsically mental about
red patches. A red patch becomes a red-
and
primitive “reference to objects” (Russell 1921: 124, 36).
But, on the sensation simply by being
appropriately related to other entities of the
other hand, it provides constructions of neutral entities
that are designed to same kind. There is no
quick way to adjudicate this dispute; a careful
play the roles of the entities they displace. The
success of this strategy will assessment of each
case is required. Still, a comparison of neutral monism
have to be assessed on a case by case
basis. There are relatively few with its
closest mentalist alternatives can be a useful first step.
objections to neutral monism that turn
on the details of proposed
constructions or reductions. (But see C.D.
Broad’s critique of Russell, Panpsychism holds that every basic entity—usually understood as
a
1925: 577–584). The most
challenging criticisms of neutral monism do physical entity—is also a mental entity. The physical nature
(if present)
not engage with technical
details, but aim squarely at the central idea of and the mental nature of the basic entities are
fundamental, i.e., irreducible
the
doctrine—the idea of neutrality. (to each other or to anything else). On
the face of it, panpsychism and
neutral monism are strikingly
different. Neutral monism takes mental and
4.2 The Mentalism Suspicion physical phenomena to be
derivative, panpsychism does not; neutral
monism holds that basic
reality is neutral, panpsychism does not. And
The most frequent type of objection to the traditional versions of
neutral neutral monism is
compatible with the view that most physical objects,
monism is that they are forms of mentalistic monism: Berkleyan
idealism, and all their
parts, are absolutely nonmental, whereas panpsychism is not.
panpsychism, or phenomenalism. The core argument is simple:
sensations This is
how things look on the Neither View of neutrality. On the
Both
(Mach), pure experience (James) and sensations/percepts
(Russell) are View of neutrality, things are less clear. The most
natural reading of the
paradigms of non-neutral, mental entities. Hence there
is nothing neutral Both View will, however, not yield
panpsychism—the view that every
about these neutral monisms. This type of
objection—the “mentalism basic physical entity has a
mind—but a dual aspect view—a view

according to which
every basic entity has a physical and a mental aspect monism. Accordingly, Russell
is engaged in the project of “constructing
or side. In any
case, Mach, James, and Russell resisted panpsychist or both [minds and
matter] out of orderings of physical events that are their
dual-aspect
interpretations of their views, though there is evidence stages” (Landini 2011: 280). After a detailed discussion,
Landini reaches
suggesting
that James adopted panpsychism sometime after 1904. the conclusion that Russell’s basic transient
particulars (or events) “are
without intrinsic phenomenal
character” (Landini 2011: 297). This makes
Phenomenalism has been defended as a doctrine about language, about it possible to regard
them as physical entities in good standing. Their
facts, and about things. Taken in this last sense, it attempts to
“reduce neutrality consists
in the fact that they are the building blocks of both
material objects to sensa, that is, to explain them as
consisting solely of mental and
physical continuants (see Landini 2011: 292).
sensa or as being primarily groups or patterns of
them” (Hirst 2006: 271).
We might substitute the terms
“sense-data”, “sensations”,
“percepts”, Similarly, Erik Banks (see section 5.6 below) presents his so-called
“experiences”, etc. for
Hirst’s term “sensa”. As noted above, the “realistic empiricism” as a direct descendant of
traditional neutral monism
traditional neutral monists supposedly purged such terms of their
usual (Banks 2014, viii). But he also holds that
his neutral monism is “a kind of
intrinsically mental dimension. Moreover, neutral monism is not
limited to physicalism” (Banks 2014:
7, 142). Banks takes himself to follow Russell
those entities that are sensations, perceptions, and so
on—this is embracing an ontology
of events as manifestations of underlying powers
particularly clear in the case of Mach and Russell.
The existence of vast or
energies—such as electromagnetism, gravitation, and nuclear
forces
majority of neutral entities is inferred from
the minute set of elements that, (Banks 149), as well as neural energies (Banks 2014: 142). But
event
due to their causal-functional roles,
happen to be sensations and particulars such as these, Banks insists, “are so
physicalistic in nature that
perceptions. These inferred elements are
outside of all minds. These are there does not seem to be any reason to
assume that these natural qualities
the strong anti-phenomenalist (and
anti-idealist) positions. How in physics have anything at all in
common with our sensations, which are
successfully the various neutral monists
defend these claims is, of course, qualities of a very different
order… [involving] events in the human
a difficult further question. nervous system at a very
different scale of complexity and size” (Banks
2014: 156).
4.3 The Materialism Suspicion
After a careful survey of the development of Russell’s neutral
monism,
In the past neutral monism has often been interpreted as a form of Donovan Wishon observes that Russell’s post-1940 version
of neutral
mentalism. But a number of contemporary philosophers argue that it is monism “has a greater affinity to Russellian
Physicalism than any
best understood as a form of physicalism. genuinely neutral monism” (Wishon
2015: 114–5). Among other things,
Wishon draws our attention to
Russell’s report that “I find myself in
We have noted how Landini’s interpretation of the notion of
neutrality ontology
increasingly materialistic” (Russell 1946: 700). He also points
to
(according to (3)—the Possible Constituent
View) allows him to argue that Russell’s remarks that “I should regard all events as
physical” and that
neutral monism is compatible with
physicalism. As he sees it, Russell is “the distinction between what is mental
and what is physical does not lie
committed to such a version of
(four-dimensionalist) physicalist neutral in any intrinsic character of
either, but in the way in which we acquire

knowledge of them”
(Russell 1958: 12). Hence, Wishon concludes, David Chalmers has raised a related worry about neutral monism,
“mental events will
turn out to be a subclass of the physical events that especially in its panqualityist forms (see section 5.5 below): He
argues that
make up
reality”—only their special epistemic accessibility
distinguishes there is no path that leads from the qualities we
experience (but which are
them from the other physical events (2015: 112). But he
does not quite not experiential themselves) to the
experience of those qualities. Having
answer whether Russell, in this late period, took all
events to be physical an experience is a matter of
having phenomenal qualities. Phenomenal
due to their intrinsic natures or merely due to
their relations to other qualities involve awareness of
qualities. But “no instantiations of qualities
events. ever necessitate
awareness of qualities” (Chalmers 2015: 273). This
“quality/awareness gap” (Chalmers 2015: 273) shows that no
structure of
These attempts to combine neutral monism with physicalism, or to qualities can add up to
experience.[19]
reinterpret neutral monism along physicalist lines pose a serious
challenge
to neutral monism as usually understood. They deny the
central claim that The traditional neutral monists would all agree that the mere
instantiation
the fundamental building blocks of the world are
neutral in the sense of of qualities (which are intrinsically neutral) does not
necessitate any
being both nonmental and
nonphysical.[18]
But no less noteworthy is the awareness of qualities. After all, such awareness
results only when a
degree to which these versions of
physicalism depart from more standard number of such qualities are appropriately related
to each other. However,
forms of physicalism. In
particular, they agree with neutral monism that they depart from Chalmers in holding that
suitable relations among
physical theories do
not fully capture the nature of the world they qualities are not only necessary for
awareness, they are also sufficient for
describe. This suggests
that the difference between neutral monism and it. That is, for a subject
(understood as an organized bundle of neutral
this sort of
physicalism may not be so deep after all (see Chalmers 2015). events) to be aware of,
say, a red patch, just is for the red patch to bear the
right kinds of
complex causal-functional relations to other neutral events
4.4 The Problem of Experience in an
organized system of which it is a member (i.e. the bundle-self).
Thus,
the traditional neutral monists would reject the view that no
Even if materialist suspicions about it are misplaced, some critics
hold that structure of qualities can add up to experience.
neutral monism shares a common failing with materialism:
namely, that it
cannot accommodate experience. The argument is driven
by two deep Whether such a reply is satisfactory is a matter of ongoing debate.
Yet to
metaphysical convictions. First, experience cannot be
reduced to or the extent that this proposal succeeds, it does raise a further
question
constructed from the non-experiential; second, radical
emergence is suggested by Strawson’s argument above: is experience,
thus understood
unintelligible. Assuming that the neutral must be
non-experiential, it in a neutral monist setting, a feature that is
emergent in an objectionable
follows that the neutral monist world has no room
for experience. Galen way?
Strawson has wielded this argument against all
forms of traditional
materialism, and occasionally also against
neutral monism (Strawson
1994, 2016, 2020).

4.5 The Problem of Emergence But Russell’s remarks about emergence (Russell 1927b:
293–96) allow
different reading. When called upon to present
examples of events, Russell
The basic idea of emergence has to do with the fact that complex
systems gives the following list:
may display interesting novel properties—properties not
possessed by
their parts. This idea has been regimented in various
ways. Following seeing a flash of lightning…hearing a tyre burst, or smelling a
Chalmers, we can distinguish between
“weak” and “strong” emergence. rotten egg, or feeling the coldness of a frog…particular colors
and
Weakly emergent
phenomena are merely unexpected, given our sounds and so on are events. (Russell 1927b: 287–88)
knowledge of the domain
from which they arise. Strongly emergent
All of these events are percepts—the only kinds of events we can
know
phenomena are not just
unexpected; they cannot (not even in principle) be
without inference. And, pace Landini, all of these events do have
deduced from the
domain from which they arise (see Chalmers 2006:
qualitative characters. When Russell speaks of emergence, he has in
mind
244). There are
ongoing debates, however, about whether epistemic and/or
the relationship between physics’ abstract mathematical
descriptions of
logical
notions such as deducibility are reliable guides to the nature of
events and their intrinsic qualitative characters. And
he maintains that
reality. Such issues can be set aside by instead using the notion of
latter are (strongly) emergent with respect to the
former because there is
“radical” emergence for cases in which complex systems
display novel
no inferential path leading from abstract
mathematical descriptions of an
features that are not wholly grounded in the nature,
features, or relations of
event to its intrinsic qualitative
features. For such abstract and
their parts (Strawson 2006). Weak emergence
will, no doubt, be a wide-
mathematical considerations
spread phenomenon in the neutral monist
world. It poses no problem. In
contrast, neutral monism appears to
rule out radical emergence. Things are cannot conceivably…prove that there are visual events, or
auditory
less clear in the case of
strong emergence. Russell’s method of logical events, or events of any of the kind that we know by
perception.
construction is
incompatible with strong emergence, but it is an open (Russell 1927b: 295)
question whether
other neutral monist accounts are.
But it is debatable whether such qualities radically emerge from
anything.
Landini adopts the contrary view that radical emergence plays a
crucial In any case, this is not how the neutral monist (who follows
Russell’s lead)
role in Russell’s neutral monism. If the fundamental
transient physical starts out. Our percepts are our initial data,
and they are qualitative
particulars (or events) have no phenomenal
characters (or qualia), such through and through. We simply do not have to
deduce the existence of
qualities must be understood as radically
emergent features within the quality from other known facts, such as those
involving complex brain
framework of Russell’s
account.[20] states. Qualities are there, in the form of
our percepts, at the very
foundation of Russell’s theory. Such
other events as we may believe in,
Qualia never occur in transient particulars. In Russell’s view,
whose intrinsic qualities we do not
know, are all inferred from this
qualia emerge from the series of brain states…colors, pitches,
qualitative bedrock. Even so, the
neutral monist insists, it doesn’t follow
smells, tastes and textures are emergent properties of series of
from the fact that
something is irreducibly qualitative that it is intrinsically
brain
states…. (Landini 2011: 302–305)
mental—or mental at all.

4.6 The Dualism Suspicion way, they are

atoms and neurons and lobes. Whether a given group of
interrelated
neutral entities counts as mental or physical depends on the
Another common objection to neutral monism is that it constitutes a
form causal-functional role this group occupies. But the entities
themselves are
of property dualism or dual aspect theory. The argument is free of intrinsically mental or physical
aspects/sides/properties. Therein
straightforward: On the neutral monist picture, physics describes
certain consists their neutrality.
relations—namely, the physical ones—among the
basic entities without
capturing their intrinsic qualities, or those
of the complexes of which they But if neutrality is understood according to the Both View,
the case for
are parts. These latter features are
revealed to us only in the case of our identifying neutral monism with dual-aspect theory is
strengthened. Much
sensations, percepts, and other
mental episodes. This suggests that the will turn on how the details of the Both
View are articulated. It must not,
basic entities exhibit two
fundamentally different kinds of aspects or for example, be understood as
proposing the identification of mental and
properties: extrinsic
physical relations and intrinsic mental qualities. But physical properties. For
the dual-aspect theory insists that the two aspects
there’s
nothing properly neutral about either kind of feature, and
neither is are fundamental
and irreducible to each other. Another question concerns
reducible to the other. At best, they are two radically
different aspects of the
relationship of the aspects and properties. If aspects are understood
as
an underlying reality which, in itself, is
neither mental nor physical. properties, dual-aspect theory may simply collapse into property
dualism
(see, e.g., Van Gulick 2014). Dual-aspect theorists have
pushed back by
The theory of dual or double aspects is usually traced back to Spinoza insisting that aspects are not properties (see Skrbina
2014: 228–29). But
(1677). The fundamental idea uniting the family of views under this
label this may, in turn, block the project of
reconciling the dual-aspect theory
is that there is an underlying reality that we can grasp as
mental or as with neutral monism. For the
neutrality, on the Both as well as on the
physical, depending on the point of view from which we
apprehend it. Neither
View, is understood in terms of mental and physical
properties.
Each one of us can know their own brain under each of
these aspects—via
introspection and (scientific) observation.
But the claim of the theory is There is a lively debate concerning the relationship between neutral
quite general: everything there is is
to be understood as consisting of an monism, property dualism, and dual-aspect theory (see, e.g., Velmans
underlying reality that has these
two aspects. 2008; Skrbina 2014). The decision about these theories—whether
they are
identical, distinct but compatible, or incompatible
rivals—is still out.
Neutral monism and the dual-aspect theory share a central claim: there
is
an underlying reality that is neither mental nor physical. But that
is where 4.7 Error
the agreement stops. Neutral monism has no room for the
central feature
of the dual-aspect theory: the mental and physical
aspects, sides, or The neutral monism of Mach and James is committed to a naively
realistic
properties that characterize the underlying
entities of dual-aspect theory. account of perception according to which our perceptual
experiences and
The neutral monist accepts the
mental/physical distinction. But it resides the aspects of the world perceived are one and the
same. Nonveridical
at the level or groups of
neutral entities. Grouped one way, the neutral experiences—illusions, hallucinations,
dreams, etc.—are difficult to
entities constituting
your brain are thoughts and feelings; grouped another accommodate within such a picture.
For in cases of nonveridical

experience—e.g. when a drunkard

“sees” a pink rat—we are inclined to 5.1 Information as Ultimate Reality
say that the
world does not contain the relevant entities.
Anticipating the current revival in interest in neutral monism by a
few
But traditional neutral monism provides an ontology rich enough to decades, Kenneth Sayre (1929–) published his main ideas on
neutral
address this problem. The pink patch experienced by the drunkard
exists: monism in the 1970s. Unlike the big three, Sayre
finds the neutral base of
it is a portion of pure experience (James), or an element
(Mach). This his system not in experience, but in the
form of pure information, where
much naïve realism is true, even in the cases of
nonveridical experience. information is understood in the
strict information theoretical sense. His
But the pink rat that the drunkard
takes himself to see does not exist—the proposal must not be
mistaken for the uncontroversial claim that that
pink patch he sees is
not a member of a group of neutral elements mental and physical
processes can be described in information theoretic
constituting a material
object such as a rat. There is nothing wrong with terms.
Sayre puts forward an ontological claim about the ultimate nature
the drunkard’s
visual experience; what is mistaken is his assumption about of
reality—that ultimate reality consists of informational
states:
how what
he sees is connected with the rest of the world. Russell (though
not a
naïve realist himself) states this point most succinctly:
“There are in If the project…is successful, it will have been shown not only
that
fact no illusions of the senses, but only mistakes
in interpreting sensational the concept of information provides a primitive for the analysis
of
data as signs of things other than
themselves” (Russell 1948: 149–50). both the physical and the mental, but also that states of
Mach puts the point as
follows: information…existed previously to states of mind. Since
information in this sense is prior to mentality, but also implicated
When we consider elements like red, green, hot, cold and the rest, in all mental states, it follows that information is prior also in the
which are physical and mental in virtue of their dependence on ontological sense…Success of the present project thus will show
both
external and internal circumstances, and are in both respects that an ontology of informational states is adequate for an
immediately given and identical, the question as to illusion and explanation of the phenomena of mind, as distinct from an
reality loses its sense. Here we are simultaneously confronted by ontology of
physical events. [And Sayre adds:] It is a reasonable
the
elements of the real world and of the ego. The only possible conjecture that
an ontology of information is similarly basic to the
further
question of interest concerns their functional physical
sciences…. (Sayre 1976: 16)
interdependence…. (Mach 1905: 7–8)
One of the greatest challenges faced by the traditional versions of
neutral
5. New Directions for Neutral Monism monism is to show how basic entities that are derived from
experience can
be neutral, rather than mental. By choosing an ontology
of informational
Neutral monism is not simply a historical curiosity. It has evolved
into a states as his “neutral stuff”, Sayre
elegantly bypasses this problem. But
number of new forms and remains an important part of ongoing while the neutrality of
informational states may be taken for granted, the
discussions about the mind-body problem. question of the
relationship of this seemingly abstract “stuff” to
concrete
world of physical and mental entities becomes all the more
pressing.[21]

Sayre’s main work on neutral monism is his 1976. In recent

decades, being a c-fiber
stimulation and a property of being a pain, and that these
David Chalmers has similarly explored the idea of an
informational two
properties stand in some interesting relationship, such as identity,
ontology (see Chalmers 1996). And the related ideas that
ultimate reality reduction, realization, etc. What this does mean is that there is a
complex
is purely structural (Ladyman and Ross 2007; Floridi
2008, 2009), is a object that makes both of these claims true. The nature of the
parts of this
computational process (Fredkin 2003; Lloyd 2006), or
is purely object, as well as their intricate relationships to one
another, is the reality
mathematical (Tegmark 2014) are the subject of a lively
discussion. that is correctly described as a c-fiber
stimulation and as a pain.
5.2 Mind & Matter: A Merely Conceptual Distinction This part of Heil’s account appears to be consistent with the
spirit of
traditional neutral monism. One is reminded of
Russell’s pithy description
For want of a better label, John Heil presents his view on the
mind-body of his project: “What I wish
to do in this essay is to restate the relations of
relation as a form of neutral monism. He resists being
labeled a materialist mind and brain in
terms not implying the existence of either” (Russell
1956a:
145). This can easily be read as a denial of the existence of a
because it carries with it the implication that there is an
asymmetry chasm
between mental and physical properties. And Heil’s complex
in the identification of mental qualities with
material qualities: the objects that serve as the truth-makers for mental and physical
descriptions
mental is supplanted by the material. (Heil
2013: 242) may be seen as analogous to Russell’s groups
(logical constructions) of
events that can properly be described in
physical and mental terms.
Nor does he see himself as an idealist. And he has systematic and deep
reasons for rejecting the property dualism that characterizes the
various But there is an additional part to the neutral monist
picture—one that
versions of nonreductive materialism. The neutral monism that
he accepts (arguably) all of the mainline neutral monists
agree on—that Heil rejects.
is characterized as follows: When he tells the “deep
story” (Heil’s term) about the nature of the
complex
objects (the truth-makers for claims about c-fibers and pains etc.),
Neutral monism includes the denial that there is a
mental–material
he turns to fundamental physics:
chasm to be bridged. The mental–material
distinction is, as
Spinoza and Donald Davidson contend, a distinction
of conception I take it to be an empirical question—a question for science,
for
only, not a real distinction, not a distinction
in reality. (Heil 2013: fundamental physics—what the substances are and what they
are
242) like, how they are. (Heil 2013: 201–2)
An example will help to illustrate the gist of this view. Take the
well-worn So the basic constituents of the world—the substances and the
properties
claim that pain is c-fiber
stimulation.[22]
According to Heil, this says that —that Heil describes are physical. Here the
neutral monist (who is
the predicate “c-fiber
stimulation” and the predicate “pain” apply to the committed to the Neither View of
neutrality) parts company with Heil. The
same things: all things that are truly described as being c-fiber
stimulations deep story of the neutral
monist has it that the fundamental entities—be
are also truly described as pains. But—and this is
a crucial claim that they events, bits
of information, substances, properties, etc.—are not
cannot be developed here—this does
not mean that there is a property of

physical
(and not mental, of course). That is to say, they are not the sort of this view would imply that the fundamental constituents of the
thing that fundamental physics (or psychology) reveals. world,
out of which everything is composed, are neither physical
nor mental
but something more basic. This position is not
5.3 Complex Basic Entities equivalent to
panpsychism. Panpsychism is, in effect, dualism all
the way down. This
is monism all the way down. (Nagel 2002:
In his book Mind and Cosmos (2012) Thomas Nagel asserts that
“the 231)
weight of the evidence favors some form of neutral monism
over the
traditional alternatives of materialism, idealism, and
dualism” (2012: 5). Is there a way to overcome this apparent tension and to see these two
Neutral monism is understood as a view that
“accounts for the relation views as parts of a coherent whole? In a personal communication Prof.
between mind and brain in terms of
something more basic about the Nagel offered the following explanation:
natural order” (2012: 56). This
yields a picture of a “general monism
the fundamental elements would be neither merely physical nor
according to which the
constituents of the universe have properties that
merely
mental, but something that was necessarily both physical
explain not only its
physical but its mental character” (2012: 56).
and mental,
(or protomental); but since this necessary connection
Borrowing a
concept from Tom Sorrell (whom Nagel cites approvingly),
can’t hold
directly between the physical and the mental as we
we can say
that these basic constituents of the universe are “transphysical
conceive them, it
would require that the real character of these
and transmental” (2012: 57). All that has been said up to this
point
fundamental
constituents be something more basic that accounts
supports the view that Nagel endorses neutral monism.
for their being
both physical and (proto)mental.
But what Nagel says next seems to contradict this simple picture. He
The resulting picture is this. Described at the most fundamental
level, the
writes:
constituents of the world have properties that are neither
mental nor
Everything, living or not, is constituted from elements having a physical. These neutral properties of every fundamental
entity give rise to
nature that is both physical and nonphysical—that is, capable of physical and mental (or protomental) properties.
Thus each fundamental
combining into mental wholes. So this reductive account can also constituent is complex: it has mental (or
protomental) properties, it has
be
described as a form of panpsychism: all the elements of the physical properties, and it has these
two sets of properties as a necessary
physical
world are also mental. (Nagel 2012: 57) consequence of its having a
third set of properties—the neutral properties.
Note that the description of the basic constituents has changed from The foundational role played by the neutral properties (in the
Neither
“transphysical and transmental” to “physical and
mental”—from the Sense) can be taken to suggest that the view is a
form of neutral monism.
Neither View to the Both
View. And Nagel is very much aware that these This interpretation can be further supported
by arguing that the neutral
are not the same
thing. In an earlier paper in which he considers neutral properties ground the other properties of
the basic entities, and that
monism, he
writes: grounded properties make for “no
addition to being”. However, it departs
from traditional neutral
monism in holding that the basic constituents have

intrinsic
physical and mental (or protomental) properties in addition to the There are many versions of Russellian Monism. Differences are due, in
neutral
ones.[23]
Thus, it is perhaps best characterized as a form of the part, to varying views about the relations between the intrinsic
properties,
dual-aspect
theory or property dualism. But others might call it a on the one side, and the mental and material properties,
on the other. But
panpsychism
since each fundamental entity has mental (or protomental) the central disagreement concerns the nature of the
intrinsic properties.
features. They have been held to be physical (Stoljar
2001; Pereboom 2011, 2015;
Montero 2015), mental (Bolender 2001;
Chalmers 2017; Schneider 2017),
5.4 Russellian Monism, Panprotopsychism, and mental and physical (Strawson 2015,
2016, 2020; Goff 2017), or neutral
Panqualityism (Coleman 2014, 2017a). Accordingly,
there are physicalist, idealist,
panpsychist, and neutral monist
versions or Russellian monism. The
In the search for a solution to the mind-body problem one may be precise nature of these
disagreements is difficult to pin down, given the
captivated by the thought that we know less about matter than we are number of different
notions of the mental and the material that are in play
commonly led to believe. All we do (or can) know are the dispositional in this
discussion (see 1.1 above).
properties of
matter.[24]
When combined with the insight that dispositions
need categorical
grounds, one discovers that one’s conception of matter is The best-known version of Russellian neutral monism is
radically incomplete. In addition to all the dispositional properties
that panprotopsychism—a view that David Chalmers has explored over
many
physics treats of, matter must have intrinsic categorical
properties. Since years (Chalmers 1996, 2015). In the standard form of this theory
the
the nature of these intrinsic properties is unknown,
the following bold postulated intrinsic properties are characterized as being neither
thought suggests itself. Perhaps these properties
play a dual role: in experiential (they are proto-psychic) nor physical (they lack
the
addition to grounding to dispositional properties
of matter, they also serve structural/dispositional nature of physical properties). That
makes them
as the grounds of our conscious experience.
These are the kinds of neutral (in the Neither Sense). But this purely
negative characterization of
considerations that may lead one to Russellian
monism, the view that the intrinsic properties has struck many
as unsatisfying.
matter has intrinsic properties that both constitute consciousness A variant of this theory—panqualityism—addresses this
problem in a
and
serve as categorical bases for the dispositional properties most satisfactory manner, while creating new problems of
its own.
described
in physics. (Alter and Nagasawa 2015: 1)
It takes redness, greenness, sweetness, roundness, etc.—the
primitive
The basic constituents of the world of Russellian monism are the sensory qualities given to us in experience, and considered
just as such—
fundamental entities of physics. But their most fundamental properties
are to be the intrinsic properties of the fundamental
physical entities (cf.
not ones fully captured by physical descriptions, but rather the
intrinsic Chalmers 2015: 272). One’s being aware of
redness—i.e., the property of
properties in virtue of which they fit such descriptions.
And these very phenomenal redness—is
mental, but redness itself is not. Nor is (this kind
same intrinsic properties, when arranged appropriately,
give rise to of) redness a
physical, structural property. So panqualityism has secured a
conscious experience.

neutral
base with which we are intimately familiar. Chalmers conjectures 5.5 Realistic Empiricism: Powerful Qualities
that
In his book The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell.
versions of [panqualityism] were popular among the neutral Neutral Monism Reconceived (2014), Erik Banks presents a critical
survey
monists of
the early twentieth century, including William James of the big three of neutral monism, as well as his own
development of the
(1904b), Ernst
Mach (1886), and Bertrand Russell (1921). doctrine.
(Chalmers 2015: 271)
The neutral monist core of Banks’s view amounts to this:
But panqualityism also has a growing number of contemporary defenders.
Sam Coleman, for instance, has developed panqualityism in a number of individual events are neutral, neither mental nor physical. Neutral
interesting new directions and restored its place within ongoing
debates events make up “physical” systems and extensions and
“mental”
about the metaphysics of mind (Coleman 2014, 2017a, 2017b,
2022). sensations in minds through different functional
relations. (Banks
2014: 203)
Of course, one may wonder how an electron’s being red can ground
its
negative charge or share Wilfrid Sellars’ (1963: 35) view
that it makes no This is very much in keeping with the traditional version of neutral
sense to think that fundamental physical entities
might have primitive monism, especially Russell’s event-based version. But Banks
embeds this
sensory qualities like redness. One may also
share Chalmers’ worry that core idea into a larger metaphysical framework. The
resulting theory is
qualities, no matter how intricately
arranged, cannot ground the thoroughly original.
phenomenal properties of our experience
for “no instantiations of qualities
ever necessitate awareness
of qualities” (Chalmers 2015: 273). Whether In a first step, Banks explains how this core idea fits into a larger
a
panqualityists can
offer satisfactory replies to such objections is a matter posteriori physicalist picture. Physicalism, according to
Banks, is best
of ongoing
debate. thought of as the view that mental supervenes on the
physical. Standard
physicalism focuses on the question of how mental
properties and
What the consideration of Russellian Monism shows is that (i) new relations depend physical properties and relations. But
Banks sides with
versions of neutral monism are currently being developed that
emphasize the Russellian monist in holding that standard
physicalism does not
somewhat different considerations than those of traditional
neutral specify the nature of the entities that exemplify
these properties and
monism; (ii) but even the most promising and well-developed
versions of relations. So-called “enhanced
physicalism” goes beyond standard
Russellian neutral monism face considerable
challenges. physicalism in specifying the
nature of the entities that bear or instantiate
the relevant
properties and relations:
In enhanced physicalism…the instantiation of all physical

properties are individualized event particulars in causal-functional
relations to each other. (Banks 2014: 147)

This is how the neutral events slot into the enhanced physicalist
picture 2014:
149).[25]
There is no separate, more fundamental level of reality
that Banks favors. underlying
the events. The powers just are the events. The neural energy
is
identical with the event that is the electrical discharging of a
group of
In a second step, Banks provides us with an account of events. Events neurons; this same neural energy is also identical with the
event that is a
have, and are individuated by, intrinsic characters or concrete
qualities. sensation of blue. But, and this is a crucial part of
Banks’s view, the
None of those qualities are mental; but experience
familiarizes us with discharge events are not identical with the
blue sensation. Banks sees the
some of them (see Banks 2014: 6). These qualities
are the ways certain question that this poses clearly:
powers manifest themselves in events (see Banks
2014: 6). Examples of
such powers (or energies) include
electromagnetism, gravitation, and how can it be the case that the powers are identical with each of
nuclear forces, and, most relevant
in the present context, neural energy— their token manifestations and even identical qua powers across
the internal energies in
neurons (see Banks 2014,149, 203). Manifesting different token manifestation events, but that different token
itself qualitatively at
the level of the single neuron, this energy may yield manifestation events are not identical to each other? (Banks 2014:
an electrical
discharge event; but manifesting itself at the level of a 149)
complex
brain event—an event that is “somehow
‘composed’ of neurons
firing in some kind of
cluster” (Banks 2014: 147)—this very same neural This is not an easy knot to unravel. Perhaps an appeal to the
controversial
energy
may yield the event that is a sensation of blue. This closes the notion of “relative identity” might help.
apparent chasm between the experience of blue and the firing of a
bunch
Assuming that the fundamentality of events has been established, we
still
of neurons:
face the question in which sense they qualify as neutral.
Consider
the quality blue and the individual electrical discharges are just
the event of seeing a blue patch and the event of having all the
different and mutually exclusive manifestations of the same natural
configured neurons fire in the region of the brain
responsible for
powers which we mistakenly see as belonging to totally different
seeing the blue patch. (Banks 2014: 164)
categories of event. (Banks 2014: 164)
To the naïve opinion that the first of these events is mental,
while the
This is an attractive picture, but it is difficult to see it as a
monism of
second is physical, Banks replies as follows:
neutral events. Wherein does the neutrality of these
events—an experience
of blue and neural firing
events—consist? Moreover, it is not obvious that The phenomenon of sensation simply falls into place as a certain
events (whether
neutral or not) play a fundamental ontological role. In type
of physical event among others in nature. The separate
their place we
find the powers/energies that give rise to events. category of
mental phenomena simply ceases to exist, except as a
provisional way
of talking. (Banks 2014: 164)
Banks addresses this second problem head on: Powers are identical with
their token manifestations, identical with the events that consist in
the
individual qualities wherein these powers manifest themselves (see
Banks

The monism expressed in this answer is beyond reasonable doubt; but

the current wave of
interest in the traditional versions of neutral monism, as
neutrality is somewhat elusive. well as the
lively development of alternative versions of neutral monism,
indicate
that neutral monism is, once more, becoming a live option in the
6. Concluding Remarks ongoing efforts to explore the metaphysics of
mind.[26]
The traditional versions of neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell Bibliography
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1.
Galen Strawson has explored the idea underlying the Both View at
Academic Tools considerable depth, though he has presented it as a version of (real)
physicalism and panpsychism rather than as a form of neutral monism
(see
How to cite this entry. Strawson 1994: 46–7, 55–9, 72–5; Strawson 2006:
187–8, 238ff; Strawson
Preview the PDF version of this entry at the
Friends of the SEP 2016.).
Society.
Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry
at the Internet 2.
In his 1948, Russell further analyzes events into bundles of
(concrete)
Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). universals. For more on Russell’s view, see Maclean
2014.
Enhanced bibliography for this entry
at PhilPapers, with links
to its database. 3.
Note that views according to which all neutral entities are events,
substances, properties, and/or some other category, are compatible
with
Other Internet Resources the existence of multiple kinds within such categories (so long
as they are
neutral in character).
Papers on Neutral Monism,
in philpapers.org.
Papers on Russellian Monism,
in philpapers.org. 4.
More rarely, the German philosopher and psychophysicist Gustav
Fechner (1801–87) has been described as an early pioneer of
neutral
Related Entries monism (Clarke 2004, Textor 2021b). However, Fechner is
generally
deemed a panpsychist or dual-aspect theorist.
consciousness |
dualism |
Hume, David |
James, William |
logical atomism:
Russell’s |
logical constructions |
Mach, Ernst |
mind/brain identity theory | 5.
See Pincock 2018 and Wishon 2021. Note that Ward seemingly used the
monism |
monism: Russellian |
panpsychism |
perception: epistemological term “neutral monism” to refer to Spinozistic dual-aspect
theories.
problems of |
perception: the problem of |
physicalism |
qualia |
Russell,
Bertrand |
sense data |
structural realism 6.
Russell’s treatment of images in his early neutral monist works
(1919,
1921) has led a number of commentators to classify Russell as a
dualist of
sorts. Russell himself acknowledges that “we seem to
find a certain
Acknowledgments
dualism, perhaps not ultimate…as to the causal
laws” (Russell 1921: 137)
We would like to give a special thanks to Galen Strawson for many that govern sensations and images
respectively. The great difficulty of
insightful discussions about neutral monism and to an anonymous
referee finding a coherent
interpretation of these texts is due, in part, to Russell’s
for a set of very useful comments. We also thank the late Erik
Banks, reliance on two different criteria of neutrality: the Neither View and
the
whose numerous writings on Mach and the history of neutral
monism Law View. It is doubtful that one can have it both ways. But note
that
taught us much about the view.

Russell never suggests that images are mental, in the sense of

being observation as the most reliable way of obtaining
knowledge” (Russell
directed at an object. 1927b: 129).
7.
Note the epistemic risk incurred by admitting inferred entities into
the 11.
Russell’s recurring remarks that physics is purely abstract
prompted
realm of the known. As this risk increases, the epistemic yield of Max Newman’s well-known objection that such knowledge
would render
following the method of logical construction diminishes. It is worth
noting physics either false or trivial—as it would at most
only capture the
that Russell never intended his logical constructions to secure
knowledge cardinality of the physical world. To this, Russell
replied in his
against traditional skepticism. autobiography: “I had always assumed
spatio-temporal continuity with the
world of percepts, that is to say,
I had assumed that there might be co-
8.
The reasons for the first inferential step are stated in (Russell
1927a: punctuality between percepts and
non-percepts, and even that one could
278–282). For an extended presentation of the inferences
involved in the pass by a finite number of steps
(from one event to another compresent
last two steps, see (Russell 1927a: ch. 20). For
Russell’s final thoughts with it) from one end of the
universe to the other. And co-punctuality I
about what we must assume about the
world in order to infer the existence regarded as a relation
which might exist among percepts and is itself
of events other than our own
sensations, images, and percepts, see (Russell perceptible”
(1968: 259). For more on this debate, see Landini 2017.
1948: Part VI).
12.
Russell’s two theses that all fundamental entities are events
and that all
9.
Russell’s views on the epistemic accessibility of our
sensations are fundamental entities are neutral entities are distinct,
but they combine
difficult to pin down exactly. Sensations are the
“theoretical core” (Russell naturally in Russell’s neutral monism.
1921: 132) or our percepts. As
such they remain “more or less
hypothetical” (Russell
1927b: 212). Some of his examples suggests that 13.
Russell counts Dewey among the American neutral monists in his An
we can attend to them;
others suggest that we cannot isolate them from Outline of Philosophy (1927b: 303). More recently, Richard Gale
has also
other components of
our percepts. argued forcefully that “Dewey developed a version of
James’s neutral
monism” (2010: 56). Peter
Godfrey-Smith—himself somewhat
10.
While Russell insists that our knowledge of the qualities of our
mental sympathetic to neutral monism
(see his “3:AM Interview”)—has similarly
episodes is “the most immediate knowledge of which we
have suggested
that Dewey might best be thought of as a neutral monist (2014:
experience”, he does not accept the so-called Revelation
Thesis which is 5-6).
However, Gale’s discussions of this thesis also makes it quite
clear
routinely attributed to him (Johnston 1992). According
to this thesis, we that this interpretation is quite controversial (1997, 2002,
2010).
can fully grasp the intrinsic nature of our mental
episodes and/or their
aspects on the basis of careful introspective
attention. In point of fact, 14.
David Chalmers’s paper “Panpsychism and
Panprotopsychism”
Russell repeatedly emphasizes that
introspection is limited, “exceedingly (Chalmers 2015) provides an illuminating
account of the dialectic that
fallible and quite
peculiarly liable to falsification in accordance with drives some contemporary philosophers to
explore the little known neutral
preconceived
theory” (Russell 1921: 223-4). Even so, he sees
“self- monistic territory.

15.
In this way, neutral monism can solve the traditional dualist problem careful to distinguish their
narrow notions of being ‘mental’ from broader
of perception by maintaining that “we cannot say that
‘matter is the cause ones
(Strawson 2020: 324; though see Wishon 2020 for a different reading
of our sensations” (1927b: 290). Mach
agrees: “Bodies do not produce of
Russell).
sensations” (Mach 1886:
29). To suggest otherwise is to rely on “the
monstrous idea of
employing atoms to explain psychical processes” (Mach 19.
One of Russell’s early criticisms of neutral monism was based
on a
1886:
311). Matter/bodies are, after all, nothing but systems of neutral similar idea:
entities, i.e., of Russellian events or Machian elements. And, for all
we
I cannot think that the difference between my seeing the patch of
know, the events/elements causing a sensation may be quite similar
to the
red,
and the patch of red being there unseen, consists in the
sensation it causes. This closes the apparent chasm between the
“material
presence or
absence of relations between the patch of red and other
process” and the ensuing experience, and the
mystery of perception
objects of the
same kind…. (1914b: 148)
vanishes.
But as his doubts about the existence of the self and of the
acquaintance
16.
None of the other neutral monists took the suggestion that
relation grew, what had seemed unthinkable gradually came
to seem
sensations/percepts might occur in the brain seriously. James mentions
the
plausible.
possibility in a footnote, only to dismiss it as “not
seriously defensible”
(James 1904a: 79). Mach warns against the
“absurdity that can be 20.
This raises the question of whether Landini should deem Russell an
committed by thinking sensations
spatially into the brain” (Mach 1886: emergentist property-dualist rather than a physicalist.
27). Petzoldt rails
against the “barbaric quid pro quo that lets the
psychological
sensation get into the brain together with the physiological 21.
One might reasonably take information in Sayre’s sense to be a
feature
stimulation” (Petzoldt 1906: 170). And a good deal of
Avenarius’s thought of ordinary concrete reality. But it is unclear
whether or not such
is directed against the fallacy of
“introjection”—the fallacy of locating information is itself concrete, which at
least raises questions about the
thought
(broadly conceived) in the brain. relation between information and
concrete reality. Our thanks to an
anonymous referee for raising this
challenge.
17.
As noted in 2.3.1 above, Russell does not strictly eliminate or
reduce
logically constructed entities. Rather, it simply frees our
relevant bodies of 22.
For the record, Heil does not defend this identity claim as stated in
the
knowledge from any commitment to the existence of
such inferred example. He defends the weaker claim that every token occurrence
of pain
entities. can be described in a physical vocabulary.
18.
Note that such physicalist interpretations are not a problem for
those 23.
Given the fact that Nagel allows that the neutral properties might
give
who accept the Both View of neutrality. This is why
Strawson, for instance, rise to mental or protomental properties, the view ends up being
even
is able to say that the neutral monisms of
James and Russell are forms of more complex than presented here.
(real) materialism and panpsychism at
the same time—as long as we are

Neutral Monism
24.
This is a version of the thesis of structuralism about physics.
Russell is
a prominent defender of this view, hence the name
“Russellian monism.”
His remark that “the aim of
physics, consciously or unconsciously, has
always been to discover
what we may call the causal skeleton of the
world” (1927a: 391;
cf. Russell 1931: 132–3) vividly captures the
structuralist
idea. The best source for recent work on Russellian monism is
Alter
and Nagasawa 2015.
25.
Here we see C.B. Martin’s “surprising identity”
between
dispositionality and qualitativity (Martin 2008: 64) being
used to further
the case of neutral monism. Although John Heil (see
5.2) is a leading
advocate of this idea, his case for neutral monism
does not turn on it.
26.
Other contemporaries exploring new directions for neutral monism
include Michael Silberstein (Silberstein 2020; Silberstein and Chemero
2015), Jonathan Westphal (2016), Iva Apostolova (Apostolova 2004,
2022; Apostolova and Frederick-Wagner 2020), and Andrea Pace
Giannotta
(2018, 2021), among others.
Copyright © 2023 by the authors
Leopold Stubenberg and Donovan Wishon
72 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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Stanford Encyclopedia Neutral monism is a monistic metaphysics. It holds that ultimate

Neutral monism is compatible with the existence of many neutral

2.2 William James 1. Neutral Monism

2 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2023 Edition 3

groups mental or material?

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If we admit—as I think we should—that the patch of color

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arguably cannot distinguish

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the other hand there is the

Baruch Spinoza (1632–77) and David Hume (1711–76) are

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on Mach’s ideas was Rudolf Carnap in his

12 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2023 Edition 13

14 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2023 Edition 15

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nature, Russell maintained that our knowledge

When Russell looks at neutral monism, he sees a theory that embodies

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For an entity to be neutral is to “have neither the hardness and

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intrinsic nonmentality of these items. Moreover, this

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of the general movement to explore all possible options in the

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subject and its perceptual object becomes the

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are composites constituted by

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4.6 The Dualism Suspicion way, they are

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experience—e.g. when a drunkard

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Sayre’s main work on neutral monism is his 1976. In recent

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In enhanced physicalism…the instantiation of all physical

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The monism expressed in this answer is beyond reasonable doubt; but

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Ayer, A.J., 1971, Russell and Moore. The Analytical

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Crawford, Sean, 2021, “Schlick, Carnap and Feigl on the

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Ralph Barton Perry, Walter B. Pitkin, and Edward

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doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-2196-5_13 Petzoldt, Joseph, 1900, Einführung in die Philosophie der

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–––, 1917, Mysticism and Logic, London:

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Skrbina, David, 2005, Panpsychism in the West, Cambridge,

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–––, 2021, “Radical Empiricism, Neutral

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Russell never suggests that images are mental, in the sense of

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