Resources Policy 52 (2017) 284–295

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Resources Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/resourpol

Beyond social capital: A strategic action fields approach to social licence to MARK
operate
⁎
Susan Wrighta, ,1, Sara Biceb
a
School of Social and Political Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia, 3010
b
Melbourne School of Government, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia 3010

A R T I C L E I N F O A BS T RAC T

Keywords: Australia's national economy continues to benefit from the extraction and exportation of non-renewable
Social licence to operate resources, even despite the end of its mining boom. The negative impacts of this primary industry endure and
Social cohesion are felt disproportionately by rural communities in close proximity to mining sites. The challenge of holding
Strategic action fields mining and extractive companies to account for social concerns – which may be difficult to measure or pin down
Community relations
to any one cause – has influenced affected communities to look to other, non-regulatory means of accountability
Australia
to raise their concerns and see them addressed. ‘Social licence to operate’ (SLO) is often touted as one such tool
for holding large resource companies to account. But a growing field of research into the concept has remained
largely focused on social capital measures and has yet to consider the conditions necessary to facilitate
communities’ successful deployment of SLO as an accountability mechanism or negotiation tool. There remains
a gap in our understanding about how SLO can be used meaningfully by communities as a tool for advocacy and
accountability, especially in company-community negotiations.
This article introduces a strategic action fields (SAFs) approach to SLO to facilitate exploration of the relative
strength between and within differing views (power), requirements and agendas of stakeholder groups (strategic
agendas) and the aligned interconnections of affected stakeholders (social cohesion), thus enhancing under-
standings of SLO possible through a social capital approach.
In introducing SAFs for SLO, this article extends research on SLO measurement through exploration of three
central research questions. First, it asks whether and how SLO might exist as more than a benchmark
measurement of acceptability, as defined primarily from corporate, risk-based perspectives? Secondly, building
on existing, social capital-based approaches to SLO measurement, are there other approaches that could
complement or extend a social capital approach to SLO to understand better a community's ability to
operationalise it? Following this, how might insights possible via a complementary means of SLO measurement
assist us to expand current understandings about the role of relationships in granting SLO?
Three M & E sector case studies from the resource intensive states of Western Australia and Queensland are
explored via a set of 105 government, public, media, social media and other related documents. Data was
thematically analysed using N*Vivo10 software. Application of social capital and SAFs approaches reveals key
tensions in claims to a SLO, especially where, under a social capital-only approach, strong relationships between
particular stakeholders would suggest that a SLO has been granted. The addition of a SAFs lens—especially
consideration of social cohesion—reveals that even where SLO may be granted, it may not necessarily be
operationalizable by communities due to these competing fields. The article concludes with suggestions about
the benefits of applying SAFs to SLO measurement, as a means of teasing out the utility of the concept to
affected stakeholders. Recommendations for future research adopting this approach are also suggested.

1. Introduction end of Australia's mining boom, in 2012–13 exports of natural

resources amounted to $AUD201.1billion (Australian Bureau of
The mining and extractives (M & E) industry in Australia has long Statistics (ABS, 2014a), 81% of Australia's total goods exports (valued
been a primary contributor to the national economy. Even despite the at $AUD246.9b) for the same period (ABS, 2014b). Although the

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: wrights1@student.unimelb.edu.au (S. Wright), sara.bice@unimelb.edu.au (S. Bice).
1
Ms Susan Wright is a PhD candidate in the School of Social and Political Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3010, Australia.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2017.04.005
Received 31 August 2016; Received in revised form 21 December 2016; Accepted 12 April 2017
Available online 19 April 2017
0301-4207/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
S. Wright, S. Bice
Australian economy benefits from the extraction and exportation of
non-renewable resources, the negative impacts of this primary industry
are felt disproportionately by rural communities in close proximity to
mining sites (Owen and Kemp, 2013). The presence of an ongoing
mining operation in rural areas has the potential to create negative
health, economic, and social impacts for community members (see, for
example Measham et al., 2013, in RSJ Special Issue). Much academic
attention has been given to the social impacts that the M & E industry
has on communities nearest to its operations, including but not limited
to: the introduction of a non-resident fly-in/fly-out (FIFO)2 workforce;
an increase in the costs of goods and services which are set in relation
to mining wages; demographic changes and increased levels of crime;
pressures on local infrastructure and services; increased levels of stress
and anxiety; and poor health outcomes (see, for example; Haslam-
Mckenzie, 2011; Larson, 2011; Reeson et al., 2012).
While companies do attend to social issues, largely via community
relations roles and regulatory requirements associated with impact
assessments, these concerns are frequently subjugated to environmen-
tal or engineering concerns. For example, regulatory structures which
tend historically to situate social impact assessments (SIAs) within
environmental impact assessments (EIAs) implicitly value environ-
mental over social concerns. In Australia—the focus for this article's
case studies—government regulation impels corporate attention to
social impacts, but formal regulation is mostly limited to or circum-
scribed within requirements concerning environmental impacts.
Consequently, there continues to be a tension between community
concerns regarding extraction's negative impacts and the regulatory
environment in which the M & E industry operates.
When M & E companies acknowledge their non-financial impacts,
they often assert their commitments to operating ‘beyond compliance’
and efforts to ‘earn and maintain a social licence to operate’ (SLO)
(Bice, 2016). Meanwhile, communities continue to seek effective means
of holding M & E companies to account for social concerns that may be
difficult to measure or pin down to any one cause (Morrison-Saunders
et al., 2014). Many affected communities therefore look to other, non-
regulatory means of accountability to raise their concerns and see them
addressed. SLO is often touted as one such tool to achieve account-
ability and redress of grievances. The SLO concept is generally defined
as ‘the ongoing acceptance and approval of a [project] by local
community members and other stakeholders that can affect its profit-
ability’ (Moffat and Zhang, 2014).
The most widely used definitions for SLO arise from prior research
focused largely on defining ways for M & E companies to measure their
SLO, drawing heavily from studies of social capital (e.g. Thomson and
Boutilier, 2011; Harvey and Bice, 2014; Moffat and Zhang, 2014).
While this approach has been widely adopted, it is also critiqued for its
lack of clear licensing criteria or brokerage processes as defined by
communities (Bice, 2014) and for its utility to communities and its
‘capture’ by M & E companies (Owen and Kemp, 2013). Indeed, much
research concerning SLO approaches it from a corporate perspective
through which effort is concentrated on providing firms with measure-
ment tools (e.g. Boutilier and Thomson, 2011; Moffat and Zhang, 2014;
Prno and Slocombe, 2012) to assist their strategic management of
stakeholder relations. Surprisingly little research approaches SLO from
communities’ perspectives, leaving a gap in our understanding as to
how communities view, define and operationalise SLO. This is the case
even despite SLO being touted as a tool through which communities
can hold resources companies to account (Boutilier, 2014). For
2
Due to the physical remoteness of many mine sites in Australia and the requirement
for specialised skill sets, M & E operations are largely reliant on a non-resident work-
force, employed on a fly-in/fly-out (FIFO), bus-in/bus-out (BIBO) or drive-in/drive-out
(DIDO) basis. This arrangement sees employees enter into a cyclic schedule that entails
commuting to the mine for an extended rostered shift, followed by a return home (usually
an Australian capital city) for an extended rest period, before heading back to the mine
for the next cycle (Blackman et al., 2014; Haslam-McKenzie, 2011).
285
Resources Policy 52 (2017) 284–295
instance, the privileging of corporate perspectives and related claims
to SLO is evidenced in the practice of corporate sustainability reporting
wherein SLO is regularly claimed but poorly defined (Parsons and
Moffat, 2014; Bice, 2014). Thus, a growing field of research into the
concept has yet to consider fully the conditions necessary to facilitate
communities’ successful deployment of SLO as an accountability
mechanism. This situation represents a critical paradox for the SLO
concept: it appears to be used widely and regularly by companies as a
‘signalling’ or rhetorical device to suggest project approval, while at the
same time often lacking meaningful utility to affected stakeholders.3
This article contributes to the broader scholarship on resources
policy, social impact assessment and management, and to the devel-
oping literature on SLO through attending specifically to this paradox
and to the operationalization of SLO as an accountability tool,
especially within a regulatory context that prioritises environmental
or economic concerns. Much previous theoretical literature on SLO
focuses on its measurement in terms of community acceptance of a
project (e.g. Boutilier and Thomson, 2011) and on the processes
through which SLO is mediated (e.g. Moffat and Zhang, 2014). These
approaches rely heavily on measures of social capital, involving
institutionalised trust, promise keeping, listening, community benefit
and procedural fairness. Research on SLO's measurement has provided
an important conceptual starting point for engaging the concept more
critically. But there remains a gap in our understanding about how SLO
can be used meaningfully by affected stakeholders as a tool for
advocacy or accountability, especially in company-community negotia-
tions to mitigate impacts or achieve benefits (Harvey and Bice, 2014;
Owen and Kemp, 2013; Prno, 2013).
This article extends the research on SLO measurement through
exploration of three central research questions. First, it explores
whether and how SLO might exist as more than a corporate benchmark
measurement of project acceptability. Can it also be a meaningful
accountability tool for communities dealing with the M & E industry?
Secondly, building on existing, social capital-based approaches to SLO
measurement, are there other approaches that could complement or
extend a social capital approach to SLO in order to understand affected
stakeholders’ ability to operationalise it? Following this, how might
insights possible via a complementary means of SLO measurement
assist us to expand current understandings about the role of relation-
ships in granting SLO? Could such an approach help to shift under-
standings of SLO towards greater community ownership and away
from corporate co-optation?
In tackling these questions, the article engages a strategic action
fields (SAFs) approach—the strategic alliances, reciprocity and social
orders that shape a shared understanding around a particular issue or
experience (Blanchet, 2015)—as a means of better understanding the
context in which SLO may be operationalised. The article therefore
aims to enrich both our understanding of commonly used, social
capital-based SLO measurement criteria and to suggest how introduc-
tion of a SAFs approach can assist to understand how and in what
circumstances SLO might offer greater utility for affected stakeholders.
We build on existing social capital frameworks to suggest that SAFs
may help to explain whether or how SLO may be advanced beyond a
relationship measurement to be operationalised by affected stake-
holders for accountability purposes. Importantly, we see the negotia-
tions associated with accountability as more than ‘consultation’ or pure
dialogue, but as a process that results in agreed actions, including but
not limited to establishment of formal agreements, like those described
by O’Fairchelleagh and Corbett (2005) or Ruwhiu and Carter (2016),
inclusive of both indigenous and non-native local communities. Equally
importantly, we recognise ‘affected stakeholders’ and ‘community/ies’
3
We use the term ‘affected stakeholders’ consciously here and throughout.
‘Stakeholders’ are commonly defined as those groups or individuals who may affect or
are affected by a company or operation. Here, we are most concerned with those groups
or individuals on the affected side of the equation and choose to make this explicit.
S. Wright, S. Bice Resources Policy 52 (2017) 284–295

as complex and contested terms. Each of the case studies represent

diverse groups and organisations, representative of multiple interests
and communities within communities. For purposes of analysis and
discussion, however, we use these terms to refer to the non-corporate
actors implicated in claims to SLO in the case studies, as defined in the
empirical section of the article. We remain ever-mindful of the
challenges inherent within this usage.
This article proceeds by briefly reviewing the social capital approach
to SLO, as prevalent in the current literature. SAFs and the related
concepts of power, strategic agendas and social cohesion are then
introduced as a conceptual adjunct to traditional social capital frame-
works. The context for three illustrative case studies of SLO in Australia
is set through a brief overview of the regulatory environment in which
the projects operate and which affects societal expectations directly
related to securing a SLO. Cases are examined via a thematic analysis of
105 community, media, social media, government and other public
documents. Findings are presented in relation to social capital
approaches to SLO and findings from a SAF approach are also
introduced. Following this, we suggest that SAFs, especially the related
concept of ‘social cohesion’, enrich the social capital SLO measurement
model through drawing attention to the competing power dynamics
that assist or hinder affected stakeholders’ abilities to operationalise
SLO, at the very least within the Australian M & E industry.
Opportunities for future research applying this enriched conceptualisa-
tion of SLO are suggested in the concluding discussion.
2. Conceptual framework: from social capital to SAFs
SLO is commonly measured through a social capital lens. Broadly,
this involves identifying the extent to which trustful and mutually
respectful relationships exist between M & E companies and local
communities (Harvey and Bice, 2014). In perhaps the most widely
applied definition of SLO, Robert Boutilier and Ian Thomson (2011,
p.2) describe it as a “community's perceptions of the acceptability of a
company and its local operations”. Here, community perceptions of
project legitimacy are necessary to gaining a SLO. Within a social
capital approach, measurement focuses on elements such as, promise
keeping, community benefit and institutionalised trust, as defined in
Table 1, below.
Using social capital measures, Boutilier and Thomson (2011)
contend that SLO exists on a continuum spanning four levels, from
the withdrawal or withholding of SLO through acceptance, approval
and finally psychological identification (i.e. assimilation) (see Fig. 1).
Further, Boutilier and Thomson (2011) identify four factors which they
hold to be necessary for a SLO to be granted: economic legitimacy,
socio-political legitimacy, interactional trust, and institutionalised
trust. Economic legitimacy is gained when a company offers only
financial benefits to a community. Socio-political legitimacy is achieved
when the community perceives that the company acts with fairness and
respect, contributes to the community's wellbeing and satisfies com-
Fig. 1. Model of the Social Licence to Operate. Source: Boutilier and Thomson (2011).
munity expectations (see, Harvey and Bice, 2014). Interactional trust
indicates that the community can engage with the company, and when
doing so, feels heard and that the company honours its contracts and
promises (Moffat and Zhang, 2014). Institutionalised trust is gained
when the community's representative organisations and the company
attain a relationship based on mutual regard for the interests of the
other (Boutilier and Thomson, 2011). Thus, in measuring SLO,
economic legitimacy is captured by examining community benefits;
socio-political legitimacy via mutual respect; interactional trust via
promise keeping; and institutionalised trust via shared values and
goals.
The Boutilier and Thomson (2011) model provides a useful
conceptual framework for measuring the relational levels of acceptance
between a M & E proponent and community members. This approach,
however, positions community dissatisfaction as a risk to the profits of
the M & E operation, suggesting that SLO finds its value primarily as a
signalling device for corporate operations management, not as a tool
for community use. A social capital approach makes it possible for a
company to take measurements of relationship quality that may
suggest that a social licence has been granted, even where that SLO
holds little or no utility for the communities in question (Owen and
Kemp, 2013). In other words, social capital measures may indicate that
a SLO is granted without consideration of whether or how affected
stakeholders are using or will be able to use it. This situation illustrates
a critical paradox in social capital approaches to SLO: a community
does not necessarily require the capacity to operationalise SLO before a
company can claim that it has one. In these instances, from a
community perspective, SLO is a toothless tiger. But from a corporate
perspective, it is a green light.
Moreover, the framing of SLO as part of a risk management due
diligence exercise conducted before undertaking a major project leans
toward the historical tendency of industry to extend an economic
rationalist standpoint to social considerations (Owen and Kemp, 2013).

Table 1
Social capital-related criteria for measuring SLO.

CRITERIA DESCRIPTION

Criteria suggested in SLO literature

Promise Keeping Promise-keeping facilitates gaining the trust of the community and gives the M & E project socio-political legitimacy. It is fundamental to the
achievement of an SLO (Thomson and Boutilier, 2011; Putnam, 1993).
Community Benefit The promise of benefit to the community in the form of financial gains as well as non-financial benefits gives economic-legitimacy to the M & E
proponent (Owen and Kemp, 2013).
Institutionalised Trust Founded on the ongoing respect between the M & E proponent and community organisations (including but not limited to Local Government, The
Chamber of Commerce and Industry), and important in building a relationship of reciprocity and concern for the ongoing benefits of the proponent
and the community (Moffat and Zhang, 2014; Harvey and Bice, 2014; Prno, 2013).

286
S. Wright, S. Bice
Indeed, recent research confirms strong interest in translating social
risks into terms of project delays, industrial or legal action and
quantifiable effects on profit (e.g. Franks et al., 2014; Graetz and
Franks, 2013). Returning to the critical paradox, the situation becomes
more complicated: While a social capital-based approach to measuring
SLO has its merits, its focus on defining company risk further precludes
attention to whether the SLO measured can be employed by commu-
nities in a manner that is both meaningful and functional. This
situation exists because social capital measures define the existence
of SLO through relationship quality proxies, not through examination
of the licence's use by or usefulness to affected stakeholders. Again, it
becomes possible for a company to claim that it has a SLO even where
that SLO has little or no utility for communities.
Considering the above, a social capital approach to SLO does not
provide necessary information about affected stakeholders’ ability to
operationalise it. Returning to the research questions, it is therefore
constructive to ask whether there are other approaches that could
complement or extend a social capital approach to SLO in order to
understand communities’ ability to operationalise it?
2.1. A Strategic Action Fields approach to SLO: understanding utility
We introduce SAFs as a means of complimenting and enriching a
social capital approach to SLO, not as a suggestion that a social capital
approach be disregarded. Rather, we argue that consideration of SAFs
could enrich and deepen understandings of the tensions and dynamics
at play within and between affected stakeholders, M & E proponents,
political agendas and the legislative and regulatory framework through
which conflicts and issues are negotiated.
‘Strategic action fields’ (SAFs) offer a helpful means of under-
standing the disparate forces within any given community that may
affect its ability to operationalise SLO. Widely used in the field of
organisational sociology, SAFs reflect the discipline's interest in the
study of internal dynamics and hierarchy found within an organisation,
as well as the ties that connect organisations to one-another and to the
communities in which they operate. These ties include strategic
alliances and reciprocity (Godwyn and Gittell, 2012)—concepts closely
linked to the social capital that comprises SLO. Leading organisational
sociology scholars Fligstein and McAdam, p3) (2011) define SAFs as:
“a meso-level social order where actors (who can be individual or
collective) interact with knowledge of one another under a set of
common understandings about the purposes of the field, the
relationships in the field (including who has power and why), and
the field's rules”.
Thus, SAFs allow us to think of communities in terms of a
combination of different stakeholder groups with alliances and rela-
tionships both within and between each group (Fligstein and McAdam,
2011). The interactions resulting from SAFs, and the consequent
impact on power, strategic agendas and social cohesion—the extent
to which a community is unified through a variety of factors
(Townshend et al., 2015)—offer important insights into the machina-
tions necessary to operationalise SLO. That is, the utility (not just
‘signalling’) of a SLO is critical to affected stakeholders’ capacity to
leverage the licence as a means of improving asymmetrical power
dynamics (Lukes, 2005) and related negotiations with M & E propo-
nents (Owen and Kemp, 2013).
A SAF approach to SLO facilitates improved attention to the diverse
parties involved and also addresses the various strategic agendas and
power influences that are in play. By aiding examination of dynamics
between and within community groups, a SAF approach offers a means
for understanding various priorities, power differentials and the roles
that both perform in gaining a consensus regarding a particular issue.
It is this consensus—or ‘social cohesion’—which we propose is espe-
cially critical to affected stakeholders’ ability to operationalise SLO.
287
Resources Policy 52 (2017) 284–295
2.2. Social cohesion and SAFs
Social cohesion is a factor in both social capital and social resilience
and is reflected in the levels of community involvement, social
interaction and relationships, and the presence of trust and reciprocity
within community relationships (Townshend et al., 2014). In this way,
social cohesion is reflective of the core social capital concerns in the
existing SLO model. But it extends and enriches these concerns by
providing an indication of the likelihood or level to which we might
expect a particular group of affected stakeholders (i.e. a SAF) to act
meaningfully or strategically. For instance, studies show that social
cohesion is visible in the way communities respond to hardship – a
socially cohesive community will develop resilience—the ability to
return to equilibrium after change (Walker and Salt, 2006)—by forming
SAFs that allow them to overcome their difficulties together
(Townshend et al., 2014). Research indicates that social cohesion
crafted through SAFs is vital to unified action in response to social
impacts (Putnam, 1995). It follows that SAFs are critical to commu-
nities’ ability to use SLO.
Social cohesion represents the combined social networks of each
SAF, along with the inherent interpersonal trust and reciprocity – the
social capital of the given community. This provides valuable resources
that facilitate coordinated action (Putnam, 1995). Following Cheshire
et al. (2014), it is theorised here that social cohesion plays a critical but
largely undiscussed role in community's power4 and agency within
SAFs, especially within the dynamic between communities and com-
panies and communities and governments. In other words, commu-
nities’ capacities to grant and leverage SLO are linked tightly not only
to social capital (Boutilier and Thomson, 2011), but also to their degree
of strategic agendas, power and social cohesion, visible via the
interactions of SAFs. It is proposed that a SAFs approach, incorporat-
ing these considerations, offers an important complement to common
SLO measurement to allow for a better understanding of the level of
SLO granted—a strategically supported and cohesive SLO is stronger
than a divided one—and to provide an indicator of the ability of
communities to operationalise SLO, especially in relation to M & E
projects (see, Table 2).
Social cohesion can be largely understood by identifying the
different views, needs and concerns within each case. Each SAF
comprises socially constructed and embedded members who share a
basic consensus regarding the issues at hand. SAFs make use of
combined social capital to generate strategic advantage (Fligstein and
McAdam, 2011). SAF boundaries are usually defined by the specific
conflict or issue in which the group is engaged, and are dynamic in
nature and able to change in relation to changing conflict (Fligstein and
McAdam, 2011). This is particularly important when we consider the
dynamic nature of social capital and social risks—often made visible
through regulation—closely associated with SLO.
To summarise so far, a social capital approach to SLO provides a
useful framework for suggesting the relational level of SLO present,
particularly from a corporate perspective in terms of corporate risk. But
social capital approaches tell us little about affected stakeholders’
ability to operationalise SLO and do not explicitly incorporate con-
textual tensions related to risk and regulation, nor do they make
explicit the influence of diverse, competing stakeholder views. A SAFs
approach facilitates exploration of the relative strength between and
within differing views, requirements and agendas of stakeholder
groups, thus enhancing findings possible through a social capital
approach.
This suggested approach, however, is not without its challenges. If
communities are divided into a diverse web of SAFs, each displaying
4
We acknowledge that the concept of power is broadly contested and our use of the
term aligns with the approach of Lukes (2005) who acknowledges the relationship
between power and decision-making rights and asymmetrical abilities to exercise those
rights.
S. Wright, S. Bice Resources Policy 52 (2017) 284–295

Table 2
SLO framework incorporating social capital and SAFs.

Considerations Description

Social capital approach

Promise Keeping Promise-keeping facilitates gaining the trust of the community and gives the M & E project socio-political legitimacy. It is
fundamental to the achievement of an SLO (Thomson and Boutilier, 2011; Putnam, 1993).
Community Benefit The promise of benefit to the community in the form of financial gains as well as non-financial benefits gives economic-
legitimacy to the M & E proponent (Owen and Kemp, 2013).
Institutionalised Trust Founded on the ongoing respect between the M & E proponent and community organisations (including but not limited to
Local Government, The Chamber of Commerce and Industry), and important in building a relationship of reciprocity and
concern for the ongoing benefits of the proponent and the community (Moffat and Zhang, 2014; Harvey and Bice, 2014;
Prno, 2013).

SAFs approach
Strategic agendas, power and social SAFs attend to “a meso-level social order where actors interact with knowledge of one another under a set of common
cohesion understandings about the purposes of the field, the relationships of the field and the field's rules” (Fligstein and McAdam,
2011). Key factor within SAFs that enable a community to operationalise SLO, include development of shared, strategic
agendas, the power of stakeholders within the SAF and social cohesion. Social cohesion, in particular, facilitates the
utilisation of existing social capital within the community. Where social cohesion is strong and SLO is granted, it may
simultaneously generate new social capital through a strong and trustful, mutually supportive relationship with the M & E
proponent.

differing requirements and agendas, and each showing different
thresholds for social acceptance of an M & E project, how can SLO be
used? For example, does a SLO granted at the ‘approval’ level
(according to social capital measures) and associated with stakeholders
in a certain SAF outweigh a ‘withheld’ SLO related to a divergent SAF?
Are there multiple and competing SLOs in play (see, for example,
Jijelava and Vanclay, 2014)? Or is there only ever a single SLO
available at any given time and which requires a particular level of
agreement about its level of approval in order to be operationalised?
While it is interesting to consider the existence of multiple SLOs,
each related to particular stakeholder groups and their interests, such a
perspective dilutes the meaningfulness and usefulness of the concept.
The assumption made here is instead that a certain degree of
community unification around the level of SLO granted to a project
is critical to that community's ability to use the ‘one available’ SLO
successfully—and for a project proponent to claim SLO with any degree
of surety. Social cohesion, as identifiable through attention to SAFs, is
therefore proposed as a means of enhancing SLO models to indicate the
likelihood or capability of affected stakeholders to operationalise SLO.
In the sections that follow, three case studies from Australian M & E
projects are explored to illustrate the usefulness of SAFs and social
cohesion to enhancing the social capital SLO model. We situate these
projects within their social and regulatory contexts, as these environ-
ments are influential for both whether corporate claims to SLO are
made and for the strength of the SLO, relative to other, potentially
competing agendas. Close attention is paid to understanding whether
and how SLO is operationalised and the extent to which social cohesion
played a role in facilitating this. Before detailing the cases and findings,
we first provide a review of the research method.
3. Research method
This study adopted a comparative case study approach (Yin, 1993)
that enabled the multiple variables that impact upon social capital for
SLO and related SAFs to be explored. The three illustrative cases
selected – Onslow, Western Australia (WA), Port Hedland, WA and
Moranbah, Queensland (QLD)– were chosen as representative of towns
hosting major operations within diverse regulatory and operating
environments but with common issues affecting regional M & E com-
munities that influence local opinion. These issues include, conflict
around broken promises, community benefits, procedural transparency
and community members ‘not feeling heard’ (Owen and Kemp, 2013).
Within the Pilbara region the study focused on two specific towns,
Onslow and Port Hedland, due to the intensity of M & E operations in
these concentrated locations. We also focused in on the town of
Moranbah in the Bowen Basin region of Queensland as a site of
conflict between community members and the M & E proponent.
Whilst other Australian regions and towns are also resource-
industry intense, these cases offer typical examples of social impacts
related to SLO and resulting from local M & E projects. While the study
does not attempt to generalise to a national level, it does build a ‘middle
range theory’ for an SAF approach to SLO (Davis and Marquis, 2005).
This style of theory building can help to reveal and explain normative
and political considerations which other types of theory may not. Thus,
the careful selection of cases allows suggestions about the types of
issues and impacts, related to SLO, that one could expect to see in
similarly affected resource-intense areas.
The case studies presented offer an appropriate and practical means
of early investigation for purposes of theory building. The data set,
detailed below, allowed for rich qualitative analyses of a type used in
previous studies as a means of understanding complex sociological
phenomena (Schneiberg and Clemens, 2006). The dense and compli-
cated narratives emerging from the data also suggest a “rich proble-
matic” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, 84) that offers an effective way to improve and
extend our understanding of a SLO.
The research was conducted using a combination of primary and
secondary documents relating to the operations and impacts of
resource projects in each community. Primary documents included:
Hansard transcripts (the transcripts of the proceedings from
Commonwealth and State Parliament and their committees),
Commonwealth and State Acts and Regulations, Government Policy
documents, minutes from Local Government meetings, Community
Reference Group minutes, and SIAs and social impact management
plans (SIMPs) (where available). The secondary documents included:
print media reports, social media dialogues, government and industry
websites and academic papers. A total of 105 documents were
thematically analysed using NVivo10 software (see Table 3).
Table 3
Breakdown of Document Type.
Documents Analysed Number
Media 50
Government 32
Industry Bodies 12
Social Media Forums 3
Othera 8
a
Legal Opinions.

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S. Wright, S. Bice
In order to measure emerging themes which are based on the social
capital SLO literature, we developed an iterative coding frame. Data for
each town was explored in relation to the social capital criteria defined
in the Thomson and Boutilier model–promise-keeping, providing
community benefit, institutionalised trust—and SAFs were also ex-
plored. We coded for community benefit (economic legitimacy) pro-
mise keeping (socio-political legitimacy and interactional trust), and
institutionalised trust, as well as including aspects of strategic agendas,
power and social cohesion, based on the literature and informed by
empirical analysis as guided by the research questions.
Thematic analysis allowed for social impacts, social capital-related
SLO criteria and SAFs to be analysed and categorised (Flyvjberg,
2001). For each community studied, the thematic analysis assisted with
identifying and mapping the differing perceptions held within these
communities regarding the social impacts of resource projects, thereby
defining SAF boundaries. Iterative coding was performed in NVivo10
to facilitate the emergence of themes from the data (Neuendorf, 2002).
This coding facilitated the development of a framework of under-
standings and created a “web-like network as an organizing principle
and a representational means” (Attride-Stirling, 2001, p.388).
3.1. Method limitations
Despite the availability of comprehensive media coverage of the
issues in each case studied, there are some important limitations that
must be addressed. Firstly, the media reports from each of the cases are
neither uniform in number nor in the mix of media and social media
sources. For example, there is no local newspaper in Onslow, but the
Edith Cowan University Journalism School produced five newspapers
(Tracking Onslow) between 2012 and 2014 that documented the
transition of the community during the construction and implementa-
tion of two major resource projects. This resulted in a significantly
higher amount of data gathered from print media in Onlsow than in
other communities. Port Hedland, on the other hand, has a number of
highly utilised social media campaigns that are run by and for
community members, and despite having its own local newspaper
(The North-West Telegraph), a large amount of data originated from
social media. The data gathered from the Bowen Basin is the result of a
more balanced mix of social media and print media available in these
regions. Notwithstanding these differences, the data remains compar-
able.
3.2. Regulatory environment: Setting the case studies’ SLO context
SLO operates within a complex environment of economic agendas,
environmental impacts, social risks and trade-offs. Many of these
related issues are articulated through the regulatory environment
governing M & E projects. Given the article's use of Australian exam-
ples, it is helpful to first review the regulatory environment that sets the
context for understanding SLO, before introducing the cases. The
Australian M & E industry is predominantly regulated by State and
Territory based legislation, however, the Federalist system means that
both Commonwealth and State/Territory based legislation applies,
with Commonwealth legislation overriding State legislation when
covering the same matter (Chambers, 2006). In terms of this article's
case study states—Western Australia (WA) and Queensland (QLD)—
WA mining falls principally under the Mining Act 1978, while QLD
mining is governed predominantly by the Mineral Resources Act 1989,
with each act adopting a similar regulatory approach yet lacking
uniform consistency (Chambers, 2006).
Besides state-based mining acts, M & E operations within each state
are regulated by a State Agreement, which is a legal agreement
developed between the State Government and the M & E proponent
for a project, and which is then presented for ratification to the State
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Parliament. It is important to note here that, in WA at least, the
negotiation of the State Agreement is between the Minister for State
Development and the proponent and “there is no opportunity for
detailed scrutiny of the agreement either by the public or by the
legislature” (Fitzgerald, 2002, p.315). This has particular implications
for the relationships that influence State Agreements and, by extension
SLO, as will become apparent in the cases below.
State Agreements are initially negotiated at the beginning of a
project and can be renegotiated throughout a project's life by the State
Government and the M & E proponent. The purpose of State
Agreements is to document the rights and responsibilities of both
parties for the life of the operation and include such issues as dispute
resolution procedures, rent and royalty agreements, and which party is
responsible for the financing and development of infrastructure
(Chambers, 2006; Fitzgerald, 2002). In Western Australia and
Queensland these ratified agreements are granted priority over other
legislation, as codified in the mining legislation (LexisNexis, 2010,
[170-80]). The agreements are negotiated by the M & E proponent and
senior advisors within the relevant government department, “without
public review or an opportunity being offered to other interested
parties” (Fitzgerald, 2002, p.315).
In addition to Federal and State-based acts and State Agreements,
the Australian M & E industry is also subject to environmental impact
assessment (EIA) requirements that vary according to jurisdiction. Of
direct interest to an investigation of SLO, in recent years, social impact
assessments (SIA) have also been requested or required by Australian
State and Territory Governments to assess, monitor and manage the
adverse social impacts and potential benefits resulting from M & E
projects. As such, SIAs offer an important means of establishing
evidence for the support or withholding of a SLO. SIAs, like other
relevant regulation, have developed differently across Australia, for the
jurisdictional reasons noted previously. Importantly, in Australia, SIAs
usually fall within the EIA process. This often leads to a restricted
emphasis on social impacts (Esteves et al., 2012).
Across Australia regulatory-required impact assessments lack an
overarching or unifying framework that clearly defines the roles and
responsibilities of industry in predicting, mitigating and rectifying
social impacts. This situation has contributed to a mismatch between
the expectations of the public and interventions designed by propo-
nents to directly address impacts or demonstrate their responsibility to
society (Bice, 2013; Franks and Vanclay, 2013). Research also shows
that the historically predictive and often one-off nature of regulated
SIAs contributes further to gaps between expectations and perfor-
mance, as the assessments usually fulfil only a perfunctory, box-ticking
role. Thus, SIA often fails to address the concerns it could ideally
engage, such as ensuring long term community benefits through
providing employment and business opportunities locally, as well as
having ongoing involvement in managing negative impacts resulting
from a M & E operation (Nish and Bice, 2011). Consequently, SIA
rarely achieves the ‘democratic development’ possible through its
ongoing application to M & E projects (Vanclay, 2009).
Regulatory SIA processes—in Australia and elsewhere—may also
contribute to conflict between affected communities and M & E propo-
nents, a loss of trust for the M & E industry and a loss of community
goodwill towards M & E proponents and operations (Moffat and Zhang,
2014; Prno, 2013). For instance, as Moffat and Zhang (2014) point out
in their work to understand the processes through which SLO is
mediated, the development of a relationship that is based on a mutual
regard for the wellbeing of the community is critical. Support for a
project may be further strengthened through transparency, open
communications and the fulfilment of commitments. Yet regulatory-
based SIAs rarely require ongoing engagement of the type that would
empower affected communities with the evidence necessary to engage
equally with the M & E proponent, or to establish whether a SLO should
S. Wright, S. Bice
be granted (Nish and Bice, 2011). In other words, regulatory ap-
proaches to SIA affect company and community understandings of SLO
and may exacerbate tensions between competing policy agendas and
community concerns; tensions made visible by application of a SAF
lens (Blanchet, 2015).
4. Findings
In the sections that follow we present the key findings of the
thematic analysis, organised according to the three cases studied. For
each case, we summarise the findings related to a social capital
approach to SLO, especially community benefit, promise keeping and
institutionalised trust. We go on to present findings related to the SAFs
identified in each case and what those tell us about strategic agendas,
power, social cohesion and related implications for SLO. The findings
suggest that SAFs offer valuable insights into the potential utility of
SLO for affected stakeholders and add helpful nuance to social capital
approaches to SLO.
4.1. Chevron in Onslow, WA
4.1.1. Background
Onslow is a regional coastal town located 1386 km north of Perth
and is the host community for the onshore processing facilities for the
Wheatstone liquid natural gas (LNG) project, a Chevron Corporation
(Chevron)-led joint venture to develop and export natural gas from the
Carnarvon Basin in Western Australia (Chevron, n.d.). The onshore
facilities are located 12 km south-west of Onslow at the Ashburton
North Strategic Industrial Area (ANSIA). This case study focused on
Chevron's decision to build a worker's camp at the ANSIA, instead of
within the township itself, as originally agreed.
Chevron's Wheatstone project in Onslow has a capital budget of $29
billion, began its five-year construction phase in 2011 and was
expected to become operational in 2016 (Chevron, n.d.). During the
project planning phase Chevron, the State Government and the Shire of
Ashburton reached an agreement whereby Chevron would invest $250
million in Onslow in the form of infrastructure, facilities and services.
This agreement involved Chevron purchasing a nine hectare ‘super-lot’
within Onslow to house their workforce in purpose-built workers
housing (Government of Western Australia, Department of State
Development (DSD), 2014). This commitment would also see the
Onslow population grow from 667 people (ABS, 2013) to approxi-
mately 2000 permanent residents in 2022, representing considerable
growth for the community (DSD, 2014).
4.1.2. SLO from a social capital perspective
In September 2014 Chevron and the Premier of WA announced that
they had renegotiated the State Agreement and would no longer be
building the workers’ accommodation within Onslow, instead they
would construct a purpose-built workers camp adjacent to the onshore
processing plant in the ANSIA development. Further, the commitment
of $250 million for infrastructure, services and facilities has been
contested by Chevron. Projects earmarked for development from that
funding have been subject to delays and cancellation (Shire of
Ashburton, 2014). Findings show that this decision was widely inter-
preted by affected stakeholders as representing a broken promise and
has subsequently coloured further engagements. Not only did the
renegotiation affect the potential to achieve expected community
benefits, findings suggest that the decision affected the project's
economic legitimacy, in the form of community benefits perceived as
being denied to the area.
While Chevron's commitment to invest in infrastructure was
contingent upon the workers’ accommodation being built in town,
the relocation of the workforce to the ANSIA precinct did not lessen the
impact that of the workers’ accommodation on Onslow's water, power
and waste management resources (Shire of Ashburton, 2014). It also
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has implications for Local Government resourcing due to a loss of
income that would otherwise have been generated through rates and
taxes associated with the housing development. As Brian Cameron,
(Executive Manager of Development and Regulatory Services, Shire of
Ashburton) observes, “because Chevron is based outside the town, the
financial pressure for constructing these things falls on the ratepayer
and the Shire” (Cameron, in Pegrum, 2014, p.11).
The above examples concerning economic and socio-political
legitimacy suggest that Chevron's SLO in Onslow was under threat.
At the same time, however, social capital between certain, powerful
stakeholders increased, suggesting a SLO for the project was in place.
This situation exemplifies the difficulties of attempting to determine
the existence or level of SLO approval based on social capital alone, as
explained below.
From a social capital perspective, the State Agreement negotiation
had considerable but different implications for SLO, relative to
institutionalised trust. Instead of harming SLO, the renegotiated
agreement reveals the strength of the relationship between the M & E
proponent and the State Government with weight given towards
building political capital at the state but not the local level
(Brueckner et al., 2014). Political legitimacy and support for the
Wheatstone project can be seen through the leveraging of the legislative
framework governing the industry, with clear implications for affected
stakeholders, including those described above. In seeking to change the
agreement that would have seen the workforce housed in Onlsow,
Chevron negotiated directly with the WA Premier and the new
agreement was presented to Parliament as a ‘fait accompli’
(Government of Western Australia, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c).
The Onslow case study demonstrates how a social capital approach
to SLO reveals tensions in which the strength of relationship between
two crucial stakeholders is visible, but primarily only as it prizes
institutionalised trust between powerful stakeholders while damaging
institutionalised trust with other, less powerful stakeholders. Findings
from a social capital approach leave us questioning whether a SLO can
be claimed to exist based primarily on the institutionalised trust
between a few key actors, as appears to have happened here? A
different perspective is needed to assist us to understand whether
and how SLO holds utility for affected stakeholders in such a contested
environment.
4.1.3. SLO from a SAFs perspective
Findings show that there are two powerful SAFs at play in this case,
with the relationship between Chevron and the State Government
forming one SAF around the State Agreement. The second SAF
emerges through the relationship that developed between Chevron
and the Onslow Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCI) during
which it funded the OCCI to build a business resource centre. In each of
these SAFs, the shared purpose of the field (Fligstein and McAdam,
2011) centred on the economic benefit that concerned parties expected
to gain from Chevron. Both SAFs have important implications for
understanding the utility of any claimed SLO for Chevron in Onslow,
more broadly. These SAFs revealed high levels of strategic agendas (i.e.
all sought self-serving economic benefit), power (i.e. the State
Government's decision to renegotiate the State Agreement overran
Local Government opposition) and social cohesion (i.e. the actors
within these SAFs demonstrated a united front to support the
controversially renegotiated State Agreement). The successful strategic
agendas of these SAFs (i.e. to secure Chevron's operation, despite
negative impacts or economic losses to Onslow) suggest there is a level
of socio-political legitimacy for these actions. Indeed, standard social
capital measures would suggest that there exists a SLO. Yet an
examination of SAFs, which aids understanding of the relationships
and agendas amongst key parties, reveals who is included in the
agreement making and who is excluded. In this case, SLO was claimed
only because of the united strategic agendas of powerful actors.
For instance, further examination of the Onslow case from a SAFs
S. Wright, S. Bice
perspective shows that whilst certain key players granted high levels of
economic and socio-political legitimacy to Chevron, these powerful
SAFs excluded other parts of the community, equally interested in the
company's SLO. But these stakeholders proved unable to question or
withdraw Chevron's SLO due to a breakdown in social cohesion. The
analysis shows that a break-down in social cohesion began when
affected stakeholders raised concerns about the company's inequitable
funding of community projects. For example, over the time period
studied, there was a diametrical change in attitude of the OCCI towards
Chevron. The OCCI was initially very vocal in expressing disapproval of
the decision to house the workers at ANSIA. But on receiving a funding
grant from Chevron to build a business resource centre in town, the
OCCI began openly supporting the decision, and further, began
claiming the Shire of Ashburton was not acting in the best interests
of the community. Affected stakeholders not receiving such benefits
formed SAFs around a shared purpose of opposition, but proved less
powerful than those of the State Government and OCCI. The findings
highlight the complexities of building effective SAFs that, we argue, are
critical to a SLO that offers utility, not just a reflection of strong social
capital between certain, powerful actors.
4.2. BHP Billiton Iron Ore in Port Hedland, WA
4.2.1. Background
Port Hedland is a regional coastal community located 1640 km
north of Perth and has the world's largest bulk mineral port, providing
port facilities for the Pilbara region M & E industry (Pilbara Ports
Authority, 2014). In 2012 the Town of Port Hedland (ToPH) along with
the State Government announced a $AUD152 million funding package
for the development of the waterfront and foreshore precinct in the
West End of Port Hedland – the Spoilbank Marina development
(Government of Western Australia, Department of Regional
Development and Lands, 2012). Once finished the development would
include: a marina with four boat launching ramps, 100 boat pens, a
lagoon style swimming area, a community events space, commercial
and retail space and an eco-tourism development. A residential
development, a hotel and transient worker accommodation to support
the development would be provided by a private developer (Town of
Port Hedland, 2015a). Despite support from the State Government, the
development has been opposed by BHP Billiton Iron Ore (BHPBIO) as
the preferred location is adjacent to the shipping channel and near the
port facilities. A development in this location would require significant
changes to BHPBIO's current operations to allow the area to meet with
environmental safety requirements (Government of Western Australia,
Environmental Protection Authority (EPA), 2014, n.p).
4.2.2. SLO from a social capital perspective
In the Port Hedland case, the importance of a mutually respectful
relationship (interactional trust) between affected stakeholders and the
proponent to achieve a SLO is highlighted by the tensions arising from
the proposed Spoilbank Marina and West End redevelopment, espe-
cially through BHPBIO's opposition to plans which findings suggest
run counter to widespread community opinion about the develop-
ment's desirability. A lack of institutionalised trust is also apparent. For
example, the Member for Pilbara's public comments reflected similar
sentiments about damage to institutionalised trust identified through
the analysis. The MP publicly commented that, “It's disappointing that
we have a vision to grow Port Hedland into a modern vibrant city and a
lot of that relies on a good partnership with BHP” (Grylls, in McNeill,
2015, n.p.). The analysis suggests that mistrust is based partly on
concerns that BHPBIO is using its financial clout to buy up portions of
the town within the redevelopment proposal. The data shows that
BHPBIO for example, owns 39 properties in the West End of Port
Hedland that are zoned a mixture of residential and business. Within
the documents studied, this ownership was perceived as evidence that
BHPBIO is seeking to “stymie growth and expansion rather than
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Resources Policy 52 (2017) 284–295
enhance it… We’re working hard on the diversification of the economy
… and a major industry player has got their foot on the hose because
they want an iron ore port and that's it.” (Grylls, in McNeill, 2015,
n.p.).5
Community-raised concerns regarding environmental safety and
occupational health and welfare identified through the thematic
analysis also suggest the perception that BHPBIO is able to operate
outside of legislation and is somehow able to bypass regulations
regarding safety. This perception indicates further feelings of distrust
towards the proponent that appear to flow through to suspicion of the
motives of Government, at least among certain groups. For example,
one vocal community activist group posted on a well-accessed com-
munity Facebook page that:
“Do you really think BHP is concerned about the health of the
people in the area outside their operations, what about the people
that work there? Are they required to wear breathing apparatus for
their 12 hour shift? … it's not our dust, it's a multibillion dollar
company that is creating the dust and … other multinational
companies around the country have had to contain their emissions
and dust within their operations, do you think BHP is exempt from
this?” (Hobday, 2014, n.p.).
Findings suggest that community dissatisfaction has also arisen in
relation to responses to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
findings about dust pollution levels, leading to a perception of double
standards:
“The so-called dust problem apparently does not affect the people
who are working there 12 hours night or day…. Me thinks it is a red
herring, solely for BHPBIO and PHPA [Port Hedland Port
Authority] to eventually take control of the old part of our historic
town” (Hobday, 2014, n.p.).
Comments like the above, from the active Pilbara Your Voice
Facebook page, are a comprehensive and articulate representation of
the depth of community dissatisfaction regarding BHPBIO found
throughout the documents analysed and highlight the many intersect-
ing issues related to a social capital-based SLO. Moreover, community-
voiced concerns relating to institutionalised trust are indicative of the
perception that BHPBIO is behaving in a manner that is not suppor-
tive, respectful and beneficial for the community. For instance, the
mediator of the Pilbara Your Voice page, Blanco, states:
“Port Hedland was established long before iron ore started rolling
out [of] this port, people have lived in the west end of town all their
lives, so now a study comes out and they have to move?
Development has to stop? Because a multinational company does
not want to comply? Is that the standard we are setting in Australia?
When a company becomes to [sic] big we have to move out of their
way and not question the operating process that affect [sic] ordinary
people?” (Blanco, 2014, n.p.).
For the community, the proposed resettlement represents a double
standard; that the proponent is not prepared to comply with emissions
regulations for the existing West End residents and their workforce,
while opposing further development on the basis that:
“BHP Billiton is seeking to avoid what we consider will be, over the
long term, a significant land use conflict. Unless proper planning
controls are in place this land use conflict will over time impact the
primacy of the Port operations” (Donovan, Head of Corporate
Affairs BHPBIO, in letter to the Town of Port Hedland, 2015b, p.8).
Thus, from a social capital perspective, the data reveals a SLO that
may be in decline due to a loss of institutionalised trust and damage to
5
Attempts were made to contact the journalist to verify this information but she was
unable to be contacted.
S. Wright, S. Bice
economic legitimacy through threats to the Spoilbank and West End
developments. At the same time, however, BHPBIO's long history to
Port Hedland and its broader economic legitimacy bolster its SLO, even
in light of controversy. Given these complexities, to what extent might
BHPBIO's contested SLO be of use to affected stakeholders, as opposed
primarily to providing a means for BHPBIO to claim legitimacy of its
opposition to a development expected to benefit the town, more
broadly?
4.2.3. SLO from a SAFs perspective
This case study reveals the emergence of three key SAFs, in addition
to a number of secondary SAFs that place constraints on the achieve-
ment of social cohesion among Port Hedland's affected stakeholders.
The SAFs identified in the analysis relate largely to community
perceptions that BHPBIO contributes considerably to the state econ-
omy and therefore the State Government will not intervene on behalf of
the community. Moreover, powerful SAFs from within Port Hedland
formed on the basis that BHPBIO's position in the community required
protection due to its broader potential to contribute economically,
despite threats to the proposed developments. For example, within this
particular SAF, the Port Hedland Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(PHCCI) remains opposed to representing affected stakeholders desires
to pursue the development, as it has positioned itself as protecting
future business opportunities with BHPBIO. Similarly, within this SAF,
the ToPH has its focus on financial concerns and appears to have taken
the strategic choice not to represent opposing views from within the
community that it represents. The other SAFs in play (e.g. community
groups united around a push for the development) present conflicting
views and agendas. These findings therefore suggest that social
cohesion is going to be difficult to achieve, making any claimed SLO
questionable and also hindering any utility it may offer.
The Port Hedland case study shows that the actions of BHPBIO
have indicated to affected stakeholders who are not direct economic
beneficiaries a lack of consideration and respect. This situation is
further complicated by competing SAFs and lack of social cohesion
within the community, as evidenced by the emergence of opposing
SAFs with differing views regarding whether the proponent, the ToPH,
the State Government or even the PHCCI, are the responsible party for
the development. Here, community disunity represents a further
complexity in the granting and use of SLO. The PHCCI has remained
silent during the conflict, leaving members of the community inter-
preting its silence as an alignment with BHPBIO, protecting the
interests of its members who seek future business with them (Leahy,
2015, n.p.). But findings reveal that other affected stakeholders believe
that the ToPH is not representing the best interests of Port Hedland
and are calling for a Government inquiry into the financial affairs of the
council, citing as evidence financial mismanagement visible in the lack
of infrastructure maintenance (Blanco, 2014). These diverse SAFs are
developing against a backdrop of continued residential rate increases,
despite a decrease in property valuations by an average of 39% (Town
of Port Hedland, 2015b). Although certain sources cite BHPBIO's
contribution of jobs to the community as a socio-economic benefit, the
analysis suggests that these views are in the minority. Thus, similarly to
the Onslow case, a social capital approach suggests a SLO in existence
but under pressure, while a SAFs approach suggests that dissension
among affected stakeholders around the development as a strategic
issue of concern results in divisiveness, damages social cohesion and
gives little capacity for affected stakeholders within less powerful SAFs
to withdraw BHPBIO's SLO or use it in a meaningful way.
4.3. Moranbah, QLD
4.3.1. Background
The town of Moranbah lies in the Central Queensland region of the
Bowen Basin (the Isaac Local Government region) and is host com-
munity for a BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance (BMA) joint venture that
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Resources Policy 52 (2017) 284–295
operates seven open-cut coal mines in the region. This case study
focuses on BMA's policy to employ only FIFO workers at two of its
mining operations; the Caval Ridge and Daunia mines. Moranbah is
the closest community to the mine sites and lies 30 km from the
Daunia mine, and 17 km from the Caval Ridge mine. The decision to
exclude local workers from the two mines has resulted in economic loss
to the region. This includes loss of jobs and community members being
forced to leave town to fly back into town on a FIFO contract to
maintain their employment at the mines (Knuth, in Government of
Queensland Legislative Assembly, Debates, (GOQLAD), 2014, p.1549).
4.3.2. SLO from a social capital perspective
Prior to becoming the Premier in the March 2012 QLD state
election, Campbell Newman made election promises that “100 per
cent fly-in fly-out applications would not be acceptable under his
Government” (Knuth, in Government of Queensland Legislative
Assembly Debates (GOQLAD), p.1549). Newman argued that the policy
was “unfair on locals and would force many to move to Brisbane to gain
work on a project that is just kilometres from their home” (Knuth, in
GOQLAD, 2014, p.1549). However, on becoming Premier Newman
elected to support the Policy citing benefits for the whole state, rather
than one region, as his reason (Government of Queensland,
Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning,
2013b). This shift in stance reflected considerable, prior machinations
around the policy, and these are worth reviewing briefly here.
In 2011 BMA successfully applied to the then Bligh Labor
Government to remove the limits of existing agreement for employment
(with a ratio of 70 per cent local workers to 30 per cent FIFO workers) at
Caval Ridge and Daunia mines, due to market limitations which restricted
them from achieving this quota (Queensland Parliament, 2015; Bowden
and Barry, 2015). With the cap removed BMA adopted the Policy, which
stated that 50% of the workers would be sourced from Cairns (a coastal
QLD town 860 km from Moranbah) and the other half from Brisbane, and
contained specific clauses stating that local residents would be excluded
from employment at both sites (Bowden and Barry, 2015).
The broken promises of the Premier left the community with
perceptions that they were unheard and ignored by both the State
Government and BMA and that they had no ability to influence
decisions affecting their livelihood (DIPNR, 2015). This situation led
certain affected stakeholders to call for a way to operationalise SLO.
For example, Councillor Kelly Vea Vea (Isaac Council), stated:
“The dialogue that I feel has been left out of this discussion since it
started is the need to reinvigorate the mining social licence to operate.
I think it needs to take specific responsibility for industry's part in
shaping the social and development outcomes in mining communities”
(DIPNR, 2015, pp.13).
This comment not only shows explicit awareness of SLO, but also
indicates a desire to leverage it as a method for negotiating with BMA.
Further, Councillor Vea Vea identifies the need for an SLO framework that
is supported by Government, actively monitored by an independent party
and which holds sanctions for non-compliance as a means to ensure the
M & E industry behaves in a responsible manner (DIPNR, 2015).
Findings also reveal affected stakeholders regularly citing the
financial impact on local businesses, as evidenced through the BMA
decision to cancel supplier contracts in Moranbah in favour of suppliers
based in Brisbane and Cairns, resulting in the closure of at least fifteen
local businesses (DIPNR, 2015). Attempts by the Moranbah Traders
Association to contact BMA regarding contracts for local suppliers were
reportedly not acknowledged, leaving members of the community with
the belief that BMA's actions were destroying the town (DIPNR, 2015).
From a social capital perspective, economic legitimacy to support
BMA's SLO was under fire.
Further economic loss was experienced through a decline in real
estate value and rental rates as workers were forced to move out of the
region to comply with the Policy and keep their employment.
S. Wright, S. Bice
Community members were also facing an investment loss when
relocating from the region to Cairns or Brisbane – cities with a higher
cost of living than the regional areas from which they came (DIPNR,
2015). The links between providing community benefits and develop-
ing interactional and institutionalised trust are missing in this case
study, with findings suggesting that a withdrawal of SLO was likely felt
appropriate by many affected stakeholders. Like the previous cases,
however, the social capital-related situation of SLO is complicated
when SAFs are considered.
4.3.3. SLO from a SAFs perspective
The analysis demonstrates that social cohesion in Moranbah
appears strong, perhaps due to the scale of negative social and
economic impacts arising from the introduction of the Policy. The
two most prominent SAFs in this case have been formed between BMA
and the State Government and between particular community mem-
bers and organisations. Importantly, and unlike the other cases, the
two most powerful SAFs in this case represent divergent strategic
agendas. The SAF incorporating the State Government and BMA
centres on agreed support for the Policy, while the community-based
SAF coalesces around opposition to the Policy. Analysis of the com-
munity-based SAF reveals a very strong amount of social cohesion to
support a withdrawal of BMA's SLO. Different to the previous cases, the
strong interconnections of key Moranbah stakeholders and their
formation of a SAF around objection to the policy appears to improve
their social cohesion and offers a form of agency to these affected
stakeholders not achieved in the other cases. This finding highlights the
importance of understanding SAFs and the impact they have on
affected stakeholders’ ability to influence and operationalise SLO for
their own strategic purposes.
Conversely, the case study findings also suggest that the costs to
community benefits resulting from the Policy are damaging the fabric
of the community, a situation which could reduce levels of social
cohesion. The loss of residents impacts the community's clubs and
recreational organisations which are further impacted through the
Policy, as it also restricts all workers from entry into the town, limiting
opportunities to build social capital and social cohesion (DIPNR,
2015). When considering SLO from a SAFs perspective, it becomes
important, therefore, to remain mindful of the contexts within which
SAFs operate.
In summary, the findings from these case studies reveal the social
capital approach commonly used to demonstrate existence of SLO fails
to engage equally important considerations of strategic agendas, power
and social cohesion that have implications for SLO's meaning and
utility, especially for less powerful stakeholders. The cases unpacked
the most commonly measured social capital components of SLO, while
introducing a SAF perspective (see, Table 4, below). In so doing, the
analysis shows the importance of understanding SLO within the
Table 4
Case studies summary: high level findings: social capital and SAF SLO approaches.
SLO criteria/ Case study town Onslow
Case overview Workers to be housed at ANSIA instead of in Onslow
Promise-keeping Promises broken
Community Benefit Loss of infrastructure and economic loss
Institutionalised Trust Lacking
SAFs Powerful/influential actors hold sway with shared
purpose of self-service economic development
Diametrecially opposed strategic agendas, Damage
to social cohesion
293
Resources Policy 52 (2017) 284–295
context of SAFs, while demonstrating the potential of understanding
strategic agendas, power and social cohesion as a means to anticipating
affected stakeholders’ abilities to operationalise SLO.
5. Discussion
The illustrative cases from Australia's M & E sector demonstrate the
complexities and tensions plaguing the concept of social licence to
operate. In these cases, we see operations proceeding, supported by
government policies and certain affected stakeholders, suggesting a
SLO is in place. This is supported in the analysis by rhetorical support
for and claims to SLOs in each case study, based largely on attention to
traditional social capital-related considerations. But application of a
SAFs lens suggests that all may not be as it seems with these SLOs. By
introducing considerations of actors’ power, strategic agendas and
social cohesion, a SAFs framework reveals how claims to SLO for
particular projects may be influenced or even co-opted by particular
actors, reducing or negating the utility of SLO to other affected
stakeholders.
In the case of Onslow, for example, findings demonstrate that
Chevron laid claim to a SLO for its Wheatstone project largely through
the institutionalised trust achieved between itself and State
Government and the local chamber of commerce. But despite this
inferred SLO, findings demonstrate that other affected stakeholders
remained opposed to Chevron's actions in the area, but had little
capacity to protest or withdraw the SLO due to the powerful SAFs at
play. This strategic positioning meant that SLO was claimed through
the machinations of united and powerful SAFs, reducing both the voice
of other affected stakeholders to withdraw the SLO or to use its
threatened withdrawal as a means of leverage in negotiations to keep
the workers’ accommodation in the township, as originally promised.
Here, we see rhetorical SLO with little or no utility for affected
stakeholders whose views do not match those of the most powerful
SAFs.
Similarly, in Port Hedland, the analysis reveals a SLO for BHPBIO
which social capital measures would suggest exists but is under
pressure. This is particularly due to damage to interactional trust and
socio-political legitimacy occurring in relation to BHPBIO's opposition
to the Spoilbank and West End developments that, the analysis
suggests, many affected stakeholders support. Applying a SAF lens,
however, it becomes clear that the strategic positioning of a few
powerful actors—here, the State Government PHCCI and the ToPH—
results in a situation that props up BHPBIO's SLO on claims to
economic legitimacy, denying less powerful SAFs the ability to question
or withdraw BHPBIO's SLO based on their own concerns about socio-
political legitimacy. Again, the SLO paradox is raised: How meaningful
is SLO if it is pursued through strategic attention to a few, particularly
powerful actors? When does SLO's disconnection from less powerful
Port Hedland Moranbah
BHPBIO objecting to Marina and 100% FIFO employment policy at Daunia
Waterfront development and Caval Ridge mines
No evidence Promises broken
Loss of alternative economy Loss of employment and business
Lacking Lacking
Unification of powerful actors to Community-based SLO achieved power
preserve broader economic benefit comparable to that of government
Poor levels of social cohesion Key SAFs represented oppositional
positions
High levels of social cohesion
S. Wright, S. Bice
actors mean the concept has lost its purpose, let alone its utility?
Finally, the case of Moranbah suggests that where affected stake-
holders are united and able to support a cohesive position, they may be
able to jockey successfully for a strategic position that allows them to
influence SLO. In Moranbah, the organisations opposed to the Policy
represented considerable numbers of stakeholders, a situation that may
also have influenced the attention paid by other, more powerful SAFs.
Also of interest, SAFs formed within the Moranbah case explicitly and
strategically invoked SLO as a means of pursuing their agenda. This
supports our theoretical suggestion that social cohesion may play a
critical role in the ability of affected stakeholders to operationalise SLO.
Finally, we feel it is important to note that community members in
all case studies reported frustration through ‘not feeling heard’ by the
M & E proponent, further contributing to a lack of trust felt towards
each proponent. For Moffat and Zhang (2014), ‘having a voice’ in a
decision-making process leads to perceptions of procedural fairness
and trust. Harvey and Bice (2014) argue that even in an instance where
the decision is not welcomed, a process of decision-making that
includes community consultation, being heard, and not deviating from
the decision, builds a trustful relationship. The formation of SAFs
provides a means of solidifying particular positions and relationships
and may offer an important means for affected stakeholders to enhance
their voice and the likelihood that it is heard by other, likely more
powerful actors (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011).
Within each of the cases, analysis pointed towards an abundance of
social capital, including established ties between members, histories,
areas of expertise and reciprocal relationships which could be captured
for the purpose of forming collective and cohesive negotiations with M
& E proponents. Notwithstanding this, the case study data also shows
that, apart from Moranbah where the community is united against ‘the
Policy’, there exist differing levels of social cohesion within each
community, limiting their ability to be heard or to compete against
more powerful SAFs.
In all cases, a SAFs approach revealed evidence of factions
developing within the community, illustrating crucial tensions around
SLO as affected stakeholders jockey for their views and positions to be
heard. For those powerful stakeholders better able to lay claim to SLO
through appeals to social capital, the SLO becomes a means of blocking
the strategic agendas of other affected stakeholders in oppositional
SAFs. Here, SLO becomes a strategic or political tool employed as a
means of enabling the status quo or protecting M & E proponents,
reducing its meaning and utility for those affected stakeholders who
might otherwise use the threat of its withdrawal as a strategic means to
enhance their power in negotiations or decision-making. These exam-
ples emphasise the competing interests both within and between SAFs
and suggest that a greater understanding of the strategic agendas,
power and social cohesion made visible through a SAF lens add nuance
to understandings of SLO.
6. Conclusion
This article proposes that a SAFs approach offers an important
means of enhancing and extending social capital-based approaches to
SLO. Within SAFs, stragetic agendas, power and social cohesion have
been posited as key factors enabling affected stakeholders to unite and
operationalise SLO. Adopting a SAFs approach can complement and
enrich understandings of SLO possible through social capital-based
measurement. Importantly, such an approach responds to a critical
paradox for SLO—the common disconnection between its use as a
signalling or rhetorical device and its level of utility to affected
stakeholders. The article argues that it is worthwhile considering the
incorporation of SAFs alongside social capital-based SLO measurement
frameworks to provide a means of understanding the ability of a
community to use SLO. Moreover, the SAF approach addresses
important critiques of the SLO concept, especially those which are
concerned that a risk-based approach prioritises company over com-
294
Resources Policy 52 (2017) 284–295
munity concerns, the lack of enforceable SLO criteria, and concerns
about the utility of the concept to affected communities.
The SAF framework presented here is limited by its case study focus
on Australia and by its reliance on secondary data. Nevertheless,
investigations of available data and the comparability of the case
studies suggest that consideration of SAFs in relation to SLO presents
a fruitful avenue for future inquiries. Future research could use social
network analysis—commonly used alongside the social capital analysis
already present in much SLO research—to identify SAFs and examine
the various webs of influence. Institutional logics (Thornton et al.,
2012) could then be applied to further explore how decisions about the
granting or withholding of SLO are made. Moreover, through better
understanding of strategic agendas, power and social cohesion, future
research may be able to suggest ways in which to build communities’
capacities for stronger SAFs to allow them to leverage SLO in a
meaningful way, making them more powerful players in the M & E
context.
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