Article 13

An Examination of the Nature of Trust in Buyer-Seller Relationships
Author(s): Patricia M. Doney and Joseph P. Cannon

Source: Journal of Marketing , Apr., 1997, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Apr., 1997), pp. 35-51
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of American Marketing Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1251829
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Patricia M. Doney and Joseph P. Cannon
An Examination of the Nature of

Trust in Buyer-Seller Relationships
The authors integrate theory developed in several disciplines to determine five cognitive processes through wh
industrial buyers can develop trust of a supplier firm and its salesperson. These processes provide a theoreti
framework used to identify antecedents of trust. The authors also examine the impact of supplier firm and sa
person trust on a buying firm's current supplier choice and future purchase intentions. The theoretical mod
tested on data collected from more than 200 purchasing managers. The authors find that several variables in
ence the development of supplier firm and salesperson trust. Trust of the supplier firm and trust of the salesp
(operating indirectly through supplier firm trust) influence a buyer's anticipated future interaction with the supplier
However, after controlling for previous experience and supplier performance, neither trust of the selling firm nor it
salesperson influence the current supplier selection decision.
R apidly changing competitive environments are forc- Interorganizational trust operates as a governance mech-
ing business marketing firms to seek more creative anism (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Heide 1994) that mitigates
and flexible means for meeting competition. Many opportunism in exchange contexts characterized by uncer-
firms have responded to these challenges by building col- tainty and dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In a dis-
laborative relationships with customers and suppliers tribution channels context, research has shown that a down-
(Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow 1989). Such collaborative stream channel member that trusts its supplier exhibits
relationships rely on relational forms of exchange character- higher levels of cooperation (Morgan and Hunt 1994) and
ized by high levels of trust (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; exerts more effort on behalf of a principal (Anderson,
Morgan and Hunt 1994). The high levels of trust character- Lodish, and Weitz 1987). Trust in a supplier also reduces
istic of relational exchange enable parties to focus on the conflict and enhances channel member satisfaction (Ander-
long-term benefits of the relationship (Ganesan 1994), ulti- son and Narus 1990). Finally, a firm that trusts its supplier is
mately enhancing competitiveness and reducing transaction more committed to and intends to stay in the relationship
costs (Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990). (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Morgan and Hunt 1994).
As business marketers placed greater emphasis on build- Persons and organizations also can develop trust in a
ing long-term relationships, trust has assumed a central role supplier firm's salesperson. The sales force often plays a key
in the development of marketing theory (Dwyer, Schurr, and role in interfacing with customers and implementing mar-
Oh 1987; Morgan and Hunt 1994) and practice (Dertouzos, keting strategy. At a basic level, salespeople persuade cus-
Lester, and Solow 1989). Marketing research on trust pri- tomers to purchase their firm's products. However, as firms
marily focuses on two targets of trust: supplier firms and actively seek more collaborative relationships with cus-
their salespeople. Trust of a supplier firm and trust of a sup- tomers, salespeople perform an important function in facili-
plier's salesperson, though related, represent different con- tating and developing customer trust (Swan and Nolan
cepts. For example, a long-term relationship with a trusted 1985). Research has shown that information provided by a
supplier could be jeopardized by a company representative trusted party is used more and thus provides greater value to
who proves to be dishonest and unreliable (e.g., Kelly and the recipient (Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande 1992).
Schine 1992). Conversely, highly trusted salespeople can Organizational buyers who trust salespeople exhibit more
preserve customer commitment during difficult times cre- integrative bargaining strategies, which lead to benefits for
ated by management policies that appear contrary to the cus- both parties (Schurr and Ozanne 1985).
tomer's best interests (e.g., Schiller 1992). Although trust can be engendered in a supplier firm and
its salesperson, the existing marketing research focuses on
Patricia M. Doney is Assistant Professor of Marketing, Florida Atlantic Uni-
one or the other target, not both. Anderson and Narus (1990)
versity. Joseph P. Cannon is Assistant Professor of Marketing, Goizueta suggest that trust of an individual differs in nature from that
Business School, Emory University. The authors contributed equally to this of an organization. Understanding such differences is par-
research, and the order of authorship was determined randomly. The ticularly important in business marketing situations in which
authors thank three anonymous JM reviewers and Michael Mullen for
the sales force plays a key role in implementing the sup-
comments on previous versions of the article, and Christy Edwards and
John Hobbs for assistance with data collection. The second author plier's marketing strategies and managing customer rela-
acknowledges the support of a Goizueta Business School Summer tionships. Yet surprisingly, our review of the extant literature
Research Grant. found only two studies (Swan and Nolan 1985; Young and
Wilkinson 1989) that even discuss such issues, neither pro-
Journal of Marketing
Vol. 61 (April 1997), 35-51 Trust in Buyer-Seller Relationships /35

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viding empirical tests of similarities and differences across buying context, customers can trust the supplier firm, its
the two targets of trust. salesperson, or both.
Given the emphasis placed on trust in commercial The trust literature also suggests that, regardless of the
exchange relationships, it is also important to understand level of analysis, trusting parties must be vulnerable to some
how trust influences specific aspects of customer behavior. extent for trust to become operational. In other words, deci-
It is now well established that trust supports exchange and sion outcomes must be uncertain and important to the trustor
helps partners project their exchange relationships into the (Deutsch 1962; Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande 1992;
future. However, the existing marketing research pays little Schlenker, Helm, and Tedeschi 1973). In marketing, much
attention to the impact of trust on current purchase deci- research on trust has been conducted in the context of dis-
sions. In fact, we found no studies that explicitly examine tribution channels (e.g., Anderson and Narus 1990; Ander-
how trust affects supplier selection decisions. son and Weitz 1989; Morgan and Hunt 1994) in which vul-
The purpose of this study is to provide new insight into
nerability is created by the high degree of interdependence
how trust develops and how it influences industrial buying
usually found in channel relationships (Gundlach and
behavior. We offer several contributions to the emerging
Cadotte 1994; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995). In typ-
marketing literature on trust. First, drawing on theory devel-
ical distribution channel arrangements (i.e., manufac-
oped in social psychology, sociology, economics, and mar-
turer-distributor or manufacturer-retailer), switching costs
keting, we isolate five cognitive processes through which
are relatively high. Therefore, this research stream empha-
trust can be built. These processes provide the theoretical
sizes the influence of trust on constructs central to building
framework used to identify a set of factors hypothesized to
long-term relationships with customers, such as commit-
influence the development of trust. Second, we evaluate
ment (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Morgan and Hunt
both trust of a supplier firm and its salesperson. Third, we
1994), long-term orientation (Ganesan 1994), and propen-
examine the impact of trust on the buying firm's current sup-
sity to stay in a relationship (Anderson and Weitz 1989).
plier selection decision, as well as its future purchase inten-
Although some buying firms have reduced their supplier
tions. Finally, we provide a richer understanding of trust by
base to facilitate collaboration or increase quality (Emsh-
placing both targets of trust in a larger nomological net of
constructs. willer 1991), many buyers still maintain multiple sources of
In the literature review that follows, we discuss supply.
the In an industrial buying context, then, risk could be
operative primarily when purchase situations involve modi-
nature of trust, its definition, and the five cognitive
processes through which trust can develop. Building onfiedthis
rebuys or new tasks, as opposed to straight rebuys
(Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967). Such situations involve
review, in the subsequent section, we develop a theoretical
model that outlines the antecedents and consequences greaterofdecision making on the part of the buying organiza-
tion,sec-
trust in an industrial buying context. In the next several more people in the decision-making process, and
tions, we describe an empirical study designed to testuncertainty (Johnston and Lewin 1996). Vulnerabil-
greater
hypothesized relationships, report study findings, and dis- from the buyer's reliance on a supplier firm and/or
ity stems
cuss their implications for marketing theory and practice.
its salesperson. The supplier firm sets policies and develops
We conclude by outlining study limitations and an agenda
strategies that can affect the buying firm's costs and quality.
for further research. The salesperson, as the primary contact with the buying
firm, provides valuable information and consultation to
Literature Review members of the buying center. To make current purchase
decisions and long-term relational commitments, buyers
Trust has received a great deal of attention in social psy-
must determine the extent to which they can trust suppliers
chology (e.g., Deutsch 1960; Lewicki and Bunker 1995;
and their salespeople.
Lindskold 1978), sociology (e.g., Lewis and Weigert 1985;
Strub and Priest 1976), and economics (e.g., Dasgupta 1988;
Defining Trust
Williamson 1991), as well as marketing (e.g., Anderson and
Weitz 1989; Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Ganesan 1994; Drawing on literature in social psychology (Larzelere and
Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman 1993; Moorman, Zalt- Huston 1980) and marketing, we define trust as the per-
man, and Deshpande 1992). Each discipline offers uniqueceived credibility and benevolence of a target of trust (cf.
Ganesan 1994; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995). The
insights into the nature of trust, its definition, and the
processes through which it develops. first dimension of trust focuses on the objective credibility
of an exchange partner, an expectancy that the partner's
Nature of Trust word or written statement can be relied on (Lindskold 1978).
The second dimension of trust, benevolence, is the extent to
Much research explores the importance of trust in interper-
sonal dyads (e.g., Rotter 1967; Schlenker, Helm, and which one partner is genuinely interested in the other part-
Tedeschi 1973). Although some researchers disagree about ner's welfare and motivated to seek joint gain. This defini-
whether organizations can be targets of trust, a large streamtion of trust is relevant in an industrial buying context. A
of literature emphasizes that people can develop trust in buying firm facing some degree of risk in a purchase situa-
public institutions (Lewis and Weigert 1985) or organization turs to a supplier or salesperson that the buyer believes
tions (Morgan and Hunt 1994), as well as individuals. is able to perform effectively and reliably (credible) and is
interested in the customer's best interests (benevolent).
Therefore, the trust literature suggests that in an industrial
36 / Journal of Marketing, April 1997

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Developing Trust Finally, trust can develop through a transference process.
Strub and Priest (1976, p. 399) describe the "extension pat-
The development of trust relies on the formation of a
tern" of gaining trust as using a "third party's definition of
trustor's expectations about the motives and behaviors of a
another as a basis for defining that other as trustworthy." This
trustee. Because of the broad nature of trust and its varied
suggests that trust can be transferred from one trusted "proof
conceptual roots, our review of the trust literature uncovered
source" to another person or group with which the trustor has
five distinct processes by which trust can develop in busi-
little or no direct experience (Milliman and Fugate 1988;
ness relationships.
Strub and Priest 1976). For example, a new salesperson rep-
The economics literature (e.g., Dasgupta 1988;
resenting a highly trusted firm would benefit from the
Williamson 1991) suggests that trust primarily involves a buyer's past experience with the supplier firm. Conversely,
calculative process, as when an individual or organization distrust also can be transferred if a person lacks other infor-
calculates the costs and/or rewards of another party cheatingmation. For example, a person's past experience with auto-
or staying in the relationship (Lindskold 1978). To the extent mobile or insurance salespeople often results in an initial
that the benefits of cheating do not exceed the costs of beingstate of distrust (Adkins and Swan 1980-81).
caught (factoring in the likelihood of being caught), one Clearly, some factors can invoke multiple trust-building
party infers that it would be contrary to the other party's bestprocesses. For example, frequent contact with a supplier's
interest to cheat and therefore the party can be trustedsalesperson can invoke the prediction process by helping the
(Akerlof 1970). For example, Rao and Bergen (1992) findbuyer more accurately predict the salesperson's behavior.
that buying firms pay premium prices to suppliers to ensure Or, the buyer could interpret frequent contact as an indica-
high levels of quality. Essentially, buyers raise the costs oftion of the salesperson's genuine interest in the buying
cheating because suppliers caught acting "untrustworthy" firm's welfare, thereby invoking the intentionality process.
lose a stream of premium rents from future purchases. Therefore, each process represents a different manner in
The prediction process of developing trust relies on one which subjective probability judgments of a partner's trust-
party's ability to forecast another party's behavior. Because worthiness can be made.
trust requires an assessment of the other party's credibility
and benevolence, one party must have information about the
other party's past behavior and promises. Repeated interac-
Research Hypotheses
The five trust-building processes provide insight into how
tion enables the party to interpret prior outcomes better, pro-
trust of a selling firm and salesperson are established in the
viding a basis for assessing predictability. For example,
industrial buyer-supplier context of this research. As the pri-
through repeatedly making promises and delivering on
mary supplier contact, the salesperson represents an impor-
them, a salesperson develops the confidence of a buying
tant personal source of trust for the buying firm. The sup-
firm (Doyle and Roth 1992; Swan and Nolan 1985). Extend-
plier firm provides an alternative source of trust through its
ing this line of reasoning, Lewicki and Bunker (1995) sug-
policies, actions, and personnel. Because of the personal and
gest that predictability as a source of trust requires not only
impersonal nature of these two targets of trust, the manner
repeated interaction, but also courtship (see also Shapiro,
through which each fosters trust is likely to differ. In Table
Sheppard, and Cheraskin 1992). Courtship behavior is 1, we summarize the five trust-building processes and link
directed at relationship development-specifically, learning
them to factors hypothesized to develop supplier firm and
more about the other party. This suggests that trust grows
salesperson trust. Although each antecedent factor can trig-
when two parties share a variety of experiences, thereby
ger multiple trust-building processes and one process can
improving each's ability to predict the other's behavior. trigger another, we focus on the primary processes likely to
The capability process involves determining another be invoked by each antecedent factor.
party's ability to meet its obligations, thereby focusing pri- In Figure 1, we offer a conceptual overview of the
marily on the credibility component of trust. For example, aempirical study. Hypothesized antecedents to trust represent
salesperson promises the customer prompt delivery, despite characteristics of the supplier firm and its salesperson, and
a supply being on allocation due to shortages. Yet if the cus-aspects of the buying firm's relationship with each, which
tomer doubts whether the salesperson has the clout neededprovide a basis for the buying firm to infer trust. The con-
to move its order up in the queue, the customer will be reluc- ceptual model also includes key outcomes of trust-the buy-
tant to trust the salesperson's word. ing firm's current supplier selection decision and anticipated
Trust also emerges through interpretation and assess- future interaction with the supplier. We detail the logic
ment of the other party's motives. Using the intentionality underlying our theoretical model in the following sections.
process, the trustor interprets the target's words and behav-
iors and attempts to determine its intentions in exchange Developing Trust in a Supplier Firm:
(Lindskold 1978). People or groups motivated to help or Characteristics of the Supplier
reward the perceiver will be more trusted than those sus- Supplier reputation. We define supplier reputation as the
pected of harboring exploitative intentions. Inferences of extent to which firms and people in the industry believe a sup-
benevolent intentions also can result when two parties plier is honest and concerned about its customers. A favorable
develop shared values or norms (Macneil 1980) that enable reputation is easily transferable across firms and enhances the
one party to understand the other partner's objectives andcredibility of the vendor (Ganesan 1994). If a buying firm
goals better (i.e., what drives their behavior). assumes the supplier's reputation is well deserved, trust will
Trust in Buyer-Seller Relationships /37

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TABLE 1
Trust-Building Processes, Generic Drivers, and Factors that Invoke Each Process
Factors that Invoke the Trust-
Trust-Building Process Generic Driver of the Process Building Process
Calculative: Trustor calculates the costs Costs are higher when a target makes
*supplier firm reputation
and/or rewards of a target acting in anlarger and/or relationship-specific *supplier firm size
untrustworthy manner investments *supplier firm willingness to customize
*supplier firm confidential information
sharing
*length of relationship with supplier firm
*length of relationship with salesperson
Prediction: Trustor develops confidence

Trustor learns more about the target *length of relationship with supplier firm
that target's behavior can be predicted
through repeated and broader *salesperson likability
experience *salesperson similarity
*frequent social contact with
salesperson
*frequent business contact with
salesperson
*length of relationship with salesperson
Evidence of the target's ability to fulfill *salesperson expertise

Capability: Trustor assesses the target's
ability to fulfill its promises its promises *salesperson power
Intentionality Trustor evaluates the Target's words and/or behavior ?supplier firm willingness to customize
target's motivations indicates concern for the trustor *supplier firm confidential information
sharing
?salesperson likability
?salesperson similarity
*frequent social contact with salesperson
Transference: Trustor draws on "proof Identification of trusted sources closely ?supplier firm reputation
sources," from which trust is transferred
associated with the target ?supplier firm size
to the target ?trust of supplier firm
*trust of salesperson
be granted on the basis of the supplier's history in relation- trusted. First, through the process of transference, a buying
ships with other firms. In other words, buyers infer the trust- firm could draw on the experience of others to infer trust-
worthiness of a supplier through the words and actions of worthiness from supplier size. Overall size and market
other people and organizations. Therefore, the process of share indicate that many other businesses trust this supplier
transference can be used to predict a positive relationship enough to do business with it. This suggests that the sup-
between supplier reputation and trust of the selling firm. plier consistently delivers on its promises to others or it
Buyers also can use the calculative process to estimate would not have been able to maintain its position in the
that the costs of a supplier acting in an untrustworthy man- industry. Second, we might expect that less trustworthy,
ner are quite high for firms with good reputations. Because more opportunistic suppliers operate as fly-by-night orga-
developing a favorable reputation involves significant invest- nizations and would be unable to build sales volume or
ment and represents a valuable asset (Dasgupta 1988), firms market share (Hill 1990). As a result, buyers could use th
are reluctant to jeopardize their reputation by acting oppor- calculative process to determine that larger suppliers inc
tunistically (Telser 1980). Even if opportunities exist, any more significant costs through untrustworthy behavior th
short-term gains from untrustworthy behavior can be bal- do smaller suppliers.
anced against the rewards of maintaining a good reputation. Formally stated,
Empirical evidence supports the link between supplier
Hi: Buying firm trust in the supplier firm is positively relate
reputation and buyer trust. In a study of industrial channel
to the supplier's reputation.
dyads, Ganesan (1994) finds that a retailer's favorable per-
H2: Buying firm trust in the supplier firm is positively relate
ception of a vendor's reputation leads to increased credibil-
to the supplier's size.
ity, one of two dimensions of trust. Similarly, Anderson and
Weitz (1989) find that a channel member's trust in a manu-
facturer is positively related to the manufacturer's reputation Developing Trust in a Supplier Firm:
for fair dealings with channel members. Characteristics of the Relationship
Supplier size. Supplier size encompasses the firm's Supplier willingness to customize. A supplier could offe
overall size and its market share position. Supplier size pro- to make, or actually make, idiosyncratic investments in th
vides a signal to the buying firm that the selling firm can be relationship. Such investments might include specializ

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FIGURE 1
Antecedents and Consequences of Trust of a Supplier Firm and Salesperson
I
r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Characteristics of the Supplier Firm

*Reputation
*Size
kl-
J\
_ n
Characteristics of the Supplier Firm Relationship

*Willingness to customize
*Confidential information sharing
*Length of relationship
I J
l^^~~~~~~~~~~-
-
-
Characteristics of the Salesperson 4

-Expertise
-Power
r )
Characteristics of the Salesperson Relationship

-Likability
-Similarity
?Frequent business contact
?Frequent social contact
2-1- r -I
?Length of relationship Control Variables

<^ *Delivery performance
*Relative price/cost
*Product/service performance
*Purchase experience with supplier
J
equipment or stantial investment. For example, because the buyer could

adaptation of pr
buyer's disclose confidential
needs. information to the supplier's competi-
Williamson (1
cratic tors, the costs of this information being
investments used improperly can
change the
firms makingbe high (cf.idiosyncratic
Kelly and Kerwin 1993). Buying firms that
engage in believe their suppliers cannot be trusted are more likely to
opportunistic beh
threatens the behave in an untrustworthy manner themselves, such as by
continuation of
syncratic passing along this
assets cansensitive informationlose
(John 1984). As a subst
tionship is continued (Ander
result, buyers could calculate that the costs of untrustworthy
could use the behavior increase as the selling firm shares more confiden-
calculative proce
untrustworthy tial information
behavior with them. are h
syncratic The extent to which a supplier shares
investments at confidential
stake infor-
Willingness mation make
to with the buyer also provides a signal of "good faith"
idiosync
vides evidence to that
the buying firm. Thea suppliervendor
uses a "disclosure pattern" c
relationship, to establish trust
and it by providing
is tangible evidence that the
willing
1994). The supplier is willing to make itself
supplier's vulnerable (Strub and
willingne
nals to the Priest 1976). Therefore,
buying the process of intentionality
firm that also
erate (Lindskoldcould be invoked
1978; because sharing confidential
Strub information a
ior could invokesignals to thethe
buyer that the supplier's
process motives and inten- o
idiosyncratic tions are benevolent-that is, the supplier can be trusted.pro
investments
plier's motives Length are benevolent
of relationship. Most researchers agree that
demonstrates trustthat buyers
develops and builds over time. Two trust-building tru
having made idiosyncratic
processes can explain why trust in the selling firm inv
Confidential increases with the length of the buyer-supplier relation-
information sha
tion sharing ship. First, length of time represents
involves the an investment
exten both
vate information with their customers. The calculative parties make in the relationship. To the extent that buyers
perceive such investments on the part of suppliers, they
process suggests that buyers will trust suppliers that share
could calculate that a supplier would incur losses by acting
confidential information, because such suppliers risk a sub-
Trust in Buyer-Seller Relationships / 39

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in an opportunistic (i.e., untrustworthy) manner. Second, H7: Buying firm trust in the supplier's salesperson is positively
the process of prediction also can be invoked as a relation- related to the buyer's perceptions that the salesperson has
power in the supplier firm.
ship grows older. When exchange relationships have a his-
tory, the outcomes of previous business episodes provide a
framework for subsequent interaction. With increased Developing Trust in the Salesperson:
experience, firms are more likely to have successfully Characteristics of the Relationship
weathered critical shake-out periods in their relationship Likability. Salesperson likability refers to the buyer's
(Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Scanzoni 1979) and gained assessment that people in the buying firm find the salesper-
a greater understanding of each other's idiosyncrasies son friendly, nice, and pleasant to be around. Prior research
(Williamson 1985). Therefore, longer relationships facili- in psychology (Rotter 1980) generally finds a positive rela-
tate the buyer's ability to predict the supplier's future tionship between a person's likability and the extent to
behavior. Empirically, Anderson and Weitz (1989) find that which the person is trusted by others. Because initial trust
a channel member's trust in a manufacturer increases with
depends on the buyer's confidence in predicting the accu-
the age of the relationship. racy of statements made by the salesperson, a positive rela-
Formally stated, tionship between trust and liking can occur as a result of the
H3: Buying firm trust in the supplier firm is positively related

prediction process. Buyers are more confident of their pre-
to a supplier's willingness to make investments specific to dictions about someone they like (Swan and Nolan 1985).
a buying firm. Salesperson trust also can be engendered by means of the
H4: Buying firm trust in the supplier firm is positively related intentionality process: Buyers attribute favorable motives to
to more confidential information sharing by a supplier those they like (Rotter 1980).
firm.
Empirical studies in business marketing show that feel-
H5: Buying firm trust in the supplier firm is positively related ings of trust in the salesperson are positively related to lik-
to the length of time a supplier firm and buyer firm have ing. For example, Swan and colleagues (1988) find that lik-
been in contact.
ability is a distinct dimension of trust in the salesperson.
Hawes, Mast, and Swan (1989) find that buyers attribute
Developing Trust in a Salesperson: positive trust-earning value to manufacturers' representa-
Characteristics of the Salesperson tives who were "likable." Finally, salespeople report that to
Expertise. Trust that is based on a partner's expertise gain customer trust, customers must see them as "likable" or
focuses on an expectancy held by a person that the part-"a friend" (Swan, Trawick, and Silva 1985).
ner's word or written statement can be relied on (Lind- Similarity. Similarity assesses the buyer's belief that the
skold 1978). Through the capability process, salesperson
salesperson shares common interests and values with people
expertise builds a buying firm's trust by increasing its con-
in the buying firm. In goal-interdependent situations, simi-
fidence that a salesperson can deliver on his or her larity can be a cue for expecting the other party to facilitate
promises. Empirically, the role salesperson expertise playsone's goals (Johnson and Johnson 1972). Therefore, simi-
in fostering trust has received some attention in the mar- larity can trigger the intentionality and/or prediction
keting literature. Busch and Wilson (1976) find that cus-process. Buyers who perceive salespeople to be similar to
tomers view salespeople with higher levels of perceived themselves could expect such salespeople to hold common
expert power as more trustworthy. In a study examiningbeliefs about what behaviors, goals, and policies are appro-
the use of marketing research, Moorman, Deshpande, andpriate. Trust is fostered because the buyer feels better able to
Zaltman (1993) find that researcher expertise is an impor-
assess the salesperson's intentions-that is, buyers attribute
tant foundation for trust. Finally, Crosby, Evans, and benevolent intentions to "similar" salespeople they believe
Cowles (1990) show that the perceived expertise of an share their values. Understanding the salesperson's motiva-
insurance salesperson is a significant predictor of customer
tions also makes it easier for a buyer to predict the salesper-
trust.
son's future behavior, thereby building trust through the
Power. Salesperson power is defined as the buying process of prediction.
firm's belief that the salesperson is capable of providing Frequent contact with the salesperson. When salespeo-
buyer outcomes that match what the salesperson says or ple have frequent contact with customers for business or
promises. For example, a salesperson who promises to expe- social purposes, trust can be engendered because buyers can
dite an order could be doubted if the buyer believes that the
observe the salesperson's behavior across a variety of situa-
salesperson lacks control over the organizational resources tions. Frequent interaction fosters trust by giving buyers
needed to fulfill the promise (Swan and Nolan 1985). There- information that helps them predict the salesperson's future
fore, power can increase trust in the salesperson by means of behavior with confidence. Social interaction with members
the capability process. Empirically, Moorman, Deshpande, of the buying firm also gives the salesperson a chance to
and Zaltman (1993) find that when researcher power in the "court" the buyer. Social settings provide an informal envi-
organization is higher, trust of the researcher is higher.
ronment conducive to enhanced information flow, building
Formally stated, closer interpersonal relationships, and fostering better
H6: Buying firm trust in the supplier's salesperson is positively understanding of mutual needs. Through the intentionality
related to the buyer's perceptions that the salesperson has process, frequent social interaction can engender trust,
expertise. because buyers attribute benevolent intentions to salespeo-
401 Journal of Marketing, April 1997

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pie with whom they share common professional and social Hi3: Buying firm trust in the salesperson is positively related
bonds. to buying firm trust in the supplier firm.
Empirically, the frequency with which salespeople and H14: Buying firm trust in the supplier firm is positively related
customers communicate for business or social reasons has to buying firm trust in the salesperson.
been shown to be a key determinant of relationship mainte-

nance in the insurance field (Crosby, Evans, and Cowles Consequences of Trust
1990). Although Crosby, Evans, and Cowles (1990) primar-
Role of trust in supplier selection. Relatively little
ily study business contacts, they find a positive relationship
research examines the role of trust in supplier selection deci-
between contact intensity and salesperson trust.
sions. The only example we found was in a consumer tele-
Length of relationship. As stated previously, the process marketing context (Milliman and Fugate 1988). Conversely,
of prediction and the calculative process could explain why a relatively large body of work in social psychology sug-
trust of the selling firm increases with the length of the gests that source credibility has important links to trust and
buyer-supplier relationship. The same processes are purchase decision making. Source credibility is the extent to
involved when the target of trust is the salesperson. First, which a communicator is perceived to be a source of valid
buyers can calculate that the salesperson's investment in the assertions (i.e., credible), and the degree of confidence in the
relationship increases with time. Because the salesperson's communicator's intent to communicate the assertions he or
investment would be jeopardized by untrustworthy behavior, she considers most valid (i.e., benevolent). Other research
the salesperson can be trusted. Second, longer relationships shows that the extent to which the source is seen as inter-
facilitate the buyer's ability to predict the salesperson's ested in the target's best interests, as opposed to their own
future behavior. Because people learn through experience (i.e., appears benevolent), also enhances persuasion (Choo
how much to trust others (Lindskold 1978), the length of a 1964). Therefore, supplier firms and salespeople deemed to
buyer's relationship with a salesperson should enhance trust be trustworthy (credible and benevolent) will be considered
because it provides assurance that the salesperson's future credible sources. Because credibility enhances persuasion,
behavior will mirror past behavior. trusted suppliers and salespeople should be more successful
Formally stated, in favorably influencing the supplier selection decision than
should less trustworthy suppliers and salespeople. This pre-
H8: Buying firm trust in the supplier's salesperson is posi-
diction is supported by the fact that highly trusted sources
tively related to perceived likability.
induce more positive attitudes toward the ideas they advo-
H9: Buying firm trust in the supplier's salesperson is posi-
tively related to perceived similarity.
cate than do less trustworthy sources (Kelman and Hovland
1953).
Hlo: Buying firm trust in the supplier's salesperson is posi-
tively related to frequent business contact. Hi5: Buying firm trust in a supplier firm is positively related to
HI : Buying firm trust in the supplier's salesperson is posi- the buying firm's selection of that supplier in a particular
tively related to frequent social contact. buying decision.
Hi2: Buying firm trust in the supplier's salesperson is posi- H16: Buying firm trust in a supplier's salesperson is positively
tively related to length of time the salesperson has called related to the buying firm's selection of that supplier in a
on the buying firm. particular buying decision.
Relationship Between Trust in the Supplier and Role of Trust in Future Purchase Intentions
Trust in the Salesperson The proposed link between trust in the selling firm and the
In industrial markets, a salesperson's behavior is partially buyer's future purchase intentions also reflects that buyers
attributable to the supplier firm's culture, reward systems, can rely on the integrity of suppliers they trust: The supplier
and training programs. Buying firms assume that the sales- will not knowingly act contrary to the buyer's best interests.
person's behavior reflects the supplier's values and attitudes. According to Ganesan (1994), trust is a necessary ingredient
Therefore, when a customer has limited experience with the for long-term orientation because it shifts the focus to future
supplier firm, trust of the firm can be inferred on the basis of conditions. Empirical evidence supports the notion that trust
perceptions of the salesperson's trustworthiness. Essentially, of the selling firm is central to a buyer's intention to con-
the customer's trust in the salesperson transfers to the sup- tinue the exchange relationship. Morgan and Hunt (1994)
plier firm. demonstrate a negative relationship between trust and
The transference process should operate in both direc- propensity to leave, which is defined as the perceived likeli-
tions. According to Strub and Priest (1976), trust is trans- hood that a partner will terminate the relationship in the near
ferred from the better-known party to a closely associated future. Anderson and Weitz (1989) find evidence that trust is
but less well-known group or individual. This suggests that key to maintaining continuity in conventional channel rela-
previous interactions with the supplier firm and other mem- tionships. Therefore, we propose the following:
bers of its sales force (more well-known parties) provide a
H17: Buying firm trust in a supplier firm is positively related to
basis for inferring the extent to which a current (new or less
the buying firm's anticipation of future interaction with
well-known) salesperson can be trusted. Therefore, we the supplier.
hypothesize a reciprocal causal relationship between the two
targets of trust, whereby trust in the supplier's salesperson We do not hypothesize a direct relationship between
leads to trust in the supplier firm and vice versa. trust of the salesperson and anticipated future interaction
Trust in Buyer-Seller Relationships /41

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with the supplier firm. Because salespeople frequently a questionnaire and letter requesting their participation;
change employers and territories, long-term intentions are one week later a reminder post card was mailed; and
driven primarily by expectations about the supplier firm. three weeks after the initial mailing, nonrespondents
This is not to suggest that the salesperson is not important in sent another letter and questionnaire. A total of 21 mail
the buyer's future intentions but rather that the effects of were returned because of bad addresses or respondents
salesperson trust operate indirectly through supplier firm longer involved in purchasing decisions. This proc
trust. yielded 210 completed questionnaires (a 31% respon
rate).
Control Variables Three items at the end of the instrument assessed
Although we focus on the influence of supplier and sales- respondents' (1) involvement in the purchase decision, (2)
person trust on current supplier selection decisions and influence over the purchase decision, and (3) confidence in
their
anticipated future interactions with the supplier, previous ability to answer the survey questions. One respondent
indicated
research suggests that several other variables affect indus- a low level of confidence and was removed from
trial buying decisions. Controlling for such variables pro- the sample. Remaining responses were uniformly high, with
vides a stronger test of the theory developed in our model. mean ratings (on a seven-point scale) of 6.4, 6.1, and 6.4,
respectively.
Supplierperformance. Considerable empirical and anec-
As previously noted, purchase decisions must involve
dotal evidence suggests that the primary criteria for current
some level of risk for trust to be operative. In industrial buy-
supplier selection decisions and future purchase intentions
ing, modified rebuy and new task situations involve more
involve a supplier's performance. Our review of the organi-
risk and uncertainty for the buying firm. Therefore, respon-
zational buying literature revealed three aspects of supplier
dents were asked to identify "a specific purchase decision in
performance that consistently emerged as central to the buy-
which you have recently been involved ... where more than
ing firm's evaluation of a supplier's product offering: (1)
one supplier was seriously considered." The questionnaire
delivery performance, (2) relative price/cost, and (3) prod-
then directed respondents to write the names or initials of
uct/service performance (cf. Lehmann and O'Shaugnessy
two suppliers their company considered for the purchase.
1974; Wilson 1994). Performance on these dimensions can
After answering a series of measures regarding the purchase
change from transaction to transaction as suppliers respond
situation and supply market, half of the respondents were
to competitive conditions and supply capabilities. There-
asked to reply to remaining questions with respect to the
fore, the performance measures focus on the supplier's
"first supplier" they identified, and the other half reported on
product offering relative to competitors' for the focal pur-
the "second supplier." The objective was to ensure variance
chase. We control for the effects of supplier performance on
on one of the dependent variables, current purchase choice.
the buying firm's current purchase choice and anticipated
future interaction. The process was successful in that respect, with 42% of
respondents reporting on a supplier they did not select for
Purchase experience with vendor. Many business pur- the focal purchase. Later in the questionnaire, respondents
chases represent rebuy and modified rebuy situations. Fur- were directed to indicate the name or initials of the sup-
thermore, many firms have reduced their supplier bases and plier's salesperson with whom their firm had the most con-
tend to do business with a limited set of suppliers. Becausetact. Respondents then replied to a series of measures
a buying firm might be partial to a supplier with which it has
involving this salesperson. Respondents were asked to
more purchasing experience, we control for the effects of answer all survey questions on behalf of their firm.
prior experience on current purchase choice and anticipated
future interaction. Characteristics of the sample and purchase decision.
Respondents were primarily male (76%) and averaged 15
Purchase choice. A decision to select or not select the
years' purchasing experience. The suppliers' primary busi-
focal supplier to supply current needs might influence a buy-
ness was most frequently listed as manufacturing (62%) or
ing firm's long-term intentions with respect to that supplier.
distribution (30%). Few suppliers were strangers to the
Therefore, we control for the effects of current purchase
buying firms; buying firms averaged 11 years' contact with
choice on anticipated future interaction. the focal supplier and 5.5 years with its sales representative.
These values were not significantly different (p < .05)
Method across "selected" and "unselected" suppliers. Across all
suppliers, buying firms reported that 65% had been used
Sample and Data Collection "many times" in the past, 23% had been used "a few times,"
and 12% had never been used before. In 24% of the sam-
Data on a recent purchase were collected from a sample of
firms involved in industrial manufacturing, specificallyple, purchases were made from more than one supplier. Use
firms in Standard Industrial Classification codes 33-37. of a competitive bidding process was reported in 94% of
purchase situations.
Although the sample firms purchased a variety of products,
Nonresponse bias. We assessed potential nonresponse
limiting the sample enabled us to develop more grounded
measures. The sample frame comprised 678 membersbias
of by
thecomparing early versus late respondents. More than
National Association of Purchasing Management. A half (55%) of the completed questionnaires were returned
three-
wave mailing that was based on Dillman's (1978) inrecom-
response to the final mailing. Early and late respondents
mendations was employed: (1) the entire sample waswere compared on several dimensions: characteristics of
mailed

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the respondents (gender and purchasing experience), pur- of this research. Items were generated on the basis of inter-
chase situation (number of people from the buying firm views with marketing and purchasing personnel. The mea-
involved in the decision), and supplier relationship (age of sure of supplier firm trust exhibits high reliability (a = .94).
the relationship with the supplier and whether the focal We also developed new scales to measure the selling firm's
supplier was selected for this purchase). That there were no size, reputation, and confidential information sharing, and
statistically significant differences across early and late the buying firm's anticipated future interaction with the sell-
respondents suggests that nonresponse bias is not a serious ing firm. These measures exhibit good reliability, with the
concern. lowest values of coefficient alpha being .78 for confidential
information sharing and supplier reputation.
Measure Development and Validation Age of the supplier relationship was measured using a
single item that asked how long the supplier firm had been
We developed measures following standard psychometric
scale development procedures (Anderson and Gerbing in contact with the buying firm. Purchase choice was mea-
sured with a yes/no response to whether the buying firm had
1988; Bagozzi and Phillips 1982). We generated multi-item
chosen
scales on the basis of previous measures, a review of the this supplier for the focal purchase.
rel-
We developed the measure of a supplier's willingness to
evant literature, and interviews with marketing and purchas-
ing personnel. Statistical procedures used to validate customize
mea- its products and services for the buying firm as a
formative
sures included assessment of item and scale reliability, uni- scale (Bollen and Lennox 1991) that identified
five ways a supplier could make changes specific to the
dimensionality, and convergent and discriminant validity.
needs of the buying firm. As with all formative scales used
We assessed psychometric properties of the final measures
by means of confirmatory factor analysis procedures inusingthis study, the items were averaged to form a single index
before being incorporated into the confirmatory factor
LISREL VIII (Joreskog and Sorbom 1993), as well as tradi-
analysis model. For purposes of identifying the factor mod-
tional methods (i.e., exploratory factor analysis, coefficient
alpha, and adjusted item-to-total correlations). els, reliability for all formative scales was assumed to be .85.
Given the large number of constructs and measures
We evaluated the measures further through confirmatory
employed in this study, the literature on confirmatory factor
factoranalysis procedures. Although the chi-square statistic
analysis suggests assessing scales by examining smaller
was statistically significant (X2(21 ) = 444; p < .01), this is
confirmatory factor models (cf. Bentler and Chounot unusual with large sample sizes. The goodness of fit
1987).
Therefore, we based measure analyses on groupings index of
(GFI), comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler 1990), and
incremental
related sets of measures: (1) measures of supplier trust, its fit index (IFI; Bollen 1989) were .89, .93, and
antecedents and outcomes, and control variables and .93, (2)
respectively. Together, the results suggest that these data
measures of salesperson trust and its antecedents. Before
provide a reasonable fit with the hypothesized measurement
discussing measure analysis results, we provide a model.
more
detailed discussion of the trust measures. We used three methods for assessing discriminant valid-
Trust measures. Although analysis of these data provide ity. First, we conducted exploratory factor analyses using
evidence of discrimination between the two targets of trust both orthogonal and oblique rotations to ensure high load-
(the salesperson and the supplier firm), the results were less ings on hypothesized factors and low cross-loadings. Next,
we constructed a 95% confidence interval around the esti-
compelling with respect to discriminating between the two
mates of correlations between the latent constructs. Finally,
dimensions of trust for each target. Assessment of the sup-
a series of nested confirmatory factor model comparisons
plier firm and salesperson trust measures raised questions
assessed whether differences existed when correlations
about discriminant validity between the two underlying
between the latent constructs were constrained to 1.0. With
dimensions of trust, credibility and benevolence. Although
other researchers find evidence of discriminant validity, one exception, all three tests provided evidence of discrimi-
these two dimensions of trust are highly correlated (see also nant validity between each pair of constructs in the set. The
Ganesan 1994; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995). exploratory factor analysis indicated high cross-loadings
between the measures of selling firm trust and supplier rep-
Although credibility and benevolence could be conceptu-
utation. Because of the lack of strong evidence of discrimi-
ally distinct, in business relationships such as those studied
here, they may be so intertwined that in practice they are nant validity, the reputation construct was removed from
operationally inseparable. Therefore, we treat trust of the further analysis.
salesperson and trust of the selling firm as unidimensional We used two methods for assessing convergent validity.
constructs. In both cases, final measures of trust include The LISREL estimates of paths from individual items to
items that tap the credibility and benevolence aspects of latent factors were all statistically significant (p < .01), with
trust, along with some global measures of trust. Results ofparameter estimates 10 to 20 times as large as the standard
errors. Moreover, results of the exploratory factor analysis
these operationalizations and further assessment of all mea-
sures are reported subsequently. (In Appendices A and B, showed that each item loaded highly on its hypothesized
we report all measures used for this study and key summary factor, with no high cross-loadings.
statistics.) Trust of the salesperson and its antecedents. We adapted
Trust of the supplier firm, its antecedents and outcomes, measures of salesperson trust to the industrial buying con-
and controls. Measures of supplier firm trust were devel- text of this research. The seven-item scale of salesperson
oped to accommodate the industrial buyer-supplier context trust exhibits high reliability (a = .90).

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Seven constructs are hypothesized to influence the buy- nonsignificant (201 d.f. = 192.49; p = .65). Th
ing firm's trust of a supplier's salesperson. Because little rectly classifies 86% of the observations (58%
empirical research has examined these factors in an indus- ers were selected in the sample). However
trial buying context, we developed new scales for these overestimate the true "hit rate" because the s
antecedents. Items were generated using interviews with used in model estimation and validation. We r
marketing and purchasing personnel. Because most of the the two models in Tables 2 and 3 and describe them in the
antecedent factors are relatively narrowly defined con- following sections.
structs, we used three-item scales to capture the relevant
facets of each construct. These reflective measures exhibited Antecedents of Trust
good reliability, with coefficient alpha values ranging from
Three of the five hypotheses tested regarding antecedents to
.79 for salesperson expertise to .90 for salesperson power,
supplier trust are supported by these data. As expected, sup-
likability, and similarity.
plier size (b = .09; p < .01) and the supplier's willingness to
We developed the measure of social interaction as a for- customize (b = .21; p < .01) have a positive impact on buy-
mative scale, listing seven types of social interaction typi-
ing firm trust. However, the supplier's willingness to share
cally encountered in business marketing. Respondents were confidential information (b = .06) and length of the rela-
asked about the frequency of each form of social interaction
tionship (b = .00) are unrelated to buying firm trust of the
between members of their firm and the focal salesperson. A
supplier firm. Finally, trust of the supplier's salesperson has
single item asked respondents how long the focal salesper-
a positive effect on trust of the selling firm (b = .77; p <
son had called on their company. We performed a log trans- .01).
formation to attenuate skewness in this measure.
Two personal characteristics of the salesperson were
The chi-square statistic for the confirmatory factor expected to influence buyer trust. As predicted, salesperson
analysis model was statistically significant (2(221) = 549; p expertise (b = .17; p < .01) has a positive effect on the buy-
< .01), but the GFI = .84, CFI = .93, and IFI = .93 were
ing firm's trust of the salesperson. However, the extent to
within acceptable standards. We assessed convergent and which the buying firm perceives the salesperson to be pow-
discriminant validity using the methods described previ-
erful is not related to salesperson trust (b = -.03).
ously, with good evidence that measures were valid on these
Three characteristics of the relationship between the
dimensions.
buying firm and the supplier's salesperson had statistically
Finally, additional tests of discriminant validity were
significant effects on trust of the salesperson. The extent to
conducted to ensure that highly correlated items across the
which the salesperson is perceived to be likable (b = .20; p
two sets of measures were unique. For example, we might
< .01) and similar to members of the buying firm (b = .09; p
expect concern with respect to discriminant validity between
< .05) has a positive impact on the buying firm's trust of the
trust of a salesperson and trust of a supplier firm. The test of
salesperson. Also as expected, frequency of business contact
nested models provided evidence that these two latent con-
with the salesperson positively influences the buying firm's
structs were discriminant (X2diff(l) = 73; p < .01). In sum- trust of the salesperson (b = 12; p < .05). However, fre-
mary, across several analytical procedures, measures
quency of social interaction with the salesperson (b = -.04)
demonstrated the sound psychometric properties required to
and length of time the salesperson called on the buying firm
test research hypotheses.
(b = -.06) were unrelated to the buying firm's trust of the
salesperson. Finally, the buying firm's trust of the supplier
Results firm has a positive effect on its trust of the salesperson (b =
.52;p < 01).
We estimated the system of equations using two methods.
The dichotomous dependent variable (supplier
Consequences of Trust
selected/not selected) necessitated the use of logistic
regression. We estimated the three remaining equations
We report results of the logistic regression used to test
simultaneously using three-stage least squares regression. hypotheses regarding purchase choice in Table 3. The non-
This method not only is efficient but also allows for corre-
significant parameter estimates for trust of the supplier
lated errors across dependent variables, which can firm be (b = .11) and trust of the salesperson (b = -.13) show
expected with the two measures of trust. Because of that the neither target of trust influences purchase choice when
expected high correlation among the predictors, we per- controlling for past purchase experience, supplier delivery
formed tests of multicollinearity (i.e., Belsley, Kuh, performance,
and relative price/cost, and product/service per-
Welsh 1980) before we estimated the models. However, formance. This is not to say that trust is unimportant. Com-
these tests provided no indication that collinearity was a paring the means of selling firm trust and salesperson trust
concern.
between selected and unselected suppliers, we find that
The three-stage least squares regression model,
selected which
suppliers and their salespeople were more trusted
than
tests the antecedents to trust and the impact ofthose
eachnot chosenof
target (t = 6.13, p < .01; t = 4.70, p < .01,
trust on anticipated future interaction, reports a system-
respectively). However, though trust levels differ between
selected
weighted R-squared of .65. This finding shows and unselected
that the com- suppliers, trust does not explain
prehensive model explains a large part of any
theadditional
variance variance
in thein purchase choice after control-
endogenous variables. The logistic regression model
ling for shows
previous experience with the supplier and supplier
performance.
a good fit, because the likelihood ratio goodness-of-fit test is

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The results reported in the last column of Table 2 indi- TABLE 3
cate that after controlling for the .three dimensions of per- Results of Maximum Likelihood Logistic
formance (none of which was statistically significant), past Regression on Purchase Choice
purchase experience (b = .29; p < .01), and current purchase
choice (b = .20; p < .01), trust of the selling firm plays an Independent Variables Purchase Choice
important role in anticipated future interaction with the sup-
Trust of supplier firm .11
plier (b = .31; p < .01). We discuss the implications of these Trust of salesperson -.13
findings in the following section. Delivery performance .47a
Relative price/cost .55a
Product/service performance .11
Discussion Purchase experience with supplier .02
Our results confirm that buying firms develop trust in both
Positive parameter estimates indicate greater likelihood of choo
the supplier firm and the supplier's salesperson. Of particu-
supplier.
lar interest, we find that current supplier selection Standardized
is not parameter estimates reported.
Likelihood ratio with 201 d.f. = 192.49; p = .65.
influenced by trust of the supplier firm or its salesperson. In
aProbability of chi-square: p < .01.
the industrial buying context of this study, the key criteria
for supplier selection are delivery performance and relative
price/cost. However, trust of the supplier firm and for trust
large segments
of of customers, as opposed to an individual
the salesperson (operating indirectly through supplier salesperson
firmresponsible for the needs of individual cus-
tomersdoing
trust) do increase the likelihood that buyers anticipate in his or her territory. Although not exclusive to
business with the supplier firm in the future. Takeneither target, our theory and results suggest that the calcula-
together,
tive process of building trust could be applied more readily
these findings indicate the extent to which trust influences
long-term relationships (i.e., trust's role in relationship mar-
to supplier firms than salespeople. In addition to transferring
keting as opposed to transactional marketing). Wetrust discuss
from salespeople, buyers appeared to form trust in sell-
ing firmsand
our results, and their implications for marketing theory on the basis of characteristics of the firm (e.g.,
practice, subsequently. size) and actual behaviors (e.g., investing in customer-spe-
cific assets). Together, such characteristics and behaviors
Trust Development Processes provide the buyer with an indication that acting in an
untrustworthy
Although our results suggest that trust of the salesperson can (or opportunistic) way would be costly for the
be transferred to the supplier firm and vice versa, theexample, a supplier that fails to deliver a criti-
supplier. For
processes by which trust develops appear to differcalwhen
product on time, beyond paying a penalty, could lose a
the
valuable customer and jeopardize its stature in the industry.
target is an organization-a collection of people responsible
TABLE 2
Results of Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation
Dependent Variables
Trust of Trust of Anticipated

Independent Variables Supplier Firm Salesperson Future Interaction
Supplier firm size .09a

Supplier firm willingness to customize .21a
Supplier firm confidential information sharing .06
Length of relationship with supplier firm1 .00
Trust of salesperson .77a
Salesperson expertise .17a
Salesperson power -.03
Salesperson likability .20a
Salesperson similarity .09b
Frequent business contact with salesperson .12b
Frequent social contact with salesperson -.04
Length of relationship with salesperson1 -.06
Trust of supplier firm .52a .31a
Delivery performance .12
Relative price/cost .07
Product/service performance .01
Purchase experience with supplier .29a
Purchase choice .20a
System Weighted R-squ

Standardized parameter e
Natural log taken of this
ap < .01.
bp < .05 (all hypothesis tests one-tailed).

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If buying organizations assume that suppliers develop poli- could be an order qualifier for many purchase decis
cies designed to maximize shareholder wealth, predictions (Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow 1989). To even be include
of trustworthy behavior emerge primarily from calculating a buying firm's consideration set, suppliers must provid
the effects of particular policies on firm performance. requisite level of product quality. Our results suggest
Inferring the costs and benefits that accrue to individual like quality, trust could be required just to enter into a
salespeople is likely to be more difficult. Although supplier tomer's consideration set. This contention is supported
firms develop policies that are based on treating groups of the fact that mean scores for trust of the salesperson and
customers in a similar manner, salespeople have a narrower plier firm (whether chosen or not) were 5.54 and 5
"span of surveillance" that lets them adapt their messages respectively, on a seven-point scale. These findings sug
and selling style to individual customer needs (Cespedes that firms focusing solely on providing the lowest-cost
1995). This gives salespeople the chance to show buyers uct on a timely basis could find they are not even consid
that they are expert and likable and share values consistent by the buying firm if they have not established a trus
with the customer's employees. In other words, unlike sup- relationship.
plier firms, salespeople can demonstrate more easily pre- Our results also indicate that trust of the supplier firm
dictable behaviors and benevolent intentions through cus- and trust of the salesperson (operating indirectly through
tomized interpersonal interaction with the customer. There- trust of the supplier) are related to anticipated future inter-
fore, it appears that the processes of prediction and inten- action. These findings have several implications for supplier
tionality are more likely to be invoked in developing trust firms. First, the importance of trust in future intentions indi-
of a salesperson. cates that trust is a criterion buyers use to evaluate suppliers.
The implications of these different routes to trust are Second, developing trusting relationships represents an
important. Lewicki and Bunker (1995) propose that there are investment with a long-term payoff. Finally, because trust in
different levels of trusting relationships. Relationships built the salesperson operates through the supplier firm, the sales-
on calculative trust are at the lowest and most fragile level. person's primary role in implementing a relationship mar-
The highest levels of trusting relationships are based on keting strategy could be to institutionalize trust in the sup-
internalizing the other's desires and intentions-where trust plier firm.
emerges through the process of intentionality. Trust built on
closely identifying with the partner is more flexible to Theoretical Implications
changing conditions and a more difficult bond to break than These findings suggest several important avenues for the
is calculative trust (Lewicki and Bunker 1995). This sug- role of trust in theories of industrial buying and buyer-seller
gests that the interpersonal trust engendered by salespeople relationships. First, the framework provided by the five
and transferred to the supplier firm plays a key role in devel-
trust-building processes gives new theoretical insight into
oping and maintaining enduring buyer-seller relationships. how trust is generated. Although our research does not test
the existence of these processes, it provides a theoretical
Consequences of Trust
foundation for understanding how trust develops.
Our findings that trust of the salesperson and supplier firm A second contribution of this research emerges from the
were not related to current supplier choice are contrary to inclusion of two targets of trust in the same study. The the-
our predictions and those of prior research (cf. Milliman andoretical development and results suggest that the processes
Fugate 1988). Although trust is higher for selected suppliersby which trust is engendered differ between salespeople and
than for those not selected, our results suggest that aspectstheir employers. Although only trust of the supplier firm
of the marketing mix-price and reliable delivery-actually directly influences future purchase intentions, trust of the
make the sale. These findings could reflect the fact that pro-
salesperson is an important factor in building trust of the
fessional buyers are trained to focus on objective evidencesupplier firm.
that demonstrates the superiority of the product offering, A third contribution to theory emerges from the rela-
rather than on subjective assessments of trust. For example, tively large number of relationships considered in this
"buyers currently are taught to carefully evaluate long-term research. Previous empirical research has not involved test-
total costs associated with dealing with a particular sup- ing the effects of supplier size, confidential information
plier" (Hutt and Speh 1995, p. 43). The fact that 94% of the sharing, perceived salesperson power, or the reciprocal
purchases evaluated in our study involved competitive bid- effects of salesperson and supplier firm trust. Furthermore,
ding indicates a formalization of the supplier selectionprevious research has not involved examining trust's role in
process, which could mitigate the effects of trust-particu-
purchase choice. Only by understanding the broader nomo-
larly because more objective criteria (price and delivery logical network surrounding trust will we be able to under-
capability) were significantly related to choice and more stand better how to build and maintain trusting business
subjective criteria (product/service performance and trust)
relationships.
were not.
Finally, the study extends other research in the area of
Therefore, it appears that trust operates as an "ordertrust by exploring its role in a new context. Some of our
qualifier," not an "order winner." Order qualifiers are "those
results confirm previous empirical research-though others
criteria that a company must meet for a customer (notably to even the lack of a link between length of the relationship
consider it as a possible supplier," whereas order winners are
and trust) are contrary to prior findings. Previous empirical
"those criteria that win the order" (Hill 1994, p.research 33). In primarily has been conducted in channels of distri-
industrial markets, some suggest that product quality butionnow(Anderson and Weitz 1989; Ganesan 1994; Kumar,

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Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995; Morgan and Hunt 1994) or by being friendly and making efficient use of the cus-
service settings (Crosby, Evans, and Cowles 1990; Moor- tomer's time. To project similarity, salespeople probably
man, Deshpande, and Zaltman 1993; Moorman, Zaltman, should establish common ground with the buyer. These
and Deshpande 1992)-contexts that differ from the indus- antecedents to trust can be taught by means of formal lec-
trial buying setting of the current study. Compared with tures or role-playing exercises. When these skills have been
channel relationships, industrial markets tend to involve mastered, managers should place salespeople with accounts
only moderate levels of dependence, and the role of the where they will be well liked and perceived as similar to
salesperson is less critical. Conversely, in service settings their customers.
dependence could be low and the service provider or sales- Salespeople also must master the technical skills neces-
person is often key (Crosby, Evans, and Cowles 1990; sary to convey expertise with respect to their products. Buy-
Moorman, Deshpande, and Zaltman 1993; Moorman, Zalt- ers trust salespeople they perceive to be expert, perhaps
man, and Deshpande 1992). Together the results of this and because they think expert salespeople can deliver on their
previous research suggest that the selling situation could promises. Moreover, salespeople should contact customers
moderate the development and influence of trust. often, because study results show that frequent contact plays
a central role in developing trust. Finally, salespeople should
Managerial Implications be rewarded for such trust-building behaviors, because they
One of the key findings of this research is that trust of a sup- strengthen the link between the buying firm and the supplier.
plier firm is positively related to the likelihood that buyers

Limitations and Further Research
plan to do business with suppliers in the future. This associ-
ation emerges despite controls for supplier performance, The choice of research design forced certain trade-offs that
past experience with the supplier, and the current supplier could limit the findings. First, though the five trust-building
selection decision. Apparently, buying firms value trusted processes provide a theoretical foundation for research
suppliers and consider trust an important prerequisite for hypotheses, the current study does not directly measure
building long-term relationships. A major determinant of these processes. Further research employing alternative
future business opportunity is the extent to which customers methods could address this limitation usefully. Second,
trust the selling firm, so suppliers should engage in trust- though our conceptual model suggests several important
enhancing activities. antecedents and outcomes of trust, other variables could
The results, and the processes that build trust, provide have been omitted. For example, buyers could bestow trust
insights into the direction such efforts might take. For exam- on the supplier firm on the basis of its capabilities-for
ple, our findings suggest that buyers rely on supplier firm example, through assessment of the supplier's past perfor-
characteristics such as size to assess a supplier firm's trust- mance. Our decision to examine purchase choice meant that
worthiness. Buyers could bestow trust through a calculative some buyers would not have had previous experience with
process by determining that large suppliers have a lot to lose the focal supplier, a fact that precluded measuring past per-
by acting in an untrustworthy way. Therefore, it is important formance in the current study. Additional research could
for suppliers to manage customer perceptions of firm size- involve examining a broader spectrum of antecedents and
perhaps through image-enhancing techniques such as adver- outcomes of trust.
tising and publicity. Buyers also could use size as a basis for A third research design issue-the decision to ask
transferring trust to unknown or untried suppliers, relying on respondents to identify a recent purchase for which more
the experience of others. This suggests that marketers than one supplier was considered seriously-undoubtedly
should emphasize customer satisfaction, perhaps including resulted in a truncation in the range of trust examined. This
testimonials in their marketing communications. approach was necessary because a certain amount of ambi-
The findings also suggest that buyers who perceived that guity must exist in the decision context for trust to be oper-
suppliers are willing to make idiosyncratic investments ative. The fact that buyers reported the use of a competitive
judged their partners to be trustworthy. Although customer- bidding process in 94% of purchase situations suggests that
specific adaptations imply costs for the seller, our findings buyers could have identified two suppliers that were finalists
suggest that these are investments that tie the firms together in a bidding competition. This, combined with the fact that
in strong buyer-supplier relationships. Because such invest- 65% of the suppliers had been used many times before, sug-
ments contribute to forging strong buyer trust in the selling gests that even suppliers not selected for the current pur-
firm, they can be expected to pay off in the long run. chase decision were highly trusted. However, the current
In addition, the results indicate that a buyer's trust in a trend toward closer collaboration between buyers and sup-
supplier firm is based, in part, on encounters with the suppliers suggests that a supplier firm must be trusted to be
plier's salesperson. Therefore, the company should teach its included in the buyer's consideration set. Therefore, the
salespeople how to develop trust (cf. Doyle and Roth 1992). study design realistically portrays the situation facing indus-
Managers could use our results, and the trust-building trial buyers and suppliers.
processes, to guide their training efforts. For example, It is important to note that our findings may not general-
through the process of intentionality, buyers attribute ize to dissimilar cultures. For example, in the United States,
benevolent motives to those they like or perceive as similar concerns about conflict of interest and unethical behavior
to themselves. Similarity and likability also can bolster the arise when personal relationships develop (Schuster and
buyer's confidence in predicting the supplier's future Copeland 1996). Researchers in the future should examine
behavior. Salespeople might be taught to exhibit likability the role national culture plays in buyer-seller relationships

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and buyer-salesperson encounters. As firms expand their Conclusion
businesses beyond national borders, studies that involve
businesses beyond national borders, studies that involve Supplier firms must make significant investments to deve
examining how antecedents and outcomes of trust differ and maintain customer trust. For suppliers,
and maintain customer thetrust.
value ofFor
suchsuppliers,
the value of such
across cultures should prove useful to marketing managers. e i m
efforts is most apparent when high levels of buy
Finally, we need to know more about how trust developsurchasin
to more outcomes for
favorable purchasing the su for
outcomes er. Our
the s
over time and whether the processes that foster trust
resultsat the out-
suggest that t
though the process of building customer
set of a relationship are the same as those that maintaintrust
it inisepensie tieconsuing
expensive, and
time-consuming, and complex, its out-
later stages. Further research using a longitudinal design could c i s of oin stong buyer-seller bonds and
address these questions and provide for stronger inferences
enhanced . ebeo critically
loyalty could oui t - oimportant to supplier
about the directions of causality posited here. By understand- firms
ing the dynamics of trust, we can obtain a greater understand-
ing of how business relationships change, grow, and decline.
APPENDIX A
Measures and Key Summary Statistics for Supplier Firm Trust and Its Antecedents,
Outcomes, and Control Variables
Scale
Scale Name [Response Cue1] (Scale Mean and Standard Deviation) and Individual Items Reliability
Supplier Firm Reputation (5.78; 1.11) a = .78

This supplier has a reputation for being honest.
This supplier is known to be concerned about custo
This supplier has a bad reputation in the market. (R
Supplier Firm Size (3.98; 1.71) a = .83
This supplier is a very large company.
This supplier is the industry's biggest suppli
This supplier is a small player in the market
Supplier Firm Willingness to Customize for Buyer [not at all-very much] (4.48; 1.47) n/a2
Just for us this supplier is willing to customize its products.
Just for us this supplier is willing to change its production process.
Just for us this supplier is willing to change its inventory procedures.
Just for us this supplier is willing to change its delivery procedures.
Just for us this supplier is willing to invest in tools and equipment.
Supplier Firm Confidential Information Sharing (3.90; 1.66) a = .78
This supplier shares proprietary information with our firm.
This supplier will share confidential information to help us.
Length of Relationship With Supplier Firm [_ years & _ months] (10.67; 9.92) n/a
About how long has your company had contact with this supplier?
Trust of Supplier Firm (5.30; 1.20) a = .94
This supplier keeps promises it makes to our firm
This supplier is not always honest with us. (R)
We believe the information that this vendor prov
This supplier is genuinely concerned that our bu
When making important decisions, this supplier
We trust this vendor keeps our best interests in m
This supplier is trustworthy.
We find it necessary to be cautious with this sup
Purchase Choice [yes or no] (.58; .49) n/a
For this purchase, did your firm buy from this sup
Anticipated Future Interaction [very little chance-definitely will use] (5.66; 1.85) a = .95
How likely is it that your firm will make a purchase from this supplier during the next 3 years?
How likely is it that your firm will make a purchase from this supplier during the next year?
Delivery Performance [How did this supplier compare with others on each of these criteria?
(much worse than others-equal to others-much better than others)] (4.68; 1.24) n/a2
delivery speed
delivery reliability
product availability
Relative Price/Cost [How did this supplier compare with others on each of these criteria?
(much worse than others-equal to others-much better than others)] (4.56; 1.33) n/a2
price
total cost
terms of sale
481 Journal of Marketing, April 1997

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Product/Service Performance [How did this supplier compare with others on each of these criteria?
(much worse than others-equal to others-much better than others)] (4.79; .99) n/a2
product/service features
product/service quality
product/service reliability
technical support
after sale service and support
Purchase Experience with Supplier [Has your firm made purchases from this supplier in the past?
(yes, many times-yes, a few times-no)] (1.53; .69) n/a
Fit Statistics: chi square with 211 d.f. = 444.13 (p < .01); GFI = .88; CFI = .93
'Unless otherwise noted, response cues for all scales are strongly agree-stron
2As a formative scale, coefficient alpha is not appropriate for assessing reliabi
(R) Reverse-scored items.
APPENDIX B
Measures and Key Summary Statistics for Salesperson Trust and Its Antecedents
Scale
Scale Name [Response Cue1] (Scale Mean and Standard Deviation) and Individual Items Reliability
Salesperson Expertise (5.54; 1.08) a = .79

This salesperson is very knowledgeable.
This salesperson knows his/her product line very
This salesperson is not an expert. (R)
Salesperson Power (5.05; 1.22) a = .90

This salesperson has the clout to get his/her
This salesperson is one of this supplier's mo
This salesperson has power in his/her firm.
Salesperson Likability (5.54; 1.05) a = .90

This salesperson is friendly.
This salesperson is always nice to us.
This salesperson is someone we like to have arou
Salesperson Similarity (4.47; 1.29) a = .90

This salesperson shares similar interests with peo
This salesperson has values similar to people in ou
This salesperson is very similar to people in our f
Frequent Contact with Salesperson (4.39; 1.45) a = .85

This salesperson frequently visits our place of business.
This salesperson takes a lot of time learning our needs.
This salesperson spends considerable time getting to know our
Extent of Social Interaction with Salesperson [How often do you

interact with this salesperson in these ways? (never-often)] (2.47; 1.01) n/a2
Meet away from the workplace.
Talk about family, sports or other personal interests.
Attend entertainment events (sports, theater etc.)
Meet over breakfast, lunch or dinner.
Get together primarily to have fun.
Talk about common interests besides work.
Get together with other family members.
Length of Relationship With Salesperson [_ years & _ months] (5.56; 4.68)

About how long has this salesperson called on your company? n/a
Trust of Salesperson (5.54; 1.18) a = .90
This salesperson has been frank in dealing wi
This salesperson does not make false claims.
We do not think this salesperson is completely
This salesperson is only concerned about hims
This salesperson does not seem to be concern
The people at my firm do not trust this salesp
This salesperson is not trustworthy. (R)
Fit Statistics: chi square with 221 d.f. = 548.72 (p <
1Unless otherwise noted, response cues for all scales
2As a formative scale, coefficient alpha is not approp
(R) Reverse-scored items.
Trust in Buyer-S

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An Examination of the Nature of Trust in Buyer-Seller Relationships

Author(s): Patricia M. Doney and Joseph P. Cannon

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1251829

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An Examination of the Nature of

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36 / Journal of Marketing, April 1997

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Trust in Buyer-Seller Relationships /37

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Prediction: Trustor develops confidence

Evidence of the target's ability to fulfill *salesperson expertise

38 / Journal of Marketing, April 1997

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Characteristics of the Supplier Firm

Characteristics of the Supplier Firm Relationship

Characteristics of the Salesperson 4

Characteristics of the Salesperson Relationship

?Length of relationship Control Variables

equipment or stantial investment. For example, because the buyer could

Trust in Buyer-Seller Relationships / 39

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H3: Buying firm trust in the supplier firm is positively related

401 Journal of Marketing, April 1997

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been shown to be a key determinant of relationship mainte-

Trust in Buyer-Seller Relationships /41

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42 / Journal of Marketing, April 1997

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Trust in Buyer-Seller Relationships / 43

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44 / Journal of Marketing, April 1997

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Trust of Trust of Anticipated

Supplier firm size .09a

System Weighted R-squ

Trust in Buyer-Seller Relationships / 45

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46 / Journal of Marketing, April 1997

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plier firm is positively related to the likelihood that buyers

Trust in Buyer-Seller Relationships / 47

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Supplier Firm Reputation (5.78; 1.11) a = .78

481 Journal of Marketing, April 1997

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Salesperson Expertise (5.54; 1.08) a = .79

Salesperson Power (5.05; 1.22) a = .90

Salesperson Likability (5.54; 1.05) a = .90

Salesperson Similarity (4.47; 1.29) a = .90

Frequent Contact with Salesperson (4.39; 1.45) a = .85

Extent of Social Interaction with Salesperson [How often do you

Length of Relationship With Salesperson [_ years & _ months] (5.56; 4.68)

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50 / Journal of Marketing, April 1997

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Trust in Buyer-Seller Relationships / 51

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