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3 Etiology of the processes of radicalisation

and radicalisation levels tipping point

Collection and analysis of interviews to French young people (men and women) that have been involved in violent radicalisation at different levels

Refine the understanding of the processes followed, personal characteristics and warning indicators of adolescents that allow recruiters of radical Islam to be an
Objective
authority for them.

Université de Toulouse – Jean Jaurès (UTM)


Participants
ALILAD – Cabinet d’Expertises Bouzar (Leader)

Dounia Bouzar (ALILAD)


Sulaymân Valsan (ALILAD)
Main Team
Laura Bouzar (ALILAD)
Alain Ruffion (ALILAD)

T3.1 : Data collection grid for quantitative interviews


Tasks
T3.2 : Grid for qualitative interviews with parents and young people

Results Analysis of the radicalisation processes from a psychological perspective

D3.1 The interactive factors of the radical process (software tool)


Deliverables D3.2 Risk mechanisms and desistance factors facing radicalization
D3.3 Stages of radicalisation and deradicalisation process

Duration May 2017 – October 2018

State of advancement All the work package is finalised.


( end of October 2018) D3.1, D3.2 and D3.3 need to be approved by the reviewers of the European Commission (presumably in December 2018 or January 2019).

METHODOLOGY : QUANTITATIVE & QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS


The 2017 report of the International Centre for Crime Prevention highlights the presence of
a significant qualitative bias in the validity of collected data, as researchers face challenges
1) Continuous of individual (semi-directive or non directive interviews) and collective date
in gaining access to empirical data via individual or collective semi-structured interviews
(group therapy session)
(often interviewed on the internet / social networks or in prison).
2) Collection of information on the history of the youngster’ his- tory prior to and during the ra-
Additionally, they often work on individuals who are at the end of their radicalization pro- dicalization (information provided by their relatives)
cess, or fully radicalized. Their cognitive-affective transformation is already carried out and 3) Analysis the conversations of the individuals from the sample with their recruiters :
the interviewees are only able to express their adherence to the ideology that has full au-
thority over them. Although this level of data and analysis is important, it is not exclusively - their communication on social networks
representative of all the data needed to study risk factors. - videos they watched and/or exchanged

RADICALIZATION IS A PROCESS
Consequently, the risk factor is not caused by one or several personal features ( as the FS-
PRT files conceive it) but by the mechanism that supplies each radicalization motive.

Milestones in the work accomplished: THE CONVERGENCE OF SEVERAL (MICRO ANS MACRO) FACTORS LEADS THE

Individual and collective qualitative data have been collected continuously during the YOUNG INDIVIDUAL TO GET INVOLVED

follow-up of young people, from April 2014 to August 2016, The radicalization process results in a combination and interaction of individual, social and
political factors, and the junction with the «Jihadist offer »
It has been possible due the access to their personal characteristics prior to their
radicalization (thanks to their relatives’ collaboration),
The follow-up and the measurement of the evolution of their definitions of themselves
and society, Insofar the radicalisation process is individualised, the exit of radicalisation can only
The study of the conversation with their recruiters, be individualised. Society must propose alternative commitments rathr than alterna-
tive discourses in response to the “jihadist” narrative.
The study of arguments that affected them in their radicalization exit.

make it possible to build a first scientific contribution based on empirical


data of 450 radicalized.
Following the study, a software tool has been developed to help field professionals in pro-
posing alternative commitments adapted to the needs the “jihadist” discourse promised to
satisfy. It is also question of verifying and measuring the levels of desistance from their level
of resilience.
The tool proposes to assess an alternative commitment for any needs corresponding to
each commitment motive
Project progress :

100%
The content of this poster are the sole responsibility of the PRACTICIES consortium and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union. The research leading
to these results has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 740072.

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