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1. Lee Yick Hon v. Insular Collector of Customs, GR L-16779. Mar. 30, 1921, 41 Phil. 548
Topic: Writ of Habeas Corpus

FACTS:

On July 23, 1920, a petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila by one Lee Yick Hon, alleging he had lately arrived from China at the port
of Manila with a view to entering the Philippine Islands, but was prevented from so doing by
the Insular Collector of Customs, who was detaining him for deportation.

Upon the presentation of said petition, his Honor, Pedro Concepcion, cited the collector to
appear and show cause in writing why the writ of habeas corpus should not be issued as
prayed. This citation was served at about 11 a. m., at which hour arrangements had already
been perfected for the deportation of Lee Yick Hon on a boat scheduled to leave Manila for
Hongkong at noon on the same day; and either by oversight or design the Insular Collector
failed to countermand the order for his embarcation on that boat. The result was that Lee
Yick Hon was deported within two or three hours after the Insular Collector had been served
with the citation to show cause in the habeas corpus proceeding. Thereupon contempt
proceedings were instituted against the Insular Collector, with the result already stated.

The conditions under which a person can be punished for contempt are precisely defined in
sections 231 and 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and unless the reprobated conduct
legitimately falls under those provisions, it cannot be punished as for contempt. The first of
these sections contemplates misbehaviour in the presence of the court which this situation
we are not of concerned as it away from the presence of the court and if punishable at all, it
falls under subsection (1) of section 232, wherein it is declared that any person may be
punished as for contempt who is guilty of "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, judgement, or command of the court or injunction granted by a court or
judge."

ISSUE: Whether the citation was the writ itself, which failure to response would be a ground
for contempt of court (No)

RULING:

In this case before the Court, if it be asked what lawful writ, process, order, judgment or
command of the court or judge of the first level Court was disobeyed or resisted by the
appellant, the answer must be: None whatever.

The citation that was served upon the appellant required him to appear 'at a stated time in
the Court of First Instance of Manila and show cause if any there might be, why the writ
prayed for should not issue. That citation was literally complied with when, on July 30, 1920,
the Attorney-General, on behalf of the Insular Collector, filed his answer, where it stated that
the case of Lee Yick Hon had been regularly passed upon by the Special Hoard of Inquiry,
and been found to have entered the Philippine Islands in contravention of the Immigration
and Exclusion Acts, wherefore the Insular Collector had ordered his deportation. That
answer, so far appears has not been found to be false or insufficient; and the sole ground
relied upon to sustain the judgement finding the appellant guilty of contempt is that by
allowing Lee Yick Hon to be deported under the conditions stated he has frustrated the
possible issuance of the writ of habeas corpus for which application had been made.

At this point attention should be directed to the fact that the order to show cause, a copy of
which was served on the Insular Collector of Customs on July 23, 1920, is not the
peremptory writ of habeas corpus, unconditionally commanding the respondent to have the
body of the detained person before the court at a time and place therein specified. The
requisites of the peremptory writ of habeas corpus are stated in section 533 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.

The order served in the case before the Court was merely a preliminary citation requiring the
respondent to appear and show cause why the peremptory writ should not be granted. The
practice of issuing a preliminary citation of this character, upon applications for the writ of
habeas corpus, has, as all legal practitioners are aware, become common in courts; and
upon considerations of practical convenience, the usage has much to commend it, in cases
where the necessity for the immediate issuance of the peremptory writ is not manifest.
Nevertheless in a case like this before the Court, it is necessary to take account of the
difference between the preliminary citation and the real writ of habeas corpus; and when
advertence is had to this point, and the actual terms of the citation are considered, it is at
once obvious that the appellant did not put himself in contempt by allowing Lee Yick Hon to
be deported.

Of course if the judge issuing the citation had had his attention directed to the fact that the
deportation of Lee Yick Hon was imminent, and there had been any reason to fear that the
Collector of Customs might proceed with his deportation notwithstanding the service of the
bare citation, his Honor could have penned a few additional words, adding to the citation an
admonition to the effect that the petitioner should not be deported until his application for the
writ of habeas corpus should be heard. If a temporary restraining order of that kind had been
issued, it would no doubt have been respected.

The considerations found the case now before the Court and corroborate the conclusion to
be inevitably drawn from provisions relative to contempt, namely, that the deportation of Lee
Yick Hon by the Insular Collector under the circumstances stated was not a contempt of
court.
2. Ampatuan vs. Macaraig
GR No.: 182497
Date of Case: June 29, 2010
Topic: Writ of Habeas Corpus

FACTS:

Petitioner is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan. According to her, PO1 Ampatuan was
detained in the PNP Provincial of Maguindanao without being informed of the cause.
Eventually, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to Manila and presented to Mayor Lim and a press
briefing was held to announce PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for killing two legal officers of
COMELEC. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was turned over to Camp Bagong Diwa on Tagging
City.
Private PNP respondents had another version of the facts. Upon investigation by the
Homicide Division of Manila Police District (MPD), PO1 Ampatuan was identified as the one
who killed Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department sometime in
November 2007 in Manila. PO1 Ampatuan was then commanded to MPD director for proper
disposition and inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office. Then
a charge sheet for Grave Misconduct was executed to PO1 Ampatuan. PO1 Ampatuan was
then placed under restrictive custody.

The Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set
for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held
for other charges/legal grounds. However, the private respondents PNP officers refused to
release PO1 Ampatuan. Hence the filing of the petition of Habeas Corpus in RTC Manila.

RTC dismissed the petition for Habeas Corpus reasoning that habeas corpus will not
lie for a PNP personnel under restrictive custody. This is authorized under Section 52, Par. 4
of R.A. 8551 authorizing the Chief of PNP to place the PNP personnel under restrictive
custody during the pendency of an administrative case for grave misconduct.

ISSUE:

The respondent court gravely abused its discretion when it failed to consider that the
arrest and detention of PO1 Ampatuan was made without any warrant and therefore, illegal.

RULING:

Petition is without merit.

Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or

detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. The objective of the writ is to
determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be
issued. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual
seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some
form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ
of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of
habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action.

In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic
Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990),
as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform
and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are
subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law
enumerates the disciplinary actions, including restrictive custody that may be imposed by
duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter of internal
discipline.

In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to
the issuance of the writ prayed for on behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition
fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and
enshrined in the Constitution.
3. GO VS DIMAGIBA

G.R. No. 151876 June 21, 2005

SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,

vs.
FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA, respondent

FACTS:

The RTC issued an Order directing the immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement
and requiring him to pay a fine of ₱100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. However, the civil aspect
of the July 16, 1999 MTCC Decision was not touched upon. A subsequent Order, explaining
in greater detail the basis of the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, was issued.

In justifying its modification of the MTCC Decision, the RTC invoked Vaca v. Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000, which allegedly
required the imposition of a fine only instead of imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if the
accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent. The RTC held that this rule should be
retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba. It further noted that (1) he was a first-time offender
and an employer of at least 200 workers who would be displaced as a result of his
imprisonment; and (2) the civil liability had already been satisfied through the levy of his
properties.

On October 22, 2001, Petitioner Go filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Orders.
That Motion was denied on January 18, 2002.26

Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court on pure questions of law.

ISSUE: WON the decision of the RTC was proper

RULING:

Inapplicability of SC-AC No. 12-2000

Petitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the benevolent policy enunciated in
SC-AC No. 12-2000, because he is not a "first time offender." This circumstance is, however,
not the sole factor in determining whether he deserves the preferred penalty of fine alone.
The penalty to be imposed depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case. It is the
trial court’s discretion to impose any penalty within the confines of the law.

The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus relied mainly on the alleged
retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000, which supposedly favored BP 22 offenders. On this
point, Dimagiba contended that his imprisonment was violative of his right to equal protection
of the laws, since only a fine would be imposed on others similarly situated.
The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court rendering the
decision against the accused. That decision is subject only to appeal on grounds of errors
of fact or law, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Another trial court may not encroach upon this authority. Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-2000
necessarily requires a review of all factual circumstances of each case. Such a review can
no longer be done if the judgment has become final and executory.

In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all relevant
circumstances from which respondent’s conviction and sentence were based. The
penalty imposed was well within the confines of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction was
sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of Baguio City. Eventually, the Decision attained finality. Hence,
RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in the guise of
granting a writ of habeas corpus.

The doctrine of equal protection of laws does not apply for the same reasons as those on
retroactivity. Foremost of these reasons is that the Circular is not a law that deletes the
penalty of imprisonment. As explained earlier, it is merely a rule of preference as to which
penalty should be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of a case. At any rate, this
matter deserves scant consideration, because respondent failed to raise any substantial
argument to support his contention.
4. CARLOS T. GO, SR., petitioner, vs. LUIS T. RAMOS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 167569. September 4, 2009.]
Topic: Writ of Habeas Corpus

FACTS

These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis
T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration)
against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged
that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy's personal circumstances
and other records indicate that he is not so.

As regards the petition in G.R. No. 171946, petitioners contend that the appellate
tribunal erred in enjoining Jimmy's deportation.
Petitioners question the remedy availed of by Jimmy. They argue that the
existence of the remedy of an ordinary appeal proscribes the filing of the petition for
certiorari as was done in this case. They point out that the appeal period in habeas
corpus cases is only 48 hours, compared to a special civil action under Rule 65 of
theRules of Court which is 60 days. This clearly shows that an ordinary appeal is the
more plain, speedy and adequate remedy; hence, it must be the one availed of. 86 Since
the decision of the trial court was not properly appealed, the same may be said to have
attained finality, and may no longer be disturbed.
They maintain that the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus by the trial
court was proper. A petition for habeas corpus has for its purpose only the determination
of whether or not there is a lawful ground for Jimmy's apprehension and continued
detention. They urge that the decision of the Board dated April 17, 2002 that ordered
Jimmy's deportation has already attained finality by reason of the belated appeal taken
by Jimmy from the said decision on April 2, 2004 before the Office of the President, or
after almost two years from the time the decision was rendered. Said decision of the
Board, they insist, is the lawful ground that sanctions Jimmy's apprehension and
detention.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 171946 also argue that the petition for habeas corpus
necessarily has to be dismissed because the same is no longer proper once the
applicant thereof has been charged before the Board, which is the case with Jimmy.
Nonetheless, they claim that the habeas corpus case is rendered moot and academic as
Jimmy is no longer being detained.
On the other hand, Jimmy counters that the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition is the most appropriate, speedy and adequate remedy in spite of the
availability of ordinary appeal considering that what is involved in this case is his
cherished liberty. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the petitioners in ordering his
arrest and detention, he argues, all the more justifies the avails of the extraordinary writ.
Contrary to the petitioners' stand, Jimmy argues that the April 17, 2002 Decision of the
Board has not attained finality owing to the availability of various remedies, one of which
is an appeal, and in fact is actually void because it was rendered without due process.
He also insists that the bail issued to him is valid and effective until the final
determination of his citizenship before the proper courts. Moreover, he maintains that the
petition for habeas corpus was proper since its object is to inquire into the legality of
one's detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the detainee. As in his petition
in G.R. No. 167570, Jimmy also contends that the proceedings before the Board is void
for failure to implead therein his father, and that he should have been given a full blown
trial before a regular court where he can prove his citizenship.

ISSUE
Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed. (Yes)

RULING
Considering the arguments and contentions of the parties, we find the petition in
G.R. No. 171946 meritorious.
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are available only when there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The writ of certiorari does
not lie where an appeal may be taken or where another adequate remedy is available for
the correction of the error.
The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the remedy availed
of as it is more plain, speedy and adequate. The 48-hour appeal period demonstrates the
adequacy of such remedy in that no unnecessary time will be wasted before the decision
will be re-evaluated.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding
governed by Rule 102 of theRevised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to
determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot
be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the
earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention
is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing
of the application.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his
detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be
to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas
corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged
before any court. The term "court" in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of
governmental agencies authorized to order the person's confinement, like the
Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail
cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the
Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the
Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail
even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
 Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered
arrested pending his deportation, coupled by this Court's pronouncement that the Board
was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the
petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. This being so, we find it
unnecessary to touch on the other arguments advanced by respondents regarding the
same subject.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are DENIED. The
Decision dated October 25, 2004 and Resolution dated February 16, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 are AFFIRMED. The petition in G.R. No. 171946 is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated December 8, 2005 and Resolution dated March
13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88277 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The December 6, 2004 and December 28, 2004 Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 167 are hereby REINSTATED.
5. IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA
GR NO. 158802/ 442 SCRA 706. NOVEMBER 17, 2004

FACTS:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de
Villa, seeks a two-fold relief: First, that respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis for the
imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and second, that petitioner be granted a new
trial. These reliefs are sought on the basis of purportedly exculpatory evidence, gathered
after performing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on samples allegedly collected from the
petitioner and a child born to the victim of the rape.

By final judgment, petitioner de Villa, the trial court found petitioner guilty of the rape
of Aileen Mendoza when she was 12 years old, his niece by affinity and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua; and ordered him to pay the offended party civil
indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit, and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the
putative child born of the rape. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City. Petitioner’s defense, at the time of the alleged rape, he was already
67 years old. Old age and sickness had rendered him incapable of having an erection. On
automatic review, the court found that the date of birth of Aileen’s child was medically
consistent with the time of the rape.

Three years after the promulgation of the Decision, there was a question of Reynaldo
de Villa’s guilt or innocence.

Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges that
during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could
determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim’s child, Leahlyn.
Petitioner-relator was only informed during the pendency of the automatic review of
petitioner’s case that DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity. This information was
apparently furnished by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death Penalty Task
Force, which took over as counsel for petitioner.

Thus, petitioner’s brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood type test
and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a result
of the rape and the relief was implicitly denied.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein he once
more prayed that DNA tests be conducted and it was denied with finality in a Resolution.
Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges, for having been informed that DNA
tests required a sample that could be extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe
de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask
Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup and used as a sample. Petitioner-relator then gathered
samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa. Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI
to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the
grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The
identities of the donors of the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were
not made known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory.

After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report and showed that
Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due
to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers.
ISSUE:

WON the DNA result is a valid basis for habeas corpus, new trial and acquittal.

RULING:

No. As to Habeas Corpus- The most criterion for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus, is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of
movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is
restrained via some the legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitant
to this principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to directly assail a judgment
rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not
deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the
proceedings.

In the recent case of Feria v. CA, it was held that review of judgment of conviction is
allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in a very specific
instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such
sentence is void as to such excess. This court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas
corpus is not a writ of error, and should not be thus used.

As to new trial- A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be
granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after
trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trail even
with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it
would probably change the judgment.

Petitioner-relator’s claim that he was “unaware” of the existence of DNA testing until
the trial was concluded carries no weight with this court. Lack of knowledge of the existence
of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of
petitioner’s counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner.

As to acquittal- Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence
presented by petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is
entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is
conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his
conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendoza's testimony and positive
identification as its bases. The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the
pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape. Therefore, the DNA
evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be
discharged. Although petitioner claims that conviction was based solely on a finding of
paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. The court's conviction was based on the
clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given credence by the trial
court, was affirmed on appeal.
6. MONCUPA VS. ENRILE

G.R. NO. L-63345

Topic: Villavicencio v. Lukban rule -Temporary release with involuntary restraints does not
render the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic.

"A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient “

Facts:

● Petitioners were arrested and detained on the allegation that they were members of a
subversive organisation. Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
● Respondents filed a motion to dismiss after the petitioner was temporarily released
from detention on the ground that the petition for habeas corpus may be deemed
moot and academic since the petitioner is free and no longer under the respondent’s
custody.
● Petitioner argues that his temporary release did not render the instant petition moot
and academic because of the restrictions imposed by the respondents which
constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.

Issue: WON a petition for a writ of habeas corpus becomes moot and academic in view of
the detained person’s release with restrictions. (NO)

Probable question in the quiz:

“The petitioner stresses that his temporary release did not render the instant petition moot
and academic but that "it merely shifted the inquiry from the legality of his actual detention to
the legality of the conditions imposed by the respondents.” (petitioner is correct)

Held: No. Restraints attached to temporary release of a detained person warrant the
Supreme Court’s inquiry into the nature of the involuntary restraint and relieving him of such
restraints as may be illegal.

Reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the detainee’s temporary
release constitutes restraints on the liberty of the detainee. It is not physical restraint alone
which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.

The principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and
academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to
be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a
denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of
subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his
behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
 7. PULIDO VS. ABU
In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of CEZARI GONZALES and JULIUS
MESA
ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO, petitioner, vs. Gen. EFREN ABU, as Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and all persons acting in his stead and under his
authority, and GEN. ERNESTO DE LEON, in his capacity as the Flag Officer in
Command of the Philippine Navy, and all persons acting in his stead and under his
authority, respondents. || G.R. No. 170924 || July 4, 2007

(Note: The issue on the validity of the issuance of the writ habeas corpus was rendered moot
and academic. But I included other facts related to non- forum shopping since the issue on
non- forum shopping is related to the petition for habeas Corpus)
FACTS:
1. 321 junior officers and enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) entered and took over the premises of the Oakwood Premiere Luxury
Apartments (Oakwood).
2. The soldiers publicly announced that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances
against the administration of President Arroyo.
3. Among those involved in the occupation of Oakwood were Cezari Gonzales and
Julius Mesa, both enlisted personnel of the Philippine Navy.
4. They were among the soldiers charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, with the crime of Coup D’etat as defined under Article 134-A of the RPC.
5. A Commitment Order was issued by the RTC committing custody of the persons of
Gonzales and Mesa to the Commanding Officer of Fort San Felipe Naval Base.
6. In an Order dated 8 July 2004, the RTC resolved the petitions admitted Gonzales
and Mesa, and twenty-five other co-accused to bail.
7. On 19 July 2004, both Gonzales and Mesa posted bail. On 20 July 2004, the RTC
issued orders directing the Commanding Officer of Philippine Marine Corps to
release Gonzales and Mesa from his custody.
8. A motion for partial reconsideration of the order granting bail was filed, but it was
denied on Oct. 26, 2004.
9. So the people filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari
asking for the nullification and setting aside of the orders dated 8 July 2004 and 26
October 2004 of Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
10. Since Gonzales and Mesa continued to be in detention, a Petition for Habeas Corpus
was filed by petitioner Pulido on their behalf on 22 July 2005. The case was raffled to
the third division (so from 7th division nangadto ha 3rd division)
11. The Court of Appeals (third Division) issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing
respondents Gen. Efren Abu, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
produce the body of Gonzales and Mesa before the Court and to appear and show
the cause and validity of their detention..
Respondents:
12. Respondents prayed that the Petition for Habeas Corpus be dismissed primarily on
two grounds: (1) the continued detention of Gonzales and Mesa is justified because
of the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari questioning the order dated 8 July 2004
of the RTC granting bail to Gonzales and Mesa before the 7th Division of the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88440; and (2) petitioner is guilty of forum
 shopping because of his failure to state in the petition that the order granting bail has
been elevated to the Court of Appeals and pending before its 7th Division.
13. The Court of Appeals (3rd Division) dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus for
violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court - old ROC ( The present petition
and its accompanying certification show that the petitioner never mentioned the
pendency before the Seventh Division of this Court of the certiorari case)
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUND OF FORUM
SHOPPING.
No.
First, the court rendered the issue on the issuance of the writ of habeas Corpus moot and
academic since the petitioner informed the Court that the Commanding General of the
Philippine Marines had ordered the release of Gonzales and Mesa and surrendered their
persons to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 148. Thus, Mesa and Gonzales are now enjoying
temporary liberty by virtue of the release orders dated 20 July 2004 issued by the RTC. With
the release of both Mesa and Gonzales, the Petition for Habeas Corpus has, indeed, been
rendered moot.
However, is petitioner guilty of forum shopping? Should petitioner be penalized when
he failed to inform the 3rd Division of the Court of Appeals of the pendency of the
Petition for Certiorari filed by respondents before the 7th Division of the same court
which asked for the annulment of the RTC’s order granting Gonzales and Mesa’s
petition for bail?
Yes.
The Court has laid down the yardstick to determine whether a party violated the rule against
forum shopping, as where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Stated differently, there must
be between the two cases: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
As lucidly explained by the Court of Appeals, the ultimate relief sought by petitioner in both
the certiorari and habeas corpus cases is the release of Gonzales and Mesa. Petitioner
should not have filed the Petition for Habeas Corpus because the relief he is seeking therein
is the same relief he is asking for in the certiorari case. Moreover, the main issue in both
cases boils down to whether Gonzales and Mesa should be released on bail. Because of the
presence of the elements of litis pendentia -- parties, reliefs and issue are substantially the
same/similar in the two cases; and any decision in the certiorari case will be binding on the
habeas corpus case – petitioner is thus guilty of forum shopping.
For his failure to inform the Court of Appeals of the pendency of the certiorari case, petitioner
clearly violated his obligation to disclose within five days the pendency of the same or a
similar action or claim as mandated in Section 5(c), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 90546 dated 12 September 2005 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
8. SALIENTES v. ABANILLA

TOPIC: Habeas Corpus

FACTS:

● Loran Abanilla (Loran) and Marie Antonette Abigail Salientes (Marie) are the parents
of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel Abanilla, who was at the time two years old.
● The couple lived together with Marie’s parents, petitioners Orlando and Rosario
Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, Loran suggested that they transfer to their own
house. Marie refused. Loran left anyway and was thereafter prevented from seeing
his son.
● Loran filed a petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody in the RTC of Muntinlupa City.
● The court ordered Marie and her parents to produce and bring before the court the
body of the minor Lorenzo in order to show cause why the said child should not be
discharged from restraint.
● Marie moved for a reconsideration of the above order which was denied
● She then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was also dismissed. The CA
held that the order of the RTC did not award to anyone the custody of the Lorenzo,
the order merely directs petitioners to produce the Lorenzo in order for the trial court
to conduct a full inquiry in the matter of his custody. This is a mere interlocutory order
which is not appealable.
● Hence this appeal by certiorari.
● Marie and her parents contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 of the Family
Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. They
maintain that Loran has failed to present any evidence of any compelling reason.
● They also argue, that assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper
remedy of Loran was not habeas corpus but a simple action for custody. They assert
that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the
right of custody of the minor.
● Loran, on the other hand argues that Art. 213 applies only to the second part of his
petition regarding the custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which
pertains to his right as the father to see his son. He asserts that a writ of habeas
corpus is available against any person who restrains the minors right to see his father
and vice versa. He also asserts that the complaints filed by Marie were merely for
delay.
● Loran also maintains that, under the law, both him and Marie share custody of
Lorenzo and when Marie is out of the country, as required by her job as an
international flight stewardess, he should have the custody of Lorenzo and not the
maternal grandparents.

ISSUE:

Whether Habeas Corpus was the appropriate remedy [YES]

RULING:
Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person
entitled thereto.

● Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie
Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint
custody.
● Although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be
adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a juridical grant of custody to one
parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child.
● In the present case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of
his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of
habeas corpus is available to him.
● In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme
consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that
in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his
welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
● The order of the court to produce the body of the minor before the court was
merely in line with the directive contained in Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC.
● Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication
of the custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by
the court. It is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child.

Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 10,
2003 and the Resolution dated March 19, 2004 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
9. So vs. Tacla, Jr.
G.R. No. 190108
Oct. 19, 2010
633 SCRA 563

FACTS:

Petitioner David E. So (So) in G.R. No. 190108 filed the petition for the writs of habeas
corpus and amparo on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande (Guisande), accused
of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending before Judge Tacla.

Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings, Guisande was committed by So for
psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati Medical Center (MMC). Thus, the return of the
warrant for the arrest of Guisande, issued by Judge Tacla which states that the former was
confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder and that she was "not ready for discharge".
Judge Tacla ordered Guisande's referral to the NCMH for an independent forensic
assessment of Guisande's mental health to determine if she would be able to stand
arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft. Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of
the NCMH, ordered that accused Guisande be physically brought to the NCMH to have
temporary legal custody of the accused, and thereafter, Judge Tacla would issue the
corresponding order of confinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMHs
determination that she was ready for trial.

Eventually, claiming "life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her confinement at the

NCMH which supposedly worsened her mental condition and violated her constitutional
rights against solitary detention and assistance of counsel, accused Guisande and her father
filed a Motion for Relief from Solitary Confinement and the present petition for the issuance
of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo.

The court granted the Motion for Relief. On the petition for habeas corpus and amparo, the
court resolved to issue a joint writ of habeas corpus and amparo and refer the petition to the
Court of Appeals for decision. Meanwhile, NCMH submitted its Evaluation Report according
to which, Guisande is competent to stand the rigors of court trial. Hence, the petition for
review on certiorari.

Public respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case for Qualified Theft against
Guisande. In view of such dismissal, Judge Tacla contends that the cases for issuance of the
writs of habeas corpus and amparo and the petition for review on certiorari should be
dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed for having been rendered moot
and academic. (YES)

RULING:
The petition should be dismissed. The petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo
was based on the criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner Sos daughter,
Guisande.

There is no affirmation of petitioner So's claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at
the NCMH was illegal. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge
Tacla and Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand
trial declared unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed government forensic
facility, albeit not held in high regard by petitioner Sos and accused Guisandes family, had
assessed Guisande fit for trial.

The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the
threatened act or omission complained of - confinement and custody for habeas corpus and
violations of, or threat to violate, a person’s life, liberty, and security for amparo cases -
should be illegal or unlawful.

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking
such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of
illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of
habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas
corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation
of freedom of action.

While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its
issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima
facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is
being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the
respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf the
petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.

In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the
NCMH or a medical facility of accused's own choosing, accused Guisande should be
referred for treatment of a supposed mental condition. In addition, it was procedurally proper
for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accused's mental fitness to be
arraigned and stand trial.

Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no
longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively,
accused Guisande's person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or
may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RT Mandaluyong
City. In short, the cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often
cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, is defined as "one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value.”
10. EDGARDO E. VELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
LUISA R. VILLANUEVA, respondent.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the resolutions February 2, 2005 and September 2, 2005 of
the C.A.where the petition for habeas corpus was denied.

The nephew of Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a
poor state of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities filed for habeas corpus after
demanding the return of Eufemia from her adopted daughters. The C.A. ruled that petitioner
failed to present any convincing proof that respondents (the legally adopted children of
Eufemia) were unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish his
legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian. Thus, in a resolution
dated February 2, 2005, the C.A. denied his petition.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should issue, a
court should limit itself to determining whether or not a person is unlawfully being deprived of
liberty and that there is no need to consider legal custody or custodial rights. Thus, a writ of
habeas corpus can cover persons who are not under the legal custody of another. According
to petitioner, as long as it is alleged that a person is being illegally deprived of liberty, the writ
of habeas corpus may issue so that his physical body may be brought before the court that
will determine whether or not there is in fact an unlawful deprivation of liberty.

However, respondents state that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia and her
deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Respondents point out that it was petitioner and his
family who were staying with Eufemia, not the other way around as petitioner claimed.
Eufemia paid for the rent of the house, the utilities and other household needs.
Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner EDGARDO E. VELUZ was appointed as administrator of
the properties of Eufemia and her deceased spouse. By this appointment, he took charge of
collecting payments from tenants and transacted business with third persons for and in
behalf of Eufemia and the respondents who were the only compulsory heirs of the late
Maximo.Eufemia and the respondents demanded an inventory and return of the properties
entrusted to petitioner. His failure to heed gave rise to a complaint of estafa. Consequently,
and by reason of their mother’s deteriorating health, respondents decided to take custody of
Eufemia on January 11, 2005. She willingly went with them. Petitioner failed to prove either
his right to the custody of Eufemia or the illegality of respondents’ action.

ISSUE: Whether or not habeas corpus should be granted.

RULING:

Petition Denied. – Application: The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the
rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued when
one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal
custody over another person. Thus, it contemplates two instances:
(1) deprivation of a person’s liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention
and
(2) withholding of the custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody.
According to the S.C., if the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the
person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed
In this case, the C.A. made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her
liberty. It found that she was not.

Petition was DENIED.

11. VICENTE vs. MAJADUCON
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1698
June 23, 2005

Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court applies only to cases where the applicant for the
writ of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal charge against him and not in an
instance, as in the case involved in the present controversy, where the applicant is serving
sentence by reason of a final judgment. The only exception to the above-cited provision
(sec. 24, rule 114) of the Rules of Court is when the convict has applied for probation before
he commences to serve sentence, provided the penalty and the offense are within the
purview of the Probation Law.

FACTS:
In a letter-complaint, Dante Vicente charged respondent Judge Jose S. Majaducon of the
RTC with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and manifest partiality, praying
that he be administratively disciplined and terminated from the service.

This administrative complaint stemmed from a series of criminal cases involving Evelyn Te
(People of the Philippines vs. Evelyn Te). In the said criminal case, Evelyn Te was found
guilty of 4 counts of the violation of BP22 and sentenced to 2 months of imprisonment on
each count.

Te filed a motion for reconsideration, which she prayed be also considered as a petition for
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Te prayed that her sentence be modified and that she
be immediately released from detention.

Trial court denied Te’s petition for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on the ground that
Te was detained by virtue of a final judgment. Trial court approved Te’s bail bonds in the
reduced amount of P500,000.00 and ordered her release.

Assistant City Prosecutor Marie Ellengred L. Baliguiat moved for reconsideration of the trial
court’s resolution which was denied. It also denied due course to Te’s notice of appeal on the
ground that there was no necessity for the appeal to the CA because it had already ordered
that the whole records be forwarded to this Court pursuant to Rule 102, §14.

In the present case, complainant (Dante Vicente), a station manager of Radyo Bombo,
General Santos City, alleges that while Te was in prison, the respondent judge allowed her to
be released and confined at a local hospital in the guise that she was suffering from certain
illnesses. The complainant further alleges that the respondent judge approved Te’s
application for bail as part of habeas corpus proceedings even though no petition for habeas
corpus in favor of Te was filed and docketed. In addition, the complainant alleges that in a
separate case, the respondent judge allowed the release of the accused without the posting
of the necessary bail. On the basis of the above allegations, complainant prays that
respondent judge be investigated and if warranted, be terminated and removed from service.
In his Comment, the respondent judge submitted the following contentions: Evelyn Te’s
counsel filed not only a motion for reconsideration denying our previous order denying her
motion for release from detention but also a petition for Habeas Corpus in the same cases;
that the court had discretion to allow her to be released on bail, based on Sec. 14, Rule 102
of the Revised Rules of Court; it was a better judgment to release her from bail on a writ of
habeas corpus, because, Evelyn Te might be right in her contention that she is considered to
have served her sentences simultaneously.

In its Resolution, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) resolved to order the said court
to give due course to Evelyn Te’s notice of appeal from the Order denying her petition for
habeas corpus and from the Order requiring her to post bail in the amount of one million
pesos for her release from detention. On the basis of the Resolution and the provisions of
Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, the OCA, in its Report in the present case, found
the respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he be fined
in the amount of P20,000.00.

ISSUE:
Whether Rule 102 of the Rules of Court is applicable. (NO)

SUPREME COURT RULING:

Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of law. Rule 102 is not applicable in the case at bar. The
Court agrees with the findings of the OCA except for the recommended penalty.

Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear in prohibiting the grant of bail
after conviction by final judgment and after the convict has started to serve sentence. It
provides: No bail after final judgment; exception. – An accused shall not be allowed bail
after the judgment has become final, unless he has applied for probation before
commencing to serve sentence, the penalty and the offense being within the purview of
the Probation Law. In case the accused has applied for probation, he may be allowed
temporary liberty under his bail, but if no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing
one, the court may allow his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible
member of the community. In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has
commenced to serve sentence.

The only exception to the above-cited provision of the Rules of Court is when the convict has
applied for probation before he commences to serve sentence, provided the penalty and the
offense are within the purview of the Probation Law.

In the case of Evelyn Te, the judgment finding her guilty of violation of BB22 on four counts
and imposing upon her the penalty of imprisonment for two months on each count has
already become final and executory. She did not apply for probation. At the time the
respondent judge granted her bail she was already serving her sentence.

From the foregoing, it is evident that Te is not entitled to bail. Respondent judge contends
that under Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, he has the discretion to allow Te to be
released on bail. However, the Court reiterates its pronouncement in its Resolution of
February 19, 2001 in G.R. Nos. 145715-18 that Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
applies only to cases where the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue
of a criminal charge against him and not in an instance, as in the case involved in the
present controversy, where the applicant is serving sentence by reason of a final judgment.

The Court agrees with the observation of the OCA that respondent judge’s ignorance or
disregard of the provisions of Section 24, Rule 114 and Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court is tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure.

Complaint's allegation that no petition for habeas corpus was filed does not hold water. As
borne by the records, the Certification issued by one Atty. Elmer D. Lastimosa, Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, shows that Evelyn Te’s petition for
habeas corpus was incorporated in the pleadings she filed in Criminal Cases Nos.
9456-9460, although no docket fees and other charges were paid. There is no showing that
the respondent should be held administratively liable for the non-payment of docket and
other lawful fees. At any rate, the matter may be considered in the appeal taken by Te, as
earlier adverted to in G.R. Nos. 145715-18.

Court finds respondent judge’s act of allowing the temporary confinement of Te in the
hospital as justified. (presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty)

The Court now determines the proper imposable penalty. Considering that respondent can
no longer be dismissed or suspended, the Court is left with no recourse but to impose the
penalty of fine.
12. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ENGR. ASHRAF
KUNTING, Petitioner.
G.R. No. 167193
April 19, 2006

Facts:
1. On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the
Malaysian Internal Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian Police in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force
Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Isabela City, Basilan, Branch 2, Ninth Judicial Region. Kunting was charged
with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with the
RTC under separate Amended Informations.
2. Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at
Camp Crame for booking and custodial investigation.
3. In a letter dated July 3, 2003, Atty. Guillermo G. Danipog, Jr., Police Superintendent
and Chief of the Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, informed the Branch Clerk of Court of
the RTC that Kunting was already in the custody of the PNP-IG. Atty. Danipog
requested for Kunting’s temporary detention at the PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon
City due to the high security risks involved and prayed for the issuance of a
corresponding commitment order.
4. On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order directing the Police
Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately turn over
Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation.
5. On November 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a letter to Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño, Department of Justice (DOJ), requesting for
representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer of the venue of the trial from
Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following reasons:
(1) Several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG stating that
utmost effort will be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the
custody of Kunting from the PNP considering his importance to the ASG;
and (2) there is a big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if
he will be detained in Basilan due to inadequate security facility in the
municipal jail and its proximity to the area of operation of the ASG.
6. On August 13, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision against petitioner’s co-accused
guilty of the crime/s charged.
7. On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus. Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty since June
12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by Police Chief Superintendent Ismael Rafanan and
assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief, General Robert Delfin. He alleged that he was
never informed of the charges filed against him until he requested his family to
research in Zamboanga City. It was discovered in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan
that his name appeared in the list of accused who allegedly participated in the
kidnapping incident which occurred on June 2, 2001 in Lamitan, Basilan.
8. Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident, so he promptly
filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation on September 8, 2003.
Issue: Whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.

Ruling:
No, The petition for habeas corpus is to be dismissed.

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to "all
case of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The
remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a
person, and if found illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee. If, however, the
detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order,
the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.

In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He
was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M.
Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court.1avvphil.net

Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious
Illegal Detention in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165.
In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued
and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged with a criminal offense.
Bernarte v. Court of Appeals holds that "once the person detained is duly charged in court,
he may no longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus."

Nevertheless, this Court notes that the RTC in its Order dated February 11, 2005 reiterated
its Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal
Affairs Division, PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, to turn over Kunting to the court. TThe
trial court has been waiting for two years for the PNP-IG to turn over the person of Kunting
for the trial of his case. The PNP-IG has delayed the turn over because it is waiting for the
DOJ to request for the transfer of venue of the trial of the case from Isabela City, Basilan to
Pasig City. In the absence of evidence that the DOJ has indeed filed a motion for the transfer
of venue, In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General stated that the PNP-IG is
presently awaiting the resolution of the Motion for Transfer of Venue it requested from the
DOJ. In this regard, t the Police Chief Superintendent is, therefore, directed to take positive
steps towards action on said motion.comply with the Order of the trial court, dated February
11, 2005, to turn over the body of petitioner Kunting to the trial court..
13. ROXAS V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Melissa Roxas is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the

United States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a
member.

2. On 19 May 2009, while Roxas and her companions were resting in the house of Mr.
Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat, 15 heavily armed men in civilian clothes forcibly entered
the house and dragged them inside a van.

3. When they alighted from the van, she was informed that she is being detained for
being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA).

4. She was then separated from her companions and was brought to a room, from
where she could hear sounds of gunfire, noise of planes taking off and landing, and some
construction bustle.

5. She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to abandon her
communist beliefs. She was informed by a person named “RC” that those who tortured her
came from the “Special Operations Group” and that she was abducted because her name is
included in the “Order of Battle.”

6. On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular phone with a
sim card. She was sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or
something untoward will happen to her and her family. After her release, Roxas continued to
receive calls from RC thru the cell phone given to her.

7. Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo
and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court, impleading the high-ranking officials of military
and Philippine National Police (PNP), on the belief that it was the government agents who
were behind her abduction and torture.

8. On 09 June 2009, the Supreme Court issued the writs and referred the case to the
Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action. The Court of
Appeals granted the privilege of writs of amparo and habeas data. However, the court a quo
absolved the respondents because it was not convinced that the respondents were
responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas.

9. Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner is entitled to the WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

RULING:

No. An indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. This is what the petitioner failed to do.

The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no
evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened
the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public
respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e.,
keeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioner’s ties with the
CPP-NPA, was not adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records were
virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the
video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press
conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had
access to such video or photograph.
14. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE vs. MANALO

G.R. No. 180906

October 7, 2008

FACTS:

On February 14, 2006, brothers Raymond and ReynaldoManalo, farmers from San
Ildefonso, Bulacan were abducted by members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU) on suspicion that the brothers were members or supporters of the New
Peoples’ Army (NPA).

The Manalo brothers were detained in various locations:in Fort Magsaysay, Nueva
Ecija;in Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan; in Camp Luna, Limay Bataan; in a house
somewhere in Zambales; in a farm in Pangasinan. After having been detained and tortured
for 18 months, the brothers were able to escape from their captors and torturers on August
13, 2007.

Thereafter, the Manalo brothers filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to stop the military (herein petitioners) from depriving
them of their right to liberty and other basic rights before the SC.

While the petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on
October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion
to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition. The next day, October 25, 2007, the Supreme
Court (SC) favorably granted their petition which was treated as an Amparo Petition. The SC
remanded the petition to the CA and to conduct the summary hearing on the petition in
accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

ISSUE:

WON the CA erred in granting the relief requested in the Amparo Petition

RULING:

No. The petitioners argue that the production order of the CA partakes the nature of
a search warrant that necessitates compliance with the Constitutional requisites for the
protection of the right against unreasonable searches. Petitioners' arguments do not hold
water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search
warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This
Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the
government, not a protection of the government from the demand of the people such as
respondents.

Moreover in his affidavit, AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook to provide results of the
investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the
circumstances of the alleged abduction of the Manalo brothers.

Also, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of assignment of Hilario and
Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper,
immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ of Amparo. They add
that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions and
duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of
personal injury or even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of Hilario and Caigas, is
relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial
jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be served
with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the
respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to
create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when
applicable and necessary.

In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are
snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of
Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.

The petition is DISMISSED.

15. TAPUZ VS. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. NO. 182484

June 17, 2008

Topic: Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas Data

FACTS:

Private respondents spouses Sanson filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioners.
Private respondents alleged that they were the registered owners of the disputed land, and
that petitioners, armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with about
120 unknown persons, entered the disputed land by force and intimidation.

Petitioners alleged that they were the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land, and
that private respondents were the intruders.

The MCTC ruled in favor of private respondents. Respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to
Vacate and for Demolition.

Petitioners filed the present petition, praying for the issuance of a writ of habeas data under
the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, and the issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo.

ISSUE: WON it would be proper in this case to issue the Writ of Habeas Data and Writ of
Amparo. (NO)

RULING:

NEGATIVE.

Writ of Amparo

The writ of amparo is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the
prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the
ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of
how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party was or is being committed.
None of the supporting affidavits submitted by petitioners compellingly show that the threat
to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.

Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners,
the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the
disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators
criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal
prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.

Writ of Habeas Data

Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations
of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to
life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in
charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained
of; and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.

The allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum,
thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, the Court sees no concrete
allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life,
liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need
for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth
as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the
insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In
sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing
expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in
defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial
of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.