Epistemological problem

The second crucial point of al-Attas’ criticism of modern knowledge is on the

epistemological aspect. Epistemologically, contemporary science affirms both form rationalism
and empiricism. Clearly, In “Islam and Philosophy of Science” al Attas points us two principal
problems of contemporary science, they are (1) rejection of intuition and authority and (2) the
affirmation of skepticism.1 The first problem was related to the source of knowledge and the
second was related in its methodology.
First, the problem sourcing of contemporary science: the rejection of intuition and
authority.
The fundamental point of al Attas’ criticism of sourcing of contemporary science is a
rejecting of intuition and authority. In his “Prolegomena” Al Attas said:
Rationalism, both the philosophic and the secular kind, and empiricism tent
to deny authority and intuition as legitimate sources and methods of knowledge. Not
they deny the existence of authority and intuition, but they reduce authority and
intuition to reason and experience. 2
The quotation above shows that contemporary science and its worldview denied authority
and intuition as a legitimate source and method of knowledge. The denial here means relating
them only with reason and experience. In fact, Al Attas justify that the original instance in the
case of both authority and intuition, there is always someone who experiences and who reasons;
but it does not follow that because of this, authority and intuition should be reduced to reasons
and experience.3 Al-Attas argues that there are levels of human reason and experience, and then,
there is no reason to suppose that there are no higher levels of human experience and
consciousness beyond the limits of normal reasons and experiences in which there are levels of
intellectual and spiritual cognition and transcendental experiences whose limits are known only
to God.4 As a result, in this system, intuition and authority are valid only as a reason and a
sensory experience, while mean intuition and authority were denied a transcendental experience
in which level higher than the reason for intellectual and spiritual cognition. Furthermore, about
the intuition, al Attas writes:
As to intuition, most rationalist, secularist, and empiricist thinker and
psychologists have reduced it to sensory observations and logical inferences that
have long been brooded over by the mind, whose meaning becomes suddenly
apprehended, or to latent sensory and emotional build-ups which are released all of
a sudden in a burst of apprehension.5
The quotation above clearly points Al Attas’ rejection of the Western intuition concept.
Many scholars view that intuition is related to logical inferences and sensory observations that
have long been sedimented by the mind, whose meaning becomes suddenly apprehend.6 For al
1
S M N Al Attas, Islam dan Filsafat Sains, p. 28-31
2
SMN Al Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphisics of Islam, p. 115
3
Ibid
4
S M N Al Attas, Islam dan Filsafat Sains, p.29
5
S M N AL Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphisics of Islam, p. 116
6
SMN Al Attas, Islam dan Filsafat Sains, p. 29
Attas, their denial of intuition and its faculty (heart) is conjectural. Al Attas questions the proof
that apprehensions come from sense experience; there is no enough proof.7 Therefore, we
conclude that al Attas points to the denial of intuition and authority means the intuition and
authority reduction to the reason and sensory experience.
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that contemporary science’s source is a reason
and a sensory observation. In his worldview theory, Wall stated that the origin of knowledge is
reason and sense.8 It means the authority and the intuition, both are not the origin of knowledge.
For Wall, both are a part of mental condition. It sedimented from a reason and a long sensory
experience on the brain that he calls it a mind. The mind is a brain function. so, Wall reduces the
mean of authority and intuition into a mental condition that resulting from sediment of the
reasons and long sensory observations. Wall’s view is a line with what al Attas points in the
denial of authority and intuition. This proves that perceiving reality is resulting in the source of
knowledge.

Second, the methodological problem of contemporary science: Doubt

We have discussed the sourcing of contemporary science, now we shall turn on the al
Attas’ criticism on the modern scientific methodology. Al Attas points the skepticism is a
fundamental problem of the method of contemporary science. In his Prolegomena al Attas said:
Moreover, in order to verify hypotheses and theories science, according to
them, requires correspondence with observable fact, and yet since hypotheses and
theories that contradict one another can correspond with observable fact, and since
the preference for one as against the other of them is not dictated by any criterion of
objective truth –because truth itself is made to conform with fact- such preferences is
then dictated simply by subjective and arbitrary considerations dependent upon
convention.9
Al Attas’ criticism of the methodology of contemporary science begins from its structure.
The scientific methodology of contemporary science -as we know as the scientific method- is the
hypotheses-observation correspondent. Al Attas said the method is a combination of realism,
idealism, and pragmatism.10 Easily we can say that the scientific method is hypotheses base on
idealism-pragmatism combination plus observation bases on realism. For al Attas, the crucial
problem is not in the observation but hypothesis setting. Al Attas stated that the most problem is
the hypotheses were based on no objective truth but a subjective one. A hypothesis is resulting
from the researcher tendency, subjectivity or his convention. As a result, hypothesis as the
fundamental basis of methodology sets on the non-permanent or a doubt belief. Therefore, al
Attas points the doubt as a crucial problem. Furthermore, al Attas said:
Finally, doubt is elevated as an epistemological method by means of which
the rationalist and the secularist believe that truth is arrived at. But there is no proof

7
Ibid
8
Thomas F Wall, Thinking Critically about Philosophical Problems, p.208
9
S M N Al Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam, p. 116-117
10
Ibid, 114
 that it is doubt and not something else other than doubt that enables one to arrive at
the truth. The arrival at truth is, in reality, the result of guidance.11
The foregoing quotation shows us al Attas' critique of the doubt-truth relationship. Al
Attas stated that truth is not arrived by a doubt. Al Attas defined the doubt a wavering between
two opposites without preponderating over either one of them; its condition a condition of being
stationary amid the two opposites without the heart inclining to the one or the other.12 If the heart
inclines on one side without rejection on the other side, then it is conjecture; and if the heart
inclines on one side by rejection in the other one, then it has entered the station of certainly.13 For
al Attas, the heart’s rejection of the other is a sign not of doubt as to its truth, but of positive
recognition of its error or falsity. This is guidance. As a result, for al Attas the doubt is not
receiving any truth, but the guidance is.
From the discussion above, it is clear that the most point in the epistemological method of
contemporary science is doubt. In his worldview theory, Wall says that the hypothesis is based
on not only idealism but also pragmatism.14 Wall believes that pragmatism makes an accurate
prediction and provides an adequate explanation.15 Meanwhile, these predictions and
explanations are originated from reason and sensory experience. It means the pragmatism also
receives a doubt as to the true method. This view bases on his “real” belief of the natural world
and his affirmation of reasons and sense as the sources of knowledge. This proves that Wall’s
view is in line with the contemporary scientific method and al Attas in another line.
Finally, the al Attas’ criticism on the epistemological aspect of contemporary science
points to us two fundamental problems. First, a rejection of authority and intuition as the source
of science. Second, the elevation of doubt as a truth method in an epistemological process.

11
Ibid,
12
S M N Al Attas, Islam dan Filsafat Sains, p. 30
13
Ibid,
14
Thomas F Wall, Thingking Critically about Philosophical Problems, p, 209
15
Ibid, p. 208