Jether K.

Corpuz

CAYETANO v. MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns a review of the qualifications of herein respondent to the position of

Chairman of the COMELEC, particularly about his career in the practice of law.

FACTS:

Respondent Atty. Christian Monsod was nominated and confirmed by the Commission

on Appointments to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. However, herein petitioner

opposed the nomination, alleging that respondent does not possess the required qualification of

having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years, as provided under Section 1(1),

Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner prays that the said confirmation and consequent

appointment of respondent as COMELEC Chairman be declared null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent does possess the necessary qualification of having been

engaged in the practice of law for ten years.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent possesses the necessary qualification.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

The Court adopted the modern interpretation of the term “practice of law”, which pertains

to legal-related endeavors and activities conducted in and out of the courtroom, not necessarily

referring to or connected with litigation. Thus, it declared that respondent’s work throughout the

years as economist, entrepreneur, negotiator and legislator among others, constitutes the practice

of law. Hence, respondent Atty. Monsod is qualified for the position of Chairman of the

COMELEC.
Jether K. Corpuz

OVERGAARD v. VALDEZ
A.C. No. 7902. March 31, 2009

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This resolution concerns a motion for reconsideration filed by respondent in response to

the Court’s ruling in a previous case which held that he be disbarred from the practice of law.

FACTS:

Complainant Torben Overgaard engaged the services of respondent Atty. Godwin Valdez

as his legal counsel. Despite receiving his legal fees, respondent Valdez refused to perform his

obligations as legal counsel and ignored the complainant's request for a report of the status of the

cases entrusted to his care. This prompted complainant to file a complaint for disbarment against

respondent before the IBP. Respondent failed to submit his answer to the complaint and to

participate in the investigation. Eventually, it was held that he committed multiple violations of

the Code of Professional Responsibility and was thus disbarred.

Now in this motion for reconsideration, respondent explains that the reason why he failed

to submit his position paper is because his physical safety and security was under threat.

Following the advice of his friends, he fled and made himself scarce, disappearing and

abandoning his client without notice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent’s disbarment should be sustained.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent’s disbarment should be sustained.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Respondent’s disbarment was not based on his failure to perform his obligations, but

rather on the fact that he abandoned his client. For a lawyer should exercise reasonable and
ordinary care and diligence, and not simply abandon his client without notice. The existence of

threats to physical safety and security is not a valid excuse for a lawyer to desert his client.
Jether K. Corpuz

PNCC v. MANDAGAN
G.R. No. 160965. July 21, 2008

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns respondent’s engagement in private law practice, rendering services in

favor of another employer.

FACTS:

Respondent Atty. Maria Nympha Mandagan was hired by petitioner Philippine National

Construction Corporation (PNCC) and assigned to its corporate legal division. Sometime later,

petitioner issued a memorandum to respondent which required her to explain herself as to why

she engaged in private law practice, i.e. moonlighting, thereby violating the PNCC Code of

Employee Discipline. On the other hand, respondent explains that the case was that of an

accommodation and that her services were requested by former top PNCC officials. She also

explained that when a petition for annulment of judgment was filed, she desisted from

representing one of the former PNCC officials and that she signed the petition for certiorari filed

before the CA only as counsel of record. Eventually however, respondent was dismissed from

employment.

The Labor Arbiter and NLRC ruled in favor of respondent’s dismissal by petitioner,

however the Court of Appeals disagreed and overturned the decisions of the two former entities.

Hence, this petition by petitioner, contending among others that the CA erred in ruling that

respondent did not violate any company policy by handling a private case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent engaged in private law practice, violative of the PNCC’s

policy.

RULING:
 The Court ruled in the negative, that respondent’s engagement in private law practice was

not violative of the PNCC’s policy.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

According to the PNCC Code of Employee Discipline, an employee is guilty of

moonlighting if he or she renders services to another employer without the knowledge or

approval of management. The Court took notice of the word “or”, which leads to the conclusion

that knowledge alone by the management of the activities of the employee is considered as

implied approval of such and thereby exonerates the employee from liability. Respondent

submits that the former management officials of the PNCC were the ones who requested her

services, and therefore knew of her private law practice.

Moreover, in the case of OCA v. Ladaga, it was held that private practice of law “does

not refer to an isolated court appearance but contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature

habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer.” Hence, the Court declared

that respondent’s employment cannot be terminated because respondent’s isolated appearance

does not constitute private practice of law, especially when it was done with permission from the

management officials.
Jether K. Corpuz

RE: PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M.

DACANAY
B.M. NO. 1678, December 17, 2007

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner for leave to resume the practice of law.

FACTS:

Petitioner was a practicing lawyer until he migrated to Canada to seek medical care and

attention. In order to avail the free medical aid program in Canada, petitioner applied for

Canadian citizenship and subsequently became a Canadian citizen. Sometime later, he reacquired

his Philippine citizenship, pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-

Acquisition Act of 2003. Petitioner returned to the Philippines, intending to resume the practice

of law. However, a question arose as to his qualifications to do so. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was disqualified to become a member of the Philippine Bar the

moment he lost his Philippine citizenship.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the negative, that petitioner is not disqualified from becoming a

member of the Philippine Bar.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

The general rule is that a lawyer who has lost his Philippine citizenship cannot practice

law in the Philippines. However, the exception is when the lawyer, who has lost his Philippine

citizenship, reacquires the same in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. By that
virtue, he has once again met all the qualifications to be a member of the Philippine Bar. But,

reacquisition of said citizenship does not come with it the resumption of the right to practice law.

To practice law again, one must fulfill the following conditions: 1) pay in full the annual

membership dues to the IBP; 2) pay the professional tax; 3) undergo mandatory continuing legal

education; and 4) retake the lawyer’s oath. Hence, petitioner may resume the practice of law,

provided that he fulfills the abovementioned conditions.

Jether K. Corpuz

CATU v. RELLOSA
A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns respondent punong barangay’s wrongful engagement in the private

practice of law.

FACTS:

Respondent Atty. Rellosa, as the punong barangay, presided over conciliation

proceedings between two parties contesting possession over a property that complainant co-

owns. To much dismay, an amicable settlement was not reached. Eventually, a proper filing of

action before the court was made. Because of the financial incapability of one of the parties,

respondent stood as their legal counsel. This prompted complainant to file an administrative

complaint against respondent, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a

lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants.

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent committed a violation of Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A.

No. 6713, which prohibited public officials from engaging in the private practice of profession.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent erred when he stood as legal counsel for one of the parties in a

conciliation proceeding which he presided over as punong barangay.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative, that responded erred in standing as legal counsel for

one of the parties.

RATIO DECIDENDI:
 The Court held that the applicable law is Section 90 of R.A. 7160, not Section 7 (b) (2) of

R.A. 6713; for the former, which is a special law, is an exception to the latter, which is a general

law. According to Section 90, elective local officials who are not required to render full-time

service may practice their professions outside session hours. Thus, sanggunian members who are

members of the Bar may engage in the private practice of law, provided that it be done outside

session hours. However, to avail of this privilege, the qualified elective local official must obtain

prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service

regulations.

Hence, in the case at bar, respondent punong barangay is not forbidden to practice his

profession; however, he failed to obtain prior permission or authorization from the Secretary of

Interior and Local Government to do so.

Jether K. Corpuz

SERANA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns a misrepresentation of reference committed by petitioner’s counsel.

FACTS:

Petitioner, a student regent in the University of the Philippines, allegedly committed

estafa of government funds which were allotted by former President Estrada to the Office of the

Student Regent Foundation, Inc. In the course of the proceedings, petitioner’s counsel, Renato

dela Cruz misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section

4 of R.A. No. 3019. Such misrepresentation is evident in the counselor’s motion to quash, instant

petition for certiorari and memorandum.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s counsel committed a breach of the Code of Professional

Responsibility and thus, ought to be admonished

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative, that petitioner’s counsel committed such a breach and

ought to be admonished.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

According to Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, “a lawyer shall not

misquote or misrepresent.” The importance of this rule is stressed in the case Pangan v. Ramos,

where a lawyer was reprimanded for deceiving the court by using a different, unauthorized name

in a criminal case. Said lawyer was sternly warned that repeating such act may result in
suspension or disbarment. Hence, in the case at bar, the Court urges petitioner’s counsel to

observe candor and fairness in his conduct, lest the administration of justice gravely suffer.

Jether K. Corpuz

SABERON v. LARONG
A.C. No. 6567. April 16, 2008

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns respondent lawyer’s use of abusive and offensive language in the

construction of pleadings for another case.

FACTS:

Complainant filed a complaint with the IBP, stating that respondent, an in-house counsel

and corporate secretary of a bank, used abusive and offensive language in his pleadings for his

clients in another case before the BSP where complainant is also an adverse party. Respondent

stated that complainant’s most recent suit against his clients was a part of a series of blackmail

suits filed for financial gain. On the other hand, respondent argues that there was nothing abusive

or offensive in his usage of the word “blackmail” in classifying the suits against his clients.

The IBP opined that respondent’s statements were irrelevant and overboard,

recommending that respondent be found guilty of gross misconduct and be suspended from the

practice of law for 30 days. However, complainant recommends that the penalty be changed to

disbarment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent attorney used abusive and offensive language in his pleadings.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent used abusive and offensive language

in his pleadings and is therefore guilty of simple misconduct.

RATIO DECIDENDI:
 Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer

shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise

improper.” Also, Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the same Code provides that “a lawyer shall abstain

from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.” In our

adversarial legal system, a lawyer is entitled to represent his clients and their interests with vigor

and courage. However, such entitlement does not permit the lawyer to employ abusive and

offensive language against opposing counsel or the adverse party. Statements in petitions and

motions, however false or malicious, are considered as absolutely privileged; but they shall only

remain so if they are relevant to, or that they are, the subject of inquiry.

In the case at bar, the use of the word “blackmail” by respondent in his pleadings was

entirely irrelevant to the subject of inquiry before the BSP. However, such use does not

necessarily warrant disbarment.

Jether K. Corpuz

TALENTO v. PANEDA
A.C. No. 7433. December 23, 2009

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns an administrative complaint filed against respondent for violation of

the lawyer’s oath and neglect of duty.

FACTS:

Respondent Atty. Paneda was hired by complainants as legal counsel for a civil case.

Despite being paid his attorney’s fees, respondent failed to file a pre-trial brief on complainants’

behalf. Also, respondent did not attend the pre-trial conference and left the complainants without

legal counsel. This resulted to the loss of complainants in the civil case not because of the merits,

but because of technicalities. And subsequently, after spending more money for an appeal,

respondent failed to inform complainants that the appeal was dismissed for lack of an appeal

brief. This prompted complainants to file a complaint against respondent.

In his defense, respondent explained that there were many uncontrollable incidents that

intervened in the case. He states that the reason why he did not file a pre-trial brief is that the

complainants already made an amicable settlement with the plaintiff; and that he was not able to

attend the pre-trial conference because he had to go to a replevin case concerning his personal

vehicle in Dagupan City. For his failure to file an appeal brief, he puts the blame on the

incompetence of his secretary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent was remiss in his duties as legal counsel of the complainants.

RULING:
 The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent was remiss in his duties as legal

counsel and is therefore suspended from the practice of law for one year.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer owes

fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in

him.” Also, Canon 18 of the same Code provides that “a lawyer shall serve his client with

competence and diligence.” Respondent’s failure to submit a pre-trial brief in the allowable

period cannot be justified, for every good lawyer knows that an amicable settlement between two

parties must first be judicially recognized by a competent court for it to be legally binding. Also,

he failed to inform his clients of the dismissal of the appeal and simply put the blame on his

secretary’s alleged incompetence. The totality of the facts of the case point to the conclusion that

respondent failed to perform his lawyerly obligations and abandoned his client’s cause.
Jether K. Corpuz

FOODSPHERE, INC. v. MAURICIO, JR.

A.C. No. 7199. July 22, 2009

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns a complaint against herein respondent for his acts of grossly immoral

and unbecoming conduct in the practice of law in relation to media.

FACTS:

A certain Alberto Cordero and his relatives discovered worms inside a can of liver spread

manufactured by the complainant. The Corderos complained to the BFAD about it and

subsequently underwent conciliation proceedings with complainant. It eventually led to the

signing of a “KASUNDUAN” between the Corderos and the complainant wherein it is stipulated

that the former will withdraw their complaint from the BFAD. However, respondent Atty.

Mauricio, Jr., who affixed his signature to the “KASUNDUAN” as a witness, later wrote in one

of his articles in a tabloid that he prepared the document. Due to complainant’s disagreement to

respondent’s terms which would favor him financially, the latter started making attacks against

complainant through various forms of media.

Despite the filing of the criminal complaints, pendency of the civil case and the issuance

of a restraining order enjoining further broadcasting or publishing of the issue, respondent

continued his attacks against complainant and its products.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent committed a breach of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.

RULING:
 The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent committed such breach and is

therefore suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Rule 13.02 of the Code provides that “a lawyer shall not make public statements in the

media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.” Also,

Canon 1 provides that a lawyer must “uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and

promote respect for law and legal processes.” Respondent violated the first said rule when he

continued his attacks against complainant through the media. And, he violated the second said

rule when he defied the restraining order enjoining him to make such attacks.

The Court also took note of the ruling in the case of Saberon v. Larong which essentially

held that a lawyer’s entitlement to represent his client with vigor and courage does not

necessarily warrant a justification of the usage of abusive and offensive language. Furthermore,

by failing to comply with the standards of legal ethics and the lawyer’s oath, respondent also

violated Canon 7 which provides that a lawyer should "at all times uphold the integrity and the

dignity of the legal profession."

Jether K. Corpuz

PACANA, JR. v. PASCUAL-LOPEZ

A.C. No. 8243. July 24, 2009

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns an administrative complaint against respondent for committing a

flagrant violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by double-dealing between two

parties with conflicting interests.

FACTS:

Complainant, the Operations Director of Multitel, was distraught and besieged with

demand letters from clients due to the company’s erring investment schemes. This prompted

complainant to seek help from respondent Atty. Pascual-Lopez who gave legal advice and helped

in many other legal and business-related affairs, particularly in absolving complainant’s liability

in an investment scam. In all this, there was no formal agreement that respondent would

officially stand as complainant’s legal counsel. To lay low from the intrigue, complainant went

to the United States and entrusted many matters to respondent such as the sale of a vehicle and

large amounts of money.

Wary that respondent might not solve his legal problems, complainant was advised to

hire another lawyer. When she knew of this, respondent communicated with complainant and

assured him that she will take care of everything as his friend and lawyer. Eventually,

complainant returned to the Philippines and, after much confusion and frustration with

respondent’s failure in accounting for all the cash and properties she was entrusted with, filed an

administrative complaint against her.

 In her Answer-Affidavit, respondent explained that there was no formal agreement

between them that would consolidate an attorney-client relation. Respondent added that she

represented the group of investors of Multitel and that she was just a mere mediator in the

settlement of the claims of her clients against the complainant. Also, respondent believes that she

did not violate any ethical standard in helping complainant with his legal problems.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent committed a flagrant violation of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent committed such flagrant violation and

is therefore disbarred.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code provides that “a lawyer shall not represent conflicting

interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.” The

Court held that this prohibition is founded on public policy, good taste and necessity. A lawyer-

client relationship is built on trust and confidence, for the client discloses all the facts so that the

lawyer may know the strong and weak points. This is important insofar as to aid the lawyer in

representing the cause and interests of the client. In the case at bar, respondent cannot be

permitted to be the legal counsel for both complainant and the Multitel investors, for it would be

double-dealing and a violation of the above said ethical rule.

Moreover, respondent’s contention that a lawyer-client relationship with complainant

does not exist in the absence of a formal document is not tenable. It cannot be said that a lawyer-

client relation is only consolidated or created by a formal written agreement between the two

parties. Respondent’s acts of constantly communicating with complainant regarding legal

matters established a lawyer-client relationship by itself. It has been held that a contract in such a

relation may be express or implied.

Jether K. Corpuz

HADJULA v. MADIANDA
A.C. No. 6711. July 3, 2007

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns a complaint for disbarment against herein respondent.

FACTS:

Complainant and respondent were employees of the BFP. Complainant approached

respondent for legal advice, and in the course of their discussion, disclosed certain personal

matters and secrets and gave copies of important documents to the latter. Later on, respondent

informed complainant that she will forward the latter’s concerns to another lawyer friend.

Complainant, however, states that it was malicious for respondent to turn her down when

sensitive information was already disclosed to the latter. After some time and as their relations

further went sour, she filed herein complaint against respondent. In her complaint, complainant

prays for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for having disclosed complainant’s

personal secrets and sensitive information.

On the other hand, respondent reasons that there was lawyer-client relationship between

her and complainant, and that the supposed confidential information of complainant were already

facts of common knowledge to the BFP. Respondent denied that confidential information was

disclosed to her by complainant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent disclosed confidential information of the complainant, thereby

violating ethical standards.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent disclosed complainant’s confidential

information thereby violating ethical standards and the rule of confidentiality. Respondent is,

therefore, reprimanded for her acts.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Firstly, it cannot be said that there was no lawyer-client relationship in the absence of a

retainer agreement to make it formal and official. The mere fact that complainant approached

respondent for legal advice, and that the former was received by the latter, marked the creation of

a lawyer-client relationship. And because of that, respondent as a lawyer is bound by

responsibilities to her client, among them is to maintain the confidentiality of certain information

disclosed.

Thus, the information disclosed to respondent by complainant is protected under the

attorney-client privilege communication. By relaying personal and confidential information,

respondent violated legal ethics and breached her duty by failing to preserve the confidence of

her client.
Jether K. Corpuz

YU v. TAJANLANGIT
A.C. No. 5691. March 13, 2009

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns an administrative complaint against herein respondent for violating

the Code of Professional Responsibility by failing to render an accounting of money received.

FACTS:

Complainant was convicted of 30 years imprisonment after losing in a criminal case. He

claims that his alleged legal counsel, herein respondent, failed to file the proper motion. That

instead of filing an appeal, respondent filed a petition for certiorari which was subsequently

denied by the CA. This alleged error in filing the proper remedy prompted complainant to file an

administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent. In his complaint, complainant states,

among others, that respondent failed to return the bail bond to him after withdrawing it, thereby

violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

On the other hand, respondent answered that he was authorized and even instructed by

complainant to withdraw the bail bond so that it may serve as payment for legal fees and as

reimbursement for other expenses.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent violated legal ethics when he did not return the bail bond to

complainant, despite being authorized and instructed by the latter to withdraw it to serve as

payment and reimbursement.

RULING:
 The Court ruled in the negative, that respondent did not violate legal ethics when he did

not return the bail bond to complainant. However, respondent violated legal ethics when he

failed to render an accounting of the money received. He is therefore ordered to render

accounting within 30 days after receipt of this resolution and is admonished.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Records show that there was a special fee arrangement between respondent and

complainant with regards to the bail bond, and that the latter had knowledge of such agreement.

Thus, it was not improper for respondent to withdraw the bail bond and apply it as payment for

his services and as reimbursement for the other expenses.

In the case of Garcia vs. Atty, Manuel, the Court held that “(t)he highly fiduciary and

confidential relation of attorney and client requires that the lawyer should promptly account for

all the funds received from, or held by him for, the client.” In the case at bar, although

respondent was entitled to be compensated and reimbursed, he failed to render an accounting of

the money he received, as required by Rule 16.01 of the Code. Respondent, thus, violated legal

ethics because of his inexcusable failure.

Jether K. Corpuz

CENIZA v. RUBIA
A.C. No. 6166. October 2, 2009

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns an administrative complaint filed against herein respondent for

violating legal ethics by neglecting her duties to her client and for withdrawing her services

without good cause and without proper notice.

FACTS:

Complainant procured the legal services of respondent for a civil case. Due to

complainant’s financial incapability to pay the acceptance fee at the time, respondent suggested

that she borrow money from another person. Then, respondent had her sign a promissory note for

payment of Php 32,000.00. After the loan was paid off, it took three months before respondent

informed her client that the complaint was filed in court. Complainant also received a copy of the

complaint with a civil case number and a rubber stamped “RECEIVED”. However, when

complainant went to check with the Clerk of Court, the complaint was never filed.

Later on, respondent withdrew her services and returned the payment given her by

complainant, reasoning that she was overwhelmed by workload in handling her other wealthier

client. This left complainant without representation. Thus, complainant filed a complaint against

herein respondent, accusing respondent of gross misconduct and ignorance of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent committed unethical acts which warrant administrative

sanctions.
RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent committed unethical acts violative of

Rule 18.03 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be

administratively sanctioned. He is therefore suspended from the practice of law for six months

effective immediately.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Rule 18.03 of the Code provides that “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted

to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.” Also, Canon 22 of the

same provides that “a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice

appropriate in the circumstances.”

The Court held that there is nothing wrong with respondent charging her client for her

services, however it was improper for respondent to suggest to her client that she borrow money

from another to pay for the acceptance fee. This fact shows that respondent would proceed to

help complainant only if payment could be made. Respondent was also wrong in withdrawing

her services simply because of overwhelming workload for another wealthier client.

Furthermore, respondent was incompetent in failing to maintain an open line of communication

with her client regarding the progress of the complaint.

What is at stake here is the great need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people

in the legal profession. A lawyer who accepts a case but fails to exert competent and diligent

efforts to fulfill his duties to his client whether rich or poor, deserves to be disciplined and

administratively sanctioned.
Jether K. Corpuz

VILLANUEVA v. GONZALES
A.C. No. 7657. February 12, 2008

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns an administrative complaint against herein respondent for failing to

render legal services and to return money and important documents to complainant.

FACTS:

Complainant sought the legal services of respondent for a civil case and gave to

respondent an acceptance fee of Php 8,000.00 and other important documents. After receiving

the said articles, respondent began avoiding complainant until the latter lost all faith and

confidence in the former. Respondent was able to return the acceptance fee but kept possession

of the important documents. Thus, complainant filed a complaint against respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent erred in his duties to his client and violated the Canons of the

Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent erred in his duties and violated

Canons 16, 17, and 18, and Rules 16.01, 16.03, 18.03, and 18.04 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. He is therefore suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years and

is ordered to return the documents to complainant.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Canon 16 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys of his client

that may come into his possession. Rule 16.01 of the same provides that a lawyer shall account
for all money received from the client. And, Rule 16.03 provides that a lawyer shall deliver the

funds of his client when due or upon demand. In this case, respondent demanded and received

his acceptance fee from complainant, but failed to render any legal service to the latter. If that

were so, then respondent should have promptly accounted for the money received and returned

the same and the documents to complainant without delay. Were it not for the persistence of the

complainant’s daughter in demanding the money, it would not have been returned. But, the

documents are still in respondent’s possession without explanation. In light of the Canons of the

Code, respondent must return them to complainant.

Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity

to the cause of his client. Canon 18 of the same provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with

competence and diligence. And, Rule 18.03 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not neglect

a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him

liable. In the case at bar, it is evident that respondent totally neglected his duties and the cause of

his client. By receiving the acceptance fee from complainant, respondent was bound to be

diligent and competent in his efforts to represent his client. But instead, respondent did not

render any legal service to complainant.

Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall keep

the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the

client's request for information. In this case, respondent started avoiding complainant after

receiving payment and the important documents for the civil case. Respondent thus failed to

keep his client informed on the status of the case and refused to fulfill his client’s requests for

information.
Jether K. Corpuz

BARBASA v. TUQUERO, et. al.

G.R. No. 163898. December 23, 2008

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns a petition for certiorari on the ruling in a criminal case of grave

coercion filed against private respondents, who merely cut off electricity for petitioner in

accordance with a penal clause in a lease contract between the two parties. Said penal clause

provided that the power can be cut off by private respondent upon petitioner’s financial liability.

Additionally, the Court took the opportunity to remind counsels of their duty to inform their

clients of the objective merits of their case, or if their case has no merit at all.

FACTS:

Petitioner, a lessee of commercial stalls belonging to private respondent, filed a criminal

case of grave coercion against the latter for disconnecting their electricity. According to

petitioner, private respondents, along with several armed guards, came to the stalls in a violent

and intimidating manner and disconnected the electricity. On the other hand, private respondent

avers that they came peacefully. Furthermore, the records show that petitioner has outstanding

debts and liabilities payable to private respondent. It has also been shown that the disconnection

of electricity upon financial liability was expressly agreed upon by the two parties in the form of

a penal clause in a validly executed lease contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents’ act of disconnecting the electricity to petitioner’s

rented stalls constitutes grave coercion.

RULING:
 The Court ruled in the negative, that private respondents’ act of disconnecting the

electricity does not constitute grave coercion. The case lacks merit; hence the petition is hereby

denied.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

As held in the case of Pryce Corporation v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming

Corporation, a penal clause is "an accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal

obligation for the purpose of insuring the performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a

special prestation (generally consisting in the payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation

is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately fulfilled." The Court further held therein that

penal clauses are quite common in lease contracts, and that it functions to strengthen the coercive

force of an obligation.

In light of the evidence presented in the case at bar, it cannot be said that private

respondents’ act of cutting off the power constitutes grave coercion. For the parties had expressly

agreed in the penal clause of their lease contract that private respondent has the option of cutting

off power in the event that petitioner fails to pay his dues. Private respondents cannot be sued for

grave coercion simply because they performed an act sanctioned by an expressly agreed upon

penal clause.

Moreover, the Court took the opportunity to remind counsels of their bounden duty as

officers of the court to help secure the orderly and unimpeded administration of justice and the

success of the rule of law. Instrumental in accomplishing this endeavor on the part of lawyers is

the sense and responsibility to inform their clients of the objective merits of their case, or if their

case has no merit at all.

Jether K. Corpuz

SALIGUMBA, et. al. v. PALANOG

G.R. No. 143365. December 4, 2008

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns a petition for review of a case that petitioners lost due to the

negligence of their counsel who failed to properly inform the court of the death of his client.

FACTS:

Sometime before, petitioners’ parents lost to respondent in a civil case. Eventually,

petitioners filed herein petition for review, averring that the ruling of the trial court in the civil

case was null and void because there was no proper substitution of their deceased parents as

party to the case and that their parents had no legal representation when the ruling was made.

They contend that the attorney-client relation between Atty. Miralles and their parents ended

with the former’s appointment as MCTC judge, despite the fact that Atty. Miralles acted on their

behalf and moved for postponement of the hearings at the time. Nevertheless, petitioners aver

that the trial court ruling has no binding legal effect on them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court ruling in the civil case is null and void.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the negative, that the trial court ruling is valid and legally binding on

petitioners. The petition is therefore denied.

RATIO DECIDENDI:
 Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that it shall be the duty of the

attorney to inform the court promptly of his client’s death. The failure of counsel to comply with

this rule and the non-substitution of a party to a case does not invalidate the proceedings and the

decision thereon. It shall be binding to the parties and their successors-in-interest. On the other

hand, an attorney must make an application to the court for his withdrawal from the record as

counsel for a party in order for the attorney-client relation to be formally terminated.

In the case at bar, Atty. Miralles continued to be the legal counsel for the petitioners’

deceased parents, for the records show that he even acted on their behalf in moving to postpone

the hearings. Counsel did not even confirm his appointment as MCTC judge. Furthermore, there

was no formal substitution of attorney on record. Atty. Miralles thus failed to perform his duty as

legal counsel to inform the court promptly of the death of his clients. His negligence does not

warrant invalidation of the proceedings and the decision on the civil case. The decision shall be

legally binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest.

Jether K. Corpuz

BELLEZA v. MACASA
A.C. No. 7815. July 23, 2009

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns an administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent for

unprofessional and unethical conduct in handling the criminal case of complainant’s son.

FACTS:

Complainant sought the legal services of respondent in handling her son’s criminal case.

Respondent agreed to handle the case. In the course of their attorney-client relation, respondent

failed to produce receipts for all the money he received from complainant in connection with the

legal processes of the case. It also turned out that respondent failed to render legal service to the

complainant’s son, forcing complainant to avail of the services of the Public Attorney’s Office

instead. Hence, this complaint for disbarment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent committed unprofessional and unethical acts during his stint

as legal counsel for the complainant’s son.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent committed unprofessional and

unethical acts violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is therefore disbarred

from the practice of law effective immediately.

RATIO DECIDENDI:
 Firstly, Canon 17 of the Code provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his

client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Rule 18.03 provides

that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection

therewith shall render him liable. And, Canon 18 provides that a lawyer shall represent his client

with zeal within the bounds of the law. It must be understood that upon acceptance of a retainer,

a lawyer pledges his devotion to help his client and that he assures the same that he is skillful,

able, trustworthy and diligent as legal counsel. In the case at bar, respondent, despite accepting

the case and the payments, failed to show fidelity to the cause of his client and neglected to

actively represent him in the matters of his criminal case.

Second, Rule 16.01 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or

property collected or received for or from the client. The fiduciary nature of the attorney-client

relation mandates the attorney to render a full accounting of all the money he received from his

client. In this case, respondent failed to produce official receipts for the money that he received.

His failure to do so is a gross violation of morality and legal ethics that borders on the criminal

as it may constitute swindling or estafa.

And finally, Canon 7 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the

integrity and the dignity of the legal profession. In the case at bar, respondent committed

unprofessional and unethical acts, chief among them was his pocketing the money entrusted to

him by complainant, which was supposed to serve as a bail bond for her son. This deceitful act

only revealed respondent’s lack of moral soundness and integrity.

Jether K. Corpuz

PORMENTO, SR. v. PONTEVEDRA

A.C. No. 5128. March 31, 2005

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns an administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent who is

guilty of representing clients with conflicting interests.

FACTS:

Respondent was legal counsel to complainant and his family for over 30 years. However,

relations between complainant and respondent turned sour when it turned out that respondent

failed to inform complainant of the dismissal of his counterclaim in a civil case for a property.

This eventually led to complainant’s loss of the right to appeal.

Later on, complainant filed a criminal case against the new alleged owner of the property

in the civil case who then engaged the legal services of respondent. In this complaint for

disbarment, complainant contends that respondent used the complainant’s disclosed information

in the civil case to help his new client in the criminal case.

Respondent, on the other hand, avers that there is no conflict of interests between his

client and the complainant because the cases he handled for the two are separate and distinct

from each other, and that the attorney-client relation between him and complainant has

terminated. Respondent contends that he took the case for the new client because of

humanitarian considerations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of representing clients with conflicting interests.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent is guilty of representing clients with

conflicting interests. However, due to his honest belief that there was no conflict of interests and

the fact that this was his first violation of this kind, he is instead hereby fined the amount of Php

10,000.00.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Rules 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not

represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full

disclosure of the facts. Rule 21.02 of the same Code provides that a lawyer shall not, to the

disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he

use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge

of the circumstances consents thereto. Also, jurisprudence states that there is a representation of

conflict of interests when the acceptance of a new retainer will negatively affect another party or

will require him to disclose information belonging to another party. Thus, a lawyer is forbidden

to represent a new client against a former client if the subject matter of the case is related,

directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous case for the former client.

In the case at bar, the subject matter for the criminal case is related to that of the civil

case. Thus, respondent represented clients with conflicting interests. Despite the absence of

direct evidence that respondent used disclosed information in the civil case to help his new client

in the criminal case, respondent still became privy to that disclosed information. Hence, in terms

of professionalism and to avoid suspicion, the mere fact of the previous attorney-client relation

with complainant should have prompted respondent to not stand as legal counsel for the new

client. Furthermore, admirable though it may be, respondent’s humanitarian considerations in

taking up the criminal case does not erase the prohibition against representation of conflicting

interests. Therefore, respondent represented clients with conflicting interests and, in light of his

honest belief that there was no such conflict, should face a proportionate punishment.
Jether K. Corpuz

SABITSANA, JR. v. VILLAMOR

A.M. No. 90-474. October 4, 1991

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns an administrative charge against respondent for falsification of

Certificates of Service and making it appear that he had resolved all submitted cases within the

90-day period requirement.

FACTS:

Complainant charged respondent judge with falsification of monthly Certificates of

Service by making it look that he has resolved all his cases, but in reality, his court has a huge

backlog of cases. In his Answer, respondent pointed fingers at his clerk of court for the

inefficient management of the court records and at the person-in-charge of preparing the monthly

reports.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of falsification of Certificates of Service and is

liable for the inefficient management of his Court’s records.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent judge is guilty of falsification of

Certificates of Service and is liable for the inefficient management of his Court’s records and is

therefore dismissed from the service without benefits and privileges.

RATIO DECIDENDI:
 Rule 3.08, of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should diligently

discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court

management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and

court personnel. Also, Rule 3.09 provides that a judge should organize and supervise the court

personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the

observance of high standards of public service and fidelity. And, in the case of Cipriano v.

Villamor, “judges are called upon to exercise the utmost diligence and dedication in the

performance of their duties. It is a measure of a judge's competence as an administrator that he is

capable of delegating to his personnel those tasks which properly pertain to them, maintaining,

likewise, their trust and confidence in him.”

In the case at bar, respondent judge puts the blame on his clerk of court and seems to

have forgotten that he is the overall administrator of his Court. The primary and original duty

and responsibility to supervise court personnel and ensure the proper functions of the court

befalls on respondent judge, which he failed to observe. Respondent’s act of falsification and the

effect thereof is anathema to the policy of the judiciary to uphold the constitutional right of the

people to a speedy disposition of cases and to preserve the people’s faith in the administration of

justice.
Jether K. Corpuz

RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR.

A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA. October 15, 2008

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns an administrative matter involving the telephone conversation of a CA

justice with his brother which turned into an improper discussion on the merits of the case.

FACTS:

Court of Appeals Justice Jose Sabio, Sr. was found guilty of simple misconduct and

conduct unbecoming of a justice. In seeking to reverse the decision of the Court, he avers that he

did not violate Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because he turned down his

brother’s offer to get his vote on a case. He further added that he should not be made liable for

the acts of his brother. Respondent contends that he would not have known that his innocent

conversation with his brother would turn out differently.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent justice is guilty of violating Canon 13

of the Code and that his motion is hereby denied with finality.
RATIO DECIDENDI:

Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall rely

upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives

the appearance of influencing the court.

In the case at bar, respondent justice should have known in the first place that it would be

improper to talk to his brother pending a case which the latter has an interest in. The records

show that respondent even continued to entertain his brother’s call despite the offer. Respondent

portrayed a blatant disregard for the standards of legal ethics, despite being a professor of that

subject himself. That fact alone aggravates the violation from simple to grave misconduct. Brief

suspension is disproportionate to the gravity of respondent’s wrongs.