CASE DIGEST

I. G.R. Nos. 204187 and 206606 - JAKA INVESTMENTS CORPORATION,

PETITIONER,V. URDANETA VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. AND AYALA LAND,
INC. (AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF MAKATI DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION), RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
Ayala Land, Inc (ALI), is the developer and seller of lots in Urdaneta Village, Makati
City. The Urdaneta Village Association, Inc. (Association) is its duly organized
homeowners’ association. All parcels of land sold by ALI in Urdaneta Village are subject
to uniform restrictions, which are annotated on the TCTs covering the lots.

Jaka Investments (Jaka) bought three lots in Urdaneta Village, covered by TCT Nos. S-
10603, S-10604, and S-74957.

On 15 March 2007, the Association’s Board of Governors held a meeting, approving the
extension of the Association’s corporate life and the term of the Deed of Restrictions
(DOR) both for another 25 years:

“A. Amendment of the Articles of Incorporation (extension of corporate life):

"Fourth - The term for which this Corporation is to exist is extended for another
twenty-five (25) years after its expiration on August 13, 2008".

B. Extension and revision of Deed Restrictions: 

....

VII - TERMS OF RESTRICTIONS

The foregoing restrictions shall remain in force for twenty-five years from

June 1, 2008.”

On 06 September 2007, the Association held a general membership meeting to vote

on the changes. Jaka Investments, represented through proxy Estela Malabanan
(Malabanan), voted in favor of both extensions.

On 08 April 2008, the HLURB issued a Certificate of the Association’s amended AOI.

On 30 July 2008, Jaka filed before the RTC a Petition for the cancellation of restrictions
annotated in TCT Nos. S-10603, S-10604, and S-74957, claiming that the legal basis
for the restrictions ceased upon the expiration of the term of restrictions on 01 June
2008.

The Association filed its Opposition with Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
arguing that it is the HLURB that has jurisdiction over the case, being an intra-
corporate dispute on the validity of the uniform restrictions’ term extension.

ALI also filed its Opposition arguing that the uniform restrictions had already been
validly extended by a majority vote of the Association’s members.

The RTC denied the oppositions of the Association and ALI. It ruled that the term of
restrictions had already expired. The Association and ALI moved for reconsideration
but was denied.

The Association and ALI separately filed before the CA petitions for certiorari assailing
the RTC’s Order.

In its 13 June 2012 Decision, the CA reversed and set aside the trial court’s rulings
and dismissed Jaka’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. It found that Jaka is estopped
from questioning the extension’s validity as it was voted upon by more than 2/3 of the
homeowner’s including Jaka, through its proxy, in the general membership meeting.

Jaka moved for reconsideration which was denied. It elevated the matter to the SC via
Petition for Review on Certiorari.

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ISSUE:

a) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case;

b) Whether or not the extension of the DOR is valid;
c) Whether or not Jaka is estopped from assailing the validity of the DOR’s
extension.

Ruling:

The HLURB has jurisdiction over the case considering that the controversy arose from
an intra-corporate relation between an association and its member, involving the
validity of term extension of DOR.

As to second and third issue, the SC deferred the resolution to the HLURB being the
appropriate government agency having the technical expertise to resolve whether the
extension of the DOR is valid and whether Petitioner is estopped to question it.

The SC likewise reminded the observance of doctrine of primary administrative

jurisdiction.

II. G.R. No. 211780, November 21, 2018

CEZAR YATCO REAL ESTATE SERVICES, INC., GRD PROPERTY RESOURCES,

INC., GAMALIEL PASCUAL, JR., MA. LOURDES LIMJAP PASCUAL, AND AURORA
PIJUAN, Petitioners, v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY
ITS PRESIDENT ANTONIO GUERRERO, AND THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS, Respondents.

FACTS:

Sometime in the 1950s, Makati Development Corporation developed Bel-Air Village, a

residential subdivision in Makati City and sold lots to interested buyers. The contracts
of sale were subjected to specific conditions & easements embodied in the Deed of
Restrictions which had a lifetime of 50 years, from January 15, 1957 to January 15,
2007.

Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (Association) was Bel-Air Village’s homeowner’s

association and under its by-laws, all lot owners of Bel-Air Village automatically
become members of the Association.

On 12 December 2006, majority of the members of the Association voted for

extension of the term of deed of restrictions until 23 August 2032.

Cezar Yatco Real Estate Services, GRD Property Resources, Masterman Land
Corporation(Masterman), Gamaliel, Lourdes, Sofia Limjap (Sofia) and Pijuan,
(collectively, the Complainants), who had voted against the Deed Restrictions’
extension, filed a Complaint before the HLURB arguing the following, that the
Association’s resolution extending the DOR’s effectivity was illegally and arbitrarily
approved, that no quorum was reached as the proxies were not notarized and their
forced membership in the Association violated their right to freedom of association.

The HLURB ruled that the extension of DOR is null and void.

The Association appealed to the Board of Commissioner which granted the appeal. The
Complainants moved for reconsideration but was denied, prompting them to file an
appeal before the Office of the President (OP).

The OP ruled in favor of the extension of DOR. It declared that the Association’s by-
laws did not provide a proxy form but the Corporation Code should be applied
suppletorily. For a proxy to be valid according to the Corporation Code, it should be a)
in writing, b) it should be signed by the stockholder and c) it must be filed before the
scheduled meeting with the corporate secretary.

Complainants moved for reconsideration but was denied.

Complainants appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA) but was denied. The CA
confirmed that the Association had the power to extend the DOR’s effectivity as the
50-year term was an integral part of it and was included among the restrictions that

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may be amended by majority vote of the Association members. It also adopted the
OP’s disquisition on proxies that it need not be embodied in a public document to be
valid.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the Association’s members, by majority vote, can extend the
Deed Restrictions’ term of effectivity;
b) Whether or not the extension of the Deed Restrictions’ term of effectivity was
validly voted upon by a majority of the Association’s members;
c) Whether or not Petitioners can be compelled to maintain their membership with
the Association.

RULING:

The Petition is denied and the Resolution of the CA are affirmed.

a) Yes. The DOR is a restrictive covenant that governs how lot owners can use or
enjoy their properties. It was annotated on the land titles issued to the lot
owners and it is not disputed that lot owners are bound by these annotations
under Sec. 39 of the Land Registration Act:

“Sec. 39. Every applicant receiving a certificate of title in pursuant of a

decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered
land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith, shall hold the
same free of all encumbrance except those noted on said certificate,
xxx”

The CA correctly ruled that the term of restrictions was also subject to amendment by
a majority vote of the Association’s members considering that it is an integral part of
the Deed. Necessarily, when Article VI of the DOR states that the restrictions may be
amended, the amendment can go as far as amending the entire DOR including the
term or duration of the restrictions which is part and parcel of the Deed. Thus, when
the Association extended the effectivity of the DOR, it did so in the context of
amending particular restrictions. The import of Article VI is so clear that it precludes
the Court from giving a different interpretation. In contract interpretation, if no
ambiguity is found and the terms of the contract clearly reflect the intentions of the
contracting parties, the stipulation will be interpreted as it is written.

b) Yes. The CA did not err in upholding the validity of the submitted proxies and
the overwhelming vote to extend the DOR’s term of effectivity.

In the absence of additional requirements for proxies in the by-laws, the basic
requirements for a written proxy submitted prior to scheduled meeting under
Sec. 58 of the Corporation Code governs.

c) Yes, as stated in PADCOM Condominium Corp vs Ortigas Center Assn, Inc. 1

automatic membership in a homeowners’ association does not violate lot
owners’ right to freedom of association because they were not forced to buy
their lots from the developer:

“It could have avoided such membership by not buying the land from
TDC. PADCOM voluntarily agreed to be bound by and respect the
condition, and thus to join the Association.”

G.R. No. 201781               December 10, 2014

ANNIE GERONIMO, SUSAN GERONIMO AND SILVERLAND ALLIANCE CHRISTIAN

CHURCH*, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. ESTELA C. CALDERON AND RODOLFO T. CALDERON, Respondents.

FACTS:

1
GR No. 146807, (09 May 2002)

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Respondents are residents of #31 Silverlane St., Silverland Subd., Pasong Tamo,
Tandang Sora, Quezon City. Sps. Joel and Annie Geronimo (“Sps. Geronimo”) are
residents of #48 Silverlane Street just across the house of Respondents.

Sometime in May 2005, a building was erected beside the house of Sps. Geronimo as
directed by Jonas Geronimo. Susan told respondents, when asked, that the lot would
be used as extension house to create a wider playing area for the Geronimo
grandchildren.

When the construction as finished, the building turned out to be the church of
Petitioner Silverland Alliance Christian Church (SACC). It was used for different
religious activities such as daily worship services, baptisms, summer school, choir
rehearsals, band practices, playing of different musical instruments and use of loud
sound system which would last until late in the evening. Respondents sought
assistance from the President of the HOA but to no avail. In fact, another residence
was used for Sunday school. Due to the added noise and tension, Estela’s nose bled.
They went to the Commission on Human Rights but no settlement was reached.

Respondents filed a Complaint before the HLURB against Silverland Realty&

Development Corp.(SRDC), SACC, Sps. Geronimo, Jonas and Susan Geronimo for
specific performance and for the issuance of cease and desist order and damages.

HLURB ruled against the continued use of the property at #46 Silverlane Street for
religious purposes and as a location of a church.

Petitioners appealed but was denied. They filed an appeal before the OP but again
denied the appeal. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA.

The CA dismissed the Petition and affirmed the ruling of the OP. The CA Agreed with
the OP that the case involves the failure of a developer of a subdivision project and
the HOA to ensure that the construction of a structures inside the subdivision
conforms to the approved plan. The CA said that the Development Permit issued for
the subdivision project clearly indicates that the subject lot’s use is residential.

The CA also ruled that under the Deed of Restrictions, a developer and the HOA are
contractually bound to the buyers of subdivision lots to maintain and preserve the
intended use of a certain lot and ensure that every construction conforms to the
approved plan. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots against the owner or developer of a
subdivision project fall under the jurisdiction of the HLURB pursuant to Sec. 1 of PD
1344.

Petitioners filed a Petition under Rule 45 before the SC.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the HLURB has jurisdiction over the
present controversy and
b) Whether the CA erred in affirming the HLURB’s ruling that Petitioners cannot
use #46 of Silverlane St. for religious purposes and as a location of a church.

RULING: Petition is denied.

a. No. The HLURB has jurisdiction over the present controversy. Respondents are
buyers of a subdivision lot from subdivision owner & developer SRDC and their
action against the latter was for violation of its own subdivision plan when it
allowed the construction and operation of SACC. Respondents sued to stop the
church activities inside the subdivision which is in contravention of the
residential use of the subdivision lots. Undoubtedly, the present suit for the
enforcement of statutory and contractual obligations of the subdivision
developer clearly falls within the ambit of the HLURB’s jurisdiction.
b. No. As noted by the HLURB, the Development Permit indicates the use of the
property as residential except for the designated open spaces. Petitioners do
not deny that the building beside the lot of Sps. Geronimo is used as a church.
Clearly, this usage contravenes the land use policy particularly prescribed in
the subdivision plan and in the Development Permit. Respondents, as
subdivision lot owners, are entitled to assert that the use of the said property
for religious activities be enjoined since it clearly violates the intended use of
the subject lot.

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G.R. No. 134269               July 7, 2010

THE LEARNING CHILD, INC. and SPS. FELIPE AND MARY ANNE ALFONSO, Petitioners,
vs.
AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ALMA ARZAGA,
MARIA LUISA QUISUMBING, ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION, SLV MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION and LAWPHIL, INC., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 134440

JOSE MARIE V. AQUINO, minor and represented by his parents DR. ERROL AQUINO AND
ATTY. MARILYN AQUINO; LORENZO MARIA E. VELASCO, minor and represented by his
parents FRANCISCO VELASCO AND ROSANNA VELASCO; CHRISTOPHER E. WALMSLEY,
minor and represented by his parents GERALD WALMSLEY AND MA. TERESA WALMSLEY;
JOANNA MARIE S. SISON, minor and represented by her parents BONIFACIO SISON AND
JOSEPHINE SISON; and MATTHEW RAPHAEL C. ARCE, minor and represented by his
parents RAPHAEL ARCE AND MA. ERISSA ARCE, Petitioners,
vs.
AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ALMA ARZAGA,
MARIA LUISA QUISUMBING, ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION and LAWPHIL,
INC., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 144518

AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ALMA ARZAGA,

MARIA LUISA QUISUMBING, ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION, SLV MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION and LAWPHIL, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF MUNTINLUPA, THE LEARNING CHILD, INC., SPOUSES FELIPE
AND MARY ANNE ALFONSO, AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIFTEENTH
DIVISION), Respondents.

Facts:

The instant cases concern three consolidated Petitions for review on Certiorari
concerning the operation of a preparatory and grade school located in Ayala Alabang
Village.

The first and second petition docketed as GR Nos. 134269 and 134440 assail the CA
resolutions dated 11 November 1997 and 02 July 1998, respectively, enjoining the
Petitioners’ continued operation on the ground that it is in violation of the Deed of
Restrictions (DOR) annotated on the title that limits the use of the lot to the
establishment of a preparatory school.

The third petition docketed as GR No. 144518 assailed the CA’s decision dated 15
August 2000 upholding the validity of a Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution correcting an
alleged typographical error in a zoning ordinance, which classified the subject property
as “institutional” where the operation of a grade school is allowed.

Injunction Case

In 1984, subdivision developer Ayala Land Inc. (ALI) sold a parcel of land to Sps.
Yuson and the latter subsequently sold the same to Sps. Alfonso. A Deed of
Restrictions (DOR) was annotated in TCT 149166 which states:

“2.2 USE AND OCCUPANCY – The property shall be used exclusively for the
establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten)
school, which may include such installations as an office for school administration,
playground and garage for school vehicles.”

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ALI turned over the right to enforce the restrictions on Ayala Alabang village
properties including the foregong restrictions on TCT 149166 to Ayala Alabang Village
Association (AAVA).

In 1989, the Sps. Alfonso operated the Learning Child Center Pre-School (TLC) on the
same lot. Initially, TLC was a preparatory school consisting of nursery and
kindergarten classes and expanded eventually in 1991 to include a grade school
program, the School of Holy Cross, that provided additional grade levels as the pupils
advanced.

AAVA filed with the RTC Makati City an action for injunction against TLC and Sps.
Alfonso, alleging breach of contract by Sps. Alfonso, particularly the DOR which
appeared in the Deed of Absolute Sale (DAS). It also alleged violation of Metro Manila
Commission Ordinance No. 81-01 (MMC No. 81-01), or the Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance for the NCR. MMC No. 81-01 classified Ayala Alabang Village as a low-
density residential area (R-1), limiting the use of the property to the operation of a
nursery and kindergarten school which should not exceed two classrooms.

AAVA prayed that defendants be restrained from continuing the operation of the
school.

On 24 November 1992, owners of properties within the vicinity of TLC, namely, Sps.
Arzaga, Quisumbing, Sena, KSL Corporation and Lawphil, Inc. (adjacent property
owners) filed a Complaint in Intervention seeking the same relief as AAVA and prayed
for damages.

On 22 July 1994, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of AAVA ordering TLC and Sps.
Alfonoso to cease and desist at the end of the school year 1994-95 from operating the
TLC beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a maximum of two classrooms in
accordance with the DOR and pay the AAVA attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.
Complaint in intervention is dismissed for failure to show by preponderance of
evidence entitlement to the damages prayed for.

TLC and Sps. Alfonso moved for reconsideration and was granted, the complaint was
dismissed. AAVA appealed and the CA reinstated the 22 July 1994 of the RTC Makati
City.

TLC and Sps. Alfonso moved for reconsideration (MR).

Zoning Ordinance Case

Meanwhile, Petitioners in GR No. 134440 (Aquino et.al) through their representatives,

alleged that they are minor children suffering from learning disabilities and benefiting
from TLC’s full-inclusion program, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and their own
Motion for Reconsideration with the CA.

The CA denied the MR filed by TLC and Sps. Alfonso and the Motion to Intervene filed
by Aquino et. Al. Subsequently, they elevated the matter to the SC.

In the meantime, while the MR of TLC and Sps. Alfonso was still pending in the RTC,
the Muntinlupa Municipality passed Resolution No. 94-179 correcting an alleged
typographical error in the description of a lot under the heading “Institutional Zone” in
Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-39, from Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V, Ayala Alabang to
Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang, which is the subject property wherein TLC is
located.

Municipality of Muntinlupa filed a Petition for the approval of Muntinlupa Resolution

No. 94-179 with the HLURB. AAVA and the adjacent property owners filed its
Opposition.

The HLURB, in its ruling deferred action to the Muntinlupa Sangguniang Bayan for the
conduct of public hearings, arguing that it is an actual rezoning of the property. The
Municipality of Muntinlupa, TLC and Sps. Alfonso appealed the HLURB Resolution to
the Office of the President (OP).

The OP ruled that the Resolution is a mere rectifying issuance and therefore does not
need for its validity compliance with the mandatory requirements of notice and
hearing. Further, it ruled that Resolution No. 94-179 is valid.

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AAVA and the adjacent property owners filed a Petition for Review with the CA. The CA
agreed with the OP that the questioned Resolution did not have to comply with the
requirements of notice and hearing.

AAVA and the adjacent property owners filed the Petition docketed as GR No. 144518.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the CA is correct in upholding the validity of Muntinlupa

Resolution No. 94-179;
b) Whether or not the CA was correct in denying Aquino et al.’s Motion to
Intervene and
c) Whether or not TLC and Sps. Alfonso should be enjoined from continuing the
operation of a grade school in the subject property.

RULING

a) Yes. Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 (MR No. 94-179) is merely a rectifying
issuance as proven from the fact that both the Official Zoning Map of
Muntinlupa and that of Ayala Alabang Village show that the subject property,
described as “Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V of Ayala Alabang” is classified as
“institutional”. On the other hand, neither the Official Zoning Map of
Muntinlupa nor that of the Ayala Alabang Village classify “Lot 25, Block 1 Phase
V of Ayala Alabang” as institutional.

The reason for the enactment of Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39 is to
have an updated zoning map.

MR No. 94-179, being a mere corrective issuance, is not invalidated by the lack
of notice and hearing as AAVA contends.

b) Yes. The date of filing of the Motion to Intervene, 05 February 1998, is late
such that the Petitioners are no longer in grade school at that time, rendering
their alleged interest in the case moot. The Motion was also filed after the
rendition of judgment by the trial court in violation of Sec. 2 Rule 19 of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
c) Yes. The DOR limits the use of subject property for preparatory school, without
regard to the number of classrooms. The two classroom limit is found in MMC
Ordinance No. 81-01 and not in the DOR. MMO 81-01 classified Ayala Alabang
Village as an R1 zone. However, in light of MR No. 94-179 removing the
classroom limitation, the said restriction is deleted.

In the instant case, the subject property, though declared an institutional lot,
lies within a residential subdivision and is surrounded by residential lots. TLC
and Sps. Alfonso cited the case of Ortigas & Co vs Feati Bank & Trust Co. 2
to argue that reclassification of properties is a valid exercise of police
power with which contractual obligations should be reconciled.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that it is not applicable considering that
the area surrounding TLC did not undergo a radical change similar to that in
Ortigas but remained purely residential.

In Ortigas case, the property was restricted for exclusive use as residential
purposes. Defendant Feati Bank acquired the subject property and built a
commercial bank building on the premises. However, the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong passed a Resolution declaring the area to which the subject
property is situated as an industrial and commercial zone. The Court upheld the
validity of the Resolution having been passed in the exercise of police power.

The Court affirmed the 22 July 1994 RTC Decision ordering TLC and Sps.
Alfonso to cease and desist from operation of the TLC beyond nursery and
kindergarten classes. Pursuant to MR No. 94-179, the restriction on two
classroom limitation is deleted. The current students enrolled in Elementary are
allowed to finish their elementary studies until grade 7 but the school shall no
longer be allowed to accept new students for grade school.

2
GR No. L-24670 (14 December 1979)

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 Meanwhile, BOC filed a Petition for Cancellation of Adverse Claim on TCT 473882 and
473883. This petition was opposed by Sps. Carmelo and Elizabeth Africa (“Sps. Africa”)
through Dominguez. BOC manifested that there is an ongoing settlement between them
to which Sps. Africa did not interpose any objections. Dominguez filed a Request for
Admission of the afore-stated manifestation. After a month, Dominguez manifested that
he withdrew as counsel for Sps. Africa as oppositors in the Petition for Cancellation of
Adverse Claim.

In 2013, Dominguez filed a Motion to Fix Attorney’s Fees and to Approve Charging
Attorney’s Lien with Motion for Production of Compromise Agreement.

On 28 January 2013, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled to hold the resolution of the
said motion in abeyance until a resolution in the Petition for Cancellation of Adverse
Claim is rendered.

Dominguez moved to reconsider said Order but was denied by the RTC on 16 September
2013 holding that the claim for attorney’s fees should be claimed in a separate civil
action.

Dominguez elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a Petition for
Certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.

The CA dismissed the Petition of Dominguez arguing on the basis of the following:

1.Trial courts cannot adjudicate money claims in petition for cancellation of adverse claim
and are limited only in determination of propriety of adverse claim.
2. The trial court could not grant monetary award especially a lien on the judgment in the
form of attorney’s fees as said petition is incapable of pecuniary estimation and his
claim for attorney’s fees should be subject of a separate civil action.
3. It also affirmed the trial court’s findings that the compromise agreement will not affect
the nature of a petition for cancellation of adverse claim since it was never part of the
proceedings nor subject of the trial court’s approval.

Dominguez filed then the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
1.Whether or not the trial court can adjudicate money judgment in a petition for
cancellation of adverse claim.
2. Whether or not the claim for attorney’s fees should be pursued in a separate action
rather than in the petition for cancellation of adverse claim.
3. Whether or not the Compromise Agreement can be used as basis for the claim of
Dominguez’s attorney’s fees even if it was part of the proceedings in the petition for
cancellation of adverse claim.
4. Whether or not the money judgment and execution in the main case are conditions
sine qua non in charging lien as security for payment of attorney’s fees.

RULING:

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As to all issues raised herein, the Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative and granted the
Petition. The case was remanded to the trial court for computation of attorney’s fees
based on quantum meruit.

In petitions for cancellation of

adverse claim, trial courts are not
precluded from adjudicating
matters involving attorney’s fees.

This is to obviate multiplicity of suits. Sec. 70 of Property Registration Decree does not
limit the issues that may be resolved by the trial court in a petition for cancellation of
adverse claim. In fact, in other cases such as determination of just compensation,
probate of a will and foreclosure of mortgage, the Supreme Court had permitted the
counsel to interpose his claim for attorney’s fees and lien in the same action. However,
the lawyer may also choose to file an entirely separate action for enforcement of his
attorney’s fees.

A compromise agreement
between the counsel’s client and
the adverse party is one of the
factors in determining the
counsel’s lawful fees for the legal
services he rendered.

As to third issue, the Compromise Agreement could be used as one of the basis in fixing
the amount of attorney’s fees for the legal services that a lawyer rendered. If no money
judgment was rendered pursuant to the Compromise Agreement, the attorney’s fees
would be fixed based on quantum meruit.

Considering that Dominguez was able to prove the rendition of legal services to Sps.
Africa, he is entitled to attorney’s fees and the case will be remanded to the trial court
for proper determination of his fees based on quantum meruit.

In charging lien to secure

attorney’s fees, money judgment
and execution are necessary.

As to the last issue, the Court ruled that a money judgment and execution are necessary
in order to charge or enforce attorney’s lien. However, it is necessary that the lawyer
comply with these two conditions 1) he registered his lien on the records of the court, 2)
he caused a written notice to such effect to be delivered to his client and to the adverse
party. It would be absurd to charge a lien without judgment or resolution of the case as
there is absence of basis for the determination of legal fees.

A) GAW CHIN TY ET. AL VS. ANTONIO GAW CHUA, GR NO. 212598 (29
SEPTEMBER 2021)

FACTS:
Sps. Gaw Chin Ty and Chua Giok See purchased a parcel of land covered by TCT
420866. They registered it in the name of their eldest son, Respondent Antonio Chua
(“Antonio”) as it is a Chinese custom. Thereafter, they entrusted the original owner’s
duplicate copy to their second eldest son, one of the herein Petitioners, Vicente Chua.
(“Vicente”)

Claiming that Antonio lost the original owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 420866, he
filed a petition for the issuance of a new/ reconstituted owner’s duplicate copy with the
RTC of Malabon.

On 15 August 2000, the RTC granted the petition, declared the owner’s duplicate copy of
TCT No. 420866 as null and void and ordered the issuance of a new/ reconstituted
owner’s duplicate of copy of TCT 420866 in the name of Antonio.

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On 27 August 2001, Petitioners Gaw Chin Ty and her children with Chua Giok See,
namely, Vicente, Robert, Manuel, Alejandro, Mario and Jacqueline, thereafter filed a
Notice of Adverse Claim and was inscribed on 31 August 2001.

On 21 April 2009, Respondent filed a complaint against Vicente for physical injury in
Brgy. 250, Manila City. No settlement was reached causing the issuance of a Certificate
to File Action.

On 24 June 2009, Antonio filed a petition for cancellation of the adverse claim and were
ordered to undergo mediation. The case was set for pre-trial in view of the failed
mediation.

On 23 September 2009, Petitioners filed a petition to annul the new/ reconstituted

owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 420866 based on the fact that the title is not lost but
merely in their possession and that Respondent Antonio knew this fact.

During pre-trial, Antonio acknowledged the existence of TCT 420866 after it was
presented by the Petitioners but disputed its authenticity. Despite opportunity to prove
his claim that it was spurious, he was not able to rebut the presumption of regularity in
the issuance of the Registry of Deeds.

The RTC granted the Petition and nullified TCT No. 420866. Antonio moved to
reconsider but was denied. He appealed before the Court of Appeals and reversed the
RTC decision. The latter dismissed the petition to annul reconstituted title without
prejudice considering that parties, as family members failed to undergo mediation
proceedings as condition precedent in filing the Petition to Annul Reconstituted TCT
420866.

Petitioners filed the Petition for review on Certiorari to assail the Resolution of the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal on the ground of failure to comply with a condition
precedent for exerting earnest efforts toward compromise between family members, was
valid.

RULING:
No. The petition was granted, the Resolution of the CA is reversed and set aside. The
Decision of RTC Malabon City is reinstated. The new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT
420866 is declared null and void.

The issue on the validity of the issuance of a new/ reconstituted owner’s duplicate copy
cannot be the subject of compromise. Article 151 of the Family Code, as a ground for
dismissal without prejudice under Section 1 (j) of Rule 16, is not applicable.

The court rendering the decision to grant the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate title, if
said title is not lost or destroyed in the first place, has no jurisdiction to order the
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate title. The decision may be attacked any time.

The validity of a new owner’s duplicate title is an issue that goes beyond the private
interests of the family members because it relates to the Torrens system of registration
of property and can affect public confidence on the certificates of title of property issued
by the RD.

The parties in this case, while family members, cannot compromise on the jurisdiction
of the RTC which issued the decision to grant the new owner’s duplicate title. Failure to
exert earnest efforts toward compromise is not fatal to the institution of the petition for
annulment of the new owner’s duplicate title.

B) THE LINDEN SUITES, INC. VS MERIDIEN FAR EAST PROPERTIES,

INC. GR NO. 211969 (04 OCTOBER 2021)

FACTS:

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On 18 November 2005, Petitioner Linden Suites, Inc (“Linden”) filed a Complaint for
Damages against Respondent Meridien Far East Properties (“Meridien”) before RTC
Branch 70, Pasig City on the ground that while Petitioner was doing excavation works
for the construction of Linden Suites in Ortigas, Pasig City, it discovered that the
concrete retaining wall of the adjacent building, One Magnificent Mile (OMM) owned by
Respondent, encroached on its property line.

Respondent Meridien undertook to remove the encroachment but was unable to finish
it, prompting Petitioner Linden to finish the demolition. Petitioner Linden incurred the
amount of P3,980,468.50 for the cost of demolition but respondent Meridien refused to
pay, which led to the filing of the complaint.

RTC adjudged respondent liable for the cost of demolition, actual and compensatory
damages and attorney’s fees. Respondent Meridien appealed and the CA affirmed the
RTC decision but deleted the award of actual and compensatory damages. An entry of
judgment was subsequently issued.

Petitioner Linden filed a motion for writ of execution before the RTC which was
subsequently granted.

On 5 and 14 of April 2010, Sheriff Boco attempted to serve the writ on Respondent in its
office address in Makati City but failed. He was advised to serve it at Mandaluyong City
being the registered address of the Respondent in its GIS but upon service thereof, he
was told by the Legal and Administrative Officer of Meridien East Realty and
Development Corporation (“MERDC”) that it was Meridien Development Group Inc
(“MDGI”) and not respondent which owned said office. Thus, the writ was returned
unserved.

Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Examine Judgment Obligor before RTC of Pasig
City, the trial court that rendered the final judgment because it observed that the 2006
GIS of Respondent and 2009 GIS of MERDC stated the same set of officers. Petitioner
prayed that Respondent’s officers be directed to appear before the court for an
examination of the income and properties owned by respondent for the satisfaction of
the RTC Decision. Petitioner also sought the grant by the trial court of other reliefs as
are just and equitable.

The RTC denied Petitioner’s motion and ruled that Respondent’s officers cannot be
subjected to an examination as they do not reside in its territorial jurisdiction. Also, it
would be violative of the doctrine of separate juridical entity to call upon the officers to
ascertain the properties and income of respondent.

Petitioners moved to reconsider but was denied. Thus, it elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals through Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The CA dismissed the petition for lack of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC, arguing that a judgment obligor cannot be compelled to appear before a court
outside the province in which he resides or is found. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was denied.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC as the court that rendered judgment on Petitioner’s
complaint, can examine Respondent’s officers.

RULING: Yes. The Petition is granted. The Resolution of the CA is reversed and set
aside. The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
examination of respondent’s officers.

The RTC as the judgment court

has supervisory control over the
execution of its judgment.

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Its supervisory control over the case ensures the enforcement of a party’s rights or
claims that it has duly recognized. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court lays down available
remedies for the satisfaction of a judgment, including the enforcement of a writ of
execution, which the winning party may avail of before the judgment court. Among the
remedies available to such party to fully enforce the writ of execution is the examination
of judgment obligor.

A judgment obligee is entitled, as

a matter of right, to an order of
the court which rendered
judgment if the writ of execution
issued against the judgment
obligor was returned unsatisfied,
in whole or in part.

In this case, when the writ of execution returned unserved, it was imperative for the
judgment court to issue an order for the examination of respondent. Such order would
have ensured the satisfaction of the judgment all the more so as it had already attained
finality. The RTC, pursuant to its residual authority, should have issued auxiliary writs
and employed processes and other means necessary to execute its final judgment. It also
disregarded the general prayer for “other reliefs just and equitable” by the petitioner.

The RTC’s denial also curtailed the execution of its very own final judgment, despite
respondent’s liability having been duly recognized by the court.

The doctrine of separate juridical

personality is inapplicable in the
case at bench.

There is also no violation of the doctrine of separate juridical personality because

petitioner wanted the officers to be examined not for the purpose of passing unto them
the liability of respondent as its judgment obligor, but in order to satisfy the final
judgment by ascertaining the properties and income of respondent which can be
subjected for execution.

C) CAT REALTY CORPORATION VS DEPT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,

CENTER FOR AGRARIAN REFORM EMPOWERMENT &
TRANSFORMATION, INC. ALTERNATIVE COMMUNITY-CENTERED
ORGANIZATION FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT (ACCORD) BENJAMIN DE
VERA JR AND TENORIO GARCIA, GR NO. 208399, (23 JUNE 2021)

FACTS:
Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the predecessor in interest of petitioner CAT Realty
Corporation (“CAT Realty”), filed a petition for conversion of 23 parcels of agricultural
land with an area of 386.7992 hectares located in Bayambang, Pangasinan (subject
property). Then DAR Secretary Estrella (“Sec. Estrella”) issued the Order dated 04
September 1975 (“Conversion Order”) granting the conversion and declaring the subject
property as suitable for residential, commercial, industrial and other urban purposes.

On 15 December 2004, Respondents filed a petition for revocation of the conversion

order on the ground that CAR Realty and its predecessor in interest failed to develop the
subject property and remains agricultural in use.

Then DAR Sec. Pangandamanan issued an Order dated 02 August 2006 partially
revoking the Conversion order and directed the municipal agrarian reform officer to
proceed with the acquisition of the portions of the subject property that were still
agriculturally viable under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. CAT Realty
moved for reconsideration of the partial revocation order which was granted. DAR
Secretary reinstated the Conversion Order on the ground that CAT Realty was able to
comply with the condition to pay disturbance compensation by giving the tenants a
subdivision. It also found that there was no specific period for CAR Realty to develop the
subject property.

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Private respondents moved to reconsider which was again granted and reinstated the
partial revocation of the Conversion Order. DAR Secretary reiterated that CAT Realty
did not substantially carry out its purpose to convert the land to commercial, industrial
and residential uses.

CAT Realty sought reconsideration but was denied. DAR Secretary ruled that majority of
the subject property was still agricultural and no substantial improvement was
introduced by the petitioner. Thereafter it filed a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals (‘CA”) under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

The CA denied CAT Realty’s petition and adopted DAR’s factual findings that there was
no substantial development on the subject property and that the same was still used for
agricultural purposes. Thus, there was no compliance with the conversion order.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the instant Petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the DAR’s partial revocation of the
conversion order, effectively allowing DAR to put the undeveloped areas of the subject
property under the coverage of agrarian reform.

RULING:
Yes. The Petition is granted. The Resolution of the CA is reversed and set aside. The
Order dated 04 September 1975 of the Sec of DAR is reinstated.

The Order dated 04 Sept.

1975 declaring the subject
property as suitable for non-
agricultural purposes has
long attained finality

Under Sec. 46 of Art. VIII of the 2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion, a
petition for revocation must be filed within ninety (90) days from discovery of the facts
which warrant the revocation or withdrawal, but not more than one (1) year from
issuance of the conversion order. In Berboso v CA, the Supreme Court (“SC”) held that
once final and executory, an order for land conversion can no longer be questioned. In
Berboso, the conversion order was sustained considering that it was only after 17 years
from the issuance of the conversion order that the parties decided to assail it.

In this case, private respondents are barred by estoppel from seeking the revocation of
the final conversion order since it was almost 30 years when they assailed the order.

CAT Realty complied with the

conditions under the
Conversion Order

There was no valid cause for revocation as Petitioners sufficiently complied with the
conditions stated therein, such as, payment of the disturbance compensation to the
tenants and it was also observed that partial development was made on one third of the
subject property. Moreover, the conversion order as well as the prevailing law at the
time of issuance, did not set a period within which the owner should completely develop
the subject property.

The subject property cannot

be subject to agrarian reform
after being declared that it is
suitable for non-agricultural
use prior to the effectivity of
RA 6657 on 15 June 1988

For lands converted prior to 15 June 1988 or the date when CARL took effect, DAR is
bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of

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the subject property within the coverage of the CARL. The subject property is beyond
the coverage of the CARL having been converted before the effectivity of RA 6657.

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