LAW ON

PUBLIC OFFICERS

CASE DIGESTS

ATTY. GIOVANNI GIO BAQUIRAN

Submitted by:
KIMBERLY J. CACHO
JDII

CAASI vs CA 
G.R. No. 88831, November 8, 1990
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.

DOCTRINE:
SECTION 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE (B.P. BLG. 881), APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR, NOT SECTION 18, ARTICLE IX OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. — Section 18, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or
acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is
not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before
he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. The law
applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which provides: "Any
person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to
run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in
the election laws."

FACTS:
Mateo Caasi filed a petition to disqualify the Miguel Merito, his  from being a candidate for the
position of municipal mayor of Pangasinan on the ground that Miguel is a green card holder. On his
defense: Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but
he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card
for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical
examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao,
Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections. COMELEC dismissed the petition on the ground that
the possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has
abandoned his residence in the Philippines.
On the contrary, inspite  of his green card, Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to
continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality.
As the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective
local officials Petitioner then appealed to CA and prays for a review of the decision, "Merito C. Miguel,
petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R. Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing the decision of the RTC which
denied. The Court of Appeals ordered the RTC to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo
warranto case. It is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning the qualification
of the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner meets
the very basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic)
and that there is no legal obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the petitioner, considering that decisions
of the Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the Election Code are appealable to the
COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United
States.
RULING:
Yes. Court deems it significant that in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien
Registration” which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila
before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein
regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was,”
Permanently.". On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States
Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel
identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN.
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted
an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States
merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have
there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.
Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or
authority to reside there permanently.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country
during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the
status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his
tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code that states that, “Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws.”.
MACALINTAL vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

DOCTRINE:
By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in construing
constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional
Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to
qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are
not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy residency requirement in
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. 

FACTS:
Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity.
Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in
seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the
instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer. Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a
resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least
six months immediately preceding an election. 
Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his claim. In that
case, the Court held that a green card holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have
abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines. 

ISSUE:
Whether Section 5 (d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or
permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their
intention to return to the Philippines violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of article 5 of the
1987 Constitution?

RULING:
NO. SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENT FOUND IN SECTION 1 OF THE SAME ARTICLE. Section 5(d) provides:

Sec. 5. Disqualifications. — The following shall be disqualified from voting

under this Act:

d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she
executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that
he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3)
years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has
not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the
name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and
his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same time,
both a resident and an absentee. However, under existing election laws and the countless
pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in
the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile.

Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his residence in this country,
the framers of the Constitution considered the circumstances that impelled them to require Congress
to establish a system for overseas absentee voting. Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came
into being to remove any doubt as to the inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1. It is
precisely to avoid any problems that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the
largest number of qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional Commission
explicitly mandated Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee voting.

MARCIAL COSTIN V. HONORABLE LOPE C. QUIMBO

GR No. L-32271, January 27, 1983
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

DOCTRINE:

It is elementary in the law of public officers that no person, no matter how qualified and eligible
he is for a certain position may be appointed to an office which is not vacant. There can be no
appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed or his appointment
validly terminated.

FACTS:

Petitoner Lajer was a member of the municipal police force of Abuyog, Leyte and was extended
a promotional appointment as sergeant of police. Months later after his appointment, the outgoing
mayor of Abuyog accorded him with another promotional appointment on November 25, 1959 as chief
of police. His appointment as chief of police was not attested and approved as required by law and in
pursuant of RA 2260, Section 20 which requires attestation of the provincial treasurer in the case of
appointments of municipal mayors to become effective. In January 14, 1960, the new municipal mayor
dismissed Lajer  and eight other members of the police department and extended to respondent Verra
a permanent position as Chief of Police of Abuyog. 

Lajer and the other eight members dismissed filed an action for Mandamus (Civil Case No.
2713) against the municipal mayor, municipal treasurer, and the municipal council of Abuyog,
contesting their separation from the service. While their petition was pending, the change in the
administration of Abuyog led the dismissal of Verra from office and was replaced by a certain Silleza
until when the petitioner Costin was appointed chief of police. 

Respondent Verra filed for quo warranto with mandamus against Marcial Costin, the municipal
mayor, and the municipal treasurer, questioning the legality of his separation alleging that he could not
be dismissed as chief of police because he was a civil service eligible and attested "Permanent" by the
Civil Service Commission.

On January 22, 1966, the mandamus suit (Civil Case No. 2713) filed by the group of Lajer, which
had been appealed was decided by the Court of Appeals that Lajer, Tomines, and Jervoso "were
illegally removed from office and are, therefore, entitled to reinstatement to their respective positions
with payment of the salaries they failed to receive.”

On December 2, 1969, respondent judge rendered his decision in Civil Case No. 3606, declaring
that Verra is entitled to reinstatement with salary to be paid to him for the whole period of his illegal
separation to the date of his reinstatement. The court also ordered the municipal mayor to reinstate
Verra immediately and the municipal treasurer to pay his salary

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of respondent Higinio Verra to the position of Chief of Police of
Abuyog, Leyte, was valid and consequently his removal therefrom illegal.

RULING:

No, the appointment issued in favor of respondent Verra as chief of police was invalid and
ineffective because the said position was not vacant from the time Lajer was illegally separated, up to
the time he was reinstated. While it is true that the appointment of Lajer was never attested as
required by law or incomplete, the incoming mayor should have awaited the action of the provincial
treasurer and later, the Commissioner of Civil Service, before appointing his own protege to a position
with an incumbent occupying it. It follows that no vacancy in the office of chief of police when Verra
was appointed.
The validity of Verra’s appointment, therefore, hinges on the legality of Lajer’s removal. It is
elementary in the law of public officers that no person, no matter how qualified and eligible he is for a
certain position may be appointed to an office which is not vacant. There can be no appointment to a
non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed or his appointment validly
terminated. Verra, never having been validly appointed, there was no office from which he was illegally
dismissed. 

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted. The decision of the respondent court in
Civil Case No. 3606 is reversed and set aside and the petition for quo warranto with mandamus filed in
the court a quo is ordered dismissed.
VICTOR AQUINO VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND LEONARDA D. DE LA PAZ
Gr No. 92403; April 22, 1992
MEDIALDEA, J.

DOCTRINE:

Once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil
service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right (to the
position), which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot be taken
away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with
previous notice and hearing.

FACTS:

Petitioner Victor A. Aquino, then holding the position of Clerk II, Division of City Schools of San
Pablo City, was designated as Officer-in-Charge of the Division Supply Office by the DECS Regional
Director. Prior to such designation, petitioner was designated as Property Inspector and In-Charge of
the Supply Office performing the duties and responsibilities of the Supply Officer I. After two years, the
Division Superintendent of City Schools of San Pablo City, issued a promotional appointment to private
respondent Leonarda D. de la Paz as Supply Officer I in the DECS Division of San Pablo City. She
assumed and performed the duties and functions of the position and received the compensation and
benefits therefor. 

At the time of her appointment, private respondent was then holding the position of Clerk II,
Division of City Schools of San Pablo City. The Civil Service Regional Office IV approved her appointment
as permanent "provided that there is no pending administrative case against the appointee, no
pending protest against the appointment, nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely
affect the approval of (the) appointment".

A month after, petitioner filed a protest with the DECS Secretary questioning the qualification
and competence of private respondent for the position of Supply Officer I. In a decision dated May 4,
1987, DECS Secretary sustained the protest of petitioner and revoked the appointment of private
respondent as Supply Officer I. Private respondent then filed her petition for reconsideration but the
same was denied. On the basis of such decision, petitioner Aquino was issued a permanent
appointment as Supply Officer I by the DECS Regional Director Pedro San Vicente.

Private respondent de la Paz filed a notice of appeal with motion to maintain status quo to the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which rendered a decision upholding the appointment of
Aquino as Supply Officer I. From the decision of the MSPB, private respondent appealed to public
respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC). 
In Resolution No, 88-820 dated November 7, 1988, public respondent CSC found the appeal of private
respondent meritorious, thus revoking the appointment of petitioner Aquino and restoring private
respondent de la Paz to her position as Supply Officer I.
 Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in the case of Santiago v. Civil Service Commission
that the Civil Service Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position for that would have constituted an
encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority. 
ISSUE:

Whether or not public respondent Civil Service Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in
revoking the appointment of petitioner Victor A. Aquino as Supply Officer I.

RULING:

The situation is different as in the instant case, where the Civil Service Commission revoked the
appointment of the successful protestant, petitioner herein, principally because the right to security of
tenure of the prior appointee, private respondent herein, to the contested position had already
attached. It must be noted that public respondent CSC did not direct the appointment of a substitute of
its choice. It merely restored the appointment of private respondent who was first appointed to the
contested position. 
The records show that private respondent was issued a permanent appointment on September 19,
1986 as Supply Officer I in the DECS Division of San Pablo City effective September 30, 1986. On the
basis of the of said appointment which was approved by the Civil Service Regional Office No. IV, private
respondent assumed and performed the duties and functions of the position as Supply Officer I and
received the compensation and benefits of the said position.

It is well-settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a
position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable
right (to the position), which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot
be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and
with previous notice and hearing.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. vs. EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA
G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005
CARPIO, J.:

DOCTRINE:

The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap

measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to
the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of
a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting
secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.

FACTS: 

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (“President Arroyo”) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (“Secretary
Ermita”) to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M.
Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap (“respondents”) as acting secretaries of
their respective departments. The petition also seeks to prohibit respondents from performing the
duties of department secretaries.

While Congress is in its regular session in 2004, President Arroyo, through Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita,  issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Respondents took their oath of
office and assumed duties as acting secretaries. 

The appointments prompted the petitioners to file this present petition. They assert that “while
Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of
an office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its
consent.

Meanwhile, after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim
appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously
appointed in an acting capacity.

Respondent secretaries, on the other hand, maintain that the President can issue appointments
in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments even while Congress is in session.

ISSUE:

Whether or not President Arroyo’s appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, while Congress is in session, is constitutional.
RULING: 

Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not
interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution
expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly
against the legislature. The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is
limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a
person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress
impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.

Thus, it is constitutional for President Arroyo to issue appointments to respondents as acting

secretaries. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-
gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as
the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice
as the acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.

Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a
position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
cannot impose on the President whom her alter ego should be.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department
secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress
is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may
make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.

The express provision of law that allows the President to make an acting appointment is Sec.
17, Chap. 5, Title I, Book III, EO 292 states that “[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer
already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office
in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet
in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

Because the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse, the acting
appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III
of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting
appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Thus, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from
President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess
of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Additional Reading: Ad-interim appointments vs. appointments in an acting capacity

Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them
are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover, ad-
interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection;
acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are
a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing
the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from
President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess
of Congress, way before the lapse of one year. (Aquilino Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005) 
FELIMON LUEGO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO
G.R. No. L-69137. August 5, 1986
CRUZ, J.

DOCTRINES: 

1. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment
extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the
appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified
and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. 

2. The Commission is merely allowed to check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate
civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is
disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts on
— or as the Decrees says, "approves" or "disapproves" — an appointment made by the proper
authorities.

3. NEXT-IN-RANK policy, NOT ABSOLUTE. — Rule V, Section 9, of Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions
and Policies, which provides that "whenever there are two or more employees who are next-in-rank,
preference shall be given to the employee who is most competent and qualified and who has the
appropriate civil service eligibility."  The next-in-rank rule is not however absolute as the Civil Service
Decree allows vacancies to be filled by transfer of present employees, reinstatement, reemployment, or
appointment of outsiders who have the appropriate eligibility.

FACTS:

Petitioner Luego was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by
Mayor Florentino Solon on February  18, 1983. The appointment was described as “permanent” but
the Civil Service Commission approved it as “temporary” subject to the final action taken in the protest
filed by the private respondent Felicula Tuozo and another employee, and provided "there (was) no
pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment nor
any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment."  

On 22 March 1984, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent Felicula Tuozo
better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and accordingly directed herein private
respondent in place of petitioner’s position. The private respondent was so appointed on 28 June 1984,
by the new mayor; Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent
appointment as well as to question the Civil Service Commission’s order and the private respondent’s
title.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on
the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding,
order his replacement by the latter?

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to
determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority
being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil
Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.
Hence, the Civil Service Commission’s resolution is set aside.
VICENTE GARCIA vs. THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE
HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV
[G.R. No. 75025 September 14, 1993]
BELLOSILLO, J. 

DOCTRINES:
The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse
effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation
from the service.
The President's control has been defined to mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to the
judgment of the former for the latter." 

FACTS: 
Petitioner Vicente Garcia was employed as a supervising lineman at the Bureau of
Telecommunications. He was accused of stealing some materials in their company. Thus, public
respondents filed a criminal case against him for qualified theft before a court and on the same ground
respondents also filed an administrative case in which petitioner was found guilty and was later
dismissed from the service. 
With respect to the criminal offense, petitioner was acquitted by the court due to insufficiency
of evidence. Petitioner was then reinstated from his work and is now claiming before the Commission
on Audit (COA) for his back salaries from the time of his dismissal up to present.COA on the other hand
reluctantly denied his pleadings. Meanwhile, petitioner was extended an executive clemency (absolute
pardon) by the President. Still, respondent COA strongly refused to give due course to petitioners
claim.
ISSUE: 
Is respondent entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to
the grant of executive clemency? 
RULING:
The Court ruled initially by explaining the mandate of Sec 19 Article VII of the Constitution and
further articulates that the bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely
obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and
ordered his separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself
exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is
rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be
reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the
clemency.
It is worthy to note that the dismissal of petitioner was not the result of any criminal conviction
that carried with it forfeiture of the right to hold public office, but is the direct consequence of an
administrative decision of a branch of the Executive Department over which the President, as its head,
has the power of control. The President's control has been defined to mean "the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to the judgment of the former for the latter." 

Established jurisprudence fixes recovery of back wages to a period of five (5) years to be paid an
illegally dismissed government employee who has been ordered reinstated. 12 The cases heretofore
decided by this Court show that petitioners therein were employees of local governments who were
removed from office by their local officials. The reasons given for their removal were abolition of office
or position, reduction of work force, or lack of funds on the part of the local governments concerned,
which reasons were found by this Court to be either devoid of factual basis or not sufficiently proven,
otherwise, their dismissal would have been valid and justified. In contrast, the case before us is
different, involving as it does circumstances that impel us to deviate from the general rule previously
laid down on the recovery of back wages for five (15) years. Petitioner's reinstatement in the instant
case which was ordered pursuant to a grant of executive clemency was effected not because of lack of
sufficient proof of his commission of the offense but that, more importantly, he did not commit the
offense charged. Verily, law, equity and justice dictate that petitioner be afforded compassion for the
embarrassment, humiliation and, above all, injustice caused to him and his family by his unfounded
dismissal. This Court cannot help surmising the painful stigma that must have caused petitioner, the
incursion on his dignity and reputation, for having been adjudged, albeit wrongfully, a dishonest man,
and worse, a thief. Consequently, this Court finds it fair and just to award petitioner full back wages
from 1 April 1975 when he was illegally dismissed, to 12 March 1984 when he was reinstated. The
payment shall be without deduction or qualification.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR NO. 83896, Feb. 22, 1991
Fernan, C.J.

DOCTRINE:
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers
and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.46 It has been held that "in cases
where there is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office
and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and
may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office.
This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public
should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one
for such services. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue
of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.

FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of EO 284 which ostensibly restricted the number of
positions that Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, and other appointive
officials may hold in addition to their primary position but in effect allowed them to hold multiple
positions contrary to Art VII, Sec 13 of the Constitution. In averring that EO 284 creates an exception to
the rule in Art VII, Sec 13, respondents contend that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution” in said section makes reference to Art IX-B, sec 7(2) insofar as appointive officials
mentioned therein are concerned.

ISSUE:
Does the prohibition in Art VII, Sec 13 of the Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their
undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for
appointive officials in general under Art IX-B, Sec 7(2) of the same?

RULING:
 NO. Art IX-B, sec 7(2) is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to appointive public
officials, while Art VII, Sec 13 is meant to be the exception applicable particularly to the President, Vice-
President, Cabinet Members, their deputies, and assistants. Thus, while all other appointive officials in
the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment during their tenure when such is
allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, Cabinet members, their deputies, and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution. EO 284 is thus null and void
as it is repugnant to Art VII, sec 13. It was noted, however, that the prohibition against the holding of
any other office or employment by the Pres., VP, Cabinet members, and their deputies or assistants
during their tenure (provided in Sec 13, Art VII) does not comprehend additional duties and functions
required by the primary functions of the officials concerned who are to perform them in an ex officio
capacity as provided by law.
The pertinent provision of the assailed EO read: “Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary
functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more
than two positions in the government and government corporations”.
[Civil Service Commission] Art IX-B, sec 7(2): Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries
In the case at bar, there seemed to be a contradiction between Art IX-B, sec 7 and Art VII, sec 13
of the Constitution. One section is not to be allowed to defeat another if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was
to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family insofar as holding other offices
or employment in the govt or elsewhere is concerned. If the contention of the respondents is adopted,
the aforestated intent of the framers would be rendered nugatory. It must therefore be departed from
(Civil Liberties Union v. Exec Sec, 194 SCRA 317)
“Ex-officio.” – means “from office; by virtue of office.” It refers to an “authority derived from
official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to
the official position.” Also denotes an “act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office,
and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.” An ex-officio
member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office and without further
warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority and the Light
Rail Transit Authority. The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the
principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for
his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by
the compensation attached to his principal office. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to
collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an
allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional
compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
AGUSTINA G. GAYATAO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and BAYANI I. FERNANDEZ, 
G.R. No. 93064 June 22, 1992
REGALADO, J.:

DOCTRINE:

It is within the power of the public respondent to order the reinstatement of government
employees who have been unlawfully dismissed. The CSC, as the central personnel agency, has the
obligation to implement and safeguard the constitutional provisions on security of tenure and due
process.

FACTS:
Bayani I. Fernandez was holding the position of Customs Operations Chief I (COC) in the Bureau
of Customs since March 5, 1984 in a permanent capacity. He was assigned to the aircraft Operations
Division. On February 15, 1988, Commission Mison, purportedly acting pursuant to Executive Order No.
127 implementing the reorganization of the Department of Finance, Bureau of Customs, appointed
petitioner Agustina G. Gayatao  to the position of Customs Operations Chief at the NAIA Customhouse,
effective March 1, 19883 Thereafter, in CPO No. B-27-88 dated March 3, 1988, petitioner was
designated as COC of the Export Division at NAIA, while private respondent was designated as Customs
Operations Assistant Chief (COAC) of the Aircraft Operations Division, both designations being effective
March 1, 1988.
Fernandezt questioned the appointment contending that (1) he was unjustifiably demoted
since he had been holding the contested position prior to the reorganization, and (2) he is more
qualified than herein petitioner.
Petitioner contended that public respondent has no authority to revoke her appointment on
the ground that another person is more qualified, for that would constitute an encroachment on the
discretion vested solely in the appointing authority.
CSC ruled in favor of Fernandez and reinstated him in his position. Motion for reconsideration
was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent commission committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the appointment of
petitioner and ordering the appointment of private respondent in her place?

RULING:

No. The issue in this case is not the qualification but the resolution of CSC being null and void
because it demoted Fernandez which is in violation of his right to  security of tenure. A reading of the
questioned resolution of respondent commission readily shows that the revocation of the appointment
of petitioner was based primarily on its finding that the said appointment was null and void by reason
of the fact that it resulted in the demotion of private respondent without lawful cause in violation of
the latter's security of tenure. The advertence of the CSC to the fact that private respondent is better
qualified than petitioner was merely to lend further support to its stand that the removal of private
respondent was unlawful and tainted with bad faith and that his reinstatement to his former position is
imperative and justified.
It is within the power of public respondent to order the reinstatement of government
employees who have been unlawfully dismissed. The CSC, as the central personnel agency, has the
obligation to implement and safeguard the constitutional provisions on security of tenure and due
process. In the present case, the issuance by the CSC of the questioned resolutions, for the reasons
clearly explained therein, is indubitably in the performance of its constitutional task of protecting and
strengthening the civil service.
ANTONIO LACSON v. HONORIO ROMERO, ET AL., 
G.R. No. L-3081, October 14, 1949
MONTEMAYOR, J.:

DOCTRINE:
"There is no Power in this country which can compel a man to accept an office." 

FACTS:
Lacson was appointed by the President of the Philippines as the provincial fiscal of Negros
Oriental on July 25, 1946. The appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointment on
August 6, 1946. He took his oath of office on August 10, 1946, and thereafter performed the duties of
that office.

Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, on May 17, 1949, the President nominated
petitioner Lacson to the post of provincial fiscal of Tarlac. On the same date, the President nominated
for the position of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental respondent Romero. Both nominations were
simultaneously confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on May 19, 1949. Lacson neither
accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of Tarlac. But respondent Romero took his
oath of office in Manila on June 16, 1949, notified the Solicitor General of the fact, and thereafter
proceeded to his station. Upon arrival at Dumaguete City, capital of Negros Oriental, he notified Lacson
of his intention to take over the office the following day, but Lacson objected. Hence this petition
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lacson can reject the appointment?
 
RULING:

Yes. The appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal to be complete involves
several steps. First, comes the nomination by the President. Then to make that nomination valid and
permanent, the Commission on Appointments of the Legislature has to confirm said nomination. The
last step is the acceptance thereof by the appointee by his assumption of office. The first two steps,
nomination and confirmation, constitute a mere offer of a post. They are acts of the Executive and
Legislative departments of the Government. But the last necessary step to make the appointment
complete and effective rests solely with the appointee himself. He may or he may not accept the
appointment or nomination. As held in the case of Borromeo vs. Mariano "there is no Power in this
country which can compel a man to accept an office." 

Consequently, since Lacson has declined to accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac
and no one can compel him to do so, then he continues as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no
vacancy in said office was created unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as Such fiscal of Negros
Oriental.

RAMON L. LABO, JR. vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND
LUIS L. LARDIZABAL
G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989
CRUZ, J.

DOCTRINE:
In an election, the 2nd placer has no right to take the contested public office if the winner is
disqualified AFTER the election. But if the decision of disqualification is made BEFORE the election yet
the people still voted for the disqualified candidate then the 2nd highest vote getter may be proclaimed
as the winner. The votes casted in favor of the highest vote getter, in this case, will be considered as
stray votes.

FACTS:

For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino citizen, Ramon Labo, Jr filed his COC
for mayor of Baguio City on March 23, 1992 for the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner Roberto Ortega
on other hand, also filed his COC for the same office on March 25, 1992.

On March 26, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before
the COMELEC on the ground that Labo is not a Filipino citizen.

On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution denying Labo’s COC. On
May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads: Acting on the “Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Clarification”, filed by the respondent (Labo) on May 9, 1992, the Commission resolves that
the decision promulgated on May 9, 1992, disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become
final and executory only after five (5) days from promulgation pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13,
Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for City Mayor
of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this case in the event the issue is
elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari.

On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of
Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio. On May 15, 1992, petitioner
Labo filed the instant petition for review with prayer, among others, for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec; to render judgment
declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec to proceed with his proclamation
in the event he wins in the contested elections.
 Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it
refused to implement its May 9, 1992 resolution notwithstanding the fact that said resolution
disqualifying Labo has already become final and executory. Petitioner Ortega submits that since this
Court did not issue a temporary restraining order as regards the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent
Comelec canceling Labo’s certificate of candidacy, said resolution has already become final and
executory. Ortega further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.

ISSUES:
1. Can the Petitioner Labo, who had the highest number of votes qualified to assume as Mayor of
Baguio City.
2. Does the disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega) receiving the next
highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor of Baguio City.

RULING:

1. No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of
respondent Comelec canceling his (Labo’s) certificate of candidacy had already become final and
executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on
the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no restraining order was issued
by this Court.

The resolution canceling Labo’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino
citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains the SC to rule against his proclamation as
Mayor of Baguio City.

Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines.
Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the
contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office.
The fact that he was elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment.

2. No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the
candidate with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.
While Ortega may have garnered the second-highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the
fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly
voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the
people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the
mayor-elect.

Petitioner Ortega lost the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not
the choice of the people of Baguio City.

Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case with the
Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner’s (Labo’s) candidacy, the
same did not deter the people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was
allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his disqualification having yet
to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus Election Code).

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle
the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to office.
ARSENIO A. LATASA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROMEO SUNGA
G.R. No. 154829 December 10, 2003
AZCUNA, J.

DOCTRINE:
A 3-term municipal mayor cannot seek office as a city mayor in the 1 st election of city officials
after the municipality has been converted to a city considering that the area and inhabitants of the
locality are the same and that the municipal mayor continues to hold office until such time as city
elections are held. While the city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of
the municipality, this does not mean that for the purpose of applying the constitutional provision on
term limitations, the office of the municipal mayor would be construed as different from that of the
office of the city mayor.

FACTS:

Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao delSur in the
elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During the petitioner's third term, the Municipality of Digos was
declared a component city,to be known as the City of Digos. 

A plebiscite conducted on September 8, 2000 ratified NRepublic Act No. 8798 entitled, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Digos, Davao delSur Province into a Component City to be known as the
“City of Digos" or the Charter of the City of Digos. This event also marked the end of the petitioner's
tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However, under Section 53, Article IX of the Charter,
petitioner was mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Hence, he
took his oath as the city mayor. 

On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for theMay 14,
2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefore, and likewise disclosed that he had
already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of theMunicipality of Digos and is now running for
the first time for the position of city mayor. 

On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the
said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course,Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
and/ or For Disqualification against petitioner Latasa. 

Respondent Sunga alleged therein that petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City since petitioner had already been elected and
served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001. 
 On March 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa filed his Answer, arguing that he did not make any false
representation in his certificate of candidacy since he fully disclosed herein that he had served as
mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms. 

Moreover, he argued that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the
May 14, 2001 elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.
Accordingly, petitioner states that a city and a municipality have separate and distinct
personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a single entity and must be accorded different treatment
consistent with specific provisions of the Local Government Code. He does not deny the fact that he
has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor.

However, he asserts that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, attained a
different juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his certificate of candidacy   for   city   mayor,  
he   cannot   be   construed   as   vying   for   the   same   local government post. Accordingly,  the  
petitioner  averred   that substantial   differences  do   exist between a municipality and a city. 

For one, there is a material change in the political and economic rights of the local government
unit when it is converted from a municipality to city and undoubtedly, these changes affect the people
as well.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-
created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos?

RULING:

No. As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose
those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that
it limits the range of choice of the people. 

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Moreover, Section 53 of the said Charter further states: 

Section 53. Officials of the City of Digos. The present elective officials of the Municipality Of Digos shall
continue to exercise their powers and functions until such a time that a new election is held and the
duly-elected officials shall have already qualified and assumed their offices. 
 As seen in the aforementioned provisions, this Court notes that the delineation of the metes
and bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by the
Municipality of Digos. 

This Court also notes that the elective officials of the Municipality of Digos continued to
exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials. True, the new
city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does
not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional Provision, the office of
the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office
of the city mayor. 

As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the
municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These
inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for
three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority
as their chief executive for nine years.

In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt, duly elected as mayor in the May
1998 elections. Can he then be construed as having involuntarily relinquished his office by reason of
the conversion of Digos from municipality to city?

This Court believes that he did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the
said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his
office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner
therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased
from acting as chief executive of the local government unit. He never ceased from discharging his
duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.

This   Court   reiterates   that   the   framers  of  the   Constitution   specifically   included   an
exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a
single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a
prolonged stay in the same office. 

To allow petitioner Latasa to seek the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when
they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City
of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to
be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.

Latasa is barred from running for another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of
Digos. The court held that, in any event, a permanent vacancy in the contested office is thereby
created which should be filled by succession.
MAQUERA VS. BORRA
15 SCRA 7, No. L-24761, No. L-24828 September 7, 1965
Per Curiam

DOCTRINE:
Republic Act No. 4421 requiring a candidate to post surety bond equivalent to one-year salary of
position to which he is a candidate, unconstitutional.

FACTS:
RA 4421 requires “all candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices” to “post a
surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a
candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the national, provincial, city or municipal
government concerned if the candidate, except when declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of
the votes cast for the office to which he has filed his certificate of candidacy, there being not more than
four (4) candidates for the same office;”

In compliance with RA 4421, the Commission on Elections had, on July 20,1965, decided to
require all candidates for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives to file a surety bond, by a bonding company of good reputation, acceptable to the
Commission, in the sums of P60,000.00 and P40,000.00 for President and Vice-President, respectively,
and P32,000.00 for Senator and Member of the House of Representatives;

In consequence of RA 4421 and the aforementioned action of the Commission on Elections,

every candidate has to pay the premium charged by bonding companies, and, to offer thereto, either
his own properties, worth, at least, the amount of the surety bond, or properties, of the same worth,
belonging to other persons willing to accommodate him, by way of counter-bond in favor of said
bonding companies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 4421 is constitutional?

RULING:

NO. Republic Act No. 4421 requires a candidate to post a surety bond equivalent toa one-year
salary of the position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the
government, if the candidate, except when declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes
cast for the office, there being not more than four candidates for the same office. The effect of said
Republic Act No. 4421 is to impose property qualifications in order that a person could run for a public
office, which property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican
system ordained in the Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same.
Consequently, Republic Act No. 4421 is unconstitutional and hence null and void.
MONSANTO VS. FACTORAN, JR.
170 SCRA 190, G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989
Fernan, C.J.

DOCTRINE:
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or
forfeited by reason of such conviction.
The pardon granted to petitioner: 1) resulted in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment, but to regain her former post, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment; 2) did not extinguish the civil liability arising from the crime she has
been convicted of; 3) acceptance of the pardon is deemed an abandonment of her appeal.

FACTS:

In 1983, Monsanto (then assistant city treasurer of Calbayog City) was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of estafa thru falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to
indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50. When her case was still pending on appeal before
the SC, she was extended by President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted. [under the 1981
amendment, pardon could be given even before conviction].

On the strength of such pardon, she wrote the City Treasurer of Calbayog asking for automatic
reinstatement to her position without need of a new appointment since it was still vacant. The letter
was referred to the Ministry of Finance (MF) [which at that time had control over the City Treasuries].
MF ruled in favor of Monsanto but said that appointment was only to retroact from the date of she was
given pardon. Monsanto asked for reconsideration saying that the full pardon wiped out the crime and
thus her service in the government should not be considered to have interrupted. Thus, the date of her
reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to
backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.

ISSUEs:

1. What is the effect of absolute pardon?

2. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?

3. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?
4. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the
sentence?

RULING:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President

may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by
final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.

Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution
of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate,
delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the
Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not
operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon
implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It
does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

No. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It
affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government
any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established
by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to
have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.”

Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities
and restores him to all his civil rights. [note: the pardon here was granted b4 conviction – the 1981
amendments deleted the rule hat clemency could be extended only upon final conviction, but that
limitation was restored in our 1987 Constitution]. But unless expressly grounded on the person’s
innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of the
privilege. Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we are in full
agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon
to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon
undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
 For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility
from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru
falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and
punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth,
petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction.
And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her
offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately whether she
can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has
resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that.
To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment.

Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty
or commutation of sentence. Petitioner’s civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes
recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of
the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her
unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
451 SCRA 570, G.R. NO. 159940 FEBRUARY 16, 2005
CARPIO-MORALES, J.

DOCTRINE:
The CSC’s general power to approve appointments in the civil service is limited only to determine
whether or not the appointee possesses the legal qualifications and the appropriate legibility, nothing
else.
CES Eligibility, as administered by CESB, cannot be validly made a requisite for the attainment of
security of tenure on qualified career officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, who are not legally part
of the CES.

FACTS:

Carandang, Clemente, and De Jesus were appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of the Office
of the Ombudsman. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved the appointments on the condition
that for the appointees to acquire security of tenure, they must first obtain a Career Executive Service
(CES) Eligibility which is governed by the CESB.

The Ombudsman requested for the change of status, from temporary to permanent, of the
appointments of Carandang, Clemente and De Jesus. CSC changed the status of Carandang‘s and
Clemente‘s appointments to permanent but not with respect to De Jesus on the ground that he “has
not met the eligibility requirements.” [referring to the Career Service Eligibility]

ISSUE:

Whether or not officials of the Office of the Ombudsman belong to the Career Executive Service (CES),
hence, governed by the rules of the CES pertaining to eligibility?

RULING:

NO. Persons occupying positions in the CES are presidential appointees. A person occupying the
position of Graft Investigation Officer III is not, however, appointed by the President but by the
Ombudsman as provided in Article IX of the Constitution, to wit:
SECTION 6. THE OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE OMBUDSMAN, OTHER THAN THE DEPUTIES, SHALL
BE APPOINTED BY THE OMBUDSMAN ACCORDING TO THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW.

To classify the position of Graft Investigation Officer III as belonging to the CES and to require an
appointee thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure would be absurd
as it would result either in 1) vesting the appointing power for said position in the President, in
violation of the Constitution; or 2) including in the CES a position not occupied by a presidential
appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code.

It bears emphasis that under PD 807, Sec. 9(h) which authorizes the CSC to approve
appointments to positions in the civil service, except those specified therein, its authority is limited
"only to determine whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate
eligibility, nothing else."
It is not disputed that, except for his lack of CES or CSE eligibility, De Jesus possesses the basic
qualifications of a Graft Investigation Officer III, as provided in the Qualification Standards for several
positions in the Office of the Ombudsman, including that for Graft Investigation Officer III, which the
CSC approved.

Such being the case, the CSC has the ministerial duty to grant the request of the Ombudsman
that appointment be made permanent effective December 18, 2002. To refuse to heed the request is a
clear encroachment on the discretion vested solely on the Ombudsman as appointing authority. It goes
without saying that the status of the appointments of Carandang and Clemente, who were conferred
CSE eligibility pursuant on June 6, 2003, should be changed to permanent effective December 18, 2002
too.
The Court likewise ruled that third level eligibility is not required for third level officials of petitioner
appointed by the Ombudsman.
ANDAYA VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CEBU CITY, BRANCH 20
319 SCRA 696, G.R. NO. 126661, DECEMBER 3, 1999
PARDO, J.

DOCTRINE:
It is the prerogative of the Regional Police Director to name the five (5) eligibles for the position
of chief of police from a pool of eligible officers screened by the Senior Officers Promotion and Selection
Board, without interference from local executives.

As deputy of the Commission, the authority of the mayor is very limited. In reality, he has no
power of appointment; he has only the limited power of selecting one from among the list of five
eligibles to be named the chief of police. Actually, the power to appoint the chief of police of Cebu City is
vested in the Regional Director.

FACTS:

Petitioner Andaya is the Regional Director of Regional Police Command No. 7. He submitted to
the City Mayor of Cebu a list of 5 eligibles from which the mayor shall choose one to be appointed as
the chief of police of Cebu City. The mayor did not choose anyone from the list because the name of his
protégé was not included therein.

The City of Cebu filed a complaint against the Regional Director to require him to include the
name of Major Andres Sarmiento in the list of police officers for appointment.

Petitioner refused, contending that Sarmiento was not qualified. He invokes Memorandum
Circular No. 95-04, dated January 12, 1995, issued by National Police Commission, for the
implementation of RA 6975. It provides that among the qualifications for chief of police of highly
urbanized cities are (1) completion of the Officers’ Senior Executive Course (OSEC) and (2) holding the
rank of Police Superintendent.

And that Section 51 of Republic Act 6975 only empowers the mayor to choose one (1) from the
five (5) eligibles recommended by the Regional Police Director to be named chief of police.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Mayor may require the Regional Director to include another name, not previously
screened and selected, in the list of 5 eligible.

RULING:

The mayor cannot superimpose his will on the recommending authority by insisting that his
protégé be included in the list of five eligibles from which the chief of police is to be chosen.

Under RA 6975, Section 51, the mayor of Cebu City shall be deputized as a representative of the
National Police Commission in his territorial jurisdiction and, as such, the mayor shall have e authority
to choose the chief of police from a list of five (5) eligibles recommended by the Police Regional
Director. The City Police Station of Cebu City is under the direct command and control of the PNP
Regional Director and is equivalent to a provincial office. Then, the Regional Director, appoints the
officer selected by the mayor as the City Director.

It is the prerogative of the Regional Police Director to name the five (5) eligibles for the position
of chief of police from a pool of eligible officers screened by the Senior Officers Promotion and
Selection Board, Headquarters, Philippine National Police, Camp Crame, Quezon City, without
interference from local executives.

In case of disagreement between the Regional Police Director and the Mayor, the question shall
be elevated to the Regional Director, National Police Commission, who shall resolve the issue within
five (5) working days from receipt and whose decision on the choice of the Chief of Police shall be final
and executory.

As deputy of the Commission, the authority of the mayor is very limited. In reality, he has no
power of appointment; he has only the limited power of selecting one from among the list of five
eligibles to be named the chief of police. Actually, the power to appoint the chief of police of Cebu City
is vested in the Regional Director, Regional Police Command No. 7.

The mayor cannot require the Regional Director, Regional Police Command, to include the name
of any officer, no matter how qualified, in the list of five to be submitted to the mayor. The purpose is to
enhance police professionalism and to isolate the police service from political domination.