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Anti-Jewish Policy in Ussr
Anti-Jewish Policy in Ussr
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In the context of our conference the anti-Jewish policy of the USSR is only a
pretext for reflection on aspects of the subordination of the East European states to
the USSR after the Second World War. This policy of the USSR well illustrates
the dependence of Eastern Europe on the Soviet Union after 1945, one of the most
interesting issues in the postwar history of the region. We see here the interaction
between one particular Soviet policy and countries with different historical
experiences, economic structures, attitudes towards Russia and attitudes towards
the Jewish community.
In this issue we can see the origins of certain political activities, their
consequences and their transfer to other countries. Moreover, it is interesting to
observe the behavior of "local communists" in a situation not of their choosing:
from attitudes of total subordination to attempts to preserve some margin of their
own independence. It is also important to observe what was the reaction of
different societies to this policy. In this regard, it should be noted that this policy
did not concern society as whole but only a small part of it. We have to remember
that the East European societies had a variety of attitudes towards Jews, including
anti-Semitic attitudes.
After the Second World War the Jewish issue appeared in the Stalin's policies
in a new context. Internally, it was a significant part of the preparation for a new
purge. Internationally, the Jewish question became an aspect of the question of
Soviet influence in the Middle East. One should stress the circumstances that
made the Jewish issue dominant in Soviet policies in some periods. On the one
hand, we can see reasons that originated in the postwar political situation: the
growth of tension between Western countries, the US and the USSR or the con
flict over influence in the Middle East, where the creation of a Jewish state was
increasingly becoming a reality. On the other hand, anti-Jewish activities had their
basis in the essence of the communist state: looking for enemies to solve political
and other problems. One should emphasize that Jews were better suited to the role
of scapegoats than other nationalities because of their connections with Jewish or
ganizations in Western countries, the US and the Middle East. We also have to re
call that some Soviet policy makers were anti-Semites or were conscious of the
anti-Semitic mood in some groups of Soviet society.
A separate problem of anti-Semitism in Russia after the Second World War is
connected with Stalin. The manifestation of anti-Semitism in his activities had
ish elite. It started in early 1949 as an anti-intellectual action but it gradually took
on an anti-Semitic character. As the Polish writer Andrzej Drawicz wrote in an es
say that "among [the guilty] were some who were more guilty ... a group of
names . . . clearly marked by their race."1 The basis of activities undertaken
against Jewish writers, scientists, and artists was the belief that they expressed
Jewish nationalism in their cultural endeavors. As 1 mentioned above, the anti
Semitic activities were only part of this campaign. Nevertheless the consequences
were significant. Once again anti-Semitism infiltrated political, cultural and social
life and created and reinforced nationalistic attitudes. And some practices used
during the "struggle against cosmopolitans," such as giving Jewish names in
brackets next to Russian names [skobariej], were repeated many times later.
Another Anti-Jewish action was the persecution conducted in the Jewish
Autonomous Region [JAR] in Birobidzhan. The repression of Birobidzhan activ
ists and the liquidation Jewish organizations took place parallel with the prepara
tion of the JAC trial. Except for one paper [Birobidzaner Stern] all Yiddish lan
guage papers and institutions were closed. In the Birobidzhan case as in the "Cri
mean affair" there was the accusation of attempting to separate the region from the
USSR. The purge of JAR leaders preceded trials against some of them. There
were death sentences and long terms in prison. The same accusations were re
peated in almost every case connected with the "Jewish issue": anti-state activity,
espionage and attempts to create a Jewish state in the USSR either in Birobidzhan
or in Crimea. The liquidation of the Jewish elite was only part of Stalin's anti
Semitic campaign. All signs of Jewish culture were destroyed as well. During the
campaign in Birobidzhan even Jewish letters in typewriters became the object of
hatred. The best illustration of this process is the changes introduced into Biro
bidzhan postmark. In the first from 1935 we can see some Yiddish inscriptions. In
1947 the name Birobdzhan still appeared in Yiddish, but in the center of the post
mark the Soviet star with the hammer and sickle appeared as if announcing further
changes. In the postmark from 1955 there are no Yiddish letters, only the Soviet
star and an inscription in Russian.
Anti-Jewish activities affected some state officials as well. Arrests and persecu
tion of the Party's Jewish activists and even people connected with Stalin's anti
Jewish policy constituted further steps in the purge. On July 12, 1951 Viktor Aba
kumov, the Security Minister was arrested. Nicolas Werth wrote in the Black Book
of Communism that the former minister was charged with "preventing the disclo
sure of a criminal group of Jewish nationalists who penetrated into the highest cir
cles of the Security Ministry (MGB)," and "several months later Abakumov him
self was presented as the 'brains' of a Jewish nationalistic plot."2 It is a paradox
that Abakumov was nominated by Stalin to begin the action against the Jewish
Anti-Fascist Committee at the end of 1947. As Vladimir Naumow wrote in his
1. Andrzej Drawicz, A/Kos czyli szkota podloici, in lysenko i kosmopolici (Warszawa: Niezaleina
Oficyna Wydawnicza, 1989), 40-41.
2. Stephane Courtois, Nicolas Werth, Jean Louis Panne, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartosek, Jean
Louis Margolin, Czarna ksiçga kominizmu. Zbrodnie, terror, przesladowania (Warszawa: Proszynski i
Sk-a., 1999), 237.
4. Ibid.
5. Golda Meir, My life (Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv: Stematzky's Agency Ltd., 1975), 203.
6. Ibid., 206.
The winter of 1953 started with a new anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli campaign.
The best known was the announcement of "the discovery of the Kremlin doctors'
plot." On January 13, 1953 Pravda published a state communique "unmasking a
terroristic group of doctors." It was written that the activities of the accused led to
the death of high state officials, among others of Zhdanov and Sherbakov. Among
the charges were spying for Great Britain and the US. The Jewish nationality of
some of the accused reflected the Jewish aspect of the accusations. Also coopera
tion with Joint, the organization of American Jews, was interpreted as espionage.
The article in Pravda initiated a purge and a persecution of the Jews. Ewa Zarzy
cka-Berard mentions in her biography of Il'a Ehrenburg that even in March 1953
Stalin's envoys brought the writer a letter to sign, in which "the undersigned . . .
demand exemplary punishment of their ignominious people, who are responsible
for the crimes of the doctor-murderers, and the punishment should be collective
deportation to the Far East."7
On February 12, 1953 the Soviet Union broke diplomatic relations with Israel.
According to the Soviet government note, this was in response to an assault on the
Soviet embassy in Tel-Aviv. Undoubtedly, the event of February 9 was a pretext
to take action against the Jewish state. Today it is impossible to give a clear inter
pretation of that aspect of Soviet policy. However, we can state that a new purge
was being prepared and the Jewish population would play a part in it, and this ac
tion prevented the intervention of the Jewish state. We cannot today fully recon
struct these events, especially since their main actor - Stalin - died two months
after the publication of the communiqué in Pravda, on March 5, 1953.
As we can see the anti-Jewish actions took place according to various scenar
ios. But their basis and aims were the same. It is worth mentioning some of them:
getting rid of some politicians, maintaining an atmosphere of fear even in closest
circle of Stalin and among East European communists, pursuing influence in the
Middle East, destroying the Jewish community, but also preparing the ground for
a situation in which a war would seem to be the only political solution.
In keeping with the reality of the divided postwar world, the anti-Jewish cam
paign initiated by Stalin spread to the East European countries subordinated to the
Soviet Union after 1945. However, we have to remember that the policy of com
munist states towards the Jews in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Roma
nia and Poland differed. On the one hand, there were anti-Jewish activities in line
with the processes inspired by Moscow. Jews were the objects of political actions
precisely because of their nationality. On the other hand, restrictions,- repression,
and persecution affected the Jewish community without reference to its national
ity. During the political, economic and social changes carried out according to the
communist scenario, Jews were treated like other nationalities. It happened, how
ever, that some changes hit the Jewish population harder, e.g., due to their eco
nomic position, in some countries. But it should be noted that these changes had a
communist and not an anti-Jewish character. This happened, for example, in Hun
7. Ewa Zarzycka-Berard, Burzliwe zycie llii Ehrenburga (Warszawa: Iskry. 2002), 256.
8. Peter Meyer, and Bernard D. Weinryb, Eugene Duschinsky, Nicolas Sylvian, The Jews in Soviet
Satellites (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1953), 453.
countries, the size of the Jewish population, anti-Semitism, the degree of engage
ment in the problem of the Jewish State in the years 1945-1948, the positions held
by Jewish communists, and the readiness of local leaders to carry out a purge.
In the East European countries - Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria
and the German Democratic Republic (DDR) - the anti-Jewish policy took differ
ent forms. The realization of this policy in Poland will be examined separately.
The turning point was the liquidation of existing Jewish institutions that had been
allowed to function for several years. The subsidy to the Jewish community was
decreased and the Jewish political scene consolidated. Jewish activists who coop
erated with the Zionist movement or international Jewish organizations suffered
repression.
The next step was the liquidation of foreign representation of Jewish organiza
tions that organized emigration or supported local communities in rebuilding their
lives after the Holocaust. The representatives of Joint and the Jewish Agency in
Czechoslovakia and Hungary were expelled and their offices closed down.
Important in those activities was the change of attitude towards Jewish emigra
tion. In some countries, for example in Hungary, emigration to Israel was prohib
ited, in others drastically limited. Another action was travel restrictions on indi
viduals involved in religious life or the Zionist movement.
An important element was also a new approach towards the Jewish State. The
establishment of Israel was seen as the victory of anti-imperialism - this referred
above all to the fight of the Jews against the British in Palestine. In this way the
significance of Zionism or its contribution to the establishment of the Jewish State
was minimized.
These activities were accompanied by propaganda. The article on Slansky in
Rude Pravo is a good illustration. We find here such statements as "mortal ene
mies of our country . . . corrupt monsters ... a whole gallery of criminals . . .
Trotskyites, Zionists, bourgeois nationalists." An article entitled "Judas" stated:
"Under the red crop of hair in a network of wrinkles the restless eyes of a villain .
. . emotionless ... he starts to speak about his horrible crimes, which the scoun
drel committed, alone doing more evil than hundreds of great villains."9
Another problem was the use of the Jewish issue to carry out political purges in
each country. The pretext for such purges was defined not as a Jewish problem but
portrayed as a "struggle against the Zionism." Already during the trial of Laszlo
Rajk in September 1949 a new approach to Zionism turned up. Christopher An
drew and Oleg Gordijewski wrote in their book about the KGB: . . the an
nouncement of a new, anti-Zionist line at first caused some trouble at Headquar
ters. When colonel Otraszczenko instructed the Middle and Far East personnel at a
meeting in KI10 that Zionism is linked with imperialism, some officers obviously
did not understand what it was about. A deserter from the KGB Ilja Dzhirkvelov
9. Josefa Slanska, "Raport о moim mçzu," Kwarlalnik Polityczny Krytyka, 16 (1983): 190-91.
10. Information Committee - the Soviet Intelligence service was created by combining the foreign
intelligence section of the Ministry of State Security and the Intelligence Administration of the Army
General Staff ( Glavnoe razvedyvatel'noe upravlenie or GRU) in the years 1947-1951. Christopher
Andrew, and Oleg Gordijewski, KGB (Warszawa: Bellona, 1997), 8,9.
11. Ilya Dzhirkvelov, Secret Servant: My Life with the KGB and the Soviet Elite ( London: Collins,
1987), 250, quoted ibid., 366.
12. Arthur London, Bylem czlonkiem bandy Slanskiego (Warszawa: Niezalezna Oficyn
Wydawnicza, 1987), 95.
Pravda in January 1953 of discovery of the Kremlin "doctors' plot," the "struggle
against Zionism" entered a new stage. Gabor Peter - Chief of the National Secu
rity in Hungary - was arrested and imprisoned "as a Zionist conspirator."13 Simi
lar actions were also undertaken in Romania and Poland. In the DDR persecution
of Jews, members of the SED, took place in the winter of 1952/1953, clearly in
imitation of what had happened in the Soviet Union. Some of the endangered es
caped to the West, but the others were arrested.14 Slansky's case and the trials
prepared in other East European countries were in line with the character of com
munist states, but to fill them with the anti-Semitic content needed a decision from
Stalin.
The policy, composed to a high degree of anti-Semitic actions, was imple
mented in countries where Jews constituted a relatively low percentage of the
whole population. But it has to be remembered that Jewish communist activists
were quite visible in the power structure. There are several reasons for this. One of
them was that during heated discussions about the future of the diaspora at the
turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, part of the Jewish population was
convinced that only Communism was able to solve the Jewish problem. However,
we should remember that Jewish communists in high positions in Communist par
ties were a minority in their community, outcasts from traditional Jewish institu
tions.
One of the aspects of the issue difficult to reconstruct is the activities of Soviet
special forces and their agents in Eastern Europe. Karel Bartosek wrote in The
Black Book of Communism: "Events happening in Moscow at that time - a deep
restructuring of security forces, the arrest of their chief Abakumov in 1951 - led to
the formulation of... a hypothesis. It proposes that in-fighting inside the Soviet
security forces most probably decided both the final selection of victims, who un
til then had cooperated with those forces, and the level of punishment."15 Abaku
mov's successor, Semën Denisovich Ignat'ev, and his deputy M. D. Riumin, were
to be the guarantors of the execution of Stalin's policy.
The implementation of decisions taken in Moscow was carried out by Soviet
advisors in communist countries. The policy was to be executed by functionaries
known for their anti-Semitism: Viktor Komarov, Mikhail Likhachev, Vladimir
Boiarskii, Aleksiej Dymitriewicz Bieszczastnow. In some countries anti-Semitic
sympathies were a criterion for nomination to some positions. It was, e.g., in
Czechoslovakia, where the director of the StB [Czech security forces] responsible
for the pursuit of enemies of the state was Andriej Keppert, a known anti
Semite.16
Interesting is the reaction of communist leaders in East European countries to
the unleashing of a new campaign (at first, anti-Tito and then anti-Zionist). In
Czechoslovakia the future victims of the most famous show trial, for example,
13. Courtois, Werth, Panne, Paczkowski, Bartosek, Margolin, Czarna ksiçga komunizmu, 405.
14. Andrzej Matkiewicz, and KrzysztofRuchniewicz, Pierwszy znak solidarno&ci. Polskie odglosy
powslania ludowego wNRD w 1953 r. (Wroclaw: Arboretum, 1998), 53.
15. Courtois, Werth, Panne, Paczkowski, Bartosek, Margolin, Czarna ksiçga komunizmu, 406.
16. Andrew, and Gordijewski, KGB, 366.
The liquidation of the diversified political, social and cultural scene of the Jews
in Poland was only an introduction to more radical actions. The Jewish issue be
came the object of the activity of the security forces. In September 1949 an in
struction of the MBP (Ministry of Public Security) recommended surveillance of
those Zionists who decided to go to Israel and as well as those staying in Poland.
Apart from the Zionists the MBP intended to focus on the Jewish community and
the diplomatic representatives of Israel in Poland.
The next stages of Stalin's anti-Jewish policy also found reflection in the ac
tivities of the Polish security forces. At the beginning of 1952 suggestions of es
pionage on the part of Zionists and the diplomatic representatives of Israel became
more and more frequent.
As in the soviet union, tne campaign against Zionism in roiana oecame an in
strument of political struggle. This is apparent in the purge of the Ministry of For
eign Affairs and of the Polish army.
One of the elements of the Soviet policy towards the Jews was the earlier accu
sation against members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and activists in Bi
robidzhan of attempting to secede some territories from the Soviet Union. It
seemed that it would not be possible to transfer such absurd accusations to Eastern
Europe. But it turned out that a "Polish version of the Crimea case" was prepared.
The role of Crimea was to be played by Lower Silesia, where almost half of the
Jews who survived the Holocaust lived. Here among Jewish activists was bom the
idea of establishing "an autonomous district" or "Jewish Region"17 in this area.
In the autumn of 1949 the chairman of the local Jewish Committee - Jakub
Egit was accused of "building and organizing a national Jewish settlement."18 In
February 1953 he was arrested and accused of "trying to separate Lower Silesia
from Poland with the help of Joint and other American organizations. He was
supposed to plan to hand over Lower Silesia to the Israeli government and build a
Jewish nationalist state in this region."19 He was also accused of organizing a Jew
ish army in Lower Silesia, which had the support of Israel. This was a reference to
the camp of Haganah volunteers that existed in one of the towns.
The arrest of Egit was supposed to initiate the repression of Jewish activists. It
was only a matter of time before the arrest of members of the Central Jewish
Committee, which after the war was the basic organization of the Jewish popula
tion in Poland and represented it inside and outside the country.20 The scope of the
planned repression of the Jewish community must have been quite large because
the authorities were thinking of establishing a camp for cosmopolitans, Zionists
and other hostile elements.21
As in other East European countries "the struggle against Zionism" was a pre
text for a party purge. According to some documents "Hungarian and Polish func
17. Archiwum Paristwowe we Wroctawiu, zespol: Wojewôdzki Komitet Zydôw na Dolnym Sl^sku,
1, p. 22. Archiwum Diaspory w Tel-Avivie, Diaspora Center. 255.3. II, 24.
18. Jakub Egit, Grand Illusion (Toronto: Lugus production Ltd., 1991), 98-99.
19. Ibid., 108.
20. Ibid, 111.
21. Michat Chçciriski, Poland. Communism. Nationalism. Anti-Semitism (New York: Karz-Cohl
Publishing, 1982), 41-42; Teresa Toranska, Oni (Warszawa: Agencja Omnipress, 1989), 140.
22. Zatajony dokument. Raport Komisji КС KPCz о procesach politycznych i rehabilitacjach, ed.
by Pawet Hartman (Warszawa: Krytyka, 1984), 24.
23. Tadeusz Marczak, Granica zachodnia w pohkiej polityce zagranicznej w latach 1944-1950
(Wroclaw: Uniwersytet Wroctawski, 1995), 213.
24. Toranska, Oni, 41.
25. Zbigniew Btaiyriski, Mowi Jozef Swiatlo (Londyn: Polska Fundacja Kulturalna, 1986), 146.
ence of Soviet advisers in the Polish reports. They only mention the pressure from
Moscow and Soviet advisers to conduct trials in Poland similar to those that took
place in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but those who carried out the actions were
officials of the Ministry of Public Security [MBP] in Poland. Among the Polish
functionaries involved in the above mentioned preparations were Radkiewicz,
Romkowski, Swiatlo and Fejgin, the last three of whom had Jewish roots. A ques
tion arises if the people working on the case were aware of the danger, as in the
Soviet Union, that the purges would also swallow those who carried out the
purges? I mentioned before that it is impossible today to reconstruct all the mo
ments of the reality of that time, including the Jewish aspect. Fragmentary mem
oirs and incomplete documents from that period mean we are often confined to the
realms of interpretation and speculation.
The Jewish state played an important role in the activities portrayed here. As
with the Soviet Union, Poland was among the first to recognize Israel de iure.
During the declaration about the future of Palestine at the United Nations, the Pol
ish delegation supported the establishment of a Jewish State. One can find per
sonal engagement in the statements of the Polish representatives, independent of
Moscow's simultaneously executed instructions. In articles on this issue we find a
tone of understanding for Jewish demands. Poland's position was certainly influ
enced to some degree by the common history of Poles and Jews throughout the
centuries. Important also was the fact that the Poles like the Jews historically ex
perienced the lack of their own state.
Diplomatic relations inaugurated with the recognition of Israel in May 1948
and the establishment of Israel's representation in Warsaw in September 1948
were initially correct. But early in 1949 the first signals came of a change of War
saw's attitude towards Israel: the postponement of raising Polish diplomatic repre
sentation in Israel to the rank of an embassy as well as the government's position
on emigration. At the same time the security forces began undercover operations
against representatives of the Jewish State. The best information about the direc
tion of these activities comes from a fragment of a note from the Public Security
Ministry in 1950 dealing with counter-espionage: "There are probably few socie
ties in the world, which by their character, origins, international ties, knowledge of
different countries and languages and connections with those countries, as suitable
to be used by foreign intelligence as the society of the state of Israel."26
Specific operations followed the suggestion to direct activity against the Israeli
Embassy in Warsaw to prove that Arie Kubovy, the ambassador of Israel in Po
land, engaged in espionage. In November 1952 an employee of the Israeli Em
bassy in Warsaw was arrested. During the investigation agents tried to collect evi
dence of espionage activity on the part of members of the Israeli Embassy in Po
land. It should be pointed out that security officers took an interest in Jewish
communists as well. No doubt these activities were a prelude to next the anti
Semitic campaign, initiated officially by Pravda in the communiqué of January
1953.
University of Wroclaw