EN BANC 3.
 What is meant by "publication"?
[G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.]
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F.
SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C.
TUVERA. in his capacity as Executive
Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES
P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET
AL., respondents.
SYLLABUS
FERNAN, J., concurring:
1.CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF
LAWS; ARTICLE 2, CIVIL CODE; PUBLICATION OF
LAWS MADE TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS AND TO INFORMATION. — The categorical
statement by this Court on the need for publication before any
law be made effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part if the
lawmakers and, at the time, ensure to the people their
constitutional right to due process and to information on matter
of public concern. cda
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J p:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in
demanding the disclosure or a number of presidential decrees
which they claimed had not been published as required by law.
The government argued that while publication was necessary as
a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this
case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive
portion as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby
orders respondents to publish to the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and
effect."
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to
move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general
applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest
that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication must be made
forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor
General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an
advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the
merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article
2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein
was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did
not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case
the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and
consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these
arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court
required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of
the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of
Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only
for the interval administration of a government agency or for
particular persons did not have to be published; that publication
when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and
that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not
binding because it was not supported by eight members of this
Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil
Code providing as follows:
"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect
one year after such publication."
After a careful study of this provision and of the
arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the
instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold,
that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date
of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication. cdphil
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-
day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as
pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate
concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which
did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication
in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The
general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause
publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that
such omission would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to
govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a
law shall become effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably
short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not
aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so
not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because
they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true
only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of
many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which
must also be communicated to the persons they may affect
before they can begin to operate. LexLib
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that
every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that
the law has been published if the presumption is to have any
legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that
Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly
applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative
enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only
to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship
to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos
who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said
that such a law does not affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The
subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political forums
or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act
of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of
local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature. LibLex
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties. cdasia
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be
published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that
place. All presidential decrees must be published, including
even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual
or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The
circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if
they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details"
of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions
issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies
to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the
head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of
his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically,
municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the
Local Government Code.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners,
the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the
title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was
the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations
Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general
applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather
than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that
only four justices were categorically for publication in the
Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could
be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently
informed. 9  One reserved his vote 10 and another merely
acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating
where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the
present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus
on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by
the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the
publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic releases and limited readership.
Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better
perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as
such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that
this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by
existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made
of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not
pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists.
If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon
the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it
impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to
the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law
as conceived and approved by the political departments of the
government in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under
Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be
made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the
legislature. LLphil
We also hold that the publication must be made
forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law
pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course,
although not suggested by the parties that a law could be
rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for
whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a
matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that
the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is
untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished
decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the
acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available
always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is
to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people
and all government authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation,
they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates
and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their
freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they
cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of
the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot
be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are
confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law
is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as
above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. dctai
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C .J ., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-
Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr ., and Paras, JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
||| (Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915 (Resolution), [December 29,
1986], 230 PHIL 528-540)
FERNAN, J ., concurring:
interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional
obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of
prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by
those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a
common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and
enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental
principle of legality in the relations between a government and
its people.
At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of
publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished
from any other medium such as a newspaper of general
circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a
constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article
2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1
of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised
Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as
the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed.
Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a
constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute
providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country.
Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of
the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the
Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my

distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would
like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious
manner by which the previous dispensation had promulgated
and made effective thousands of decrees, executive orders,
letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power
which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and
abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man
legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in those
days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two
presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering
two different subject matters. In point is the case of two
presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19,
1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon,
the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax on
every motor vehicle equipped with air-conditioner. This was
further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on
March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball
players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George Still. cdll
The categorical statement by this Court on the need for
publication before any law may be made effective seeks to
prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same
time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due
process and to information on matters of public concern.
FELICIANO, J ., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so

eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same
time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding
of what the Court is saying. cdlex
A statute which by its terms provides for its coming
into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly
interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication
thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the
Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded
as purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its
approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 80718. January 29, 1988.]
FELISA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO
RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPE
ALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA
BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR.,
HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely,
GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and
LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE;
APPEAL; PERIOD FOR APPEALING OR FOR FILING A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, NON-EXTENDIBLE.
— The rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon,
[G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985, 138 SCRA 46], that the
fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GRACE PERIOD IN BOCAVA
CASE, INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. — The one-
month grace period from the promulgation on May 30,
1986 of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas
case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring
extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration may still be allowed cannot be invoked by the
petitioners as their motion for extension of time was filed on
September 9, 1987, more than a year after the grace period on
June 30, 1986.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J p:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare
null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special
Division of the Court of Appeals in the Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v.
Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The
first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied
petitioner's motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the
decision in said case had become final; and the second
Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition
outright for not being verified as required by Rule 65 section
1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did
not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and
substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a
burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the
death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had
been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its
proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court.
First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon.
Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners
guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision
promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received
by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the
last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners
filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the
appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987.
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September
24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27,
1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners'
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration,
directed entry of judgment and denied their motion for
reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down
in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895,
August 5, 1985, 138 SCRA 46], that the fifteen-day period for
appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, promulgated on May 30, 1986 (142 SCRA
208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the
promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall
be strictly enforced that no motion for
extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration may be filed with the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the
Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed
only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort,
which may in its sound discretion either grant
or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26,
1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to
restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No.
74824, Sept. 16, 1985, 144 SCRA 161], stressed the prospective
application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace
period, to wit: LibLex
In other words, there is one-month
grace period from the promulgation on May
30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the
clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30,
1986, within which the rule barring
extensions of time to file motions for new trial
or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly
enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their
motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it
is still within the grace period, which expired
on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate
Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA
306].
 In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for
extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a
year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986.
Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period.
Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace
period to the promulgation of the
decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners
cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding
said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration
within the reglementary period. prLL
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in
the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at
bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in
the Official Gazette as of the time the subject
decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to
petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the
publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active
law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published in the advance
reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such
publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA)
and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that
the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable
under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the
proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the
damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be
due to the lack of necessary repairs."
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument
that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the
accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring
shop and, therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be
disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has
been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for
lack of merit.
Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin,
JJ., concur.
 
||| (De Roy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80718 (Resolution),
[January 29, 1988], 241 PHIL 804-808)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 222450. July 7, 2020.]
MIGUEL LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE,
Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur,
FORTUNATO PEŃA, Vice-Governor of the
Province of Camarines Sur, ATTY.
AMADOR L. SIMANDO, WARREN
SEÑAR, GILMAR S. PACAMARRA,
EMMANUEL H. NOBLE, GIOVANNI
SEÑAR, RUDITO ESPIRITU, JR., JORGE
BENGUA, FABIO FIGURACION,
NELSON JULIA, Members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines
Sur, petitioners, vs. CONSTANTINO H.
CORDIAL, Jr., Mayor of Caramoan,
Camarines Sur and IRENE R. BREIS, Vice-
Mayor of Caramoan, Camarines
Sur, respondents.
DECISION
J.C. REYES, JR., J p:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari, 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated January 13, 2015
and the Order 3 dated December 15, 2015 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 30 which
annulled the Orders dated October 28, 2014 4 and December 12,
2014, 5 and the Resolution 6 dated December 16, 2014 of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur which denied
the Motion to Dismiss filed by Mayor Constantino H. Cordial,
Jr. and Vice-Mayor Irene R. Breis (respondents) on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.
The Relevant Antecedents
On July 18, 2014, respondents, as incumbent officials
of Caramoan, Camarines Sur, were administratively charged
with Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of Service docketed as Administrative Case No.
003-2014 by Chief of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan Fermin M.
Mabulo (Mabulo), Municipal Councilors Eduardo B. Bonita and
Lydia Obias, and former Municipal Councilor Romeo Marto.
The complaint was lodged before the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur, through its Special Committee
on Administrative Cases (Special Committee) headed by Atty.
Amador Simando. 7
In said Complaint, 8 it was alleged that the
respondents, through the Sangguniang Bayan of Caramoan,
Camarines Sur, passed Resolution No. 48 which requested for
the removal of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan in the entire
Municipality of Caramoan, Camarines Sur without the conduct
of deliberation. Prior to said incident, the Task Force Sagip
Kalikasan conducted an inspection in Barangay Gata,
Caramoan, Camarines Sur because of reported mining activities.
Upon inspection, the team found 30 people engaged in illegal
mining activities, holes where minerals were being extracted,
and machinery and equipment for mining and extraction. The
Chief of the Task Force, Mabulo, asked those involved if they
had the necessary permits; and as they failed to show him any,
he asked them to cease from operating.
However, days after the inspection, the
aforementioned Resolution was passed by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Caramoan, Camarines Sur. 9
In response to the Complaint, respondents filed a
Motion for Extension to File Answer. 10 However, instead of
filing their Answer, respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss, 11 assailing the jurisdiction of the Special Committee,
as well as its Rules of Procedure on the Investigation of
Administrative and Disciplinary Cases against Elected
Municipal Officials as embodied in Resolution No. 13, Series of
2013 (Resolution No. 13-2013) for lack of publication.
In an Order 12 dated October 28, 2014,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan dismissed the motion for lack of
merit. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan maintained that the
publication was duly complied with as Resolution No. 151,
Series of 2013, which incorporated Resolution No. 13-2013, was
duly published.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR)
asserting that with the publication of the Rules of Procedure
only on October 9, 16 and 23, 2014, it became effective only on
November 8, 2014, the 16th day following its publication as
held in the case of Tañada v. Tuvera, 13 interpreting the Article
2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 14
Said MR was denied in an Order 15 dated December
12, 2014. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur
maintained that the publication requirement anent ordinances
and resolutions of local government units was governed by
the Local Government Code, and not by the Civil Code as
pronounced in Tañada.
Corollary, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Camarines Sur issued a Resolution 16 dated December 16, 2014,
recommending that respondents be placed under preventive
suspension for a period of 60 days.
Aggrieved by the turn of events, respondents filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary
Injunction, and Prohibitory Injunction before the RTC.
In their Petition, 17 respondents insisted, among
others, that the Rules of Procedure as embodied in Resolution
No. 13-2013 must be published; and failure to observe such
requirement not only rendered said Resolution ineffective, but
likewise removed the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur over the proceedings.
In a Decision 18 dated January 13, 2015, the RTC
construed that the lack of publication of the Rules of Procedure
embodied in Resolution No. 13-2013 stripped off
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur of jurisdiction
over the conduct of the administrative hearing against
respondents.
The Issue
Essentially, the issue in this case is whether or not the
non-publication of Resolution No. 13-2013 divested
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur of jurisdiction
over the proceedings of the case.
The Court's Ruling
Notably, petitioners resorted to the Court via a Petition
for Review on Certiorari in assailing the ruling of the RTC.
 In the issuances of the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus, the Court, the CA, and the RTC share original and
concurrent jurisdiction. However, in accordance with the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the parties are mandated to
initially file their petitions before lower rank courts. As
imprinted in the case of Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of
Transportation and Communications, 19 the Court expounded
on this constitutional imperative by emphasizing the structure of
our judicial system — the trial courts decide on questions of fact
and law in the first instance; the intermediate courts resolve both
questions of fact and law; and the Court generally decides only
questions of law.
As a constitutional mechanism, the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts is established to enable the Court to
concentrate on its constitutional tasks, guided by the judicial
compass in disposing of matters without need for factual
determination.
In a rare instance, the Constitution itself mandates the
exercise of judicial power over a case even with the existence of
factual issues. Such sole exception is stated in Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, that is, when the matter involved
is the review of sufficiency of factual basis of the President's
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
Although several exceptions were carved out from the
general rule of the observance of hierarchy of courts, the nature
of the question raised by the parties shall be one of law. In other
words, resort to the Court is permitted only when the issues are
purely legal.
Likewise relevant is Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, which allows direct resort to the Court from the
RTC via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
said Rules when the issues raised are questions of law.
In this case, petitioners assail the ruling of the RTC in
maintaining that Resolution No. 13-2013 requires publication;
and that the absence of such publication stripped off
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of jurisdiction over the case.
Clearly, the determination of the publication requirement is a
question of law.
On this note, the Court likewise deems it proper to
discuss the rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
It is notable that respondents sought relief from the
RTC to nullify the action of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Camarines Sur. Instead of filing an appeal before the Office of
the President, 20 which is the available remedy to respondents
under Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of
1991 (LGC), they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
As raised by the petitioners in their Memoranda/Comments
before the RTC, 21 respondents failed to exhaust administrative
remedies.
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is that the courts must allow administrative agencies to
carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities
within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. 22 Generally, relief to the courts of justice is not
sanctioned when the law provides for remedies against the
action of an administrative board, body, or officer. 23 The
availability of such remedy prevents the petitioners from
resorting to a petition for certiorari and prohibition, being
extraordinary remedies.
However, exceptions to this rule allow the deviation
from such procedural rule. Among which is when the question
raised is purely legal in nature, as in this case.
The Court now resolves.
Ignorantia juris non excusat. That every person is
presumed to know the law is a conclusive presumption.
However, before one may be bound by a law, he must be fully
and categorically informed of its contents. 24 For this purpose,
the Civil Code clearly mandates the publication of "laws":
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code
shall take effect one year after such
publication.
This is fundamentally the essence of due process.
The significance of publication is illuminated in the
1985 landmark case of Tañada v. Tuvera. 25 The Court,
speaking through Justice Escolin, emphasized that laws of
"public nature" or of "general applicability" must be published.
In the 1986 Tañada 26 case, the Court resolved petitioners' MR,
seeking clarification as to the scope of "law of public nature" or
"general applicability," among others. The Court, thus,
definitively expounded that "laws" should refer to all laws. After
all, a law which has no impact on the public is considered
invalid for several reasons, e.g., intrusion of privacy or ultra
vires act of the legislature. 27 Thus, an indirect effect of a
particular law to the public does not necessarily call for the
dispensability of the publication requirement.
Therefore, the Court was forthright in stating that "all
statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity." 28
However, the Court clarified that "interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public" and "letters of instruction issued by
administrative superiors relative to guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in the performance of their duties" need not be
published. Interpretative regulations are merely annotative; and
internal rules are directly related to the conduct of government
personnel, and not the public in general.
On a different plane, however, are municipal
ordinances which are not covered by the Civil Code, but by
the LGC.
On this note, the nature of municipal ordinances or
resolutions which require publication is embodied in Sections
59, 188, and 511 of the LGC:
SEC. 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or
Resolutions. —
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal
sanctions shall be published in a newspaper
of general circulation within the province
where the local legislative body concerned
belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of
general circulation within the province,
posting of such ordinances shall be made in
all municipalities and cities of the province
where the Sanggunian of origin is situated.
(d) In the case of highly urbanized cities, the
main features of the ordinance or resolution
duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to
being posted, be published once in a local
newspaper of general circulation within the
city: Provided, That in the absence thereof
 the ordinance or resolution shall be the Civil Code is to give notice to the public of the laws to allow
published in any newspaper of general them to properly conduct themselves as citizens. That omission
circulation. of publication of laws is tantamount to denying the public of
knowledge and information of the laws that govern it; hence, a
xxx xxx xxx violation of due process. Effectivity of laws, thus, depends on
SEC. 188. Publication of Tax ordinances their publication. Without such notice and publication, the
and Revenue Measures. — Within ten (10) conclusive presumption cannot apply.
days after their approval, certified true Jurisdiction over the subject matter, on the other hand,
copies of all provincial, city, and municipal is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
tax ordinances or revenue shall be published complaint. 29
in full for three (3) consecutive days in a
newspaper of local circulation: Provided, Sections 61 and 62 30 of the LGC, as well as Sections
however, That in provinces, cities and 125 and 126 31 of its Implementing Rules and
municipalities where there are no Regulations or Administrative Order No. 270, provide that
newspapers of local circulation, the same the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur has
may be posted in at least two (2) jurisdiction over complaints filed against any erring municipal
conspicuous and publicly accessible places. official within its jurisdiction. Upon the filing of said complaint,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall require the filing of the
xxx xxx xxx respondent's verified answer. Investigation shall ensue
SEC. 511. Posting and Publication of accordingly.
Ordinances with Penal Sanctions. — (a) In this case, the allegations in the Complaint 32 filed
ordinances with penal sanctions shall be by Mabulo, et al. against the respondents, as local municipal
posted at prominent places in the provincial officials of Caramoan, Camarines Sur, vested the Sangguniang
capitol, city, municipal or Barangay hall, as Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur of jurisdiction over the case.
the case may be, for a minimum period of
three (3) consecutive weeks. Such As it is, the RTC failed to discern the import of the
ordinances shall also be published in a publication requirement. Publication or lack of it is relevant in
newspaper of general circulation, where determining the observance of due process.
available, within the territorial jurisdiction
of the local government unit concerned, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
except in the case of Barangay ordinances. petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated
Unless otherwise provided therein, said January 13, 2015 and the Order dated December 15, 2015 of the
ordinances shall take effect on the day Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 30
following its publication, or at the end of the are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
period of posting, whichever occurs later. The Orders dated October 28, 2014 and December 12,
(b) Any public officer or employee who 2014, and the Resolution dated December 16, 2014 issued by
violates an ordinance may be meted the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur are
administrative disciplinary action, without hereby REINSTATED.
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate civil SO ORDERED.
or criminal action.
Peralta, C.J., Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier and Lopez, JJ.,
(c) The secretary to the Sanggunian concur.
concerned shall transmit official copies of
such ordinances to the chief executive ||| (Villafuerte v. Cordial, Jr., G.R. No. 222450, [July 7, 2020])
officer of the Official Gazette within seven
(7) days following the approval of the said
ordinance for publication purposes. The
Official Gazette may publish ordinances
with penal sanctions for archival and
reference purposes.
In the instant case, what was being assailed is
Resolution No. 13-2013, which provides for the rules of
procedure concerning the conduct of investigation against
municipal officials in said province, issued by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur. Clearly, it is neither penal in
nature as it does not provide for any sanction or punishment nor
a tax measure. It is merely interpretative of Title II, Chapter 4 of
the LGC, which outlines the procedure when a disciplinary
action is instituted against an elective local official. Based on the
foregoing, Resolution No. 13-2013 need not be published.
Also, it bears stressing that the RTC erroneously
concluded that the element of publication is an essential element
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur's
jurisdiction over the proceedings of the case.
The publication requirement on laws accomplishes the
constitutional mandate of due process. In the 1985 and 1986
Tañada cases, the Court explained that the object of Article 2 of
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 202889. March 2, 2020.]
RODOLFO
CARANTO, petitioner, vs. ANITA AGRA
CARANTO, respondent.
DECISION
HERNANDO, J p:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari 1 assailing the April 18, 2012 Decision 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90285 and its July
31, 2012 Resolution 3 which partly affirmed the October 22,
2007 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 212
of Mandaluyong City in Civil Case No. MC01-1454, and denied
petitioner Rodolfo Caranto's (Rodolfo) Motion for
Reconsideration, 5 respectively.
The Factual Antecedents
Respondent Anita Agra Caranto (Anita) is the
registered owner of a 347-square-meter parcel of land situated in
Barangay Hagdang Bato, Mandaluyong City which is covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7884. 6 Sometime in
2001, Rodolfo filed a Complaint 7 for cancellation of title and
reconveyance against Anita seeking to: (a) cancel the title of the
subject land; (b) reconvey one-half of the same to him; and (c)
pay the sum equal to 25% of the value of the recoverable
property as attorney's fees as well as costs of suit.
Rodolfo alleged that he is the son of Juan C. Caranto,
Sr. and Guillerma Lopez-Caranto. He has a sister named
Rizalina Caranto (Rizalina), and a brother named Juan Caranto
(Juan) who was Anita's husband.
On May 12, 1972, Juan executed a Special Power of
Attorney 8 in favor of Rizalina authorizing her to execute a deed
of extrajudicial settlement involving the subject property that
was previously covered by TCT No. 277297. A few months later
or on September 18, 1972, the siblings executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Guillerma O. Lopez-
Caranto 9 which stated, among others, the following:
8. That the parties herein have
therefor agreed, as they do hereby agree, to
divide and settle the aforementioned estate
between and among them in the following
manner, to wit:
(a) Property to be adjudicated to
Juan L. Caranto: The parcel of land
specified and described in paragraph 5(a)
hereinabove (TCT No. 277297-Rizal);
[subject property]
(b) Property to be adjudicated to
Rizalina Caranto Balaoeg: The parcel of
land specified and described in paragraph
5(b) hereinabove (TCT No. 23542-Rizal);
(c) Property to be adjudicated to
Rodolfo L. Caranto: The parcel of land
specified and described in paragraph 5(c)
and the three (3) door residential apartment
described in paragraph 5(d) hereinabove.
(TCT No. 59009-Rizal)
(d) Properties to be adjudicated to
Juan L. Caranto, Rizalina Caranto Balaoeg
and Rodolfo L. Caranto, in equal one-third
undivided interest each:
The parcels of land specified and
described in paragraph 5(e) — TCT 23453
(Rizal); 5(f) — OCT 0-304 (La Union) and
5(g) — Tax Dec. No. 27418 (La Union). 10
Juan died intestate on May 22, 1983. Afterwards, on
August 14, 1993, Anita executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication 11 adjudicating upon herself the subject property.
As a result, TCT No. 277297 (later referred to as TCT No.
391576) 12 was cancelled and TCT No. 7884 was issued in the
name of Anita.
When Rodolfo learned about Anita's Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication, he filed a Notice of Adverse Claim to protect his
share in the subject property. He also filed a criminal complaint
for falsification of public documents against Anita before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. In his
September 3, 1998 Resolution, 13 the city prosecutor
recommended the filing of an Information for falsification
against Anita.
Rodolfo alleged that the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication was a total falsity because at the time of his
demise, Juan was survived not only by his wife Anita, but also
by him and their sister Rizalina, as collateral relatives.
Considering that Rizalina executed a Deed of Waiver of
Rights 14 on January 16, 1990 whereby she relinquished all her
rights and participation over the subject property in his favor,
Rodolfo alleged that he is now entitled to one-half thereof.
For her part, Anita sought the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of cause of action and that Rodolfo is barred
by laches or prescription. Further, Anita claimed that the subject
property is her exclusive property since she purchased the same
with her own money. She denied that Rodolfo is a legitimate
brother of her husband, Juan. Anita further denied committing
any falsehood or misrepresentation in the execution of the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Lastly, she belied Rodolfo's
allegation that he exerted earnest efforts to settle the dispute
between them prior to the filing of the complaint considering
that she was already residing in the United States.
Anita, in turn, filed a compulsory claim for damages
against Rodolfo for filing a baseless and malicious suit against
her.
During the trial, Dante Agra, the brother of Anita and
her attorney-in-fact, 15 testified that Juan disclosed to him that
Rodolfo was his illegitimate brother and that he also has an
illegitimate sister. Further, Dante narrated that Juan informed
him that he was the only son of Dolores Lopez who was the
latter's mother as stated in the Marriage Certificate 16 of Juan
and Anita. Anita presented a Certification 17 from the National
Archives that it has no file of the Makati City Register of Births
for the year 1935; hence, there was no available record about the
birth of Juan on April 4, 1935 to Juan Caranto, Sr., as his father,
and Dolores Lopez, as his mother. On the other hand, the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacnotan, La Union, 18 stated
that Rodolfo was born on May 21, 1945, to Juan Caranto as his
father and Guillerma Lopez, as his mother.
 Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its October 22, 2007 Decision, 19 the RTC ruled
that the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased
Guillerma Lopez-Caranto does not suffice to support Rodolfo's
claim that he is the brother of Juan. Moreover, the Deed of
Waiver of Rights executed by Rizalina in his favor, and the
Special Power of Attorney executed by Juan designating
Rizalina as his attorney-in-fact, were inadmissible for being
mere photocopies of the originals. Besides, even if admitted,
these also did not serve as proofs of Rodolfo's filiation with
Juan.
The trial court further observed that Rodolfo did not
present the birth certificate of Juan showing that his mother was
also Guillerma Lopez-Caranto. It could have disproved Dante's
testimony that Juan's mother was Dolores Lopez with said
evidence.
Anent the compulsory claim of Anita, the trial court
awarded exemplary damages in her favor for failure of Rodolfo
to prove his cause of action. Anita was also adjudged entitled to
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit. The fallo of
the Decision reads in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the court hereby renders
judgment in favor of defendant Anita Agra
Caranto and against plaintiff Rodolfo
Caranto, ordering said plaintiff —
1) to pay the amount of
Php20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
2) to pay the amount of
Php20,000.00 as attorney's fees;
3) to pay the amount of
Php10,000.00 as litigation expenses and cost
of suit.
SO ORDERED. 20
Undeterred, Rodolfo appealed·to the CA 21 averring
that the trial court erred: (a) in not declaring Anita in estoppel in
impugning his relationship with her husband; (b) in ruling that
he failed to sufficiently prove that he is the brother of Juan; (c)
in not giving credence to the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
of the Late Guillerma O. Lopez-Caranto even in the absence of
Juan's signature; (d) in not ordering the reversion of the property
to him considering that the property was originally owned by his
mother, Guillerma Lopez-Caranto; and (e) in awarding
exemplary damages and attorney's fees to Anita despite lack of
bases thereof. 22
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its April 18, 2012 Decision, 23 the CA partly
granted Rodolfo's appeal. It agreed with the trial court's findings
that Rodolfo failed to prove that he is the brother of Anita's
husband, Juan, so as to have the right to inherit a portion of the
subject property. Likewise, there was insufficient evidence to
prove his title over the same to warrant an action for
reconveyance as well as the cancellation of the title of the
subject property.
Nonetheless, the appellate court held that the award of
exemplary damages was improper for lack of basis. Further,
there was no factual finding as to whether Rodolfo acted in a
wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner in filing the complaint
against Anita.
The dispositive portion of the appellate court's
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, this Court partially
AFFIRMS in part the October 22, 2007
Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 212 of Mandaluyong City. This
Court partially DISMISSES the instant
appeal without prejudice to the filing before
the appropriate court of an intestate
proceeding for the purpose of determining
the heirs who may be entitled to inherit to
the estate, including the property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7884,
previously under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 391576, of deceased Juan L.
Caranto. Additionally, the award of
exemplary damages is DELETED but the
awards of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and
P10,000.00 litigation expenses and cost of
suit are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 24
Aggrieved, Rodolfo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, 25 but the appellate court denied the same in
its July 31, 2012 Resolution 26 for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari. 27
The Issues
The core issues for resolution are:
(1) whether Anita is estopped from
impugning the relationship between her late
husband, Juan, and Rodolfo;
(2) whether the evidence of
Rodolfo, particularly the Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Late
Guillerma O. Lopez-Caranto, sufficed to
prove that he is entitled to one-half of the
subject property of Juan by way of
inheritance and by virtue of the waiver of
rights executed by Rizalina in his favor; and
(3)  assuming that Juan's mother
was named Dolores Lopez, whether Rodolfo
is entitled to the whole subject property by
reason that it was previously owned by his
mother Guillerma.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition must be denied. The allegations of
Rodolfo are a mere rehash of his arguments before the CA and
essentially raise questions of fact as to be beyond the ambit of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court lays down the rule that
only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under
the said rule since factual questions are not the proper subject of
an appeal by certiorari. The Court will thus not entertain
questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate court are
considered final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon
this Court especially when supported by substantial evidence. 28
In Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Bañas, 29 the Court
differentiated a question of law from a question of fact in this
manner:
A question of law arises when
there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, while there is a
 question of fact when the doubt arises as to
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a
question to be one of law, the question must
not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The resolution of
the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances.
Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the
question posed is one of fact.
Thus, the test of whether a
question is one of law or of fact is not the
appellation given to such question by the
party raising the same; rather, it is whether
the appellate court can determine the issue
raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of
law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
(Citations omitted)
However, there are 10 recognized exceptional
circumstances wherein the Court admits and reviews questions
of fact. These are enumerated in Medina v. Mayor Asistio,
Jr. 30 as follows:
(1) When the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) When the
inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) When
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) The
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence
on record. (Citations omitted)
The allegations asseverated by Rodolfo such as: (a)
that Anita is estopped from impugning that he and Juan are
siblings; and (b) he is entitled to one-half or the whole of the
subject property, hinge on his claim that he has sufficiently
proven by preponderance of evidence his cause of action in the
complaint for annulment of title and reconveyance of the subject
property that he filed against Anita.
In civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
plaintiff, who is required to establish his/her case by a
preponderance of evidence. 31 Preponderance of evidence is
defined as the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or
"greater weight of the credible evidence." 32 It is a phrase that,
in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence
that is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 33
Preponderance of evidence refers to the probability to
truth of the matters intended to be proven as facts. As such, it
concerns a determination of the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts based on the evidence presented by a party, who in this
case is Rodolfo. 34
Rodolfo's arguments are essentially questions of fact.
Rodolfo argues that he is the brother of Juan although his birth
certificate stated that his mother was Guillerma Lopez-Caranto
while the marriage contract between Juan and Anita indicated
that Juan's mother was Dolores Lopez, and both documents
stated that Juan Caranto, Sr. was their father. Rodolfo stresses
that, assuming that he and Juan have different mothers, he is
therefore entitled to the ownership of the entire property being
the legitimate heir of Guillerma Lopez-Caranto and because of
Rizalina's relinquishment of her rights over the same in his
favor.
It is thus clear that if the Court has to entertain the
above-mentioned contentions assailing the findings of the
appellate court, it has to review the probative value and evaluate
once again the evidence presented by the contending parties.
This is evidently beyond the purview of a petition for review
under Rule 45.
In his vain attempt to prove that his petition should be
given due course despite raising factual issues, Rodolfo
interposes that the following six exceptions wherein the Court
may review factual issues exist: (a) the findings of the appellate
court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; (b) its inference from the findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken/absurd; (c) it went beyond the issues of the
case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both parties;
(d) its judgment is premised on misapprehension of facts; (e) it
failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; and (f) its
findings of fact are based on the absence of evidence but
contradicted by the evidence on record.
None of these exceptions is present in the case.
A close perusal of Rodolfo's arguments in the petition
shows that these are simply a mere rehash of his claims in his
appeal before the appellate court which it already thoroughly
passed upon. Coming before this Court, Rodolfo alleges that the
appellate court gravely erred in its findings resulting in the
presence of the exceptional circumstances aforementioned.
Unfortunately, he failed to demonstrate any compelling reason
that would warrant the reversal of the findings and conclusions
of the appellate court that Rodolfo failed to sufficiently prove
that he is the brother of Juan and therefore he had no share in the
latter's estate.
Indubitably, the Court will not review the factual
findings of the appellate court as there is not even a scintilla of
evidence that the instant petition falls under any of the
exceptions laid down in Medina. To stress, the burden of proof
lies upon Rodolfo who failed to convince the Court that a review
of the factual findings is necessary. 35 His mere assertion and
claim that the case falls under the exceptions is not enough.
At this juncture, we quote with approval the findings
of the Court of Appeals:
Thus, it is incumbent upon Rodolfo to prove
that he is the brother of the decedent.
Unfortunately, Rodolfo failed to overcome
this burden. The record is bereft of any
evidence submitted by Rodolfo to prove his
relationship with the decedent. Indeed,
Rodolfo could have submitted documents,
such as birth certificates, duly showing that
 he and Juan have the same mother, father or
both.
From the foregoing discussions, it
is without a doubt that Rodolfo failed to
prove his title to the 347-square meter lot
covered by TCT No. 7884, previously under
TCT No. 391576, in order to successfully
maintain an action for reconveyance. In
addition thereto, he failed to prove by
preponderance of evidence that he is the
brother of deceased Juan. In the absence of
evidence to support his cause, the right to
inheritance sought by Rodolfo is untenable
for lack of ground or basis therefor. 36
All told, considering that the issues were factual in
nature as it involved the determination of whether Rodolfo
sufficiently proved his claim by preponderance of evidence, the
Court sees no reason to warrant the exercise of its judicial
discretion to review the same. Hence, there is no need to discuss
the other issues raised by Rodolfo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review
on Certiorari is DENIED. The April 18, 2012 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92085 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carandang, * Inting, Delos Santos and Gaerlan, JJ.,
concur.
||| (Caranto v. Caranto, G.R. No. 202889, [March 2, 2020])
 THIRD DIVISION A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of
the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved
as a non-subd. project), being a portion of
[G.R. No. 179922. December 16, 2008.] Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon.
Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner, vs.
155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as
to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1
FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or
by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or
Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE
subd. plan, containing an area of ONE
CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS
HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS,
II, respondents.
more or less.
PARCEL No. 4

DECISION A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the

REYES, R.T., J p:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the
marital bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of
the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15,
2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be
declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review
on certiorari the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
reversed and set aside the summary judgment 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance,
sum of money, and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suit
are unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died
intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs,
Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are
particularly described as follows: TAECSD
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the
MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION,
Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land
Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of
Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically
reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07
centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B),
being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the
Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of
Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, . . .
containing an area of Thirteen Thousand
Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square
meters. TEDHaA
Parcel No. 3
subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion
of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec.
No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang,
Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot
27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE,
along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and
on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of
the subd. plan . . . containing an area of
ONE THOUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX
(1,076) SQUARE METERS. IATHaS
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No.
50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan.
Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el
NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la
parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1
en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W,
72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta
manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la
Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E.
que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
Castillas, continiendo un extension
superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150)
METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No.
51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De
Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela
50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE,
con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle
Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto
Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S.
43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de
esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto
de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el
esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una
extension superficial de CIENTO
CINCUENTA (150) METROS
CUADRADOS. 3
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to
transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order
to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn,
undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal
heir, petitioner Juan de Dios Carlos.
 Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were
transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3)
lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT
No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and
TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati
City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner.
The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was
survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos
II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were
registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-
respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are
covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents
before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No.
94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the
approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the
compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in
the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land.
This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said
land. cEAIHa
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first
parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v.
Carlos, 4 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of land were
adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-
square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and
respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental
compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with
respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the
supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved
accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more
contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties
equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of
land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action,
docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before
the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a)
declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c)
recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money
and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the
RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage
between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a
nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license.
He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the
natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the
contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect
to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation
of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He
argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title,
including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should
be reconveyed to him. TAECaD
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by
way of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their
answer. They denied the material averments of petitioner's
complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details
regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate
Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that
Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo
Carlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the
dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that
their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial,
respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the
motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who
solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the
Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the
certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were
designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for
summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract
evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged
his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit,
Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent
Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for
summary judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in
another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-
2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255,
Las Piñas. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that
co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo. 5
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and
manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between
the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, defendant's (respondent's)
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
granted and summary judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff as
follows: ETaSDc
1. Declaring the marriage between
defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo
Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May
14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage
Certificate submitted in this case, null and
void ab initio for lack of the requisite
marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant
minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the
natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child
of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
 3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to
pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of
P18,924,800.00 together with the interest
thereon at the legal rate from date of filing
of the instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole
and exclusive owner of the parcel of land,
less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No.
139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati
City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to
cancel said title and to issue another title in
the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex
"K" of complaint, between plaintiff and
defendant Sandoval null and void, and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati
City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name
of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title
in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex
M of the complaint, between plaintiff and
defendant Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of
TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant
Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S.
Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds
of Manila to issue another title in the
exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of
TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant
Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S.
Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds
of Manila to issue another title in the sole
name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for
the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his
claim for moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees,
and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at
1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED. 6
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the
appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary
judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad
and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo,
Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside
the RTC ruling, disposing as follows: cSaADC
WHEREFORE, the summary
judgment appealed from is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is
entered REMANDING the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED. 7
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein
appealed summary judgment by the court a
quo contrary to law and public policy as
ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The
fact that it was appellants who first sought
summary judgment from the trial court, did
not justify the grant thereof in favor of
appellee. Not being an action "to recover
upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory
relief," the rule on summary judgment
apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage.
The mere fact that no genuine issue was
presented and the desire to expedite the
disposition of the case cannot justify a
misinterpretation of the rule. The first
paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil
Code expressly prohibit the rendition of
decree of annulment of a marriage upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the
petition for summary judgment practically
amount to these methods explicitly
proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of
appellee's argument that the foregoing
safeguards have traditionally been applied to
prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of
dissolution of marriages and that the death
of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had
effectively dissolved the marriage herein
impugned. The fact, however, that
appellee’s own brother and appellant
Felicidad Sandoval lived together as
husband and wife for thirty years and that
the annulment of their marriage is the very
means by which the latter is sought to be
deprived of her participation in the estate left
by the former call for a closer and more
thorough inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the case. Rather that the
summary nature by which the court a
quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule
is to the effect that the material facts alleged
in the complaint for annulment of marriage
should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19
of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: aEDCAH
"Section 1. Judgment on
the pleadings. — Where an answer
fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or
for legal separation, the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved." (Underscoring
supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to
sustain the applicability of the rules on
summary judgment to the case at bench, Our
perusal of the record shows that the finding
of the court a quo for appellee would still
not be warranted. While it may be readily
conceded that a valid marriage license is
among the formal requisites of marriage, the
absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in
relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the
failure to reflect the serial number of the
marriage license on the marriage contract
evidencing the marriage between Teofilo
Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval,
although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee
represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of
evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad
Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of
said marriage license is corroborated by the
following statement in the affidavit executed
by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the
Peace who officiated the impugned
marriage, to wit:
"That as far as I could
remember, there was a marriage
license issued at Silang, Cavite on
May 14, 1962 as basis of the said
marriage contract executed by
Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad
Sandoval, but the number of said
marriage license was inadvertently
not placed in the marriage contract
for the reason that it was the Office
Clerk who filled up the blanks in the
Marriage Contract who in turn, may
have overlooked the same."
Rather than the inferences merely
drawn by the trial court, We are of the
considered view that the veracity and
credibility of the foregoing statement as well
as the motivations underlying the same
should be properly threshed out in a trial of
the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the
marriage contract — the primary evidence
of marriage — is not proof that a marriage
did not take place, neither should appellants'
non-presentation of the subject marriage
license be taken as proof that the same was
not procured. The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage, it must be
emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage. aETASc
Considering that the burden of
proof also rests on the party who disputes
the legitimacy of a particular party, the same
may be said of the trial court's rejection of
the relationship between appellant Teofilo
Carlos II and his putative father on the basis
of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad
Sandoval's statements. Although it had
effectively disavowed appellant's prior
claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant
Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer
that he is the illegitimate son of appellee's
brother, to Our mind, did not altogether
foreclose the possibility of the said
appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to
prove the same or, for that matter, his
entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having
been conducted in the case, We find
appellee's bare allegation that appellant
Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased
from an indigent couple by appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole,
insufficient to support what could well be a
minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising
from his putative filiation. Inconsistent
though it may be to her previous statements,
appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration
regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo
Carlos II is more credible when considered
in the light of the fact that, during the last
eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos
allowed said appellant the use of his name
and the shelter of his household. The least
that the trial court could have done in the
premises was to conduct a trial on the merits
in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the
issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant
Teofilo Carlos II. 8
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for
reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice
Rebecca de Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the
following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting
aside the Summary Judgment under the
Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying
petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under
the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect
to the nullity of the impugned marriage,
petitioner respectfully submits that the Court
of Appeals committed a grave
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and
101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that
the circumstances of this case are different
from that contemplated and intended by law,
or has otherwise decided a question of
substance not theretofore decided by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a
manner probably not in accord with law or
with the applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court; AEHCDa
2. That in setting aside and
reversing the Summary Judgment and, in
lieu thereof, entering another remanding the
case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, petitioner most respectfully
submits that the Court of Appeals committed
a serious reversible error in applying Section
1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the
Rules of Court providing for judgment on
the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing
Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting
aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu
thereof, entering another remanding the case
to the court of origin for further proceedings,
petitioner most respectfully submits that the
Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion, disregarded judicial admissions,
made findings on ground of speculations,
surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise
committed misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the
facts. 9 (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a
marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on
the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of
a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the
capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for
nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the
pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession
of judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule
19 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides: aIAEcD
SEC. 1.  Judgment on the
pleadings. — Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But
in actions for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation, the material facts alleged in
the complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of
the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the
rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its
finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on
the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA
likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments, to
wit:
Moreover, even if We are to
sustain the applicability of the rules on
summary judgment to the case at bench, Our
perusal of the record shows that the finding
of the court a quo for appellee would still
not be warranted . . . . 11
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings
or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no
place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and
even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known
as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages", the question on the
application of summary judgments or even judgment on the
pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been
stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the
said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 2003 12 is found in
Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. — (1) The
presiding judge shall personally conduct the
trial of the case. No delegation of evidence
to a commissioner shall be allowed except as
to matters involving property relations of the
spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage
must be proved. No judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession
of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring
supplied) cHCSDa
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan. 13 In that case, We excluded
actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application
of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing
discussion, save for annulment of marriage
or declaration of its nullity or for legal
separation, summary judgment is applicable
to all kinds of actions. 14 (Underscoring
supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has
divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the
case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the
declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists
between the parties. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the
judgment was rendered. 15
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that
the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and
intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public
prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence.
Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the
public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be
presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of
marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to
appear at the pre-trial. — (a) . . .
(b) . . . If there is no collusion, the
court shall require the public prosecutor to
intervene for the State during the trial on the
merits to prevent suppression or fabrication
of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public
prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest
of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication
or suppression of evidence. 16
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before
the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages
celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not
be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it
exclusively a right of the spouses by stating: SDEHIa
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. —
(a) Who may file. — A petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2 (a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the
husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is
enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured
spouse may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
 intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
The Committee is of the belief that they do
not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of
their predecessor, and, hence, can only
question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek
its dissolution. 17 (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the
wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful
marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how
to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the
engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the
directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence,
they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in
accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by
the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.
The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988. 18
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the
right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of
marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never
intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their
successional rights. THEcAS
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the
law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated
in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for
declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts. 19
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not
apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003
although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the
Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became
effective on March 15, 2003 20 is prospective in its application.
Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps.
Medinaceli, 21 viz.:
As has been emphasized,  A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines, and is
prospective in its
application. 22 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case
against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in
controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would
govern depends upon when the marriage took place. 23
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration. 24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring
an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any
person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of
marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a
provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for
any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person
must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. 25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-
interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest. 26
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material
interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about
the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having
no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real
party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of
cause of action. 27
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of
Appeals, 28 where the Court held: HcTDSA
True, under the New Civil Code
which is the law in force at the time the
respondents were married, or even in the
Family Code, there is no specific provision
as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage; however, only a party
who can demonstrate "proper interest"  can
file the same. A petition to declare the
nullity of marriage, like any other
actions, must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest and
must be based on a cause of action. Thus,
in  Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held that the
children have the personality to file the
petition to declare the nullity of marriage of
their deceased father to their stepmother as it
affects their successional rights.
xxx xxx xxx
In fine, petitioner's personality to
file the petition to declare the nullity of
marriage cannot be ascertained because of
the absence of the divorce decree and the
foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of
the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to
determine whether respondent Orlando was
granted a divorce decree and whether the
foreign law which granted the same allows
or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a
valid divorce decree was obtained and the
same did not allow respondent Orlando's
remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondent's marriage as bigamous
and void ab initio but reduced the amount of
moral damages from P300,000.00 to
P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from
P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary,
if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry,
then the trial court must dismiss the instant
petition to declare nullity of marriage on the
ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-
 Catalan lacks legal personality to file the
same. 29 (Underscoring supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine
whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek
the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when
Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory
heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under
the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs
are called to succeed by operation of law. 30
Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are
transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were
respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse
and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are
compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with
respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate
parents and ascendants, with respect
to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower; SCETHa
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural
children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in
Article 287 of the Civil Code. 31
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as
compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a
brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he
still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003
of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and
sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the
other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased in accordance with the
following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants
or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from
succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the
deceased precludes succession by collateral
relatives. 32 Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. 33
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven
not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo,
petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This
is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and
sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent
dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his
parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo
II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate,
or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of
the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow
pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes
petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent
Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab
initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality
of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent
upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate,
adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate,
or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal
personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased
brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground
that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does not
have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy
may be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner
would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant,
illegitimate, 34 or even an adopted child 35 excludes the
collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial
on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject
marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to
dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of
action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a
legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo
Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner. DSIaAE
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of
filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order.
There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as
to the other causes of action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue
the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the
filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We
should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not
specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the
case. 36
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits
having been conducted in the case, petitioner’s bare allegation
that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple
is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from
his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support
its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad
as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more
credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such
declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded
credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article
167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a
child, to wit:
ART. 167. The child shall be
considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
(Underscoring supplied)
 It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the
legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by
Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is
unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy
of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or
conceived within a valid marriage. 37
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of
petitioner for causes of action concerning reconveyance,
recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This
has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its
finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab
initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED
as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court in regard to the action on
the status and filiation of respondent
Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or
nullity of marriage between
respondent Felicidad Sandoval and
the late Teofilo Carlos; TcDAHS
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the
legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally
adopted son of the late Teofilo
Carlos, the RTC is strictly
INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the
action for nullity of marriage for lack
of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of
the fallo of its decision is
VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct
trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in
its calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-
Nazario and Nachura, JJ., concur.
||| (Carlos v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, [December 16, 2008], 594
PHIL 534-561)
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 174238. July 7, 2009.]
ANITA CHENG, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES
WILLIAM SY and TESSIE
SY, respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
This is a petition 1 for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Order dated January 2,
2006 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Manila in
Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses
William Sy and Tessie Sy.
The antecedents are as follows —
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases
before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila against respondent spouses
William and Tessie Sy (Criminal Case No. 98-969952 against
Tessie Sy and Criminal Case No. 98-969953 against William
Sy) for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC)
Check Nos. 171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in
payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored upon
presentment for having been drawn against a closed account.
Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on
January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two (2) cases for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25, Manila (Criminal
Case Nos. 341458-59).
On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila
dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove
the elements of the crime. The Order dismissing Criminal Case
No. 98-969952 contained no declaration as to the civil liability
of Tessie Sy. 3 On the other hand, the Order in Criminal Case
No. 98-969953 contained a statement, "Hence, if there is any
liability of the accused, the same is purely 'civil', not criminal in
nature. 4
Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on
demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases in its Order 5 dated February 7,
2005 on account of the failure of petitioner to identify the
accused respondents in open court. The Order also did not make
any pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused
respondents. cHCIDE
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against
respondents before the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a
complaint 6 for collection of a sum of money with damages
(Civil Case No. 05-112452) based on the same loaned amount of
P600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject
of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.
In the assailed Order 7 dated January 2, 2006, the
RTC, Branch 18, Manila, dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the
amount of P600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly
instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section l, paragraph
(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 8 which
the court denied in its Order 9 dated June 5, 2006. Hence, this
petition, raising the sole legal issue —
Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111
of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and
Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on the
Rules and Guidelines in the filing and
prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg.
22 are applicable to the present case where the
nature of the order dismissing the cases for
bouncing checks against the respondents was
[based] on the failure of the prosecution to
identify both the accused (respondents
herein)? 10
Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg.
22 cases were filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000
should not apply, as it must be given only prospective
application. She further contends that that her case falls within
the following exceptions to the rule that the civil action
correspondent to the criminal action is deemed instituted with
the latter —
(1) additional evidence as to the identities of
the accused is necessary for the
resolution of the civil aspect of the
case;
(2) a separate complaint would be just as
efficacious as or even more
expedient than a timely remand to
the trial court where the criminal
action was decided for further
hearings on the civil aspect of the
case;
(3) the trial court failed to make any
pronouncement as to the civil
liability of the accused amounting to
a reservation of the right to have the
civil liability litigated in a separate
action;
(4) the trial court did not declare that the facts
from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist;
(5) the civil complaint is based on an
obligation ex-contractu and not ex-
delicio pursuant to Article 31 11 of
the Civil Code; and
(6) the claim for civil liability fro damages
may be had under Article 29 12 of
the Civil Code.
Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by
any private prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 proceedings.
The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP
Blg. 22 cases against respondents, where the petitioner has not
made any waiver, express reservation to litigate separately, or
has not instituted the corresponding civil action to collect the
amount of P600,000.00 and damages prior to the criminal
action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal
cases. 13
 This rule applies especially with the advent of
the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus, during the
pendency of both the estafa and the BP Blg. 22 cases, the action
to recover the civil liability was impliedly instituted and
remained pending before the respective trial courts. This is
consonant with our ruling in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada 14 that
then possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing
a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed
instituted with the estafa case and the prosecution for violation
of BP Blg. 22, simultaneously available to the complaining
party, without traversing the prohibition against forum
shopping. 15 Prior to the judgment in either the estafa case or
the BP Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as the complainant, cannot be
deemed to have elected either of the civil actions both impliedly
instituted in the said criminal proceedings to the exclusion of the
other. 16 CSaITD
The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the
prosecution to prove the elements of crime beyond reasonable
doubt — where in Criminal Case No. 98-969952 there was no
pronouncement as regards the civil liability of the accused and
in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 where the trial court declared
that the liability of the accused was only civil in nature —
produced the legal effect of a reservation by the petitioner of her
right to litigate separately the civil action impliedly instituted
with the estafa cases, following Article 29 of the Civil Code.17
However, although this civil action could have been
litigated separately on account of the dismissal of the estafa
cases on reasonable doubt, the petitioner was deemed to have
also elected that such civil action be prosecuted together with
the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v.
Ponferrada ruling.
With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure
to establish the identity of the accused, the question that arises is
whether such dismissal would have the same legal effect as the
dismissed estafa cases. Put differently, may petitioner's action to
recover respondents' civil liability be also allowed to prosper
separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were dismissed?
Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure states —
Section 1. Institution of criminal and
civil actions. —
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil separately shall be
allowed.
Upon filing of the joint criminal and
civil actions, the offended party shall pay in
full the filing fees based on the amount of the
check involved, which shall be considered as
the actual damages claimed. Where the
complaint or information also seeks to recover
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall
pay the filing fees based on the amounts
alleged therein. If the amounts are not so
alleged but any of these damages [is]
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing
fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed
separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court
trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed
in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and
criminal actions.
Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure should not apply because she filed
her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of
procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time of
their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants' rights does not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the
retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor
is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as
a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws. 18
Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal
action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding
civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be
stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing
of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the
reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file
a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court.
The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is
when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even
then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil and
criminal cases. Thus, where petitioner's rights may be fully
adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP
Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability
is clearly unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of
petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this
special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22,
Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable. 19 CDAEHS
Be it remembered that rules governing procedure
before the courts, while not cast in stone, are for the speedy,
efficient, and orderly dispensation of justice and should
therefore be adhered to in order to attain this objective. 20
However, in applying the procedure discussed above,
it appears that petitioner would be left without a remedy to
recover from respondents the P600,000.00 allegedly loaned from
her. This could prejudice even the petitioner's Notice of Claim
involving the same amount filed in Special Proceedings No. 98-
88390 (Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin Enterprises,
William Sy and Tessie Sy), which case was reportedly archived
for failure to prosecute the petition for an unreasonable length of
time. 21 Expectedly, respondents would raise the same defense
that petitioner had already elected to litigate the civil action to
recover the amount of the checks along with the BP Blg.
22 cases.
It is in this light that we find petitioner's contention
that she was not assisted by a private prosecutor during the BP
Blg. 22 proceedings critical. Petitioner indirectly protests that
the public prosecutor failed to protect and prosecute her cause
when he failed to have her establish the identities of the accused
during the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil action
deemed impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases. On this
ground, we agree with petitioner.
Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases,
petitioner's recourse pursuant to the prevailing rules of
procedure would have been to appeal the civil action to recover
the amount loaned to respondents corresponding to the bounced
checks. Hence, the said civil action may proceed requiring only
a preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure SO ORDERED.
to appeal within the reglementary period was tantamount to a
waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil liability of Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. and Peralta,
respondents. However, due to the gross mistake of the JJ., concur.
prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to digress
||| (Cheng v. Spouses Sy, G.R. No. 174238, [July 7, 2009], 609 PHIL
from this rule.
617-630)
It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes,
negligence and omission of their counsel. 22 But this rule admits
of exceptions — (1) where the counsel's mistake is so great and
serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in court,
or (2) where the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in
the client's deprivation of liberty or property without due process
of law. 23 Tested against these guidelines, we hold that
petitioner's lot falls within the exceptions.
It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-
informed of existing laws and rules and to keep abreast with
legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence.
Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be
able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as
members of the Bar. 24 Further, lawyers in the government
service are expected to be more conscientious in the
performance of their duties as they are subject to public scrutiny.
They are not only members of the Bar but are also public
servants who owe utmost fidelity to public
service. 25 Apparently, the public prosecutor neglected to equip
himself with the knowledge of the proper procedure for BP Blg.
22 cases under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure such that
he failed to appeal the civil action impliedly instituted with
the BP Blg. 22 cases, the only remaining remedy available to
petitioner to be able to recover the money she loaned to
respondents, upon the dismissal of the criminal cases on
demurrer. By this failure, petitioner was denied her day in court
to prosecute the respondents for their obligation to pay their
loan.
Moreover, we take into consideration the trial court's
observation when it dismissed the estafa charge in Criminal
Case No. 98-969953 that if there was any liability on the part of
respondents, it was civil in nature. Hence, if the loan be proven
true, the inability of petitioner to recover the loaned amount
would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as
they may now conveniently evade payment of their obligation
merely on account of a technicality applied against petitioner.
There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is
unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense
of or with damages to another. This doctrine simply means that a
person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself
inequitably at another's expense. One condition for invoking this
principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no
other recourse based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-
delict or any other provision of law. 26 DICcTa
Court litigations are primarily designed to search for
the truth, and a liberal interpretation and application of the rules
which will give the parties the fullest opportunity to adduce
proof is the best way to ferret out the truth. The dispensation of
justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be
barred by technicalities. 27 For reasons of substantial justice and
equity, as the complement of the legal jurisdiction that seeks to
dispense justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of
their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the
special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so, 28 we
thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil
Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy
and Tessie Sy is hereby ordered REINSTATED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 189649. April 20, 2015]
ADORACION CAROLINO (spouse and in
substitution of the deceased JEREMIAS A.
CAROLINO), petitioner, vs. GEN.
GENEROSO SENGA, as Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP);
BRIG. GEN. FERNANDO ZABAT, as
Chief of the AFP Finance Center; COMMO.
REYNALDO BASILIO, as Chief of the
AFP-GHQ Management and Fiscal Office;
and COMMO. EMILIO MARAYAG,
Pension and Gratuity Officer, Pension and
Gratuity Management Center, AFP Finance
Center, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated May 25,
2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103502
and the Resolution 2 dated September 10, 2009 denying
reconsideration thereof.
The factual and legal antecedents are as follows:
On December 1, 1976, Jeremias A. Carolino,
petitioner's husband, retired 3 from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) with the rank of Colonel under General Order
No. 1208 dated November 29, 1976, pursuant to the provisions
of Sections 1 (A) and 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 340, 4 as
amended. He started receiving his monthly retirement pay in the
amount of P18,315.00 in December 1976 until the same was
withheld by respondents in March 2005. On June 3, 2005,
Jeremias wrote a letter 5 addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff
asking for the reasons of the withholding of his retirement pay.
In a letter reply, 6 Myrna F. Villaruz, LTC (FS) PA, Pension and
Gratuity Officer of the AFP Finance Center, informed Jeremias
that his loss of Filipino citizenship caused the deletion of his
name in the alpha list of the AFP Pensioners' Payroll effective
March 5, 2005; and that he could avail of re-entitlement to his
retirement benefits and the restoration of his name in the AFP
Pensioners' Masterlist Payroll by complying with the
requirements prescribed under RA No. 9225, or the Dual
Citizenship Act.
It appeared that the termination of Jeremias' pension
was done pursuant to Disposition Form 7 dated October 29,
2004, which was approved by the Chief of Staff and made
effective in January 2005. In the said Disposition Form, the AFP
Judge Advocate General opined that under the provisions of
Sections 4, 5, and 6 of RA No. 340, retired military personnel
are disqualified from receiving pension benefits once incapable
to render military service as a result of his having sworn
allegiance to a foreign country. It was also mentioned that
termination of retirement benefits of pensioner of the AFP could
be done pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1638 8 which provides that the name of a retiree who loses
his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and
his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss. It being in
consonance with the policy consideration that all retirement laws
inconsistent with the provisions of PD No. 1638 are repealed
and modified accordingly.
On August 24, 2006, Jeremias filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a Petition
for Mandamus 9 against Gen. Generoso Senga, as Chief of Staff
of the AFP, Brig. Gen. Fernando Zabat, as Chief of the AFP
Finance Center, Comm. Reynaldo Basilio, as Chief of the AFP-
GHQ Management and Fiscal Office, and Comm. Emilio
Marayag, Pension and Gratuity Management Officer, Pension
and Gratuity Management Center, AFP Finance Center, seeking
reinstatement of his name in the list of the AFP retired officers,
resumption of payment of his retirement benefits under RA No.
340, and the reimbursement of all his retirement pay and
benefits which accrued from March 5, 2005 up to the time his
name is reinstated and, thereafter, with claim for damages and
attorney's fees. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-06-
58686, and raffled off to Branch 220.
On February 26, 2007, the RTC rendered its
Decision 10 granting the petition for mandamus, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering General
Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., as Chief of Staff
of the AFP, Brigadier General Fernando
Zabat, as the Commanding Officer of the
AFP Finance Center, Commodore Reynaldo
Basilio, as Chief of the AFP-GHQ
Management and Fiscal Office, and Captain
Theresa M. Nicdao, as Pension and Gratuity
Officer of the Pension and Gratuity
Management Center, or any of their
respective successors and those taking
instructions from them as agents or
subordinates, to:
a. immediately reinstate the name of
petitioner in the list of
retired AFP Officers, and
to resume payment of his
retirement benefits
under RA 340; and
b. release to [petitioner] all
retirement benefits due him
under RA 340 which
accrued to him from March
2005 continuously up to
the time his name is
reinstated in the list of AFP
retired officers. 11
The RTC found that the issue for resolution is the
applicability of RA No. 340 and PD No. 1638 upon Jeremias'
retirement benefits. It found that he retired as a commissioned
officer of the AFP in 1976; thus, RA No. 340 is the law
applicable in determining his entitlement to his retirement
benefits and not PD No. 1638 which was issued only in 1979.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." PD No.
1638 does not provide for such retroactive application. Also, it
could not have been the intendment of PD No. 1638 to deprive
its loyal soldiers of a monthly pension during their old age
especially where, as here, the right had been vested to them
through time. RA No. 340 does not provide that the loss of
Filipino citizenship would terminate one's retirement benefits; Petitioner
and that PD No. 1638 does not reduce whatever benefits that any correctly availed of the
person has already been receiving under existing law. cSEDTC remedy of mandamus to
compel the
Respondents sought reconsideration, 12 but the RTC reinstatement of his
denied the same in an Order 13 dated May 25, 2007, the decretal pension and benefits
portion of which reads: from the AFP under RA
WHEREFORE, premises 340 as PD 1638 was not
considered, the instant Motion for applicable to him.
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED, Petitioner contends that her husband's retirement from
considering that the questioned decision has the active service in 1976 was pursuant to the provisions of RA
not yet attained its finality. The Motion for No. 340 as PD No. 1638 was not yet in existence then, and there
Execution in the meantime is was nothing in RA No. 340 that disqualifies a retired military
hereby DENIED. 14 personnel from receiving retirement benefits after acquiring
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the CA. foreign citizenship. The concept of retirement benefits is such
After the submission of the parties' respective memoranda, the that one is entitled to them for services already rendered and not
case was submitted for decision. for those to be made at a future time. Retirement benefits due
petitioner's husband under RA No. 340, is an acquired right
Jeremias died on September 30, 2007 15 and was which cannot be taken away by a subsequent law. PD No.
substituted by his wife, herein petitioner. 1638 does not expressly provide for its retroactive application.
On May 25, 2009, the CA granted respondents' appeal. Respondents, being officers of the AFP tasked to implement the
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads: provisions of RA No. 340 have neglected their function
thereunder by delisting petitioner's husband as a retiree,
WHEREFORE, premises thus, mandamus is proper.
considered, the instant appeal
is GRANTED. The appealed decision In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that PD
is REVOKED and SET ASIDE. 16 No. 1638 applies to all military personnel in the service of the
AFP whether active or retired; hence, it applies retroactively to
In so ruling, the CA found that while it is true that petitioner's husband. Even when a retiree is no longer in the
Jeremias retired in 1976 under the provisions of RA No. 340, as active service, his being a Filipino still makes him a part of the
amended, which does not contain any provision anent cessation Citizen Armed Forces; that whether a military personnel retires
or loss of retirement benefits upon acquiring another under the provisions of RA No. 340 or under PD No. 1638, he is
citizenship, PD No. 1638, which was signed in 1979, effectively still in the service of the military and/or the State only that he is
repealed RA No. 340, as amended. Section 27 of PD No. 1638, retired, thus, they should not be treated differently upon the loss
which provides that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino of Filipino citizenship. He argues when there is an irreconcilable
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his conflict between the two laws of different vintages, i.e., RA No.
retirement benefits terminated upon such loss, was correctly 340 and PD No. 1638, the latter enactment prevails.
made applicable to Jeremias' retirement benefits. Logic dictates
that since Jeremias had already renounced his allegiance to the The Solicitor General argues that mandamus will not
Philippines, he cannot now be compelled by the State to render issue to enforce a right to compel compliance with a duty which
active service and to render compulsory military service when is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. In this
the need arises. The CA found that for the writ of mandamus to case, petitioner's husband does not have a well-defined, clear
lie, it is essential that Jeremias should have a clear legal right to and certain legal right to continuously receive retirement
the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of benefits after becoming an American citizen. Likewise, the AFP
respondents to perform the act required which petitioner failed does not have a clear and imperative duty to grant the said
to show; thus, mandamus will not lie. benefits considering that Section 27 of PD No. 1638 provides
that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits
Resolution dated September 10, 2009. terminated upon such loss.
Hence, this petition raising the following: Petitioner filed her reply thereto.
RESPONDENT COURT OF We find merit in the petition.
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RENDERING Petitioner's husband retired in 1976 under RA No.
THE ASSAILED DECISION AND 340. He was already receiving his monthly retirement benefit in
RESOLUTION WHICH SET ASIDE AND the amount of P18,315.00 since December 1976 until it was
REVERSED THE 26 FEBRUARY 2007 terminated in March 2005. Section 5, RA No. 340 provides:
DECISION OF THE QC RTC BECAUSE: Sec. 5. Officers and enlisted men
PD 1638 placed in the retired list shall be subject to
should not have been the rules and articles of war and to trial by
applied and cannot be court-martial for any breach thereof. At any
used against petitioner time said officers and enlisted men may be
as her husband's called to active service by the President.
retirement and pension Refusal on the part of any officer or enlisted
were granted to him by man to perform such services shall terminate
the AFP under RA 340 his right to further participation in the
which was not benefits of this Act provided he resides in
superseded by PD 1638, the Philippines and is physically fit for
a later statute.
 service. Such fitness for service shall be
determined by applicable regulations.
The afore-quoted provision clearly shows how a
retiree's retirement benefits may be terminated, i.e., when the
retiree refuses to perform active service when called to do so
provided that (1) the retiree resides in the Philippines and (2) is
physically fit for service. There is no other requirement found in
the law which would be the reason for the termination of a
retiree's retirement benefits. Petitioner's husband was never
called to perform active service and refused to do so, however,
his retirement benefit was terminated. The reason for such
termination was his loss of Filipino citizenship based on Section
27 of PD No. 1638, to wit:
Section 27. Military personnel
retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12
shall be carried in the retired list of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. The name
of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship
shall be removed from the retired list and his
retirement benefits terminated upon such
loss.
We find that the CA erred in applying PD No. 1638 to
the retirement benefits of petitioner's husband.
Firstly, PD No. 1638 was signed by then President
Ferdinand Marcos on September 10, 1979. Under Article 4 of
the Civil Code, it is provided that laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided. It is said that the law
looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the
legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal
provisions; 17 that all statutes are to be construed as having only
prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the
legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly
declared or is necessarily implied from the language used; and
that every case of doubt must be resolved against retrospective
effect. 18 These principles also apply to amendments of statutes.
PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding
its retroactive application, nor the same may be implied from its
language. In fact, Section 36 of PD No. 1638 clearly provides
that the decree shall take effect upon its approval. As held
in Parreño v. COA, 19 there is no question that PD No. 1638, as
amended, applies prospectively. Since PD No. 1638, as
amended, is about the new system of retirement and separation
from service of military personnel, it should apply to those who
were in the service at the time of its
approval. 20 Conversely, PD No. 1638 is not applicable to those
who retired before its effectivity in 1979. The rule is familiar
that after an act is amended, the original act continues to be in
force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such
amendment. 21
Moreover, Section 27 of PD No. 1638 specifically
provides for the retirees to whom the law shall be applied, to
wit:
Section 27. Military personnel
retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and
12 shall be carried in the retired list of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. The name
of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship
shall be removed from the retired list and his
retirement benefits terminated upon such
loss. (emphasis supplied)
Notably, petitioner's husband did not retire under those
above-enumerated Sections of PD No. 1638 as he retired
under RA No. 340.
Secondly, it has been held that before a right to
retirement benefits or pension vests in an employee, he must
have met the stated conditions of eligibility with respect to the
nature of employment, age, and length of
service. 22 Undeniably, petitioner's husband had complied with
the conditions of eligibility to retirement benefits as he was then
receiving his retirement benefits on a monthly basis until it was
terminated. Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested right to the benefits that is
protected by the due process clause. 23 It is only upon
retirement that military personnel acquire a vested right to
retirement benefits. 24 Retirees enjoy a protected property
interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment
under pre-existing law. 25
In Ayog v. Cusi, 26 we expounded the nature of a
vested right, thus:
"A right is vested when the right
to enjoyment has become the property of
some particular person or persons as a
present interest" (16 C.J.S. 1173). It is "the
privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to
enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of
property conferred by the existing law" (12
C.J.S. 955, Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or
interest in property which has become fixed
and established and is no longer open to
doubt or controversy" (Downs vs.
Blount 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs.
Farrales, 51 Phil 498, 502).
The due process clause prohibits
the annihilation of vested rights. "A state
may not impair vested rights by legislative
enactment, by the enactment or by the
subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance,
or by a change in the constitution of the
State, except in a legitimate exercise of the
police power" (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
It has been observed that,
generally, the term "vested right" expresses
the concept of present fixed interest, which
in right reason and natural justice should be
protected against arbitrary State action, or an
innately just and imperative right which an
enlightened free society, sensitive to
inherent and irrefragable individual rights,
cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5,
citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.
vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl. 2nd 587). 27
Petitioner's husband acquired vested right to the
payment of his retirement benefits which must be respected and
cannot be affected by the subsequent enactment of PD No.
1638 which provides that loss of Filipino citizenship terminates
retirement benefits. Vested rights include not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an
exemption from new obligations after the right has vested. 28
In fact, Sections 33 and 35 of PD No. 1638 recognize
such vested right, to wit:
Section 33. Nothing in this Decree
shall be construed in any manner to reduce
whatever retirement and separation pay or
gratuity or other monetary benefits which
any person is heretofore receiving or is
entitled to receive under the provisions of
existing law.
 xxx xxx xxx
Section 35. Except those necessary
to give effect to the provisions of this
Decree and to preserve the rights granted to
retired or separated military personnel, all
laws, rules and regulations inconsistent with
the provisions of this Decree are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 33 of PD No. 1638 is clear that the law has no
intention to reduce or to revoke whatever retirement benefits
being enjoyed by a retiree at the time of its passage. Hence,
Section 35 provides for an exception to what the decree repealed
or modified, i.e., except those necessary to preserve the rights
granted to retired or separated military personnel. acEHCD
We also find that the CA erred in finding
that mandamus will not lie.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down
under what circumstances petition for mandamus may be filed,
to wit:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities
in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction
before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for
review. 34 However, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not be adhered to when the
question is purely legal. 35 This is because issues of law cannot
be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. 36 Appeal
to the administrative officer would only be an exercise in
futility. 37 Here, the question raised is purely legal, i.e., what
law should be applied in the payment of retirement benefits of
petitioner's husband. Thus, there was no need to exhaust all
administrative remedies before a judicial relief can be sought.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated May 25, 2009 and the Resolution dated
September 10, 2009 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
February 26, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 220, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. — Velasco, Jr., Perez, * Reyes and Jardeleza,

When any tribunal, corporation, board, JJ., concur.
officer or person unlawfully neglects the ||| (Carolino v. Senga, G.R. No. 189649, [April 20, 2015])
performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or
at some other time to be specified by the
court, to do the act required to be done to
protect the rights of the petitioner, and to
pay the damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
A writ of mandamus can be issued only when
petitioner's legal right to the performance of a particular act
which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. A clear
legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is
inferable as a matter of law. 29 A doctrine well-embedded in our
jurisprudence is that mandamus will issue only when the
petitioner has a clear legal right to the performance of the act
sought to be compelled and the respondent has an imperative
duty to perform the same. 30 The remedy of mandamus lies to
compel the performance of a ministerial duty. 31 A purely
ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs
in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to
the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety
of the act done. 32 If the law imposes a duty upon a public
officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. 33
The petition for mandamus filed by petitioner's
husband with the RTC was for the payment of his terminated
retirement benefits, which has become vested, and being a
ministerial duty on the part of the respondents to pay such
claim, mandamus is the proper remedy to compel such payment.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 211353. June 10, 2019.]
WILLIAM G. KWONG MANAGEMENT,
INC. and WILLIAM G.
KWONG, petitioners, vs. DIAMOND
HOMEOWNERS & RESIDENTS
ASSOCIATION, respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J p:
A homeowners' association may regulate passage into
a subdivision for the safety and security of its residents, even if
its roads have already been donated to the local government. It
has the right to set goals for the promotion of safety and
security, peace, comfort, and the general welfare of its
residents. 1
This Court resolves the Petition for Review
on Certiorari 2 assailing the Court of Appeals' July 5, 2013
Decision 3 and February 12, 2014 Resolution 4 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 115198. The Court of Appeals set aside the Office of the
President's March 24, 2010 Decision 5 and found the "No
Sticker, No ID, No Entry" Policy valid and issued within the
authority of the homeowners' association.
Diamond Subdivision is a residential subdivision in
Balibago, Angeles City, Pampanga with several commercial
establishments operating within it. These establishments include
beer houses, karaoke bars, night clubs, and other drinking
joints. 6
Because of these, patrons, customers, and many other
people freely come in and out of Diamond Subdivision. Such
unrestricted access to the subdivision, however, also exposed its
residents to incidents of robbery, akyat-bahay, prostitution, rape,
loud music, and noise that would last until the wee hours of the
morning. 7
Diamond Homeowners & Resident Association
(Diamond Homeowners), the legitimate homeowners'
association of Diamond Subdivision, sought to address the
residents' peace and security issues by raising their concerns to
the City Council of Angeles City (Angeles City Council). 8
On February 24, 2003, the Angeles City Council
issued Ordinance No. 132, 9 series of 2003, reclassifying
Diamond Subdivision as exclusively residential and prohibited
the further establishment and operation of any business except
for those already existing. 10 The Ordinance states:
Whereas, legitimate homeowners
of the Diamond Subdivision have presented
to the City Council their serious concern on
what is presently occurring in their
subdivision;
Whereas, with the present
classification of Diamond Subdivision
constant problems of peace and order have
confronted the homeowners and residents
affecting their lives, property and security;
Whereas, the introduction of
business establishments in an uncontrolled
manner have likewise proliferated due to the
current classification of the
subdivision; CAIHTE
Whereas, due to the R-2
classification of Diamond Subdivision the
value of property have not increase[d],
despite its strategic location;
Whereas, there is an urgent need
to address all the concern[s] of the
homeowners and residents of Diamond
Subdivision;
Whereas, the appropriate and
immediate solution to the present concerns
is the reclassification of Diamond
Subdivision from Residential 2 to
Residential 1 Classification.
Now therefore foregoing
considered, the City Council of Angeles City
in session assembled hereby resolved to
ordain:
Section 1. An Ordinance
reclassifying Diamond Subdivision located
in Balibago, Angeles City from Residential
2 to Residential 1 Classification status, be as
it is hereby, approved.
Section 2. Arayat and S.L. Orosa
Streets and the service road of Diamond
Subdivision are exempted from this new
classification.
Section 3. That existing and
legitimate business establishments operating
within the territorial boundaries of the said
Diamond Subdivision as of approval of the
ordinance shall remain and continue to
operate and no commercial establishment of
any kind shall be allowed thereafter.
Section 4. Unless by hereditary
succession no business establishment rights
shall be transferred to any individual or
entity after approval of this ordinance.
Section 5. This Ordinance shall
take effect upon its approval. 11
However, this Ordinance was not complied with as
more beer gardens and nightclubs were still put up. The peace,
order, and security situation in the subdivision did not
improve. 12
Among those affected was William G. Kwong
(Kwong). A resident of Diamond Subdivision for more than 38
years, he runs three (3) motels 13 in the subdivision under his
company, William G. Kwong Management, Inc. 14
Seeking to address his security concerns, Kwong
proposed to his neighbors that guard posts with telephone lines
be set up at the entry and exit points on the street where he
resides to screen all incoming and outgoing visitors. 15 In an
August 3, 2006 Letter, Kwong wrote:
 TO THE RESIDENTS OF EMMANUEL
STREET
Diamond Subdivision, Balibago
Angeles City
Dear MR/MS ____________,
In direct response to a sharp increase in
criminal activities in our subdivision, a
number of which have remained unreported,
I would like to ask your approval and
cooperation on a number of proposals,
which I outlined below, for our own
protection and safety:
1. To put up security
gates on both entry/exit
points of Emmanuel
Street.
2. To permanently seal
off the proposed gate at
Emmanuel Street corner
V.Y. Orosa Street.
3. To engage the
services of two security
guards to man the gate
24 hours a day at
Emmanuel Street corner
Marlim Avenue.
4. To install a telephone
line at the guard's booth
to screen all incoming
and outgoing visitors
and outsiders. The guard
will have to call the
residents for approval
before he lets anyone in.
With regard to the costs of this project, I am
willing to shoulder the cost of the two
security gates and one-half (1/2) of the
monthly security and telephone fees, which
amounts to approximately Nine Thousand
Pesos (PhP9,000.00). In support of this
project, I would like to request the residents
to shoulder the remaining one-half (1/2) of
the monthly costs of security and telephone
fees, which also amounts to approximately
Nine Thousand Pesos (PhP9,000.0[0]) for 15
households or Six Hundred Pesos
(PhP600.00) a month per household.
It is with the sense of cooperation and
solidarity that I ask you to consider this
project for the security and safety of our
family.
Thank you for most (sic) kind attention and
understanding. 16
However, the other residents of Diamond Subdivision
also wanted their security concerns addressed. Thus, to
safeguard the whole subdivision, Diamond Homeowners
proposed the "No Sticker, No ID, No Entry" Policy (the
Policy). 17
Under the Policy, visitors on vehicles who sought to
enter the premises must leave with the subdivision guards their
identification cards, which they may reclaim upon leaving the
subdivision. Visitors on foot were not required to surrender
theirs. Meanwhile, residents with vehicles may obtain stickers to
identify themselves so that they did not need to surrender any
identification card. 18 DETACa
After consultations and meetings, the Policy was
approved in December 2006. Diamond Homeowners later issued
a Memorandum to inform residents that the Policy would be
implemented by March 15, 2007. 19
Kwong, however, contested the Policy.
When Diamond Homeowners did not heed his
objection, Kwong filed before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board Regional Office a Complaint for the issuance
of a cease and desist order with application for a temporary
restraining order. He argued that the Policy was invalid because
the subdivision roads have been donated to the City of Angeles
in 1974 and were, thus, public roads that must be open for public
use. Likewise, he contended that the screening of visitors would
be cumbersome for his customers, affecting his businesses. 20
Ruling in Kwong's favor, the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board Regional Office issued a Cease and Desist
Order and a Temporary Restraining Order. The records were
later forwarded to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
Arbiter for final disposition. 21
In his August 10, 2007 Decision, 22 the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board Arbiter lifted the Cease and Desist
Order and dismissed Kwong's Complaint. He ruled that the
Policy's alleged damage to Kwong's business was "imaginary,
unsubstantiated[,] and hypothetical[.]" 23
The Arbiter further held that the protection and
security of Diamond Subdivision's residents were the primary
and utmost concern, and must be prioritized over the
convenience of motel patrons. 24 He ruled that the Policy's
objective to protect the community at large was far greater than
Kwong's business concerns. 25
Upholding the Policy's validity, the Arbiter found that
it neither prohibited nor impaired the use of the roads. Neither
did it change the classification of the roads nor usurp the
government's authority. Moreover, the roads were still for public
use, and the public was still allowed to pass as long as they
presented identification cards. The Arbiter noted that there was
no evidence showing that persons were being refused access or
asked to pay for its use. 26
On appeal before the Board of Commissioners of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, the Arbiter's ruling
was reversed. In its September 12, 2008 Decision, 27 the Board
of Commissioners found merit in Kwong's appeal and declared
the Policy void for being "unjustifiable and without legal
basis." 28
In subjecting the subdivision roads to the Policy, the
Board of Commissioners found that they were turned into
private roads — inaccessible, not open to the public, and under
the control of Diamond Homeowners. It also ruled that Kwong
and William G. Kwong Management, Inc. have already acquired
a vested right to unrestricted passage through the subdivision
roads since 1974 because they owned the subdivision lots and
because the public use of the roads is guaranteed by law. It
found that to limit or impose pecuniary conditions for their
enjoyment over the roads violates the roads' public character. 29
The Board of Commissioners also ruled that the Policy
must be justified by an issue so serious and overwhelming that it
is prioritized over the lot owners' rights. Diamond Homeowners,
it found, failed to present evidence of peace and security issues
within the subdivision. 30
The Office of the President, in its March 24, 2010
Decision, 31 affirmed the Board of Commissioners' Decision in
toto. It noted that the factual findings of the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board, as the administrative agency with the
technical expertise on the matter, were entitled to great
respect. 32
Hence, Diamond Homeowners elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review. 33
In its July 5, 2013 Decision, 34 the Court of Appeals
granted Diamond Homeowners' Petition and set aside the Office
of the President's Decision. 35 It found that Diamond
Homeowners was authorized in enacting the Policy. 36
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the local
government acquires ownership rights, these rights should be
harmonized with the interests of homeowners who invested life
savings in exchange for special amenities, comfort, and tighter
security, which non-subdivisions did not offer. 37
The Court of Appeals found that the State recognized
this interest in Presidential Decree No. 957, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1216, and recently in Republic Act
No. 9904, or the Magna Carta for Homeowners and
Homeowners' Associations. 38
The Court of Appeals noted that Presidential Decree
No. 957, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1216, required
the donation of subdivision roads to the local government. While
the issuance was silent on regulating access to subdivision roads,
it found that the requirement was imposed to benefit
homeowners, amid subdivision developers who tended to fail in
maintaining the upkeep of subdivision roads, alleys, and
sidewalks. 39 It cited Albon v. Fernando, 40 which explained
that subdivision owners or developers were relieved of
maintaining roads and open spaces once they have been donated
to the local government. 41 aDSIHc
Likewise, the Court of Appeals noted the Magna Carta
for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations, under which
homeowners were given the right to organize to protect and
promote their mutual benefits and the power to create rules
necessary to regulate and operate the subdivision
facilities. 42 Section 10 (d) provided homeowners' associations
the right to regulate access to and passage through the
subdivision roads to preserve privacy, tranquility, internal
security, safety, and traffic order. 43
The Court of Appeals further noted that the law did
not distinguish between roads donated to the local government
and those retained by the subdivision owners or developers. This
showed that while the local government had ownership of
subdivision roads, homeowners' associations maintained their
enjoyment, possession, and management. 44
Likewise, the Court of Appeals held that the Policy
was reasonably exercised. 45 It ruled that Ordinance No. 132
was sufficient to show that Diamond Subdivision was
encountering peace, order, and security problems, as it explicitly
stated that the subdivision was confronted with such issues
affecting the residents and homeowners. As a public document,
it is prima facie evidence of facts stated in it. 46 The Court of
Appeals further found that the City of Angeles would not have
approved Ordinance No. 132 had it not been substantiated by
these facts. 47
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held the Policy
reasonable because its purpose was to secure and ensure the
peace, safety, and security of homeowners and residents. It
found that not only was the Policy supported by 314 Diamond
Homeowners members, but that only Kwong opposed it, and he
himself recognized the security concerns when he had proposed
to set up gates at the entry and exit points on the street where he
resides. 48
The Court of Appeals further found that even if
Kwong's proprietary rights may be affected, it is still his duty as
a Diamond Homeowners member to support and participate in
the association's projects. Likewise, it held that his personal
interests may be limited for the promotion of the association's
goals for the community at large. 49
The dispositive portion of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant petition
is GRANTED. The Decision of the Office
of the President dated March 24, 2010 and
its Order dated June 10, 2010 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
complaint for the issuance of a cease and
desist order plus damages with application
for temporary restraining order filed before
the House (sic) and Land Use Regulatory
Board Region III is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 50 (Emphasis in
the original)
The Court of Appeals denied Kwong's Motion for
Reconsideration in its February 12, 2014 Resolution. 51
Hence, Kwong and William G. Kwong Management,
Inc. filed this Petition. 52
Diamond Homeowners filed a Comment 53 and, in
turn, petitioners filed their Reply. 54
The parties later submitted their respective
Memoranda. 55
Petitioners insist that the Policy is invalid.
They assert that the subdivision roads are public roads
for public use, and outside the commerce of man, having been
donated to the Angeles City government since 1974. 56 They
maintain that access to and use of Diamond Subdivision roads
should be open to the general public, not limited to privileged
individuals. 57 They point out that these roads cannot be
alienated, leased, be the subject of contracts, be acquired by
prescription, be subjected to attachment and execution, be
burdened by any voluntary easement, or be under the control of
private persons or entities, including homeowners'
associations. 58
Petitioners further argue that the Policy is an
unauthorized restriction on the use of public roads as it unduly
converts them to private roads, hinders their accessibility from
the public, and subjects them under the exclusive control of
Diamond Homeowners. 59
Petitioners insist that it is the City of Angeles that has
the power to control and regulate the use of roads. 60 As such,
they argue that Diamond Homeowners should have had the city
government address its concerns. 61
Petitioners contend that the Local Government
Code has conferred local government units with the authority to
regulate the use of public roads and ensure protection and
promotion of public welfare, 62 well before the Magna Carta for
Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations was enacted. 63
Petitioners claim that the local governments' power to
regulate roads cannot be exercised by a private entity. To do so
would be a usurpation of the local government's authority, and
an illegal abdication of power on the part of the latter. Thus,
they posit that, to their and the public's prejudice, the Policy
disregards the primary right, power, and authority of the City of
Angeles to regulate the use of the public roads. 64 ETHIDa
 Petitioners further insist that nothing in Presidential
Decree Nos. 957 and 1216 or in Albon, which the Court of
Appeals relied on, gives homeowners' associations the authority
to regulate the use of subdivision roads that have already been
donated to the local government. 65
Petitioners also contend that since the Policy was
issued before the Magna Carta for Homeowners and
Homeowners' Associations, it should not apply
retroactively. 66 In any case, they assert that the law did not give
homeowners' associations absolute and unbridled power to
regulate the use of subdivision roads. They cite Section 10 (d),
which lists the requisites that limit a homeowners' association's
rights and powers, 67 showing that its power is merely delegated
and conditional. A homeowners' association cannot arrogate
unto itself the power to issue the Policy or limit or prevent the
free use of public roads without complying with the law's
requisites, as it would be ultra vires. 68
Petitioners point out that because respondent failed to
comply with the requisites under Section 10 (d), 69 it violated
the law. 70 They claim that the required public consultations
must include the general public who use the public road, and
should not be limited to the subdivision residents or the
homeowners' association members. They argue that it should be
done the same way public hearings are conducted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod before the enactment of an ordinance
or resolution. 71
Petitioners further allege that no authority from or
memorandum of agreement with the City of Angeles was
obtained. They maintain that Ordinance No. 132 cannot be
treated as the required memorandum of agreement because it
made no mention of the Policy. They argue that a separate
ordinance is necessary to comply with the requirements. 72
Petitioners further allege that while Ordinance No. 132
reclassified Diamond Subdivision as exclusively residential, it
still expressly exempted Arayat and S.L. Orosa Streets and the
service road from the classification. The ordinance, they point
out, also recognized that the existing businesses have acquired a
vested right to operate within the subdivision as it allowed them
to continue their operations. 73
Petitioners also cite Sections 2 and 18 of the Magna
Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations, which
provide that homeowners' associations are encouraged to
actively cooperate with the local government unit to pursue
common goals and provide vital and basic services. They claim
that to perform this mandate, the homeowners' association
should not disregard the law that gives them the power to
regulate roads. 74
Petitioners contend that if the provisions of the Local
Government Code and the Magna Carta for Homeowners and
Homeowners' Associations were to be harmonized, it is the local
government unit that has the primary right and power to regulate
the use of the public roads. Homeowners' associations only have
limited, delegated power, which may only be exercised upon
compliance with the conditions in the law. 75
Moreover, petitioners deny that there are security
concerns within the subdivision. They claim that the Policy was
enacted based on a speculative, conjectural, and negative
exaggeration of the actual situation, as there is no single
evidence of an actual crime committed. 76 Likewise, they
submit that Ordinance No. 132 cannot be considered as
competent evidence of the alleged criminality in the
subdivision. 77
Finally, petitioners argue that the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board has the technical expertise and special
competence on matters involving the business of developing
subdivisions and condominiums. Thus, its factual findings
should be respected. 78
On the other hand, respondent insists that the Policy is
valid.
In its Memorandum, respondent asserts it has the right
and authority to issue the Policy under Section 10 (d) of
the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners'
Associations. It insists that it issued the Policy to preserve
"privacy, tranqui[l]ity, internal security[,] safety[,] and traffic
order." 79
Respondent further cites Section 30 of Presidential
Decree No. 957, which mandates subdivision associations to
promote and protect the mutual interests of homeowners, and
Section 5 of the Rules on Registration and Supervision of
Homeowners Association, which empowers homeowners'
associations to adopt rules and regulations, and to exercise other
powers necessary to govern and operate the association. It
argues that this right and authority applies even if the
subdivision roads have been donated to the local government. 80
Respondent points out that it issued the Policy to only
regulate the use of roads and streets inside Diamond
Subdivision. It neither recategorized them as private property
nor exercised acts of private ownership over them. It emphasizes
that the roads are still public roads, open for public
use. 81 cSEDTC
Respondent claims that subdivision owners were
required to donate their roads to the local government primarily
to protect and benefit the residents themselves, as some
developers would lose interest in maintaining the subdivision's
upkeep. 82 They claim that no law puts the exclusive authority
to control, dispose, and enjoy the roads to local government
units, to the exclusion of the homeowners, especially since the
donation was intended for the latter's benefit. Moreover, no law
denies associations their right to regulate open spaces and roads
within their subdivisions. 83
Respondent argues that the Court of Appeals correctly
ruled that while the local government units own the lots, their
enjoyment, possession, and management are retained by the
homeowners and their association. 84
Respondent further asserts that there was a valid
reason for the Policy's adoption. 85 It was not a whimsical
exercise of authority to exclude the public from using the roads,
but an effort to attain peace and order within the subdivision. 86
Respondent emphasizes that the Policy was applied
because the public's uncontrolled and unrestricted passage into
the subdivision has made crimes rampant within it. It asserts that
the situation has caused its residents fear, discomfort, and
disquiet. 87
Respondent argues that while the Angeles City
Council recognized issues of peace and order in Ordinance No.
132, 88 its intervention was not sufficient to abate the recurring
crimes. 89
Respondent narrates that after the residents of the
subdivision clamored for action, it studied and sought advice
from other subdivisions in Angeles City that implemented the
same Policy, as they had minimal security problems within their
subdivision. Respondent alleges that when the Policy was
approved by 314 legitimate residents 90 and implemented, the
crimes decreased as it was able to deter lawless
elements. 91 Thus, the Policy has improved the peace and order
of the subdivision. 92
 Respondent points out that only petitioner Kwong
questioned the policy, even if he recognized the crime and
disorder issue himself. It points out that prior to the Policy, he
was willing to shoulder the cost of putting up security gates on
both the entry and exit points of the street where he resides to
prohibit bypassers. 93 He even sought to block those who do not
live on his street, whether or not the person was a Diamond
Subdivision resident. 94 It is, therefore, contradictory for him to
oppose the more reasonable solution of implementing the Policy
in the entire subdivision. 95
Respondent further argues that under the Magna Carta
for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations, subdivision
residents are duty bound to support and participate in the
association's projects and activities, especially if the project is
supported by 314 members, with petitioner Kwong as the only
opposition. 96
Respondent further maintains that every person's right
to life, property, and security is constitutionally protected. The
Policy, thus, is a reasonable means to ensure that these rights are
guarded, especially since the local police were unable to stop the
threats to it. 97
Respondent further posits that petitioner Kwong's
ownership and personal or business interests may be limited for
the interests of the community at large. Such interests cannot
defeat the association's right to regulate and administer the use
of the roads inside the subdivision, in accordance with existing
laws and regulations, and for the welfare of the homeowners and
residents of Diamond Subdivision. 98
Respondent asserts that entry to the subdivision was
not confined to privileged individuals, and that it exercised no
discrimination in the Policy's implementation. 99 The
regulations, it alleges, were not so rigid as to make it difficult for
the riding public to comply with. 100 It further points out that
the roads within Diamond Subdivision are not the main entry
and exit points to the highway or main roads of Angeles
City. 101
Respondent, thus, claims that it is actually working
hand in hand with the City of Angeles in protecting the lives,
property, and security of its residents from lawless elements. 102
Lastly, respondent denies that the Court of Appeals
disregarded the special competence of the lower administrative
bodies. It points out that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board Arbiter even ruled in its favor and found the Policy to be
justified. 103
This Court resolves the following issues:
First, whether or not the factual findings of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board are entitled to respect;
Second, whether or not the security concerns within
Diamond Subdivision were established; and
Finally, whether or not respondent Diamond
Homeowners & Residents Association was authorized in issuing
the "No Sticker, No ID, No Entry" Policy despite the roads
having been donated to the local government.
This Court denies the Petition.
I
Petitioners argue that the factual findings of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board should be respected as
it is the agency with the technical know-how on matters
involving the development of subdivisions. 104 Respondent,
however, denies that the agency's special competence was
disregarded, pointing out that even the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board Regional Office found that the Policy was
justified. 105 SDAaTC
Petitioners are correct that the factual findings of
administrative agencies with special competence should be
respected if supported by substantial evidence. 106 However,
this Court finds that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board's findings were not disregarded.
To begin with, the proper procedure was followed.
The matter was brought before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board, which exercised jurisdiction and ruled on the
merits of the case. The appellate process then took place from
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Arbiter to the
Board of Commissioners, to the Office of the President, to the
Court of Appeals, and now, to this Court.
However, because the factual findings of the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board Arbiter and the Board of
Commissioners are conflicting, they cannot be deemed
conclusive as to preclude any examination on appeal.
On one hand, the Arbiter found that the Policy did not
prohibit or impair the use of the roads. 107 He noted that there
was no evidence showing that persons were being refused access
or asked to pay for its use. 108 He also found no evidence of any
damage to petitioners' business. He lent credence to respondent's
allegation that there was a need for the protection and security of
its residents, which must be prioritized over the convenience of
motel patrons. 109 These findings were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
On the other hand, the Board of Commissioners and
the Office of the President ruled that there was no evidence of
peace and security issues within Diamond Subdivision. It held
that subjecting the subdivision roads to the Policy converts them
to private roads, which are inaccessible, not open to the public,
and under respondent's control. 110
Since the factual findings are conflicting, they cannot
be deemed conclusive as to preclude any examination on appeal
and, therefore, cannot bind this Court. As such, this Court may
determine what is more consistent with the evidence on record.
While only questions of law may be raised in Rule 45 petitions,
this rule is not without exceptions. In Spouses Miano v. Manila
Electric Company: 111
The Rules of Court states that a
review of appeals filed before this Court is
"not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion." The Rules of Court further
requires that only questions of law should be
raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since
factual questions are not the proper subject
of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this
Court's function to once again analyze or
weigh evidence that has already been
considered in the lower courts.
xxx xxx xxx
However, the general rule for
petitions filed under Rule 45 admits
exceptions. Medina v. Mayor Asistio,
Jr. lists down the recognized exceptions:
(1) When the
conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) When
the inference made is
manifestly mistaken,
 absurd or impossible; (3) Whereas, with the present
Where there is a grave classification of Diamond
abuse of discretion; (4) Subdivision constant problems of peace and
When the judgment is order have confronted the homeowners and
based on a residents affecting their lives, property and
misapprehension of security;
facts; (5) When the
findings of fact are Whereas, the introduction of
conflicting; (6) When business establishments in an uncontrolled
the Court of Appeals, in manner have likewise proliferated due to the
making its findings, current classification of the
went beyond the issues subdivision; acEHCD
of the case and the same Whereas, due to the R-2
is contrary to the classification of Diamond Subdivision the
admissions of both value of property have not increase[d],
appellant and appellee; despite its strategic location;
(7) The findings of the
Court of Appeals are Whereas, there is an urgent
contrary to those of the need to address all the concern[s] of the
trial court; (8) When the homeowners and residents of Diamond
findings of fact are Subdivision[.] 113 (Emphasis supplied)
conclusions without Ordinance No. 132 explicitly states that "with the
citation of specific present classification of Diamond Subdivision[,] constant
evidence on which they problems of peace and order have confronted the homeowners
are based; (9) When the and residents affecting their lives, property[,] and security." 114
facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the Ordinance No. 132 is a public document. Under Rule
petitioner's main and 132, Section 19 (a) of the Rules of Court, written official acts of
reply briefs are not the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
disputed by the officers of the Philippines are public documents. The provision
respondents; and (10) states:
The finding of fact of
SECTION 19. Classes of
the Court of Appeals is
documents. — For the purpose of their
premised on the
presentation in evidence, documents are
supposed absence of
either public or private.
evidence and is
contradicted by the Public documents are:
evidence on record.
(a) The written official acts, or
These exceptions similarly apply records of the official acts of the sovereign
in petitions for review filed before this Court authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
involving civil, labor, tax, or criminal public officers, whether of the Philippines,
cases. 112 (Emphasis supplied, citations or of a foreign country;
omitted)
(b) Documents acknowledged
Since the findings of the lower tribunals are before a notary public except last wills and
conflicting as to whether there were security concerns within testaments; and
Diamond Subdivision that would warrant the issuance of the
Policy, this Court may exercise its discretion to resolve this (c) Public records, kept in the
factual issue. Philippines, of private documents required
by law to be entered therein.
II
All other writings are private.
The case records reveal that Diamond Subdivision was
experiencing security concerns. Public documents are prima facie evidence of the facts
stated in them. 115 Rule 132, Section 23 of the Rules of
In Ordinance No. 132, the Angeles City Council Court provides:
acknowledged that Diamond Subdivision had been having
security problems that seriously affected the homeowners and SECTION 23. Public documents
residents. The whereas clauses state: as evidence. — Documents consisting of
entries in public records made in the
Whereas, legitimate homeowners performance of a duty by a public officer
of the Diamond Subdivision have presented are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
to the City Council their serious concern on stated. All other public documents are
what is presently occurring in their evidence, even against a third person, of the
subdivision; fact which gave rise to their execution and
of the date of the latter.
Thus, there is prima facie evidence of the security and
safety issues within Diamond Subdivision.
 Besides, these security concerns were affirmed by Upon their
petitioner Kwong himself. In his August 3, 2006 Letter, he completion as certified
acknowledged that there was a "sharp increase in criminal to by the Authority, the
activities" in Diamond Subdivision, "a number of which roads, alleys, sidewalks
remain[ed] unreported." 116 He also proposed to shoulder the and playgrounds shall
costs of putting up security gates on both entry and exit points of be donated by the owner
the street where he resides, and the hiring of security guards to or developer to the city
screen incoming and outgoing visitors. 117 These constitute or municipality and it
admissions, or declarations "as to a relevant fact that may be shall be mandatory for
given in evidence against him." 118 the local governments to
accept; provided,
Petitioner Kwong presented no evidence to counter however, that the parks
these documents. Thus, this Court affirms that Diamond and playgrounds may be
Subdivision was experiencing security concerns. donated to the
III Homeowners
Association of the
Diamond Subdivision was, likewise, authorized in project with the consent
enacting the Policy. of the city or
There is no question that the subdivision roads have municipality concerned.
been donated to the City of Angeles. 119 Therefore, they are No portion of the parks
public property, for public use. and playgrounds
donated thereafter shall
According to the Deed of Donation, 120 the donation be converted to any
was done in compliance with Resolution No. 162, series of other purpose or
1974, of the Municipal Board of Angeles City. 121 purposes. (Emphasis
supplied)
This donation is consistent with Section 31
of Presidential Decree No. 957, or the Subdivision and The whereas clauses of Presidential Decree No.
Condominium Buyers' Protection Decree. The provision states: 1216 explicitly state that roads, alleys, and sidewalks in
subdivisions are for public use, and are beyond the commerce of
SECTION 31. Donation of Roads
men:
and Open Spaces to Local Government. —
The registered owner or developer of the WHEREAS, there is a compelling
subdivision or condominium project, upon need to create and maintain a healthy
completion of the development of said environment in human settlements by
project may, at his option, convey by way of providing open spaces, roads, alleys and
donation the roads and open spaces found sidewalks as may be deemed suitable to
within the project to the city or municipality enhance the quality of life of the residents
wherein the project is located. Upon therein;
acceptance of the donation by the city or
municipality concerned, no portion of the WHEREAS, such open spaces,
area donated shall thereafter be converted to roads, alleys and sidewalks in residential
any other purpose or purposes unless after subdivision are for public use and are,
hearing, the proposed conversion is therefore, beyond the commerce of men[.]
approved by the Authority. (Emphasis supplied)

On October 14, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 957 was Moreover, both parties admit that the subdivision
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1216, which made the roads are public. Thus, there is no issue on the roads' ownership:
donation to the local government unit mandatory: it belongs to the Angeles City government.

SECTION 2. Section 31 However, both Presidential Decree Nos.

of Presidential Decree No. 957 is hereby 957 and 1216 are silent on the right of homeowners' associations
amended to read as follows: to issue regulations on using the roads to ensure the residents'
safety and security.
SEC.
31. Roads, Alleys, This silence was addressed in 2010 when Republic
Sidewalks and Open Act No. 9904, or the Magna Carta for Homeowners and
Spaces. — The owner as Homeowners' Associations, was enacted. Section 10 (d) states:
developer of a SECTION 10. Rights and Powers
subdivision shall of the Association. — An association shall
provide adequate roads, have the following rights and shall exercise
alleys and sidewalks. the following powers:
For subdivision projects
one (1) hectare or more, xxx xxx xxx
the owner or developer (d) Regulate access to, or passage
shall reserve thirty through the
percent (30%) of the subdivision/village roads
gross area for open for purposes of preserving
space. . . . SDHTEC privacy, tranquility,
xxx xxx xxx internal security, safety
and traffic order: Provided,
 That: (1) public
consultations are held; (2)
existing laws and
regulations are met; (3) the
authority of the concerned
government agencies or
units are obtained; and (4)
the appropriate and
necessary memoranda of
agreement are executed
among the concerned
parties[.]
Section 10 (d) gives homeowners' associations the
right to "[r]egulate access to, or passage through the
subdivision/village roads for purposes of preserving privacy,
tranquility, internal security, safety[,] and traffic order" as long
as they complied with the requisites. The law does not
distinguish whether the roads have been donated to the local
government or not. 122
Petitioners argue that the Magna Carta for
Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations does not apply
because it was not yet in effect when the Policy was issued.
Assuming that it applies, they assert that respondent failed to
comply with the stated requisites. 123
Petitioners are correct. The Policy was approved in
2006, way before the law was enacted in 2010. Diamond
Homeowners, then, could not have yet complied with the
conditions provided. It would, thus, be unjustified if the Policy
were to be invalidated on the ground that these conditions were
not followed.
Laws are not retroactive. Article 4 of the Civil
Code states that "laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided." Lex prospicit, non respicit; the law looks
forward, not backward. This is due to the unconstitutional result
of retroacting a law's application: it divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs obligations of
contract. 124 In Espiritu v. Cipriano: 125
Likewise the claim of private
respondent that the act is remedial and may,
therefore, be given retroactive effect is
untenable. A close study of the provisions
discloses that far from being remedial, the
statute affects substantive rights and hence a
strict and prospective construction thereof is
in order. Article 4 of the New Civil
Code ordains that laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided and that where the law is clear, Our
duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the
facts as found. . . . The said law did not, by
its express terms, purport to give a
retroactive operation. It is a well-established
rule of statutory construction
that "Expressium facit cessare tacitum" and,
therefore, no reasonable implication that the
Legislature ever intended to give the law in
question a retroactive effect may be
accorded to the same. . . . AScHCD
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Well-settled is the principle
that while the Legislature has the power to
pass retroactive laws which do not impair
the obligation of contracts, or affect
injuriously vested rights, it is equally true
that statutes are not to be construed as
intended to have a retroactive effect so as to
affect pending proceedings, unless such
intent is expressly declared or clearly and
necessarily implied from the language of the
enactment. 126 (Citations omitted)
The Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners'
Associations does not state that it has a retroactive effect. Thus,
it cannot be applied to the Policy, This Court must rule on the
Policy's validity based on the laws, rules, and court doctrines in
force at the time of its issuance.
Under Section 16 of the Local Government Code,
local governments have the power to govern the welfare of those
within its territorial jurisdiction:
SECTION 16. General
Welfare. — Every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well
as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to
the promotion of the general welfare. Within
their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain
peace and order, and preserve the comfort
and convenience of their inhabitants.
This includes the power to close and open roads,
whether permanently or temporarily:
SECTION 21. Closure and
Opening of Roads. — (a) A local
government unit may, pursuant to an
ordinance, permanently or temporarily close
or open any local road, alley, park, or square
falling within its jurisdiction: Provided,
however, That in case of permanent closure,
such ordinance must be approved by at least
two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the
sanggunian, and when necessary, an
adequate substitute for the public facility
that is subject to closure is provided.
(b) No such way or place or any
part thereof shall be permanently closed
without making provisions for the
maintenance of public safety therein. A
property thus permanently withdrawn from
public use may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property
belonging to the local government unit
concerned may be lawfully used or
conveyed: Provided, however, That no
freedom park shall be closed permanently
without provision for its transfer or
relocation to a new site.
(c) Any national or local road,
alley, park, or square may be temporarily
closed during an actual emergency, or fiesta
celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or
 industrial fairs, or an undertaking of public
works and highways, telecommunications,
and waterworks projects, the duration of
which shall be specified by the local chief
executive concerned in a written
order: Provided, however, That no national
or local road, alley, park, or square shall be
temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or
civic activities not officially sponsored,
recognized, or approved by the local
government unit concerned.
(d) Any city, municipality, or
barangay may, by a duly enacted ordinance,
temporarily close and regulate the use of any
local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other
public place where shopping malls, Sunday,
flea or night markets, or shopping areas may
be established and where goods,
merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or
articles of commerce may be sold and
dispensed to the general public.
More relevantly, local governments may also enact
ordinances to regulate and control the use of the roads:
SECTION 458. Powers, Duties,
Functions and Compensation. — (a) The
sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative
body of the city, shall enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of
this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for
under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Approve ordinances
which shall ensure the
efficient and effective
delivery of the basic
services and facilities as
provided for under
Section 17 of this Code,
and in addition to said
services and facilities,
shall: AcICHD
xxx xxx xxx
(v) Regulate
the use of
streets,
avenues,
alleys,
sidewalks,
bridges, parks
and other
public places
and approve
the
construction,
improvement,
repair and
maintenance
of the same[.]
In Albon, this Court upheld the City of Marikina's
right to enact an ordinance to widen, clear, and repair the
existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision that
have been donated to it:
Like all LGUs, the City of
Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances
for the purposes set forth in the Local
Government Code (RA 7160). It is expressly
vested with police powers delegated to
LGUs under the general welfare clause
of R.A. 7160. With this power, LGUs may
prescribe reasonable regulations to protect
the lives, health, and property of their
constituents and maintain peace and order
within their respective territorial
jurisdictions.
Cities and municipalities also have
the power to exercise such powers and
discharge such functions and responsibilities
as may be necessary, appropriate or
incidental to efficient and effective
provisions of the basic services and
facilities, including infrastructure facilities
intended primarily to service the needs of
their residents and which are financed by
their own funds. These infrastructure
facilities include municipal or city roads and
bridges and similar facilities.
There is no question about the
public nature and use of the sidewalks in the
Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. One of
the "whereas clauses" of P.D. 1216 (which
amended P.D. 957) declares that open
spaces, roads, alleys and sidewalks in a
residential subdivision are for public use and
beyond the commerce of man. In
conjunction herewith, P.D. 957, as amended
by P.D. 1216, mandates subdivision owners
to set aside open spaces which shall be
devoted exclusively for the use of the
general public.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, the implementing rules
of P.D. 957, as amended by P.D. 1216,
provide that it is the registered owner or
developer of a subdivision who has the
responsibility for the maintenance, repair
and improvement of road lots and open
spaces of the subdivision prior to their
donation to the concerned LGU. The owner
or developer shall be deemed relieved of the
responsibility of maintaining the road lots
and open space only upon securing a
certificate of completion and executing a
deed of donation of these road lots and open
spaces to the LGU. 127 (Citations omitted)
Nonetheless, homeowners' associations are not
entirely powerless in protecting the interests of homeowners and
residents. Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957 recognizes
the need for a homeowners' association to promote and protect
their mutual interest and assist in community development:
SECTION 30. Organization of
Homeowners Association. — The owner or
developer of a subdivision project or
condominium project shall initiate the
organization of a homeowners association
among the buyers and residents of the
 projects for the purpose of promoting and association or its
protecting their mutual interest and assist in members; and
their community development.
h. To exercise other
Moreover, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory powers necessary for the
Board issued Resolutions that provided the powers and rights of governance and
homeowners' associations. Its Resolution No. R-771-04, or operation of the
the Rules on the Registration and Supervision of Homeowners association. TAIaHE
Associations, states:
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Resolution
SECTION 5. Powers and No. 770-04, or the Framework for Governance of Homeowners
Attributes of a Homeowners Association. — Associations, states that associations are expected to promote the
The powers and attributes of the security of residents in their living environment:
Homeowners Association are those stated in
its by-laws, which shall include the WHEREAS, there is a need to
following: highlight the basic roles, powers and
responsibilities of a homeowners association
a. To adopt and amend and its officers and members under existing
by-laws, rules and laws and regulations;
regulations;
WHEREAS, there is also a need to
b. To adopt an annual promote and operationalize the best
program of activities and practices and norms of good governance in
the corresponding the management of a homeowners
budget therefor, subject association;
to the limitations and
conditions imposed WHEREAS, the active and
under the by-laws; enlightened management of the affairs of a
homeowners association will enhance the
c. To impose and collect delivery of basic services to and promote the
reasonable fees on general welfare of its members;
members and non-
member residents who xxx xxx xxx
avail of or benefit from SECTION 3. General Principles.
the facilities and — An Association should —
services of the
association, to defray a. endeavor to serve the
necessary operational interest of its
expenses, subject to the members through equity
limitations and of access in the
conditions imposed decision-making
under the law, process, transparency
regulations of the Board and accountability,
and the association by- and the promotion of
laws; security in their living
environment;
d. To sue and be sued in
its name; b. establish its vision,
define and periodically
e. To enter into contracts assess its mission,
for basic and necessary policies, and objectives
services for the general and the means to attain
welfare of the the same; and
association and its
members; c. without abandoning
its non-partisan
f. To acquire, hold, character:
encumber and convey in
its own name any right, i. actively
title or interest to any cooperate with
property; local
government
g. To impose reasonable units and
sanctions upon its national
members for violations government
and/or non-compliance agencies, in
with the association by furtherance of
laws; and upon non- its common
member residents by goals and
reason of any act and/or activities for
omission prejudicial to the benefit of
the interest of the the residents
inside and
 outside of the and maintenance of
subdivision; streets, establishment of
and parks, etc. Living in this
modern, complex society
ii. complement has raised complex
, support and problems of security,
strengthen sanitation,
local communitarian comfort
government and convenience and it
units and is now a recognized
national necessity that members
government of the community must
agencies organize themselves for
in providing the successful solution
vital services of these problems.
to its Goals intended for the
members and promotion of their safety
in helping and security, peace,
implement comfort, and general
local welfare cannot be
government categorized as
policies, unreasonable. Indeed,
programs, the essence of
ordinances, community life is
and rules. association and
This Court has also acknowledged the right of cooperation for without
homeowners' associations to set goals for the promotion of these such broader
safety and security, peace, comfort, and the general welfare of welfare goals cannot be
their residents. 128 In Bel Air Village Association, Inc. v. attained. It is for these
Dionisio: 129 reasons that modern
subdivisions are
The petitioner also objects to the imposing encumbrance
assessment on the ground that it is upon titles of
unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory, prospective lot buyers a
oppressive and confiscatory. According to limitation upon
him the assessment is oppressive because ownership of the said
the amount assessed is not based on benefits buyers that they
but on the size of the area of the lot, automatically become
discriminatory and unreasonable because members of
only the owners of the lots are required to homeowners' association
pay the questioned assessment and not the living within the
residents who are only renting inside the community of the
village; and confiscatory because under the subdivision. 130 (Empha
by-Laws of the respondent association, the sis supplied)
latter holds a lien on the property assessed if
the amount is not paid. In Spouses Anonuevo v. Court of Appeals, 131 this
Court, quoting the Court of Appeals Decision, affirmed that
We agree with the lower court's ownership of public spaces is with the local government, while
findings, to wit: enjoyment, possession, and control are with the residents and
xxx xxx xxx homeowners:

The second It appears that reliance was placed

question has reference to by the lower court upon the fact that TCT
the reasonableness of the No. 37527 covering Lot II, Block 6 did not
resolution assessing the contain an annotation as to the open space
monthly dues in character of said piece of land. But the
question upon the argument does not find justification with
defendant. The exhibits applicable jurisprudence. When the lot in
annexed to the question had been allotted as an open space
stipulation of facts by Carmel Corporation, it had become the
describe the purpose or property of the Quezon City government
goals for which these and/or the Republic of the Philippines held
monthly dues assessed under the management, control and
upon the members of the enjoyment of the residents and homeowners
plaintiff including the of Carmel II-A Subdivision. . . . cDHAES
defendant are to be xxx xxx xxx
disbursed. They are
intended for garbage Therefore, with the approval of the
collection, salary of subdivision plan of Carmel II-A followed
security guards, cleaning with it the exclusion of the land from the
 commerce of man. It would not be too
presumptuous to conclude that the sale by
Carmel Corporation which resulted in the
subsequent private dealings involving this
public property is void ab initio. And the
mere fact that Carmel Corporation did not
consider Lot II, Block 6 as the designated
open space would not give it licentious
freedom to sell such public property "under
the nose," so to speak, of the Quezon City
government, the Republic of the Philippines,
and the homeowners who are the direct
beneficiaries thereof. While the afore-
enumerated entities do not hold the owners'
duplicate title over the open space, hence,
could not properly forewarned of any
prejudicial act of conveyance or
encumbrance perpetrated by the subdivision
owner/developer, they should not be faulted
for taking a belated attempt to question these
conveyances affecting the open space which
are made manifest only during the actual
disruptions accompanying the exercise of
ownership and possession by the ultimate
vendee. 132 (Emphasis in the original,
citation omitted)
From all these, we hold that the Policy is valid. In De
Guzman v. Commission on Audit: 133
It is a basic principle in statutory
construction that when faced with apparently
irreconcilable inconsistencies between two
laws, the first step is to attempt to harmonize
the seemingly inconsistent laws. In other
words, courts must first exhaust all efforts to
harmonize seemingly conflicting laws and
only resort to choosing which law to apply
when harmonization is
impossible. 134 (Citations omitted)
The Policy maintains the public nature of the
subdivision roads. It neither prohibits nor impairs the use of the
roads. It does not prevent the public from using the roads, as all
are entitled to enter, exit, and pass through them. One must only
surrender an identification card to ensure the security of the
residents. As stated, the residents and homeowners, including
petitioner Kwong, have valid security concerns amid a sharp
increase in criminal activities within the subdivision.
The Policy, likewise, neither denies nor impairs any of
the local government's rights of ownership. Respondent does not
assert that it owns the subdivision roads or claims any private
right over them. Even with the Policy, the State still has the jus
possidendi (right to possess), jus utendi (right to use), just
fruendi (right to its fruits), jus abutendi (right to consume),
and jus disponendi (right to dispose) of the subdivision roads. It
still has the power to temporarily close, permanently open, or
generally regulate the subdivision roads.
It must be pointed out that this case is not even
between a homeowners' association and the local government,
but a homeowners' association and a resident who disagrees with
the Policy. Respondent, therefore, is not asserting any right
against any local government act on the subdivision roads.
Neither is the local government claiming that its right to regulate
the roads is being impinged upon.
Furthermore, Section 31 of Presidential Decree No.
957, as amended, on the donation of subdivision roads to the
local government, "was [enacted] to remedy the situation
prevalent at that time where owners/developers fail to keep up
with their obligation of providing and maintaining the
subdivision roads, alleys[,] and sidewalks." 135 The whereas
clauses of Presidential Decree No. 957 reveal the legislative
intent:
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the
State to afford its inhabitants the
requirements of decent human settlement
and to provide them with ample
opportunities for improving their quality of
life;
WHEREAS, numerous reports
reveal that many real estate subdivision
owners, developers, operators, and/or
sellers have reneged on their
representations and obligations to provide
and maintain properly subdivision roads,
drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting
systems, and other similar basic
requirements, thus endangering the health
and safety of home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming
magnitude also show cases of swindling and
fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by
unscrupulous subdivision and condominium
sellers and operators, such as failure to
deliver titles to the buyers or titles fee from
liens and encumbrances, and to pay real
estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same
subdivision lots to different innocent
purchasers for value;
WHEREAS, these acts not only
undermine the land and housing program of
the government but also defeat the
objectives of the New Society, particularly
the promotion of peace and order and the
enhancement of the economic, social and
moral condition of the Filipino people;
WHEREAS, this state of affairs
has rendered it imperative that the real estate
subdivision and condominium businesses be
closely supervised and regulated, and that
penalties be imposed on fraudulent practices
and manipulations committed in connection
therewith. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, here, the donation was for the benefit of the
subdivision's homeowners, lot buyers, and residents. This must
be taken into consideration in interpreting the provision for the
donation: ASEcHI
In the construction or interpretation of a
legislative measure — a presidential decree
in these cases — the primary rule is to
search for and determine the intent and spirit
of the law. Legislative intent is the
controlling factor, for in the words of this
Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice
Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the
spirit of a statute is within the statute, and
this has to be so if strict adherence to the
letter would result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions. 136 (Emphasis in the
original, citation omitted)
In Spouses Belo v. Philippine National Bank: 137
It is well settled that courts are not
to give a statute a meaning that would lead
 to absurdities. If the words of a statute are
susceptible of more than one meaning, the
absurdity of the result of one construction is
a strong argument against its adoption, and
in favor of such sensible interpretation. We
test a law by its result. A law should not be
interpreted so as not to cause an injustice.
There are laws which are generally valid but
may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances. We are not bound to apply
them in slavish obedience to their
language. 138 (Citations omitted)
Thus, the donation of the roads to the local
government should not be interpreted in a way contrary to the
legislative intent of benefiting the residents. Conversely,
residents should not be disempowered from taking measures for
the proper maintenance of their residential area. Under Section
30 of Presidential Decree No. 957, they may protect their mutual
interests. Here, the Policy was not inconsistent with this
purpose. To rule against it would be contrary to the intention of
the law to protect their rights.
This Court further notes that the Deed of Donation
recognizes the Diamond Subdivision's power to monitor the
security within the subdivision. The Deed of Donation between
the developer of Diamond Subdivision and the City of Angeles
states:
That it is a condition of this
donation, that the Severina Realty
Corporation will have the exclusive right to
appoint and to enter into a contract with any
duly licensed security guard agency for the
security guard services of the Diamond
Subdivision, Angeles City. 139
Thus, the subdivision is still empowered to determine
how best to maintain the security and safety within the
subdivision.
Moreover, it is common knowledge that when
homeowners purchase their properties from subdivisions, they
pay a more valuable consideration in exchange for better
facilities, safer security, and a higher degree of peace, order, and
privacy. Some may also have purchased their properties in
contemplation of their right to organize and to take measures to
protect these interests. It would be an injustice if these were not
taken into consideration in determining the validity of the
Policy.
Here, the Policy was enacted to ensure the safety and
security of Diamond Subdivision residents who have found
themselves exposed to heightened crimes and lawlessness. The
Policy was approved by 314 members of the homeowners'
association, with only petitioner Kwong protesting the solution.
His protest is ultimately rooted in the damage that the Policy has
allegedly caused to his businesses. However, he failed to present
any evidence of this damage.
It is established that he who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it. In Republic v. Estate of Hans Menzi: 140
It is procedurally required for each
party in a case to prove his own affirmative
allegations by the degree of evidence
required by law. In civil cases such as this
one, the degree of evidence required of a
party in order to support his claim is
preponderance of evidence, or that evidence
adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the other
party. It is therefore incumbent upon the
plaintiff who is claiming a right to prove his
case. Corollarily, the defendant must
likewise prove its own allegations to buttress
its claim that it is not liable.
The party who alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it. The burden of
proof may be on the plaintiff or the
defendant. It is on the defendant if he alleges
an affirmative defense which is not a denial
of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff's
cause of action, but is one which, if
established, will be a good defense — i.e.,
an "avoidance" of the claim. 141 (Citations
omitted)
Since petitioner Kwong presented no evidence of the
damage caused to him, this Court cannot rule in his favor.
In any case, the community's welfare should prevail
over the convenience of subdivision visitors who seek to
patronize petitioners' businesses. Article XII, Section 6 of
the Constitution provides that the use of property bears a social
function, and economic enterprises of persons are still subject to
the promotion of distributive justice and state intervention for
the common good: ITAaHc
SECTION 6. The use of property
bears a social function, and all economic
agents shall contribute to the common good.
Individuals and private groups, including
corporations, cooperatives, and similar
collective organizations, shall have the right
to own, establish, and operate economic
enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to
promote distributive justice and to intervene
when the common good so demands.
Article XIII, Section 1 of the Constitution states that
the State may regulate the use of property and its increments for
the common good:
SECTION 1. The Congress shall
give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right
of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities,
and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good.
To this end, the State shall
regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its increments.
These provisions reveal that the property ownership
and the rights that come with it are not without restrictions, but
rather come with the consideration and mindfulness for the
welfare of others in society. The Constitution still emphasizes
and prioritizes the people's needs as a whole. Such is the case
here: even if petitioner Kwong's rights are subordinated to the
rights of the many, the Policy improves his own wellbeing and
quality of life. In Bel Air Village Association, Inc.:
Even assuming that defendant's
ownership and enjoyment of the lot covered
by TCT No. 81136 is limited because of the
burden of being a member of plaintiff
association the goals and objectives of the
association are far greater because they
apply to and affect the community at
 large. It can be justified on legal grounds
that a person's enjoyment of ownership may
be restricted and limited if to do so the
welfare of the community of which he is a
member is promoted and attained. These
benefits in which the defendant participates
more than offset the burden and
inconvenience that he may
suffer. 142 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS the Court of
Appeals' July 5, 2013 Decision and February 12, 2014
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 115198. This Court finds that
Diamond Homeowners & Residents Association's "No Sticker,
No ID, No Entry" Policy is valid and consistent with law and
jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, A.B. Reyes, Jr., Hernando and Inting, JJ.,
concur.
||| (William G. Kwong Management, Inc. v. Diamond Homeowners &
Residents Association, G.R. No. 211353, [June 10, 2019])
 EN BANC
[A.M. No. MTJ-92-706. March 29, 1995.]
LUPO
ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JU
DGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20,
Manila, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.  CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; NULLITY OF
PREVIOUS MARRIAGE MAY BE INVOKED FOR
PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE; REMARRIAGE MUST BE
ENTERED ON OR AFTER AUGUST 3, 1988. — Article 40 is
applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first
marriage.
2.  ID.; ID.; APPLICATION OF LAWS; MAY BE
GIVEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION WHERE IT DOES
NOT PREJUDICE OR IMPAIR VESTED RIGHTS. — Under
Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was
impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
3.  ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRECLUDED BY MERE
ADVERSE EFFECT ON LITIGANTS' RIGHT; REASON. —
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws
is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229
[1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
4.  JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; CONTRACTING
TWO MARRIAGES WITH THE SAME WOMAN WITHOUT
A MARRIAGE LICENSE AND COHABITING WITH
ANOTHER CONSTITUTE GROSS IMMORALITY; CASE
AT BENCH. — Respondent was given an opportunity to correct
the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married
for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on
these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith. It
is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral
fitness for membership in the legal profession. While the deceit
employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a
Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of
cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was
already in the judiciary.
DECISION
QUIASON, J p:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross
Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge
Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with
Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy
Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in
said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in
Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his
bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's)
bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent
had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother
to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving
instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his
children and even alienated the affection of his children for
him. Cdpr
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one
Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing
in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities.
Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on
January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro
inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was
not married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative
action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air
residence, which was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest
and claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of the
complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against
complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro
who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to
Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He
alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage
ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965,
the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license.
Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went
through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June
5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license.
Ongkiko abandoned respondent 19 years ago, leaving their
children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in
civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he
believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes,
that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized
without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party
thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code
provides:
"The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for the purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage
void."
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of
the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code
 of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991
and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides,
under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
"retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a
rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right
that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his
case. Cdpr
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect
the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application
to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26
SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested
right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good
faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who begot
him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and
was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went
through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was
already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license.
Any law student would know that a marriage license is
necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an
opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and
Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure
a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister
motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard
of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior
to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral
and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued
when he was already in the judiciary. LLjur
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct
of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his
behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality.
A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in
order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all
times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his
everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to
be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
judiciary. (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the
service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and
with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality,
or agency of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. This decision is immediately
executory. prLL
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
||| (Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, [March 29,
1995], 312 PHIL 939-944)
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 221836. August 14, 2019.]
ESTHER ABALOS y that it was Molina who transacted with her and she merely
PUROC, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
J.C. REYES, JR., J p:
The Case
Petitioner Esther P. Abalos (petitioner) comes to this
Court appealing 1 her conviction for the crime of Estafa
rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in its Decision dated
May 20, 2015, 2 in CA-G.R. CR No. 35633, which affirmed the
indeterminate penalty of four years and two months of prision
correccional as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum and actual damages of P232,500.00 imposed by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), but modified the legal interest at
6% per annum from finality of the decision until fully paid.
The Version of the Prosecution
In April 2011, petitioner, who introduced herself as
"Vicenta Abalos," accompanied by Christine Molina (Molina),
went to the office of private complainant Elaine D. Sembrano
(Sembrano) at Manulife, Baguio City and offered to her two
EastWest Bank checks for rediscounting. 3 The checks were
signed by petitioner in Sembrano's office, as follows:
 
Check No. Dated Amount
0370031 May 31, 2011 P17,500.00
0370032 June 1, 2011 250,000.00
    ––––––––––––
    P267,500.00 4
 
Sembrano agreed to rediscount the checks upon
assurance of petitioner and her companion, Molina, that they
were good checks. 5 Sembrano gave the amount of P250,000.00
less 7% as interest. Sometime later, she learned from friends that
petitioner's name was Esther and not "Vicenta." 6 When
Sembrano presented the checks for payment on due dates, the
checks were dishonored. 7 Sembrano then engaged the services
of Benguet Credit Collectors to collect from petitioner.
Petitioner failed to make good the checks such that a demand
letter was sent to petitioner which she received on October 23,
2011. 8 Despite the said demand, petitioner made a promise to
pay, but up to this date, nothing was received by
Sembrano. 9 For failure to pay her loans, a complaint for estafa
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)was filed
against petitioner.
The Version of the Defense
Petitioner denied the accusations. She claimed that the
checks were issued only as a collateral for a loan together with
the title to a property in the name of "Vicenta Abalos." 10 She
stated that she did not personally transact with Sembrano 11 and
accompanied Molina to Sembrano's office in April 2011. 12 As
a requirement for the release of the loan, petitioner was asked to
present as collateral an original certificate of title and a check,
which she agreed. 13 When she was informed that the loan was
ready, she together with Molina proceeded to the office of
Sembrano purposely to receive the money. 14 Before taking the
money from Sembrano, petitioner was asked to sign a real estate
mortgage offering the title as a collateral to the loan. 15 After
she and Molina received the money from Sembrano, they went
to a convenience store where Molina gave petitioner
P100,000.00 and petitioner handed back to Molina P20,000.00
as commission. 16 Petitioner insists that the checks she issued
were merely to serve as collateral for the loan and not for the
purpose of rediscounting the same. 17
The Ruling of the RTC
On November 29, 2012, the RTC rendered a
Decision 18 finding petitioner guilty, viz.:
WHEREFORE, all premises duly
considered, the [c]ourt finds the accused,
GUILTY as charged. Applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, there being no aggravating and
mitigating circumstance, the accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as minimum
to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
The accused is likewise found to
be civilly liable to pay the private
complainant the amount of Php232,500.00
as and by way of actual damages, with legal
interest thereon to be computed from the
date of the filing of this case, until the same
is fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 19
The Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction, but fixed
the rate of interest at 6% per annum, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated November 29, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Baguio
City, in Criminal Case No. 32571-R, finding
[appellant] guilty of [Estafa] is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that appellant is
directed to pay private complainant the
amount of P232,500.00 as and by way of
actual damages, with legal interest at six
percent (6%) per annum from finality of
this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 20
The CA is convinced that the false pretense of
petitioner is apparent when she, together with her companion
knowingly and intelligently misrepresented herself as "Vicenta
Abalos" by showing to Sembrano a Transfer Certificate of Title
in the name of Vicenta Abalos, a BIR ID Card, a Community
Tax Certificate all bearing the name of Vicenta Abalos, and by
signing the subject checks as "Vicenta Abalos." These pieces of
evidence assured Sembrano that petitioner can make good the
checks she issued as she has the means to do so prompting her to
part with her money. The CA likewise ruled that mere issuance
of a check and its subsequent non-payment is a prima
facie evidence of deceit.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant appeal.
The Issue
Petitioner submits for the Court's consideration the
lone issue that —
THE [CA] ERRED IN
FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS
GUILTY OF ESTAFA CONSIDERING
THAT THE REAL TRANSACTION
BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AS
DEFINED BY LAW, IS NOT
CRIMINAL IN NATURE, BUT CIVIL
ONLY. 21
Petitioner insists that not all elements of estafa were
established. The element of deceit and/or false pretenses are
lacking because the issuance of the checks was not the factor
that induced private complainant to grant the loan, but the
intercession made by Molina and the interest to be earned on the
money lent. 22 It was Molina who maneuvered the transaction
with private complainant by assuring the latter that petitioner
will pay the loan. 23
Petitioner also zeroed-in on the irreconcilable conflict
between Sembrano's affidavit and her testimony in open court.
In her affidavit, Sembrano stated that the checks were offered to
her for rediscounting, while her testimony in open court, she
admitted that the checks were used for collaterals. 24 This
inconsistency put doubt on the testimony of Sembrano, but
strengthened petitioner's claim that the checks were meant to be
collaterals of the loan which are supposed to be encashed only
upon non-payment. 25
The Ruling of the Court
As can be inferred from the records, petitioner was
convicted of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of
the RPC, 26 which provides:
check to deposit the
amount necessary to cover
his check within three (3)
days from receipt of notice
from the bank and/or the
payee or holder that said
check has been dishonored
for lack or insufficiency of
funds shall be prima
facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense
or fraudulent act. (As
amended by R.A. [No.]
4885, approved June 17,
1967.)
This kind of estafa is committed by any person who
shall defraud another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud. The elements are: (1) postdating or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was
issued; (2) lack of sufficient funds to cover the check; (3)
knowledge on the part of the offender of such circumstances;
and (4) damage to the complainant. 27
The prosecution was able to establish beyond
reasonable doubt all the aforesaid elements of estafa.
There is no question that petitioner issued two checks
in the total amount of P267,500.00 in payment for an obligation.
The issued checks have insufficient funds as proven by the fact
that they were dishonored for the reason "account closed."
Because petitioner knew too well that she was not the owner of
the check, petitioner had no knowledge whether the checks were
sufficiently funded to cover the amount drawn against the
checks. Petitioner did not inform Sembrano about the
insufficiency/lack of funds of the checks. Thus, upon
presentment for payment, the checks were eventually dishonored
causing damages to Sembrano in the total amount of
P267,500.00, 28 as what was reflected in the issued checks.
What sets apart the crime of estafa from the other
offense of this nature (i.e., Batas Pambansa Bilang 22) is the
element of deceit. Deceit has been defined as "the false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct
by false or misleading allegations or by concealment of that
which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended
to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury." 29

ART. 315.  Swindling (estafa). — In Juaquico v. People, 30 the Court reiterated that in

Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned hereinbelow
shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2.  By means of any of the
following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
xxx xxx xxx
(d)  By [postdating] a check, or
issuing a check in payment
of an obligation when the
offender had no funds in
the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not
sufficient to cover the
amount of the check. The
failure of the drawer of the
the crime of estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit
and damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be
established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. To
constitute estafa, deceit must be the efficient cause of the
defraudation, such that the issuance of the check should be the
means to obtain money or property from the payer 31 resulting
to the latter's damage. In other words, the issuance of the check
must have been the inducement for the surrender by the party
deceived of his money or property. 32
The element of deceit was established from the very
beginning when petitioner misrepresented herself as Vicenta
Abalos, the owner of the check. To fortify the misrepresentation,
petitioner issued and signed the checks in front of
Sembrano 33 presumably to show good faith on her part.
Petitioner also showed Sembrano documents such as an
Identification Card and Community Tax Certificate to prove that
she is Vicenta Abalos. And lastly, she showed a transfer
certificate of title of a land registered under the name of
"Vicenta Abalos" presumably guaranteeing her capability to pay.
As observed by the RTC, at the outset, petitioner's fraudulent correccional in its
scheme was already evident. maximum period
to prision mayor in its
The misrepresentation of petitioner assured Sembrano minimum period, if the
that she is indeed dealing with Vicenta Abalos who has amount of the fraud is
sufficient means and property, and the capacity to make good over 12,000 but does not
the issued checks. It is safe to say that Sembrano was induced to exceed 22,000 pesos,
release the money to petitioner relying on the latter's false and if such amount
pretense and fraudulent act. Evidently, petitioner's act of issuing exceeds the latter sum,
a worthless check belonging to another who appears to have the penalty provided in
sufficient means is the efficient cause of the deceit and this paragraph shall be
defraudation. Were it not for the said circumstance, Sembrano imposed in its maximum
would not have parted with her money. At any rate a prima period, adding one year
facie presumption of deceit arises when the drawer of the for each additional
dishonored check is unable to pay the amount of the check 10,000 pesos; but the
within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor. 34 total penalty which may
In its last ditch effort to enfeeble the case against her, be imposed shall not
petitioner pointed out the inconsistency in the evidence of the exceed twenty years. In
prosecution specifically with the testimonies of Sembrano such cases, and in
herself. In her affidavit, Sembrano stated that the checks were connection with the
offered to her for rediscounting, while her testimony in open accessory penalties
court, she admitted that the checks were used for which may be imposed
collaterals. 35 For a discrepancy to serve as basis for acquittal, it and for the purpose of
must refer to significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the other provisions of
the accused. An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the this Code, the penalty
elements of the crime, cannot be a ground to reverse a shall be termed prision
conviction. 36 The inconsistency referred to in this case does not mayor or reclusion
attach upon the very element of the crime of estafa. temporal, as the case
may be.
While it was indeed admitted by Sembrano that the
checks were collaterals, this only lends credence to the fact that Considering that the penalty prescribed by law is
the said checks were the reason why Sembrano parted with her composed only of two periods, pursuant to Article 65 of
money. Sembrano was assured that the loan contracted was the RPC, the same must be divided into three equal portions of
secured by the checks issued. Notwithstanding that the said time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period for
checks were merely used to guarantee a loan, the fact remains each of the three portions, 41 to wit:
that petitioner committed deceit when she failed to make known Maximum — 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to
to Sembrano that the checks she issued were not hers and they 8 years;
were not sufficiently funded. Sembrano will not accede to an Medium — 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6
arrangement of issuing unfunded checks to secure the loan. It is years, 8 months, 20 days; and
against ordinary human behavior and experience for a person to Minimum — 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5
accept a check, even as a mere guaranty for a supposed loan or years, 5 months, 10 days. 42
obligation, if one knew beforehand that the account against
which the check was drawn was already closed. 37 The check Since the amount involved in this case is
would not even serve its purpose of guaranty because it can no P232,500.00 43 which is beyond the P22,000.00 ceiling set by
longer be encashed. 38 law, the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner should be
taken within the maximum period of the penalty prescribed
While it is true that no criminal liability under which is eight years; and from there should be added the
the RPC arises from the mere issuance of postdated checks as a incremental penalty of 21 years (P232,500.00 less P22,000.00
guarantee of repayment, 39 this is not true in the instant case divided by 10). However, the law only provides the highest
where the element of deceit is attendant in the issuance of the allowable duration which is 20 years. Therefore, the maximum
said checks. The liability therefore is not merely civil, but period of indeterminate penalty is 20 years.
criminal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
As to the penalty imposed, we take into consideration minimum term should be within the penalty next lower in degree
the amendment embodied in R.A. No. 10951 40 which modifies of the penalty prescribed, which is, prision correccional in its
the penalty in swindling and estafa cases. Section 100 of the said minimum and medium periods or anywhere from six months and
law, however, provides that it shall have retroactive effect only one day to four years and two months. If only to be beneficial to
insofar as it is favorable to the accused. This necessitates a the accused, the lowest term possible that can be imposed is six
comparison of the corresponding penalties imposable under months and one day.
the RPC and R.A. No. 10951.
Hence, under the RPC, the penalty of estafa (of the
The penalty imposed by the RPC in estafa committed amount of P232,500.00) ranged from six months and one day as
under Section 315, paragraph 2(d) are as follows: minimum to 20 years as maximum.
ART. 315.  Swindling (estafa). — On the other hand, R.A. No. 10951 provides:
Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned herein below SEC. 85.  Article 315 of the same
shall be punished by: Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885,
Presidential Decree No. 1689, and
1st.  The Presidential Decree No. 818, is hereby
penalty of prision further amended to read as follows:
 ART. At any rate, even if the maximum
315.  Swindling (estafa). period imposable upon the petitioner under
—xxx the RPC in this case is higher than that
under R.A. No. 10951, the Court finds that
xxx xxx xxx the benefits that would accrue to the
Any person petitioner with the imposition of a lower
who shall defraud minimum sentence outweighs the longer
another by means of prison sentence and is more in keeping with
false pretenses or the spirit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
fraudulent acts as In fixing the indeterminate penalty
defined in paragraph imposable upon the accused, the Court
2(d) hereof shall be should be mindful that the basic purpose of
punished by: the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to "uplift
4th. The and redeem valuable human material, and
penalty of prision prevent unnecessary and excessive
mayor in its medium deprivation of personal liberty and economic
period, if such amount usefulness." Simply, an indeterminate
is over Forty thousand sentence is imposed to give the accused the
pesos (P40,000) but opportunity to shorten the term of
does not exceed One imprisonment depending upon his or her
million two hundred demeanor, and physical, mental, and moral
thousand pesos record as a prison. The goal of the law is to
(P1,200,000). encourage reformation and good behavior,
and reduce the incidence of recidivism.
Considering that the actual amount involved in this While the grant of parole after service of the
case is P232,500.00, the proper imposable penalty is prision minimum sentence is still conditional, the
mayor in its medium period. Since the penalty prescribed by law flexibility granted upon the petitioner to
is a penalty composed of only one period, Article 65 of immediately avail of the benefits of parole
the RPC requires the division of the time included in the penalty considering the much shorter minimum
into three portions, thus: sentence under the RPC should inspire the
Maximum: 9 years, 4 months and 1 day to petitioner into achieving the underlying
10 years purpose behind the Indeterminate Sentence
Medium: 8 years, 8 months and 1 day to 9 Law. 49
years and 4 months It is clear, therefore, that if R.A. No. 10951 would be
Minimum: 8 years and 1 day to 8 years and given retroactive effect, the same will prejudice petitioner. The
8 months 44 penalty under the RPC, insofar as it benefits the petitioner must
Under Article 64 of the RPC, the penalty prescribed prevail. Hence, the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA,
shall be imposed in its medium period when there are neither which is four years and two months of prision correccional as
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances. Considering the minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, is
absence of any modifying circumstance in this case, the correct as it is within the proper penalty imposed by law.
maximum penalty should be anywhere within the medium The legal rate of interest of 6% per annum on the
period of eight years, eight months and one day to nine years monetary award of P232,500.00 (the actual damage sustained by
and four months. Sembrano), from the date of finality of this Decision until fully
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), the paid, as imposed by the CA, is modified as follows: the
minimum term, which is left to the sound discretion of the court, monetary award shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum
should be within the range of the penalty next lower than the from the filing of the Information until June 30, 2013 and 6%
aforementioned penalty, which is left to the sound discretion of per annum from July 1, 2013 until the finality of the decision.
the court. 45 Thus, the minimum penalty should be one degree The total amount of the foregoing shall, in turn, earn interest at
lower from the prescribed penalty of prision mayor in its the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of the decision until
medium period, or prision mayor in its minimum period. 46 The full payment of the same. 50
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 20, 2015 of
anywhere from six years and one day to 10 years. the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35633 sentencing
Under R.A. No. 10951, therefore, the petitioner is petitioner to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
liable to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
ranging from six years and one day of prision mayor, as temporal as maximum
minimum, to eight years, eight months and one day of prision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the monetary
mayor, as maximum. 47 award of P232,500.00 shall be subject to interest rate of 12% per
annum from the filing of the Information until June 30, 2013 and
It appears, however, that the imposable penalty under 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until the finality of the
the RPC, which is six months and one day to 20 years, presents a decision, and the total amount of the foregoing shall, in turn,
lower minimum period, but a higher maximum period of earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of the
imprisonment compared to that imposable under R.A. No. decision until full payment thereof.
10951, which is six years and one day to eight years, eight
months and one day. In the case of Hisoler v. People, 48 the SO ORDERED.
Court has ruled that since the penalty under the RPC is more Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
beneficial to the accused, thus, it is the proper penalty to be
imposed. It ratiocinated as follows: Carpio, * J., is on official leave.
||| (Abalos y Puroc v. People, G.R. No. 221836, [August 14, 2019])
 FIRST DIVISION NLRC in its resolution dated June 29, 1998, 12 petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with this Court. On December 2, 1998, we
resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to our
[G.R. No. 150429. August 29, 2006.] ruling in St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations
Commission. 13
ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, petitioner, vs. On March 30, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated the
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Spc. Fmr. assailed decision which dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Seventh Division) and BARBERSHIP Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the present
MANAGEMENT LIMITED and NFD petition for review raising the following issues:
INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS,
INC., respondents. I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DECISION UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF
THE RECEIPT AND RELEASE
SINCE PETITIONER'S CONSENT
THERETO WAS VITIATED
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p: THEREBY MAKING THE SAME
VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the II. THE COURT OF APPEALS
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50615 dated COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
March 30, 2001 which affirmed the Decision 2 of the National Labor DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 31, 1998 dismissing LACK OR EXCESS OF
petitioner's complaint for payment of disability and other benefits for JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
lack of merit and the Resolution 3 dated October 5, 2001 of the Court THAT THE PRESCRIPTION
of Appeals denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. PERIOD APPLICABLE TO THE
The antecedent facts are as follows: CLAIM OF THE PETITIONER IS
THE 3-YEAR PERIOD PROVIDED
In 1989, respondent NFD International Manning Agents, FOR UNDER THE LABOR CODE
Inc. hired the services of petitioner Roberto G. Famanila as OF THE PHILIPPINES AND NOT
Messman 4 for Hansa Riga, a vessel registered and owned by its THE 10-YEAR PERIOD
principal and co-respondent, Barbership Management Limited. PROVIDED FOR UNDER
THE CIVIL CODE.
On June 21, 1990, while Hansa Riga was docked at the port
of Eureka, California, U.S.A. and while petitioner was assisting in the Petitioner claims that he did not sign the Receipt and
loading operations, the latter complained of a headache. Petitioner Release voluntarily or freely because he was permanently disabled
experienced dizziness and he subsequently collapsed. Upon and in financial constraints. These factors allegedly vitiated his
examination, it was determined that he had a sudden attack of left consent which makes the Receipt and Release void and
cerebral hemorrhage from a ruptured cerebral aneurysm. 5 Petitioner unenforceable.
underwent a brain operation and he was confined at the Emmanuel
Hospital in Portland, Oregon, U.S.A. On July 19, 1990, he underwent The petition lacks merit.
a second brain operation. It is fundamental that the scope of the Supreme Court's
Owing to petitioner's physical and mental condition, he was judicial review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is confined only
repatriated to the Philippines. On August 21, 1990, he was examined to errors of law. It does not extend to questions of fact. More so in
at the American Hospital in Intramuros, Manila where the examining labor cases where the doctrine applies with greater force. 14 The
physician, Dr. Patricia Abesamis declared that he "cannot go back to Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have already determined the factual
sea duty and has been observed for 120 days, he is being declared issues, and these were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, they
permanently, totally disabled." 6 are accorded not only great respect but also finality and are deemed
binding upon this Court so long as they are supported by substantial
Thereafter, authorized representatives of the respondents evidence. 15 We reviewed the records of the case and we find no
convinced him to settle his claim amicably by accepting the amount reason to deviate from the findings of the labor arbiter, NLRC and the
of US$13,200. 7 Petitioner accepted the offer as evidenced by his Court of Appeals.
signature in the Receipt and Release dated February 28, 1991. 8 His
wife, Gloria Famanila and one Richard Famanila, acted as witnesses A vitiated consent does not make a contract void and
in the signing of the release. ECaAHS unenforceable. A vitiated consent only gives rise to a voidable
agreement. Under the Civil Code, the vices of consent are mistake,
On June 11, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint 9 with the violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. 16 If consent is
NLRC which was docketed as NLRC OCW Case No. 6-838-97-L given through any of the aforementioned vices of consent, the
praying for an award of disability benefits, share in the insurance contract is voidable. 17 A voidable contract is binding unless
proceeds, moral damages and attorney's fees. On September 29, 1997, annulled by a proper action in court. 18
Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Voltaire A. Balitaan dismissed the
complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioner appealed the Petitioner contends that his permanent and total disability
decision with the NLRC. On March 31, 1998, the NLRC promulgated vitiated his consent to the Receipt and Release thereby rendering it
its decision 10 finding the appeal to be without merit and ordered its void and unenforceable. However, disability is not among the factors
dismissal. When the motion for reconsideration 11 was denied by the that may vitiate consent. Besides, save for petitioner's self-serving
allegations, there is no proof on record that his consent was vitiated
on account of his disability. In the absence of such proof of vitiated
consent, the validity of the Receipt and Release must be upheld. We
agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that:
In the case at bar, there is nothing in
the records to show that petitioner's consent
was vitiated when he signed the agreement.
Granting that petitioner has not fully recovered
his health at the time he signed the subject
document, the same cannot still lead to the
conclusion that he did not voluntar[il]y accept
the agreement, for his wife and another relative
witnessed his signing. aDHScI
Moreover, the document entitled
receipt and release which was attached by
petitioner in his appeal does not show on its
face any violation of law or public policy. In
fact, petitioner did not present any proof to
show that the consideration for the same is not
reasonable and acceptable. Absent any
evidence to support the same, the Court cannot,
on its own accord, decide against the
unreasonableness of the consideration. 19
It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes
frowned upon and are considered as ineffective in barring recovery
for the full measure of the worker's right and that acceptance of the
benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel. 20 The reason is
plain. Employer and employee, obviously do not stand on the same
footing. 21 However, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as
against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into
and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and
may not later be disowned simply because of change of mind. It is
only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the settlement are
unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the
questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person
making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what
he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding
undertaking, 22 as in this case.
To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear
and unequivocal terms, leaving no doubt as to the intention of those
giving up a right or a benefit that legally pertains to them. 23 We
have reviewed the terms and conditions contained in the Receipt and
Release and we find the same to be clear and unambiguous. The
signing was even witnessed by petitioner's wife, Gloria T. Famanila
and one Richard T. Famanila. The Receipt and Release provides in
part:
That for and in consideration of the
sum of THIRTEEN THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED DOLLARS (US$13,200.00) or its
equivalent in Philippine currency THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FOUR PESOS (365,904.00), the
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged to my
full and complete satisfaction . . . I,
ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, . . . hereby
remise, release and forever discharge said
vessel "HANSA RIGA", her Owners,
operators, managers, charterers, agents,
underwriters, P and I Club, master, officers,
and crew and all parties at interest therein or
thereon, whether named or not named,
including but not limited to BARBER SHIP
MANAGEMENT LIMITED, NFD
INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS,
INC. and ASSURANCEFORENIGEN GARD
from any and all claims, demands, debts, dues,
liens, actions or causes of action, at law or in
equity, in common law or in admiralty,
statutory or contractual, arising from and under
the laws of the United States of America,
Norway, Hongkong or the Republic of the
Philippines and/or any other foreign country
now held, owned or possessed by me or by any
person or persons, arising from or related to or
concerning whether directly or indirectly,
proximately or remotely, without being limited
to but including the said illness suffered by me
on board the vessel "HANSA RIGA" on or
about 21st June 1990 at Portland, Oregon and
disability compensation in connection
therewith.
This instrument is a GENERAL
RELEASE intended to release all liabilities of
any character and/or claims or damages and/or
losses and/or any other liabilities whatsoever,
whether contractual or statutory, at common
law or in equity, tortious or in admiralty, now
or henceforth in any way related to or
occurring as a consequence of the illness
suffered by me as Messman of the vessel
"HANSA RIGA", including but not limited to
all damages and/or losses consisting of loss of
support, loss of earning capacity, loss of all
benefits of whatsoever nature and extent
incurred, physical pain and suffering and/or all
damages and/or indemnities claimable in law,
tort, contract, common law, equity and/or
admiralty by me or by any person or persons
pursuant to the laws of the United States of
America, Norway, Hongkong or the Republic
of the Philippines and of all other countries
whatsoever.
 
I hereby certify that I am of legal age
and that I fully understand this instrument
which was read to me in the local dialect and I
agree that this is a FULL AND FINAL
RELEASE AND DISCHARGE of all parties
and things referred to herein, and I further
agree that this release may be pleaded as an
absolute and final bar to any suit or suits or
legal proceedings that may hereafter be
prosecuted by me or by any one claiming by,
through, or under me, against any of the
persons or things referred to or related herein,
for any matter or thing referred to or related
herein. 24
It is elementary that a contract is perfected by mere consent
and from that moment the parties are bound not only to the
fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping
with good faith, usage and law. 25 Further, dire necessity is not an
acceptable ground for annulling the Receipt and Release since it has
not been shown that petitioner was forced to sign it. 26
Regarding prescription, the applicable prescriptive period
for the money claims against the respondents is the three year period
pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor Code which provides that:
 ART. 291. Money Claims. — All
money claims arising from employer-employee
relations accruing during the effectivity of this
Code shall be filed within three (3) years from
the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise
they shall be forever barred. SaIEcA
xxx xxx xxx
Since petitioner's demand for an award of disability
benefits is a money claim arising from his employment, Article 291
of the Labor Code applies. From the time petitioner was declared
permanently and totally disabled on August 21, 1990 which gave rise
to his entitlement to disability benefits up to the time that he filed the
complaint on June 11, 1997, more than three years have elapsed
thereby effectively barring his claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No.
50615 which affirmed the Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission dismissing petitioner's complaint for disability and other
benefits for lack of merit, and the Resolution dated October 5, 2001
denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo,
Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

||| (Famanila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150429, [August 29,

2006], 531 PHIL 470-480)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 163707. September 15, 2006.]
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO
MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 138, Makati City and minors,
KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE
DANES WEI, represented by their mother,
REMEDIOS OANES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the January
22, 2004 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79742, which affirmed the Orders dated July 21, 2000 2 and July 17,
2003 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 in SP
Proc. Case No. 4549 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its
May 25, 2004 Resolution 4 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes
Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios
Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of
administration 5 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 138. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and
entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate
in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at
P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known
heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne,
Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents
prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly
settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that, in the
meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be
appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Attached to private
respondents' petition was a Certification Against Forum
Shopping 6 signed by their counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez.
In his Comment/Opposition, 7 petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no
debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of
administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
He further argued that private respondents should have established
their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei
pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code. HICSaD
The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to
Dismiss 8 on the ground that the certification against forum shopping
should have been signed by private respondents and not their counsel.
They contended that Remedios should have executed the certification
on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint
Motion to Dismiss, 9 petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private
respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and
Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and
educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her
minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all
liabilities.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to
Dismiss as well as the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that
while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it
had not been established that she was the duly constituted guardian of
her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of right occurred.
Applying a liberal application of the rules, the trial court also rejected
petitioner's objections on the certification against forum shopping.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court in its assailed
Decision dated January 22, 2004, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for
lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed
Orders dated July 21, 2000 and July 17, 2003
are hereby both AFFIRMED. Respondent
Judge is hereby DIRECTED to resolve the
controversy over the illegitimate filiation of the
private respondents (sic) minors [-] Karen
Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei who are
claiming successional rights in the intestate
estate of the deceased Sima Wei, a.k.a. Rufino
Guy Susim.
SO ORDERED. 10
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded
existing rules on certification against forum shopping; that the
Release and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios released and
discharged the Guy family and the estate of Sima Wei from any
claims or liabilities; and that private respondents do not have the legal
personality to institute the petition for letters of administration as they
failed to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei in
accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code.
Private respondents contend that their counsel's
certification can be considered substantial compliance with the rules
on certification of non-forum shopping, and that the petition raises no
new issues to warrant the reversal of the decisions of the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private
respondents' petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with
the rules on certification of non-forum shopping; 2) whether the
Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from
claiming their successional rights; and 3) whether private respondents
are barred by prescription from proving their filiation.
The petition lacks merit.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the
certification of non-forum shopping should be executed by the
plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply with the
requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case. However, a
liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher interest of
justice would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals, 11 we ruled
that while a petition may have been flawed where the certificate of
non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party,
this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial
justice. 12 So it is in the present controversy where the merits 13 of
the case and the absence of an intention to violate the rules with
impunity should be considered as compelling reasons to temper the
strict application of the rules. caHASI
As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the
same does not bar private respondents from claiming successional
rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear
and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a
party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A
waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not
explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right. 14
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary
rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity
the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received
P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by
way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all
claims of whatsoever nature and kind . . . against the estate of the late
Rufino Guy Susim." 15 Considering that the document did not
specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the
estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional
rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the
hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the
latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the
free disposal of his property may accept or
repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or
incapacitated persons may be accepted by
their parents or guardians. Parents or
guardians may repudiate the inheritance left
to their wards only by judicial
authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left
to the poor shall belong to the persons
designated by the testator to determine the
beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in
their default, to those mentioned in Article
1030. (Emphasis supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the
inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is
because repudiation amounts to an alienation of
property 16 which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to
protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially
authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case
is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their
rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks
knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can
rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot
be established by a consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact. 17
In the present case, private respondents could not have
possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to
prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the
deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private
respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that
they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they
do not have such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on
the part of private respondents must fail.
Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the same would be
premature considering that private respondents have yet to present
evidence. Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law on
actions for recognition of illegitimate children was Article 285 of
the Civil Code, to wit:
 
ART. 285. The action for the
recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed
parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died
during the minority of the child, in which
case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment
of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or
of the mother a document should appear of
which nothing had been heard and in which
either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be
commenced within four years from the finding
of the document. (Emphasis supplied)
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo 18 that illegitimate children
who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and
whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to
seek recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining
majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the
passage of the Family Code. 19
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family
Code, which superseded Article 285 of the Civil Code, provide:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate
children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing
evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim
legitimacy may be brought by the child during
his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to
the heirs should the child die during minority
or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of five years within
which to institute the action.
 The action already commenced by having a right to compel acknowledgment, but
the child shall survive notwithstanding the who has not been in fact acknowledged, may
death of either or both of the parties. maintain partition proceedings for the division
of the inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil., 5; Tiamson vs. Tiamson,
establish their illegitimate filiation in the same 32 Phil., 62); and the same person may
way and on the same, evidence as legitimate intervene in proceedings for the distribution of
children. the estate of his deceased natural father, or
mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8 Phil.,
The action must be brought within
135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil., 249; Ramirez
the same period specified in Article 173,
vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855). In neither of these
except when the action is based on the second
situations has it been thought necessary for the
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
action may be brought during the lifetime of
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in
the alleged parent.
partition suits and distribution proceedings the
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate other persons who might take by inheritance
child is established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register are before the court; and the declaration of
or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned,
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
the action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or
Decision dated January 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and
SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss;
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any
and its Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's motion
other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be
for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the records be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of for further proceedings.
prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private
SO ORDERED.
respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be
impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been no Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo,
reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier of facts. Such Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after a full-
blown trial. ||| (Guy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163707, [September 15, 2006],
533 PHIL 446-458)
While the original action filed by private respondents was a
petition for letters of administration, the trial court is not precluded
from receiving evidence on private respondents' filiation. Its
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise
of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate,
including the determination of the status of each heir. 20 That the two
causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim
inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our
jurisprudence. 21 As held in Briz v. Briz: 22
The question whether a person in the
position of the present plaintiff can in any
event maintain a complex action to compel
recognition as a natural child and at the same
time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of
heir, is one which in the opinion of this court
must be answered in the affirmative, provided
always that the conditions justifying the
joinder of the two distinct causes of action are
present in the particular case. In other words,
there is no absolute necessity requiring that the
action to compel acknowledgment should have
been instituted and prosecuted to a successful
conclusion prior to the action in which that
same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the
character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so
peculiar to the action to compel
acknowledgment as to require that a rule
should be here applied different from that
generally applicable in other cases. . . .
The conclusion above stated, though
not heretofore explicitly formulated by this
court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported
by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in
numerous cases, and the doctrine must be
considered well settled, that a natural child
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 189516. June 8, 2016.]
EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, JEFFREN
M. OTAMIAS and MINOR JEMWEL M.
OTAMIAS, represented by their mother
EDNA MABUGAY
OTAMIAS, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by COL.
VIRGILIO O. DOMINGO, in his capacity
as the Commanding Officer of the
PENSION AND GRATUITY
MANAGEMENT CENTER (PGMC) OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J p:
A writ of execution lies against the pension benefits of
a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which is
the subject of a deed of assignment drawn by him granting
support to his wife and five (5) children. The benefit of
exemption from execution of pension benefits is a statutory right
that may be waived, especially in order to comply with a
husband's duty to provide support under Article XV of the 1987
Constitution and the Family Code.
Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired
Colonel Francisco B. Otamias (Colonel Otamias) were married
on June 16, 1978 and had five (5) children. 1
On September 2000, Edna and Colonel Otamias
separated due to his alleged infidelity. 2 Their children remained
with Edna. 3
On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit
against Colonel Otamias before the Provost Marshall Division of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 4 Edna demanded monthly
support equivalent to 75% of Colonel Otamias' retirement
benefits. 5 Colonel Otamias executed an Affidavit, stating:
That sometime in August or
September 2002, I was summoned at the
Office of the Provost Marshal, Philippine
Army, in connection with a complaint
affidavit submitted to said Office by my
wife Mrs. Edna M. Otamias signifying her
intention 75% of my retirement benefits
from the AFP;
That at this point, I can only
commit 50% of my retirement benefits to be
pro-rated among my wife and five (5)
children;
That in order to implement this
compromise, I am willing to enter into
Agreement with my wife covering the same;
That I am executing this affidavit
to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts
and whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6
On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otamias executed a
Deed of Assignment where he waived 50% of his salary and
pension benefits in favor of Edna and their children. 7 The Deed
of Assignment was considered by the parties as a compromise
agreement. 8 It stated:
This Assignment, made and
executed unto this 26th day of February
2003 at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, by the
undersigned LTC Francisco B. Otamias, 0-
0-111045 (INP) PA, of legal age, married
and presently residing at Dama De Noche
St., Pembo, Makati City.
WITNESSETH
WHEREAS, the undersigned
affiant is the legal husband of EDNA M.
OTAMIAS and the father of Julie Ann,
Jonathan, Jennifer, Jeffren and Jemwel all
residing at Patag, Cagayan de Oro City;
WHEREAS, the undersigned will
be retiring from the military service and
expects to receive retirement benefits from
the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the undersigned had
expressed his willingness to give a share in
his retirement benefits to my wife and five
(5) abovenamed children;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in
consideration of the foregoing premises, the
undersigned hereby stipulated the following:
1. That the undersigned will give
to my legal wife and five (5) children FIFTY
PERCENT (50%) of my retirement benefits
to be pro-rated among them. acEHCD
2. That a separate check(s) be
issued and to be drawn and encash [sic] in
the name of the legal wife and five (5)
children pro-rating the fifty (50%) percent of
my retirement benefits.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have
hereunto set my hand this 26th day of
February 2003 at Fort Bonifacio, Makati
City. 9
Colonel Otamias retired on April 1, 2003. 10
The agreement was honored until January 6,
2006. 11 Edna alleged that "the A[rmed] F[orces] [of the]
P[hilippines] suddenly decided not to honor the
agreement" 12 between Colonel Otamias and his legitimate
family.
In a letter 13 dated April 3, 2006, the Armed Forces of
the Philippines Pension and Gratuity Management Center (AFP
PGMC) informed Edna that a court order was required for the
AFP PGMC to recognize the Deed of Assignment. 14
In another letter 15 dated April 17, 2006, the AFP
PGMC reiterated that it could not act on Edna's request to
receive a portion of Colonel Otamias' pension "unless ordered
by [the] appropriate court." 16
 Heeding the advice of the AFP PGMC, Edna, on
behalf of herself and Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M.
Otamias (Edna, et al.), filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro, Misamis Oriental an action for support,
docketed as F.C. Civil Case No. 2006-039. 17
The trial court's Sheriff tried to serve summons on
Colonel Otamias several times, to no avail. 18 Substituted
service was resorted to. 19 Colonel Otamias was subsequently
declared in default for failure to file a responsive pleading
despite order of the trial court. 20
The trial court ruled in favor of Edna, et al. and
ordered the automatic deduction of the amount of support from
the monthly pension of Colonel Otamias. 21
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision
stated:
ALL THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERED, and in consonance with the
legal obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiffs, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, through its Finance Center
and/or appropriate Finance Officer thereof,
is thereby ordered to release to Edna
Mabugay Otamias and minor Jemwel M.
Otamias, herein represented by his mother
Edna, their fifty (50%) per cent share of
each of the monthly pension due to Colonel
Francisco B. Otamias, AFP PA (Retired).
Defendant Francisco Otamias is
also ordered to pay plaintiff Edna M.
Otamias, fifty (50%) per cent of whatever
retirement benefits he has already received
from the Armed Forces of the Philippines
AND the arrears in support, effective
January 2006 up to the time plaintiff
receives her share direct from the Finance
Center of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
IT IS SO
ORDERED. 22 EcTCAD
The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Judge Advocate General, filed a
Manifestation/Opposition 23 to the Decision of the trial court,
but it was not given due course due to its late filing. 24
Edna, et al., through counsel, filed a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution 25 dated February 22, 2008. The
trial court granted the Motion, and a writ of execution was
issued by the trial court on April 10, 2008. 26
The Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center
(AFP Finance Center), through the Office of the Judge Advocate
General, filed a Motion to Quash 27 the writ of execution and
argued that the AFP Finance Center's duty to disburse benefits is
ministerial. It releases benefits only upon the AFP PGMC's
approval. 28
The trial court denied the Motion to Quash and held
that:
Under the law and existing
jurisprudence, the "right to support" is
practically equivalent to the "right to life."
The "right to life" always takes precedence
over "property rights." The "right to
support/life" is also a substantive right
which always takes precedence over
technicalities/procedural rules. It being so,
technical rules must yield to substantive
justice. Besides, this Court's Decision dated
February 27, 2007 has long acquired
finality, and as such, is ripe for
enforcement/execution.
THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERED, the instant Motion is
hereby DENIED. 29
The AFP PGMC moved for reconsideration of the
order denying the Motion to Quash, 30 but the Motion was also
denied by the trial court in the Order 31 dated August 6, 2008.
A Notice of Garnishment was issued by the trial court
on July 15, 2008 and was received by the AFP PGMC on
September 9, 2008. 32
The AFP PGMC filed before the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. 33
The Court of Appeals granted 34 the Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition and partially nullified the trial
court's Decision insofar as it directed the automatic deduction of
support from the pension benefits of Colonel Otamias.
The Court of Appeals discussed that Section
31 35 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, otherwise known as the
AFP Military Personnel Retirement and Separation Decree of
1979, "provides for the exemption of the monthly pension of
retired military personnel from execution and
attachment[,]" 36 while Rule 39, Section 13 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 13. Property exempt from
execution. — Except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the following property, and
no other, shall be exempt from execution:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) The right to receive legal
support, or money or property obtained as
such support, or any pension or gratuity
from the Government[.]
The Court of Appeals also cited Pacific Products, Inc.
vs. Ong: 37
[M]oneys sought to be garnished, as long as
they remain in the hands of the disbursing
officer of the Government, belong to the
latter, although the defendant in garnishment
may be entitled to a specific portion thereof.
And still another reason which covers both
of the foregoing is that every consideration
of public policy forbids it. 38
In addition, the AFP PGMC was not impleaded as a
party in the action for support; thus, it is not bound by the
Decision. 39
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan
de Oro City dated February 27, 2007 in Civil
Case No. 2006-039 is PARTIALLY
NULLIFIED in so far as it directs the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance
Center to automatically deduct the financial
support in favor of private respondents,
Edna Otamias and her children Jeffren and
 Jemwel Otamias, from the pension benefits
of Francisco Otamias, a retired military
officer. The Order dated June 10, 2008,
Order dated August 6, 2008 and Writ of
Execution dated April 10, 2008, all issued
by the court a quo are likewise SET
ASIDE. Perforce, let a writ of permanent
injunction issue enjoining the
implementation of the assailed Writ of
Execution dated April 10, 2008 and the
corresponding Notice of Garnishment dated
July 15, 2008. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED. 40 (Emphasis in
the original)
Edna, et al. moved for reconsideration, but the Motion
was denied by the Court of Appeals. 41 HSAcaE
Edna, et al. filed before this Court a Petition for
Review on Certiorari 42 on November 11, 2009. In the
Resolution 43 dated January 20, 2010, this Court required
respondent to comment.
In the Resolution 44 dated August 4, 2010, this Court
noted the Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
and required Edna, et al. to file a reply. 45
A Reply 46 was filed on September 27, 2010.
Edna, et al. argue that the Deed of Assignment
Colonel Otamias executed is valid and legal. 47
They claim that Section 31 of Presidential Decree No.
1638 48 "does not include support"; 49 hence, the retirement
benefits of Colonel Otamias can be executed upon.
Edna, et al. also argue that the Court of Appeals erred
in granting respondent's Petition because it effectively rendered
the Deed of Assignment of no force and effect. 50 On the other
hand, the trial court's Decision implements the Deed of
Assignment and Edna, et al.'s right to support. 51
Further, the AFP PGMC had already recognized the
validity of the agreement and had made payments to them until
it suddenly stopped payment. 52 After Edna, et al. obtained a
court order, the AFP PGMC still refused to honor the Deed of
Assignment. 53
The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, argues that it was not a party to
the case filed by Edna, et al. 54 Thus, "it cannot be compelled to
release part of the monthly pension benefits of retired Colonel
Otamias in favor of [Edna, et al]." 55
The Office of the Solicitor General avers that the AFP
PGMC never submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court. 56 It was not a party to the case as the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over the AFP PGMC. 57
The Office of the Solicitor General also argues that
Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 and Rule 39, Section
13 (1) of the Rules of Court support the Court of Appeals
Decision that Colonel Otamias' pension benefits are exempt
from execution. 58
Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 "does not
deprive the survivor/s of a retired or separated officer or enlisted
man of their right to support." 59 Rather, "[w]hat is prohibited is
for respondent [AFP PGMC] to segregate a portion of the
pension benefit in favor of the retiree's family while still in the
hands of the A[rmed] F[orces] [of the] P[hilippines]." 60
Thus, the AFP PGMC "cannot be compelled to
directly give or issue a check in favor of [Edna, et al.] out of the
pension gratuity of Col. Otamias." 61
In their Reply, 62 Edna, et al. argue that the Armed
Forces of the Philippines should not be allowed to question the
legal recourse they took because it was an officer of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines who had advised them to file an action
for support. 63
They argue that the phrase "while in the active
service" in Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 refers to
the "time when the retired officer incurred his accountabilities in
favor of a private creditor[,]" 64 who is a third person. The
phrase also "serves as a timeline designed to separate the debts
incurred by the retired officer after his retirement from those
which he incurred prior thereto." 65
Further, the accountabilities referred to in Section 31
of Presidential Decree No. 1638 refer to debts or loans, not to
support. 66
The issues for resolution are:
First, whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
the AFP Finance Center cannot be directed to automatically
deduct the amount of support needed by the legitimate family of
Colonel Otamias; and
Second, whether Colonel Otamias' pension benefits
can be executed upon for the financial support of his legitimate
family.
The Petition is granted. HESIcT
I
Article 6 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.
The concept of waiver has been defined by this Court
as:
a voluntary and intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known existing legal
right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege,
which except for such waiver the party
would have enjoyed; the voluntary
abandonment or surrender, by a capable
person, of a right known by him to exist,
with the intent that such right shall be
surrendered and such person forever
deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment
of such right; or the intentional doing of an
act inconsistent with claiming it. 67
In determining whether a statutory right can be
waived, this Court is guided by the following pronouncement:
[T]he doctrine of waiver extends to rights
and privileges of any character, and, since
the word 'waiver' covers every conceivable
right, it is the general rule that a person may
waive any matter which affects his property,
and any alienable right or privilege of which
he is the owner or which belongs to him or
to which he is legally entitled, whether
secured by contract, conferred with statute,
or guaranteed by constitution, provided
 such rights and privileges rest in the
individual, are intended for his sole
benefit, do not infringe on the rights of
others, and further provided the waiver of
the right or privilege is not forbidden by
law, and does not contravene public
policy; and the principle is recognized that
everyone has a right to waive, and agree to
waive, the advantage of a law or rule made
solely for the benefit and protection of the
individual in his private capacity, if it can be
dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without
detriment to the community at
large[.] 68 (Emphasis in the original)
When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of
Assignment, he effectively waived his right to claim that his
retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The right to
receive retirement benefits belongs to Colonel Otamias. His
decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits does not
infringe on the right of third persons, but even protects the right
of his family to receive support.
In addition, the Deed of Assignment should be
considered as the law between the parties, and its provisions
should be respected in the absence of allegations that Colonel
Otamias was coerced or defrauded in executing it. The general
rule is that a contract is the law between parties and parties are
free to stipulate terms and conditions that are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 69
The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel
Otamias was not contrary to law; it was in accordance with the
provisions on support in the Family Code. Hence, there was no
reason for the AFP PGMC not to recognize its validity.
Further, this Court notes that the AFP PGMC granted
the request for support of the wives of other retired military
personnel in a similar situation as that of petitioner in this case.
Attached to the Petition are the affidavits of the wives of retired
members of the military, who have received a portion of their
husbands' pensions. 70
One affidavit stated:
4. That when I consulted and appeared before
the Office of PGMC, I was instructed
to submit a Special Power of
Authority from my husband so they
can release part of his pension to me;
5. That my husband signed the Special Power
of Attorney at the PGMC ceding
50% of his pension to me; the SPA
form was given to us by the PGMC
and the same was signed by my
husband at the PGMC; . . .
xxx xxx xxx
7. That the amount was deposited directly to
my account by the PGMC-Finance
Center AFP out of the pension of my
husband;
8. That only the Special Power of Attorney was
required by the PGMC in order for
them to segregate my share of my
husband's pension and deposit the
same to my account[.] 71
The other affidavit stated: caITAC
8. That my husband signed the Special Power
of Attorney at the PGMC ceding
50% of his pension to me; the SPA
form was given to us by the PGMC
and the same was signed by my
husband at the PGMC[.] 72
In addition, the AFP PGMC's website informs the
public of the following procedure:
Tanong: My husband-retiree cut-off my
allotment. How can I have it restored?
Sagot: Pension benefits are separate
properties of the retiree and can not [sic] be
subject of a Ocurt [sic] Order for execution
nor can they be assigned to any third party
(Sec. 31, PD 1638, as amended). However, a
valid Special Power of Attorney (SPA) by
the retiree himself empowering the AFP
Finance Center to deduct certain amount
from his lumpsum [sic] or pension pay as
the case maybe, as a rule, is a valid waiver
of rights which can be effectively
implemented by the AFP F[inance]
C[enter]. 73
Clearly, the AFP PGMC allows deductions from a
retiree's pension for as long as the retiree executes a Special
Power of Attorney authorizing the AFP PGMC to deduct a
certain amount for the benefit of the retiree's beneficiary.
It is curious why Colonel Otamias was allowed to
execute a Deed of Assignment by the administering officer
when, in the first place, the AFP PGMC's recognized procedure
was to execute a Special Power of Attorney, which would have
been the easier remedy for Colonel Otamias' family.
Instead, Colonel Otamias' family was forced to incur
litigation expenses just to be able to receive the financial support
that Colonel Otamias was willing to give to Edna, et al.
II
Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 provides:
Section 31. The benefits authorized under
this Decree, except as provided herein, shall
not be subject to attachment, garnishment,
levy, execution or any tax whatsoever;
neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or
conveyed to any third person: Provided,
That if a retired or separated officer or
enlisted man who is entitled to any benefit
under this Decree has unsettled money
and/or property accountabilities incurred
while in the active service, not more than
fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or
other payment due such officer or enlisted
man or his survivors under this Decree may
be withheld and be applied to settle such
accountabilities.
Under Section 31, Colonel Otamias' retirement
benefits are exempt from execution. Retirement benefits are
exempt from execution so as to ensure that the retiree has
enough funds to support himself and his family.
On the other hand, the right to receive support is
provided under the Family Code. Article 194 of the Family
Code defines support as follows:
Art. 194. Support comprises
everything indispensable for sustenance,
 dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person
entitled to be supported referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall include his
schooling or training for some profession,
trade or vocation, even beyond the age of
majority. Transportation shall include
expenses in going to and from school, or to
and from place of work.
The provisions of the Family Code also state who are
obliged to give support, thus:
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions
of the succeeding articles, the following are
obliged to support each other to the whole
extent set forth in the preceding article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate
ascendants and
descendants;
(3) Parents and their
legitimate children and
the legitimate and
illegitimate children of
the latter;
(4) Parents and their
illegitimate children and
the legitimate and
illegitimate children of
the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers
and sisters, whether of
the full or half-blood.
Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not
legitimately related, whether of the full or
half-blood, are likewise bound to support
each other to the full extent set forth in
Article 194 except only when the need for
support of the brother or sister, being of age,
is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's
fault or negligence.
Art. 197. For the support of
legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers and
sisters, whether legitimately or illegitimately
related, only the separate property of the
person obliged to give support shall be
answerable provided that in case the obligor
has no separate property, the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, if
financially capable, shall advance the
support, which shall be deducted from the
share of the spouses obliged upon the
liquidation of the absolute community or of
the conjugal partnership[.]
The provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that
are applicable to this case are in apparent conflict with each
other. Section 4 provides that judgments in actions for support
are immediately executory. On the other hand, Section 13 (1)
provides that the right to receive pension from government is
exempt from execution, thus:
RULE 39
EXECUTION, SATISFACTION, AND
EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 4. Judgments not stayed by
appeal. — Judgments in actions for
injunction, receivership, accounting
and support, and such other judgments as
are now or may hereafter be declared to be
immediately executory, shall be enforceable
after their rendition and shall not, be stayed
by an appeal taken therefrom, unless
otherwise ordered by the trial court. On
appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its
discretion may make an order suspending,
modifying, restoring or granting the
injunction, receivership, accounting, or
award of support. cDHAES
The stay of execution shall be
upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as
may be considered proper for the security or
protection of the rights of the adverse party.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 13. Property exempt from
execution. — Except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the following property, and
no other, shall be exempt from execution:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) The right to receive legal
support, or money or property obtained as
such support, or any pension or gratuity
from the Government;
xxx xxx xxx
But no article or species of
property mentioned in this section shall be
exempt from execution issued upon a
judgment recovered for its price or upon a
judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage
thereon. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the Family Code, Colonel Otamias is obliged
to give support to his family, petitioners in this case. However,
he retired in 2003, and his sole source of income is his pension.
Judgments in actions for support are immediately executory, yet
under Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, his pension
cannot be executed upon.
However, considering that Colonel Otamias has
waived a portion of his retirement benefits through his Deed of
Assignment, resolution on the conflict between the civil
code provisions on support and Section 31 of Presidential
Decree No. 1638 should be resolved in a more appropriate case.
III
Republic v. Yahon 74 is an analogous case because it
involved the grant of support to the spouse of a retired member
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
In Republic v. Yahon, Daisy R. Yahon filed a Petition
for the Issuance of Protection Order under Republic Act No.
9262. 75 She alleged that she did not have any source of income
because her husband made her resign from her job. 76 The trial
court issued a temporary restraining order, a portion of which
stated: TCAScE
 To insure that petitioner [Daisy
R. Yahon] can receive a fair share of
respondent's retirement and other
benefits, the following agencies thru their
heads are directed to WITHHOLD any
retirement, pension[,] and other benefits
of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A.
YAHON, a member of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines assigned at 4ID, Camp
Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City
until further orders from the court:
1. Commanding
General/Officer of the
Finance Center of the
Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Camp
Emilio Aguinaldo,
Quezon City;
2. The Management of
RSBS, Camp Emilio
Aguinaldo, Quezon
City;
3. The Regional
Manager of PAG-IBIG,
Mortola St., Cagayan de
Oro City. 77 (Emphasis
in the original)
The trial court subsequently granted Daisy's Petition
and issued a permanent protection order 78 and held:
Pursuant to the order of the court
dated February 6, 2007, respondent, S/Sgt.
Charles A. Yahon is directed to give it to
petitioner 50% of whatever retirement
benefits and other claims that may be due or
released to him from the government and the
said share of petitioner shall be
automatically deducted from respondent's
benefits and claims and be given directly to
the petitioner, Daisy R. Yahon.
Let copy of this decision be sent to
the Commanding General/Officer of Finance
Center of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo,
Quezon City; the Management of RSBS,
Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City and
the Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG,
Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City for their
guidance and strict compliance. 79
In that case, the AFP Finance Center filed before the
trial court a Manifestation and Motion stating that "it was
making a limited and special appearance" 80 and argued that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the Armed Forces of
the Philippines. Hence, the Armed Forces of the Philippines is
not bound by the trial court's ruling. 81
The Armed Forces of the Philippines also
cited Pacific Products, where this Court ruled that:
A rule, which has never been
seriously questioned, is that money in the
hands of public officers, although it may be
due government employees, is not liable to
the creditors of these employees in the
process of garnishment. One reason is, that
the State, by virtue of its sovereignty may
not be sued in its own courts except by
express authorization by the Legislature, and
to subject its officers to garnishment would
be to permit indirectly what is prohibited
directly. Another reason is that moneys
sought to be garnished, as long as they
remain in the hands of the disbursing officer
of the Government, belong to the latter,
although the defendant in garnishment may
be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And
still another reason which covers both of the
foregoing is that every consideration of
public policy forbids it. 82 (Citations
omitted)
This Court in Republic v. Yahon denied the Petition
and discussed that because Republic Act No. 9262 is the later
enactment, its provisions should prevail, 83 thus:
We hold that Section 8 (g) of R.A.
No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be
construed as laying down an exception to the
general rule above stated that retirement
benefits are exempt from execution. The law
itself declares that the court shall order the
withholding of a percentage of the income or
salary of the respondent by the employer,
which shall be automatically remitted
directly to the woman "[n]otwithstanding
other laws to the contrary." 84 (Emphasis in
the original)
IV
The 1987 Constitution gives much importance to the
family as the basic unit of society, such that Article XV 85 is
devoted to it.
The passage of the Family Code further implemented
Article XV of the Constitution. This Court has recognized the
importance of granting support to minor children, provided that
the filiation of the child is proven. In this case, the filiation of
Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias was admitted by
Colonel Otamias in the Deed of Assignment. 86 cTDaEH
Even before the passage of the Family Code, this
Court has given primary consideration to the right of a child to
receive support. In Samson v. Yatco, 87 a petition for support
was dismissed with prejudice by the trial court on the ground
that the minor asking for support was not present in court during
trial. An appeal was filed, but it was dismissed for having been
filed out of time. This Court relaxed the rules of procedure and
held that "[i]f the order of dismissal with prejudice of the
petition for support were to stand, the petitioners would be
deprived of their right to present and future support." 88
In Gan v. Reyes, 89 Augustus Caezar R. Gan (Gan)
questioned the trial court's decision requiring him to give
support and claimed that that he was not the father of the minor
seeking support. He also argued that he was not given his day in
court. This Court held that Gan's arguments were meant to delay
the execution of the judgment, and that in any case, Gan himself
filed a Motion for Leave to Deposit in Court Support Pendente
Lite:
In all cases involving a child, his
interest and welfare are always the
paramount concerns. There may be instances
where, in view of the poverty of the child, it
would be a travesty of justice to refuse him
support until the decision of the trial court
attains finality while time continues to slip
 away. An excerpt from the early case of De
Leon v. Soriano is relevant, thus:
The money
and property adjudged
for support and
education should and
must be given presently
and without delay
because if it had to wait
the final judgment, the
children may in the
meantime have suffered
because of lack of food
or have missed and lost
years in school because
of lack of funds. One
cannot delay the
payment of such funds
for support and
education for the reason
that if paid long
afterwards, however
much the accumulated
amount, its payment
cannot cure the evil and
repair the damage
caused. The children
with such belated
payment for support and
education cannot act as
gluttons and eat
voraciously and
unwisely, afterwards, to
make up for the years of
hunger and starvation.
Neither may they enrol
in several classes and
schools and take up
numerous subjects all at
once to make up for the
years they missed in
school, due to non-
payment of the funds
when needed. 90
V
The non-inclusion of the AFP PGMC or the AFP
Finance Center in the action for support was proper, considering
that both the AFP PGMC and the AFP Finance Center are not
the persons obliged to give support to Edna, et al. Thus, it was
not a real party-in-interest. 91 Nor was the AFP PGMC a
necessary party because complete relief could be obtained even
without impleading the AFP PGMC. 92
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2009 and Resolution
dated August 11, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 02555-MIN
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
Decision dated February 27, 2007 in F.C. Civil Case No. 2006-
039 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. cSaATC
Carpio, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Brion, * J., is on official leave.
||| (Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic, G.R. No. 189516, [June 8, 2016])
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 174689. October 19, 2007.]
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES
SILVERIO, petitioner,vs.REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness
of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by
Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo.
"Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices
said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the
bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings;
one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the
man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda"
(Beautiful).(The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman?
In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a
physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a
person's sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of
name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the
result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name
and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-
105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in
the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and
Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered
as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live
birth (birth certificate).His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is,
"anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and
that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted
several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman"
culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery 2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter
examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr.,a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical
certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in
fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in
his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely,"
and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was
published in the People's Journal Tonight, a newspaper of
general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive
weeks. 3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional
requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was
made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also
presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard
P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a
decision 4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition
not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his birth
records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not
petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the
affirmative. SCEHaD
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion
that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. With his sexual [re-
assignment],petitioner, who has always felt,
thought and acted like a woman, now
possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner's
misfortune to be trapped in a man's body is not
his own doing and should not be in any way
taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no
harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the
petition. On the contrary, granting the petition
would bring the much-awaited happiness on
the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and
the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented
to show any cause or ground to deny the
present petition despite due notice and
publication thereof. Even the State, through the
[OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
[o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered GRANTING the petition and
ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to
change the entries appearing in the Certificate
of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for
petitioner's first name from "Rommel Jacinto"
to MELY and petitioner's gender from "Male"
to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic),thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals. 6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the
change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex
alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of
Appeals 7 rendered a decision 8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled
that the trial court's decision lacked legal basis. There is no law
allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of
birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus,
the Court of Appeals granted the Republic's petition, set aside
the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP
Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it
was denied. 9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his
name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles
407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court and RA 9048. 10
The petition lacks merit. AEScHa
A PERSON'S FIRST NAME
CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE
GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground
for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial
court:
Petitioner filed the present petition
not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his
birth records compatible with his present
sex.(emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the
physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil
registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of identification. 11 A
change of name is a privilege, not a right. 12 Petitions for
change of name are controlled by statutes. 13 In this connection,
Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his
name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA
9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA
9048 provides:
SECTION 1.  Authority to Correct
Clerical or Typographical Error and Change
of First Name or Nickname.— No entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name
or nickname which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general in accordance
with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It
vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of
first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged
with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and
effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court,until and unless an administrative petition for change of
name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays
down the corresponding venue, 16 form 17 and procedure. In
sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first
name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial. AcDaEH
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which
change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4.  Grounds for Change
of First Name or Nickname.— The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be
allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first
name or nickname to be
ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or
pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname
has been habitually and
continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been
publicly known by that
first name or nickname in
the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first
name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first
name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself
into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter
one's legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048 does not sanction
a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner's first name
for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in
the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he
must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling
reason justifying such change. 19 In addition, he must show that
he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. 20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and
official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it
prayed for the change of petitioner's first name was not within
that court's primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been
filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could
be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper
remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA
9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue
was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth
certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the
use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all.
For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner's petition in so far as the change of his first name was
concerned. EACTSH
NO LAW ALLOWS THE
CHANGE OF ENTRY IN THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO
SEX ON THE GROUND OF SEX
REASSIGNMENT
The determination of a person's sex appearing in his
birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes. 21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil
Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.
 Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this
provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of
such matters can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule 108
now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in
entries in the civil register. 23
Section 2 (c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or
typographical error" is:
SECTION 2.  Definition of Terms.—
As used in this Act, the following terms shall
mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error"
refers to a mistake
committed in the
performance of clerical
work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an
entry in the civil register
that is harmless and
innocuous, such as
misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth or
the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only
by reference to other
existing record or
records: Provided,
however,That
no correction must
involve the change
of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner.
(emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. AIDcTE
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil
Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are
those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: 24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be
entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths;
(4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)
adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural
children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12)
recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16)
changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under
Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth. 25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision
can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the
ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to
remove the faults or error from“ while to change means "to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute." 26 The birth certificate of
petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No
correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in
the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization),events (such as births, marriages, naturalization
and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages,
adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil
interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of
name).These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal
consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and
nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by
the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts
or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor
even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal
situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of
a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership. 27 DHaEAS
The status of a person in law
includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature,
not ordinarily terminable at his own
will,such as his being legitimate or illegitimate,
or his being married or not. The
comprehensive term status ... include such
matters as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights in general,
family relations, and its various aspects, such
as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation,
marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession. 28 (emphasis supplied)
A person's sex is an essential factor in marriage and
family relations. It is a part of a person's legal capacity and civil
status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil
Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters
pertaining to the registration of civil status
shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines
governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to
petitioner's cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register
Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and
certification of births.— The declaration of the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth
or, in default thereof, the declaration of either
parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient
for the registration of a birth in the civil
register. Such declaration shall be exempt from
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the
local civil registrar not later than thirty days
after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
 attendance at the birth or by either parent of the
newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above
mentioned shall certify to the following facts:
(a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant;(c) names, citizenship and
religion of parents or, in case the father is not
known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of
parents; (e) place where the infant was born;
and (f) such other data as may be required in
the regulations to be issued. AScHCD
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a
historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
birth. 29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth,visually
done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no
law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
person's sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended
by error, 30 is immutable. 31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be
given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a
contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and
"female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning
the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no
legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is
defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that
distinguish a male from a female" 32 or "the distinction between
male and female." 33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or
bears young" 34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." 35 Thus, the words "male" and
"female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who
have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known
meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the
context compels to the contrary." 36 Since the statutory
language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early
1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term
"sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or
something that allows a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual to be included in the category "female." DCTHaS
For these reasons, while petitioner may have
succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of
entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is
no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the
entries in his birth certificate.
NEITHER MAY ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE AS TO FIRST NAME OR
SEX BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF
EQUITY
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was
in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It
believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury
||| (Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, [October 19, 2007], 562
or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
PHIL 953-974)
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and
wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even
the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner's
first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé.
However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is
a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman. 37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of
the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. 38 To
grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who
has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-
operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which
apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor
Code on employment of women, 39 certain felonies under the
Revised Penal Code 40 and the presumption of survivorship in
case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy
in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner's petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that
"[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason
of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it
is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The
duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or
amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature,
should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should
govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The
need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in
this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions
for change of first name and for correction or change of entries
in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may
be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures
shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person
who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his
name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to
write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no
authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else.
The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only
apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also
entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization
of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes
that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit
neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social
convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal.
However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of
public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the
courts. AaCTID
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J.,Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia,
JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 249011. March 15, 2021.]
CRISTITA ANABAN, CRISPINA
ANABAN, PUREZA ANABAN,
CRESENCIA ANABAN-WALANG, and
ROSITA ANABAN-
BARISTO, petitioners, vs. BETTY
ANABAN-ALFILER, MERCEDES
ANABAN, and MARCELO
ANABAN, respondents.
DECISION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J p:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to
reverse and set aside the Decision 2 dated July 24, 2019 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 154216 affirming the
nullity of the bigamous marriage between Pedrito Anaban
(Pedrito) and Pepang Guilabo (Pepang) and petitioners Cristita
Anaban, Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban, Cresencia Anaban-
Walang, and Rosita Anaban-Baristo's status as illegitimate
children of Pedrito and must inherit only as such.
Antecedents
In 1942, Pedrito Anaban (Pedrito) and Virginia
Erasmo (Virginia) got married in accordance with the native
customs of the Ibaloi Tribe to which they both belonged. They
had three (3) children, i.e., respondents Betty Anaban-Alfiler,
Mercedes Anaban, and Marcelo Anaban. 3
In 1947, however, the council of tribe elders took
notice of Virginia's insanity and based thereon approved the
couple's divorce and allowed Pedrito to remarry. 4
In 1952, Pedrito got married to fellow Ibaloi Pepang
still in accordance with their tribe's customs. They begot eight
(8) children — Lardi Anaban, Teodoro Anaban, Monina Anaban
and respondents Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban, Pureza
Anaban, Cresencia Anaban-Walang, and Rosita Anaban-
Baristo. 5
Upon Pedrito's death on September 2, 2004,
respondents sued for summary settlement or judicial partition of
the intestate estate of their father Pedrito. 6 They named as
respondents their half-siblings, petitioners Cristita Anaban,
Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban, Cresencia Anaban-Walang,
and Rosita Anaban-Baristo.
Respondents averred that during the marriage of their
father Pedrito to their mother Virginia, Pedrito acquired from his
father Pedro Anaban a portion of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-14574. But the new certificate
of title issued to Pedrito reflected that he was married to
petitioners' mother Pepang. Although in truth, his marriage with
their mother Virginia was not yet legally dissolved. Thus,
petitioners are actually the illegitimate children of their father
Pedrito. 7
Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that they are the
legitimate children of their father Pedrito with their mother
Pepang. Pedrito and respondents' mother Virginia were married
in accordance with the Ibaloi Tribe customs and their marriage
was also dissolved in accordance with Ibaloi tribe customs and
traditions. Thereafter, Pedrito married their (petitioners') mother
Pepang similarly in accord with the Ibaloi customs. Since the
celebration of marriage pursuant to a tribe's customs was
recognized under the Old Civil Code of the Philippines, then its
dissolution in accordance with that tribe's customs must also be
recognized. Thus, both the marriage and the subsequent divorce
between Pedrito and Virginia are valid. Consequently, the
marriage of their parents must also be deemed valid. 8
Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
By Decision 9 dated September 28, 2015, the MCTC
ruled that, first, the marriage between Pedrito and Virginia was
validly dissolved in accordance with the customs of the Ibaloi
tribe; and second, petitioners are the legitimate children of
Pedrito who must succeed in equal proportion with
respondents, viz.:
WHEREFORE, from the
foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows by declaring and ordering that:
1. The entire intestate estate of
Pedrito Anaban consists of his exclusive
property described as the parcel of land with
an area of 1.8 hectares located at Calot,
Sablan, Benguet and registered in the name
of Pedrito Anaban under TCT No. T-14575;
2. Petitioners Betty Anaban-
Alfiler, Mercedes Anaban and Marcelo
(Billy) Anaban and respondents Teodoro
Anaban, Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban,
Pureza Anaban, Monina Anaban,
Crese[n]cia (Esterlita) Anaban-Walang and
Rosita Anaban-Baristo are the true and
lawful heirs of the late Pedrito Anaban and
entitled to inherit the intestate estate left [by]
the said deceased;
3. Said true and lawful heirs of the
late Pedrito Anaban shall divide the subject
parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-14575
into ten equal shares of 1,800 square meters
each;
4. Within 30 days from [the]
finality of this Decision, Administratrix
Betty Alfiler is ordered to prepare a project
of partition of the intestate estate of the late
Pedrito Anaban for [purposes] of
distribution and delivery to the heirs their
corresponding shares, the identification of
which should be mutually agreed by the
heirs. In the event that identification of the
location of the specific shares will not be
agreed upon mutually, the same shall be
identified through draw lots; and
5. Administratrix Betty Alfiler is
likewise hereby ordered to render her final
accounting of her administration of the
intestate estate of the late Pedrito Anaban
also within 30 days from finality of this
Decision.
 SO ORDERED. 10
It held that since the tribe elders approved Pedrito and
Virginia's divorce. Subsequently, the tribe elders also approved
Pedrito and Pepang's marriage in accordance with the Ibaloi
customs. Thus, Pedrito's marriage with Pepang was as valid as
his marriage to Virginia. Petitioners, therefore, are also Pedrito's
legitimate children. 11
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
On appeal, RTC-Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet, by
Decision 12 dated October 10, 2017, declared as bigamous the
marriage of Pedrito and Pepang, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the appeal is partially
GRANTED.
The Decision of the court a
quo declaring that the intestate estate of the
decedent consists only of that parcel of land
with an area of 18,574 square meters,
registered in the name of the decedent under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-14575 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court finds the marriage
between the decedent, PEDRITO ANABAN
and Pepang Guilabo bigamous and VOID.
Respondent-appellees are, therefore,
illegitimate. Necessarily, Petitioner-
appellants, as legitimate children, shall
equally divide the entire one-half of their
father's estate, while Respondent-appellees,
as illegitimate children, shall equally divide
the other half thereof. Thus, assuming that
no creditor's claim may be deducted upon
finality of this judgment, each of Petitioner-
appellants shall be entitled to a share of
3,095.66 square meters. The other one-half
remaining portion shall be apportioned
equally between and among Respondent-
appellees. Thus, also assuming that no
creditor's claim may be deducted,
Respondent-appellees will get a share of
1,326.71 square meters each from their
father's estate. The Decision of the court a
quo stating the contrary is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Prior to distribution, the court a
quo should ensure that the required
publication of the notice of hearing of the
petition and the notice to creditors be
complied with and the claims of creditors, if
any, are disposed of.
SO ORDERED. 13
It held that customs and traditions cannot supplant
existing laws unless specifically provided under said laws.
Under the Civil Code, a subsisting marriage may be dissolved
only by death of either spouse or when the marriage is annulled
or declared void. True, Article 78 of the old Civil
Code recognizes the validity of marriages performed in
accordance with the couple's customs, rites, or practices, but this
recognition is limited to the solemnization of marriage and does
not extend to its dissolution. Thus, Pedrito's purported divorce
from Virginia cannot be legally recognized. It follows, therefore,
that Pedrito's marriage to Pepang was bigamous, hence, void. In
the eyes of the law, his marriage to Virginia subsisted.
Consequently, petitioners are illegitimate children of Pedrito. 14
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By its assailed Decision 15 dated July 24, 2019, the
Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Article 78 of the
old Civil Code was unequivocal — it only referred to
celebration of marriage. There was nothing therein implying that
the framers also intended to include the validity of divorce
decreed in accordance with non-Christian rites or customs. As
the statute is clear, its literal meaning must be applied without
attempt at any further interpretation. 16
More, Section 8, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 8371 (RA 8371),
otherwise known as the Indigenous People's Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA) also limits the State's recognition of marriages to
those solemnized pursuant to the non-Christian's rites and
customs. It does not mention anything about the State
recognition of dissolution of marriages in accordance with non-
Christian practices. 17
It is true that the State has permitted divorce between
Muslim Filipinos after the enactment of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws; but not divorce in other local tribes. 18
The Court of Appeals opined that while it
commiserated with the plight of petitioners and the rest of those
non-Christians who contracted subsequent marriages, honestly
believing that their previous marriages had already been
dissolved by a divorce decree in accordance with their customs,
the court cannot do anything as the matter is for the exclusive
consideration of the legislature and not of the judiciary. 19
The Present Petition
Petitioners now pray that the disposition of the Court
of Appeals be reversed and set aside. They maintain that
Pedrito's marriage with Virginia had already been legally
dissolved before he got married to their mother Pepang. As
marriages solemnized in accordance with a tribe's customs and
rites are recognized by the State, the subsequent dissolution of
these marriages in accordance with the same customs and rites
must also be recognized. 20
Admittedly, Article 78 did not expressly state that
marriages may be dissolved according to customs, rites, or
practices of non-Christians, but it cannot be denied that the
framers of the law intended to recognize all the existing
customs, rites, or practices of non-Christians, for how else
would a marriage solemnized in accordance with non-Christian's
customs, rites, or practices be dissolved if not in also accordance
with the same customs, rites, or practices? 21
The Court of Appeals also failed to give due attention
to the IPRA. Its passage has been the very legal basis of the
recognition of customary laws and practices of the indigenous
people (IPs) and indigenous cultural communities (ICCs). It is a
policy of the State to maintain the cultural integrity of the ICCs
and IPs. 22
This is precisely the reason why the Philippine
Statistics Authority (PSA) now applies Administrative Order
No. 3 (AO 3), Series of 2004 to govern the procedures and
guidelines for the effective civil registration, among others, of
births, marriages, dissolution of marriages, and other civil
concerns of the ICCs and IPs. It defines dissolution of marriage
among IPs as the termination of marriage per ruling of the
council of elders for causes sanctioned by established customary
laws or practices after exhausting all possible means of
reconciliation between the couple. This was what happened to
the marriage of Pedrito and Virginia. The Ibaloi council of
elders decreed their separation and thereafter allowed their
father to marry their mother. 23
In their Opposition/Motion to Deny Due
Course 24 dated October 28, 2019, respondents pray that the
petition be denied due course on ground that petitioners failed to
furnish their (respondents) counsel with a copy of the petition.
Petitioners only sent a copy of the petition to them, not their
counsel in violation of Section 5, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court and of established jurisprudence stating that service
must be made to counsel if the adverse party is represented by
one. They were duly represented by counsel, hence, service of
the petition should have been made on their counsel.
The State, on the other hand, through Assistant
Solicitor General Rex Bernardo L. Pascual, Senior State
Solicitor Joel N. Villaseran, and State Solicitor Soleil C. Flores,
avers 25 that the marriage between Pedrito and Pepang is void.
Customs and traditions cannot be made to apply over and above
existing laws unless otherwise allowed by these laws. The
old civil code which was in effect at the time Pedrito and Pepang
got married simply stated that marriages may be performed in
accordance with the parties' customs, rites, or practices. It did
not state that marriages may be dissolved according to these
customs, rites, and practices. Nothing therein implied that the
lawmakers intended to allow as well securing a divorce in
accordance with tribal customs, rites, or practices. 26
More, customs must be proven as a fact. Here,
petitioners failed to sufficiently prove their specific customs, if
any, governing divorce. They did not present evidence that
conclusively establish that Pedrito's purported divorce from
Virginia was in accord with their customs. They similarly failed
to present any ruling or decision rendered by the council of
elders supposedly approving the dissolution of Pedrito's
marriage with Virginia. Further, they failed to prove that Pedrito
and Virginia complied with the required rituals for completion
of the divorce process. In fine, it cannot be safely assumed that
Pedrito's marriage with Virginia was validly terminated. 27
Issue
Is Pedrito Anaban's divorce from Virginia Erasmo
claimed to have been decreed in accordance with the Ibaloi
customs be recognized under our laws?
Ruling
We answer in the negative.
At the threshold, we emphasize that the action below
is for partition of Pedrito's estate. In determining who should
succeed to the estate, the court may pass upon the validity of the
subsequent marriage between Pedrito and Pepang. Thus, in De
Castro v. Assidao-De Castro, 28 the Court decreed:
However, other than for
purposes of remarriage, no judicial action
is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such
as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of declaration
of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee
Cariño, the Court ruled that it is clothed
with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of two marriages despite the main
case being a claim for death benefits.
Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court
may pass upon the validity of a marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. However, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to
prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a marriage an absolute nullity.
(Emphasis supplied)
Here, there is no dispute that Pedrito was first married
to Virginia, although petitioners assert this marriage was later on
validly dissolved by the divorce decree handed down by the
Ibaloi council of elders which consequently allowed Pedrito to
remarry.
The question now comes to fore: can the divorce
granted under Ibaloi customs and practices be legally recognized
as to make Pedrito's subsequent marriage to Pepang as valid.
All of the courts below resolved the validity of the so-
called divorce between Pedrito and Virginia through the lens of
the old Civil Code. But, in reality, when Pedrito and Virginia got
married and even when they later on supposedly divorced, the
old Civil Code was not yet in effect. For it took effect on June
18, 1949, or two (2) years after the divorce decree was
purportedly handed down by the Ibaloi council of elders. The
law in effect prior thereto was still the Spanish Civil Code of
1889, Article 5 of which stated: 29
Article 5. Laws are abrogated only by other
subsequent laws, and the disuse or any
custom or practice to the contrary shall
not prevail against their observance.
(Emphasis supplied)
This was the equivalent of Article 11 of the old Civil
Code which provides that customs which are contrary to law,
public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.
For purposes of determining whether divorce was
contrary to law, public order or public policy at the time Pedrito
and Virginia allegedly obtained their own divorce, we trace back
the history of divorce or dissolution of marriage starting from
the Spanish regime.
During the Spanish colonization, Las Siete Partidas
was passed which only allowed relative divorce or what is
known now as legal separation. This allowed spouses to be free
of all marital obligations while their marriage subsists in the
eyes of the law. In 1917, however, Las Siete Partidas was
repealed by Act No. 2710 30 which took effect on March 11,
1917. Section 1 of Act No. 2710 reads:
Section 1. A petition for divorce can only be
filed for adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband,
committed in any of the forms described in
article four hundred and thirty-seven of the
Penal Code.
 Divorce, then, can be granted only on two (2)
grounds, i.e., adultery and concubinage. This was the prevailing
law when Pedrito and Virginia got married in 1942. In 1943,
however, during the Japanese occupation, Act No. 2710 was
abolished and Executive Order No. 141 (EO 141) was enacted
and took effect on March 25, 1943.
Under EO 141, absolute divorce may be granted on
these grounds: (a) adultery and concubinage; (b) attempt on the
life of one spouse by the other; (c) a subsequent marriage by
either party before the previous one was dissolved; (d)
loathsome contagious diseases contracted by either spouse; (e)
incurable insanity; (f) impotency; (g) repeated bodily violence
by one against the other; (h) intentional or unjustified desertion
continuously for at least one year; (i) unexplained absence from
the last conjugal abode continuously for at least three years; and
(j) slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the
other.
Only a little over a year, however, after the Americans
had taken over the Japanese as colonizers again of the
Philippines, EO 141 became ineffective and Act No. 2710,
which allowed divorce on ground of concubinage and adultery,
was once again reinstated. This was the prevailing law when
Pedrito and Virginia were granted divorce by the Ibaloi council
of elders in 1947.
Thus, in 1947, only two (2) grounds were accepted for
divorce, i.e., adultery and concubinage. Neither was the reason
for Pedrito and Virginia's divorce. The Ibaloi council of elders
granted the divorce on ground of Virginia's alleged insanity. The
divorce, therefore, is contrary to law, hence, cannot be
recognized.
The issue of whether divorce based on customs and
practices can be legally recognized during the effectivity of Act
No. 2710 has been resolved by the Court as early as 1933
in People v. Bitdu. 31 The Court held that Mora Bitdu's divorce
from Moro Halid in accordance with the Mohammedan customs
cannot be recognized. For divorce cannot be had except in that
court upon which the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then
only for those causes and with those formalities which the state
has, by statute, prescribed. The Court explained:
There is little to add to the well considered
decision of the trial judge. It seems to us
unnecessary to determine whether or not the
divorce in question was granted in
accordance with the Mohammedan religious
practices, as to which there seems to exist
considerable uncertainty, because in our
view of the case a valid divorce can be
granted only by the courts and for the
reasons specified in Act No. 2710. It is not
claimed that the appellant was divorced
from her first husband in accordance with
said Act.
In the case of Francisco vs. Tayao (50 Phil.
42), it was held that in the Philippines the
causes for divorce are prescribed by statute
or Act No. 2710 that (of adultery on the part
of the) wife or concubinage on the part of
the husband.
In the recent decision of People vs.
Bituanan (Moro), (56 Phil. 23), where the
defendant and a Moro woman were married
by a datu according to Moro customs and
usages and afterwards divorced by the datu
according to the same customs and usages, it
was held that the marriage performed
according to the rites of the Mohammedan
religion was valid, and assumed, for the
purpose of that case, that the defendant and
his wife were not legally divorced.
Section 25 of the Marriage Law (Act No.
3613) provides that marriages between
Mohammedans may be performed in
accordance with the rites or practice of their
religion, but there is no provision of law
which authorizes the granting of divorces
in accordance with the rites or practices
of their religion.
A divorce cannot be had except in that
court upon which the state has conferred
jurisdiction, and then only for those
causes and with those formalities which
the state has by statute prescribed (19
C.J., 19).
It is conceded in all jurisdictions that
public policy, good morals, and the
interests of society require that the
marriage relation should be sounded with
every safeguard and its severance allowed
only in the manner prescribed and for the
causes specified by law. And the parties can
waive nothing essential to the validity of the
proceedings (19 C.J., 20).
With respect to the contention that the
appellant acted in good faith in
contracting second marriage, believing
that she had been validly divorced from
her first husband, it is sufficient to say
that everyone is presumed to know the
law, and the fact that one does not know
that is act constitutes a violation of the
law does not exempt him from the
consequences thereof. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
As the trial court in Bitdu held, the laws governing
marriage and its incidents are moral in nature and as such they
are laws relating to public policy. The habits and customs of a
people, the dogmas and doctrines of a religion cannot be
superior to or have precedence over laws relating to public
policy, because as stated above laws relating to marriage and
its incidents are normal in nature and as such they affect public
policy. This holds true even up to this time.
Since there was no legal and valid ground for the
divorce of Pedrito and Virginia, in the eyes of the law, they were
still married and their marriage was not dissolved as to permit
Pedrito to remarry. Pedrito's subsequent marriage to petitioners'
mother Pepang, therefore, is void for being bigamous. Verily,
the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err when they ruled so
and declared petitioners as Pedrito's illegitimate children.
Petitioners insists, however, that since the old Civil
Code and the IPRA recognize customs in the solemnization of
marriage, the same should be applied in cases of dissolution as
marriage. But, as discussed, customs which are contrary to law,
public policy and public order cannot be recognized.
Also, even assuming that the old Civil Code was
applicable in the present case, the Court would arrive at the
same conclusion. Article 78 of the old Civil Code provided:
Article 78. Marriages between
Mohammedans or pagans who live in the
non-Christian provinces may be performed
 in accordance with their customs, rites or Lastly, petitioners invoke PSA's AO 3, series of 2004
practices. No marriage license or formal governing the procedures and guidelines for civil registration of
requisites shall be necessary. Nor shall the births, marriages, dissolution of marriages, and other civil
persons solemnizing these marriages be concerns of the ICCs and IPs. According to petitioners, AO 3
obliged to comply with Article 92. defines dissolution of marriage among IPs as the termination of
marriage per ruling of the council of elders for causes sanctioned
xxx xxx xxx by established customary law or practice after exhausting all
Section 8, Rule 6 of the IRR of IPRA is similarly possible means of reconciliation between the couple.
worded: But, AO 3 only took effect in 2004, fifty-seven (57)
Section 8. Recognition of years after the divorce was supposedly granted by the Ibaloi
Customary Laws and Practices Governing council of elders to Pedrito and Virginia. It cannot be applied
Civil Relations. — Marriage as an inviolable retroactively, but only prospectively.
social institution shall be protected. Besides, AO 3 is only a procedural avenue to
Marriages performed in accordance with recognize divorce or any other form of dissolution of marriage
customary laws, rites, traditions and where the substantive law already recognizes such change in a
practices shall be recognized as valid. As person's civil status. AO 3 cannot confer substantive rights
proof of marriage, the testimony of because the role of the PSA and now the National Statistics
authorized community elders or authorities Office is to record the civil status of persons but not to issue
of traditional sociopolitical structures shall laws on how to obtain or confer status.
be recognized as evidence of marriage for
purposes of registration. x x x All told, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err
in pronouncing that the marriage of Pedrito and Virginia was not
Clearly, both the old Civil Code and the IPRA- legally dissolved. As a consequence, Pedrito's subsequent
IRR provisions limited the State recognition to "marriages marriage to Pepang was bigamous, thus, void from the
performed" in accordance with customary laws, rites, traditions, beginning. The status of petitioners as illegitimate children of
and practices. There is no mention of the recognition of Pedrito and their heirship as such insofar as Pedrito's estate is
dissolution of marriage in accordance with the IP's customs. concerned can no longer be questioned.
On this score, we emphasize that Muslim customs, ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the
rites, and practices are the only non-Christian customary law Decision dated July 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
recognized by the State through the enactment of Presidential G.R. SP No. 154216 is AFFIRMED.
Decree No. 1083 otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines. 32 The same in fact bears an SO ORDERED.
entire chapter exclusively dedicated to divorce. Notably, its
applicability clause states: Perlas-Bernabe, Gesmundo, M.V. Lopez and Delos
Santos, * JJ., concur.
Article 13. Application. —
||| (Anaban v. Anaban-Alfiler, G.R. No. 249011, [March 15, 2021])
(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to
marriage and divorce wherein both parties
are Muslims, or wherein only the male party
is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized
in accordance with Muslim law or this Code
in any part of the Philippines.
At present, there is no similar law explicitly
recognizing the matrimonial customs, rites, and practices of the
Ibaloi Tribe.
Even if we are to assume that the constitutional and
statutory right to cultural integrity includes recognition of
indigenous divorce or any other form of indigenous dissolution
of marriages, the record is bereft of evidence that: (i) the culture
of the Ibaloi recognizes divorce or any other form of dissolution
of marriage; (ii) this recognition is a central aspect of their
cultural integrity and not merely peripheral to it; (iii) this
recognition has been a central cultural practice since time
immemorial and lasted to this day in its modern forms; and (iv)
the contents of and procedures for this central cultural practice,
if any.
The lead government agency for this determination —
in the words of the learned counsel of the State, the proof of
customary law as a fact — is the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples. But nothing from their end could answer
how, why, and when the dissolution of marriages is central to
the right to cultural integrity and what it means to say so. It
would, therefore, be speculative at this point to link this right to
cultural integrity to the dissolution of marriages between
members of the IP communities, sans any supporting evidence.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 193707. December 10, 2014.]
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in
behalf of her minor child RODERIGO
NORJO VAN WILSEM, petitioner, vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN
VAN WILSEM, respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Orders 1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu),
which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the
Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as
Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst
Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on
September 25, 1990. 2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a
son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing
of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age. 3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995
by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland. 4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
old. 5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the
Philippines. 6 CHIaTc
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to
provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred
Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less). 7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. 8
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and
remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing
thereat. 9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known
as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of
Pinamungahan, Cebu City. 10 To date, all the parties, including their
son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City. 11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a
letter demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent
refused to receive the letter. 12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a
complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E (2) of R.A.
No. 9262 for the latter's unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner. 13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to
which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit. 14 Thereafter, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution
recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged
against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and
raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that: IcTEaC
That sometime in the year 1995 and
up to the present, more or less, in the
Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue
to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old
minor, of financial support legally due him,
resulting in economic abuse to the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu
issued a Hold Departure Order against respondent. 16 Consequently,
respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. 17
Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent
Protection Order to which respondent filed his
Opposition. 18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was
arraigned. 19
Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the
application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged. 20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein
assailed Order, 21 dismissing the instant criminal case against
respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do
not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an
alien, the dispositive part of which states: aATEDS
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that
the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the
accused, he being an alien, and accordingly,
orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused
Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his
provisional liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and
ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19,
2010. 22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration
thereto reiterating respondent's obligation to support their child under
Article 195 23 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him
liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in
the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children
regardless of the obligor's nationality." 24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an
Order 25 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and
reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
. . . The arguments therein presented
are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier
in the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus,
the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since
 the accused is a foreign national he is not
subject to our national law (The Family Code)
in regard to a parent's duty and obligation to
give support to his child. Consequently, he
cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for
his alleged failure to support his child. Unless
it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262
applies to a foreigner who fails to give support
to his child, notwithstanding that he is not
bound by our domestic law which mandates a
parent to give such support, it is the considered
opinion of the court that no prima facie case
exists against the accused herein, hence, the
case should be dismissed. CScTDE
WHEREFORE, the motion for
reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1,
2010. 26
Hence, the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an
obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be
held criminally liable under R.A. No.
9262 for his unjustified failure to
support his minor child. 27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking
cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that the same was
directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling
in Republic  v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, 28 which
lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be
brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
. . . Nevertheless, the Rules do not
prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45
Petition with this Court, in case only
questions of law are raised or involved. This
latter situation was one that petitioners found
themselves in when they filed the instant
Petition to raise only questions of
law. CScTED
In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court
clarified the three modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary
appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule
41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil
or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for
review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was
rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court
under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is
taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of
fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The
second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of
fact and law. The third mode of appeal is
elevated to the Supreme Court only on
questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the
issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented or of
the truth or falsehood of the facts being
admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on the
matter. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given
set of circumstances. 29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve
questions of law — the response thereto concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,
whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his
minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held
criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do
so. DIEcHa
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition
highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability of a foreign
national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under
special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and
duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case,
therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will
eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore,
dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA
would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in
the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the
administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the
hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the
petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with
petitioner's contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable
under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to
support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 195 30 of the Family Code,
which provides the parent's obligation to support his child. Petitioner
contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree
issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, 31 respondent is
not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor
child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no
sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as well as
her minor son, are entitled to financial support. 32 Respondent also
added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated to
petitioner for any financial support. 33 AHaETS
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner
cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the New Civil Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article
15 35 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In
other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the
provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to
Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners
such that they are governed by their national law with respect to
family rights and duties. 36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that
falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen
of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether
he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences
of his failure to do so. 37
In the case of Vivo  v. Cloribel, 38 the Court held that —
 Furthermore, being still aliens, they Thus, when the foreign law,
are not in position to invoke the provisions of judgment or contract is contrary to a sound
the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that and established public policy of the forum,
Code cleaves to the principle that family the said foreign law, judgment or order shall
rights and duties are governed by their not be applied.
personal law, i.e., the laws of the nation to
which they belong even when staying in a Additionally, prohibitive laws
foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15). 39 concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order,
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not public policy and good customs shall not be
obliged to support petitioner's son under Article 195 of the Family rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in promulgated, or by determinations or
Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not conventions agreed upon in a foreign
obliged to support petitioner's son altogether. EHaASD country. CAHTIS
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign The public policy sought to be
law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign protected in the instant case is the principle
law. 40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the splitting up of a single cause of action.
matter of provision of and capacity to support. 41 While respondent
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules
is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. of Civil Procedure is pertinent —

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the
national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the
obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the
issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente  v. Court of
Appeals, 42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved. 43
In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of
the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption
shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign
law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. 44 Thus,
since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support
has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-
compliance therewith. IASTDE
If two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one
is available as a ground for the
dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not
be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum. To give justice is the
most important function of law; hence, a law,
or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict
of Laws. 48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands
neither enforce a parent's obligation to support his child nor penalize
the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice
to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is
entitled thereto.

Moreover, while in Pilapil  v. Ibay-Somera, 45 the Court We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself,
held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife, in
effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality consonance with the ruling in San Luis  v. San Luis, 49 to
principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant wit: SHaIDE
presented by respondent does not completely show that he is not
As to the effect of the divorce on the
liable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued.
Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should
Emphasis is placed on petitioner's allegation that under the second
no longer be considered married to the alien
page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent's obligation to support his
spouse. Further, she should not be required to
child is specifically stated, 46 which was not disputed by respondent.
perform her marital duties and obligations. It
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that held:
the national law of respondent states that parents have no obligation
To maintain, as private
to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by
respondent does, that, under our
law, said law would still not find applicability, in light of the ruling
laws, petitioner has to be
in Bank of America, NT and SA  v. American Realty
considered still married to private
Corporation, 47 to wit:
respondent and still subject to a
In the instant case, wife's obligations under Article
assuming arguendo that the English Law on 109, et. seq. of the Civil
the matter were properly pleaded and proved in Code cannot be just. Petitioner
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the should not be obliged to live together
Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down with, observe respect and fidelity,
in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign and render support to private
law would still not find applicability. respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property.
 She should not be discriminated have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against
against in her own country if the respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
ends of justice are to be served. respondent was acquired upon his arrest. cdll
(Emphasis added) 50
Finally, we do not agree with respondent's argument that
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging
respondent may be made liable under Section 5 (e) and (i) of R.A. violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability
No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support to petitioner's has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of
son, to wit: crime 52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence SECTION 24. Prescriptive
Against Women and Their Children. — The Period. — Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to
crime of violence against women and their 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts
children is committed through any of the falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall
following acts: prescribe in ten (10) years.
xxx xxx xxx The act of denying support to a child under Section 5 (e)
(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense, 53 which started
(e) Attempting to compel in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged
or compelling the woman or her in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has
desist from or desist from conduct provided support to petitioner's child calls for an examination of the
which the woman or her child has the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood
right to engage in, or attempting to of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of tis
restrict or restricting the woman's or issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
her child's freedom of movement or
conduct by force or threat of force, WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders
physical or other harm or threat of dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the
physical or other harm, or Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are
intimidation directed against the hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to
woman or child. This shall include, the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of
but not limited to, the following acts the case. CEASaT
committed with the purpose or effect
SO ORDERED.
of controlling or restricting the
woman's or her child's movement or Velasco, Jr., Villarama, Jr., Mendoza * and Reyes,
conduct: DHSaCA JJ., concur.
xxx xxx xxx ||| (Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, [December 10,
2014], 749 PHIL 823-840)
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the
woman or her children of financial support
legally due her or her family, or deliberately
providing the woman's children insufficient
financial support;
xxx xxx xxx
(i) Causing mental or
emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her
child, including, but not limited to,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children of access
to the woman's child/children. 51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of
financial support to the child is considered an act of violence against
women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living
in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner's claim that the
Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of
the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides
that:"[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory,
subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties
herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.]
ALICE REYES VAN
DORN, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V.
ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region Pasay City, and
RICHARD UPTON, respondents.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders,
dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No.
1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to
Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the
Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a
citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of
the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972;
that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973
and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were
divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner
has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit
against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's
business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community
property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the
Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the
property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the
subject of this Certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil
case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. Certiorari and
Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of
an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave
abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court
acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this
Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory
authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a
case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would
then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead
with the proceedings. 2 We consider the petition filed in this
case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on
the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from
laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the
American Court that they had no community of property; that
the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds;
and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree
issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive
laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the
acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the
same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to
determine whether the property relations between petitioner and
private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or
relative community property, upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case
is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce,
had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person
before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained
jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as
No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt, Ltd., to agree to the
divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding
that there were neither community property nor community
obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he
executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336
W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
"You are hereby authorized to accept
service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear
on my behalf and do all things necessary and
proper to represent me, without further
contesting, subject to the following:
"1. That my spouse seeks a divorce
on the ground of incompatibility.
"2. That there is no community of
property to be adjudicated by the Court.
"3. That there are no community
obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx" 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen.
For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce
in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
 the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree
of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to change
the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from
the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed
as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the
guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from
the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled
to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. cdll
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under
our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article
109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent
Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil
Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova Gutierrez, Jr.,
De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.
||| (Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., G.R. No. L-68470, [October 8, 1985],
223 PHIL 357-363)
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.]
IMELDA MANALAYSAY
PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA
IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C.
VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal
of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; ADULTERY AND
CONCUBINAGE; SWORN WRITTEN COMPLAINT OF
OFFENDED SPOUSE, JURISDICTIONAL. — Under Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as
four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It
has long since been established, with unwavering consistency,
that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely
a formal, requirement. While in point of strict law the
jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the
Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is
just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which
starts the prosecutory proceeding and without which the court
cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCLUSIVE AND SUCCESSIVE
RULE IN THE PROSECUTION OF SEDUCTION,
ABDUCTION, RAPE AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS,
NOT APPLICABLE TO CONCUBINAGE AND ADULTERY.
— Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for
adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents
or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above
mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is
significant that while the State, as parens partriae, was added
and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the
power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or
incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her
parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not
include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words,
only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to
initiate the action therefor.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE IN
CIVIL CASES, DETERMINED AS OF THE FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT, APPLIED TO PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL
CASES. — Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that
such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact,
lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss
in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or
petition. The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the
prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same
requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it
may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are
generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through
the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely
the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called
"private crimes", or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio,
and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the
offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the
right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter
exclusively within his power and option.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — This policy
was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who
might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through the scandal of a public trial. Hence, as cogently argued
by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the
time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is
a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of
law would be absent where the supposed offended party had
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the
filing of the criminal case.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADULTERY AND
CONCUBINAGE; AFTER A DIVORCE HAS BEEN
DECREED, THE INNOCENT SPOUSE NO LONGER HAS
THE RIGHT TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
THE OFFENDERS. — American jurisprudence, on cases
involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been
decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that
the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have
been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can
have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal
proceedings to a conclusion.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; U.S. RULE APPLIED IN THIS
JURISDICTION. — We see no reason why the same doctrinal
rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We
are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the
time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant
that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the
filing of the complaint.
7. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS; MARRIAGE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY BETWEEN A FILIPINA AND A GERMAN,
RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES. — In the present case,
the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status
of persons.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEVERANCE OF MATERIAL
BOND HAD THE EFFECT OF DISSOCIATING THE
FORMER SPOUSES FROM EACH OTHER. — The allegation
of private respondent that he could not have brought this case
before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true,
is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When
said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously
knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows
to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither
would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the
family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular
formulation of our law on adultery, since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one
would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; RULE IN MATA CASE (18
PHIL. 4 90), NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — The
aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully
relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the
old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the
Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the
marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated
that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity
of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should
be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage
contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually
secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it
cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can
still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such
declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to
stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the
beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration
of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover,
what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of
the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal
action for adultery was filed before the termination of the
marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The
same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the
termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a
valid foreign divorce.
DECISION
REGALADO, J p:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner
which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed
by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former,
provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on
what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional
question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay
Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal
Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously
enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate,
Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born
on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual
recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de
facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such
connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent
initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany
before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed
that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been
living apart since April, 1982.2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23,
1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-
15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg
Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The
records show that under German law said court was locally and
internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the
dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and
authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the
issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging
that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an
affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant
Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review,
the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8,
1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against
the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were
eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda
Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-
52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as
Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo
Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the
Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be
dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-
accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of
Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to
both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform
the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been
arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further
proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to
his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal
cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo
Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On
the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987.
Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the
cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of
proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the
resolution of the petition for review then pending before the
Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the
same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion
was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September
8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both
accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter
entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be
arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by
respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were
fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted
herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a
plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order
of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is
anchored on the main ground that the court is without
jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a
private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since
the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his
national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing
the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on
March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted
on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's
ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the
petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for
shall accordingly issue. LexLib
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the
crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity,
cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint
filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established,
with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in
point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is
vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn
written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is
that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and
without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the
case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions
for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents
or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above
mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is
significant that while the State, as parens partriae, was added
and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the
power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or
incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her
parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not
include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words,
only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to
initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that
such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact,
lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss
in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or
petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the
prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same
requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it
may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are
generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through
the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely
the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called
"private crimes", or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio,
and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the
offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the
right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter
exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the
aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as
cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for
adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of
said provision of law would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the
status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action
be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such
status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the
action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to
the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status
existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to
but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We
would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing
suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do
so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local
precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when
precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must
exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by
one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status.
Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the
inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement
of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between
the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at
the time of the institution of the action by the former against the
latter. cdphil
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in
that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the
rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse
no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse
shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly
commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal
effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a
conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa
held that —
" 'No prosecution for adultery can be
commenced except on the complaint of the
husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though
Loftus was husband of defendant when the
offense is said to have been committed, he had
ceased to be such when the prosecution was
begun; and appellant insists that his status was
not such as to entitle him to make the
complaint. We have repeatedly said that the
offense is against the unoffending spouse, as
well as the state, in explaining the reason for
this provision in the statute; and we are of the
opinion that the unoffending spouse must be
 such when the prosecution is commenced."
(Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should
not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our
statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced
that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-
vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint
was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must
be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still
married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law
on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.,
et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court
between Alice Van Dorn, a Filipina, and her American husband,
the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her
business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be
ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted
the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this
Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
"There can be no question as to the
validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American
citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot
sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union . . .
"It is true that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their
national law . . .
"Thus, pursuant to his national law,
private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
the case below as petitioner's husband entitled
to exercise control over conjugal assets . . ." 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent,
being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing
to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not
have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or
consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no
longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a
danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is
said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our
law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had
the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,
hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on
the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot
be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying
Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as
Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery
"although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court
merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous
the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even
though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have
her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless
she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect".
Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the
complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity
because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is
equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no
marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed
after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to
stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and
within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation
where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the
termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its
nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily
apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in
this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al.
vs. Vamenta, herein before cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of
inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the
offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a
complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its
sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant.
Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at
bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying
petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-
52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order
issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento,
JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J ., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether
We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in the
Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by
the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can
no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former
wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in
divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to
have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be
less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed
to deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]),
the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce between the
American husband and his American wife as valid and binding
in the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are
governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is
no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of
 such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married
to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would
be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled
Private International Law and precisely because of the National
law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar
as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as the
Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially
grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a
man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of
the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the
correct view. While under the national law of the husband the
absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the
application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to
comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury
to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to
recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the
husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife
whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it
would seem that under our law existing before the new Family
Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should
be considered void both with respect to the American husband
and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.(139
SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband
was an American with a Filipino wife because in said case the
validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned
was NEVER put in issue.
||| (Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116, [June 30, 1989], 256
PHIL 407-421)
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001.]
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J.
GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
Olivia Velasco-Jacoba for petitioner.
Gomez & Associates for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity
of marriage in the court a quo on the ground of bigamy, alleging
that respondent, an Australian citizen, had a prior subsisting
marriage to one Editha Samson, also an Australian citizen at the
time he married her in 1994. Pending trial of the case,
respondent obtained a divorce decree from a family court in
Australia. The court held that the Australian divorce had ended
the marriage, thus, there was no more marital union to nullify.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held: that the Australian
divorce decree did not absolutely establish respondent's legal
capacity to remarry under his national law, hence, there is no
basis for the ruling of the trial court which assumed that the
Australian divorce restored respondent's capacity to remarry;
that as it is, there is no evidence that proves respondent's legal
capacity to marry petitioner; that the case should, therefore, be
remanded to the lower court for the purpose of receiving
evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to
marry petitioner; and that failing in that, of declaring the parties'
marriage void on the ground of bigamy. ADEacC
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY;
OFFICIAL RECORD OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY, HOW
PROVED. — Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted
in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of a foreign country. Under Sections 24 and
25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1)
an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AUSTRALIAN DIVORCE DECREE
RENDERED ADMISSIBLE DESPITE NONCOMPLIANCE
THEREWITH IN CASE AT BAR. — The divorce decree between
respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued
by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated. Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce
decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for
petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it
had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object
properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of
the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
3. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL NOTICE; COURTS CANNOT
TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF AUSTRALIAN MARITAL LAWS;
CASE AT BAR. — The burden of proof lies with "the party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are
denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.
Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon
him. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SHOW
RESPONDENT'S CAPACITY TO REMARRY; PROPER
REMEDY; CASE AT BAR. — On its face, the herein Australian
divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: "1. A party to a
marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by
respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish
his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we
find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter. . . .
As it is, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal
capacity to marry petitioner. Hence, we believe that the most
judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive
evidence, if any, which show respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity
of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already
in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated
March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12,
1994.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized
in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce
must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree
and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
according to our law on evidence. aHTCIc
 The Case of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of
based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The
the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more
Decision 1 and the March 24, 1999 Order 2 of the Regional Trial
marital union to nullify or annul. HDTISa
Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF.
The assailed Decision disposed as follows: Hence, this Petition. 18
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares Issues
the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and
Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, Petitioner submits the following issues for our
1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both consideration:
parties can now remarry under existing and
"1
applicable laws to any and/or both parties." 3
The trial court gravely erred in
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-
finding that the divorce decree obtained in
quoted Decision.
Australia by the respondent ipso
The Facts facto terminated his first marriage to Editha
Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha second marriage with the petitioner.
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
1987. 4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On "2
May 18, 1989, 5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. The failure of the respondent, who is
now a naturalized Australian, to present a
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, certificate of legal capacity to marry
as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the constitutes absence of a substantial requisite
Australian government. 6 Petitioner — a Filipina — and respondent voiding the petitioner's marriage to the
were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help respondent.
Church in Cabanatuan City. 7 In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino." 8 "3

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While
the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on
May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia. 9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in the court a quo, on the
ground of bigamy — respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed
that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in
November, 1997. TDCaSE
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993,
he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution. 11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australia in 1989; 12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 — or about five years after the couple's
wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending
— respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably
broken down." 13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be
dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action. 14 The
Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. 15 The court
marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties. 16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case
was submitted for resolution. 17
The trial court seriously erred in the
application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in
this case.
"4
The trial court patently and
grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13,
21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the
applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in
pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained
by the respondent in Australia ipso
facto capacitated the parties to remarry,
without first securing a recognition of the
judgment granting the divorce decree before
our courts." 19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this
Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the
divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)
whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more
necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision Proving the Divorce Between
and Order. Respondent and Editha Samson

Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the
ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized
in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong
Seng Gee, 20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other
foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only
upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute
divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that
respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by
the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the
legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as
the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide
for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 21 A marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 22 and 17 23 of the Civil
Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26 25 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." 26 A divorce
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws. 27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as
pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo
Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law." 28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can
be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. 29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient. STHAID
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be
admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration
requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These
articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license
is required, each of the contracting parties shall
file separately a sworn application for such
license with the proper local civil registrar
which shall specify the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) If previously married, how,
when and where the previous marriage was
dissolved or annulled;
xxx xxx xxx"
"ART. 13. In case either of the
contracting parties has been previously
married, the applicant shall be required to
furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal
certificate required in the last preceding article,
the death certificate of the deceased spouse or
the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or
the judicial decree of annulment or declaration
of nullity of his or her previous marriage. . . . .
"ART. 52. The judgment of
annulment or of absolute nullity of the
marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of
the children's presumptive legitimes shall be
recorded in the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property; otherwise, the same shall
not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian
divorce decree is a public document — a written official act of an
Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign
judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must
first be presented and admitted in evidence. 30 A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. 31 The decree purports
to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of
a foreign country. 32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested 33 by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office. 34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court. 35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree
of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City. 36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification. 37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object
properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of
the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. 38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of
the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992. 39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen. 40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of
their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws. aSDCIE
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian
divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging
the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of
the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in
that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law
is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take
judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the
"party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." 41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have
the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when
those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters. 42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him.
 It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. 43 Like any other facts, they
must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among
those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function. 44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised
with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of
the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in
1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree,
which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his
legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal
sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The
two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force. 45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce
was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory
decree — a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in
effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected. 46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may
under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage.
Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute;
thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of
adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may
allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. 47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a
restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who
marries again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless the other party has died)
commits the offense of bigamy." 48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce
obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his
national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court,
which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso
facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce
decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to
his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 49 of the Rules of Court,
for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal
effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity
required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together
with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its
absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to
remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract
marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned.
The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would
have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had
he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted
certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. 50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that
proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of
the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits
were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit
"A" — Complaint; 51 (b) Exhibit "B" — Certificate of Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija; 52 (c) Exhibit "C" — Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on
March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; 53 (d) Exhibit "D" —
Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no
information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D.
Samson was in its records; 54 and (e) Exhibit "E" — Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; 55 (2) for respondent:
(a) Exhibit "1" — Amended Answer; 56 (b) Exhibit "2" — Family
Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family
Court of Australia; 57 (c) Exhibit "3" — Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; 58 (d) Exhibit "4" —
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia Certificate; 59 and Exhibit "5" — Statutory Declaration of
the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia
Recio since October 22, 1995. 60 EHaASD
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree
with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that
the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or
at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After
all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.
Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this
case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then
the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the
ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing
marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines,
one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the
purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's
legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the
parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
||| (Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, [October 2, 2001], 418 PHIL
723-739)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 162580. January 27, 2006.]
ELMAR O. PEREZ, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZ-
CATINDIG, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court assails the July 25, 2003 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 which set aside
and declared as null and void the September 30, 2002 Order 2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, granting
petitioner's motion for leave to file intervention and admitting
the Complaint-in-Intervention 3 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44847;
and its January 23, 2004 Resolution 4 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily
Gomez Catindig 5 twice on May 16, 1968. The first marriage
ceremony was celebrated at the Central Methodist Church at
T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila while the second took place
at the Lourdes Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon City. The
marriage produced four children.
Several years later, the couple encountered marital
problems that they decided to separate from each other. Upon
advice of a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from
the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and
Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the
Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican
Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce
action under its laws. 6
Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents
filed a joint petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil
court in the Dominican Republic ratified the divorce by mutual
consent of Tristan and Lily. Subsequently, on June 23, 1984, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, ordered the
complete separation of properties between Tristan and Lily.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O.
Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States 7 and both
lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union
produced one offspring. 8
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the
divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic
which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was
not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to
Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law. When she
confronted Tristan about this, the latter assured her that he
would legalize their union after he obtains an annulment of his
marriage with Lily. Tristan further promised the petitioner that
he would adopt their son so that he would be entitled to an equal
share in his estate as that of each of his children with Lily. 9
On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Case No. Q-01-
44847. CTSHDI
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to
File Intervention 10 claiming that she has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation because she knows certain information which
might aid the trial court at a truthful, fair and just adjudication of
the annulment case, which the trial court granted on September
30, 2002. Petitioner's complaint-in-intervention was also ordered
admitted.
Tristan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the order dated
September 30, 2002 of the trial court. The Court of Appeals
granted the petition and declared as null and void the September
30, 2002 Order of the trial court granting the motion for leave to
file intervention and admitting the complaint-in-intervention.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied,
hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition filed under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals gravely abused its discretion in disregarding her legal
interest in the annulment case between Tristan and Lily.
The petition lacks merit.
Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrieved party
from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, if
the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act
complained of was granted by a court with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as alleged
in this case, the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the said Rules. 11 This is based on the premise that in
issuing the assailed decision and resolution, the Court of
Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of lack of jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A remedy is
considered plain, speedy, and adequate if it will promptly relieve
the petitioner from the injurious effect of the judgment and the
acts of the lower court. 12
It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to
establish that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated the assailed decision and resolution.
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of
discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or
contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation
of law. 13 The word "capricious," usually used in tandem with
the term "arbitrary," conveys the notion of willful and
unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand
of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the
exercise of discretion is imperative. 14
The Rules of Court laid down the parameters before a
person, not a party to a case can intervene, thus:
Who may intervene. — A person
who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the
 parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an officer thereof
may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties, and whether
or not the intervenor's rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding. 15
admitting the complaint-in-intervention was attended with grave
abuse of discretion. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
correctly set aside and declared as null and void the said order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The
assailed Decision dated July 25, 2003 and Resolution dated
January 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
74456 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal interest Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario,
in the matter in litigation; and [b] consideration must be given as JJ., concur.
to whether the adjudication of the original parties may be Panganiban, C.J., in the result.
delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights may be
protected in a separate proceeding or not. 16  
Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, ||| (Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162580, [January 27, 2006],
must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and 516 PHIL 204-212)
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose
by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. 17 Such
interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply
contingent and expectant. 18
Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and
companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her with the requisite
legal interest required of a would-be intervenor under the Rules
of Court. ICAcaH
Petitioner's claim lacks merit. Under the law,
petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan, hence her claim of
legal interest has no basis.
When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984,
Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree
that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic
never dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic that
laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad. 19 Regardless of
where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be
governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family
rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal
capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she
was married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain
an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes
successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines
will not recognize such absolute divorce. 20
When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their
marriage was governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code 21 which took effect on August 30, 1950. In the case
of Tenchavez v. Escaño 22 we held:
(1) That a foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act
No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid
in this jurisdiction; and neither is the
marriage contracted with another party by
the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity
in the country. (Emphasis added)
Thus, petitioner's claim that she is the wife of Tristan
even if their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus,
petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which
her motion for intervention is based.
Since petitioner's motion for leave to file intervention
was bereft of the indispensable requirement of legal interest, the
issuance by the trial court of the order granting the same and
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.]
EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 134029. February 6, 2007]
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review
assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set
aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31,
1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate
of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born
six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married
Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However,
on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.),
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent
Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no
children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the
time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo's
estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch
146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of
Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was
residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent's surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage,
and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real
properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at
P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have
any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration
be issued to her. TAaIDH
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one
of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion
to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to
state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for
letters of administration should have been filed in the Province
of Laguna because this was Felicisimo's place of residence prior
to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same
grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the
dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial
court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss,
respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto.
She submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna,
he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982.
Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by
the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove
that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been
dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal
capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of
the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar
San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the
Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate respondent's bigamous marriage
with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of
Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify
Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the
case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that
respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid.
Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot
and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos
was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the
resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge
Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed
a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their
motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts
and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an
Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-
raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the
parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin
issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the
petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is
adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous
motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and
Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June
20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the
petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a
resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should
have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It
also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the
decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo's marriage to
Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimo's legitimate children. CDTHSI
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the
disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were
denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed
Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated
September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the
Orders dated February 28 and October 24,
1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of
the case is REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings. 29
The appellate court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73
of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished
from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although
Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he
actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for
letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had
legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the
marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly
dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by
the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a
result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated
to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus —
With the well-known rule — express
mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of
the Family Code of the Philippines, the
doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason
and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O.
No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to
sustain the individual view — sweeping
statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that
"Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state
against divorce in any form whatsoever."
Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
grants. All that the courts should do is to give
force and effect to the express mandate of the
law. The foreign divorce having been obtained
by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the
Filipino divorcee, "shall . . . have capacity to
remarry under Philippine laws". For this
reason, the marriage between the deceased and
petitioner should not be denominated as "a
bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of
the Family Code, the petitioner as the
surviving spouse can institute the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased. . . . 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the
instant petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a
manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was
granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and
Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They
contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v.
Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one
domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his
domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent's marriage to
Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed
during the subsistence of the latter's marriage to Merry Lee.
They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively
applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void
bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered
the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was
properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to
file the subject petition for letters of administration. DScTaC
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in
which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia
Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence — as contradistinguished from
domicile — of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi
termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term
"resides," like the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted
in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules —
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature — residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word "domicile" still
it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
 make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as
the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides"
should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one's domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must
be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis
supplied) STIcEA
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence,"
for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings
in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case
because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a
distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws
and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In
election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to
which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under
the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his
residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that
Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent
submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated
January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the
aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from
the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for
the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of
Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa."
Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased
in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country
Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
deceased's children to him at his Alabang address, and the
deceased's calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is
at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while
his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a
municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as
per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the
subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad's legal
personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we
must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced
by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil
Code, considering that Felicidad's marriage to Felicisimo was
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a
marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which
marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained
abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid
under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in
the properties from their conjugal partnership should be
protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the
divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the
properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of
the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45
L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree
of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them
both from the bond. The marriage
tie, when thus severed as to one
party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides, in the
nature of a penalty, that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that
party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the
former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law,
private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
the case below as petitioner's husband entitled
to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is bound by the Decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction
over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the
Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to
the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform
her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent
does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to
be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
 the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support
to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be
served. 54 (Emphasis added) AcaEDC
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the
alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit
against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of
the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not
affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court
stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although
decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was
obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in
effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the
development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines
cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as
severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a
valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the
Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to
Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the
historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President
Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3,
1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the
signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to
Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized
outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of
the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according
to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case
of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino
spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in
resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law
already established through judicial precedent. HAaECD
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some
way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and
shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered
released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to
it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a
valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil
Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law
insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this
Court's rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse
should not be discriminated against in his own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed,
we test a law by its results; and likewise, we
may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule
that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the
first concern of the judge should be to discover
in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be
interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice
as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is
to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law
not independently of but in consonance with
 justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and
we must keep them so. To be sure, there are
some laws that, while generally valid, may
seem arbitrary when applied in a particular
case because of its peculiar circumstances. In
such a situation, we are not bound, because
only of our nature and functions, to apply them
just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance
between the word and the will, that justice may
be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons.
We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the
literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking
too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these
words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxx xxx xxx
More than twenty centuries ago,
Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due."
That wish continues to motivate this Court
when it assesses the facts and the law in every
case brought to it for decision. Justice is
always an essential ingredient of its decisions.
Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the
law in a way that will render justice, presuming
that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the
divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that
there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held
that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and
that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo
allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated
text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly
show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said
law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial
court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to
marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter
has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through
their joint efforts during their cohabitation. TIEHDC
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that
letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse
of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also
provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for
letters of administration. — A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by
an interested person and must show, as far as
known to the petitioner: . . . .
An "interested person" has been defined as one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has
a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must
be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which
was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the
divorce and Felicisimo's capacity to remarry, but fails to prove
that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws
of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Article 144 76 of the Civil Code.This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired
by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and
industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of
both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision
would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating
the property relations of couples living together as husband and
wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property
regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership
of property governing the union of parties who
are not legally capacitated to marry each other,
but who nonetheless live together as husband
and wife, applies to properties acquired during
said cohabitation in proportion to their
respective contributions. Co-ownership will
only be up to the extent of the proven actual
contribution of money, property or industry.
Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
xxx xxx xxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang,
and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the
issue of co-ownership of properties acquired
 by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled
that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. . . .
As in other civil cases, the burden of
proof rests upon the party who, as determined
by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must
be proved by competent evidence and reliance
must be had on the strength of the party's own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponent's defense. . . . 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent's
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil
Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February
28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
petitioners' motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order
which dismissed petitioners' motion for reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
||| (San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. Nos. 133743 & 134029, [February 6,
2007], 543 PHIL 275-298)
 FIRST DIVISION live separately and to dissolve and liquidate
their conjugal partnership of
property. CAHaST
[G.R. No. 171914. July 23, 2014.]
On January 12, 1977, ATTY. LUNA
obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, petitioner, vs. EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, Chamber of the First Circumscription of the
represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo,
EUGENIA ZABALLERO- Dominican Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo,
LUNA, respondents. Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY.
LUNA contracted another marriage, this time
with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA
and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and
DECISION lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA
organized a new law firm named: Luna,
BERSAMIN, J p: Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON)
where ATTY. LUNA was the managing
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the partner.
nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON
property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos through ATTY. LUNA purchased from
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country Tandang Sora Development Corporation the
lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium
the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage. Project (condominium unit) at Gamboa St.,
The Case Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square
meters, for P1,449,056.00, to be paid on
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces installment basis for 36 months starting on
Luna, appeals the adverse decision promulgated on November 11, April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to
2005, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with be used as law office of LUPSICON. After full
modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City. 2 The CA condominium unit was executed on July 15,
thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on
husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing
acquired during the second marriage. the following names:
Antecedents "JUAN LUCES LUNA,
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as married to Soledad L.
follows: Luna (46/100); MARIO
E. ONGKIKO, married
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko
was at first a name partner in the prestigious (25/100); GREGORIO
law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, R. PURUGANAN,
Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that married to Paz A.
time when he was living with his first wife, Puruganan (17/100); and
herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero- TERESITA CRUZ
Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married SISON, married to
in a civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of Antonio J.M. Sison
the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September (12/100) . . ."
10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church
ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY.
Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R.
LUNA's marriage to EUGENIA, they begot Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold
seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new
Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7,
Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio 1992 in the following names:
Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and "JUAN LUCES LUNA,
Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) married to Soledad L.
decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and Luna (38/100); MARIO
EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from E. ONGKIKO, married
each other in February 1966 and agreed to to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko
separation of property, to which end, they (50/100); TERESITA
entered into a written agreement entitled CRUZ SISON, married
"AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND to Antonio J.M. Sison
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated (12/100) . . ."
November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to
 Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761
dissolved and the condominium unit was consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN
partitioned by the partners but the same was (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to
still registered in common under CCT No. have been acquired by Juan Luces Luna
21716. The parties stipulated that the interest through his sole industry;
of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit
would be 25/100 share. (b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or
under any other concept over the condominium
ATTY. LUNA thereafter established unit, hence the entry in Condominium
and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry
G. De la Cruz and used a portion of the office of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil
condominium unit as their office. The said law status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed
firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
July 12, 1997. Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his
share in the condominium unit including the (c) Plaintiff is declared to be the
lawbooks, office furniture and equipment owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Corporation, American Jurisprudence and
Luna, ATTY. LUNA's son of the first Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the condominium unit and defendants are ordered
25/100 portion of the condominium unit to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as
belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la appropriate arrangements have been made for
Cruz who established his own law firm named transport and storage.
Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
No pronouncement as to costs.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of
ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well SO ORDERED. 5
as the law books, office furniture and
Decision of the CA
equipment became the subject of the complaint
filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. Both parties appealed to the CA. 6
JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch
138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to
Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the RTC namely:
the subject properties were acquired during the I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
existence of the marriage between ATTY. RULING THAT THE
LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS
efforts that since they had no children, ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE
SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN
properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to LUCES LUNA;
the extent of 3/4 pro-indiviso share consisting
of her 1/2 share in the said properties plus her II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
1/2 share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA RULING THAT PLAINTIFF-
which was bequeathed to her in the latter's last APPELLANT DID NOT
will and testament; and that the heirs of ATTY. CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE
LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded ACQUISITION OF THE
SOLEDAD from her share in the subject CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
properties. The complaint prayed that
SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the 1/2 III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
portion of the subject properties; that the same GIVING CREDENCE TO
be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY
on the condominium unit pertaining to the OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS
share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF
receiver be appointed to preserve and THE ACQUISITION OF THE
administer the subject properties; and that the UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER
heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY
attorney's fees and costs of the suit to FAVORABLE TO THE
SOLEDAD. 3 EIaDHS PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

Ruling of the RTC IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT

GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL
trial upon the aforementioned facts, 4 disposing thusly: PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA
WHEREFORE, judgment is AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT
rendered as follows: WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED
AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-
the condominium unit located at the SIXTH APPELLANT AND LUNA;
FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE
 TO THE ABSENCE OF THE prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign
DISPOSITION OF THE divorce between Filipino citizens is not
CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE recognized in our jurisdiction. . . . 10
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT; xxx xxx xxx

VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN WHEREFORE, premises

GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE considered, the assailed August 27, 2001
TO THE FACT THAT THE NAME Decision of the RTC of Makati City, Branch
OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID 138, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF
(a) The 25/100 pro-
ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED
indiviso share in the condominium
BY TANDANG SORA
unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
KALAW LEDESMA
OVER THE CONDOMINIUM
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT
UNIT; cAaDHT
covered by Condominium Certificate
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN of Title No. 21761 consisting of
RULING THAT NEITHER FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN
ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS
CODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF is hereby adjudged to defendants-
THE CIVIL CODE OF THE appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces
PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE; Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Lung
(first marriage), having been
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT acquired from the sole funds and sole
RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF industry of Juan Luces Luna while
ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR- marriage of Juan Luces Luna and
APPELLANT HAS BEEN Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first
BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION marriage) was still subsisting and
AND LACHES; and valid;
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT (b) Plaintiff-appellant
EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE Soledad Lavadia has no right as
INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE owner or under any other concept
OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT over the condominium unit, hence
TO PAY FILING FEE. 7 the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the
In contrast, the respondents attributed the following errors Registry of Deeds of Makati with
to the trial court, to wit: respect to the civil status of Juan
Luces Luna should be changed from
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
HOLDING THAT CERTAIN
Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES
FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE
LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero
LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA
Luna"; SHaATC
WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE
OF PLAINTIFF'S MONEY; (c) Defendants-appellants,
the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first
HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF
marriage) are hereby declared to be
PROVED BY PREPONDERANCE
the owner of the books Corpus Juris,
OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM
Fletcher on Corporation, American
OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme
LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY.
Court Reports found in the
LUNA'S LAW OFFICE; and
condominium unit.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
No pronouncement as to costs.
HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING
PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID SO ORDERED. 11
FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE
RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM On March 13, 2006, 12 the CA denied the petitioner's
HAD PRESCRIBED AND motion for reconsideration. 13
BARRED BY LACHES AND
ESTOPPEL. 8 Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed
on certiorari that:
modified decision, 9 holding and ruling:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the
ruling that the Agreement for
legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the
Separation and Property
latter's death on July 12, 1997. The absolute
Settlement executed by Luna and
divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in
Respondent Eugenia was
the Dominican Republic did not terminate his
 unenforceable; hence, their conjugal
partnership was not dissolved and
liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
not recognizing the Dominican
Republic court's approval of
the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that Petitioner Failed to
adduce sufficient proof of actual
contribution to the acquisition of
purchase of the subject condominium
unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that Petitioner was not entitled
to the subject law books. 14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the
contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indiviso share
in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal
Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to
ascertain the law that should determine, firstly, whether the divorce
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had
validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the
second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner
entitled the latter to any rights in property.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1.
Atty. Luna's first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna. and Eugenia, both
Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947.
The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish
Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil
Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that
Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, although living abroad. 15 Pursuant to the nationality
rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna
and Eugenia having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna
on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on
September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between
Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even
under the Family Code, 16 even if either or both of the spouses are
residing abroad. 17 Indeed, the only two types of defective marital
unions under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages.
As such, the remedies against such defective marriages have been
limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment
of the marriage. DHIcET
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the
Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia. 18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the
divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the
time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to
the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution, 19 and regards it as a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and
family life. 20 The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the
Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the
marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the
death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided by law.
For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists,
no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be
given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this
jurisdiction.
2.
The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation
and Property Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and
Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the divorce
proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership was
enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible
error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered
into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10,
1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish
Civil Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not
specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had
not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the
marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may
in the marriage settlements agree upon
absolute or relative community of property, or
upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains as established in this
Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Code has defined a conjugal
partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the
conjugal partnership of gains the husband and
wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their
work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for
any of various causes of termination enumerated in Article 175
of the Civil Code, viz.:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership
of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal
separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
 (4) In case of judicial separation of
property under Article
191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and
Eugenia did not per se dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent
court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil
Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an
express declaration in the marriage settlements,
the separation of property between spouses
during the marriage shall not take place save in
virtue of a judicial order. (1432a) cCaSHA
Article 191. The husband or the wife
may ask for the separation of property, and it
shall be decreed when the spouse of the
petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty
which carries with it civil interdiction, or has
been declared absent, or when legal separation
has been granted.
xxx xxx xxx
The husband and the wife may agree
upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage, subject to
judicial approval. All the creditors of the
husband and of the wife, as well as of the
conjugal partnership shall be notified of any
petition for judicial approval or the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that
any such creditors may appear at the hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, the court shall take such measures
as may protect the creditors and other third
persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and
215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code
concerning the effect of partition stated in
articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of
Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and
liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty.
Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question
that the approval took place only as an incident of the action for
divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the
justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to
the grounds raised in the action for divorce. 21 With the divorce not
being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being
contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of
the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under
Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of
Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3.
Atty. Luna's marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second
marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna's subsequent
marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being
bigamous, 22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna
and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered
by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had
subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil
Code clearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed
outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages as
determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a
second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings. 23 A bigamous marriage is considered void ab
initio. 24 cDTCIA
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the
petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the
properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by
the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil
Code, viz.:
Article 144. When a man and a
woman live together as husband and wife, but
they are not married, or their marriage is void
from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried
the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership,
therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her
actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere
allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent
evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court
explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals: 25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang,
and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the
issue of co-ownership of properties acquired
by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled
that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. The
claim of co-ownership of the petitioners
therein who were parties to the bigamous and
adulterous union is without basis because they
failed to substantiate their allegation that they
contributed money in the purchase of the
disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court
of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the
controverted property was titled in the name of
the parties to an adulterous relationship is not
sufficient proof of co-ownership absent
evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of
proof rests upon the party who, as determined
 by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must
be proved by competent evidence and reliance
must be had on the strength of the party's own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponent's defense. This applies with more
vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff
was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The
plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the
relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant
some measure of protection as the plaintiff
must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only
after the court is convinced that the facts
proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.
Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden
of proving it and a mere allegation is not
evidence. 26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her
actual contributions in the purchase of the condominium unit in the
aggregate amount of at least P306,572.00, consisting in direct
contributions of P159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna
had obtained from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totaling
P146,825.30; 27 and that such aggregate contributions of
P306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in
the purchase of the condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00 of
the unit's purchase price of P1,449,056.00. 28
their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares
were prima facie presumed to be
equal. However, for this presumption to arise,
proof of actual contribution was
required. The same rule and presumption was
to apply to joint deposits of money and
evidence of credit. If one of the parties was
validly married to another, his or her share in
the co-ownership accrued to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in
such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith was not validly married to another,
his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the Article
147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if
both parties were in bad faith. SDTIHA
Co-ownership was the exception
while conjugal partnership of gains was the
strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable
social institution and divorce decrees are not
recognized in the Philippines, as was held by
the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs.
Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29,
1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid As to the 25/100 pro-indiviso share
for solely out of her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit,
even sent her a "thank you" note; 29 that she had the financial SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an
capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna actual contribution to purchase the said
could not acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of property. She failed to establish that the four
the income derived from his law practice. (4) checks that she presented were indeed used
for the acquisition of the share of ATTY.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co- LUNA in the condominium unit. This was
ownership? aptly explained in the Decision of the trial
court, viz.:
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the
petitioner's assertions on her actual contributions through the ". . . The first check,
following findings and conclusions, namely: Exhibit "M" for
P55,000.00 payable to
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by Atty. Teresita Cruz
preponderance of evidence that her own Sison was issued on
independent funds were used to buy the law January 27, 1977, which
office condominium and the law books subject was thirteen (13) months
matter in contention in this case — proof that before the Memorandum
was required for Article 144 of the New Civil of Agreement, Exhibit
Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to "7" was signed. Another
apply — as to cases where properties were check issued on April
acquired by a man and a woman living 29, 1978 in the amount
together as husband and wife but not married, of P97,588.89, Exhibit
or under a marriage which was void ab "P" was payable to
initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Banco Filipino.
Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. According to the
But this was not readily applicable to many plaintiff, this was in
situations and thus it created a void at first payment of the loan of
because it applied only if the parties were not Atty. Luna. The third
in any way incapacitated or were without check which was for
impediment to marry each other (for it would P49,236.00 payable to
be absurd to create a co-ownership where there PREMEX was dated
still exists a prior conjugal partnership or May 19, 1979, also for
absolute community between the man and his payment of the loan of
lawful wife). This void was filled upon Atty. Luna. The fourth
adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 check, Exhibit "M", for
provided that: only the property acquired by P4,072.00 was dated
both of the parties through their actual joint December 17, 1980.
contribution of money, property or industry None of the foregoing
shall be owned in common and in proportion to prove that the amounts
 delivered by plaintiff to should then be justly concluded that the properties in litis legally
the payees were for the pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his
acquisition of the subject death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro
condominium unit. The indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the
connection was simply lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty.
not established. . . ." Luna.
SOLEDAD's claim that she made a WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
cash contribution of P100,000.00 is promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to
unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for pay the costs of suit.
SOLEDAD's claim of co-ownership over the
25/100 portion of the condominium unit and SO ORDERED.
the trial court correctly found that the same
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama,
was acquired through the sole industry of
Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
ATTY. LUNA, thus:
||| (Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna, G.R. No. 171914, [July 23, 2014])
"The Deed of Absolute
Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the
condominium unit was in the name
of Atty. Luna, together with his
partners in the law firm. The name of
the plaintiff does not appear as
vendee or as the spouse of Atty.
Luna. The same was acquired for the
use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna.
The loans from Allied Banking
Corporation and Far East Bank and
Trust Company were loans of Atty.
Luna and his partners and plaintiff
does not have evidence to show that
she paid for them fully or partially. . .
."
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and
subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the
name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to
Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that
SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
condominium unit. Acquisition of title and
registration thereof are two different acts. It is
well settled that registration does not confer
title but merely confirms one already existing.
The phrase "married to" preceding "Soledad
L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil
status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not
even a lawyer. So it is but logical that
SOLEDAD had no participation in the law
firm or in the purchase of books for the law
firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had
anything to contribute and that she actually
purchased or paid for the law office
amortization and for the law books. It is more
logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA
who bought the law office space and the law
books from his earnings from his practice of
law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from
SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that
he headed. 30 STcEaI
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions
by the CA both because they were substantiated by the records and
because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo them.
Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not
discharge her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her
contributions, not being evidence, 31 did not serve the purpose. In
contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the
properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It
 SECOND DIVISION
A parcel of land with an area of 175 P175,000.00 3 

[G.R. No. 188289. August 20, 2014.] sq.m. located at Sabang Baler,  

Aurora  
DAVID A. NOVERAS, petitioner, vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, respondent.    

3-has. coconut plantation in San P750,000.00

Joaquin Maria Aurora, Aurora  

DECISION
   

USA
PEREZ, J p:
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9
May 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.    
88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96. House and Lot at 1155 Hanover $550,000.00 (unpaid debt of 

The factual antecedents are as follow: Street, Daly City, California $285,000.00)
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) Furniture and furnishings $3,000
were married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They
resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000
eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two
children, namely: Jerome T. Noveras, who was born on 4 November 2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup
$13,770.00
1990 and Jena T. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was engaged truck
in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Bank of America Checking Account $8,000
Francisco, California.
Bank of America Cash Deposit $10,000.00
During the marriage, they acquired the following properties
in the Philippines and in the USA: Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00
PHILIPPINES
  Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, $56,228.00 4 

PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE annuities  

    The Sampaloc property used to be owned by David's

House and Lot with an area of 150
sq.m. located at 1085 Norma Street,
Sampaloc, Manila (Sampaloc
property)
 
Agricultural land with an area of
20,742 sq.m. located at Laboy,
Dipaculao, Aurora
 
A parcel of land with an area of 2.5
hectares located at Maria Aurora,
Aurora
 
parents. The parties herein secured a loan from a bank and mortgaged
P1,693,125.00 the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the
couple paid a total of P1.5 Million for the redemption of the
  same. IAcTaC
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned
 
to the Philippines in 2001. In December 2002, Leticia executed a
  Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the
Sampaloc property for P2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime
  in September 2003, David abandoned his family and lived with
Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David
P400,000.00 agreed to and executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence
of David's father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3 December 2003 stating
  that: 1) the P1.1 Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc
property shall be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall
  return and pay to Leticia P750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of
the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3)
  that David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the
conjugal and real properties situated in the Philippines. 5 David was
P490,000.00 able to collect P1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc property,
leaving an unpaid balance of P410,000.00.
 
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair,
  Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted
  the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29
June 2005. 6 The California court granted to Leticia the custody of
her two children, as well as all the couple's properties in the USA. 7
 On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial
Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora.
She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David's failure
to comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the
power to administer all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2)
David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject
conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be
forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the
purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc
property; and 5) the payment of P50,000.00 and P100,000.00
litigation expenses. 8
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the
dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded
that the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA
properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation,
including attorney's fees of both parties be charged against the
conjugal partnership. 9
The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:
1. Whether or not respondent David A.
Noveras committed acts of
abandonment and marital infidelity
which can result into the forfeiture of
the parties' properties in favor of the
petitioner and their two (2) children.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction
over the properties in California,
U.S.A. and the same can be included
in the judicial separation prayed for.
3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" . . .
executed by petitioner Leticia T.
Noveras and respondent David A.
Noveras will amount to a waiver or
forfeiture of the latter's property
rights over their conjugal properties.
4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras is entitled
to reimbursement of one-half of the
P2.2 [M]illion sales proceeds of their
property in Sampaloc, Manila and
one-half of the P1.5 [M]illion used to
redeem the property of Atty. Isaias
Noveras, including interests and
charges.
5. How the absolute community properties
should be distributed.
6. Whether or not the attorney's fees and
litigation expenses of the parties
were chargeable against their
conjugal properties.
Corollary to the above is the issue of:
Whether or not the two common
children of the parties are entitled to
support and presumptive
legitimes. 10
On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as
follows:
1. The absolute community of property of the
parties is hereby declared
DISSOLVED;
2. The net assets of the absolute community of
property of the parties in the
Philippines are hereby ordered to be
awarded to respondent David A.
Noveras only, with the properties in
the United States of America
remaining in the sole ownership of
petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the
divorce decree issued by the Superior
Court of California, County of San
Mateo, United States of America,
dissolving the marriage of the parties
as of June 24, 2005. The titles
presently covering said properties
shall be cancelled and new titles be
issued in the name of the party to
whom said properties are awarded;
3. One-half of the properties awarded to
respondent David A. Noveras in the
preceding paragraph are hereby
given to Jerome and Jena, his two
minor children with petitioner
Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia
Tacbiana as their presumptive
legitimes and said legitimes must be
annotated on the titles covering the
said properties. Their share in the
income from these properties shall be
remitted to them annually by the
respondent within the first half of
January of each year, starting
January 2008;
4. One-half of the properties in the United
States of America awarded to
petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are
hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her
two minor children with respondent
David A. Noveras as their
presumptive legitimes and said
legitimes must be annotated on the
titles/documents covering the said
properties. Their share in the income
from these properties, if any, shall be
remitted to them annually by the
petitioner within the first half of
January of each year, starting
January 2008;
5. For the support of their two (2) minor
children, Jerome and Jena,
respondent David A. Noveras shall
give them US$100.00 as monthly
allowance in addition to their income
from their presumptive legitimes,
while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana
shall take care of their food, clothing,
education and other needs while they
are in her custody in the USA. The
monthly allowance due from the
respondent shall be increased in the
future as the needs of the children
require and his financial capacity can
afford;
6. Of the unpaid amount of P410,000.00 on the
purchase price of the Sampaloc
 property, the Paringit Spouses are
hereby ordered to pay P5,000.00 to
respondent David A. Noveras and
P405,000.00 to the two children. The
share of the respondent may be paid
to him directly but the share of the
two children shall be deposited with
a local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a
joint account to be taken out in their
names, withdrawal from which shall
only be made by them or by their
representative duly authorized with a
Special Power of Attorney. Such
payment/deposit shall be made
within the period of thirty (30) days
after receipt of a copy of this
Decision, with the passbook of the
joint account to be submitted to the
custody of the Clerk of Court of this
Court within the same period. Said
passbook can be withdrawn from the
Clerk of Court only by the children
or their attorney-in-fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorney's fees
incurred by the parties shall be
shouldered by them
individually. 11 SaIEcA
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US
citizens, the laws that cover their legal and personal status are those
of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced
by virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo on 24 June 2005.
Under their law, the parties' marriage had already been dissolved.
Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for
liquidation of the absolute community of property regime with the
determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the children,
instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first
classified their property regime as absolute community of property
because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the
solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family
Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine
of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the
court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did
not submit any proof of their national law. The trial court held that as
the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the law for
the grant of judicial separation of properties, the absolute community
properties cannot be forfeited in favor of Leticia and her children.
Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove
abandonment and infidelity with preponderant evidence.
The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to
the reimbursements she is praying for considering that she already
acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the
principle of equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine
properties to David, subject to the payment of the children's
presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89 of
the Family Code, the waiver or renunciation made by David of his
property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's
Decision by directing the equal division of the Philippine properties
between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common
children's presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both
spouses to each pay their children the amount of P520,000.00, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is
PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of
the assailed Decision dated December 8, 2006
of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province,
in Civil Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED
to read as follows:
2. The net assets of the absolute
community of property of the parties in the
Philippines are hereby divided equally between
petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia
Tacbiana (sic) and respondent David A.
Noveras;
xxx xxx xxx
4. One-half of the properties awarded
to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in
paragraph 2 shall pertain to her minor children,
Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive
legitimes which shall be annotated on the
titles/documents covering the said properties.
Their share in the income therefrom, if any,
shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually
within the first half of January, starting 2008;
xxx xxx xxx
6. Respondent David A. Noveras and
petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each
ordered to pay the amount of P520,000.00 to
their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their
presumptive legitimes from the sale of the
Sampaloc property inclusive of the receivables
therefrom, which shall be deposited to a local
bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in
the latter's names. The payment/deposit shall
be made within a period of thirty (30) days
from receipt of a copy of this Decision and the
corresponding passbook entrusted to the
custody of the Clerk of Court a quo within the
same period, withdrawable only by the
children or their attorney-in-fact.
A number 8 is hereby added, which
shall read as follows:
8. Respondent David A. Noveras is
hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia
Tacbiana (sic) the amount of P1,040,000.00
representing her share in the proceeds from the
sale of the Sampaloc property.
The last paragraph shall read as
follows:
Send a copy of this Decision to the
local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local
civil registry of Quezon City; the Civil
Registrar-General, National Statistics Office,
Vibal Building, Times Street corner EDSA,
Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the
children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.
The rest of the Decision is
AFFIRMED. 12
In the present petition, David insists that the Court of
Appeals should have recognized the California Judgment which
awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was
part of the pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial
court. David argues that allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine
properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia
considering that the latter was already granted all US properties by
the California court. TIaCcD
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and
Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the
Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior
Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the
properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in
the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of
conjugal properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce
decree which severed the bond of marriage between the parties.
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 13 we stated that:
The starting point in any recognition
of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.
Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal
of another country." This means that the
foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien's applicable national
law to show the effect of the judgment on the
alien himself or herself. The recognition may
be made in an action instituted specifically for
the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect
of his claim or defense. 14
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree
and the national law of the foreigner must comply with our Rules of
Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of
the Rules of Court. 15
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1)
an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy
must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with
a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof.
The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine
embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of
a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was
presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its
authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were
not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals, 16 we
relaxed the requirement on certification where we held that
"[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizen when she
secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any
of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign
divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said
decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that
there is no seal from the office where the divorce decree was
obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual
presumption 17 as the lower courts did with respect to the property
regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different
matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between
Filipino citizens in the Philippines.
Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows
that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial
court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage
settlements must be made before the celebration of marriage. An
exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification is
judicially approved and refers only to the instances provided in
Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code. 18
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial
separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of
the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall
be considered sufficient cause for judicial
separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been
sentenced to a penalty which carries
with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been
judicially declared an
absentee; SDEHCc
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse
of petitioner has been decreed by the
court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has
abandoned the latter or failed to
comply with his or her obligations
to the family as provided for in
Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of
administration in the marriage
settlements has abused that power;
and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the
spouses have been separated in
fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly
improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers
(1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final
judgment against the guilty or absent spouse
shall be enough basis for the grant of the
decree of judicial separation of property.
(Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no
abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial separation of
properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The
trial court ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under
Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above,
 must be for a valid cause and the spouse is
deemed to have abandoned the other when
he/she has left the conjugal dwelling without
intention of returning. The intention of not
returning is prima facie presumed if the
allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to
give any information as to his or her
whereabouts within the period of three months
from such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner
knows that the respondent has returned to and
stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora,
Philippines, as she even went several times to
visit him there after the alleged abandonment.
Also, the respondent has been going back to
the USA to visit her and their children until the
relations between them worsened. The last visit
of said respondent was in October 2004 when
he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the
latter of a petition for dissolution of marriage
with the California court. Such turn for the
worse of their relationship and the filing of the
said petition can also be considered as valid
causes for the respondent to stay in the
Philippines. 19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a
judicial separation of property was not tackled in the trial court's
decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as
liquidation of the absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that
Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that
reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment
had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living
separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the
Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from
her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez,
who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who
worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that
she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the
Consent for Operation form. 20 Third and more significantly, they
had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in
June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually
separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of
absolute community of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute
community property automatically dissolves the absolute community
regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 of the Family
Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community
terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared
void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property
during the marriage under
Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis
supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows
the dissolution of the absolute community regime and the following
procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the
absolute community regime, the following
procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing
separately all the properties of the
absolute community and the
exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute
community shall be paid out of its
assets. In case of insufficiency of
said assets, the spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties
in accordance with the provisions of
the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive
properties of the spouses shall
thereafter be delivered to each of
them. ICESTA
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the
absolute community shall constitute
its net assets, which shall be divided
equally between husband and wife,
unless a different proportion or
division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements, or unless there
has been a voluntary waiver of such
share provided in this Code. For
purposes of computing the net profits
subject to forfeiture in accordance
with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No.
(2), the said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market
value of the community property at
the time of the celebration of the
marriage and the market value at the
time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common
children shall be delivered upon
partition, in accordance with Article
51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the
parties, in the partition of the
properties, the conjugal dwelling and
the lot on which it is situated shall be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom
the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the
age of seven years are deemed to
have chosen the mother, unless the
court has decided otherwise. In case
there is no such majority, the court
shall decide, taking into
consideration the best interests of
said children.
At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case
to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by
the Court of Appeals on the trial court's Decision with respect to
liquidation.
 We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts ||| (Noveras v. Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, [August 20, 2014])
did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David
and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that
real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to
the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals
with respect to the share of the spouses in the absolute community
properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their
children's presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained
in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have
an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property. While both claimed to have
contributed to the redemption of the Noveras
property, absent a clear showing where their
contributions came from, the same is presumed
to have come from the community property.
Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement
of half of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part
of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc
property for the benefit of the absolute
community cannot be given full credence.
Only the amount of P120,000.00 incurred in
going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged
thereto. Election expenses in the amount of
P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal
councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of
receipts or at least the Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures required under
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly
received by the Commission on Elections.
Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the
criminal case of his personal driver is not
deductible as the same had not benefited the
family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share
equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the
amount of P120,000.00 or in the respective
amounts of P1,040,000.00.
xxx xxx xxx
Under the first paragraph of Article
888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of
legitimate children and descendants consists of
one-half of the hereditary estate of the father
and of the mother." The children are therefore
entitled to half of the share of each spouse in
the net assets of the absolute community,
which shall be annotated on the
titles/documents covering the same, as well as
to their respective shares in the net proceeds
from the sale of the Sampaloc property
including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in
the amount of P410,000.00. Consequently,
David and Leticia should each pay them the
amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive
legitimes therefrom. 21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, * C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr. ** and Del Castillo,
JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION CCT No. 18186 representing the title to the
condominium unit had no existing encumbrance, except for an
annotation under Entry No. 73321/C-10186 which provided that
[G.R. No. 205487. November 12, 2014.] any conveyance or encumbrance of CCT No. 18186 shall be
subject to approval by the Philippine Retirement
Authority (PRA). Although CCT No. 18186 contained Entry No.
ORION SAVINGS BANK, petitioner, vs.
66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999 representing a mortgage
SHIGEKANE SUZUKI, respondent.
in favor of Orion for a P1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was
subsequently cancelled on June 16, 2000 by Entry No. 73232/T.
No. 10186. Despite the cancellation of the mortgage to Orion,
the titles to the properties remained in possession of Perez.
DECISION
To protect his interests, Suzuki then executed an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim 12 dated September 8, 2003, with
the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, annotated as Entry
BRION, J p: No. 3292/C-No. 18186 in CCT No. 18186. Suzuki then
demanded the delivery of the titles. 13 Orion, (through Perez),
Before us is the Petition for Review however, refused to surrender the titles, and cited the need to
on Certiorari 1 filed by petitioner Orion Savings consult Orion's legal counsel as its reason.
Bank (Orion) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the On October 14, 2003, Suzuki received a letter from
decision 2 dated August 23, 2012 and the resolution 3 dated Orion's counsel dated October 9, 2003, stating that Kang
January 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV obtained another loan in the amount of P1,800,000.00. When
No. 94104. Kang failed to pay, he executed a Dacion en Pago dated
The Factual Antecedents February 2, 2003, in favor of Orion covering Unit No. 536.
Orion, however, did not register the Dacion en Pago, until
In the first week of August 2003, respondent October 15, 2003.
Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with Ms.
Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and On October 28, 2003, Suzuki executed an Affidavit of
a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly Adverse Claim over Parking Slot No. 42 (covered by CCT No.
owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national and a 9118) and this was annotated as Entry No. 4712/C-No. 9118 in
Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder. the parking lot's title.

At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for
536 [covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. specific performance and damages against Kang and Orion. At
18186] 4 and Parking Slot No. 42 [covered by CCT No. the pre-trial, the parties made the following admissions and
9118] 5 were for sale for P3,000,000.00. Soneja likewise assured stipulations:
Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking slot were clean. 1. That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the
After a brief negotiation, the parties agreed to reduce the price to registered owner of Unit No. 536 and
P2,800,000.00. Parking Slot No. 42;
On August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank of the
2. That the mortgage in favor of Orion
Philippine Island (BPI) Check No. 83349 6 for One Hundred
supposedly executed by Kang, with
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as reservation fee. 7 On August
Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated
21, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang another check, BPI Check No.
February 2, 1999, was subsequently
83350, 8 this time for P2,700,000.00 representing the remaining
cancelled by Entry No. 73232/T No.
balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and Kang then executed a
10186 dated June 16, 2000;
Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 2003 9 covering Unit
No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took 3. That the alleged Dacion en Pago was never
possession of the condominium unit and parking lot, and annotated in CCT Nos. 18186 and
commenced the renovation of the interior of the condominium 9118;
unit.
4. That Orion only paid the appropriate capital
Kang thereafter made several representations with gains tax and the documentary stamp
Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties, which were then tax for the alleged Dacion en
allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion's Pago on October 15, 2003;
Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several verbal demands,
Kang failed to deliver the documents. Suzuki later on learned 5. That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by CCT
that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the No. 9118, was never mortgaged to
status of the properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Orion; and
Deeds. aSITDC
6. That when Suzuki bought the properties, he
Before long, Suzuki learned that CCT No. 9118 went to Orion to obtain possession of
representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained no the titles.
annotations although it remained under the name of Cityland
Pioneer. This notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer, through The RTC Ruling
Assistant Vice President Rosario D. Perez, certified that Kang
In its decision 14 dated June 29, 2009, the Regional
had fully paid the purchase price of Unit. No. 536 10 and
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, Mandaluyong City ruled in
Parking Slot No. 42. 11
favor of Suzuki and ordered Orion to deliver the CCT Nos.
18186 and 9118 to Suzuki. EADCHS
The court found that Suzuki was an innocent
purchaser for value whose rights over the properties prevailed
over Orion's. The RTC further noted that Suzuki exerted efforts
to verify the status of the properties but he did not find any
existing encumbrance in the titles. Although Orion claims to
have purchased the property by way of a Dacion en Pago,
Suzuki only learned about it two (2) months after he bought the
properties because Orion never bothered to register or annotate
the Dacion en Pago in CCT Nos. 18186 and 9116.
The RTC further ordered Orion and Kang to jointly
and severally pay Suzuki moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, appearance fees, expenses for litigation and cost
of suit. Orion timely appealed the RTC decision with the CA.
The CA Ruling
On August 23, 2012, the CA partially granted Orion's
appeal and sustained the RTC insofar as it upheld Suzuki's right
over the properties. The CA further noted that Entry No.
73321/C-10186 pertaining to the withdrawal of investment of an
SRRV only serves as a warning to an SRRV holder about the
implications of a conveyance of a property investment. It
deviated from the RTC ruling, however, by deleting the award
for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
expenses for litigation and cost of suit.
Orion sought a reconsideration of the CA decision but
the CA denied the motion in its January 25, 2013 resolution.
Orion then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 with this Court.
The Petition and Comment
Orion's petition is based on the following
grounds/arguments: 15
1. The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor
of Suzuki is null and void. Under
Korean law, any conveyance of a
conjugal property should be made
with the consent of both spouses;
2. Suzuki is not a buyer in good faith for he
failed to check the owner's duplicate
copies of the CCTs;
3. Knowledge of the PRA restriction under
Entry No. 73321/C-10186, which
prohibits any conveyance or
encumbrance of the property
investment, defeats the alleged claim
of good faith by Suzuki; and
4. Orion should not be faulted for exercising
due diligence.
In his Comment, 16 Suzuki asserts that the issue on
spousal consent was belatedly raised on appeal. Moreover, proof
of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine
qua non for the operation of the presumption of conjugal
ownership. 17 Suzuki additionally maintains that he is a
purchaser in good faith, and is thus entitled to the protection of
the law.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The Court may inquire into
conclusions of fact when the
inference made is manifestly
mistaken
In a Rule 45 petition, the latitude of judicial review
generally excludes a factual and evidentiary re-evaluation, and
the Court ordinarily abides by the uniform factual conclusions of
the trial court and the appellate court. 18 In the present case,
while the courts below both arrived at the same conclusion, there
appears to be an incongruence in their factual findings and the
legal principle they applied to the attendant factual
circumstances. Thus, we are compelled to examine certain
factual issues in the exercise of our sound discretion to correct
any mistaken inference that may have been made. 19 HEISca
Philippine Law governs the
transfer of real property
Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the
issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold this position,
however, because the issue of spousal consent was only raised
on appeal to the CA. It is a well-settled principle that points of
law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention
of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and
considered by a reviewing court. 20 To consider these belated
arguments would violate basic principles of fair play, justice,
and due process.
Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the
issues Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an end to lingering
doubts on the correctness of the denial of the present petition.
It is a universal principle that real or immovable
property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state
where it is located. 21 The reason is found in the very nature of
immovable property — its immobility. Immovables are part of
the country and so closely connected to it that all rights over
them have their natural center of gravity there. 22
Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition
of real property are determined by what is known as the lex loci
rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title
can pass from one person to another, or by which an interest
therein can be gained or lost. 23 This general principle includes
all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of
immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of
wills and other conveyances. 24
This principle even governs the capacity of the person
making a deed relating to immovable property, no matter what
its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to
transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by
the lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile
and by the law of the place where the instrument is actually
made, his capacity is undoubted. 25
On the other hand, property relations between spouses
are governed principally by the national law of the
spouses. 26 However, the party invoking the application of a
foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The
foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and
proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign
law. 27 He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the
forum. 28
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must
present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The
record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof
 or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must
state. — Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of the
evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be. The attestation must be under
the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such
court. ITaCEc
Accordingly, matters concerning
the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by
Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of
the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it
is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to
prove the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership of
property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy
of the Republic of Korea" 29 to prove the existence of Korean
Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of
the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that
it was properly authenticated by the seal of his office, as
required under Section 24 of Rule 132. 30
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine
of presumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not
pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is
that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law. 31
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam
Kang 'married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the
civil status of Kang. 32 In other words, the import from the
certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as
they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married to
Hyun Sook Jung.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have
held that registration of the property in the name of only one
spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or
community property. 33 In those cases, however, there was
proof that the properties, though registered in the name of only
one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community
properties. 34 Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as
invalid Kang's conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed
lack of spousal consent.
The petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence
to prove the due execution of the
Dacion en Pago
Article 1544 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines provides that:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have
been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person
who may have first taken possession thereof
in good faith, if it should be movable
property.
Should it be immovable property, the
ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded
it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the
ownership shall pertain to the person who in
good faith was first in the possession; and, in
the absence thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith.
The application of Article 1544 of the New Civil
Code presupposes the existence of two or more duly executed
contracts of sale. In the present case, the Deed of Sale dated
August 26, 2003 35 between Suzuki and Kang was admitted by
Orion 36 and was properly identified by Suzuki's witness Ms.
Mary Jane Samin (Samin). 37
It is not disputed, too, that the Deed of Sale dated
August 26, 2003 was consummated. In a contract of sale, the
seller obligates himself to transfer the ownership of the
determinate thing sold, and to deliver the same to the buyer, who
obligates himself to pay a price certain to the seller. 38 The
execution of the notarized deed of sale and the actual transfer of
possession amounted to delivery that produced the legal effect of
transferring ownership to Suzuki. 39
On the other hand, although Orion claims priority in
right under the principle of prius tempore, potior jure (i.e., first
in time, stronger in right), it failed to prove the existence and
due execution of the Dacion en Pago in its favor. HECTaA
At the outset, Orion offered the Dacion en
Pago as Exhibit "5" with submarkings "5-a" to "5-c" to prove
the existence of the February 6, 2003 transaction in its Formal
Offer dated July 20, 2008. Orion likewise offered in evidence
the supposed promissory note dated September 4, 2002
as Exhibit "12" to prove the existence of the additional
P800,000.00 loan. The RTC, however, denied the admission
of Exhibits "5" and "12," among others, in its order dated
August 19, 2008 "since the same [were] not identified in court
by any witness." 40
Despite the exclusion of its most critical documentary
evidence, Orion failed to make a tender of excluded evidence, as
provided under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. For
this reason alone, we are prevented from seriously
considering Exhibit "5" and its submarkings and Exhibit "12" in
the present petition.
Moreover, even if we consider Exhibit "5" and its
submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the present petition, the
copious inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonial and
documentary evidence of Orion, militate against the conclusion
that the Dacion en Pago was duly executed.
First, there appears to be no due and demandable
obligation when the Dacion en Pago was executed, contrary to
the allegations of Orion. Orion's witness Perez tried to impress
upon the RTC that Kang was in default in his P1,800,000.00
loan. During his direct examination, he stated:
ATTY. CRUZAT:
 Q: Okay, so this loan of P1.8 million, what
happened to this loan, Mr. Witness?
A: Well it became past due, there has been
delayed interest payment by Mr.
Kang and. . .
Q: So what did you do after there were
defaults[?]
A: We have to secure the money or the
investment of the bank through loans
and we have executed a dacion en
pago because Mr. Kang said he has
no money. So we just execute[d]
the dacion en pago rather than
going through the Foreclosure
proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Can you tell the court when was this
executed?
A: February 6, 2003, your Honor. 41
A reading of the supposed promissory note, however,
shows that there was no default to speak of when the
supposed Dacion en Pago was executed.
Based on the promissory note, Kang's loan obligation
would mature only on August 27, 2003. Neither can Orion
claim that Kang had been in default in his installment payments
because the wordings of the promissory note provide that "[t]he
principal of this loan and its interest and other charges shall
be paid by me/us in accordance hereunder: SINGLE
PAYMENT LOANS." 42 There was thus no due and
demandable loan obligation when the alleged Dacion en
Pago was executed.
Second, Perez, the supposed person who prepared
the Dacion en Pago, appears to only have a vague idea of the
transaction he supposedly prepared. During his cross-
examination, he testified: cHaADC
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
Q: And were you the one who prepared this
[dacion en pago] Mr. witness?
A: Yes, sir. I personally prepared this.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: So this 1.8 million pesos is already
inclusive of all the penalties, interest
and surcharge due from Mr. Yung
Sam Kang?
A: It's just the principal, sir.
Q: So you did not state the interest [and]
penalties?
A: In the [dacion en pago], we do not include
interest, sir. We may actually include
that but. . . .
Q: Can you read the Second Whereas Clause,
Mr. Witness?
A: Whereas the first party failed to pay the
said loan to the second party and as
of February 10, 2003, the
outstanding obligation which is due
and demandable principal and
interest and other charges included
amounts to P1,800,000.00 pesos, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You are now changing your answer[.] [I]t
now includes interest and other
charges, based on this document?
A: Yes, based on that document, sir. 43
Third, the Dacion en Pago, mentioned that the
P1,800,000.00 loan was secured by a real estate mortgage.
However, no document was ever presented to prove this real
estate mortgage aside from it being mentioned in the Dacion en
Pago itself.
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
Q: Would you know if there is any other
document like a supplement to that
Credit Line Agreement referring to
this 1.8 million peso loan by Mr.
Yung Sam Kang which says that
there was a subsequent
collateralization or security given by
Mr. Yung [Sam] Kang for the loan?
xxx xxx xxx
A: The [dacion en pago], sir. 44
Fourth, the Dacion en Pago was first mentioned
only two (2) months after Suzuki and Samin demanded the
delivery of the titles sometime in August 2003, and after Suzuki
caused the annotation of his affidavit of adverse claim. Records
show that it was only on October 9, 2003, when Orion,
through its counsel, Cristobal Balbin Mapile & Associates
first spoke of the  Dacion en Pago. 45 Not even Perez
mentioned any Dacion en Pago on October 1, 2003, when he
personally received a letter demanding the delivery of the titles.
Instead, Perez refused to accept the letter and opted to first
consult with his lawyer. 46
Notably, even the October 9, 2003 letter contained
material inconsistencies in its recital of facts surrounding the
execution of the Dacion en Pago. In particular, it mentioned
that "on [September 4, 2002], after  paying the original
loan, [Kang] applied and was granted a new Credit Line
Facility by [Orion] . . . for ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,800,000.00)." Perez, however,
testified that there was "no cash movement" in the original
P1,000,000.00 loan. In his testimony, he said:
COURT:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Would you remember what was the subject
matter of that real estate mortgage
for that first P1,000,000.00 loan?
A: It's a condominium Unit in Cityland,
sir. EDcIAC
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Would you recall if there was any
payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang
of this P1,000,000.00 loan?
A: None sir.
 Q: No payments? In the present case, the presumption cannot apply
because the regularity in the execution of the Dacion en
A: None sir. Pago and the loan documents was challenged in the proceedings
below where their prima facie validity was overthrown by the
Q: And from 1999 to 2002, there was no
highly questionable circumstances surrounding their
payment, either by way of
execution. 52 acIHDA
payment to the principal, by way
of payment of interest, there was Effect of the PRA restriction on
no payment by Mr. Yung Sam the validity of Suzuki's title to the
Kang of this loan? property
A: Literally, there was no actual cash Orion argues that the PRA restriction in CCT No.
movement, sir. 18186 affects the conveyance to Suzuki. In particular, Orion
assails the status of Suzuki as a purchaser in good faith in view
Q: There was no actual cash? of the express PRA restriction contained in CCT No. 18186. 53
A: Yes, sir. We reject this suggested approach outright because, to
our mind, the PRA restriction cannot affect the conveyance in
Q: And yet despite no payment, the bank Orion favor of Suzuki. On this particular point, we concur with the
Savings Bank still extended an following findings of the CA:
P800,000.00 additional right?
. . . the annotation merely serves as a
A: Yes, sir. 47 warning to the owner who holds a Special
Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) that he shall
Fifth, it is undisputed that notwithstanding the
lose his visa if he disposes his property which
supposed execution of the Dacion en Pago on February 2, 2003,
serves as his investment in order to qualify for
Kang remained in possession of the condominium unit. In fact,
such status. Section 14 of the Implementing
nothing in the records shows that Orion even bothered to take
Investment Guidelines under Rule VIII-A of
possession of the property even six (6) months after the
the Rules and Regulations Implementing
supposed date of execution of the Dacion en Pago. Kang was
Executive Order No. 1037, Creating the
even able to transfer possession of the condominium unit to
Philippine Retirement Park System Providing
Suzuki, who then made immediate improvements thereon. If
Funds Therefor and for Other Purpose
Orion really purchased the condominium unit on February 2,
(otherwise known as the Philippine Retirement
2003 and claimed to be its true owner, why did it not assert its
Authority) states:
ownership immediately after the alleged sale took place? Why
did it have to assert its ownership only after Suzuki demanded Section 14. Should the
the delivery of the titles? These gaps have remained unanswered retiree-investor withdraw his
and unfilled. investment from the Philippines, or
In Suntay v. CA, 48 we held that the most prominent transfer the same to another domestic
index of simulation is the complete absence of an attempt on the enterprise, or sell, convey or transfer
part of the vendee to assert his rights of ownership over the his condominium unit or units to
property in question. After the sale, the vendee should have another person, natural or juridical
entered the land and occupied the premises. The absence of any without the prior approval of the
attempt on the part of Orion to assert its right of dominion Authority, the Special Resident
over the property allegedly sold to it is a clear badge of Retiree's Visa issued to him, and/or
fraud. That notwithstanding the execution of the Dacion en unmarried minor child or children[,]
Pago, Kang remained in possession of the disputed may be cancelled or revoked by the
condominium unit — from the time of the execution of Philippine Government, through the
the Dacion en Pago until the property's subsequent transfer appropriate government department
to Suzuki — unmistakably strengthens the fictitious nature or agency, upon recommendation of
of the Dacion en Pago. the Authority. 54

These circumstances, aside from the glaring Moreover, Orion should not be allowed to successfully
inconsistencies in the documents and testimony of Orion's assail the good faith of Suzuki on the basis of the PRA
witness, indubitably prove the spurious nature of the Dacion en restriction. Orion knew of the PRA restriction when it transacted
Pago. with Kang. Incidentally, Orion admitted accommodating
Kang's request to cancel the mortgage annotation despite the
The fact that the Dacion en Pago lack of payment to circumvent the PRA restriction. Orion,
is a notarized document does not thus, is estopped from impugning the validity of the conveyance
support the conclusion that the in favor of Suzuki on the basis of the PRA restriction that Orion
sale it embodies is a true itself ignored and "attempted" to circumvent.
conveyance
With the conclusion that Orion failed to prove the
Public instruments are evidence of the facts that gave authenticity of the Dacion en Pago, we see no reason for the
rise to their execution and are to be considered as containing all application of the rules on double sale under Article 1544 of
the terms of the agreement. 49 While a notarized document the New Civil Code. Suzuki, moreover, successfully adduced
enjoys this presumption, "the fact that a deed is notarized is not sufficient evidence to establish the validity of conveyance in his
a guarantee of the validity of its contents." 50 The presumption favor.
of regularity of notarized documents is not absolute and may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 51 WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the
petition for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner Orion Savings
Bank.
 SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Del Castillo, Mendoza and Leonen,
JJ., concur.
 
||| (Orion Savings Bank v. Shigekane Suzuki, G.R. No. 205487,
[November 12, 2014])
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 202039. August 14, 2019.]
ANGELITA SIMUNDAC-
KEPPEL, petitioner, vs. GEORG
KEPPEL, respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, C.J p:
The courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws.
To have evidentiary weight in a judicial proceeding, the foreign
laws should be alleged and proved like any other material fact.
This Case
By this appeal, the petitioner assails the decision
promulgated on September 26, 2011 1 by the Court of Appeals
(CA) that reversed the judgment rendered on June 21, 2006 2 by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City in Civil
Case No. 96-048.
Antecedents
As summarized by the CA, the factual antecedents are
as follows:
In November 1972, petitioner
Angelita Simundac Keppel (Angelita) left
the Philippines to work in Germany as a
nurse. In the hospital where Angelita
worked, she met Reynaldo
Macaraig (Reynaldo), also a nurse and
fellow Filipino who had become a
naturalized German citizen. They fell in love
and got married in Germany on 12 June
1976. Angelita and Reynaldo's union
produced a son. CAIHTE
After a few years of marriage,
Angelita became attracted to another
German nurse and co-employee, Georg
Keppel (Georg). Like Angelita, Georg was
married to a Filipina nurse, with whom he
had two children. Eventually, the attraction
between Angelita and Georg developed into
an intimate affair. Not long after that,
Reynaldo discovered Angelita's infidelity
and they separated.
In the meantime, in February
1986, Angelita became a naturalized
German citizen. Angelita and her son left
Germany to go home to the Philippines,
where they planned to start over.
While in the Philippines, Angelita
continued communicating with Georg
through letters and telephone calls. In July
1987, Georg's wife divorced him, and so
Georg felt free to come to the Philippines to
meet Angelita's family in September 1987.
In December 1987, Angelita
returned to Germany to file divorce
proceedings against Reynaldo, and she
obtained the divorce decree she sought in
June 1988. Shortly thereafter, Angelita and
Georg got married in Germany on 30 August
1988. On 21 November 1989, Angelita gave
birth in Germany to a daughter, whom they
named Liselotte.
In 1991, Angelita and Georg
entered into an agreement for the complete
separation of their properties. At that time,
Georg resigned from his job. To make
matters worse, Georg was diagnosed with
early multiple sclerosis and could not work.
Since Angelita's income was barely enough
to support them all, they decided to return
and settle permanently in the Philippines in
1992.
Angelita bought a lot in
Muntinlupa on which they had a house built
in 1993. She also put up a commercial
building — which earned rentals — on
another lot in Muntinlupa, which she and her
first husband, Reynaldo, previously bought
together. The rest of Angelita's savings from
Germany went into putting up a school with
her other family members and relatives.
Angelita earned a considerable
income from her business ventures, which
she shared with Georg. However, Angelita
stopped giving Georg money in 1994 when
she discovered that Georg was having
extramarital affairs.
Claiming that Georg was beating
her up, Angelita and her two children left
their home in March 1996. Being the
registered owner of their family home,
Angelita sold the same to her sister. Despite
said sale, Georg refused to vacate the
house. DETACa
On 26 March 1996, Angelita filed
the instant petition for annulment of
marriage on the ground of Georg's alleged
psychological incapacity. Georg opposed the
petition, insisting that the court should only
issue a decree of legal separation with the
consequent division of their properties and
determination of Liselotte's custody.
Angelita countered that there were no
properties to divide between them because
all the real properties that she acquired in the
Philippines belong solely to her as a
consequence of the agreement for complete
separation of property that they previously
executed in Germany in 1991.
During trial, Angelita presented
evidence of Georg's psychological
incapacity through medical reports and the
like, as well as the contract for separation of
 property. On the other hand, Georg
presented evidence of the properties that
they acquired during their marriage that he
thinks should be divided equally between
them. 3
Judgment of the RTC
On June 21, 2006, the RTC rendered judgment
declaring the marriage of Angelita and Georg null and void, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
a)  [T]he marriage between spouses
ANGELITA SIMUNDAC
and GEORG KEPPEL
which was solemnized on
August 30, 1988 in
Duisburg, Germany, is
hereby declared as null and
void in view of the
psychological incapacity of
defendant to perform the
essential marital
obligations;
b)  [A]ll the real and personal
properties including the
businesses subject of the
instant suit is (sic) hereby
declared as forming part of
the paraphernal property of
petitioner;
c)  [T]he spouses are directed to
equally support their minor
child Liselotte Angela
Keppel;
d)  [T]he custody of the minor child
is hereby declared as
belonging to herein
petitioner, the mother,
without prejudice to the
visitorial rights accorded
by law to defendant, unless
the said minor child
chooses her father's
custody, herein defendant.
SO ORDERED. 4
The RTC found both of the parties psychologically
incapacitated but considered Georg's incapacity to be more
severe on the basis of the clinical finding that he had manifested
an anti-social or psychopathic type of personality that translated
to the symptomatic tendency to deceive and injure Angelita. The
RTC declared that as to the properties of the parties to be
distributed after the dissolution of the marriage, the business and
personal properties should be allocated to Angelita pursuant to
the "Matrimony Property Agreement"; and that the lands should
exclusively belong to Angelita inasmuch as Georg, being a
German citizen, was absolutely prohibited from owning lands
pursuant to Section 7, Article XVII of the Constitution. aDSIHc
Decision of the CA
On September 26, 2011, the CA promulgated its
decision on appeal, reversing the RTC's findings, and thereby
dismissing the complaint, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, the Decision,
dated 21 June 2006, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City in Civil
Case No. 96-048 for Annulment of Marriage
and Custody of Minor Child
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except for
the trial court's declaration that all properties
acquired in the Philippines by Angelita
Simundac Keppel belong to her alone. The
complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 5
The CA observed that Angelita did not prove the
allegations in her complaint because she did not present the
original of her divorce decree from Reynaldo Macaraig, her first
spouse; that she did not also prove the German law that
capacitated her to marry Georg; that in the eyes of the court,
therefore, there could be no annulment of the marriage between
Angelita and Georg to speak of because under Philippine law,
Angelita had remained married to Reynaldo; that Angelita's
evidence was insufficient to prove that either of the parties
herein had been psychologically incapacitated to comply with
essential marital obligations inasmuch as anti-social behavior
did not equate to psychological incapacity; and that the
properties of the couple exclusively belonged to Angelita
because Georg could not own lands in the Philippines.
Issues
In this appeal, Angelita posits that the CA erred in not
declaring her marriage with Georg null and void inasmuch as
Georg was suffering from psychological incapacity that rendered
him incapable to fulfill his essential marital obligations as borne
out by the medical findings; that being then a German citizen,
she need not prove the dissolution of her marriage with
Reynaldo, or the validity of her marriage with Georg because
Philippine law did not apply in both instances; and that as
alleged in her petition she had recently re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship. 6
Georg counters that the evidence presented was not
sufficient basis to conclude that he was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations; and
that the prohibition against land ownership by aliens did not
apply because the bulk of the properties of the spouses consisted
of personal properties that were not covered by the
Constitutional prohibition.
Did the CA err in sustaining the validity of the
marriage of the parties? Are the lower courts correct in awarding
all the properties of the spouses in favor of Angelita?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal fails to impress.
I.
Under the Nationality Principle, the
petitioner
cannot invoke Article 36 of the Family
Code
 unless there is a German law that allows
her to do so
A fundamental and obvious defect of Angelita's
petition for annulment of marriage is that it seeks a relief
improper under Philippine law in light of both Georg and
Angelita being German citizens, not Filipinos, at the time of the
filing thereof. Based on the Nationality Principle, which is
followed in this jurisdiction, and pursuant to which laws relating
to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad, 7 it was the pertinent German law
that governed. In short, Philippine law finds no application
herein as far as the family rights and obligations of the parties
who are foreign nationals are concerned. ETHIDa
In Morisono v. Morisono, 8 we summarized the
treatment of foreign divorce judgments in this jurisdiction, thus:
The rules on divorce prevailing in
this jurisdiction can be summed up as
follows: first, Philippine laws do not provide
for absolute divorce, and hence, the courts
cannot grant the same; second, consistent
with Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code,
the marital bond between two (2) Filipino
citizens cannot be dissolved even by an
absolute divorce obtained abroad; third, an
absolute divorce obtained abroad by a
couple who are both aliens may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it
is consistent with their respective national
laws; and fourth, in mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the
former is allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the absolute divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. [Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis]
Accordingly, the petition for annulment initiated by
Angelita fails scrutiny through the lens of the Nationality
Principle.
Firstly, what governs the marriage of the parties is
German, not Philippine, law, and this rendered it incumbent
upon Angelita to allege and prove the applicable German law.
We reiterate that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws; hence, the existence and contents of such laws are
regarded as questions of fact, and, as such, must be alleged and
proved like any other disputed fact. 9 Proof of the relevant
German law may consist of any of the following, namely: (1)
official publications of the law; or (2) copy attested to by the
officer having legal custody of the foreign law. If the official
record is not kept in the Philippines, the copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. 10 Angelita did not
comply with the requirements for pleading and proof of the
relevant German law.
And, secondly, Angelita overlooked that German and
Philippine laws on annulment of marriage might not be the
same. In other words, the remedy of annulment of the marriage
due to psychological incapacity afforded by Article 36 of
the Family Code might not be available for her. In the absence
of a showing of her right to this remedy in accordance with
German law, therefore, the petition should be dismissed.
II.
Assuming the remedy was proper, the
petitioner did not
prove the respondent's psychological
incapacity
Even if we were now to adhere to the concept of
processual presumption, 11 and assume that the German law
was similar to the Philippine law as to allow the action under
Article 36 of the Family Code to be brought by one against the
other party herein, we would still affirm the CA's dismissal of
the petition brought under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Notable from the RTC's disquisition is the fact that the
psychiatrists found that both parties had suffered from anti-
social behavior that became the basis for the trial court's
conclusion that they had been both psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential martial obligations. Therein lay the
reason why we must affirm the CA.
Jurisprudentially speaking, psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity
or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in
the performance of marital obligations or ill will. The disorder
consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community
of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must
be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a
spouse did not meet his or her responsibility and duty as a
married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must
be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some
psychological illness. 12
Psychological incapacity is unlike any other disorder
that would invalidate a marriage. It should refer to a mental
incapacity that causes a party to be incognitive of the basic
marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of
the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. 13
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 14 the Court issued
the following guidelines for the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1)  The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are
to be "protected" by the state. cSEDTC
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2)  The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological — not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3)  The incapacity must be proven
to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation
of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4)  Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5)  Such illness must
be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characterological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts"
cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
(6)  The essential marital
obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
Here, however, the petitioner presented no evidence to
show that the anti-social behavior manifested by both parties had
been grave, and had existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage as to render the parties incapable of performing all the
essential marital obligations provided by law. As the records
bear out, the medical experts merely concluded that the behavior
was grave enough as to incapacitate the parties from the
performance of their essential marital relationship because the
parties exhibited symptoms of an anti-social personality
disorder. Also, the incapacity was not established to have existed
at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In short, the
conclusion about the parties being psychologically incapacitated
was not founded on sufficient evidence.
III.
Former Filipinos have the limited right to
own
public agricultural lands in the
Philippines
We next deal with the ownership of lands by aliens.
Properties accumulated by a married couple may
either be real or personal. While the RTC awarded herein all
personal properties in favor of Angelita pursuant to the
"Matrimonial Property Agreement" executed in Germany, it
ignored that such agreement was governed by the national law
of the contracting parties; and that the forms and solemnities of
contracts, wills, and other public instruments should be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed. 15
Angelita did not allege and prove the German law that
allowed her to enter into and adopt the regime of complete
separation of property through the "Matrimonial Property
Agreement." In the absence of such allegation and proof, the
German law was presumed to be the same as that of the
Philippines.
In this connection, we further point out Article 77 of
the Family Code declares that marriage settlements and any
modification thereof shall be made in writing and signed by the
parties prior to the celebration of the marriage. Assuming that
the relevant German law was similar to the Philippine law, the
"Matrimonial Property Agreement," being entered into by the
parties in 1991, or a few years after the celebration of their
marriage on August 30, 1988, could not be enforced for being in
contravention of a mandatory law. 16
Also, with the parties being married on August 30,
1988, the provisions of the Family Code should govern.
Pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code, the property relations
between the spouses were governed by the absolute community
of property. This would then entitle Georg to half of the personal
properties of the community property.
As to the real properties of the parties, several factual
considerations were apparently overlooked, or were not
established.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states
that: "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain." It seems clear, however, that the lower
courts were too quick to pronounce that Georg, being a German
citizen, was automatically disqualified from owning lands in the
Philippines. Without disputing the inherent validity of the
pronouncement, we nonetheless opine that the lower courts
missed to take note of the fact that Angelita, in view of her citizenship; and, if she had, to ascertain what would be the
having admitted that she herself had been a German citizen, extent of her ownership of the real assets pertaining to the
suffered the same disqualification as Georg. Consequently, the marriage. If the remand should establish that she had remained a
lower courts' pronouncement awarding all real properties in foreigner, it must next be determined whether or not she
favor of Angelita could be devoid of legal basis as to her. complied with the limits defined or set by R.A. No.
8179 regarding her land ownership. The trial court shall award
At best, an alien could have enjoyed a limited right to her the real property that complied with the limits of the law,
own lands. Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution provides: and inform the Office of the Solicitor General for purposes of a
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a proper disposition of any excess land whose ownership violated
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his the law.
Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands,
subject to limitations provided by law." Section 5 of Republic WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for
Act No. 8179 (An Act Amending the Foreign Investments Act of review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
1991) also states: AaCTcI September 26, 2011 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 89297 subject to the MODIFICATION that the personal
Sec. 10.  Other Rights of Natural properties of the parties are to be equally divided between them;
Born Citizen Pursuant to the Provisions of and REMANDS the case to the court of origin for the
Article XII, Section 8 of the Constitution. — determination of the issues deriving from the petitioner's re-
Any natural born citizen who has lost his acquisition of her Filipino citizenship as far as the ownership of
Philippine citizenship and who has the legal the land pertaining to the parties is concerned consistent with
capacity to enter into a contract under this decision.
Philippine laws may be a transferee of a
private land up to a maximum area of five No pronouncement on costs of suit.
thousand (5,000) square meters in the case
of urban land or three (3) hectares in the SO ORDERED.
case of rural land to be used by him for Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza,
business or other purposes. In the case of Gesmundo and Carandang, JJ., concur.
married couples, one of them may avail of ||| (Simundac-Keppel v. Keppel, G.R. No. 202039, [August 14, 2019])
the privilege herein granted: Provided, That
if both shall avail of the same, the total area
acquired shall not exceed the maximum
herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns
urban or rural land for business or other
purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a
transferee of additional urban or rural land
for business or other purposes which when
added to those already owned by him shall
not exceed the maximum areas herein
authorized.
A transferee under this Act may
acquire not more than two (2) lots which
should be situated in different municipalities
or cities anywhere in the
Philippines: Provided, That the total land
area thereof shall not exceed five thousand
(5,000) square meters in the case of urban
land or three (3) hectares in the case of rural
land for use by him for business or other
purposes. A transferee who has already
acquired urban land shall be disqualified
from acquiring rural land area and vice
versa.
As the foregoing indicates, Angelita did not have any
unlimited right to own lands. On the other hand, the records
were not clear on whether or not she had owned real property as
allowed by law. It was imperative for the lower courts to
determine so. Hence, remand for further proceedings is called
for.
It is true that Angelita stated in her petition that she
had meanwhile re-acquired Filipino citizenship. 17 This
statement remained unsubstantiated, but the impact thereof
would be far reaching if the statement was true, for there would
then be no need to determine whether or not Angelita had
complied with Section 5 of R.A. No. 8179. Thus, the remand of
the case will enable the parties to adduce evidence on this aspect
of the case, particularly to provide factual basis to determine
whether or not Angelita had validly re-acquired her Filipino
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 212302. September 2, 2020.]
KARL WILLIAM YUTA MAGNO
SUZUKI a.k.a. YUTA
HAYASHI, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondent.
DECISION
INTING, J p:
This resolves the Petition 1 for Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Adoption Decree seeking to reverse and set aside the
Order 2 dated November 21, 2013 of Branch 192, Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Marikina City in JDRC Case No. 2013-2279-MK.
The assailed RTC Order dismissed the Petition 3 for Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Adoption Decree filed by Karl William
Yuta Magno Suzuki a.k.a. Yuta Hayashi (petitioner).
The Antecedents
Petitioner was born on April 4, 1988 in Manila to Mr.
Sadao Kumai Suzuki, a Japanese national, and Ms. Lorlie Lopez
Magno (Lorlie), a Filipino citizen. 4 Petitioner's parents were
married on December 29, 1987. 5 Based on Identification
Certificate No. 08-19540, 6 issued by the Bureau of Immigration
on March 31, 2008, petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
On June 12, 1997, petitioner's parents divorced. 7 On
December 6, 2002, Lorlie married another Japanese national,
Mr. Hikaru Hayashi (Hayashi), in San Juan City, Metro
Manila. 8
On November 9, 2004, petitioner, then 16 years old,
was adopted by Hayashi based on Japanese law. This was
reflected in Hayashi's Koseki or Family
Register. 9 The Koseki and its English translation were both
authenticated at the Philippine Consulate General on May 15,
2007. 10
At 24 years old, petitioner sought to be recognized in
the Philippines his adoption by Hayashi under Japanese law.
Thus, on May 24, 2013, he filed a Petition 11 for Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Adoption Decree before the RTC of
Marikina City.
On June 4, 2013, the RTC issued an
Order 12 requiring the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
file its comment on the petition. In its
Comment/Opposition 13 dated November 4, 2013, the OSG
alleged that the present legislation shows a strong intent to
regulate adoption by aliens. 14 It contended that Executive
Order No. (EO) 91 15 provides certain conditions before an
alien may adopt Filipino citizens. Likewise, it argued that the
Family Code provides limits on who are allowed to adopt
Filipino citizens. 16 Moreover, it claimed that an adoption is
only valid if made within the legal framework on adoption as
enunciated in Republic Act No. (RA) 8043 known as the Inter-
Country Adoption Act of 1995, and RA 8552 known as
the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. The OSG concluded that
petitioner's adoption is not in accordance with the laws, and
thus, should not be allowed.
On November 21, 2013, the RTC issued the assailed
Order 17 dismissing the petition for being contrary to law and
public policy. The RTC was of the view that the judicial
recognition sought would render nugatory the local laws on
adoption. The dispositive portion of the RTC Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for
further Proceedings is hereby DENIED, for
lack of merit. The instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED, for being contrary to law and
public policy.
SO ORDERED. 18
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, 19 which the RTC denied in its Order 20 dated
April 23, 2014. The RTC was convinced that RA 8043 (Inter-
Country Adoption Act of 1995) and RA 8552 (Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998) govern all adoptions of Filipino
citizens. 21
Furthermore, the RTC ruled that even assuming that
the adoption of petitioner is valid under the Japanese law,
Philippine courts are not automatically obliged to recognize its
validity. The RTC stated that under Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, there must be a "judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country." The RTC noted that the petition
merely alleges the fact of registration of petitioner's adoption in
the Family Register of Hayashi and fails to present any
judgment or final order issued by a Japanese tribunal. 22
Aggrieved, petitioner, on pure questions of law,
directly filed before the Court the present petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.
On August 7, 2017, the Court issued a
Resolution 23 requiring the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within 30 days from notice.
In his Memorandum, 24 petitioner claimed that: (1)
the National Statistics Office 25 Memorandum Circular No.
2007-008 26 dated September 24, 2007 which establishes the
guidelines for the registration in the civil registry of foreign
judgments/orders, includes adoption in its coverage; (2) Rule 53
of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, 27 issued by the
Office of the Civil Registrar-General (OCRG), states that a
decree of adoption issued by a foreign court is acceptable for
registration in the Philippines and can be issued only in the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; (3) Rule 9 of Circular
No. 90-2 28 dated March 28, 1990, also issued by the OCRG,
allows a decree of adoption issued by a foreign court to be
accepted for registration in the Philippines; and (4) that the
modern trend is to encourage adoption and that every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote such objective.
On the other hand, the OSG in its
Memorandum 29 reiterated that: (1) petitioner's adoption is
subject to the Philippine laws; (2) the Philippine laws manifest a
strong legislative intent to regulate adoption; (3) an adoption is
valid only if made within the framework enunciated in RA
8043 and RA 8552; (4) petitioner's adoption was not performed
under RA 8043; and (5) the adoption was not made pursuant
to RA 8552. 30
The present petition relies upon the following ground:
THE RTC ERRED IN RULING THAT
UNDER PHILIPPINE JURISDICTION A
JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF A
FOREIGN DECREE OF ADOPTION IS
NOT ALLOWED. 31
 Our Ruling the legitimate parent of the person to be
adopted.
The petition is meritorious.
Art. 184. The following persons
The RTC erroneously ruled that a foreign judgment of may not adopt:
adoption of a Filipino citizen cannot be judicially recognized
based on the view that such recognition would render nugatory (1) The guardian with respect to
the Philippine laws on adoption. It bears to emphasize that there the ward prior to the approval of the final
are two parties involved in an adoption process: the adopter and accounts rendered upon the termination of
the adoptee. The RTC in this case failed to consider that their guardianship relation;
Hayashi, the adopter, is a Japanese citizen.
(2) Any person who has been
Article 15 of the Civil Code states that "[l]aws convicted of a crime involving moral
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition turpitude;
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." Owing to this (3) An alien, except:
nationality principle, the Philippine laws on adoption are thus (a) A former
binding on petitioner. However, with respect to the case of Filipino citizen who
Hayashi, who is a Japanese citizen, it bears stressing that the seeks to adopt a relative
Philippine courts are precluded from deciding on his "family by consanguinity;
rights and duties, or on [his] status, condition and legal capacity"
concerning the foreign judgment to which he is a party. 32 Thus, (b) One who
as to the foreign judgment of adoption obtained by Hayashi, if it seeks to adopt the
is proven as a fact, the Philippine courts are limited to the legitimate child of his or
determination of whether to extend its effect to petitioner, the her Filipino spouse; or
Filipino party. (c) One who is
By definition, adoption is "the process of making a married to a Filipino
child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, citizen and seeks to
the rights accorded to a legitimate child." 33 It is a juridical act, adopt jointly with his or
a proceeding in rem which creates a relationship that is similar her spouse a relative by
to that which results from legitimate paternity and consanguinity of the
filiation. 34 The process of adoption therefore fixes a status, viz., latter.
that of parent and child. 35 More technically, it is an act by Aliens not included in the
which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino
legally existing between persons not so related by nature. 36 children in accordance with the rules on
Adoption has also been defined as the taking into one's inter-country adoptions as may be provided
family of the child of another as son or daughter and heir and by law. (Italics supplied.)
conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges of such. The Based on Article 184 of the Family Code, Hayashi
purpose of the proceeding for adoption is to effect this new falls under exception (b) of item (3). He is a Japanese citizen
status of relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, married to Lorlie, a Filipino. Under the Philippine law, it is
the change of name which frequently accompanies adoption therefore valid and legal for Hayashi to adopt petitioner, the
being more an incident than the object of the proceeding. 37 legitimate child of Lorlie. Further, the rules on inter-country
Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to adoptions of Filipino children as mentioned in the last paragraph
legitimate paternity and filiation with corresponding rights and of Article 184 do not apply to him.
duties that necessarily flow from it, including, but not Special laws on adoption have been passed by
necessarily limited to, the exercise of parental authority, use of Congress subsequent to the promulgation of the Family Code. In
surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and 1995, RA 8043 40 was enacted to establish the rules governing
successional rights. 38 inter-country adoptions of Filipino children. The Inter-Country
Indeed, matters relating to adoption are subject to Adoption Board (ICAB) was created to serve as the central
regulation by the State. 39 In the Philippines, the general authority in matters relating to inter-country
provisions on adoption are found in Articles 183 to 193, Title adoptions. 41 Meanwhile, in 1998, RA 8552 42 was passed to
VII of EO 209, Series of 1987, entitled "The Family Code of the set out the rules and policies on domestic adoption.
Philippines" (Family Code). Under the Family Code, not all As already mentioned, the rules on inter-country
persons are qualified to adopt. Articles 183 and 184 provide adoption are not applicable in the case of Hayashi pursuant to
limitations, viz.: Article 184 (3) (b) of the Family Code. Specifically, the
Art. 183. A person of age and in provisions of RA 8043 do not apply to him. Besides, as provided
possession of full civil capacity and legal in Section 8 thereof, "only a legally free child may be the subject
rights may adopt, provided he is in a of inter-country adoption." By definition, a "legally-free child"
position to support and care for his children, means a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily
legitimate or illegitimate, in keeping with committed to the Department of Social Welfare and
the means of the family. Development, in accordance with the Child and Youth Welfare
Code. 43 Petitioner is not a "legally-free child" within the
xxx xxx xxx contemplation of the law; hence, he may not be the subject of
In addition, the adopter must be at inter-country adoption.
least sixteen years older than the person to On the other hand, the rules on domestic adoption
be adopted, unless the adopter is the parent under RA 8552 have the following pertinent provisions with
by nature of the adopted, or is the spouse of respect to eligibility:
 ARTICLE III within the fourth
(4th) degree of
Eligibility consanguinity or
SECTION 7. Who May Adopt. — affinity; or
The following may adopt: (ii) one who seeks to adopt
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, the legitimate
in possession of full civil son/daughter of
capacity and legal rights, his/her Filipino
of good moral character, spouse; or
has not been convicted of (iii) one who is married to
any crime involving moral a Filipino citizen
turpitude, emotionally and and seeks to
psychologically capable of adopt jointly
caring for children, at least with his/her
sixteen (16) years older spouse a relative
than the adoptee, and who within the fourth
is in a position to support (4th) degree of
and care for his/her consanguinity or
children in keeping with affinity of the
the means of the family. Filipino spouse;
The requirement of sixteen or
(16)-year difference
between the age of the (c) The guardian with respect to the
adopter and adoptee may ward after the termination
be waived when the of the guardianship and
adopter is the biological clearance of his/her
parent of the adoptee, or is financial accountabilities.
the spouse of the adoptee's
parent; Husband and wife shall
jointly adopt, except in the
(b) Any alien possessing the same following cases:
qualifications as above
stated for Filipino (i) if one spouse seeks to
nationals: Provided, That adopt the
his/her country has legitimate
diplomatic relations with son/daughter of
the Republic of the the other; or
Philippines, that he/she (ii) if one spouse seeks to
has been living in the adopt his/her
Philippines for at least own illegitimate
three (3) continuous years son/daughter:
prior to the filing of the Provided,
application for adoption However, that
and maintains such the other spouse
residence until the has signified
adoption decree is entered, his/her consent
that he/she has been thereto; or
certified by his/her
diplomatic or consular (iii) if the spouses are
office or any appropriate legally separated
government agency that from each other.
he/she has the legal In case husband and wife jointly
capacity to adopt in adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
his/her country, and that son/daughter of the other, joint parental
his/her government allows authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
the adoptee to enter
his/her country as his/her SECTION 8. Who May be
adopted son/daughter: Adopted. — The following may be adopted:
Provided, Further, That
(a) Any person below eighteen (18)
the requirements on
years of age who has been
residency and certification
administratively or
of the alien's qualification
judicially declared
to adopt in his/her country
available for adoption;
may be waived for the
following: (b) The legitimate son/daughter of
one spouse by the other
(i) a former Filipino citizen
spouse;
who seeks to
adopt a relative
 (c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a
qualified adopter to
improve his/her status to
that of legitimacy;
(d) A person of legal age if, prior to
the adoption, said person
has been consistently
considered and treated by
the adopter(s) as his/her
own child since minority;
(e) A child whose adoption has been
previously rescinded; or
(f) A child whose biological or
adoptive parent(s) has
died: Provided, That no
proceedings shall be
initiated within six (6)
months from the time of
death of said parent(s).
(Italics supplied.)
Apparently, the adoption of petitioner by Hayashi may
be validly effected in accordance with the provisions of RA
8552. However, the Court disagrees with the RTC's view that
adoption decrees involving Filipino citizens obtained abroad
cannot be judicially recognized in the Philippines for being
contrary to law and public policy.
As emphasized by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos
Santos (Justice Delos Santos), the availability of RA 8552 as a
means to adopt petitioner should not automatically foreclose
proceedings to recognize his adoption decree obtained under
Japanese law. Justice Delos Santos reminds that the principle
behind the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment
derives its force not only from our Rules of Court but from the
fact that such act of recognition is considered part of what is
considered as the "generally accepted principles of international
law." 44 It is characterized as such because aside from the
widespread practice among States accepting in principle the
need for such recognition and enforcement, the procedure for
recognition and enforcement is embodied in the rules of law,
whether statutory or jurisprudential, in various foreign
jurisdictions. 45
As already established, the adoption by an alien of the
legitimate child of his/her Filipino spouse is valid and legal
based on Article 184 (3) (b) of the Family Code and Section 7
(b) (i), Article III of RA 8552. Thus, contrary to the RTC's
sweeping conclusion against foreign adoption decrees, the Court
finds that the adoption of petitioner by Hayashi, if proven as a
fact, can be judicially recognized in the Philippines. Justice
Delos Santos aptly propounds that the rules on domestic
adoption should not be pitted against the recognition of a foreign
adoption decree; instead, the better course of action is to
reconcile them and give effect to their respective purposes.
Judicial recognition of a foreign judgment is allowed
under Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
SEC. 48. Effect of Foreign
Judgments or Final Orders. — The effect of
a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order is as
follows:
(a) In case of a
judgment or final order
upon a specific thing,
the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon
the title to the thing; and
(b) In case of
a judgment or final
order against a person,
the judgment or final
order is presumptive
evidence of a right as
between the parties and
their successors in
interest by a subsequent
title.
In either case,
the judgment or final
order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
(Italics supplied.)
To emphasize, the rule states that the foreign judgment
against a person is already "presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties." Upon judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment, the right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves
as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil
registry. 46
In Mijares v. Hon. Rañada, 47 the Court extensively
discussed the underlying principles for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippine jurisdiction:
There is no obligatory rule derived
from treaties or conventions that requires the
Philippines to recognize foreign judgments,
or allow a procedure for the enforcement
thereof. However, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of
the incorporation clause of the Constitution,
form part of the laws of the land even if they
do not derive from treaty obligations. The
classical formulation in international law
sees those customary rules accepted as
binding result from the combination two
elements: the established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and
a psychological element known as
the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion
as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in
question is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it.
While the definite conceptual
parameters of the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments have not
been authoritatively established, the Court
can assert with certainty that such an
undertaking is among those generally
accepted principles of international law. As
earlier demonstrated, there is a widespread
practice among states accepting in principle
the need for such recognition and
enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of
varying degrees. The fact that there is no
binding universal treaty governing the
practice is not indicative of a widespread
rejection of the principle, but only a
disagreement as to the imposable specific
 rules governing the procedure for
recognition and enforcement.
Aside from the widespread
practice, it is indubitable that the procedure
for recognition and enforcement is embodied
in the rules of law, whether statutory or
jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign
jurisdictions. In the Philippines, this is
evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39
of the  Rules of Court which has existed in
its current form since the early 1900s.
Certainly, the Philippine legal system has
long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and
procedural rules the viability of an action
for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well
as the requisites for such valid enforcement,
as derived from internationally accepted
doctrines. Again, there may be distinctions
as to the rules adopted by each particular
state, but they all prescind from the premise
that there is a rule of law obliging states to
allow for, however generally, the
recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment. The bare principle, to our mind,
has attained the status of opinio juris in
international practice.
This is a significant proposition, as
it acknowledges that the procedure and
requisites outlined in Section 48, Rule 39
derive their efficacy not merely from the
procedural rule, but by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution.
Rules of procedure are promulgated by the
Supreme Court, and could very well be
abrogated or revised by the high court itself.
Yet the Supreme Court is obliged, as are all
State components, to obey the laws of the
land, including generally accepted principles
of international law which form part thereof,
such as those ensuring the qualified
recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments.
Thus, relative to the enforcement
of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it
emerges that there is a general right
recognized within our body of laws, and
affirmed by the Constitution, to seek
recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, as well as a right to defend
against such enforcement on the grounds of
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. 48 (Italics supplied.)
It is an established international legal principle that
final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious subject to certain
conditions that vary in different countries. 49 "In the recognition
of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under
foreign law." 50 They are limited to the question of whether to
extend the effect of the foreign judgment in the
Philippines. 51 Thus, in a foreign judgment relating to the status
of adoption involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine
courts will only decide whether to extend its effect to the
Filipino party.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only
determine: (1) whether the foreign judgment is contrary to an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any
alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the
foreign judgment, i.e., want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. 52 Absent
any inconsistency with public policy or adequate proof to repel
the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the
foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. 53
For Philippine courts to judicially recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of an adoption where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs
to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.
Thus, as held in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.: 54
x x x To be more specific, a copy
of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family
Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of
the judgment. If the office which has
custody is in a foreign country such as
Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office. 55
Accordingly, the Court deems it proper to remand the
case to Branch 192, RTC, Marikina City for further proceedings.
To emphasize, recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment or final order require only proof of fact of such foreign
judgment or final order. Furthermore, the recognition of the
foreign judgment of adoption is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right, and fact affecting petitioner. If
duly proven, the foreign judgment needs to be reflected in the
Philippine civil registry.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Orders dated November 21, 2013 and April 23, 2014 of Branch
192, Regional Trial Court, Marikina City in JDRC Case No.
2013-2279-MK are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the
petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, Hernando and Delos Santos, JJ.,
concur.
Baltazar-Padilla, * J., is on leave.
||| (Suzuki v. Office of the Solicitor General, G.R. No. 212302,
[September 2, 2020])
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 54919. May 30, 1984.]
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. HON.
TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as
the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII,
Court of First Instance of Manila and
NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION;
CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; GRANT
OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW OPPOSITION TO PROBATE
OF WILL IN CASE AT BAR, NOT A CASE OF. — We find
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge
when he allowed withdrawal of petitioner's opposition to the
probate of the will. No proof was adduced to support petitioner's
contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through
fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his
counsel of record. The records show that after the filing of the
contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a
manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss
Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the
time the motion was filed, the petitioner's former counsel, Atty.
Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and had been
substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion.
The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old
man's attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing
the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent
judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will ex-parte,
there being no other opposition to the same.
2. ID.; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; PROBATE OF
WILL; PROBATE COURT, SCOPE OF AUTHORITY. — As a
general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the
extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the
testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity
of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that
the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet
the issue (Maninang, v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
3. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION;
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF WILLS GOVERNED BY THE
NATIONAL LAW OF THE DECEDENT; CASE AT BAR. —
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will, as provided for by Articles 16(2) and
1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must
apply. In the case at bar, although on its face, the will appeared
to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge
should have denied its probate outright, the private respondents
have sufficiently established that Adoracion Campos was, at the
time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident
of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.. Therefore, the law
governing Adoracion Campos' will is the law of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Under the
Pennsylvania law, no legitimes are provided for, and all the
estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS;
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF THE PROVINCE WHERE THE ESTATE IS LOCATED
HAS JURISDICTION. — The settlement of the estate of
Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged
and proven the Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen
and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of
America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the
petitioner.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER ESTOPPED
FROM QUESTIONING JURISDICTION OF COURT IN
CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner is now estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is
a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (See Saulog Transit, Inc. v. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et
al., G.R. No. 63284, April 4, 1984).
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to
annul the order of the respondent judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and
allowed the probate of the last will and testament of Adoracion
C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein
private respondent. LLjur
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died,
leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her
sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez
and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes
Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit
of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court
whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire
estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita
C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the
deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in
the United States and for her appointment as administratrix of
the estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an
American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent
resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977
while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza,
Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her
last will and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New
Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix' death, her last will and
testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with
the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that
Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed
after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as
executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need
for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and
eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the
Philippines. Cdpr
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of
the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other
things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in
question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are
null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on
intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply
inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through
his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss
Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he
"has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and
now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his
daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte presentation of
evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an
order to wit:
"At the hearing, it has been
satisfactorily established that Adoracion C.
Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the
United States of America with a permanent
residence at 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia,
PA 19124, (Exhibit D); that when alive,
Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will
and Testament in the county of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws
thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b); that while in
temporary sojourn in the Philippines,
Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of
Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in the
Philippines and in the United States of
America; that the Last Will and Testament of
the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted
and granted probate by the Orphan's Court
Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the
probate court of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A.,
and letters of administration were issued in
favor of Clement J. McLaughlin, all in
accordance with the laws of the said foreign
country on procedure and allowance of wills
(Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is
not suffering from any disqualification which
would render her unfit as administratrix of the
estate in the Philippines of the late Adoracion
C. Campos.
"WHEREFORE, the Last Will and
Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is
hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the
Philippines, and Nenita Campos Paguia is
hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate
of said decedent; let Letters of Administration
with the Will annexed issue in favor of said
Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the
amount of P5,000.00 conditioned under the
provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of
Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on
April 14, 1979, confirming the withdrawal of his opposition,
acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a
petition for relief, praying that the order allowing the will be set
aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the
same was secured through fraudulent means. According to him,
the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among the
papers which he signed in connection with two Deeds of
Conditional Sales which he executed with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also
alleged that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the
opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the special
proceedings case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the
petitioner failed to appear. He made several motions for
postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion
entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of
January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of hearing provided:
"Please include this motion in your
calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30
in the morning for submission for
reconsideration and resolution of the
Honorable Court. Until this Motion is resolved,
may I also request for the future setting of the
case for hearing on the Oppositor's motion to
set aside previously filed."
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court
for June 19, 1980. When the case was called for hearing on this
date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to
vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of the petition for
relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the
petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support
thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also
denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition. cdll
Meanwhile, on June 6, 1982, petitioner Hermogenes
Campos died and left a will, which, incidentally has been
questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as,
on its face patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing
Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament.
Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as
petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court on
September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
rights of the petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged upon his
death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only
remaining children and forced heirs was denied on September
12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that
the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction when:
"1) He ruled the petitioner lost his
standing in court deprived the Right to Notice
(sic) upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss
opposition with waiver of rights or interests
against the estate of deceased Adoracion C.
Campos, thus, paving the way for the ex-
parte hearing of the petition for the probate of
decedent will.
"2) He ruled that petitioner can
waive, renounce or repudiate (not made in a
public or authenticated instrument), or by way
of a petition presented to the court but by way
of a motion presented prior to an order for the
distribution of the estate — the law especially
 providing that repudiation of an inheritance
must be presented, within 30 days after it has
issued an order for the distribution of the estate
in accordance with the rules of Court.
"3) He ruled that the right of a forced
heir to his legitime can be divested by a decree
admitting a will to probate in which no
provision is made for the forced heir in
complete disregard of Law of Succession.
"4) He denied petitioner's petition for
Relief on the ground that no evidence was
adduced to support the Petition for Relief when
no Notice nor hearing was set to afford
petitioner to prove the merit of his petition — a
denial of the due process and a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
"5) He acquired no jurisdiction over
the testate case, the fact that the Testator at the
time of death was a usual resident of
Dasmariñas, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court
of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over
the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792,
July 1955)."
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are
anchored on the allegation that the respondent judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the
petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge. No proof was adduced to support petitioner's
contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through
fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his
counsel of record. The records show that after the filing of the
contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a
manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss
Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the
time the motion was filed, the petitioner's former counsel, Atty.
Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and had been
substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion.
The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old
man's attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing
the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent
judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will ex-parte,
there being no other opposition to the same. LLpr
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the
provisions of the will. As a general rule, the probate court's
authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the
due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and
the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after
the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
However, where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang v. Court of
Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since
the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will,
Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was
reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have
preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should
have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have
sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her
death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16
par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
"However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found."
Art. 1039.
"Capacity to succeed is governed by
the law of the nation of the decedent."
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent.
Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not
provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away
by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that
such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the
sound and established public policy and would run counter to
the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity
of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16 (2)
and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent
must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v.
Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
"It is therefore evident that whatever
public policy or good customs may be involved
in our system of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession
of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
"The parties admit that the decedent,
Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine Law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G.
Bellis."
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for
the petition for relief, the records will bear the fact that what was
repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19,
1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief and not his motion to
vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the
petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The court
even admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence
when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There
was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested "for the
future setting of the case for hearing . . ." did not mean that at
the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given
 preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such
request should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice
of hearing. prcd
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the
issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73,
Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:
"SECTION 1. Where estate of
deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is
an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance in the province in which he
resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record."
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion
Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven
the Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and
permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America
an not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner.
Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a
settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court
to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing
to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
(See Saulog Transit, Inc. v. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G.R. No.
63284, April 4, 1984). LLphil
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente,
JJ ., concur.
Teehankee, J ., took no part.
 
||| (Cayetano v. Leonidas, G.R. No. 54919, [May 30, 1984], 214
PHIL 460-470)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139868. June 8, 2006.]
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, petitioner, vs.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-
DALAYGON, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
Spouses Audrey O'Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey
(Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines
for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill
(Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she
bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as
executor. 1 The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan's
Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N.
Phillips as executor due to Richard's renunciation of his
appointment. 2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta
(petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law
Offices as ancillary administrator. 3
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon
(respondent) with whom he has two children, namely, Kimberly and
Kevin.
On October 12, 1982, Audrey's will was also admitted to
probate by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 25,
Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No.
9625. 4 As administrator of Audrey's estate in the Philippines,
petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties:
(1) Audrey's conjugal share in real estate with improvements located
at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at
P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audrey's
name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of
stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. 5
On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he
bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and
interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to
Kyle. 6 The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan's Court
of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was
likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William
Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena &
Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator. HScCEa
Richard's will was then submitted for probate before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as Special
Proceeding No. M-888. 7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary
administrator on July 24, 1986. 8
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding
No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of
Audrey. 9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of
partition of Audrey's estate, with Richard being apportioned the 3/4
undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G
Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and
Kyle, the 1/4 undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares
in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash. 10
The motion and project of partition was granted and
approved by the trial court in its Order dated February 12,
1988. 11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988,
directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792
in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of
the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (3/4 undivided interest) and Kyle
(1/4 undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc.
to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and
16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the
amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to
the heirs. 12
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on
June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names of the Estate of W.
Richard Guersey and Kyle. 13
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special
Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of
Richard's 3/4 undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated
to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard's three
children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under
the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the
entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the
legacy." 14 Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except
for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his
entire 3/4 undivided interest in the Makati property should be given
to respondent.
The trial court found merit in respondent's opposition, and
in its Order dated December 6, 1991, disapproved the project of
partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also
adjudicated Richard's entire 3/4 undivided interest in the Makati
property to respondent. 15
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the annulment of the trial
court's Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in
Special Proceeding No. 9625. 16 Respondent contended that
petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded
the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey's
estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since
Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property
should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely 3/4 thereof, and
since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests
over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati
property should now pertain to respondent.
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent's
allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good faith in
submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special
Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge of the State of
Maryland's laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged
that he believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving
children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their
just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be
annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision
annulling the trial court's Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7,
1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 17 The dispositive portion of
the assailed Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders
of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are
hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a new
one is entered ordering:
 (a) The adjudication of the entire thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubrey's will bequeathing
estate of Audrey O'Neill Guersey in favor of entirely her estate to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project
the estate of W. Richard Guersey; and of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of
Richard's estate.
(b) The cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person
City Registry and the issuance of a new title in vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if
the name of the estate of W. Richard erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes
Guersey. DAHEaT final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in
rem. 23 However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution
SO ORDERED. 18 of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or
fraud. 24 Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar, 25 the Court ruled that a
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was
party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation
denied by the CA per Resolution dated August 27, 1999. 19
set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CA gravely erred in negligence. 26
not holding that:
 
A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988
The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on
AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL
October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997 Rules of Civil
PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 "IN THE
Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg.
MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 . An
PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE
annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the
DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY,
ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY
judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud. 27 For fraud to become a
ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND
basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or
BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME
actual, 28 and must be brought within four years from the discovery
FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY
of the fraud. 29
IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND
CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED. In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as
basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988
B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR
and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent's cause and
HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID
found that petitioner's failure to follow the terms of Audrey's will,
NOT COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER
despite the latter's declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic
EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE
fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the
PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS
national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner
ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF
should have distributed Aubrey's estate in accordance with the terms
AUDREY O'NEIL GUERSEY'S ESTATE IN
of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to
THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO
distribute Audrey's estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order
FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR
to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey's adopted daughter,
INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM]
Kyle Guersey Hill. STcEaI
IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS. 20
Petitioner contends that respondent's cause of action had
Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the
already prescribed because as early as 1984, respondent was already
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988 can no longer be
well aware of the terms of Audrey's will, 30 and the complaint was
annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the
filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack
administration as to all matters involved in such judgment or order,
of immediate action by saying that she had no opportunity to question
and will determine for all time and in all courts, as far as the parties
petitioner's acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No.
to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined," and
9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition
the same has already been executed. 21
in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the
Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in estate of Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to
performing his duties as an ancillary administrator. He maintains that protect her interest. 31
at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for
the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was
annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run
made in accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes
from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent's
knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the terms of
knowledge of the terms of Audrey's will is immaterial in this case
Aubrey's will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised
since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioner's failure
respondent of the contents of the will and how the estate will be
to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland
divided. 22
that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have
Respondent argues that petitioner's breach of his fiduciary been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year
duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey's estate amounted to period should be counted from the time of respondent's discovery
extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound thereof.
to follow the express terms of Aubrey's will, and his denial of
Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of
knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is
partition of Richard's estate, the opposition thereto, and the order of
a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know
the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special
the relevant laws.
Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in 1991. 32 Respondent cannot
Respondent also states that she was not able to file any be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since it
opposition to the project of partition because she was not a party was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to
comprehend the ramifications of petitioner's acts. Obviously,
respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but to file
the annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993,
clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.
Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic
Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 33 the Court stated that
"man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive
new schemes to fool the unwary."
There is extrinsic fraud within the
meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129,
where it is one the effect of which prevents a
party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or
from presenting all of his case to the court, or
where it operates upon matters, not pertaining
to the judgment itself, but to the manner in
which it was procured so that there is not a fair
submission of the controversy. In other words,
extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of
the prevailing party in the litigation which is
committed outside of the trial of the case,
whereby the defeated party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his side of the case by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the
unsuccessful party has been prevented from
exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent, as by
keeping him away from court, a false promise
of a compromise; or where the defendant never
had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where
an attorney fraudulently or without authority
connives at his defeat; these and similar cases
which show that there has never been a real
contest in the trial or hearing of the case are
reasons for which a new suit may be sustained
to set aside and annul the former judgment and
open the case for a new and fair hearing. 34
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is
alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court. 35
Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey's estate.
As such, he occupies a position of the highest trust and confidence,
and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire
good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a
guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be
infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which
a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar
transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct
is to be judged. 36
Petitioner's failure to proficiently manage the distribution of
Audrey's estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by
the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA
Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and
April 7, 1988, must be upheld. ACDIcS
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American
citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her
will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others,
that at the time of Audrey's death, she was residing in the Philippines
but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament
dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the
Orphan's Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly
authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City
and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted
by the Orphan's Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and
the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and
the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey's
will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by
her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in
Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as
personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary
succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that
"capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent."
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of
Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines and
Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered. —
When a will is thus allowed, the court shall
grant letters testamentary, or letters of
administration with the will annexed, and such
letters testamentary or of administration, shall
extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of
just debts and expenses of administration,
shall be disposed of according to such will,
so far as such will may operate upon it; and
the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is
provided by law in cases of estates in the
Philippines belonging to persons who are
inhabitants of another state or country.
(Emphasis supplied)
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them; 37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey's
estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of
the State of Maryland. 38
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence
the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely
relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine
law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily
applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of Audrey's
will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the
case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence
presented. ISTDAH
Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was
made in good faith. The Court cannot accept petitioner's protestation.
How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when
as early as the reprobate of Audrey's will before the trial court in
1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen,
domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent,
petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big
legal staff and a large library." 39 He had all the legal resources to
determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise
his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and
to discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately,
petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties.
 
Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the
fact remains that the trial court failed to consider said law when it
issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7,
1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey's heirs, and distributing
Audrey's estate according to the project of partition submitted by
petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of
her full successional right to the Makati property.
In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc., 40 the Court
held that when the rule that the negligence or mistake of counsel
binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be
relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of
justice, and the court has the power to except a particular case from
the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.
The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his
responsibilities as ancillary administrator of Audrey's estate. The CA
likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was
prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should
equally benefit from the Makati property. The CA correctly stated,
which the Court adopts, thus:
In claiming good faith in the
performance of his duties and responsibilities,
defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the
principle which presumes the law of the forum
to be the same as the foreign law (Beam vs.
Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of
evidence adduced to prove the latter law
(Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210).
In defending his actions in the light of the
foregoing principle, however, it appears that
the defendant lost sight of the fact that his
primary responsibility as ancillary
administrator was to distribute the subject
estate in accordance with the will of Audrey
O'Neill Guersey. Considering the principle
established under Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship
and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it
goes without saying that the defendant was
also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of
Maryland on the matter.
The record reveals, however, that no
clear effort was made to prove the national law
of Audrey O'Neill Guersey during the
proceedings before the court a quo. While
there is claim of good faith in distributing the
subject estate in accordance with the Philippine
laws, the defendant appears to put his
actuations in a different light as indicated in a
portion of his direct examination, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
It would seem, therefore, that the
eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey
O'Neill Guersey was prompted by defendant
Alonzo H. Ancheta's concern that the subject
realty equally benefit the plaintiff's adopted
daughter Kyle Guersey.
Well-intentioned though it may be,
defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta's action appears
to have breached his duties and responsibilities
as ancillary administrator of the subject
estate. While such breach of duty admittedly
cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under
ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary
nature of the said defendant's position, as
well as the resultant frustration of the
decedent's last will, combine to create a
circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic
fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta's
omission to prove the national laws of the
decedent and to follow the latter's last will, in
sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject
orders without a fair submission of the real
issues involved in the case. 41 (Emphasis
supplied) AHCaED
This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave
abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a result of
petitioner's abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not
rest upon petitioner's pleasure as to which law should be made
applicable under the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent
was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property
through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioner's omission
was beyond her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal
implications of petitioner's omission and it was belatedly that she
realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end result was a
miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and
moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their
rights. 42
The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in
Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the State of
Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:
Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-
Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public
General Laws of Maryland on Estates and
Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be
subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon
his death shall pass directly to the personal
representative, who shall hold the legal title for
administration and distribution," while Section
4-408 expressly provides that "unless a
contrary intent is expressly indicated in the
will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire
interest of the testator in the property which is
the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title
7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that
"a personal representative is a fiduciary" and as
such he is "under the general duty to settle and
distribute the estate of the decedent in
accordance with the terms of the will and the
estate of decedents law as expeditiously and
with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable
under the circumstances". 43
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate,
consisting of the following: (1) Audrey's conjugal share in the Makati
property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of
stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties
passed on to Richard upon Audrey's death. Meanwhile, Richard, in
his will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his
rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left
to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property
should have then passed on to respondent. This, of course, assumes
the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a
legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the testator in the
property which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently proven
in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take
judicial notice thereof in view of the ruling in Bohanan v.
Bohanan. 44 Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law of
Nevada despite failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.:
We have, however, consulted the
records of the case in the court below and we
have found that during the hearing on October
4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C.
Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her
share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905,
Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in
evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as
Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n.
pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance).
Again said law was presented by the counsel
for the executor and admitted by the Court as
Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on
January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo
(see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants,
children of the testator, do not dispute the
above-quoted provision of the laws of the State
of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances,
we are constrained to hold that the pertinent
law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the
Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken
judicial notice of by us, without proof of such
law having been offered at the hearing of the
project of partition.
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of
Maryland has been brought to record before the CA, and the trial
court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the
same in disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard's
estate, not to mention that petitioner or any other interested person for
that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity of said law, then
Audrey's and Richard's estate should be distributed according to their
respective wills, and not according to the project of partition
submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property
belongs to respondent.
Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion
in Santos v. Manarang, 45 wrote:
A will is the testator speaking after
death. Its provisions have substantially the
same force and effect in the probate court as if
the testator stood before the court in full life
making the declarations by word of mouth as
they appear in the will. That was the special
purpose of the law in the creation of the
instrument known as the last will and
testament. Men wished to speak after they
were dead and the law, by the creation of that
instrument, permitted them to do so . . . All
doubts must be resolved in favor of the
testator's having meant just what he
said. ADEaHT
Honorable as it seems, petitioner's motive in equitably
distributing Audrey's estate cannot prevail over Audrey's and
Richard's wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis: 46
. . . whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national Law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones. 47
Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and
Richard Guersey were American citizens who owned real property in
the Philippines, although records do not show when and how the
Guerseys acquired the Makati property.
Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935
Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of the public
domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate
public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or
controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha, 48 the Court clarified that
the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American
citizens and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands
of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and
utilization of natural resources of the Philippines, does not include the
acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The
prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried
on to the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the
exception of private lands acquired by hereditary succession and
when the transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as
provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article
XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands
or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal
succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born
citizen.
 
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. 49 In
this case, since the Makati property had already passed on to
respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended
the acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now
inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision to
keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated
March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated August 27, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the
performance of his duties as an official of the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, C.J., in the result.
Ynares-Santiago, J., is on leave.
||| (Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon, G.R. No. 139868, [June 8, 2006],
523 PHIL 516-539)
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 157314. July 29, 2005.]
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, NOW BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs.
THEMISTOCLES PACILAN,
JR., respondent.
Filomeno B. Tan, Jr. for petitioner.
Emmanuel G. Vinco for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; AWARD THEREOF
BASED ON ABUSE OF RIGHTS; ELEMENTS, CONSTRUED. —
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. The elements of abuse of rights are
the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is
exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another. Malice or bad faith is at the core of the said
provision. The law always presumes good faith and any person who
seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of
proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill-motive. Good faith
refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the
individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple
negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or
interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice
connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies
an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith
or bad motive.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEGATED BY THE ABSENCE OF
MALICE OR BAD FAITH; EXEMPLIFIED IN CASE AT BAR. —
It is observed that nowhere under its rules and regulations is
petitioner bank required to notify the respondent, or any depositor for
that matter, of the closure of the account for frequently drawing
checks against insufficient funds. No malice or bad faith could be
imputed on petitioner bank for so acting since the records bear out
that the respondent had indeed been improperly and irregularly
handling his account not just a few times but hundreds of times.
Under the circumstances, petitioner bank could not be faulted for
exercising its right in accordance with the express rules and
regulations governing the current accounts of its depositors. Upon the
opening of his account, the respondent had agreed to be bound by
these terms and conditions. Neither the fact that petitioner bank
accepted the deposit made by the respondent the day following the
closure of his account constitutes bad faith or malice on the part of
petitioner bank. The same could be characterized as simple
negligence by its personnel. Said act, by itself, is not constitutive of
bad faith.
3. ID.; ID.; DISTINGUISHED FROM INJURY. — There
is a material distinction between damages and injury. The Court had
the occasion to explain the distinction between damages and injury in
this wise: . . . Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is
the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are
the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which
the loss of harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In
such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person
alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act
which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations
are often called damnum absque injuria. In other words, in order that
a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach
of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff — a concurrence of
injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.
The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that
the individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must
first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that
breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty
should be the proximate cause of the injury. Whatever damages the
respondent may have suffered as a consequence, e.g., dishonor of his
other insufficiently funded checks, would have to be borne by him
alone. It was the respondent's repeated improper and irregular
handling of his account which constrained petitioner bank to close the
same in accordance with the rules and regulations governing its
depositors' current accounts. The respondent's case is clearly one of
damnum absque injuria.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J p:
Before the Court is the petition for review
on certiorari filed by Far East Bank and Trust Company (now Bank
of the Philippines Islands) seeking the reversal of the
Decision 1 dated August 30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 36627 which ordered it, together with its branch
accountant, Roger Villadelgado, to pay respondent Themistocles
Pacilan, Jr. 2 the total sum of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages. The assailed decision affirmed with modification that of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City,
Branch 54, in Civil Case No. 4908. Likewise sought to be reversed
and set aside is the Resolution dated January 17, 2003 of the appellate
court, denying petitioner bank's motion for reconsideration.
The case stemmed from the following undisputed facts:
Respondent Pacilan opened a current account with
petitioner bank's Bacolod Branch on May 23, 1980. His account was
denominated as Current Account No. 53208 (0052-00407-4). The
respondent had since then issued several postdated checks to different
payees drawn against the said account. Sometime in March 1988, the
respondent issued Check No. 2434886 in the amount of P680.00 and
the same was presented for payment to petitioner bank on April 4,
1988. cDCIHT
Upon its presentment on the said date, Check No. 2434886
was dishonored by petitioner bank. The next day, or on April 5, 1988,
the respondent deposited to his current account the amount of
P800.00. The said amount was accepted by petitioner bank; hence,
increasing the balance of the respondent's deposit to P1,051.43.
Subsequently, when the respondent verified with petitioner
bank about the dishonor of Check No. 2434866, he discovered that
his current account was closed on the ground that it was "improperly
handled." The records of petitioner bank disclosed that between the
period of March 30, 1988 and April 5, 1988, the respondent issued
four checks, to wit: Check No. 2480416 for P6,000.00; Check No.
2480419 for P50.00; Check No. 2434880 for P680.00 and; Check No.
2434886 for P680.00, or a total amount of P7,410.00. At the time,
however, the respondent's current account with petitioner bank only
had a deposit of P6,981.43. Thus, the total amount of the checks
presented for payment on April 4, 1988 exceeded the balance of the
respondent's deposit in his account. For this reason, petitioner bank,
through its branch accountant, Villadelgado, closed the respondent's
current account effective the evening of April 4, 1988 as it then had
an overdraft of P428.57. As a consequence of the overdraft, Check
No. 2434886 was dishonored.
On April 18, 1988, the respondent wrote to petitioner bank
complaining that the closure of his account was unjustified. When he
did not receive a reply from petitioner bank, the respondent filed with
the RTC of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 54, a complaint
for damages against petitioner bank and Villadelgado. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4908. The respondent, as complainant
therein, alleged that the closure of his current account by petitioner
bank was unjustified because on the first banking hour of April 5,
1988, he already deposited an amount sufficient to fund his checks.
The respondent pointed out that Check No. 2434886, in particular,
was delivered to petitioner bank at the close of banking hours on
April 4, 1988 and, following normal banking procedure, it (petitioner
bank) had until the last clearing hour of the following day, or on
April 5, 1988, to honor the check or return it, if not funded. In
disregard of this banking procedure and practice, however, petitioner
bank hastily closed the respondent's current account and dishonored
his Check No. 2434886.
The respondent further alleged that prior to the closure of
his current account, he had issued several other postdated checks. The
petitioner bank's act of closing his current account allegedly
preempted the deposits that he intended to make to fund those checks.
Further, the petitioner bank's act exposed him to criminal prosecution
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
According to the respondent, the indecent haste that
attended the closure of his account was patently malicious and
intended to embarrass him. He claimed that he is a Cashier of
Prudential Bank and Trust Company, whose branch office is located
just across that of petitioner bank, and a prominent and respected
leader both in the civic and banking communities. The alleged
malicious acts of petitioner bank besmirched the respondent's
reputation and caused him "social humiliation, wounded feelings,
insurmountable worries and sleepless nights" entitling him to an
award of damages.
In their answer, petitioner bank and Villadelgado
maintained that the respondent's current account was subject to
petitioner bank's Rules and Regulations Governing the Establishment
and Operation of Regular Demand Deposits which provide that "the
Bank reserves the right to close an account if the depositor frequently
draws checks against insufficient funds and/or uncollected deposits"
and that "the Bank reserves the right at any time to return checks of
the depositor which are drawn against insufficient funds or for any
reason." 3
They showed that the respondent had improperly and
irregularly handled his current account. For example, in 1986, the
respondent's account was overdrawn 156 times, in 1987, 117 times
and in 1988, 26 times. In all these instances, the account was
overdrawn due to the issuance of checks against insufficient funds.
The respondent had also signed several checks with a different
signature from the specimen on file for dubious reasons.
When the respondent made the deposit on April 5, 1988, it
was obviously to cover for issuances made the previous day against
an insufficiently funded account. When his Check No. 2434886 was
presented for payment on April 4, 1988, he had already incurred an
overdraft; hence, petitioner bank rightfully dishonored the same for
insufficiency of funds.
After due proceedings, the court a quo rendered judgment
in favor of the respondent as it ordered the petitioner bank and
Villadelgado, jointly and severally, to pay the respondent the amounts
of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages and costs of suit. In so ruling, the court a quo also cited
petitioner bank's rules and regulations which state that "a charge of
P10.00 shall be levied against the depositor for any check that is
taken up as a returned item due to 'insufficiency of funds' on the date
of receipt from the clearing office even if said check is honored
and/or covered by sufficient deposit the following banking day." The
same rules and regulations also provide that "a check returned for
insufficiency of funds for any reason of similar import may be
subsequently recleared for one more time only, subject to the same
charges."
According to the court a quo, following these rules and
regulations, the respondent, as depositor, had the right to put up
sufficient funds for a check that was taken as a returned item for
insufficient funds the day following the receipt of said check from the
clearing office. In fact, the said check could still be recleared for one
more time. In previous instances, petitioner bank notified the
respondent when he incurred an overdraft and he would then deposit
sufficient funds the following day to cover the overdraft. Petitioner
bank thus acted unjustifiably when it immediately closed the
respondent's account on April 4, 1988 and deprived him of the
opportunity to reclear his check or deposit sufficient funds therefor
the following day.
As a result of the closure of his current account, several of
the respondent's checks were subsequently dishonored and because of
this, the respondent was humiliated, embarrassed and lost his credit
standing in the business community. The court a quo further
ratiocinated that even granting arguendo that petitioner bank had the
right to close the respondent's account, the manner which attended the
closure constituted an abuse of the said right. Citing Article 19 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines which states that "[e]very person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith" and Article 20 thereof which states that "[e]very
person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same," the court a
quo adjudged petitioner bank of acting in bad faith. It held that, under
the foregoing circumstances, the respondent is entitled to an award of
moral and exemplary damages. cSCADE
The decretal portion of the court a quo's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES
CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the defendants
[petitioner bank and
Villadelgado], jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiff
[the respondent] the sum of
P100,000.00 as moral
damages;
2. Ordering the defendants, jointly
and severally, to pay
plaintiff the sum of
P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages plus costs and
expenses of the suit; and
3. Dismissing [the] defendants'
counterclaim for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED. 4
 On appeal, the CA rendered the Decision dated August 30,
2002, affirming with modification the decision of the court a quo.
The appellate court substantially affirmed the factual
findings of the court a quo as it held that petitioner bank unjustifiably
closed the respondent's account notwithstanding that its own rules
and regulations allow that a check returned for insufficiency of funds
or any reason of similar import, may be subsequently recleared for
one more time, subject to standard charges. Like the court a quo, the
appellate court observed that in several instances in previous years,
petitioner bank would inform the respondent when he incurred an
overdraft and allowed him to make a timely deposit to fund the
checks that were initially dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
However, on April 4, 1988, petitioner bank immediately closed the
respondent's account without even notifying him that he had incurred
an overdraft. Even when they had already closed his account on April
4, 1988, petitioner bank still accepted the deposit that the respondent
made on April 5, 1988, supposedly to cover his checks.
 
Echoing the reasoning of the court a quo, the CA declared
that even as it may be conceded that petitioner bank had reserved the
right to close an account for repeated overdrafts by the respondent,
the exercise of that right must never be despotic or arbitrary. That
petitioner bank chose to close the account outright and return the
check, even after accepting a deposit sufficient to cover the said
check, is contrary to its duty to handle the respondent's account with
utmost fidelity. The exercise of the right is not absolute and good
faith, at least, is required. The manner by which petitioner bank
closed the account of the respondent runs afoul of Article 19 of
the Civil Code which enjoins every person, in the exercise of his
rights, "to give every one his due, and observe honesty and good
faith."
The CA concluded that petitioner bank's precipitate and
imprudent closure of the respondent's account had caused him, a
respected officer of several civic and banking associations, serious
anxiety and humiliation. It had, likewise, tainted his credit standing.
Consequently, the award of damages is warranted. The CA, however,
reduced the amount of damages awarded by the court a quo as it
found the same to be excessive:
We, however, find excessive the
amount of damages awarded by the RTC. In
our view the reduced amount of P75,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages are in order. Awards for damages are
not meant to enrich the plaintiff-appellee [the
respondent] at the expense of defendants-
appellants [the petitioners], but to obviate the
moral suffering he has undergone. The award
is aimed at the restoration, within limits
possible, of the status quo ante, and should be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted. 5
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, subject
to the MODIFICATION that the award of
moral damages is reduced to P75,000.00 and
the award of exemplary damages reduced to
P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 6
Petitioner bank sought the reconsideration of the said
decision but in the assailed Resolution dated January 17, 2003, the
appellate court denied its motion. Hence, the recourse to this Court.
Petitioner bank maintains that, in closing the account of the
respondent in the evening of April 4, 1988, it acted in good faith and
in accordance with the rules and regulations governing the operation
of a regular demand deposit which reserves to the bank "the right to
close an account if the depositor frequently draws checks against
insufficient funds and/or uncollected deposits." The same rules and
regulations also provide that "the depositor is not entitled, as a matter
of right, to overdraw on this deposit and the bank reserves the right at
any time to return checks of the depositor which are drawn against
insufficient funds or for any reason."
It cites the numerous instances that the respondent had
overdrawn his account and those instances where he deliberately
signed checks using a signature different from the specimen on file.
Based on these facts, petitioner bank was constrained to close the
respondent's account for improper and irregular handling and
returned his Check No. 2434886 which was presented to the bank for
payment on April 4, 1988.
Petitioner bank further posits that there is no law or rule
which gives the respondent a legal right to make good his check or to
deposit the corresponding amount to cover said check within 24
hours after the same is dishonored or returned by the bank for having
been drawn against insufficient funds. It vigorously denies having
violated Article 19 of the Civil Code as it insists that it acted in good
faith and in accordance with the pertinent banking rules and
regulations.
The petition is impressed with merit.
A perusal of the respective decisions of the court a quo and
the appellate court show that the award of damages in the
respondent's favor was anchored mainly on Article 19 of the Civil
Code which, quoted anew below, reads:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the
existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith;
and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 7 Malice
or bad faith is at the core of the said provision. 8 The law always
presumes good faith and any person who seeks to be awarded
damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the
latter acted in bad faith or with ill-motive. 9 Good faith refers to the
state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. 10 Bad faith
does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence,
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-
will that partakes of the nature of fraud. 11 Malice connotes ill-will or
spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do
ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. 12
Undoubtedly, petitioner bank has the right to close the
account of the respondent based on the following provisions of its
Rules and Regulations Governing the Establishment and Operation of
Regular Demand Deposits:
10) The Bank reserves the right to close an
account if the depositor frequently
draws checks against insufficient
funds and/or uncollected deposits.
xxx xxx xxx
12) . . .
  However, it is clearly understood that the
depositor is not entitled, as a matter
of right, to overdraw on this deposit
and the bank reserves the right at any
time to return checks of the depositor
which are drawn against insufficient
funds or for any other reason.
The facts, as found by the court a quo and the appellate
court, do not establish that, in the exercise of this right, petitioner
bank committed an abuse thereof. Specifically, the second and third
elements for abuse of rights are not attendant in the present case. The
evidence presented by petitioner bank negates the existence of bad
faith or malice on its part in closing the respondent's account on April
4, 1988 because on the said date the same was already overdrawn.
The respondent issued four checks, all due on April 4, 1988,
amounting to P7,410.00 when the balance of his current account
deposit was only P6,981.43. Thus, he incurred an overdraft of
P428.57 which resulted in the dishonor of his Check No. 2434886.
Further, petitioner bank showed that in 1986, the current account of
the respondent was overdrawn 156 times due to his issuance of
checks against insufficient funds. 13 In 1987, the said account was
overdrawn 117 times for the same reason. 14 Again, in 1988, 26
times. 15 There were also several instances when the respondent
issued checks deliberately using a signature different from his
specimen signature on file with petitioner bank. 16 All these
circumstances taken together justified the petitioner bank's closure of
the respondent's account on April 4, 1988 for "improper handling."
It is observed that nowhere under its rules and regulations
is petitioner bank required to notify the respondent, or any depositor
for that matter, of the closure of the account for frequently drawing
checks against insufficient funds. No malice or bad faith could be
imputed on petitioner bank for so acting since the records bear out
that the respondent had indeed been improperly and irregularly
handling his account not just a few times but hundreds of times.
Under the circumstances, petitioner bank could not be faulted for
exercising its right in accordance with the express rules and
regulations governing the current accounts of its depositors. Upon the
opening of his account, the respondent had agreed to be bound by
these terms and conditions.
damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. These
situations are often called damnum absque
injuria.
In other words, in order that a
plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries
of which he complains, he must establish that
such injuries resulted from a breach of duty
which the defendant owed to the plaintiff — a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. The
underlying basis for the award of tort damages
is the premise that the individual was injured in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be
a breach of some duty and the imposition of
liability for that breach before damages may be
awarded; and the breach of such duty should
be the proximate cause of the injury. 17
 
Whatever damages the respondent may have suffered as a
consequence, e.g., dishonor of his other insufficiently funded checks,
would have to be borne by him alone. It was the respondent's
repeated improper and irregular handling of his account which
constrained petitioner bank to close the same in accordance with the
rules and regulations governing its depositors' current accounts. The
respondent's case is clearly one of damnum absque injuria.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated August 30, 2002 and Resolution dated January 17, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 36627 are REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
||| (Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. Pacilan, Jr., G.R. No. 157314,
[July 29, 2005], 503 PHIL 334-347)

Neither the fact that petitioner bank accepted the deposit

made by the respondent the day following the closure of his account
constitutes bad faith or malice on the part of petitioner bank. The
same could be characterized as simple negligence by its personnel.
Said act, by itself, is not constitutive of bad faith.
The respondent had thus failed to discharge his burden of
proving bad faith on the part of petitioner bank or that it was
motivated by ill-will or spite in closing his account on April 4, 1988
and in inadvertently accepting his deposit on April 5, 1988. TCEaDI
Further, it has not been shown that these acts were done by
petitioner bank with the sole intention of prejudicing and injuring the
respondent. It is conceded that the respondent may have suffered
damages as a result of the closure of his current account. However,
there is a material distinction between damages and injury. The Court
had the occasion to explain the distinction between damages and
injury in this wise:
. . . Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm
which results from the injury; and damages are
the recompense or compensation awarded for
the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in
which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured
person alone, the law affords no remedy for
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146322. December 6, 2006.]
ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and
RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS,
INC., petitioners, vs. ERNESTO
QUIAMCO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum
cuique tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure others and to
give everyone his due. These supreme norms of justice are the
underlying principles of law and order in society. We reaffirm
them in this petition for review on certiorari assailing the July
26, 2000 decision 1 and October 18, 2000 resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 47571.
In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was
approached by Juan Davalan, 2 Josefino Gabutero and Raul
Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case
for robbery 3 filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered
to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its
certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the original
certificate of registration but the three accused never came to see
him again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open
space inside respondent's business establishment, Avesco-
AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible to the
public.
It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had
been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas
Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by
petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its
payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner
corporation. 4
When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments,
Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the payments. In
September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the
remaining installments and told petitioner corporation's
collector, Wilfredo Veraño, that the motorcycle had allegedly
been "taken by respondent's men."
Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner
Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, 5 went to Avesco-
AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. The leader of the
police team, P/Lt. Arturo Vendiola, talked to the clerk in charge
and asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk
were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside
the establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."
On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE
Enterprises, the policemen left to look for respondent in his
residence while petitioner Uypitching stayed in the
establishment to take photographs of the motorcycle. Unable to
find respondent, the policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE
Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitching's instruction and over
the clerk's objection, took the motorcycle. EDIHSC
On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a
criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of
the Anti-Fencing Law 6 against respondent in the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City. 7 Respondent moved for
dismissal because the complaint did not charge an offense as he
had neither stolen nor bought the motorcycle. The Office of the
City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint 8 and denied petitioner
Uypitching's subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Respondent filed an action for damages against
petitioners in the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental,
Branch 37. 9 He sought to hold the petitioners liable for the
following: (1) unlawful taking of the motorcycle; (2) utterance
of a defamatory remark (that respondent was a thief) and (3)
precipitate filing of a baseless and malicious complaint. These
acts humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and injured his
reputation and integrity.
On July 30, 1994, the trial court rendered a
decision 10 finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated
with malice and ill will when he called respondent a thief, took
the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless
complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law. Petitioners' acts were found to be contrary to
Articles 19 11 and 20 12 of the Civil Code.Hence, the trial court
held petitioners liable to respondent for P500,000 moral
damages, P200,000 exemplary damages and P50,000 attorney's
fees plus costs.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA
affirmed the trial court's decision with modification, reducing
the award of moral and exemplary damages to P300,000 and
P100,000, respectively. 13 Petitioners sought reconsideration but
it was denied. Thus, this petition.
In their petition and memorandum, petitioners submit
that the sole (allegedly) issue to be resolved here is whether the
filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of
the Anti-Fencing Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor
warranted the award of moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and costs in favor of respondent.
Petitioners' suggestion is misleading. They were held
liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless
complaint against respondent but also for making a slanderous
remark and for taking the motorcycle from respondent's
establishment in an abusive manner.
CORRECTNESS OF THE FINDINGS
OF THE RTC AND CA
As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and
CA that malice and ill will attended not only the public
imputation of a crime to respondent 14 but also the taking of the
motorcycle, petitioners were deemed to have accepted the
correctness of such findings. This alone was sufficient to hold
petitioners liable for damages to respondent.
Nevertheless, to address petitioners' concern, we also
find that the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the
filing of the complaint was tainted with malice and bad faith.
Petitioners themselves in fact described their action as a
"precipitate act." 15 Petitioners were bent on portraying
respondent as a thief. In this connection, we quote with approval
the following findings of the RTC, as adopted by the CA:
. . . There was malice or ill-will [in
filing the complaint before the City
Prosecutor's Office] because Atty. Ernesto
Ramas Uypitching knew or ought to have
known as he is a lawyer, that there was no
 probable cause at all for filing a criminal
complaint for qualified theft and fencing
activity against [respondent]. Atty. Uypitching
had no personal knowledge that [respondent]
stole the motorcycle in question. He was
merely told by his bill collector ([i.e.] the bill
collector of Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc.)[,]
Wilfredo Veraño[,] that Juan Dabalan will [no
longer] pay the remaining installment(s) for the
motorcycle because the motorcycle was taken
by the men of [respondent]. It must be noted
that the term used by Wilfredo Veraño in
informing Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching of
the refusal of Juan Dabalan to pay for the
remaining installment was [']taken['], not
[']unlawfully taken['] or 'stolen.' Yet, despite
the double hearsay, Atty. Ernesto Ramas
Uypitching not only executed the [complaint-
affidavit] wherein he named [respondent] as
'the suspect' of the stolen motorcycle but also
charged [respondent] of 'qualified theft and
fencing activity' before the City [Prosecutor's]
Office of Dumaguete. The absence of probable
cause necessarily signifies the presence of
malice. What is deplorable in all these is that
Juan Dabalan, the owner of the motorcycle, did
not accuse [respondent] or the latter's men of
stealing the motorcycle[,] much less bother[ed]
to file a case for qualified theft before the
authorities. That Atty. Uypitching's act in
charging [respondent] with qualified theft and
fencing activity is tainted with malice is also
shown by his answer to the question of Cupid
Gonzaga 16 [during one of their conversations]
— "why should you still file a complaint? You
have already recovered the motorcycle. . ."[:]
"Aron motagam ang kawatan ug motor." ("To
teach a lesson to the thief of motorcycle.") 17
Moreover, the existence of malice, ill will or bad faith
is a factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the trial court,
when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this
Court. We see no compelling reason to reverse the findings of
the RTC and the CA. SEIcHa
PETITIONERS ABUSED THEIR
RIGHT OF RECOVERY AS
MORTGAGEE(S)
Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for
petitioner corporation's exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee
to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement
of its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They
are clearly mistaken.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the
mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its
foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined
procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property:
if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged
property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action
either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the
sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure. 18
Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil
action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle.
Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent's
establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the
motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in
the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner
Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement.
No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-
petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure
for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent.
Petitioners' acts violated the law as well as public morals, and
transgressed the proper norms of human relations.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in
Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 19. Every person must in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give every one his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of
right," prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly
or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens
himself to liability. 19 It seeks to preclude the use of, or the
tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to
prejudice or injure another. 20 The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and
must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to harm another. 21 Otherwise, liability for damages to
the injured party will attach.
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was
taken at petitioners' instance was not only attended by bad faith
but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered
in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners'
exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was
utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other
hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could
not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the
purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established.
Thus, the totality of petitioners' actions showed a calculated
design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent.
Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice
of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused
damage to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him. 22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
July 26, 2000 decision and October 18, 2000 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47571 are AFFIRMED.
Triple costs against petitioners, considering that
petitioner Ernesto Ramas Uypitching is a lawyer and an officer
of the court, for his improper behavior. SDIaHE
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia,
JJ., concur.
||| (Uypitching v. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, [December 6, 2006],
539 PHIL 227-236)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 160273. January 18, 2008.]
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., SABINO
R. DAPAT, RUBEN D. ALMENDRAS,
JULIUS Z. NERI, DOUGLAS L. LUYM,
CESAR T. LIBI, RAMONTITO * E.
GARCIA and JOSE B. SALA, petitioners, vs.
RICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE, respondent.
Consequently, on December 23, 1998, respondent
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71, Pasig
City a complaint for damages against petitioners, docketed as
Civil Case No. 67190.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated
February 14, 2001 in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff:
1. Ordering defendants to pay,
jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of
P2,340,000.00 as actual or compensatory
damages.

DECISION 2. Ordering defendants to pay,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision 1 dated January
31, 2003 and Resolution dated October 2, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71506. ESHAcI
jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of
P5,000,000.00 as moral damages. acHDTA
3. Ordering defendants to pay,
jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of
P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. Ordering defendants to pay,
jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of
P1,000,000.00 as and by way of attorney's
fees and P80,000.00 as litigation expenses.

The facts are: 5. Costs of suit.

Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a Counterclaims are hereby

domestic corporation operating as a non-profit and non-stock DISMISSED for lack of merit.
private membership club, having its principal place of business SO ORDERED. 2
in Banilad, Cebu City. Petitioners herein are members of its
Board of Directors. On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in its
Decision dated January 31, 2003, affirmed the trial court's
Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special Decision with modification, thus:
company proprietary member of CCCI, designated respondent
Ricardo F. Elizagaque, its Senior Vice President and Operations WHEREFORE, premises
Manager for the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non- considered, the assailed Decision dated
proprietary member. The designation was thereafter approved by February 14, 2001 of the Regional Trial
the CCCI's Board of Directors. Court, Branch 71, Pasig City in Civil Case
No. 67190 is hereby AFFIRMED with
In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application for MODIFICATION as follows:
proprietary membership. The application was indorsed by
CCCI's two (2) proprietary members, namely: Edmundo T. Misa 1. Ordering defendants-appellants
and Silvano Ludo. ESCacI to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-
appellee the amount of P2,000,000.00 as
As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5 moral damages;
million range, Benito Unchuan, then president of CCCI, offered
to sell respondent a share for only P3.5 million. Respondent, 2. Ordering defendants-appellants
however, purchased the share of a certain Dr. Butalid for only to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-
P3 million. Consequently, on September 6, 1996, CCCI issued appellee the amount of P1,000,000.00 as
Proprietary Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to respondent. exemplary damages;

During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May 30, 3. Ordering defendants-appellants
1997 of the CCCI Board of Directors, action on respondent's to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-
application for proprietary membership was deferred. In another appellee the amount of P500,000.00 as
Board meeting held on July 30, 1997, respondent's application attorney's fees and P50,000.00 as litigation
was voted upon. Subsequently, or on August 1, 1997, respondent expenses; and
received a letter from Julius Z. Neri, CCCI's corporate secretary, 4. Costs of the suit.
informing him that the Board disapproved his application for
proprietary membership. The counterclaims are
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf of
respondent, wrote CCCI a letter of reconsideration. As CCCI did SO ORDERED. 3
not answer, respondent, on October 7, 1997, wrote another letter
On March 3, 2003, petitioners filed a motion for
of reconsideration. Still, CCCI kept silent. On November 5,
reconsideration and motion for leave to set the motion for oral
1997, respondent again sent CCCI a letter inquiring whether any
arguments. In its Resolution 4 dated October 2, 2003, the
member of the Board objected to his application. Again, CCCI
appellate court denied the motions for lack of merit. cTDaEH
did not reply.
 Hence, the present petition.
The issue for our resolution is whether in disapproving
respondent's application for proprietary membership with CCCI,
petitioners are liable to respondent for damages, and if so,
whether their liability is joint and several.
Petitioners contend, inter alia, that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding exorbitant damages to respondent
despite the lack of evidence that they acted in bad faith in
disapproving the latter's application; and in disregarding their
defense of damnum absque injuria.
For his part, respondent maintains that the petition
lacks merit, hence, should be denied.
CCCI's Articles of Incorporation provide in part:
SEVENTH: That this is a non-
stock corporation and membership therein as
well as the right of participation in its assets
shall be limited to qualified persons who are
duly accredited owners of Proprietary
Ownership Certificates issued by the
corporation in accordance with its By-Laws.
Corollary, Section 3, Article 1 of CCCI's Amended
By-Laws provides:
SECTION 3.  HOW MEMBERS
ARE ELECTED — The procedure for the
admission of new members of the Club shall
be as follows:
(a) Any proprietary member,
seconded by another voting proprietary
member, shall submit to the Secretary a
written proposal for the admission of a
candidate to the "Eligible-for-Membership
List";
(b) Such proposal shall be posted
by the Secretary for a period of thirty (30)
days on the Club bulletin board during
which time any member may interpose
objections to the admission of the applicant
by communicating the same to the Board of
Directors; cHAaCE
(c) After the expiration of the
aforesaid thirty (30) days, if no objections
have been filed or if there are, the Board
considers the objections unmeritorious, the
candidate shall be qualified for inclusion in
the "Eligible-for-Membership List";
(d) Once included in the "Eligible-
for-Membership List" and after the
candidate shall have acquired in his name a
valid POC duly recorded in the books of the
corporation as his own, he shall become a
Proprietary Member, upon a non-refundable
admission fee of P1,000.00, provided that
admission fees will only be collected once
from any person.
On March 1, 1978, Section 3 (c) was amended to read
as follows:
(c) After the expiration of the
aforesaid thirty (30) days, the Board may,
by unanimous vote of all directors present
at a regular or special meeting, approve
the inclusion of the candidate in the
"Eligible-for-Membership List".
As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret
balloting known as the "black ball system" of voting wherein
each member will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball
represents conformity to the admission of an applicant, while a
black ball means disapproval. Pursuant to Section 3 (c), as
amended, cited above, a unanimous vote of the directors is
required. When respondent's application for proprietary
membership was voted upon during the Board meeting on July
30, 1997, the ballot box contained one (1) black ball. Thus, for
lack of unanimity, his application was disapproved.
Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its
Articles of Incorporation, has the right to approve or disapprove
an application for proprietary membership. But such right should
not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code
on the Chapter on Human Relations provide restrictions,
thus: DECcAS
Article 19. Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.
In GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona, 5 we expounded
Article 19 and correlated it with Article 21, thus:
This article, known to contain
what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only
in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards
are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore,
recognizes a primordial limitation on all
rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must
be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source
of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must
be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper. (Emphasis in the original)
In rejecting respondent's application for proprietary
membership, we find that petitioners violated the rules
governing human relations, the basic principles to be observed
for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of social order. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
aptly held that petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith
in disapproving respondent's applications. This is contrary to
morals, good custom or public policy. Hence, petitioners are
liable for damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 21
of the same Code. ACTESI
It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3 (c)
of CCCI's Amended By-Laws requiring the unanimous vote of
the directors present at a special or regular meeting was not
printed on the application form respondent filled and submitted
to CCCI. What was printed thereon was the original provision of
Section 3 (c) which was silent on the required number of votes
needed for admission of an applicant as a proprietary member.
Petitioners explained that the amendment was not
printed on the application form due to economic reasons. We
find this excuse flimsy and unconvincing. Such amendment,
aside from being extremely significant, was introduced way
back in 1978 or almost twenty (20) years before respondent filed
his application. We cannot fathom why such a prestigious and
exclusive golf country club, like the CCCI, whose members are
all affluent, did not have enough money to cause the printing of
an updated application form.
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the
dark wondering why his application was disapproved. He was
not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members
was required. When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an
inquiry whether there was an objection to his application,
petitioners apparently ignored him. Certainly, respondent did not
deserve this kind of treatment. Having been designated by San
Miguel Corporation as a special non-proprietary member of
CCCI, he should have been treated by petitioners with courtesy
and civility. At the very least, they should have informed him
why his application was disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must
nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm. When the
right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. 6 It bears reiterating that
the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that petitioners'
disapproval of respondent's application is characterized by bad
faith. EcHIDT
As to petitioners' reliance on the principle of damnum
absque injuria, or damage without injury, suffice it to state that
the same is misplaced. In Amonoy v. Gutierrez, 7 we held that
this principle does not apply when there is an abuse of a
person's right, as in this case.
As to the appellate court's award to respondent of
moral damages, we find the same in order. Under Article 2219
of the New Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered,
among others, in acts and actions referred to in Article 21. We
believe respondent's testimony that he suffered mental anguish,
social humiliation and wounded feelings as a result of the
arbitrary denial of his application. However, the amount of
P2,000,000.00 is excessive. While there is no hard-and-fast rule
in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of
moral damages, the same should not be palpably and
scandalously excessive. Moral damages are not intended to
impose a penalty to the wrongdoer, neither to enrich the
claimant at the expense of the defendant. 8 Taking into
consideration the attending circumstances here, we hold that an
award to respondent of P50,000.00, instead of P2,000,000.00, as
moral damages is reasonable.
Anent the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229
allows it by way of example or correction for the public good.
Nonetheless, since exemplary damages are imposed not to
enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a
deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions, 9 we reduce the amount from P1,000,000.00
to P25,000.00 only.
On the matter of attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, Article 2208 of the same Code provides, among
others, that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be
recovered in cases when exemplary damages are awarded and
where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation should be recovered, as in this case. In
any event, however, such award must be reasonable, just and
equitable. Thus, we reduce the amount of attorney's fees
(P500,000.00) and litigation expenses (P50,000.00) to
P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. IHEDAT
Lastly, petitioners' argument that they could not be
held jointly and severally liable for damages because only one
(1) voted for the disapproval of respondent's application lacks
merit.
Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides:
SEC. 31. Liability of directors,
trustees or officers. — Directors or trustees
who willfully and knowingly vote for or
assent to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation or who are guilty of gross
negligence or bad faith in directing the
affairs of the corporation or acquire any
personal or pecuniary interest in conflict
with their duty as such directors, or trustees
shall be liable jointly and severally for all
damages resulting therefrom suffered by the
corporation, its stockholders or members
and other persons. (Emphasis ours)
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The
challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71506 are AFFIRMED with modification in
the sense that (a) the award of moral damages is reduced from
P2,000,000.00 to P50,000.00; (b) the award of exemplary
damages is reduced from P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00; and (c)
the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses is reduced
from P500,000.00 and P50,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
P25,000.00, respectively. HEISca
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Corona, Azcuna and Leonardo-de Castro,
JJ., concur.
||| (Cebu Country Club, Inc. v. Elizagaque, G.R. No. 160273,
[January 18, 2008], 566 PHIL 65-77)
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 165443. April 16, 2009.]
CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB,
INC., petitioner, vs. SIXTO CLEMENTE,
JR., respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
Seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 dated 1 June
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62331 and the
reinstatement of the Decision dated 15 November 2000 of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in SEC Case No.
04-98-5954, petitioner Calatagan Golf Club, Inc. (Calatagan)
filed this Rule 45 petition against respondent Sixto Clemente, Jr.
(Clemente).
The key facts are undisputed.
Clemente applied to purchase one share of stock of
Calatagan, indicating in his application for membership his
mailing address at "Phimco Industries, Inc. — P.O. Box 240,
MCC", complete residential address, office and residence
telephone numbers, as well as the company (Phimco) with
which he was connected, Calatagan issued to him Certificate of
Stock No. A-01295 on 2 May 1990 after paying P120,000.00 for
the share. 2
Calatagan charges monthly dues on its members to
meet expenses for general operations, as well as costs for upkeep
and improvement of the grounds and facilities. The provision on
monthly dues is incorporated in Calatagan's Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws. It is also reproduced at the back of
each certificate of stock. 3 As reproduced in the dorsal side of
Certificate of Stock No. A-01295, the provision reads: IaHAcT
5. The owners of shares of stock
shall be subject to the payment of monthly
dues in an amount as may be prescribed in the
by-laws or by the Board of Directors which
shall in no case be less that [sic] P50.00 to
meet the expenses for the general operations of
the club, and the maintenance and
improvement of its premises and facilities, in
addition to such fees as may be charged for the
actual use of the facilities . . .
When Clemente became a member the monthly charge
stood at P400.00. He paid P3,000.00 for his monthly dues on 21
March 1991 and another P5,400.00 on 9 December 1991. Then
he ceased paying the dues. At that point, his balance amounted
to P400.00. 4
Ten (10) months later, Calatagan made the initial step
to collect Clemente's back accounts by sending a demand letter
dated 21 September 1992. It was followed by a second letter
dated 22 October 1992. Both letters were sent to Clemente's
mailing address as indicated in his membership application but
were sent back to sender with the postal note that the address
had been closed. 5 IDSaAH
Calatagan declared Clemente delinquent for having
failed to pay his monthly dues for more than sixty (60) days,
specifically P5,600.00 as of 31 October 1992. Calatagan also
included Clemente's name in the list of delinquent members
posted on the club's bulletin board. On 1 December 1992,
Calatagan's board of directors adopted a resolution authorizing
the foreclosure of shares of delinquent members, including
Clemente's; and the public auction of these shares.
On 7 December 1992, Calatagan sent a third and final
letter to Clemente, this time signed by its Corporate Secretary,
Atty. Benjamin Tanedo, Jr. The letter contains a warning that
unless Clemente settles his outstanding dues, his share would be
included among the delinquent shares to be sold at public
auction on 15 January 1993. Again, this letter was sent to
Clemente's mailing address that had already been
closed. 6 TEcADS
On 5 January 1993, a notice of auction sale was posted
on the Club's bulletin board, as well as on the club's premises.
The auction sale took place as scheduled on 15 January 1993,
and Clemente's share sold for P64,000. 7 According to the
Certificate of Sale issued by Calatagan after the sale, Clemente's
share was purchased by a Nestor A. Virata. 8 At the time of the
sale, Clemente's accrued monthly dues amounted to
P5,200.00. 9 A notice of foreclosure of Clemente's share was
published in the 26 May 1993 issue of the Business World. 10
Clemente learned of the sale of his share only in
November of 1997. 11 He filed a claim with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) seeking the restoration of his
shareholding in Calatagan with damages.
On 15 November 2000, the SEC rendered a decision
dismissing Clemente's complaint. Citing Section 69 of
the Corporation Code which provides that the sale of shares at
an auction sale can only be questioned within six (6) months
from the date of sale, the SEC concluded that Clemente's claim,
filed four (4) years after the sale, had already prescribed. The
SEC further held that Calatagan had complied with all the
requirements for a valid sale of the subject share, Clemente
having failed to inform Calatagan that the address he had earlier
supplied was no longer his address. Clemente, the SEC ruled,
had acted in bad faith in assuming as he claimed that his non-
payment of monthly dues would merely render his share
"inactive". CIAHDT
Clemente filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. On 1 June 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
decision reversing the SEC. The appellate court restored
Clemente's one share with a directive to Calatagan to issue in his
a new share, * and awarded to Clemente a total of P400,000.00
in damages, less the unpaid monthly dues of P5,200.00.
In rejecting the SEC's finding that the action had
prescribed, the Court of Appeals cited the SEC's own ruling
in SEC Case No. 4160, Caram v. Valley Golf Country Club,
Inc., that Section 69 of the Corporation Code specifically refers
to unpaid subscriptions to capital stock, and not to any other
debt of stockholders. With the insinuation that Section 69 does
not apply to unpaid membership dues in non-stock corporations,
the appellate court employed Article 1140 of the Civil Code as
the proper rule of prescription. The provision sets the
prescription period of actions to recover movables at eight (8)
years.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that since that
Calatagan's first two demand letters had been returned to it as
sender with the notation about the closure of the mailing
address, it very well knew that its third and final demand letter
also sent to the same mailing address would not be received by
Clemente. It noted the by-law requirement that within ten (10)
days after the Board has ordered the sale at auction of a
member's share of stock for indebtedness, the Corporate
Secretary shall notify the owner thereof and advise the
Membership Committee of such fact. Finally, the Court of
Appeals ratiocinated that "a person who is in danger of the
imminent loss of his property has the right to be notified and be
given the chance to prevent the loss". 12
Hence, the present appeal.
Calatagan maintains that the action of Clemente had
prescribed pursuant to Section 69 of the Corporation Code, and
that the requisite notices under both the law and the by-laws had
been rendered to Clemente. EHcaAI
Section 69 of the Code provides that an action to
recover delinquent stock sold must be commenced by the filing
of a complaint within six (6) months from the date of sale. As
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Section 69 is part
of Title VIII of the Code entitled "Stocks and Stockholders" and
refers specifically to unpaid subscriptions to capital stock, the
sale of which is governed by the immediately preceding Section
68.
The Court of Appeals debunked both Calatagan's and
the SEC's reliance on Section 69 by citing another SEC ruling in
the case of Caram v. Valley Golf. In connection with Section 69,
Calatagan raises a peripheral point made in the
SEC's Caram ruling. In Caram, the SEC, using as take-off
Section 6 of the Corporation Code which refers to "such rights,
privileges or restrictions as may be stated in the articles of
incorporation", pointed out that the Articles of Incorporation of
Valley Golf does not "impose any lien, liability or restriction on
the Golf Share [of Caram]", but only its (Valley Golf's) By-
Laws does. Here, Calatagan stresses that its own Articles of
Incorporation does provide that the monthly dues assessed on
owners of shares of the corporation, along with all other
obligations of the shareholders to the club, "shall constitute a
first lien on the shares . . . and in the event of delinquency such
shares may be ordered sold by the Board of Directors in the
manner provided in the By-Laws to satisfy said dues or other
obligations of the shareholders". 13 With its illative but
incomprehensible logic, Calatagan concludes that the
prescriptive period under Section 69 should also apply to the
sale of Clemente's share as the lien that Calatagan perceives to
be a restriction is stated in the articles of incorporation and not
only in the by-laws.
We remain unconvinced.
There are fundamental differences that defy
equivalence or even analogy between the sale of delinquent
stock under Section 68 and the sale that occurred in this case. At
the root of the sale of delinquent stock is the non-payment of the
subscription price for the share of stock itself. The stockholder
or subscriber has yet to fully pay for the value of the share or
shares subscribed. In this case, Clemente had already fully paid
for the share in Calatagan and no longer had any outstanding
obligation to deprive him of full title to his share. Perhaps the
analogy could have been made if Clemente had not yet fully
paid for his share and the non-stock corporation, pursuant to an
article or by-law provision designed to address that situation,
decided to sell such share as a consequence. But that is not the
case here, and there is no purpose for us to apply Section 69 to
the case at bar. CaAIES
Calatagan argues in the alternative that Clemente's suit
is barred by Article 1146 of the Civil Code which establishes
four (4) years as the prescriptive period for actions based upon
injury to the rights of the plaintiff on the hypothesis that the suit
is purely for damages. As a second alternative still, Calatagan
posits that Clemente's action is governed by Article 1149 of
the Civil Code which sets five (5) years as the period of
prescription for all other actions whose prescriptive periods are
not fixed in the Civil Code or in any other law. Neither article is
applicable but Article 1140 of the Civil Code which provides
that an action to recover movables shall prescribe in eight (8)
years. Calatagan's action is for the recovery of a share of stock,
plus damages.
Calatagan's advertence to the fact that the constitution
of a lien on the member's share by virtue of the explicit
provisions in its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws is
relevant but ultimately of no help to its cause. Calatagan's
Articles of Incorporation states that the "dues, together with all
other obligations of members to the club, shall constitute a first
lien on the shares, second only to any lien in favor of the
national or local government, and in the event of delinquency
such shares may be ordered sold by the Board of Directors in the
manner provided in the By-Laws to satisfy said dues or other
obligations of the stockholders". 14 In turn, there are several
provisions in the By-laws that govern the payment of dues, the
lapse into delinquency of the member, and the constitution and
execution on the lien. We quote these provisions:
ARTICLE XII — MEMBER'S
ACCOUNT
SEC. 31. (a) Billing Members,
Posting of Delinquent Members. — The
Treasurer shall bill all members monthly. As
soon as possible after the end of every month,
a statement showing the account of bill of a
member for said month will be prepared and
sent to him. If the bill of any member remains
unpaid by the 20th of the month following that
in which the bill was incurred, the Treasurer
shall notify him that if his bill is not paid in full
by the end of the succeeding month his name
will be posted as delinquent the following day
at the Clubhouse bulletin board. While posted,
a member, the immediate members of his
family, and his guests, may not avail of the
facilities of the Club.
(b) Members on the delinquent list
for more than 60 days shall be reported to the
Board and their shares or the shares of the
juridical entities they represent shall thereafter
be ordered sold by the Board at auction to
satisfy the claims of the Club as provided for in
Section 32 hereon. A member may pay his
overdue account at any time before the auction
sale. DTAHSI
Sec. 32. Lien on Shares; Sale of
Share at Auction. — The club shall have a first
lien on every share of stock to secure debts of
the members to the Club. This lien shall be
annotated on the certificates of stock and may
be enforced by the Club in the following
manner:
(a) Within ten (10) days after the
Board has ordered the sale at auction of a
member's share of stock for indebtedness under
Section 31(b) hereof, the Secretary shall notify
the owner thereof, and shall advise the
Membership Committee of such fact.
 (b) The Membership Committee
shall then notify all applicants on the Waiting
List and all registered stockholders of the
availability of a share of stock for sale at
auction at a specified date, time and place, and
shall post a notice to that effect in the Club
bulletin board for at least ten (10) days prior to
the auction sale. EAIcCS
(c) On the date and hour fixed, the
Membership Committee shall proceed with the
auction by viva voce bidding and award the
sale of the share of stock to the highest bidder.
(d) The purchase price shall be paid
by the winning bidder to the Club within
twenty-four (24) hours after the bidding. The
winning bidder or the representative in the case
of a juridical entity shall become a Regular
Member upon payment of the purchase price
and issuance of a new stock certificate in his
name or in the name of the juridical entity he
represents. The proceeds of the sale shall be
paid by the Club to the selling stockholder
after deducting his obligations to the Club.
(e) If no bids be received or if the
winning bidder fails to pay the amount of this
bid within twenty-four (24) hours after the
bidding, the auction procedures may be
repeated from time to time at the discretion of
the Membership Committee until the share of
stock be sold. TCacIE
(f) If the proceeds from the sale of
the share of stock are not sufficient to pay in
full the indebtedness of the member, the
member shall continue to be obligated to the
Club for the unpaid balance. If the member
whose share of stock is sold fails or refuse to
surrender the stock certificate for cancellation,
cancellation shall be effected in the books of
the Club based on a record of the proceedings.
Such cancellation shall render the
unsurrendered stock certificate null and void
and notice to this effect shall be duly
published.
It is plain that Calatagan had endeavored to install a
clear and comprehensive procedure to govern the payment of
monthly dues, the declaration of a member as delinquent, and
the constitution of a lien on the shares and its eventual public
sale to answer for the member's debts. Under Section 91 of
the Corporation Code, membership in a non-stock corporation
"shall be terminated in the manner and for the causes provided
in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws". The By-law
provisions are elaborate in explaining the manner and the causes
for the termination of membership in Calatagan, through the
execution on the lien of the share. The Court is satisfied that the
By-Laws, as written, affords due protection to the member by
assuring that the member should be notified by the Secretary of
the looming execution sale that would terminate membership in
the club. In addition, the By-Laws guarantees that after the
execution sale, the proceeds of the sale would be returned to the
former member after deducting the outstanding obligations. If
followed to the letter, the termination of membership under this
procedure outlined in the By-Laws would accord with
substantial justice. ICDSca
Yet, did Calatagan actually comply with the by-law
provisions when it sold Clemente's share? The appellate court's
finding on this point warrants our approving citation, thus:
In accordance with this provision,
Calatagan sent the third and final demand letter
to Clemente on December 7, 1992. The letter
states that if the amount of delinquency is not
paid, the share will be included among the
delinquent shares to be sold at public auction.
This letter was signed by Atty. Benjamin
Tanedo, Jr., Calatagan Golf's Corporate
Secretary. It was again sent to Clemente's
mailing address — Phimco Industries Inc.,
P.O. Box 240, MCC Makati. As expected, it
was returned because the post office box had
been closed.
Under the By-Laws, the Corporate
Secretary is tasked to "give or cause to be
given, all notices required by law or by these
By-Laws. . . . and . . . keep a record of the
addresses of all stockholders. As quoted above,
Sec. 32 (a) of the By-Laws further provides
that "within ten (10) days after the Board has
ordered the sale at auction of a member's share
of stock for indebtedness under Section 31 (b)
hereof, the Secretary shall notify the owner
thereof and shall advise the Membership
Committee of such fact". The records do not
disclose what report the Corporate Secretary
transmitted to the Membership Committee to
comply with Section 32(a). Obviously, the
reason for this mandatory requirement is to
give the Membership Committee the
opportunity to find out, before the share is
sold, if proper notice has been made to the
shareholder member.
We presume that the Corporate
Secretary, as a lawyer is knowledgeable on the
law and on the standards of good faith and
fairness that the law requires. As custodian of
corporate records, he should also have known
that the first two letters sent to Clemente were
returned because the P.O. Box had been
closed. Thus, we are surprised — given his
knowledge of the law and of corporate records
— that he would send the third and final letter
— Clemente's last chance before his share is
sold and his membership lost — to the same
P.O. Box that had been closed.
Calatagan argues that it "exercised
due diligence before the foreclosure sale" and
"sent several notices to Clemente's specified
mailing address". We do not agree; we cannot
label as due diligence Calatagan's act of
sending the December 7, 1992 letter to
Clemente's mailing address knowing fully well
that the P.O. Box had been closed. Due
diligence or good faith imposes upon the
Corporate Secretary — the chief repository of
all corporate records — the obligation to check
Clemente's other address which, under the By-
Laws, have to be kept on file and are in fact on
file. One obvious purpose of giving the
Corporate Secretary the duty to keep the
addresses of members on file is specifically for
matters of this kind, when the member cannot
 be reached through his or her mailing address. to issue to Clemente * a new certificate of stock. That
Significantly, the Corporate Secretary does not sufficiently redresses the actual damages sustained by Clemente.
have to do the actual verification of other After all, the certificate of stock is simply the evidence of the
addressees on record; a mere clerk can do the share.
very simple task of checking the files as in fact
clerks actually undertake these tasks. In fact, The Court of Appeals also awarded Clemente
one telephone call to Clemente's phone P200,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary
numbers on file would have alerted him of his damages, and P100,000.00 as attorney's fees. We agree that the
impending loss. award of such damages is warranted.
The Court of Appeals cited Calatagan for violation of
Ultimately, the petition must fail because Calatagan Article 32 of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of damages
had failed to duly observe both the spirit and letter of its own by- from any private individual "who directly or indirectly obstructs,
laws. The by-law provisions was clearly conceived to afford due defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs" the right
notice to the delinquent member of the impending sale, and not "against deprivation of property without due process of law".
just to provide an intricate facade that would facilitate The plain letter of the provision squarely entitles Clemente to
Calatagan's sale of the share. But then, the bad faith on damages from Calatagan. Even without Article 32 itself,
Calatagan's part is palpable. As found by the Court of Appeals, Calatagan will still be bound to pay moral and exemplary
Calatagan very well knew that Clemente's postal box to which it damages to Clemente. The latter was able to duly prove that he
sent its previous letters had already been closed, yet it persisted had sustained mental anguish, serious anxiety and wounded
in sending that final letter to the same postal box. What for? Just feelings by reason of Calatagan's acts, thereby entitling him to
for the exercise, it appears, as it had known very well that the moral damages under Article 2217 of the Civil Code.Moreover,
letter would never actually reach Clemente. it is evident that Calatagan's bad faith as exhibited in the course
It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership of its corporate actions warrants correction for the public good,
application had provided his residential address along with his thereby justifying exemplary damages under Article 2229 of
residence and office telephone numbers. Nothing in Section 32 the Civil Code. SIcCEA
of Calatagan's By-Laws requires that the final notice prior to the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
sale be made solely through the member's mailing address. of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Clemente cites our aphorism-like pronouncement inRizal
Commercial Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals 15 that SO ORDERED.
"[a] simple telephone call and an ounce of good faith . . . could
have prevented this present controversy". That memorable Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio-
observation is quite apt in this case. Morales and Velasco, Jr., * JJ., concur.
 
Calatagan's bad faith and failure to observe its own
By-Laws had resulted not merely in the loss of Clemente's ||| (Calatagan Golf Club, Inc. v. Clemente, Jr., G.R. No. 165443,
privilege to play golf at its golf course and avail of its amenities, [April 16, 2009], 603 PHIL 295-309)
but also in significant pecuniary damage to him. For that loss,
the only blame that could be thrown Clemente's way was his
failure to notify Calatagan of the closure of the P.O. Box. That
lapse, if we uphold Calatagan would cost Clemente a lot. But, in
the first place, does he deserve answerability for failing to notify
the club of the closure of the postal box? Indeed, knowing as he
did that Calatagan was in possession of his home address as well
as residence and office telephone numbers, he had every reason
to assume that the club would not be at a loss should it need to
contact him. In addition, according to Clemente, he was not even
aware of the closure of the postal box, the maintenance of which
was not his responsibility but his employer Phimco's.
The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into
operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code, 16 under the
Chapter on Human Relations. These provisions, which the Court
of Appeals did apply, enunciate a general obligation under law
for every person to act fairly and in good faith towards one
another. A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not exempt
from that obligation in its treatment of its members. The
obligation of a corporation to treat every person honestly and in
good faith extends even to its shareholders or members, even if
the latter find themselves contractually bound to perform certain
obligations to the corporation. A certificate of stock cannot be a
charter of dehumanization.
We turn to the matter of damages. The award of actual
damages is of course warranted since Clemente has sustained
pecuniary injury by reason of Calatagan's wrongful violation of
its own By-Laws. It would not be feasible to deliver Clemente's
original Certificate of Stock because it had already been
cancelled and a new one issued in its place in the name of the
purchases at the auction who was not impleaded in this case.
However, the Court of Appeals instead directed that Calatagan
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 161921. July 17, 2013.]
JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, petitioner, vs.
SPOUSES JAVIER and MA. THERESA
PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO
WATER DISTRICT and GASPAR
GONZALEZ, * JR., respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 73000. The CA Decision affirmed with modification the
August 15, 2001 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, while the CA Resolution denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente
and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are
owners of a housing unit at Emily Homes,
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City with a lot area
of one hundred fifty-three (153) square meters
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 69905.
On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
(Exh. "B", pp. 470-473, Records) selling,
transferring and conveying in favor of
[respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their
rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily
Homes in consideration of P70,000.00. The
Memorandum of Agreement carries a
stipulation:
"4. That the water and
power bill of the subject property
shall be for the account of the
Second Party (Ma. Theresa
Pastorfide) effective June 1, 1994."
(Records, p. 47) HSEIAT
vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's
assumption of the payment of the mortgage
loan secured by Joyce Ardiente from the
National Home Mortgage (Records, Exh.
"A", pp. 468-469)
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use
of the water connection in the name of Joyce
Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed
(T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 7-8) until on
March 12, 1999, without notice, the water
connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off.
Proceeding to the office of the Cagayan de Oro
Water District (COWD) to complain, a certain
Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa that she was
delinquent for three (3) months corresponding
to the months of December 1998, January
1999, and February 1999. Ma. Theresa argued
that the due date of her payment was March
18, 1999 yet (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 11-
12). Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was at
the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water
line was cut off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p.
31).
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa
paid the delinquent bills (T.S.N., October 31,
2000, p. 12). On the same date, through her
lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the
COWD to explain who authorized the cutting
of the water line (Records, p. 160).
On March 18, 1999, COWD, through
the general manager, [respondent] Gaspar
Gonzalez, Jr., answered the letter dated March
15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the
instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line
was cut off (Records, p. 161).
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma.
Theresa Pastorfide [and her husband] filed [a]
complaint for damages [against petitioner,
COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez]
(Records, pp. 2-6).
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa
Pastorfide's water line was only restored and
reconnected when the [trial] court issued a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction on
December 14, 1999 (Records, p.
237). 4 HCATEa
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
In the exercise of their rights and
performance of their duties, defendants did not
act with justice, gave plaintiffs their due and
observe honesty and good faith. Before
disconnecting the water supply, defendants
COWD and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not
even send a disconnection notice to plaintiffs
as testified to by Engr. Bienvenido Batar, in-
charge of the Commercial Department of
defendant COWD. There was one though, but
only three (3) days after the actual
disconnection on March 12, 1999. The due
date for payment was yet on March 15.
Clearly, they did not act with justice. Neither
did they observe honesty.
They should not have been swayed
by the prodding of Joyce V. Ardiente. They
should have investigated first as to the present
ownership of the house. For doing the act
because Ardiente told them, they were
negligent. Defendant Joyce Ardiente should
have requested before the cutting off of the
water supply, plaintiffs to pay. While she
attempted to tell plaintiffs but she did not have
the patience of seeing them. She knew that it
 was plaintiffs who had been using the water 7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
four (4) years ago and not hers. She should (ALTHOUGH IT HAS REDUCED THE
have been very careful. . . . 5 LIABILITY INTO HALF) HAS STILL
COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads, ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE JOINT
thus: AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF
PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
WITH CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER
judgment is hereby rendered ordering
DISTRICT (COWD) AND ENGR.
defendants [Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez]
GASPAR D. GONZALES FOR THE
to pay jointly and severally plaintiffs, the
LATTER'S FAILURE TO SERVE NOTICE
following sums:
UPON RESPONDENTS SPOUSES
(a) P200,000.00 for moral PASTORFIDE PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL
damages; AEDCHc DISCONNECTION DESPITE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED DURING TRIAL THAT
(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary EVEN WITHOUT PETITIONER'S
damages; and REQUEST, COWD WAS ALREADY SET
TO EFFECT DISCONNECTION OF
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee. RESPONDENTS' WATER SUPPLY DUE
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro TO NON-PAYMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR
Water District and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales is THREE (3) MONTHS.
hereby dismissed. The Court is not swayed that 7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF
the cutting off of the water supply of plaintiffs APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND
was because they were influenced by SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED
defendant Joyce Ardiente. They were negligent TOTALLY AGAINST PETITIONER AND
too for which they should be liable. FAILED TO FIND THAT RESPONDENTS
SO ORDERED. 6 ARE GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE WHEN THEY FAILED TO
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the PAY THEIR WATER BILLS FOR THREE
CA. MONTHS AND TO MOVE FOR THE
TRANSFER OF THE COWD ACCOUNT
On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed IN THEIR NAME, WHICH WAS A
Decision disposing as follows: VIOLATION OF THEIR MEMORANDUM
OF AGREEMENT WITH PETITIONER
IN VIEW OF ALL THE
JOYCE V. ARDIENTE. RESPONDENTS
FOREGOING, the appealed decision
LIKEWISE DELIBERATELY FAILED TO
is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the
EXERCISE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD
awarded damages is reduced to P100,000.00
FATHER OF THE FAMILY TO
each for moral and exemplary damages, while
MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE UNDER ART.
attorney's fees is lowered to P25,000.00. Costs
2203 OF THE NEW CIVIL
against appellants.
CODE. EAcCHI
SO ORDERED. 7
7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF
The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN
"legal duty to honor the possession and use of water line by Ma. IT DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT
Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement" RESPONDENT SPOUSES PASTORFIDE
and "that when [petitioner] applied for its disconnection, she acted in ARE LIKEWISE BOUND TO OBSERVE
bad faith causing prejudice and [injury to] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide." 8 ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE, i.e., IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR
As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they "failed RIGHTS AND IN THE PERFORMANCE
to give a notice of disconnection and derelicted in reconnecting the OF THEIR DUTIES TO ACT WITH
water line despite payment of the unpaid bills by the [respondent JUSTICE, GIVE EVERYONE HIS DUE
spouses Pastorfide]." 9 AND OBSERVE HONESTY AND GOOD
FAITH.
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective
Motions for Reconsideration, but these were denied by the CA in its 7.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF
Resolution dated December 17, 2003. ADHcTE APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
GRANTED AN AWARD OF MORAL
COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
on certiorari with this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. ATTORNEY'S FEES AS AGAINST
161802. However, based on technical grounds and on the finding that PETITIONER ARDIENTE. 12
the CA did not commit any reversible error in its assailed Decision,
the petition was denied via a Resolution 10 issued by this Court on At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez,
March 24, 2004. COWD and Gonzalez filed a motion for who were petitioner's co-defendants before the RTC and her co-
reconsideration, but the same was denied with finality through this appellants in the CA, were impleaded as respondents in the instant
Court's Resolution 11 dated June 28, 2004. petition. This cannot be done. Being her co-parties before the RTC
and the CA, petitioner cannot, in the instant petition for review
Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant on certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez, adversary parties. It is a
petition with the following Assignment of Errors: grave mistake on the part of petitioner's counsel to treat COWD and
Gonzalez as respondents. There is no basis to do so, considering that, his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
in the first place, there is no showing that petitioner filed a cross- everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
claim against COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court, a cross-claim which is not set up shall be barred. In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The
Thus, for failing to set up a cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation 17 is instructive, to wit:
before the RTC, petitioner is already barred from doing so in the
xxx xxx xxx
present petition. DSCIEa
This provision of law sets standards
More importantly, as shown above, COWD and Gonzalez's
which must be observed in the exercise of
petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court was already
one's rights as well as in the performance of its
denied with finality on June 28, 2004, making the presently assailed
duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone
CA Decision final and executory insofar as COWD and Gonzalez are
his due; and observe honesty and good
concerned. Thus, COWD and Gonzalez are already precluded from
faith. CAHTIS
participating in the present petition. They cannot resurrect their lost
cause by filing pleadings this time as respondents but, nonetheless, In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
reiterating the same prayer in their previous pleadings filed with the Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was
RTC and the CA. elucidated that while Article 19 "lays down a
rule of conduct for the government of human
As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise
relations and for the maintenance of social
noticed that the main issues raised by petitioner are factual and it is
order, it does not provide a remedy for its
settled that the resolution of factual issues is the function of lower
violation. Generally, an action for damages
courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and
under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
considered binding by the Supreme Court subject only to certain
proper." The Court said:
exceptions, none of which is present in this instant petition. 13 This is
especially true when the findings of the RTC have been affirmed by One of the more notable
the CA as in this case. 14 innovations of the New Civil Code is
the codification of "some basic
In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily
principles that are to be observed for
show that the instant petition lacks merit.
the rightful relationship between
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the human beings and for the stability of
disconnection of respondent spouses' water supply, because she had the social order." [REPORT ON
no participation in the actual disconnection. However, she admitted in THE CODE COMMISSION ON
the present petition that it was she who requested COWD to THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF
disconnect the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply. This was confirmed THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The
by COWD and Gonzalez in their cross-claim against petitioner. framers of the Code, seeking to
While it was COWD which actually discontinued respondent spouses' remedy the defect of the old Code
water supply, it cannot be denied that it was through the instance of which merely stated the effects of the
petitioner that the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply was law, but failed to draw out its spirit,
disconnected in the first place. ADCTac incorporated certain fundamental
precepts which were "designed to
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even indicate certain norms that spring
require the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's from the fountain of good
account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their conscience" and which were also
Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such meant to serve as "guides for human
right is not to cause the disconnection of the respondent spouses' conduct [that] should run as golden
water supply. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the threads through society, to the end
purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or that law may approach its supreme
unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm ideal, which is the sway and
another. 15 Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost
attach. 16 In the present case, intention to harm was evident on the among these principles is that
part of petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of pronounced in Article
respondent spouses' water supply without warning or informing the 19 . . . . SAaTHc
latter of such request. Petitioner claims that her request for
disconnection was based on the advise of COWD personnel and that xxx xxx xxx
her intention was just to compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply
This article, known to
with their agreement that petitioner's account with COWD be
contain what is commonly referred to
transferred in respondent spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only
as the principle of abuse of rights,
intention, then she should have advised respondent spouses before or
sets certain standards which must be
immediately after submitting her request for disconnection, telling
observed not only in the exercise of
them that her request was simply to force them to comply with their
one's rights, but also in the
obligation under their Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not.
performance of one's duties. These
What made matters worse is the fact that COWD undertook the
standards are the following: to act
disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to reconnect
with justice; to give everyone his
the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply despite payment of their
due; and to observe honesty and
arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner,
good faith. The law, therefore,
COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
recognizes a primordial limitation on
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 all rights; that in their exercise, the
of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A
 right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by
law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised
in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined
in Article 19 and results in damage
to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and
for the maintenance of social order, it
does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would be proper.
With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of
the Civil Code provides, among others, that such fees may be
recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, when the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest, and where
the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiffs' plainly valid, just and demandable
claim. aITECD
WHEREFORE, instant petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals, dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Abad, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
||| (Ardiente v. Spouses Pastorfide, G.R. No. 161921, [July 17, 2013],
714 PHIL 235-248)

Corollarily, Article 20 provides that

"every person who, contrary to law, willfully
or negligently causes damage to another shall
indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of
the general sanctions of all other provisions of
law which do not especially provide for its
own sanction. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform to the
standards set forth in the said provision and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible. Thus, if the provision
does not provide a remedy for its violation, an
action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
The question of whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights has been violated
resulting in damages under Article 20 or other
applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. . . . 18 IDCcEa
To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the
abovementioned provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of having
the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected, coupled with her
failure to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such intention.
On the part of COWD and Gonzalez, it is their failure to give prior
notice of the impending disconnection and their subsequent neglect to
reconnect respondent spouses' water supply despite the latter's
settlement of their delinquent account.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent
reason to depart from the ruling of both the RTC and the CA that
petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily liable. ECDHIc
The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based
on the provisions of Article 2219, 19 in connection with Articles
20 20 and 21 21 of the Civil Code.
As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that
exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary damages are
imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as
a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions. 22 In the instant case, the Court agrees with the
CA in sustaining the award of exemplary damages, although it
reduced the amount granted, considering that respondent spouses
were deprived of their water supply for more than nine (9) months,
and such deprivation would have continued were it not for the relief
granted by the RTC.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 160689. March 26, 2014.]
RAUL H. SESBREÑO, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
JUAN I. COROMINA (SUBSTITUTED BY
ANITA COROMINA, ELIZABETH
COROMINA and ROSIEMARIE
COROMINA), VICENTE E. GARCIA
(SUBSTITUTED BY EDGAR JOHN
GARCIA), FELIPE CONSTANTINO,
RONALD ARCILLA, NORBETO
ABELLANA, DEMETRIO BALICHA,
ANGELITA LHUILLIER, JOSE E.
GARCIA, AND VISAYAN ELECTRIC
COMPANY (VECO), respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
This case concerns the claim for damages of petitioner Raul
H. Sesbreño founded on abuse of rights. Sesbreño accused the
violation of contract (VOC) inspection team dispatched by the
Visayan Electric Company (VECO) to check his electric meter with
conducting an unreasonable search in his residential premises. But
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, in Cebu City rendered
judgment on August 19, 1994 dismissing the claim; 1 and the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the dismissal on March 10, 2003. 2
Hence, this appeal by Sesbreño.
Antecedents
At the time material to the petition, VECO was a public
utility corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. VECO engaged in the sale and distribution of electricity
within Metropolitan Cebu. Sesbreño was one of VECO's customers
under the metered service contract they had entered into on March 2,
1982. 3 Respondent Vicente E. Garcia was VECO's President,
General Manager and Chairman of its Board of Directors.
Respondent Jose E. Garcia was VECO's Vice-President, Treasurer
and a Member of its Board of Directors. Respondent Angelita
Lhuillier was another Member of VECO's Board of Directors.
Respondent Juan Coromina was VECO's Assistant Treasurer, while
respondent Norberto Abellana was the Head of VECO's Billing
Section whose main function was to compute back billings of
customers found to have violated their contracts.
To ensure that its electric meters were properly functioning,
and that none of it meters had been tampered with, VECO employed
respondents Engr. Felipe Constantino and Ronald Arcilla as violation
of contract (VOC) inspectors. 4 Respondent Sgt. Demetrio Balicha,
who belonged to the 341st Constabulary Company, Cebu
Metropolitan Command, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City,
accompanied and escorted the VOC inspectors during their inspection
of the households of its customers on May 11, 1989 pursuant to a
mission order issued to him. 5 aEHTSc
The CA summarized the antecedent facts as follows:
. . . . Reduced to its essentials,
however, the facts of this case are actually
simple enough, although the voluminous
records might indicate otherwise. It all has to
do with an incident that occurred at around
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 11, 1989.
On that day, the Violation of Contracts (VOC)
Team of defendants-appellees Constantino and
Arcilla and their PC escort, Balicha, conducted
a routine inspection of the houses at La Paloma
Village, Labangon, Cebu City, including that
of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño, for illegal
connections, meter tampering, seals, conduit
pipes, jumpers, wiring connections, and meter
installations. After Bebe Baledio, plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño's maid, unlocked the gate,
they inspected the electric meter and found that
it had been turned upside down. Defendant-
appellant Arcilla took photographs of the
upturned electric meter. With Chuchie Garcia,
Peter Sesbreño and one of the maids present,
they removed said meter and replaced it with a
new one. At that time, plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreño was in his office and no one called to
inform him of the inspection. The VOC Team
then asked for and received Chuchie Garcia's
permission to enter the house itself to examine
the kind and number of appliances and light
fixtures in the household and determine its
electrical load. Afterwards, Chuchie Garcia
signed the Inspection Division Report, which
showed the condition of the electric meter on
May 11, 1989 when the VOC Team inspected
it, with notice that it would be subjected to a
laboratory test. She also signed a Load Survey
Sheet that showed the electrical load of
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño.
But according to plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreño there was nothing routine or proper at
all with what the VOC Team did on May 11,
1989 in his house. Their entry to his house and
the surrounding premises was effected without
his permission and over the objections of his
maids. They threatened, forced or coerced their
way into his house. They unscrewed the
electric meter, turned it upside down and took
photographs thereof. They then replaced it with
a new electric meter. They searched the house
and its rooms without his permission or a
search warrant. They forced a visitor to sign
two documents, making her appear to be his
representative or agent. Afterwards, he found
that some of his personal effects were missing,
apparently stolen by the VOC Team when they
searched the house. 6
Judgment of the RTC
On August 19, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint. 7 It did not accord credence to the
testimonies of Sesbreño's witnesses, Bebe Baledio, his housemaid,
and Roberto Lopez, a part-time salesman, due to inconsistencies on
material points in their respective testimonies. It observed that
Baledio could not make up her mind as to whether Sesbreño's
children were in the house when the VOC inspection team detached
and replaced the electric meter. Likewise, it considered unbelievable
that Lopez should hear the exchanges between Constantino, Arcilla
and Balicha, on one hand, and Baledio, on the other, considering that
Lopez could not even hear the conversation between two persons six
feet away from where he was seated during the simulation done in
court, the same distance he supposedly had from the gate of
Sesbreño's house during the incident. It pointed out that Lopez's
presence at the gate during the incident was even contradicted by his
own testimony indicating that an elderly woman had opened the gate
for the VECO personnel, because it was Baledio, a lady in her 20s,
who had repeatedly stated on her direct and cross examinations that
she had let the VECO personnel in. It concluded that for Lopez to do
nothing at all upon seeing a person being threatened by another in the
manner he described was simply contrary to human
experience. caCSDT
In contrast, the RTC believed the evidence of the
respondents showing that the VOC inspection team had found the
electric meter in Sesbreño's residence turned upside down to prevent
the accurate registering of the electricity consumption of the
household, causing them to detach and replace the meter. It held as
unbelievable that the team forcibly entered the house through threats
and intimidation; that they themselves turned the electric meter
upside down in order to incriminate him for theft of electricity,
because the fact that the team and Sesbreño had not known each other
before then rendered it unlikely for the team to fabricate charges
against him; and that Sesbreño's non-presentation of Chuchie Garcia
left her allegation of her being forced to sign the two documents by
the team unsubstantiated.
Decision of the CA
Sesbreño appealed, but the CA affirmed the RTC on March
10, 2003, 8 holding thusly:
. . . . plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño's
account is simply too implausible or far-
fetched to be believed. For one thing, the
inspection on his household was just one of
many others that the VOC Team had
conducted in that subdivision. Yet, none but
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño complained of the
alleged acts of the VOC Team. Considering
that there is no proof that they also perpetrated
the same illegal acts on other customers in the
guise of conducting a Violation of Contracts
inspection, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño
likewise failed to show why he alone was
singled out. It is also difficult to believe that
the VOC Team would be brazen enough to
want to antagonize a person such as plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño. There is no evidence that
the VOC Team harbored any evil motive or
grudge against plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño,
who is a total stranger to them. Until he came
along, they did not have any prior criminal
records to speak of, or at least, no evidence
thereof was presented. It is equally difficult to
believe that their superiors would authorize or
condone their alleged illegal acts. Especially so
since there is no indication that prior to the
incident on May 11, 1989, there was already
bad blood or animosity between plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño and defendant appellees to
warrant such a malevolent response. In fact,
since availing of defendant-appellee VECO's
power services, the relationship between them
appears to have been uneventful.
It becomes all the more apparent that
the charges stemming from the May 11, 1989
incident were fabricated when taken together
with the lower court's evaluation of the alleged
theft of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño's personal
effects. It stated that on August 8, 1989,
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño wrote the
barangay captain of Punta Princesa and
accused Chuchie Garcia and Victoria Villarta
alias Victoria Rocamora of theft of some of his
things that earlier he claimed had been stolen
by members of the VOC Team. When he was
confronted with these facts, plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreño further claimed that the items
allegedly stolen by Chuchie Garcia were part
of the loot taken by defendants-appellees
Constantino and Arcilla. Yet not once did
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño or any of his
witnesses mention that a conspiracy existed
between these people. Clearly, much like his
other allegations, it is nothing more than an
afterthought by plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño.
All in all, the allegations against
defendants-appellees appear to be nothing
more than a put-on to save face. For the simple
truth is that the inspection exposed plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño as a likely cheat and thief.
xxx xxx xxx
Neither is this Court swayed by the
testimonies of Baledio and Lopez. The lower
court rightly described their testimonies as
fraught by discrepancies and inconsistencies on
material points and even called Lopez a
perjured witness. On the other hand, it is odd
that plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño chose not to
present the witness whose testimony was very
crucial. But even though Chuchie Garcia never
testified, her absence speaks volumes. Whereas
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño claimed that the
VOC Team forced her to sign two documents
that made her appear to be his authorized agent
or representative, the latter claimed otherwise
and that she also gave them permission to enter
and search the house. The person most
qualified to refute the VOC Team's claim is
Chuchie Garcia herself. It is axiomatic that he
who asserts a fact or claim must prove it. He
cannot transfer that burden to the person
against whom he asserts such fact or claim.
When certain evidence is suppressed, the
presumption is that it will adversely affect the
cause of the party suppressing it, should it
come to light. . . . 9 SHTaID
Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, 10 Sesbreño
appealed.
Issue
Was Sesbreño entitled to recover damages for abuse of
rights?
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Sesbreño's main contention is that the inspection of his
residence by the VOC team was an unreasonable search for being
carried out without a warrant and for being allegedly done with
malice or bad faith.
Before dealing with the contention, we have to note that
two distinct portions of Sesbreño's residence were inspected by the
VOS team — the garage where the electric meter was installed, and
the main premises where the four bedrooms, living rooms, dining
room and kitchen were located.
Anent the inspection of the garage where the meter was
installed, the respondents assert that the VOC team had the
continuing authority from Sesbreño as the consumer to enter his
premises at all reasonable hours to conduct an inspection of the meter
without being liable for trespass to dwelling. The authority emanated
from paragraph 9 of the metered service contract entered into
between VECO and each of its consumers, which provided as
follows:
9. The CONSUMER agrees to allow
properly authorized employees or
representatives of the COMPANY to enter his
premises at all reasonable hours without being
liable to trespass to dwelling for the purpose of
inspecting, installing, reading, removing,
testing, replacing or otherwise disposing of its
property, and/or removing the COMPANY'S
property in the event of the termination of the
contract for any cause. 11
Sesbreño contends, however, that paragraph 9 did not give
Constantino, Arcilla and Balicha the blanket authority to enter at will
because the only property VECO owned in his premises was the
meter; hence, Constantino and Arcilla should enter only the garage.
He denies that they had the right to enter the main portion of the
house and inspect the various rooms and the appliances therein
because those were not the properties of VECO. He posits that
Balicha, who was not an employee of VECO, had no authority
whatsoever to enter his house and conduct a search. He concludes
that their search was unreasonable, and entitled him to damages in
light of their admission that they had entered and inspected his
premises without a search warrant. 12
We do not accept Sesbreño's conclusion. Paragraph 9
clothed the entire VOC team with unquestioned authority to enter the
garage to inspect the meter. The members of the team obviously met
the conditions imposed by paragraph 9 for an authorized entry.
Firstly, their entry had the objective of conducting the routine
inspection of the meter. 13 Secondly, the entry and inspection were
confined to the garage where the meter was installed. 14 Thirdly, the
entry was effected at around 4 o'clock p.m., a reasonable
hour. 15 And, fourthly, the persons who inspected the meter were
duly authorized for the purpose by VECO. IHaECA
Although Balicha was not himself an employee of
VECO, 16 his participation was to render police assistance to ensure
the personal security of Constantino and Arcilla during the
inspection, rendering him a necessary part of the team as an
authorized representative. Under the circumstances, he was
authorized to enter considering that paragraph 9 expressly extended
such authority to "properly authorized employees or representatives"
of VECO.
It is true, as Sesbreño urges, that paragraph 9 did not cover
the entry into the main premises of the residence. Did this necessarily
mean that any entry by the VOS team into the main premises required
a search warrant to be first secured?
Sesbreño insists so, citing Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, the clause guaranteeing the right of every individual
against unreasonable searches and seizures, viz.:
Section 2. The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
He states that a violation of this constitutional guaranty rendered
VECO and its VOS team liable to him for damages by virtue of
Article 32 (9) of the Civil Code, which pertinently provides:
Article 32. Any public officer or
employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person
shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The right to be secured in one's
person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
xxx xxx xxx.
Sesbreño's insistence has no legal and factual basis.
The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and
seizures is intended as a restraint against the Government and its
agents tasked with law enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure
freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of State power.
The Court has made this clear in its pronouncements, including that
made in People v. Marti, 17 viz.:
If the search is made upon the
request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test
of constitutionality. However, if the search is
made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its
own and private purposes, as in the case at
bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for
only the act of private individual, not the
law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government. 18 CSDcTA
It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to enter
the main premises only after finding the meter of Sesbreño turned
upside down, hanging and its disc not rotating. Their doing so would
enable them to determine the unbilled electricity consumed by his
household. The circumstances justified their decision, and their
inspection of the main premises was a continuation of the authorized
entry. There was no question then that their ability to determine the
unbilled electricity called for them to see for themselves the usage of
electricity inside. Not being agents of the State, they did not have to
first obtain a search warrant to do so.
Balicha's presence participation in the entry did not make
the inspection a search by an agent of the State within the ambit of
the guaranty. As already mentioned, Balicha was part of the team by
virtue of his mission order authorizing him to assist and escort the
team during its routine inspection. 19 Consequently, the entry into the
main premises of the house by the VOC team did not constitute a
violation of the guaranty.
 Our holding could be different had Sesbreño persuasively . . . . Both Judge Paredes and Judge
demonstrated the intervention of malice or bad faith on the part of Priscila Agana serve the Regional Trial Court
Constantino and Arcilla during their inspection of the main premises, and are therefore of co-equal rank. The latter
or any excessiveness committed by them in the course of the has no authority to reverse or modify the
inspection. But Sesbreño did not. On the other hand, the CA correctly orders of Judge Paredes. But in ordering Judge
observed that the inspection did not zero in on Sesbreño's residence Paredes to continue hearing the case, Judge
because the other houses within the area were similarly subjected to Agana did not violate their co-equal status or
the routine inspection. 20 This, we think, eliminated any notion of unilaterally increased her jurisdiction. It is
malice or bad faith. merely part of her administrative
responsibilities as Executive Judge of the
Clearly, Sesbreño did not establish his claim for damages if Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, of which
the respondents were not guilty of abuse of rights. To stress, the Judge Paredes is also a member. 29
concept of abuse of rights prescribes that a person should not use his
right unjustly or in bad faith; otherwise, he may be liable to another Lastly, the Court finds nothing wrong if the writer of the
who suffers injury. The rationale for the concept is to present some decision in the CA refused to inhibit from participating in the
basic principles to be followed for the rightful relationship between resolution of the motion for reconsideration filed by Sesbreño. The
human beings and the stability of social order. 21 Moreover, motion for her inhibition was grounded on suspicion of her bias and
according to a commentator, 22 "the exercise of right ends when the prejudice, 30 but suspicion of bias and prejudice were not enough
right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the grounds for inhibition. 31 Suffice it to say that the records are bereft
prejudice of others[;] [i]t cannot be said that a person exercises a right of any indication that even suggested that the Associate Justices of
when he unnecessarily prejudices another." Article 19 of the Civil the CA who participated in the promulgation of the decision were
Code 23 sets the standards to be observed in the exercise of one's tainted with bias against him.
rights and in the performance of one's duties, namely: (a) to act with
justice; (b) to give everyone his due; and (c) to observe honesty and WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review
good faith. The law thereby recognizes the primordial limitation on on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March 10,
all rights — that in the exercise of the rights, the standards under 2003; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
Article 19 must be observed. 24
SO ORDERED. ACIDTE
Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama,
arise should there be an abuse of rights, like when the act is
Jr. and Perez, * JJ., concur.
performed without prudence or in bad faith. In order that liability
may attach under the concept of abuse of rights, the following ||| (Sesbreño v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160689, [March 26,
elements must be present, to wit: (a) the existence of a legal right or 2014], 730 PHIL 428-443)
duty, (b) which is exercised in bad faith, and (c) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. 25 There is no hard and fast rule that
can be applied to ascertain whether or not the principle of abuse of
rights is to be invoked. The resolution of the issue depends on the
circumstances of each case. HTDAac
Sesbreño asserts that he did not authorize Baledio or
Chuchie Garcia to let anyone enter his residence in his absence; and
that Baledio herself confirmed that the members of the VOC team
had intimidated her into letting them in.
The assertion of Sesbreño is improper for consideration in
this appeal. The RTC and the CA unanimously found the testimonies
of Sesbreño's witnesses implausible because of inconsistencies on
material points; and even declared that the non-presentation of Garcia
as a witness was odd if not suspect. Considering that such findings
related to the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, the
Court cannot review and undo them now because it is not a trier of
facts, and is not also tasked to analyze or weigh evidence all over
again. 26 Verily, a review that may tend to supplant the findings of
the trial court that had the first-hand opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses themselves should be undertaken by the
Court with prudent hesitation. Only when Sesbreño could make a
clear showing of abuse in their appreciation of the evidence and
records by the trial and the appellate courts should the Court do the
unusual review of the factual findings of the trial and appellate
courts. 27 Alas, that showing was not made here.
Nor should the Court hold that Sesbreño was denied due
process by the refusal of the trial judge to inhibit from the case.
Although the trial judge had issued an order for his voluntary
inhibition, he still rendered the judgment in the end in compliance
with the instruction of the Executive Judge, whose exercise of her
administrative authority on the matter of the inhibition should be
respected. 28 In this connection, we find to be apt the following
observation of the CA, to wit:
 EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4697. November 25, 2014.]
FLORENCIO A.
SALADAGA, complainant, vs. ATTY.
ARTURO B. ASTORGA, respondent.
[A.C. No. 4728. November 25, 2014.]
FLORENCIO A.
SALADAGA, complainant, vs. ATTY.
ARTURO B. ASTORGA, respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
Membership in the legal profession is a high personal
privilege burdened with conditions, 1 including continuing fidelity to
the law and constant possession of moral fitness. Lawyers, as
guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society,
and a consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest
standards of ethical conduct. 2 Failure to live by the standards of the
legal profession and to discharge the burden of the privilege
conferred on one as a member of the bar warrant the suspension or
revocation of that privilege.
The Factual Antecedents
Complainant Florencio A. Saladaga and respondent Atty.
Arturo B. Astorga entered into a "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" on December 2, 1981 where respondent sold (with right
of repurchase) to complainant a parcel of coconut land located at
Barangay Bunga, Baybay, Leyte covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-662 for P15,000.00. Under the said deed,
respondent represented that he has "the perfect right to dispose as
owner in fee simple" the subject property and that the said property is
"free from all liens and encumbrances." 3 The deed also provided that
respondent, as vendor a retro, had two years within which to
repurchase the property, and if not repurchased within the said
period, "the parties shall renew [the] instrument/agreement." 4
Respondent failed to exercise his right of repurchase within
the period provided in the deed, and no renewal of the contract was
made even after complainant sent respondent a final demand dated
May 10, 1984 for the latter to repurchase the property. Complainant
remained in peaceful possession of the property until December 1989
when he received letters from the Rural Bank of Albuera (Leyte), Inc.
(RBAI) informing him that the property was mortgaged by
respondent to RBAI, that the bank had subsequently foreclosed on the
property, and that complainant should therefore vacate the property. 5
Complainant was alarmed and made an investigation. He
learned the following:
(1) TCT No. T-662 was already
cancelled by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of
Philippine National Bank (PNB) as early as
November 17, 1972 after foreclosure
proceedings;
(2) TCT No. T-3211 was cancelled
by TCT No. T-7235 in the names of
respondent and his wife on January 4, 1982
pursuant to a deed of sale dated March 27,
1979 between PNB and respondent;
(3) Respondent mortgaged the
subject property to RBAI on March 14, 1984,
RBAI foreclosed on the property, and
subsequently obtained TCT No. TP-10635 on
March 27, 1991. 6
Complainant was subsequently dispossessed of the property
by RBAI. 7
Aggrieved, complainant instituted a criminal complaint for
estafa against respondent with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Leyte, docketed as I.S. No. 95-144. The Provincial Prosecutor of
Leyte approved the Resolution 8 dated April 21, 1995 in I.S. No. 95-
144 finding that "[t]he facts of [the] case are sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that Estafa . . . has been committed and that
respondent herein is probably guilty thereof." 9 Accordingly, an
Information 10 dated January 8, 1996 was filed before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Baybay, Leyte, formally charging respondent
with the crime of estafa under Article 316, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, 11 committed as follows:
On March 14, 1984, accused
representing himself as the owner of a parcel
of land known as Lot No. 7661 of the Baybay
Cadastre, mortgaged the same to the Rural
Bank of Albuera, Albuera, Leyte, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, knowing
fully well that the possessor and owner at that
time was private complainant Florencio
Saladaga by virtue of a Pacto de Retro Sale
which accused executed in favor of private
complainant on 2nd December, 1981, without
first redeeming/repurchasing the same.
[P]rivate complainant knowing of accused['s]
unlawful act only on or about the last week of
February, 1991 when the rural bank
dispossessed him of the property, the mortgage
having been foreclosed, private complainant
thereby suffered damages and was prejudiced
by accused['s] unlawful transaction and
misrepresentation. acIASE
The aforementioned estafa case against respondent was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 3112-A.
Complainant likewise instituted the instant administrative
cases against respondent by filing before this Court an Affidavit-
Complaint 12 dated January 28, 1997 and Supplemental
Complaint 13 dated February 27, 1997, which were docketed as A.C.
No. 4697 and A.C. No. 4728, respectively. In both complaints,
complainant sought the disbarment of respondent.
The administrative cases were referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. 14
In his Consolidated Answer 15 dated August 16, 2003 filed
before the IBP, respondent denied that his agreement with
complainant was a pacto de retro sale. He claimed that it was an
equitable mortgage and that, if only complainant rendered an
accounting of his benefits from the produce of the land, the total
amount would have exceeded P15,000.00.
 Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
In a Report and Recommendation 16 dated April 29, 2005,
the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP's Commission on Bar
Discipline found that respondent was in bad faith when he dealt with
complainant and executed the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" but later on claimed that the agreement was one of
equitable mortgage. Respondent was also guilty of deceit or fraud
when he represented in the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase"
dated December 2, 1981 that the property was covered by TCT No.
T-662, even giving complainant the owner's copy of the said
certificate of title, when the said TCT had already been cancelled on
November 17, 1972 by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of Philippine
National Bank (PNB). Respondent made matters even worse, when
he had TCT No. T-3211 cancelled with the issuance of TCT No. T-
7235 under his and his wife's name on January 4, 1982 without
informing complainant. This was compounded by respondent's
subsequent mortgage of the property to RBAI, which led to the
acquisition of the property by RBAI and the dispossession thereof of
complainant. Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
that respondent be (1) suspended from the practice of law for one
year, with warning that a similar misdeed in the future shall be dealt
with more severity, and (2) ordered to return the sum of P15,000.00,
the amount he received as consideration for the pacto de retro sale,
with interest at the legal rate.
Considering respondent's "commission of unlawful acts,
especially crimes involving moral turpitude, acts of dishonesty,
grossly immoral conduct and deceit," the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation with modification as follows: respondent is (1)
suspended from the practice of law for two years, with warning that a
similar misdeed in the future shall be dealt with more severity, and
(2) ordered to return the sum of P15,000.00 received in consideration
of the pacto de retro sale, with legal interest. 17
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors to suspend respondent from the practice of law
for two years, but it refrains from ordering respondent to return the
P15,000.00 consideration, plus interest.
Respondent does not deny executing the "Deed of Sale with
Right to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 in favor of
complainant. However, respondent insists that the deed is not one of
sale with pacto de retro, but one of equitable mortgage. Thus,
respondent argues that he still had the legal right to mortgage the
subject property to other persons. Respondent additionally asserts that
complainant should render an accounting of the produce the latter had
collected from the said property, which would already exceed the
P15,000.00 consideration stated in the deed.
There is no merit in respondent's defense.
Regardless of whether the written contract between
respondent and complainant is actually one of sale with pacto de
retro or of equitable mortgage, respondent's actuations in his
transaction with complainant, as well as in the present administrative
cases, clearly show a disregard for the highest standards of legal
proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required
from lawyers, for which respondent should be held administratively
liable.
When respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he
took an oath where he undertook to "obey the laws," "do no
falsehood," and "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best
of [his] knowledge and discretion." 18 He gravely violated his oath.
The Investigating Commissioner correctly found, and the
IBP Board of Governors rightly agreed, that respondent caused the
ambiguity or vagueness in the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" as he was the one who prepared or drafted the said
instrument. Respondent could have simply denominated the
instrument as a deed of mortgage and referred to himself and
complainant as "mortgagor" and "mortgagee," respectively, rather
than as "vendor a retro" and "vendee a retro." If only respondent had
been more circumspect and careful in the drafting and preparation of
the deed, then the controversy between him and complainant could
have been avoided or, at the very least, easily resolved. His imprecise
and misleading wording of the said deed on its face betrayed lack of
legal competence on his part. He thereby fell short of his oath to
"conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion."
More significantly, respondent transgressed the laws and
the fundamental tenet of human relations as embodied in Article 19
of the Civil Code: CcaASE
Art. 19. Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Respondent, as owner of the property, had the right to
mortgage it to complainant but, as a lawyer, he should have seen to it
that his agreement with complainant is embodied in an instrument
that clearly expresses the intent of the contracting parties. A lawyer
who drafts a contract must see to it that the agreement faithfully and
clearly reflects the intention of the contracting parties. Otherwise, the
respective rights and obligations of the contracting parties will be
uncertain, which opens the door to legal disputes between the said
parties. Indeed, the uncertainty caused by respondent's poor
formulation of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" was a
significant factor in the legal controversy between respondent and
complainant. Such poor formulation reflects at the very least
negatively on the legal competence of respondent.
Under Section 63 of the Land Registration Act, 19 the law
in effect at the time the PNB acquired the subject property and
obtained TCT No. T-3211 in its name in 1972, where a decree in
favor of a purchaser who acquires mortgaged property in foreclosure
proceedings becomes final, such purchaser becomes entitled to the
issuance of a new certificate of title in his name and a memorandum
thereof shall be "indorsed upon the mortgagor's original
certificate." 20 TCT No. T-662, which respondent gave complainant
when they entered into the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase"
dated December 2, 1981, does not bear such memorandum but only a
memorandum on the mortgage of the property to PNB in 1963 and
the subsequent amendment of the mortgage.
Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith,
falsehood, and deceit when he entered into the "Deed of Sale with
Right to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 with the latter. He
made it appear that the property was covered by TCT No. T-662
under his name, even giving complainant the owner's copy of the said
certificate of title, when the truth is that the said TCT had already
been cancelled some nine years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the
name of PNB. He did not even care to correct the wrong statement in
the deed when he was subsequently issued a new copy of TCT No. T-
7235 on January 4, 1982, 21 or barely a month after the execution of
the said deed. All told, respondent clearly committed an act of gross
dishonesty and deceit against complainant.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold
the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
 Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Under Canon 1, a lawyer is not only mandated to
personally obey the laws and the legal processes, he is moreover
expected to inspire respect and obedience thereto. On the other hand,
Rule 1.01 states the norm of conduct that is expected of all
lawyers. 22
Any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or
unauthorized by, in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law
is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily imply the
element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to
include such element. 23
To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, defraud or betray; be untrustworthy; lacking in integrity,
honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and
straightforwardness. On the other hand, conduct that is "deceitful"
means as follows:
[Having] the proclivity for fraudulent
and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or
device that is used upon another who is
ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and
damage of the party imposed upon. In order to
be deceitful, the person must either have
knowledge of the falsity or acted in reckless
and conscious ignorance thereof, especially if
the parties are not on equal terms, and was
done with the intent that the aggrieved party
act thereon, and the latter indeed acted in
reliance of the false statement or deed in the
manner contemplated to his injury. 24
The actions of respondent in connection with the execution
of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" clearly fall within the
concept of unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct. They violate
Article 19 of the Civil Code. They show a disregard for Section 63 of
the Land Registration Act. They also reflect bad faith, dishonesty,
and deceit on respondent's part. Thus, respondent deserves to be
sanctioned.
Respondent's breach of his oath, violation of the laws, lack
of good faith, and dishonesty are compounded by his gross disregard
of this Court's directives, as well as the orders of the IBP's
Investigating Commissioner (who was acting as an agent of this
Court pursuant to the Court's referral of these cases to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation), which caused delay in the
resolution of these administrative cases. SCETHa
In particular, the Court required respondent to comment on
complainant's Affidavit-Complaint in A.C. No. 4697 and
Supplemental Complaint in A.C. No. 4728 on March 12, 1997 and
June 25, 1997, respectively. 25 While he requested for several
extensions of time within which to submit his comment, no such
comment was submitted prompting the Court to require him in a
Resolution dated February 4, 1998 to (1) show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure,
and (2) submit the consolidated comment. 26 Respondent neither
showed cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held
in contempt for such failure, nor submitted the consolidated
comment.
When these cases were referred to the IBP and during the
proceedings before the IBP's Investigating Commissioner, respondent
was again required several times to submit his consolidated answer.
He only complied on August 28, 2003, or more than six years after
this Court originally required him to do so. The Investigating
Commissioner also directed the parties to submit their respective
position papers. Despite having been given several opportunities to
submit the same, respondent did not file any position paper. 27
Respondent's disregard of the directives of this Court and of
the Investigating Commissioner, which caused undue delay in these
administrative cases, contravenes the following provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall
observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist
on similar conduct by others.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 12 — A lawyer shall exert
every effort and consider it his duty to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.03 — A lawyer shall not,
after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period
lapse without submitting the same or offering
an explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 — A lawyer shall not
unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes.
Respondent's infractions are aggravated by the fact that he
has already been imposed a disciplinary sanction before. In Nuñez v.
Atty. Astorga, 28 respondent was held liable for conduct unbecoming
an attorney for which he was fined P2,000.00.
Given the foregoing, the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for two years, as recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors, is proper.
The Court, however, will not adopt the recommendation of
the IBP to order respondent to return the sum of P15,000.00 he
received from complainant under the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase." This is a civil liability best determined and awarded in a
civil case rather than the present administrative cases.
In Roa v. Moreno, 29 the Court pronounced that "[i]n
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether
the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of
respondent's administrative liability. Our findings have no material
bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file
against each other." While the respondent lawyer's wrongful
actuations may give rise at the same time to criminal, civil, and
administrative liabilities, each must be determined in the appropriate
case; and every case must be resolved in accordance with the facts
and the law applicable and the quantum of proof required in each.
Section 5, 30 in relation to Sections 1 31 and 2, 32 Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, such as the ones
at bar, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond
reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence
as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion. 33
The Court notes that based on the same factual antecedents
as the present administrative cases, complainant instituted a criminal
case for estafa against respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No.
3112-A, before the MTC. When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action. 34 Unless the complainant waived the civil action, reserved
the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to
the criminal action, then his civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the estafa committed by respondent is deemed
instituted with Criminal Case No. 3112-A. The civil liability that
complainant may recover in Criminal Case No. 3112-A includes
restitution; reparation of the damage caused him; and/or
indemnification for consequential damages, 35 which may already
cover the P15,000.00 consideration complainant had paid for the
subject property.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found GUILTY of
the following: breach of the Lawyer's Oath; unlawful, dishonest, and
deceitful conduct; and disrespect for the Court and causing undue
delay of these cases, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years, reckoned from receipt of this
Decision, with WARNING that a similar misconduct in the future
shall be dealt with more severely. AaHcIT
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
information and guidance. The Court Administrator is directed to
circulate this Decision to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes,
Leonen and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Brion, * J., is on leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, ** J., is on official leave.
||| (Saladaga v. Astorga, A.C. Nos. 4697 & 4728, [November 25,
2014], 748 PHIL 1-17)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 190667. November 7, 2016.]
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner, vs. SPOUSES JOSE R.
BERNARDO AND LILIBETH R.
BERNARDO, DOING BUSINESS UNDER
THE NAME AND STYLE "JOLLY
BEVERAGE
ENTERPRISES," respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J p:
This is a Petition for Review 1 filed by Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (petitioner), from the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision 2 and Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 91096.
The CA affirmed in toto the Decision 4 of Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Branch 88 in Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-00-42320.
This case originated from the claim for damages filed
by respondent spouses Jose and Lilibeth Bernardo (respondents)
against petitioner for violation of Articles 19, 20, 21, and 28 of
the Civil Code.The RTC found petitioner liable to pay
respondents temperate damages in the amount of P500,000 for
loss of goodwill, to be offset against the latter's outstanding
balance for deliveries in the amount of P449,154. The trial court
ordered petitioner to pay P50,000 as moral damages, P20,000 as
exemplary damages, and P100,000 as attorney's fees.
Petitioner asserts that the Complaint had no basis, and
that the trial court had no jurisdiction to award temperate
damages in an amount equivalent to the outstanding obligation
of respondents. It prays not only for the reversal of the assailed
judgments, but also for an award of moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. It
also asks that respondents be ordered to pay P449,154 plus legal
interest from the date of demand until full payment. 5
We deny the Petition.
FACTS
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the
large-scale manufacture, sale, and distribution of beverages
around the country. 6 On the other hand, respondents, doing
business under the name "Jolly Beverage Enterprises," are
wholesalers of softdrinks in Quezon City, particularly in the
vicinities of Bulacan Street, V. Luna Road, Katipunan Avenue,
and Timog Avenue. 7
The business relationship between the parties
commenced in 1987 when petitioner designated respondents as
its distributor. 8 On 22 March 1994, the parties formally entered
into an exclusive dealership contract for three years. 9 Under the
Agreement, 10 petitioner would extend developmental
assistance to respondents in the form of cash assistance and
trade discount incentives. For their part, respondents undertook
to sell petitioner's products exclusively, meet the sales quota of
7,000 cases per month, and assist petitioner in its marketing
efforts. 11
On 1 March 1997, the parties executed a similar
agreement for another two years, or until 28 February
1999. 12 This time, petitioner gave respondents complimentary
cases of its products instead of cash assistance, and increased the
latter's sales quota to 8,000 cases per month.
For 13 years, the parties enjoyed a good and
harmonious business partnership. 13 While the contracts
contained a clause for breach, it was never enforced. 14
Sometime in late 1998 or early 1999, before the
contract expired, petitioner required respondents to submit a list
of their customers on the pretext that it would formulate a policy
defining its territorial dealership in Quezon City. 15 It assured
respondents that their contract would he renewed for a longer
period, provided that they would submit the list. 16 However,
despite their compliance, the promise did not materialize. 17
Respondents discovered that in February 1999,
petitioner started to reach out to the persons whose names were
on the list. 18 Respondents also received reports that their
delivery trucks were being trailed by petitioner's agents; and that
as soon as the trucks left, the latter would approach the former's
customers. 19 Further, respondents found out that petitioner had
employed a different pricing scheme, such that the price given to
distributors was significantly higher than that given to
supermarkets. 20 It also enticed direct buyers and sari-sari store
owners in the area with its "Coke Alok" promo, in which it gave
away one free bottle for every case purchased. 21 It further
engaged a store adjacent to respondents' warehouse to sell the
former's products at a substantially lower price. 22 TCAScE
Respondents claimed that because of these schemes,
they lost not only their major customers — such as Peach
Blossoms, May Flower Restaurant, Saisaki Restaurant, and Kim
Hong Restaurant — but also small stores, such as the canteen in
the hospital where respondent Jose Bernardo worked. 23 They
admitted that they were unable to pay deliveries worth
P449,154. 24
Respondents filed a Complaint 25 for damages,
alleging that the acts of petitioner constituted dishonesty, bad
faith, gross negligence, fraud, and unfair competition in
commercial enterprise. 26 The Complaint was later
amended 27 to implead petitioner's officers and personnel,
include additional factual allegations, and increase the amount of
damages prayed for.
Petitioner denied the allegations. 28 It maintained that
it had obtained a list of clients through surveys, and that
promotional activities or developmental strategies were
implemented only after the expiration of the Agreements. 29 It
opined that the filing of the complaint was a mere ploy resorted
to by respondents to evade the payment of the deliveries. 30
The RTC held petitioner liable for damages for abuse
of rights in violation of Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil
Code and for unfair competition under Article 28. It found that
petitioner's agents solicited the list of clients in order to
penetrate the market and directly supply customers with its
products. 31 Moreover, the trial court found that petitioner had
recklessly ignored the rights of respondents to have a fair chance
to engage in business or earn a living when it deliberately used
oppressive methods to deprive them of their business. 32 Its
officers were, however, absolved of liability, as there was no
showing that they had acted in their individual and personal
capacities. 33
In the body of its Decision, the RTC stated that
petitioner should pay respondents P500,000 as temperate
damages, and that it was only just and fair that the latter offset
this amount against their outstanding obligation to petitioner in
the amount of P449,154. 34 In the fallo, the trial court awarded
P50,000 as moral damages, P20,000 as exemplary damages, and
P100,000 as attorney's fees. 35 It denied petitioner's
counterclaim for damages for lack of factual and legal
basis. 36 Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion
was denied. 37
Petitioner then elevated the case to the CA, which
affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. According to the appellate
court's ruling, petitioner had used its sizable resources to railroad
the business of respondents: 38
[Petitioner] infiltrated certain areas in
Quezon City at the expense of and later, in
derogation of its wholesalers, particularly
[respondents]. As admitted by Allan
Mercado, the Integrated Selling and
Marketing Manager of appellant, it was
previously dependent on wholesalers to
circulate its products around the country. . . .
. to [respondent's] warehouse, to sell Coke
xxx xxx xxx
[T]owards the end of the partnership.
appellant employed a different marketing
scheme purportedly to obviate the pour
dealership management from wholesalers in
major areas. But as may be shown by the
incidents leading to the filing of this case,
this method was designed strategically to
overrun [respondents'] business and take
over the customers of its wholesalers.
xxx xxx xxx
One such method was "different
pricing schemes" wherein the prices given to
supermarkets and grocery stores were
considerably lower than those imposed on
wholesalers. No prior advice thereof was
given to [respondents] or any of the
wholesalers. In fact, they only knew of it
when their customers began complaining
about the variation in prices of softdrinks
sold in supermarkets and those that were
sold by them. When in fact [respondent]
Bernardo personally inspected the products
in grocery stores, he discovered that a box of
Coke-in-can is sold at P40.00, lower than
those offered by them as wholesalers.
About the same time, [petitioner]
also implemented the "Area Market
Cooperatives" (AMC) and the "Coke-
Alok" promo. Under the AMC, customers of
wholesalers can purchase [petitioner's]
products from prominent stores in heavily
crowded areas for P76.00 per case, as
opposed to [respondent's] offering of
P112.00. In "Coke-Alok," [petitioner]
directly sold Coke products to wholesale
customers with incentives as free bottle of
Coke for every case of softdrinks purchased.
Being of limited resources, [respondents had
no] means to equal the lucrative incentives
given by [petitioner] to their customers.
xxx xxx xxx
Apart from direct selling and other
promotions, [petitioner] also employed high-
handed means that further shrunk
[respondents'] market coverage. In one
instance, [petitioner's sales representative]
advised [respondents] and other wholesalers
to keep away from major thoroughfares.
Apparently, [petitioner] was going to supply
their products to these stores themselves. . . .
.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Furthermore, one of [petitioner's]
representatives, Nelson Pabulayan, admitted
that he sold products at the canteen in V.
Luna Hospital [which was then being
serviced by respondents]. cTDaEH
As if that was not enough,
petitioner engaged other stores, such as
Freezel's Bakeshop that was located adjacent
products at a price substantially lower than
[that offered by respondents].
ISSUES
Petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction
to award temperate damages that were not prayed for in the
Complaint. It further asserts that it did not violate Articles 19,
20, 21 or 28; hence, the award of damages and attorney's fees
was improper.
OUR RULING
The CA did not err in affirming the finding that
petitioner was liable for temperate, moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees, for abuse of rights and unfair
competition.
The Petition raises questions of fact.
Petitioner ignores the nature of a petition for review as
a remedy against errors of law. Instead, it raises factual matters
that have already been passed upon by the RTC and the CA.
It insists on the following facts: 1) the "promotional
activities" were implemented after the dealership agreements
expired; 39 2) the "developmental strategies" were implemented
nationwide and were not meant to destroy the business of
respondents; 40 3) its agents did not follow the trucks of Jolly
Beverages; 41 4) the price difference resulted because
respondents could no longer avail of trade discounts and
incentives under the expired Agreement; 42 and 5) there is no
causal connection between the promotional activities and the
claimed losses of respondents. 43
Petitioner contends that since it did not assign any
exclusive territory to respondents, the latter had no exclusive
right to any customer. 44 It supposedly decided to rely on its
own sales personnel to push the sale of its products, because the
distributors had violated the terms of their agreements by selling
competing products, failing to meet the required sales volume,
or failing to pay on time. 45 Petitioner, however, did not allege
that respondents committed any of these actions during the
existence of the agreement.
We have repeatedly held that factual findings of the
trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are
given great weight, even finality, by this Court. 46 Petitioner
fails to make a convincing argument that this case falls under
any of the exceptions to the rule. On the contrary, the Decisions
of the RTC and the CA appear to be supported by the records.
 Petitioner bewails the fact that the RTC and the CA, in
establishing the facts, relied heavily on the testimony of
respondent Jose Bernardo. 47 Petitioner, however, forgets that
trial courts are in an ideal position to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses and can therefore discern if the latter are telling the
truth or not. 48 In this case, both the trial and the appellate
courts found the testimonies of respondent Jose Bernardo and
his witnesses more credible than those of the witnesses
presented by petitioners. We shall not substitute our judgment
for that of the trial court, absent any compelling reason.
Petitioner is liable for damages for
abuse of rights and unfair
competition under the  Civil Code.
Both the RTC and the CA found that petitioner had
employed oppressive and high-handed schemes to unjustly limit
the market coverage and diminish the investment returns of
respondents. 49 The CA summarized its findings as follows: 50
This [cut-throat competition] is precisely
what appellant did in order to take over the
market: directly sell its products to or deal
them off to competing stores at a price
substantially lower than those imposed on its
wholesalers. As a result, the wholesalers
suffered losses, and in [respondents'] case,
laid off a number of employees and
alienated the patronage of its major
customers including small-scale stores.
It must be emphasized that petitioner is not only a
beverage giant, but also the manufacturer of the products; hence,
it sets the price. In addition, it took advantage of the information
provided by respondents to facilitate its takeover of the latter's
usual business area. Distributors like respondents, who had
assisted petitioner in its marketing efforts, suddenly found
themselves with fewer customers. Other distributors were left
with no choice but to fold. 51
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code provide the
legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffers
damage whenever another person commits an act in violation of
some legal provision; or an act which, though not constituting a
transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain
rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved. 52 The provisions
read:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law,
wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
In Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA, 53 this Court
held that under any of the above provisions of law, an act that
causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of
damages. As explained by this Court in GF Equity, Inc. v.
Valenzona: 54 cSaATC
The exercise of a right ends when
the right disappears, and it disappears when
it is abused, especially to the prejudice of
others. The mask of a right without the spirit
of justice which gives it life is repugnant to
the modern concept of social law. It cannot
be said that a person exercises a right when
he unnecessarily prejudices another or
offends morals or good customs. Over and
above the specific precepts of positive law
are the supreme norms of justice which the
law develops and which are expressed in
three principles: honeste vivere, alterum non
laedere and jus suum quique tribuere; and
he who violates them violates the law. For
this reason, it is not permissible to abuse our
rights to prejudice others.
Meanwhile, the use of unjust, oppressive, or high-
handed business methods resulting in unfair competition also
gives a right of action to the injured party. Article 28 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural,
commercial or industrial enterprises or in
labor through the use of force, intimidation,
deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or highhanded method shall give
rise to a right of action by the person who
thereby suffers damage.
Petitioner cites Tolentino, who in turn cited Colin and
Capitant. According to the latter, the act of "a merchant [who]
puts up a store near the store of another and in this way attracts
some of the latter's patrons" is not an abuse of a right. 55 The
scenario in the present case is vastly different: the merchant was
also the producer who, with the use of a list provided by its
distributor, knocked on the doors of the latter's customers and
offered the products at a substantially lower price. Unsatisfied,
the merchant even sold its products at a preferential rate to
another store within the vicinity. Jurisprudence holds that when
a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of
profit, but regardless of loss and for the sole purpose of driving a
competitor out of business, in order to take advantage of the
effects of a malevolent purpose, that person is guilty of a wanton
wrong. 56
Temperate, moral, and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees,
were properly awarded.
Petitioner argues that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to grant an award of temperate damages, because
respondents did not specifically pray for it in their Amended
Complaint:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, it is most respectfully prayed
that the Honorable Court render a judgment
directing defendants to:
1. Pay plaintiffs the amount of
P1,000,000.00 representing
loss of goodwill nurtured
over the past 13 years as
actual damages.
2. Pay plaintiffs the amount of
P200,000 representing
moral damages.
3. Pay plaintiffs the amount of
P100,000 representing
exemplary damages.
 4. Pay plaintiffs the amount of
P100,000 representing
attorney's fees.
Other reliefs which are just and
equitable under the premises are also prayed
for.
Petitioner's argument is flimsy and unsupported even
by the cases it has cited. 57 The CA correctly ruled that the
award of temperate damages was justified, even if it was not
specifically prayed for, because 1) respondents did pray for the
grant of "other reliefs," and 2) the award was clearly warranted
under the circumstances. Indeed, the law permits judges to
award a different kind of damages as an alternative to actual
damages:
Civil Code,Art. 2224. Temperate or
moderate damages, which are more than
nominal but less than compensatory
damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount can not, from the
nature of the case, be provided with
certainty. (Emphasis supplied)
Compensatory damages may be awarded in
the concept of temperate damages for injury to business
reputation or business standing, loss of goodwill, and loss of
customers who shifted their patronage to competitors. 58
It is not extraordinary for courts to award temperate
damages in lieu of actual damages. In Canada v. All
Commodities Marketing Corporation, 59 this Court awarded
temperate damages in recognition of the pecuniary loss suffered,
after finding that actual damages could not be awarded for lack
of proof. In Public Estates Authority v. Chu, 60 this Court held
that temperate damages should have been awarded by the trial
court considering that the plaintiff therein had suffered some
pecuniary loss.
In this case, both the RTC and the CA found that
respondents had similarly suffered pecuniary loss by reason of
petitioner's high-handed machinations to eliminate competition
in the market. 61 cHDAIS
We see no grave error on the part of the RTC when it
ruled that the unpaid obligation of respondents shall be offset
against the temperate damages due them from
petitioner. 62 However, the trial court was not accurate in
considering the P500,000 temperate damages as adequate to
completely extinguish the obligation of respondents to
petitioner. 63 We note that while the principal was P449,154,
this amount earned legal interest from the time of demand.
Nonetheless, in view of the established fact that respondents
incurred the losses after their business was systematically
crippled by petitioner, it is only proper and just that the
obligation, as well as the legal interest that has accrued, be
deemed totally compensated by the temperate damages.
Therefore, respondents do not need to tender the amount of
P449,154 plus legal interest to petitioner, while the latter does
not have to tender any amount as temperate damages to the
former.
With regard to moral damages, petitioner argues that
respondents failed to provide satisfactory proof that the latter
had undergone any suffering or injury. 64 This is a factual
question that has been resolved by the trial court in a Decision
affirmed by the CA. The award finds legal basis under Article
2219 (10) of the Civil Code, which states that moral damages
may be recovered in acts and actions referred to in Articles 21
and 28. 65
Petitioner likewise questions the award of exemplary
damages without "competent proof." 66 It cites Spouses
Villafuerte v. CA 67 as basis for arguing that the CA should have
based its Decision regarding the fact and the amount of
exemplary damages upon competent proof that respondents have
suffered injury and upon evidence of the actual amount thereof.
We enjoin petitioner's counsel to fully and carefully read the text
of our decisions before citing them as authority. 68 The excerpt
lifted pertains to compensatory damages, not exemplary
damages. We remind counsel that exemplary damages are
awarded under Article 2229 of the Civil Code by way of
example or correction for the public good. The determination of
the amount is left to the discretion of the judge; its proof is not
incumbent upon the claimant.
There being no meritorious argument raised by
petitioner, the award of exemplary damages must be sustained to
caution powerful business owners against the use of oppressive
and high-handed commercial strategies to target and trample on
the rights of small business owners, who are striving to make a
decent living.
Exemplary damages having been awarded, the grant of
attorney's fees was therefore warranted. 69
Petitioner's counterclaims for moral
and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, were properly denied.
The counterclaim for the payment of P449,154 plus
legal interest was effectively granted when the trial court offset
the temperate damages awarded to respondents against the
outstanding obligation of the latter to petitioner. ISHCcT
The counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages,
as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, had no basis
and were properly denied. The fact that petitioner was
compelled to engage the services of counsel in order to defend
itself against the suit of respondents did not entitle it to
attorney's fees.
According to petitioner, it is entitled to moral
damages, because "respondents clearly acted in a vexatious
manner when they instituted this suit." 70 We see nothing in the
record to sustain this argument.
With respect to the prayer for exemplary damages,
neither do we find any act of respondents that has to be deterred.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated 23 July 2009 and Resolution dated 19 November
2009 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
91096, which affirmed in toto the Decision dated 28 September
2007 issued by Regional Trial Court Branch 88 Quezon City in
Civil Case No. Q-00-42320, are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the
damages awarded shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of this Decision until its full satisfaction. The
total compensation of respondents' unpaid obligation, including
legal interest that has accrued, and the temperate damages
awarded to them, is hereby upheld.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Perlas-
Bernabe and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
||| (Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Spouses Bernardo, G.R.
No. 190667, [November 7, 2016], 798 PHIL 28-44)
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 217426. December 4, 2017.]
ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC,
INC., petitioner, vs. LWV
CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are
the Decision 2 dated July 11, 2014 and the Resolution 3 dated
February 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 125451, which affirmed with modification the
Decision 4 dated December 15, 2011 and the Order dated May
25, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 211 (RTC) in SCA Case No. MC11-879 (Civil Case No.
21881), and thereby ordered herein petitioner St. Martin
Polyclinic, Inc. (petitioner) to pay respondent LWV
Construction Corporation (respondent) temperate damages in the
amount of P50,000.00.
The Facts
Respondent is engaged in the business of recruiting
Filipino workers for deployment to Saudi Arabia. 5 On the other
hand, petitioner is an accredited member of the Gulf
Cooperative Council Approved Medical Centers Association
(GAMCA) and as such, authorized to conduct medical
examinations of prospective applicants for overseas
employment. 6
On January 10, 2008, respondent referred prospective
applicant Jonathan V. Raguindin (Raguindin) to petitioner for a
pre-deployment medical examination in accordance with the
instructions from GAMCA. 7 After undergoing the required
examinations, petitioner cleared Raguindin and found him "fit
for employment," as evidenced by a Medical Report 8 dated
January 11, 2008 (Medical Report). 9
Based on the foregoing, respondent deployed
Raguindin to Saudi Arabia, allegedly incurring expenses in the
amount of P84,373.41. 10 Unfortunately, when Raguindin
underwent another medical examination with the General Care
Dispensary of Saudi Arabia (General Care Dispensary) on
March 24, 2008, he purportedly tested positive for HCV or the
hepatitis C virus. The Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia (Ministry of Health) required a re-examination of
Raguindin, which the General Care Dispensary conducted on
April 28, 2008. 11 However, the results of the re-examination
remained the same, i.e., Raguindin was positive for HCV, which
results were reflected in a Certification 12 dated April 28, 2008
(Certification). An undated HCV Confirmatory Test
Report 13 likewise conducted by the Ministry of Health affirmed
such finding, thereby leading to Raguindin's repatriation to the
Philippines. 14
Claiming that petitioner was reckless in issuing its
Medical Report stating that Raguindin is "fit for employment"
when a subsequent finding in Saudi Arabia revealed that he was
positive for HCV, respondent filed a complaint 15 for sum of
money and damages against petitioner before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60 (MeTC).
Respondent essentially averred that it relied on petitioner's
declaration and incurred expenses as a consequence. Thus,
respondent prayed for the award of damages in the amount of
P84,373.41 representing the expenses it incurred in deploying
Raguindin abroad. 16
In its Answer with compulsory
counterclaim, 17 petitioner denied liability and claimed
that: first, respondent was not a proper party in interest for lack
of privity of contract between them; second, the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the case as it involves the interpretation and
implementation of a contract of employment; third, the action is
premature as Raguindin has yet to undergo a post-employment
medical examination following his repatriation; and fourth, the
complaint failed to state a cause of action as the Medical Report
issued by petitioner had already expired on April 11, 2008, or
three (3) months after its issuance on January 11, 2008. 18
The MeTC Ruling
In a Decision 19 dated December 17, 2010, the MeTC
rendered judgment in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner
to pay the amount of P84,373.41 as actual damages, P20,000.00
as attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. 20
At the onset, the MeTC held that it had jurisdiction
over the case, since respondent was claiming actual damages
incurred in the deployment of Raguindin in the amount of
P84,373.41. 21 It further ruled that respondent was a real party
in interest, as it would not have incurred expenses had petitioner
not issued the Medical Report certifying that Raguindin was fit
to work.
On the merits, the MeTC found that respondent was
entitled to be informed accurately of the precise condition of
Raguindin before deploying the latter abroad and consequently,
had sustained damage as a result of the erroneous
certification. 22 In this relation, it rejected petitioner's contention
that Raguindin may have contracted the disease after his medical
examination in the Philippines up to the time of his deployment,
there being no evidence offered to corroborate the same. 23
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC,
contending, 24 among others, that respondent failed to comply
with the requirements on the authentication and proof of
documents under Section 24, 25 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
considering that respondent's evidence, particularly the April 28,
2008 Certification issued by the General Care Dispensary and
the HCV Confirmatory Test Report issued by the Ministry of
Health, are foreign documents issued in Saudi Arabia.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision 26 dated December 15, 2011, the RTC
dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the MeTC Decision in
its entirety. 27 Additionally, the RTC pointed out that petitioner
can no longer change the theory of the case or raise new issues
on appeal, referring to the latter's argument on the authentication
of respondent's documentary evidence. 28
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration 29 was denied
in an Order 30 dated May 25, 2012. Dissatisfied, petitioner
elevated the case to the CA. 31
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 32 dated July 11, 2014, the CA affirmed
the RTC Decision, with the modification deleting the award of
actual damages and instead, awarding temperate damages in the
amount of P50,000.00. 33
The CA held that petitioner failed to perform its duty
to accurately diagnose Raguindin when it issued its Medical
Report declaring the latter "fit for employment," considering that
he was subsequently found positive for HCV in Saudi
Arabia. 34 Further, the CA opined that the Certification issued
by the General Care Dispensary is not a public document and in
such regard, rejected petitioner's argument that the same is
inadmissible in evidence for not having been authenticated.
Moreover, it remarked that petitioner's own Medical Report does
not enjoy the presumption of regularity as petitioner is merely an
accredited clinic. 35 Finally, the CA ruled that petitioner could
not disclaim liability on the ground that Raguindin tested
positive for HCV in Saudi Arabia after the expiration of the
Medical Report on April 11, 2008, noting that the General Care
Dispensary issued its Certification on April 28, 2008, or a mere
seventeen (17) days from the expiration of petitioner's Medical
Report. 36 Hence, the CA concluded that "it is contrary to
human experience that a newly-deployed overseas worker, such
as Raguindin, would immediately contract a serious virus at the
very beginning of a deployment." 37
However, as the records are bereft of evidence to show
that respondent actually incurred the amount of P84,373.41 as
expenses for Raguindin's deployment, the CA deleted the award
of actual damages and instead, awarded temperate damages in
the amount of P50,000.00. 38
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for partial
reconsideration, 39 which the CA denied in a
Resolution 40 dated February 27, 2015; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue advanced for the Court's resolution
is whether or not petitioner was negligent in issuing the Medical
Report declaring Raguindin "fit for employment" and hence,
should be held liable for damages.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is granted.
I.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that a re-
examination of factual findings cannot be done acting on a
petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier
of facts but reviews only questions of law. 41 Thus, in petitions
for review on certiorari, only questions of law may generally be
put into issue. This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions,
such as "when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible"; or "when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are
based." 42 Finding a confluence of certain exceptions in this
case, the general rule that only legal issues may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court would not apply, and the Court retains the authority to
pass upon the evidence presented and draw conclusions
therefrom. 43
II.
An action for damages due to the negligence of
another may be instituted on the basis of Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict: ATICcS
Article 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
The elements of a quasi-delict are: (1) an act or
omission; (2) the presence of fault or negligence in the
performance or non-performance of the act; (3) injury; (4) a
causal connection between the negligent act and the injury;
and (5) no pre-existing contractual relation. 44
As a general rule, any act or omission coming under
the purview of Article 2176 gives rise to a cause of action under
quasi-delict. This, in turn, gives the basis for a claim of
damages. 45 Notably, quasi-delict is one among several sources
of obligation. Article 1157 of the Civil Code states:
Article 1157. Obligations arise
from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by
law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts.
However, as explained by Associate Justice Marvic
M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) in his opinion in Alano v.
Magud-Logmao 46 (Alano), "Article 2176 is not an all-
encompassing enumeration of all actionable wrongs which
can give rise to the liability for damages. Under the Civil
Code, acts done in violation of Articles 19, 20, and 21 will
also give rise to damages." 47 These provisions — which were
cited as bases by the MTC, RTC and CA in their respective
rulings in this case — read as follows:
Article 19. Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to
law, willfully or negligently causes damage
to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
 Article 21. Any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
"[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
one's rights, but also in the performance of one's
duties." 48 Case law states that "[w]hen a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for
the government of human relations and for the maintenance of
social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would [then] be proper." 49 Between these two
provisions as worded, it is Article 20 which applies to
both willful and negligent acts that are done contrary to law. On
the other hand, Article 21 applies only to willful acts
done contra bonos mores. 50
In the Alano case, Justice Leonen aptly elaborated on
the distinctive applications of Articles 19, 20 and 21, which are
general provisions on human relations, vis-à-vis Article 2176,
which particularly governs quasi-delicts:
Article 19 is the general rule which governs
the conduct of human relations. By itself, it
is not the basis of an actionable tort. Article
19 describes the degree of care required so
that an actionable tort may arise when it is
alleged together with Article 20 or Article
21.
Article 20 concerns violations of existing
law as basis for an injury. It allows
recovery should the act have been willful or
negligent. Willful may refer to the intention
to do the act and the desire to achieve the
outcome which is considered by the plaintiff
in tort action as injurious. Negligence may
refer to a situation where the act was
consciously done but without intending the
result which the plaintiff considers as
injurious.
Article 21, on the other hand, concerns
injuries that may be caused by acts which
are not necessarily proscribed by law. This
article requires that the act be willful, that is,
that there was an intention to do the act and
a desire to achieve the outcome. In cases
under Article 21, the legal issues revolve
around whether such outcome should be
considered a legal injury on the part of the
plaintiff or whether the commission of the
act was done in violation of the standards of
care required in Article 19.
Article 2176 covers situations where an
injury happens through an act or omission of
the defendant. When it involves a positive
act, the intention to commit the outcome is
irrelevant. The act itself must not be a
breach of an existing law or a pre-existing
contractual obligation. What will be
considered is whether there is "fault or
negligence" attending the commission of the
act which necessarily leads to the outcome
considered as injurious by the plaintiff. The
required degree of diligence will then be
assessed in relation to the circumstances of
each and every case. 51 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, with respect to negligent acts or omissions, it
should therefore be discerned that Article 20 of the Civil
Code concerns "violations of existing law as basis for an
injury," whereas Article 2176 applies when the negligent act
causing damage to another does not constitute "a breach of
an existing law or a pre-existing contractual obligation."
In this case, the courts a quo erroneously anchored
their respective rulings on the provisions of Articles 19, 20, and
21 of the Civil Code.This is because respondent did not proffer
(nor have these courts mentioned) any law as basis for which
damages may be recovered due to petitioner's alleged negligent
act. In its amended complaint, respondent mainly avers that had
petitioner not issue a "fit for employment" Medical Report to
Raguindin, respondent would not have processed his documents,
deployed him to Saudi Arabia, and later on — in view of the
subsequent findings that Raguindin was positive for HCV and
hence, unfit to work — suffered actual damages in the amount
of P84,373.41. 52 Thus, as the claimed negligent act of
petitioner was not premised on the breach of any law, and not to
mention the incontestable fact that no pre-existing contractual
relation was averred to exist between the parties, Article 2176 —
instead of Articles 19, 20 and 21 — of the Civil Code should
govern.
III.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. 53
As early as the case of Picart v. Smith, 54 the Court
elucidated that "the test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case is: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence." 55 Corollary thereto, the Court stated that "[t]he
question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent
man in a given situation must of course be always determined in
the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved
in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of
much value x x x: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the
circumstances which are before them or known to them. They
are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future.
Hence[,] they can be expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn of danger." 56
Under our Rules of Evidence, it is disputably
presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and
that private transactions have been fair and regular. 57 In effect,
negligence cannot be presumed, and thus, must be proven by
him who alleges it. 58 In Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers,
Inc.: 59
[T]he negligence or fault should be clearly
established as it is the basis of her action.
The burden of proof is upon [the plaintiff].
Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court provides that "burden of proof is the
duty of a party to present evidence on the
facts in issue necessary to establish his claim
 or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law." It is then up for the
plaintiff to establish his cause of action or
the defendant to establish his
defense. Therefore, if the plaintiff alleged
in his complaint that he was damaged
because of the negligent acts of the
defendant, he has the burden of proving
such negligence. It is even presumed that
a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns. The quantum of proof required is
preponderance of evidence. 60 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The records of this case show that the pieces of
evidence mainly relied upon by respondent to establish
petitioner's negligence are: (a) the Certification 61 dated April
28, 2008; and (b) the HCV Confirmatory Test
Report. 62 However, these issuances only indicate the results of
the General Care Dispensary and Ministry of Health's own
medical examination of Raguindin finding him to be positive for
HCV. Notably, the examination conducted by the General Care
Dispensary, which was later affirmed by the Ministry of Health,
was conducted only on March 24, 2008, or at least two (2)
months after petitioner issued its Medical Report on
January 11, 2008. Hence, even assuming that Raguindin's
diagnosis for HCV was correct, the fact that he later tested
positive for the same does not convincingly prove that he was
already under the same medical state at the time petitioner
issued the Medical Report on January 11, 2008. In this regard, it
was therefore incumbent upon respondent to show that there
was already negligence at the time the Medical Report was
issued, may it be through evidence that show that standard
medical procedures were not carefully observed or that there
were already palpable signs that exhibited Raguindin's unfitness
for deployment at that time. This is hardly the case when
respondent only proffered evidence which demonstrate that
months after petitioner's Medical Report was issued, Raguindin,
who had already been deployed to Saudi Arabia, tested positive
for HCV and as such, was no longer "fit for employment."
In fact, there is a reasonable possibility that Raguindin
became exposed to the HCV only after his medical examination
with petitioner on January 11, 2008. Based on published reports
from the World Health Organization, HCV or the hepatitis C
virus causes both acute and chronic infection. Acute HCV
infection is usually asymptomatic, 63 and is only very rarely
associated with life-threatening diseases. The incubation
period 64 for HCV is two (2) weeks to six (6) months, and
following initial infection, approximately 80% of people do not
exhibit any symptoms. 65 Indisputably, Raguindin was not
deployed to Saudi Arabia immediately after petitioner's medical
examination and hence, could have possibly contracted the same
only when he arrived thereat. In light of the foregoing, the CA
therefore erred in holding that "[h]ad petitioner more thoroughly
and diligently examined Raguindin, it would likely have
discovered the existence of the HCV because it was contrary to
human experience that a newly-deployed overseas worker, such
as Raguindin, would immediately have contracted the disease at
the beginning of his deployment." 66
While petitioner's Medical Report indicates an
expiration of April 11, 2008, the Court finds it fitting to clarify
that the same could not be construed as a certified guarantee
coming from petitioner that Raguindin's medical status at the
time the report was issued on January 11, 2008 (i.e., that he was
fit for employment) would remain the same up until that date
(i.e., April 11, 2008). As earlier intimated, the intervening period
could very well account for a number of variables that could
have led to a change in Raguindin's condition, such as his
deployment to a different environment in Saudi Arabia. If at all,
the expiration date only means that the Medical Report is valid
— and as such, could be submitted — as a formal requirement
for overseas employment up until April 11, 2008; it does not, by
any means, create legal basis to hold the issuer accountable for
any intervening change of condition from the time of issuance
up until expiration. Truly, petitioner could not be reasonably
expected to predict, much less assure, that Raguindin's medical
status of being fit for employment would remain unchanged.
Thus, the fact that the Medical Report's expiration date of April
11, 2008 was only seventeen (17) days away from the issuance
of the General Care Dispensary's April 28, 2008 Certification
finding Raguindin positive for HCV should not — as it does not
— establish petitioner's negligence. TIADCc
IV.
At any rate, the fact that Raguindin tested positive for
HCV could not have been properly established since the courts a
quo, in the first place, erred in admitting and giving probative
weight to the Certification of the General Care Dispensary,
which was written in an unofficial language. Section 33, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court states that:
Section 33. Documentary evidence
in an unofficial language. — Documents
written in an unofficial language   shall not
be admitted  as evidence,  unless
accompanied with a translation into English
or Filipino. To avoid interruption of
proceedings, parties or their attorneys are
directed to have such translation prepared
before trial. 67
A cursory examination of the subject document would
reveal that while it contains English words, the majority of it is
in an unofficial language. Sans any translation in English or
Filipino provided by respondent, the same should not have been
admitted in evidence; thus their contents could not be given
probative value, and deemed to constitute proof of the facts
stated therein.
Moreover, the due execution and authenticity of the
said certification were not proven in accordance with Section 20,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
Section 20. Proof of private document. —
Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved
either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed
or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the
maker.
(c) Any other private document need only be
identified as that which it is claimed
to be.
Notably, the foregoing provision applies since the
Certification does not fall within the classes of public documents
under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court 68 — and
hence, must be considered as private. It has been settled that
an unverified and unidentified private document cannot be
accorded probative value. 69 In addition, case law states that
"since a medical certificate involves an opinion of one who
 must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot be
given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is
presented in court to show his qualifications. It is precluded
because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the
right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the
statements or writings are attributed. Its executor or author
should be presented as a witness to provide the other party to the
litigation the opportunity to question its contents. Being mere
hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the medical
certificate renders its contents suspect and of no probative
value," 70 as in this case.
Similarly, the HCV Confirmatory Test Report issued
by the Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia should have also been
excluded as evidence. Although the same may be considered a
public document, being an alleged written official act of an
official body of a foreign country, 71 the same was not duly
authenticated in accordance with Section 24, 72 Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court. While respondent provided a
translation 73 thereof from the National Commission on Muslim
Filipinos, Bureau of External Relations, Office of the President,
the same was not accompanied by a certificate of the secretary
of the embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul,
or consular agent or any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in Saudi Arabia, where the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office. 74
To be sure, petitioner — contrary to respondent's
contention 75 — has not changed its theory of the case by
questioning the foregoing documents. As petitioner correctly
argued, it merely amplified its defense 76 that it is not liable for
negligence when it further questioned the validity of the
issuances of the General Care Dispensary and Ministry of
Health. In Limpangco Sons v. Yangco, 77 the Court explained
that "[t]here is a difference x x x between a change in the theory
of the case and a shifting of the incidence of the emphasis placed
during the trial or in the briefs." "Where x x x the theory of the
case as set out in the pleadings remains the theory throughout
the progress of the cause, the change of emphasis from one
phase of the case as presented by one set of facts to another
phase made prominent by another set of facts x x x does not
result in a change of theory x x x." 78 In any case, petitioner had
already questioned the validity of these documents in its Position
Paper 79 before the MeTC. 80 Hence, there is no change of
theory that would preclude petitioner's arguments on this score.
All told, there being no negligence proven by
respondent through credible and admissible evidence, petitioner
cannot be held liable for damages under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code as above-discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Decision dated July 11, 2014 and the
Resolution dated February 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 125451 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and a NEW ONE is entered, DISMISSING the complaint of
respondent LWV Construction Corporation for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Peralta, Caguioa and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. v. LWV Construction Corp., G.R. No.
217426, [December 4, 2017])
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 246012. June 17, 2020.]
ISMAEL G. LOMARDA and CRISPINA
RASO, petitioners, vs. ENGR. ELMER T.
FUDALAN, respondent,
BOHOL I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
INC., defendant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are
the Decision 2 dated February 9, 2017 and the
Resolution 3 dated May 19, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 04480, which affirmed the Decision 4 dated
May 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City,
Bohol, Branch 49 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 7476, granting the
complaint for damages filed by respondent Engr. Elmer T.
Fudalan (respondent) against petitioners Ismael D. Lomarda
(Lomarda) and Crispina Raso (Raso; collectively, petitioners).
The Facts
On September 27, 2006, respondent, through his wife,
Alma Fudalan, applied for electrical service from BOHECO I
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BOHECO I) to illuminate their
farmhouse located in Cambanac, Baclayon, Bohol. At the pre-
membership seminar, respondent paid the amount of P48.12 as
membership fee and was advised to employ the services of an
authorized electrician from BOHECO I. 5 Accordingly, on
October 7, 2006, respondent employed the services of Sabino
Albelda Sr. (Albelda), a BOHECO I authorized electrician, who
informed him that the electrical connection could only be
installed in his farmhouse if he procures a certification from
Raso, the Barangay Power Association (BAPA) 6 Chairperson.
Respondent then instructed his farmhand to get a certification
from Raso but despite efforts to reach Raso, the latter was
unavailable. Thus, respondent consented to the tapping of his
electrical line to that of BAPA upon the assurance of Albelda
that he would not be charged with pilferage of electricity
because his electric usage shall be determined by the check
meter of BOHECO I at the base of the drop line and shall be
billed accordingly. 7
In the morning of October 8, 2006, respondent still
tried again to obtain Raso's certification. However, during their
meeting, Raso allegedly got mad, vowed to never issue the said
certification, and eventually then reported the matter to
BOHECO I for disconnection. 8
Feeling aggrieved, respondent and his wife went to
BOHECO I on October 17, 2006 to complain about Raso's
malicious actuations. They were attended to by the receiving
clerk, petitioner Lomarda, who, after reviewing their documents,
told them that he would conduct an ocular inspection of their
farmhouse. The next day, respondent, together with his
farmhand, went looking for Raso and confronted her about the
latter's threat of disconnection. To appease them, Raso
guaranteed not to order the disconnection of respondent's
electricity; nevertheless, she still refused to issue the
certification on the premise that respondent's farmhouse already
had electricity. In the course of their conversation, Raso uttered,
"Sabut sabuton lang ni nato," which translates to "let us just
settle this." 9
On November 5, 2006, respondent and his wife once
more went to Raso to follow up on the issuance of such
certification. They met at the purok center, where Raso was
conducting a meeting with several purok members. Thereat,
Raso asked why respondent's electricity has not yet been
installed. Respondent took this to be a sarcastic and rhetorical
remark because Raso was, in fact, the one withholding the
issuance of the BAPA certification which was precisely the
cause of the delay of the aforesaid installation. 10
In another confrontation, Raso explained that she was
about to issue the certification but was prevented by Lomarda,
who allegedly apprised her of a pending complaint for premature
tapping against respondent. To settle the misunderstanding, Raso
directed respondent to discuss the matter with Lomarda at his
house, and again uttered "Sabut sabuton lang ni nato." During
their conversation, Lomarda told respondent that he earlier
received a disconnection order issued a long time ago but
misplaced the document, and that an ocular inspection of
respondent's farmhouse will be conducted on November 6, 2006.
When respondent informed Raso of the date of inspection, the
latter once again remarked, "Sabut sabuton lang ni nato." 11
On the day of inspection, or on November 6, 2006,
respondent was assured that his electricity will not be
disconnected and that Raso will issue the certification, provided
he would pay the amount of P1,750.00 or sign a promissory
note. Respondent, however, refused to comply with the said
conditions, reasoning that there was no official order from the
concerned office. After respondent refused to pay, Lomarda
allegedly posed in front of a camera and while pointing at the
slot provided for the electric meter, shouted, "This is an illegal
tapping." Thereafter, Lomarda, in the presence of policemen, the
barangay treasurer, and other several passersby, ordered his
linemen to cut off respondent's electricity. 12
On November 9, 2006, respondent communicated with
BOHECO I, through phone, and inquired about his electric dues.
He was informed that there was no system loss or excess billed
to the cooperative, and that his electric usage amounted only to
P20.00.
Claiming that petitioners' acts tarnished his image,
besmirched his reputation, and defamed his honor and dignity,
respondent filed a complaint for damages before the RTC.
Respondent alleged that petitioners confederated with one
another to purposely delay the approval of his application for
electric connection by: (a) withholding the issuance of the
BAPA certification; (b) falsely accusing him of premature
tapping and pilferage of electricity; and (c) demanding the
payment of P1,750.00, when what was due him was only
P20.00. 13
For their part, petitioners contended that respondent
committed premature tapping of electricity, when the latter
consented to the tapping of his line to the service line of BAPA
without a "turn-on" order from BOHECO I. Moreover, they
claim that they cannot be faulted for the disconnection, since
they gave respondent the option to pay the penalty or sign a
promissory note, which the latter refused. 14
The RTC Ruling
 In a Decision 15 dated May 15, 2012, the RTC found In this case, petitioners were found liable by both the
petitioners liable for damages under Article 21 of the Civil RTC and CA for abuse of rights under Article 19, in relation to
Code, 16 and accordingly, ordered them to jointly and severally Article 21, of the Civil Code.
pay respondent the following amounts: (a) P451.65 as actual
damages; (b) P200,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P100,000.00 as "Article 19, known to contain what is commonly
exemplary damages; (d) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
and (e) P20,000.00 as litigation expenses. 17 standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of
one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties." In this
In so ruling, the RTC held that respondent could not regard, case law states that "[a] right, though by itself legal
have committed premature electrical connection or electric because [it is] recognized or granted by law as such, may
pilferage in violation of the existing rules and regulations of nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right
BOHECO I, considering that the installation of respondent's is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
electrical connection was only done upon the advice of Albelda, enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
who is an authorized electrician of BOHECO I. Moreover, the wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
RTC pointed out that respondent was in good faith and exerted held responsible." 24
all his efforts to comply with the requirements of BOHECO I,
while petitioners performed acts that are malicious, dishonest, "Article 19 is the general rule which governs the
and in gross bad faith. In particular, petitioners intentionally conduct of human relations. By itself, it is not the basis of an
withheld the issuance of the required BAPA certification and actionable tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care required
worse, demanded the payment of P1,750.00, when what was due so that an actionable tort may arise when it is alleged together
from respondent was only P20.00. Consequently, the RTC ruled with Article 20 or Article 21." 25 In Saudi Arabian Airlines v.
that petitioners are liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.18 CA, 26 the Court explained the relation of Article 19 and Article
21 of the Civil Code:
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA). On one hand, Article 19 of
the New Civil Code provides:
The CA Ruling
Art. 19. Every person must, in the
In a Decision 19 dated February 9, 2017, the CA exercise of his rights and in the performance
affirmed the RTC Decision. 20 of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
At the onset, the CA observed that respondent exerted
all efforts to comply with the prescribed requirements in good On the other hand, Article 21 of
faith. Moreover, it pointed out that respondent was not caught in the New Civil Code provides:
flagrante delicto of premature tapping because he was the one
who reported to Raso the fact of tapping, which was only done Art. 21. Any person who willfully
under the context that the approving authority was then causes loss or injury to another in a manner
unavailable to issue the certification despite respondent's that is contrary to morals, good customs or
efforts. 21 On the other hand, the CA ruled that petitioners acted public policy shall compensate the latter for
with malice and bad faith, as exhibited by their conduct before, damages.
during, and after the disconnection, which is contrary to morals, Thus, in Philippine National Bank
good customs, or public policy. vs. CA, this Court held that:
Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration but The aforecited
was denied in a Resolution 22 dated May 19, 2017; hence, this provisions on human
petition. relations were intended
The Issue Before the Court to expand the concept of
torts in this jurisdiction
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not by granting adequate
the CA correctly upheld the award of damages under Article 21 legal remedy for the
of the Civil Code. untold number of moral
wrongs which is
The Court's Ruling impossible for human
At the outset, it bears stressing that factual findings of foresight to specifically
the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, deserve provide in the statutes.
great weight and respect, unless there are facts of weight and Although
substance that were overlooked or misinterpreted and that would Article 19 merely
materially affect the disposition of the case. 23 Hence, finding declares a principle of
no cogent reason to the contrary, their factual findings in this law, Article 21 gives
case are sustained. flesh to its provisions.
Petitioners mainly argue that they should not be held Thus, we agree with
liable for damages, considering that respondent made a private respondent's
premature and unauthorized tapping of his electrical connection. assertion that violations
In this regard, they invoke the principle that he who comes to of Articles 19 and 21 are
court must come with clean hands. Moreover, petitioners allege actionable, with
that respondent is not entitled to moral damages in the absence judicially enforceable
of evidence to show that the acts imputed against them caused remedies in the
respondent moral suffering. municipal forum. 27

The arguments of petitioners are untenable. In Mata v. Agravante, 28 the Court pointed out that
Article 21 of the Civil Code "refers to acts contra bonos
mores and has the following elements: (1) an act which is legal;
(2) but which is contrary to morals, good customs, public order
or public policy; and (3) is done with intent to injure." 29
In this case, records show that respondent had
consistently pursued all reasonable efforts to comply with the
prescribed requirements for the installation of electrical
connection at his farmhouse. As part of his application for
electrical service with BOHECO I, he attended a pre-
membership seminar wherein he duly paid the amount of P48.12
as membership fee. At the seminar, he was advised to employ
the services of a BOHECO I authorized electrician, which he did
by employing Albelda. As the CA pointed out, there were
certain advantages to this course of action, considering
that: (a) the said electrician is familiar with the rules and
regulations of BOHECO I; (b) an inspection fee will not be
charged if the wiring is done by him; and (c) BOHECO I shall
provide a 30-meter service drop wire, and electric meter, free of
charge, upon payment of the bill deposit. 30
Eventually, Albelda informed respondent that he could
only install the electrical connection in respondent's farmhouse
if the latter becomes a BAPA member and if he can obtain a
certification as such from BAPA Chairperson Raso. Again,
respondent took no time in obtaining this certification by
instructing his farmhand to reach the aforesaid chairperson.
Unfortunately, Raso was unavailable despite the farmhand's
diligent efforts. Respondent, who was then put into a precarious
situation, sought the advice of Albelda, the cooperative's
authorized electrician, on how to deal with the matter. Albelda
then assured him that if he will proceed with the tapping of his
electrical line to that of BAPA, he would not be charged with
pilferage of electricity and would be billed accordingly. Relying
in good faith on the authorized electrician's advice on the matter,
respondent then consented to the tapping but nonetheless, still
instructed his farmhand to secure the certification from Raso to
ensure compliance with the requirements for proper installation.
Upon meeting with Raso, respondent, by his own volition,
candidly brought to her attention the tapping of BAPA's line and
duly explained to her the situation. This notwithstanding, Raso
was quick to impute malicious actuations against respondent for
proceeding with the tapping and reported the matter to
BOHECO I for disconnection.
Faced with this predicament, respondent and his wife
went to the cooperative to report Raso's actions. They were then
attended by the receiving clerk, Lomarda, who told them that he
would conduct an ocular inspection of the farmhouse. In the
course of trying to comply with the requirements, both Raso and
Lomarda gave respondent the roundabout by consistently
assuring him that they were settling the matter ("Sabot sabuton
lang ni nato"). The following excerpt of respondent's testimony
during trial is instructive on this score:
Q. Now, did Mrs. Raso tell you while that
controversy was between you during
that time that rather Mrs. Raso told
you in visayan vernacular "Sabut
saboton lang ni nato"? (sic)
A. Oh! Ye[s] (sic) she mentioned that
p[hrase] (sic) which disturb me so
much for 3 three (3) times (sic), 1.)
when I went together with my farm
help I went to her house on October
18 her parting words (sic) was don't
worry you will not be disconnected
"Sabut saboton lang ni nato" and the
other two (2) was on November 5
when I again look (sic) her which I
found her at the purok center to ask
for my certification again and her
parting words is (sic) "Sabut saboton
lang ni nato" and then she told me to
go (sic) Mr. Lomarda because Mr.
Lomarda has the final say whether
she will give me my certification or
not. And the 3rd, was again on the
same date November 5 already night
time when Mr. Lomarda told me that
he is going to inspect the house on
Monday so that I went back to Mrs.
Raso to inform her that Mr. Lomarda
is going to inspect the house on
Monday and again Mrs. Raso told
me that "Sabut saboton lang ni nato."
Q. Now, after hearing that statement "Sabut
saboton lang ni nato," what did you
ask Mrs. Raso what (sic) was that
meaning of "Sabut saboton lang ni
nato?"
A. I did not bother to ask her but in my mind it
means money that Mrs. Raso
together with Mr. Lomarda is out to
victimize me to please
me (sic) "[pangkwartahan]
ko" (sic) because of that premature
connection. 31
In this regard, the CA aptly observed that
"[c]onfronted with the crisis presented by [respondent], it is only
proper for [petitioners] to tell him what corrective or remedial
measures must be done to avoid the commission of any further
infraction. Instead of doing so, x x x Raso made herself
unavailable, which delayed the issuance of the certification. For
his part, x x x Lomarda failed to immediately disclose the notice
of disconnection to [respondent], under the pretext that he is yet
to conduct an ocular inspection on the subject farmhouse." 32
Worse than their inaction and lack of forthrightness,
petitioners even tried to extort from respondent the amount of
P1,792.00 in exchange for the issuance of a certification and for
the continued availment of their electrical services. However,
respondent refused to accede to this condition since there was no
official issuance coming from BOHECO I itself. In fact, upon
reporting the matter to the cooperative, respondent, to his
dismay, discovered that his electric usage amounted to only
P20.00. Indeed, as the CA ruled, "[b]y setting these conditions,
it is evident that [petitioners] were induced by an ill motive."
To further exacerbate the situation, petitioner Lomarda
even caused a scene in the public's view which made it appear
that respondent was an unscrupulous violator and thereupon,
proceeded to disconnect his electricity that caused him
embarrassment and humiliation. As the testimony of respondent
during trial shows:
Q. Now, Mr. witness to refresh your memory
according to you on November 6,
2006 Mr. Ismale (sic) Lomarda went
to your house at Cambanac,
Baclayon, Bohol what did Mr.
Lomardo do when he reached
at (sic) your house?
A. It was in the afternoon of November 6 Mr.
Lomarda bringing with him 2
Policemen (sic) they were also
bringing with them camera taking
pictures on the post where the
 electrical line was connected and
there were many people around.
Q. Then after that what did Mr. Lomarda do?
A. Mr. Lomarda in hearing the
window (sic) with all the people
shouted that "kita mo ha" "kita
mo ha" in our vernacular, "kita
mo ha" at the same time pointing
to the post where the electrical
connection is made "kita mo ha"
witness "ka ha" witness "ka ha" at
the same time taking pictures.
Q. So, after that what did Mr. Lomarda do?
A. Mr. Lomarda demanded to (sic) me an
amount of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,750.00) (sic) according to him as
payment of an allege penalty so that I
will not be disconnected.
Q. Did you give that amount?
A. No.
Q. Then considering that you did not give that
amount One Thousand
(P1,750.00) (sic) what did Mr.
Lomarda do?
A. Mr. Lomarda demanded or
insisting (sic) that he is going to
inspect the house and when I let him
in inside the house he
refuse (sic) and told me to sign first
his report before he will enter the
house.
Q. Did you sign the report?
A. I did not sign the report.
Q. Now considering that you did not sign the
report, what did Mr. Lomarda do?
A. Mr. Lomarda instructed his line men
because he was also bringing
linemen to finally cut (sic). Days
after I ask Mrs. Raso whether she
will allow the disconnection which
Mrs. Raso answered in the
affirmative and after that Mr.
Lomarda instructed his line man to
finally cut (sic).
Q. And that was on November 6, 2006?
A. November 6, in the afternoon.
Q. Will (sic) Mrs. Raso present during the time
when the line man of Mr. Lomarda
cut your electrical connection?
A. Yes. Mrs. Raso was also present because
she wanted me to sign a
promissory note that if I have no
cash to pay that
P1,750.00 allege (sic) penalty then I
should sign her promissory note so
that I will not also be
disconnected. 33 (Emphases
supplied)
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is clear that
petitioners should be held liable for damages under Article 19, in
relation to Article 21, of the Civil Code.While it appears that
petitioners were engaged in a legal act, i.e., exacting compliance
with the requirements for the installation of respondent's
electricity in his farmhouse, the circumstances of this case show
that the same was conducted contrary to morals and good
customs, and were in fact done with the intent to cause injury to
respondent. Petitioners did not only fail to apprise respondent of
the proper procedure to expedite compliance with the
requirements, they also misled him to believe that everything
can be settled, extorted money from him when only a meager
amount was due, and worse, publicly humiliated him in front of
many people which ended up in the disconnection of his
electricity altogether. To be sure, the clean hands doctrine —
which was invoked by petitioners herein — should not apply in
their favor, considering that while respondent may have
technically failed to procure the required BAPA certification and
proceeded with the tapping, the same was not due to his lack of
effort or intention in complying with the rules in good faith. As
exhibited above, it was, in fact, petitioners' own acts which made
compliance with the rules impossible. Hence, respondent was
actually free from fault, negating the application of the clean
hands doctrine, to wit: 34
Parties who do not come to court
with clean hands cannot be allowed to profit
from their own wrongdoing. The action (or
inaction) of the party seeking equity must be
"free from fault, and he must have done
nothing to lull his adversary into repose,
thereby obstructing and preventing vigilance
on the part of the latter." 35
That being said, the awards of damages in favor of
respondent are therefore warranted. In this case, both the RTC
and the CA awarded actual, moral, and exemplary damages,
including attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Actual damages are such compensation or damages for
an injury that will put the injured party in the position in which
he had been before he was injured. They pertain to such injuries
or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of
measurement. To justify an award of actual damages, there must
be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. 36 In this case,
the award of actual damages in the amount of P451.65 was
based on the evidence presented as found by both the RTC and
CA. Hence, finding no cogent reason to the contrary, and given
that the same was supported by receipts, 37 the said award is
sustained.
However, the Court finds otherwise with respect to the
awards of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees and litigation expenses (in the amounts of P200,000.00,
P100,000.00, P50,000.00, and P20,000.00, respectively) which
appear to be excessive considering the circumstances of this
case. Notably, the amounts of moral and exemplary damages
may be discretionary upon the court depending on the attendant
circumstances of the case. 38
Under Article 2219 39 of the Civil Code, moral
damages may be recovered, among others, in acts and actions
referred to in Article 21 of the same Code. "[A]n award of moral
damages must be anchored on a clear showing that the party
claiming the same actually experienced mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, sleepless nights, wounded feelings, or
similar injury." 40 In this case, the aforementioned malicious
acts, as proven through the evidence presented by respondent,
clearly caused moral suffering to the latter, for which petitioners
should be made liable. As intimated in one case, 41 although
mental anguish and emotional sufferings of a person are not
 quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must
nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore
respondent to his moral status quo ante. 42 In this regard, the
Court finds it reasonable to award the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages, considering the meager amount of actual
damages awarded despite the public humiliation and distress
suffered by respondent throughout his ordeal.
Meanwhile, case law states that "exemplary or
corrective damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated, or compensatory damages. The award of exemplary
damages is allowed by law as a warning to the public and as
a deterrent against the repetition of socially deleterious
actions." In this case, the Court finds the award of exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 reasonable in order to
serve as a reminder against unscrupulous persons — as herein
petitioners — who take undue advantage of their positions to the
detriment of the consuming public.
As regards attorney's fees and litigation costs, "Article
2208 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines states the policy
that should guide the courts when awarding attorney's fees to a
litigant. As a general rule, the parties may stipulate the recovery
of attorney's fees. In the absence of such stipulation, this article
restrictively enumerates the instances when these fees may be
recovered," to wit:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation,
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation,
other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded; x x
x
In view of the award of exemplary damages, the Court
finds it proper to award attorney's fees and litigation costs but in
the reduced amount of P25,000.00.
In fine, the Court holds that petitioners, as joint
tortfeasors under Article 21 of the Civil Code, are jointly and
severally liable to pay respondent the following
amounts: (a) P451.65 as actual damages; (b) P50,000.00 as
moral damages; (c) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and (d) attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of
P25,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated February 9, 2017 and the Resolution dated May
19, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 04480 are
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that
petitioners Ismael G. Lomarda and Crispina Raso are ordered to
jointly and severally pay respondent Elmer Fudalan the
following amounts: (a) P451.65 as actual
damages; (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and (d) attorney's fees and litigation
expenses in the amount of P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Hernando, Inting, Delos Santos and Gaerlan, * JJ.,
concur.
||| (Lomarda v. Fudalan, G.R. No. 246012, [June 17, 2020])
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 217806. July 28, 2020.]
ADELAIDA C. NAVARRO-
BANARIA, petitioner, vs. ERNESTO A.
BANARIA, PANFILO A. BANARIA,
GRACIA SEVERA BANARIA-ESPIRITU,
REINA CLARA BANARIA-MAGTOTO,
MARCELINO S. BANARIA, PAULINA
BANARIA-GELIDO, MARIA LOURDES
DIVINE BANARIA-DURAN, GRACIA
ISABELITA BANARIA-ESPIRITU,
GEOFFREY BANARIA-ESPIRITU, ANNE
MARIE ESPIRITU-PAPPANIA, JUSTIN
BANARIA-ESPIRITU, respondents.
DECISION
J.C. REYES, JR., J p:
This resolves the petition for review
on certiorari 1 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to review the Decision 2 dated October 15,
2014 of the Honorable Court of Appeals (Special First Division)
in CA-G.R. No. 97264, denying the appeal of herein petitioner
by affirming with modification the Judgment 3 dated May 23,
2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 216
(Quezon City) in Civil Case No. Q-0452212, and its
Resolution 4 dated April 14, 2015, denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
The instant petition arose from the Complaint filed by
respondents for Damages with the RTC of Quezon City against
petitioner.
As borne by the records of the case, respondents are
brother (Marcelino S. Banaria), sister (Paulina Banaria-Gelido),
sons (Ernesto A. Banaria and Panfilo A. Banaria), daughters
(Gracia Severa Banaria-Espiritu and Reina Clara Banaria-
Magtoto), granddaughters (Gracia Isabelita Banaria-Espiritu,
Anne Marie Espiritu-Pappania, Maria Lourdes Divine Banaria-
Duran), and grandsons (Geoffrey Banaria-Espiritu and Justin
Banaria-Espiritu) of the late Pascasio S. Banaria, Sr. (Pascasio),
while petitioner Adelaida C. Navarro-Banaria (Adelaida) is the
legal wife of Pascasio and stepmother of the Banaria siblings. 5
Pascasio, the family patriarch, at the time of the filing
of the complaint, was already frail and suffering from physical
and mental infirmity incapacitating him to fully functioning on
his own without any assistance. 6
The action for damages of respondents stemmed from
the alleged bad faith, malice, and deliberate failure of Adelaida
to keep her word and honor her promise to bring Pascasio to his
90th birthday celebration held on February 22, 2004. Such
special event was prepared by the respondents and the non-
appearance of Pascasio during the event allegedly caused loss
and injury to the respondents. 7
Respondents alleged that the planning of the event
started as early as February 2003 or a year before the planned
90th birthday celebration to be held on February 22, 2004.
Between November 2003 and January 2004, respondents were in
continuous contact with Adelaida to remind her of the upcoming
event. Adelaida, for her part, confirmed Pascasio's attendance
during the event although it coincides with the death anniversary
of Adelaida's mother. The plan was to bring Pascasio to the
venue in the early morning of February 22, 2004 before
proceeding to her hometown in Tarlac. Adelaida promised
respondents that she will try her best to attend the birthday
celebration in the evening after going to Tarlac. 8
On February 13, 2004, Reina and Gracia Severa, who
are both residing in the United States, arrived in the country to
attend the birthday celebration of their father. They were able to
visit their father and Adelaida in their home on February 14 and
15, 2004. Adelaida promised them during their visit that
Pascasio would be present in his scheduled 90th birthday
celebration. 9
However, much to the dismay of the Banaria siblings
as well as their guests, Pascasio was nowhere to be found in his
90th birthday celebration. Respondents continuously called
Adelaida but they were not able to contact her. Almost 200
guests were at the venue waiting for Pascasio to come. The
siblings deemed it proper to continue the celebration even
without the birthday celebrant himself. Worried that there might
be something untoward that happened to their father,
respondents went to the nearest police station to report Pascasio
as a missing person. However, they were advised by the police
officers that before a person can be considered missing, there
should be a 24-hour waiting period. Thus, respondents just
entered their concern in the police blotter. The next day, the
missing person report was officially made after Pascasio and
Adelaida have not been seen or heard for more than 24 hours. 10
Respondents called and went to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), where Adelaida works but they
failed to see her there. Afterwards, respondent Paulina was able
to talk to one of Adelaida's maids named Kit. Kit told Paulina
that she went to Tarlac with Pascasio and Adelaida in the
morning of February 21, 2004 but went their separate ways upon
reaching said province. However, when asked about the
whereabouts of Pascasio and Adelaida, she said that she did not
know where they were. 11
In the evening of February 23, 2004, Marcelino,
Pascasio's brother, told the other respondents that Pascasio and
Adelaida were at their residence then at 7-B Sigma Drive, Alpha
Village, Quezon City. Respondents went to the said place to ask
Adelaida her reason why Pascasio was not able to attend the
birthday celebration. Adelaida reasoned that Pascasio did not
want to go to the party. When asked why Adelaida broke her
commitment to bring Pascasio to the party, Adelaida uttered the
words, "I am the wife." 12
Thus, the Complaint for Damages filed by respondents
against Adelaida.
In response, Adelaida rebutted the allegations of the
respondents by saying that she was not privy to the respondents'
planned birthday celebration for Pascasio. She also said that she
deemed it wise to spare Pascasio of the embarrassment and
humiliation of defecating and urinating without regard to the
people around him brought about by his advanced age. 13
Eventually, the RTC rendered its May 23, 2011
Decision, which ordered petitioner to pay the respondents' travel
expenses, actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees. The fallo 14 of the decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and
against the defendant Adelaida C. Navarro-
Banaria ordering said defendant to pay unto
the plaintiffs the following:
1. the total amount of $3,619.00
(US Dollars) which may be paid in
Philippine Currency computed at the
exchange rate at the time of payment,
representing the total sum for their
(plaintiffs) travel expenses;
2. the amount of P61,200.00,
Philippine currency, for the food and
refreshments spent during the birthday of
Pascasio S. Banaria, Sr., which the latter was
not able to attend; the amount of P3,000.00
for the birthday cake; and the amount
P3,275.00 for the balloon arrangements;
3. the amount of P60,000.00,
Philippine Currency, for each and every
plaintiff, as and by way of moral damages;
4. the amount of P50,000.00,
Philippine Currency, for the herein
plaintiffs, as and by way of exemplary
damages;
5. the amount of P60,000.00,
Philippine Currency, as and by way of
attorney's fees; and
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals, which, through the assailed October 15, 2014 Decision,
affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC.
The fallo 15 of the decision of the appellate court reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
The Judgment dated 23 May 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court-Branch 216 (Quezon
City) is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: a) the amount of
$3,619.00 (US Dollars) awarded as actual
damages in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees
is DELETED for lack of factual and legal
basis; b) the amount of moral damages
awarded for ALL the plaintiffs-appellees is
REDUCED to a fixed amount of
Php300,000.00; c) the amount of exemplary
damages awarded in favor of the plaintiffs-
appellees is REDUCED to Php30,000.00;
and d) the amount of attorney's fees awarded
to plaintiffs-appellees is likewise
REDUCED to Php50,000.00.
The rest of the challenged
Judgment stands.
SO ORDERED.
Despite petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the CA
affirmed its October 15, 2014 Decision via the April 14, 2015
Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
The petitioner anchors her prayer for the reversal of
the October 15, 2014 Decision and the April 14, 2015
Resolution based on the following issues:
A. Whether the Hon. Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that petitioner violated Articles 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code regarding Human Relations;
and
B. Whether the Hon. Court of Appeals erred in
granting damages to the respondents.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful perusal of the arguments presented and
the evidence submitted, the Court finds no merit in the petition.
Petitioner contends that she did not commit any
violation under Article 19 of the Civil Code by alleging that the
testimonies of the respondents were pure surmises and
conjectures. Aside from that, petitioner avers that respondents
failed to prove bad faith, malice and ill motive on her part.
Because of this, petitioner posits that there can be no award of
actual, moral and exemplary damages under the principle
of damnum absque injuria or damage without injury since her
legal right was not exercised in bad faith and with no intention
to injure another.
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties
must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. The principle embodied in this provision
is more commonly known as the "abuse of right principle." The
legal consequence should anyone violate this fundamental
provision is found in Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.The
correlation between the two provisions are showed in the case
of GF EQUITY, Inc. v. Valenzona, to wit:
[Article 19], known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of
one's rights but also in the performance of
one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore,
recognizes a primordial limitation on all
rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must
be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source
of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must
be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
While Article 19 of the New Civil Code may have
been intended as a mere declaration of principle, the "cardinal
law on human conduct" expressed in said article has given rise
to certain rules, e.g., that where a person exercises his rights but
does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a manner
that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens
himself to liability. The elements of an abuse of rights under
Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another. 17
Consequently, when Article 19 is violated, an action
for damages is proper under Articles 20 and 21 of the New Civil
Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of
law. 18
For starters, there is no question that as legal wife and
guardian of Pascasio, who is physically and mentally infirm,
Adelaida has the principal and overriding decision when it
comes to the affairs of her husband including the celebration of
the latter's 90th birthday.
However, it must be noted Adelaida's right, as with
any rights, cannot be exercised without limitation. The exercise
of this right must conform to the exacting standards of conduct
enunciated in Article 19. Adelaida was clearly remiss in this
aspect.
Glaring is the fact that long before the scheduled date
of Pascasio's 90th birthday celebration, Adelaida was already
informed about the event. As early as February 2003 or a year
before the scheduled event, Adelaida was already reminded of
the event by the respondents to which she confirmed Pascasio's
attendance. Even though Adelaida alleges that she was not privy
to any birthday celebration for Pascasio, the fact remains that
she was continuously informed and reminded about the
scheduled event. She even contributed P5,000.00 for the costs.
Following Adelaida's testimony that Pascasio had
already decided not to attend his birthday celebration a day
before such event, she should have contacted the respondents
immediately for the respondents to be able to take appropriate
action. Adelaida knew fully well that the respondents already
spent a considerable amount of money and earnest efforts were
already made to ensure the success of the event. The least that
Adelaida could have done was to inform the respondents
immediately of any unforeseen circumstance that would hinder
its success and to avert any further damage or injury to the
respondents. Moreover, considering that numerous guests were
invited and have confirmed their attendance, she placed the
respondents in a very embarrassing situation.
Instead of making good on her prior commitment,
Adelaida allegedly followed Pascasio's wish of going to Tarlac
and arrived thereat in the afternoon of February 21, 2004. At that
time, Adelaida still had the opportunity to contact the
respondents and inform them that they will not be able to come,
but she did not. Her excuse, that Pascasio grabbed her cellular
phone and caused damage to it, is feeble and unrealistic. We find
incredulous that Pascasio, who was allegedly infirm, would be
able to grab the cellphone from Adelaida and throw it away,
when he cannot even move on his own without any assistance.
And even if true, there are certainly other means of
communication aside from her cellphone if she really wanted to
call the respondents.
Adelaida also neglected to contact the respondents
immediately after their return to Manila on February 23, 2004. If
she was sincere in bringing Pascasio to his birthday celebration,
then she would have immediately called the respondents upon
returning to Manila to inform them of their whereabouts and to
state the reason for Pascasio non-attendance.
We find it dubious that Pascasio would refuse to
attend his birthday celebration. Respondents have sufficiently
established that it was an annual tradition for the family to
celebrate the birthday of their father Pascasio. Besides, the
allegation that Pascasio refused to attend his birthday celebration
because of an alleged misunderstanding with his two sons was
not duly proven. Common sense dictates that he should have
conveyed about the matter to Reina and Gracia Severa when
they visited him on February 14 and 15, 2004, but he did not.
All in all, the foregoing shows that Adelaida
intentionally failed to bring Pascasio to the birthday celebration
prepared by the respondents thus violating Article 19 of
the Civil Code on the principle of abuse of right. Her failure to
observe good faith in the exercise of her right as the wife of
Pascasio caused loss and injury on the part of the respondents,
for which they must be compensated by way of damages
pursuant to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Actual damages are compensation for an injury that
will put the injured party in the position where he/she was before
the injury. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are
actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. Except as
provided by law or stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss as is duly proven.
Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must
the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually
proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. 19
We find proper the modification made by the CA to
delete the award of $3,619.00 (US Dollars) as actual damages
for lack of factual and legal bases. We also agree that actual
damages in the amount of P61,200.00 for the food and
refreshments spent during the birthday of Pascasio, the amount
of P3,000.00 for the birthday cake and the amount of P3,275.00
for the balloon arrangements should be paid as these expenses
were incurred by respondents for Pascasio's grand birthday
celebration.
As for moral damages, the CA is correct in granting a
lump sum of P300,000.00. Moral damages are not punitive in
nature but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way
the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a person. 20 In
the instant case, the respondents clearly suffered serious anxiety,
humiliation and embarrassment in front of all guests who
expected that Pascasio would be present in the event.
The award of exemplary damages of P30,000.00 is
likewise affirmed. Exemplary damages, which are awarded by
way of example or correction for the public good, may be
recovered if a person acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner towards another party, as in
this case. 21 The aim of awarding exemplary damages is to deter
serious wrongdoings. 22
By the same token, the CA correctly awarded
attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00 in favor of the
respondents considering that they were constrained to file a case
because of petitioner's acts characterized by bad faith, malice
and wanton attitude which were intentional to inflict damage
upon the former.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated October 15, 2014 of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, C.J., Gesmundo * and Lopez, JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., please see concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
CAGUIOA, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia in its findings of abuse of
right on the part of petitioner, in clear breach of the most
rudimentary principles of human relations as embodied in
Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.1 I take this
opportunity to recall and to emphasize the underlying
propositions governing the principle of abuse of right, and echo
the breadth of application that these encompassing provisions
historically contemplated, both of which support a decisive
finding of abuse of right in the present case.
The invocation of the abuse of right principle under
Article 19 in relation to either Article 20 or 21 is admittedly not
subject to a hard and fast evaluation of mathematical precision,
owing perhaps to its design as an all-inclusive provision that
seeks to redress other wrongs or injurious acts not covered by
legislative foresight. Article 19 is based on the maxim suum jus
summa injuria (the abuse of a right is the greatest possible
wrong), 2 and is described as the guide to relational behavior
that rise from the dictates of good conscience and govern any
human society, to wit:
Therein are formulated some basic
principles that are to be observed for the
rightful relationship between human being
and for the stability of the social order. The
present Civil Code merely states the effects
of the law, but fails to draw out the spirit of
the law. This chapter is designed to indicate
certain norms that spring from the fountain
of good conscience. These guides for human
conduct should run as golden threads
through society, to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal, which is the
sway and dominance of Justice. 3
This provision on the basic tenets of decent human
behavior, however, may not be invoked independently of
Articles 20 and 21, which provide for the legal consequences of
such an abuse. Article 20 is said to underpin the entire legal
system, and ensures that no person who suffers damage, because
of the act of another, may find himself without redress. 4 It is
further said to extend our understanding of what tortious acts
may consist of, with its language indicative of the incorporation
into our traditional contemplation of tort or culpa aquiliana —
the Anglo-American concept of tort which includes
malice. 5 Article 21, for its part, stretched the "sphere of
wrongs" provided for by positive law, and filled in the gaps to
ensure remedy for people who have sustained material injuries
from moral wrongs, in the absence of any other express
provision. 6
The scope of this principle is expansive, and is said to
have "greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil
wrongs." 7 It provides that although an act is not illegal,
damages may be properly awarded should the injury be borne of
an abuse of a right, as when the right is exercised without
prudence or in bad faith. This abuse may, however, be properly
entreated only upon establishment of the following elements: (1)
there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith;
and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 8
The idea that rights are capable of abuse is a far shift
from the prior theory embodied in the Roman Law maxim "qui
iure suo utitur neminem laedit" or, he who exercises his own
right injures no one. This idea of abuse of right instead
acknowledges the primordial boundary on one's rights, that is,
the rights of others. In his Commentary on the Civil Code, noted
Civilist Eduardo P. Caguioa elaborated on the inherent logic of
limitations of rights, the overstepping of which constitutes the
abuse:
x x x In Roman Law the maxim
was "qui iure suo utitur neminem laedit,"
[i.e.], he who exercises his own right injures
no one. Taken absolutely and literally the
maxim is false and leads to absurd
consequences. The exercise of rights must
be done within certain limits. These
limitations can be classified into two
categories: 1. The intrinsic
limitations which emanate from the right
itself, [i.e.] from its nature and purpose, 2.
The extrinsic limitations which emanate
from the rights of others. The Intrinsic
limitations are the following: (a) those
derived from the nature of the right, [e.g.],
the depositary cannot use the things
deposited without authorization otherwise
the character of the contract is destroyed; (b)
Limitations arising from good faith; and (c)
Limitations imposed by the economic and
social ends of the right which require the
holder of the right to exercise the right in
accordance with the end for which it was
granted or created. Hence the principle of
ABUSE OF RIGHT. The extrinsic
limitations are: (a) Those in favor of third
persons who act in good faith; and (b) Those
arising from the concurrence or conflict with
the rights of others.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x "The abusive act" says
Josserand, "is simply that which, performed
in accordance with a subjective right whose
limits has been respected, is nevertheless
contrary to right considered in general and
as the sum total of all obligatory laws. It is
perfectly possible to have in one's own favor
such a determinate right but nevertheless
have against one the whole of law and this is
the situation which produces that famous
maxim "summum jus summa injuria." The
responsibility arising from the abuse of right
covers both the subjective character of right
and its social end and function. 9
Under the aforementioned operative definition of
abuse of right, therefore, petitioner's acts of failing to actually
bring Pascasio (the father of respondents) to the birthday
celebration which respondents mounted for him, and her
concomitant failure to inform the latter of their foreseen absence
from the party, or to just let them know that they had already
returned to Manila after the schedule of the same, despite her
justifications — that, based on her own narrative, are easily
surmountable challenges — betrays intention and bad faith on
petitioner's part. This is a clear breach of the intrinsic limitation
on her right as the spouse of Pascasio arising from good faith, as
well as breach of the extrinsic limitation arising from its conflict
with the rights of others. So that although she indeed possessed
the determinate right of bringing or not bringing her spouse to
the birthday celebration, her exercise of said right placed her
squarely against the basic rule on observance of good faith.
The Court of Appeals succinctly described this abuse
of right through the apparent pretense in petitioner's defense, to
wit:
Second, defendant-appellant
testified that before going to Tarlac, she and
Pascasio attended a birthday celebration at
 the Century Club, Quezon City on 21 described, 15 people would be free to cause damage to others,
February 2004. Her testimony further and violate the most elementary principles of morality, so long
reveals that as early as that day, Pascasio as no positive law is broken. Such a situation could not be
was (allegedly) already decided on not further from the contemplations of the law, and the abuse of
attending the party prepared by his children. right principle under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil
If said testimony is to be believed, it puzzles Code ensure that it remains so.
the Court why defendant-appellant did not
attempt to contact, at that earliest time, ||| (Navarro-Banaria v. Banaria, G.R. No. 217806, [July 28, 2020])
plaintiffs-appellees to advise them of their
father's sudden change of heart. Defendant-
appellant knew that the celebration prepared
by the Banaria children is not simple as
guests were invited and a considerable sum
of money is spent for the event. Indeed, had
defendant-appellant informed plaintiffs-
appellees of her predicament, the damage or
injury that plaintiffs-appellees are now
complaining of could have been prevented.
Further, petitioner argues that this was no more than a
case of damnum absque injuria, or a damage without injury as
the loss or harm suffered was not a result of a violation of a legal
duty. 10 Here, petitioner is in error. Damnum absque injuria or
damage without injury may not be appreciated in petitioner's
actions as said principle contemplates a situation wherein in the
exercise of a right, "the purpose was good, the exercise normal
and still damage is caused." 11 As applied to petitioner's actions,
her failure to inform respondents of their intended absence from
the party or their whereabouts, in the least, to the extent that
respondents found it necessary to file a Missing Person's report
with the local police, 12 exhibits the utter lack of consideration
for respondents, or otherwise a deficit in good faith relations
with the latter.
With respect to the indemnification for the damage
caused, I agree that respondents herein are entitled to moral and
exemplary damages in addition to actual damages, but wish to
supplement the basis for finding the propriety of said awards.
For moral damages, such may be properly awarded in this case,
pursuant to Article 2219 (10) in relation to Article 21 of
the Civil Code, where the former enumerates the instances when
moral damages may be appreciated. Exemplary damages was
also properly found in favor of respondents, pursuant to Article
2231 in relation to Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.To my
mind, the lower courts and the ponencia aptly found gross
negligence on the part of the petitioner when, despite clear
opportunities to inform respondents of their foreseen absence
from the event in question, petitioner nevertheless repeatedly
failed to undertake the same. Given that such a simple act of
phoning any of respondents at any point during the time prior to
and after the party could have spared respondents from the loss
and humiliation that they subsequently sustained, the fact that
petitioner kept failing to do so escapes reason. I therefore agree
that such repeated failure is properly characterized as gross
negligence under the contemplation of Article 2231. As the
Court has held in the case of Abrogar v. Cosmos Bottling Co., et
al., 13 gross negligence is the thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. In this
case, petitioner's utter disregard of each opportunity she could
have taken to inform respondents of their father's absence is
correctly characterized as gross negligence which
correspondingly entitled herein respondents to exemplary
damages. 14
In fine, Articles 19, 20, and 21 have been historically
planted to ensure that no wanton discounting of the rights of
others may escape with impunity for the sole reason that no
black letter law specifically prohibits the same. For if the case
were otherwise, we would be constantly confronted with the
irony wherein, as the Report of the Code Commission itself
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127358. March 31, 2005.]
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL
LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 127449. March 31, 2005.]
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL
LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J p:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity
of marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July
12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his
wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent
filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition
by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In
response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation
that she was psychologically incapacitated. 1
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage
entered into between plaintiff Noel
A. Buenaventura and defendant
Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on
July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant
moral damages in the amount of 2.5
million pesos and exemplary
damages of 1 million pesos with 6%
interest from the date of this decision
plus attorney's fees of P100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant
expenses of litigation of P50,000.00,
plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the
conjugal partnership property[,]
particularly the plaintiff's
separation/retirement benefits
received from the Far East Bank
[and] Trust Company[,] by ceding,
giving and paying to her fifty percent
(50%) of the net amount of
P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89
together with 12% interest per
annum from the date of this decision
and one-half (1/2) of his outstanding
shares of stock with Manila
Memorial Park and Provident Group
of Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in
favor of his son Javy Singh
Buenaventura in the amount of
P15,000.00 monthly, subject to
modification as the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor
Javy Singh Buenaventura to his
mother, the herein defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert
back to the use of her maiden family
name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be
furnished the appropriate civil registry and
registries of properties. EHaCTA
SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of
Appeals. While the case was pending in the appellate court,
respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly
support pendente lite of their son Javy Singh Buenaventura.
Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied or that
such incident be set for oral argument. 3
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution increasing the support pendente lite to
P20,000. 4 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning
the said Resolution. 5
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a
Decision dismissing petitioner's appeal for lack of merit and
affirming in toto the trial court's decision. 6 Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration which was denied. From the abovementioned
Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly support
for the son. 7 Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question
these two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review
on Certiorari 8 and the Petition for Certiorari 9 were ordered
consolidated by this Court. 10
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims
that the Court of Appeals decided the case not in accord with law and
jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL
DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P2.5
MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST
FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION,
WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL
BASIS;
 2. WHEN IT AWARDED
P100,000.00 ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF LITIGATION,
PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-
APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OR
P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT
BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR
EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12%
INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE
OF ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE
GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO
DELIVER TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK
WITH THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK
AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF
COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES
OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL
BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE
RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE,
THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTIES; AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED
EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER
THE PARTIES' MINOR CHILD TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT
ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS
ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT THAT
TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM,
BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS, HE
WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER
HIS PERSON. 11
In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the
following contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE
PARTIES' SON FOR HEARING. 12
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE
COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE
JAVY'S MONTHLY SUPPORT
P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER
EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES. 13
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVY'S
SUPPORT, THE COURT OF APPEALS
SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF
EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY
RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF
PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS THERETO,
INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT
JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000
INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID
AMOUNT IS "TOO MINIMAL." 14
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF
APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN
PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO
PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW
THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO
INCREASE JAVY'S SUPPORT. 15
With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of
Appeals articulated: AcSCaI
On Assignment of Error C, the trial
court, after findings of fact ascertained from
the testimonies not only of the parties
particularly the defendant-appellee but
likewise, those of the two psychologists,
awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21,
2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that
plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-
appellee into marrying him by professing true
love instead of revealing to her that he was
under heavy parental pressure to marry and
that because of pride he married defendant-
appellee; that he was not ready to enter into
marriage as in fact his career was and always
would be his first priority; that he was unable
TO
to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a
husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father;
that he had no inclination to make the marriage
work such that in times of trouble, he chose the
easiest way out, that of leaving defendant-
appellee and their son; that he had no desire to
keep defendant-appellee and their son as
proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to
reconcile after their separation; that the
aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to
suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation, sleepless nights not only in those
years the parties were together but also after
and throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial
court's decision on the ground that unlike those
arising from a breach in ordinary contracts,
damages arising as a consequence of marriage
may not be awarded. While it is correct that
there is, as yet, no decided case by the
Supreme Court where damages by reason of
the performance or non-performance of marital
obligations were awarded, it does not follow
that no such award for damages may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended
OF answer, specifically prayed for moral and
exemplary damages in the total amount of 7
million pesos. The lower court, in the exercise
of its discretion, found full justification of
awarding at least half of what was originally
prayed for. We find no reason to disturb the
ruling of the trial court. 16
The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on
Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the
 proximate result of the defendant's wrongful
act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article
2219 17 of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which moral
damages may be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the
instances. It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual
must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the
act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral
damages, therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not
but have assumed that the acts on which the moral damages were
based were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral
damages would have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of
the parties null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code, due
to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura.
Article 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus: aEHTSc
. . . no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68
of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. . . . 18
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts
of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological
incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said
courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for
granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a
product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of
the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner
as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral
damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral
damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into
the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately
and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability
and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to
have been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means
that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one
must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes
the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the
private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not
due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award
of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows
that the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil
Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 19
With respect to the grant of attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation the trial court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorney's fees, Art. 2208
of the Civil Code authorizes an award of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other
than judicial costs, when as in this case the
plaintiff's act or omission has compelled the
defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of
litigation to protect her interest (par. 2), and
where the Court deems it just and equitable
that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered. (par. 11) 20
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the
award of moral and exemplary damages is
fully justified, the award of attorney's fees and
costs of litigation by the trial court is likewise
fully justified. 21
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower
court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the
complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as
unduly compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are
grounded on petitioner's psychological incapacity, which as explained
above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with
the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for
attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award
of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East
Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the Manila Memorial
Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved
by the Court is what to do with the assets of the
conjugal partnership in the event of declaration
of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable
Supreme Court has held that the declaration of
nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a
judgment for the liquidation of property
(Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572-
573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this
case:
When a marriage is
declared void ab initio, the law states
that the final judgment therein shall
provide for the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, the custody and support
of the common children and the
delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had
been adjudicated in the previous
proceedings. ASTcEa
 The parties here were legally married
on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property
acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or
both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116,
New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art.
117 of the Family Code enumerates what are
conjugal partnership properties. Among others
they are the following:
1) Those acquired by
onerous title during the marriage at
the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;
2) Those obtained from the
labor, industry, work or profession of
either or both of the spouses;
3) The fruits, natural,
industrial, or civil, due or received
during the marriage from the
common property, as well as the net
fruits from the exclusive property of
each spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal
provisions, and without prejudice to requiring
The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:
an inventory of what are the parties' conjugal
properties and what are the exclusive
properties of each spouse, it was disclosed
during the proceedings in this case that the
plaintiff who worked first as Branch Manager
and later as Vice-President of Far East Bank &
Trust Co. received separation/retirement
package from the said bank in the amount of
P3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions
amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net
amount of P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to
him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11). Not having shown debts or obligations
other than those deducted from the said
retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of
the Family Code "The net remainder of the
conjugal partnership properties shall constitute
the profits, which shall be divided equally
between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlement or unless there has been a
voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as
provided in this Code." In this particular case,
however, there had been no marriage
settlement between the parties, nor had there
been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture
of the defendant wife's share in the conjugal
partnership properties. The previous cession
and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half
(1/2) share in their residential house and lot
covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the Registry
of Deeds of Parañaque, Metro Manila, in favor
of the defendant as stipulated in their
Compromise Agreement dated July 12, 1993,
and approved by the Court in its Partial
Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually
intended to be in full settlement of any and all
demands for past support. In reality, the
defendant wife had allowed some concession
in favor of the plaintiff husband, for were the
law strictly to be followed, in the process of
liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated
shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the
parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with
whom their only child has chosen to remain
(Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was
one-half (1/2) portion of the house was ceded
to defendant so that she will not claim anymore
for past unpaid support, while the other half
was transferred to their only child as his
presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been
given to the defendant wife by way of her
share in the conjugal properties, and it is but
just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half
(1/2) share of the separation/retirement benefits
received by the plaintiff the same being part of
their conjugal partnership properties having
been obtained or derived from the labor,
industry, work or profession of said defendant
husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of
the Family Code. For the same reason, she is
entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding
shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with
the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident
Group of Companies. 22
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-
appellant assails the order of the trial court for
him to give one-half of his
separation/retirement benefits from Far East
Bank & Trust Company and half of his
outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park
and Provident Group of Companies to the
defendant-appellee as the latter's share in the
conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court
rendered a Partial Decision approving the
Compromise Agreement entered into by the
parties. In the same Compromise Agreement,
the parties had agreed that henceforth, their
conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter,
no steps were taken for the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is
entitled to at least half of the
separation/retirement benefits which plaintiff-
appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust
Company upon his retirement as Vice-
President of said company for the reason that
the benefits accrued from plaintiff-appellant's
service for the bank for a number of years,
most of which while he was married to
defendant-appellee, the trial court adjudicated
the same. The same is true with the outstanding
shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila
Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies. As these were acquired by the
plaintiff-appellant at the time he was married
to defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to
one-half thereof as her share in the conjugal
 partnership. We find no reason to disturb the
ruling of the trial court. 23
 
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a
bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles
41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may
be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case
a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable
and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-
ownership. ASICDH
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon
City, 24 this Court expounded on the consequences of a void
marriage on the property relations of the spouses and specified the
applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the
law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148,
such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of
the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in
previous cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man
and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them
in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
In the absence of proof to
the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry,
and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a
party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can
encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common,
without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their
cohabitation.
When only one of the
parties to a void marriage is in good
faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In
the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership
applies when a man and a woman, suffering no
legal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife
under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. The term "capacitated" in the
provision (in the first paragraph of the law)
refers to the legal capacity of a party to
contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of
the age of eighteen years or upwards not under
any of the impediments mentioned in Articles
37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property
acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property
shall still be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family
household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of
gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in
substance and to the above extent, has clarified
Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the
law now expressly provides that —
(a) Neither party can dispose or
encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her
share in co-ownership property, without the
consent of the other, during the period of
cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage,
any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her
share in the co-ownership in favor of their
common children; in default thereof or waiver
by any or all of the common children, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants, or still in default
thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture
shall take place upon the termination of the
cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the
marriage. aCHDAE
xxx xxx xxx
In deciding to take further
cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the
parties' common property, the trial court acted
neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court
which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage
a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with
 authority to resolve incidental and As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot since he is about to
reversible error in ruling that petitioner and turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 2005 26 and has, therefore,
private respondent own the "family home" and attained the age of majority.
all their common property in equal shares, as
well as in concluding that, in the liquidation With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition
and partition of the property owned in common for Certiorari, these would also now be moot, owing to the fact that
by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained
the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in the age of majority.
relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to
October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which
govern the liquidation of either the absolute
are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are
community or the conjugal partnership of
hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary
gains, the property regimes recognized for
damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted.
valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case
The order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of
until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to
petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of
the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
petitioner's shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the
between common-law spouses. The first
Provident Group of Companies is sustained but on the basis of the
paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code,
liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not of
applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision
Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms,
and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
to voidable marriages and, exceptionally,
to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358)
i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent contesting the Court of Appeals' Resolutions of September 2, 1996
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void and November 13, 1996 which increased the support pendente lite in
marriage before the latter is judicially declared favor of the parties' son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT
void. The latter is a special rule that somehow and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine
that void marriages are inexistent from the very No costs.
beginning and no judicial decree is necessary
to establish their nullity. In now requiring SO ORDERED.
for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-
nullity by final judgment of the previously Santiago and Carpio, JJ., concur.
contracted void marriage, the present law aims
to do away with any continuing uncertainty on ||| (Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 127358 & 127449,
the status of the second marriage. It is not then [March 31, 2005], 494 PHIL 264-282)
illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in
relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family
Code, on the effects of the termination of a
subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is
not to be assumed that the law has also meant
to have coincident property relations, on the
one hand, between spouses in valid and
voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on
the other, between common-law spouses or
spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in
the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-
ownership subject to the provision of Article
147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It
must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may
merely state the obvious, that the provisions of
the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the
provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of
the Family Code, remain in force and effect
regardless of the property regime of the
spouses. 25
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a
quo were found, both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to
have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one
of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said
distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the
court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-
ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
 THIRD DIVISION respective properties. Respondents received the downpayment
for the properties on October 28, 1995. ISTDAH

[G.R. No. 174715. October 11, 2012.] A few days after the execution of the aforestated deeds
and the delivery of the corresponding documents to petitioner,
respondents came to know that the sale of their properties was
FILINVEST LAND, INC., EFREN C. null and void, because it was done within the period that they
GUTIERRE and LINA DE GUZMAN- were not allowed to do so and that the sale did not have the
FERRER, petitioners, vs. ABDUL BACKY, approval of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
ABEHERA, BAIYA, EDRIS, HADJI Natural Resources (DENR) prompting them to file a case for the
GULAM, JAMELLA, KIRAM, LUCAYA, declaration of nullity of the deeds of conditional and absolute
MONER, OMAR, RAMIR, ROBAYCA, sale of the questioned properties and the grant of right of way
SATAR, TAYBA ALL SURNAMED with the RTC, Las Piñas, Branch 253.
NGILAY, EDMER ANDONG, UNOS
BANTANGAN and NADJER On the other hand, petitioner claims that sometime in
ESQUIVEL, n respondents. 1995, the representative of Hadji Ngilay approached petitioner
to propose the sale of a portion of his properties. Thereafter,
representatives of petitioner flew to General Santos City from
Manila to conduct an ocular inspection of the subject properties.
DECISION Petitioner was willing to purchase the properties but seeing that
some of the properties were registered as land grants through
homestead patents, representatives of petitioner informed Ngilay
that they would return to General Santos City in a few months to
finalize the sale as ten (10) certificates of title were issued on
PERALTA, J p:
November 24, 1991.
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for According to petitioner, Ngilay and his children
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, dated November 9, 2006, prevailed upon the representatives of petitioner to make an
of petitioner Filinvest Land, Inc., which seeks to set aside the advance payment. To accommodate the Ngilays, petitioner
Decision 1 dated March 30, 2006 and Resolution 2 dated acceded to making an advance with the understanding that
September 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) partially petitioner could demand anytime the return of the advance
reversing the Decision 3 dated October 1, 2003 of the Regional payment should Ngilay not be able to comply with the
Trial Court, Las Piñas, Branch 253 (RTC). conditions of the sale. The Ngilays likewise undertook to secure
the necessary approvals of the DENR before the consummation
The factual antecedents, as found in the records of the sale.
follow.
The RTC ruled in favor of Filinvest Land, Inc. and
Respondents were grantees of agricultural public lands upheld the sale of all the properties in litigation. It found that the
located in Tambler, General Santos City through Homestead and sale of those properties whose original certificates of title were
Fee patents sometime in 1986 and 1991 which are covered by issued by virtue of the 1986 Patents was valid, considering that
and specifically described in the following Original Certificates the prohibitory period ended in 1991, or way before the
of Title issued by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City: transaction took place. As to those patents awarded in 1991, the
OCT No. Area (sq. m.) Grantee Date Granted same court opined that since those properties were the subject of
        a deed of conditional sale, compliance with those conditions is
P-5204 38,328 Abdul Backy Ngilay November 11, 1986 necessary for there to be a perfected contract between the
P-5205 49,996 Hadji Gulam Ngilay November 11, 1986 parties. The RTC also upheld the grant of right of way as it
P-5206 49,875 Edris A. Ngilay November 11, 1986 adjudged that the right of way agreement showed that the right
P-5207 44,797 Robayca A. Ngilay November 11, 1986 of way was granted to provide access from the highway to the
P-5209 20,000 Omar Ngilay November 11, 1986 properties to be purchased. The dispositive portion of the
P-5211 29,990 Tayba Ngilay November 11, 1986 Decision dated October 1, 2003 reads:
P-5212 48,055 Kiram Ngilay November 11, 1986 WHEREFORE, premises considered,
P-5578 20,408 Nadjer Esquevel November 24, 1991 the Court upholds the sale of all the properties
P-5579 35,093 Unos Bantangan November 24, 1991 in litigation. It likewise upholds the grant of
P-5580 39,507 Moner Ngilay November 24, 1991 right of way in favor of the respondent.
P-5582 44,809 Baiya Ngilay November 24, 1991 Consequently, the petition is DISMISSED.
P-5583 10,050 Jamela Ngilay November 24, 1991
P-5584 49,993 Ramir Ngilay November 24, 1991 No pronouncement as to damages for
P-5586 40,703 Satar Ngilay November 24, 1991 failure to prove the same.
P-5590 20,000 Abehara Ngilay November 24, 1991
P-5592 41,645 Lucaya Ngilay November 24, 1991 Costs against the petitioners.
P-5595 13,168 Edmer Andong November 24, 1991
SO ORDERED. 4 IDcHCS
Negotiations were made by petitioner, represented by
Lina de Guzman-Ferrer with the patriarch of the Ngilays, Hadji Respondents elevated the case to the CA in which the
Gulam Ngilay sometime in 1995. Eventually, a Deed of latter modified the judgment of the RTC. While the CA upheld
Conditional Sale of the above-enumerated properties in favor of the validity of the sale of the properties the patents of which
petitioner Filinvest Land, Inc. was executed. Upon its execution, were awarded in 1986, including the corresponding grant of
respondents were asked to deliver to petitioner the original right of way for the same lots, it nullified the disposition of those
owner's duplicate copy of the certificates of title of their properties granted through patents in 1991 and the right of way
on the same properties. As to the "1991 Patents," the CA ruled (1) The Honorable Court of Appeals
that the contract of sale between the parties was a perfected did not err in holding that the Deed of
contract, hence, the parties entered into a prohibited conveyance Conditional Sale and Deed of Absolute Sale
of a homestead within the prohibitive period of five years from for the properties covered by the 1991 Patents,
the issuance of the patent. The CA Decision dated March 30, as well as the Right of Way Agreement thereto
2006 disposed the case as follows: is null and void for the simplest reason that the
said transactions were volatile of the Public
WHEREFORE, the assailed Land Act.
Decision dated October 1, 2003 is MODIFIED:
(2) The questions raised by the
a) The Deed of Conditional Sale and Petitioner, Filinvest Land, Inc. (FLI) are
Deed of Absolute Sale for the properties unsubstantial to require consideration. 8
covered by the "1991 Patents", as well as the
Right of Way Agreement thereto, are declared In its Reply 9 dated July 30, 2007, petitioner insists
null and void. The Register of Deeds of that the prohibition against alienation and disposition of land
General Santos City is consequently directed to covered by Homestead Patents is a prohibition against the actual
cancel the certificates of title covered by the loss of the homestead within the five-year prohibitory period,
"1991 Patents" issued in favor of appellee not against all contracts including those that do not result in such
Filinvest and to issue new titles in favor of an actual loss of ownership or possession. It also points out that
herein appellants. respondents themselves admit that the transfer certificates of
title covering the ten parcels of land are all dated 1998, which
b) The sale of the properties covered confirms its declaration that the lands covered by 1991
by the "1986 Patents", including the Homestead Patents were not conveyed to Filinvest until after the
corresponding grant of way for said lots, are five-year prohibitory period.
declared valid.
The petition is unmeritorious.
SO ORDERED. 5
The five-year prohibitory period following the
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, issuance of the homestead patent is provided under Section 118
but it was denied by the CA. of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 456, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. 10 It
Hence, the present petition.
bears stressing that the law was enacted to give the homesteader
The grounds relied upon are: or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family
the land that the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward
1. for his labour in cleaning and cultivating it. 11 Its basic
A CONDITIONAL SALE INVOLVING objective, as the Court had occasion to stress, is to promote
THE 1991 PATENTS DID NOT VIOLATE public policy that is to provide home and decent living for
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST destitute, aimed at providing a class of independent small
ALIENATION OF HOMESTEADS landholders which is the bulwark of peace and order. 12 Hence,
UNDER THE PUBLIC LAND ACT SINCE any act which would have the effect of removing the property
NO ACTUAL TRANSFER OR subject of the patent from the hands of a grantee will be struck
DISPOSITION WAS PERFECTED UNTIL down for being violative of the law. 13
ALL THE CONDITIONS OF THE DEED In the present case, the negotiations for the purchase
ARE FULFILLED. of the properties covered by the patents issued in 1991 were
made in 1995 and, eventually, an undated Deed of Conditional
2.
Sale was executed. On October 28, 1995, respondents received
REGISTRATION IS THE OPERATIVE the downpayment of P14,000,000.00 for the properties covered
ACT THAT CONVEYS OR DISPOSES by the patents issued in 1991. Applying the five-year
RIGHTS IN REAL PROPERTY. BEING prohibition, the properties covered by the patent issued on
UNREGISTERED, THE DEED OF November 24, 1991 could only be alienated after November 24,
CONDITIONAL SALE DID NOT 1996. Therefore, the sale, having been consummated on October
CONVEY OR DISPOSE OF THE 1991 28, 1995, or within the five-year prohibition, is as ruled by the
HOMESTEADS OR ANY RIGHTS CA, void. HCEcaT
THEREIN IN VIOLATION OF Petitioner argues that the correct formulation of the
THE PUBLIC LAND ACT. AIDSTE issue is not whether there was a perfected contract between the
3. parties during the period of prohibition, but whether by such
deed of conditional sale there was "alienation or encumbrance"
ASSUMING THE NULLITY OF THE within the contemplation of the law. This is wrong. The
SALE OF THE 1991 PATENTS, THE prohibition does not distinguish between consummated and
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS executory sale. The conditional sale entered into by the parties is
SHOULD HAVE ORDERED still a conveyance of the homestead patent. As correctly ruled by
RESPONDENTS AS A MATTER OF LAW the CA, citing Ortega v. Tan: 14
TO RETURN TO PETITIONERS WHAT
And, even assuming that the disputed
THEY HAVE RECEIVED. 6
sale was not yet perfected or consummated,
In their Comment 7 dated March 5, 2007, respondents still, the transaction cannot be validated. The
stated the following counter-arguments: prohibition of the law on the sale or
 encumbrance of the homestead within five
years after the grant is MANDATORY. The
purpose of the law is to promote a definite
policy, i.e., "to preserve and keep in the family
of the homesteader that portion of the public
land which the State has gratuitously given to
him." Thus, the law does not distinguish
between executory and consummated sales.
Where the sale of a homestead was
perfected within the prohibitory period of
five years, the fact that the formal deed of
sale was executed after the expiration of the
staid period DID NOT and COULD NOT
legalize a contract that was void from its
inception. To hold valid such arrangement
would be to throw the door open to all possible
fraudulent subterfuges and schemes which
persons interested in the land given to a
homesteader may devise in circumventing and
defeating the legal provisions prohibiting their
alienation within five years from the issuance
of the patent. 15
To repeat, the conveyance of a homestead before the
expiration of the five-year prohibitory period following the
issuance of the homestead patent is null and void and cannot be
enforced, for it is not within the competence of any citizen to
barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve. 16
Nevertheless, petitioner does not err in seeking the
return of the down payment as a consequence of the sale having
been declared void. The rule is settled that the declaration of
nullity of a contract which is void ab initio operates to restore
things to the state and condition in which they were found before
the execution thereof. 17 Petitioner is correct in its argument that
allowing respondents to keep the amount received from
petitioner is tantamount to judicial acquiescence to unjust
enrichment. Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles
of justice, equity and good conscience." 18 There is unjust
enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code when (1) a person
is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the
expense of or with damages to another. 19 Thus, the sale which
created the obligation of petitioner to pay the agreed amount
having been declared void, respondents have the duty to return
the down payment as they no longer have the right to keep it.
The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates
payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who
receives the payment has no right to receive it. 20 As found by
the CA and undisputed by the parties, the amount of the down
payment made is P14,000,000.00 which shall also be the amount
to be returned by respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review
on Certiorari dated November 9, 2006 of petitioner Filinvest
Land, Inc. is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision
dated March 30, 2006 and Resolution dated September 18, 2006
of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that respondents return the amount of
P14,000,000.00 given by petitioner as down payment for the
sale which is ruled to be void ab initio.
SO ORDERED. AcSEHT
Velasco, Jr., Abad, Perez * and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
||| (Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Ngilay, G.R. No. 174715, [October 11,
2012], 697 PHIL 403-413)
 FIRST DIVISION having been fully aware of the illegality and ineffectuality of
the deed of assignment from the time of its execution, could not go to
court with unclean hands to invoke any right based on the
[G.R. No. 160600. January 15, 2014.] invalid deed of assignment or on the product of such deed of
assignment. 7
DOMINGO Ruling of the RTC
GONZALO, petitioner,vs.JOHN
TARNATE, JR., respondent. On January 26, 2001, the RTC, opining that the deed of
assignment was a valid and binding contract, and that Gonzalo must
comply with his obligations under the deed of assignment,rendered
judgment in favor of Tarnate as follows: caHIAS
DECISION WHEREFORE, premises considered
and as prayed for by the plaintiff, John
Tarnate, Jr. in his Complaint for Sum of
Money, Breach of Contract with Damages is
BERSAMIN, J p: hereby RENDERED in his favor and against
the above-named defendant Domingo Gonzalo,
The doctrine of in pari delicto,which stipulates that the the Court now hereby orders as follows:
guilty parties to an illegal contract are not entitled to any relief,
cannot prevent a recovery if doing so violates the public policy 1.  Defendant Domingo Gonzalo to
against unjust enrichment. pay the Plaintiff, John
Tarnate, Jr.,the amount of
Antecedents TWO HUNDRED
After the Department of Public Works and Highways THIRTY THREE
(DPWH) had awarded on July 22, 1997 the contract for the THOUSAND FIVE
improvement of the Sadsadan-Maba-ay Section of the Mountain HUNDRED TWENTY
Province-Benguet Road in the total amount of P7,014,963.33 to his SIX and 13/100 PESOS
company, Gonzalo Construction, 1 petitioner Domingo Gonzalo (P233,526.13) representing
(Gonzalo) subcontracted to respondent John Tarnate, Jr. (Tarnate) on the rental of equipment;
October 15, 1997, the supply of materials and labor for the project 2.  Defendant to pay Plaintiff the
under the latter's business known as JNT Aggregates. Their sum of THIRTY
agreement stipulated, among others, that Tarnate would pay to THOUSAND (P30,000.00)
Gonzalo eight percent and four percent of the contract price, PESOS by way of
respectively, upon Tarnate's first and second billing in the reasonable Attorney's Fees
project. 2 AHDaET for having
In furtherance of their agreement, Gonzalo executed on forced/compelled the
April 6, 1999 a deed of assignment whereby he, as the contractor, plaintiff to litigate and
was assigning to Tarnate an amount equivalent to 10% of the total engage the services of a
collection from the DPWH for the project. This 10% retention fee lawyer in order to protect
(equivalent to P233,526.13) was the rent for Tarnate's equipment that his interest and to enforce
had been utilized in the project. In the deed of assignment, Gonzalo his right. The claim of the
further authorized Tarnate to use the official receipt of Gonzalo plaintiff for attorney's fees
Construction in the processing of the documents relative to the in the amount of FIFTY
collection of the 10% retention fee and in encashing the check to be THOUSAND PESOS
issued by the DPWH for that purpose. 3 The deed of assignment was (P50,000.00) plus THREE
submitted to the DPWH on April 15, 1999. During the processing of THOUSAND PESOS
the documents for the retention fee, however, Tarnate learned that (P3,000.00) clearly appears
Gonzalo had unilaterally rescinded the deed of assignment by means to be unconscionable and
of an affidavit of cancellation of deed of assignment dated April 19, therefore reduced to Thirty
1999 filed in the DPWH on April 22, 1999; 4 and that the Thousand Pesos
disbursement voucher for the 10% retention fee had then been issued (P30,000.00) as aforestated
in the name of Gonzalo, and the retention fee released to him. 5 making the same to be
reasonable;
Tarnate demanded the payment of the retention fee from
Gonzalo, but to no avail. Thus, he brought this suit against Gonzalo 3.  Defendant to pay Plaintiff the
on September 13, 1999 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in sum of FIFTEEN
Mountain Province to recover the retention fee of P233,526.13, moral THOUSAND PESOS
and exemplary damages for breach of contract, and attorney's fees. 6 (P15,000.00) by way of
litigation expenses;
In his answer, Gonzalo admitted the deed of
assignment and the authority given therein to Tarnate, but averred 4.  Defendant to pay Plaintiff the
that the project had not been fully implemented because of its sum of TWENTY
cancellation by the DPWH, and that he had then revoked the deed of THOUSAND PESOS
assignment.He insisted that the assignment could not stand (P20,000.00) for moral
independently due to its being a mere product of the subcontract that damages and for the breach
had been based on his contract with the DPWH; and that Tarnate, of contract; and
 5.  To pay the cost of this suit.
Award of exemplary damages in the instant
case is not warranted for there is no showing
that the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner analogous to the case
of Xentrex Automotive, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals,291 SCRA 66. 8
Gonzalo appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Decision of the CA
On February 18, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC. 9
Although holding that the subcontract was an illegal
agreement due to its object being specifically prohibited by Section 6
of Presidential Decree No. 1594; that Gonzalo and Tarnate were
guilty of entering into the illegal contract in violation of Section 6
of Presidential Decree No. 1594; and that the deed of
assignment,being a product of and dependent on the subcontract, was
also illegal and unenforceable, the CA did not apply the doctrine
of in pari delicto,explaining that the doctrine applied only if the fault
of one party was more or less equivalent to the fault of the other
party. It found Gonzalo to be more guilty than Tarnate, whose guilt
had been limited to the execution of the two illegal contracts while
Gonzalo had gone to the extent of violating the deed of assignment.It
declared that the crediting of the 10% retention fee equivalent to
P233,256.13 to his account had unjustly enriched Gonzalo; and ruled,
accordingly, that Gonzalo should reimburse Tarnate in that amount
because the latter's equipment had been utilized in the project.
Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, 10 Gonzalo
has now come to the Court to seek the review and reversal of the
decision of the CA.
Issues
Gonzalo contends that the CA erred in affirming the RTC
because: (1) both parties were in pari delicto;(2) the deed of
assignment was void; and (3) there was no compliance with the
arbitration clause in the subcontract.
Gonzalo submits in support of his contentions that the
subcontract and the deed of assignment,being specifically prohibited
by law, had no force and effect; that upon finding both him and
Tarnate guilty of violating the law for executing the subcontract, the
RTC and the CA should have applied the rule of in pari delicto, to the
effect that the law should not aid either party to enforce the illegal
contract but should leave them where it found them; and that it was
erroneous to accord to the parties relief from their predicament. 11
Ruling
We deny the petition for review, but we delete the grant of
moral damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
There is no question that every contractor is prohibited
from subcontracting with or assigning to another person any contract
or project that he has with the DPWH unless the DPWH Secretary
has approved the subcontracting or assignment. This is pursuant to
Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1594, which provides:
Section 6.  Assignment and
Subcontract. — The contractor shall not
assign, transfer, pledge, subcontract or make
any other disposition of the contract or any part
or interest therein except with the approval of
the Minister of Public Works, Transportation
and Communications, the Minister of Public
Highways, or the Minister of Energy, as the
case may be. Approval of the subcontract shall
not relieve the main contractor from any
liability or obligation under his contract with
the Government nor shall it create any
contractual relation between the subcontractor
and the Government.
Gonzalo, who was the sole contractor of the project in
question, subcontracted the implementation of the project to Tarnate
in violation of the statutory prohibition. Their subcontract was illegal,
therefore, because it did not bear the approval of the DPWH
Secretary. Necessarily, the deed of assignment was also illegal,
because it sprung from the subcontract. As aptly observed by the
CA: aICcHA
....The intention of the parties in
executing the Deed of Assignment was merely
to cover up the illegality of the sub-contract
agreement. They knew for a fact that the
DPWH will not allow plaintiff-appellee to
claim in his own name under the Sub-Contract
Agreement.
Obviously, without the Sub-Contract
Agreement there will be no Deed of
Assignment to speak of. The illegality of the
Sub-Contract Agreement necessarily affects
the Deed of Assignment because the rule is
that an illegal agreement cannot give birth to a
valid contract. To rule otherwise is to sanction
the act of entering into transaction the object of
which is expressly prohibited by law and
thereafter execute an apparently valid contract
to subterfuge the illegality. The legal
proscription in such an instance will be easily
rendered nugatory and meaningless to the
prejudice of the general public. 12
Under Article 1409 (1) of the Civil Code, a contract whose
cause, object or purpose is contrary to law is a void or inexistent
contract. As such, a void contract cannot produce a valid one. 13 To
the same effect is Article 1422 of the Civil Code,which declares that
"a contract, which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is
also void and inexistent."
We do not concur with the CA's finding that the guilt of
Tarnate for violation of Section 6 of Presidential Decree No.
1594 was lesser than that of Gonzalo, for, as the CA itself observed,
Tarnate had voluntarily entered into the agreements with
Gonzalo. 14 Tarnate also admitted that he did not participate in the
bidding for the project because he knew that he was not authorized to
contract with the DPWH. 15 Given that Tarnate was a businessman
who had represented himself in the subcontract as "being financially
and organizationally sound and established, with the necessary
personnel and equipment for the performance of the project," 16 he
justifiably presumed to be aware of the illegality of his agreements
with Gonzalo. For these reasons, Tarnate was not less guilty than
Gonzalo.
According to Article 1412 (1) of the Civil Code,the guilty
parties to an illegal contract cannot recover from one another and are
not entitled to an affirmative relief because they are in pari delicto or
in equal fault. The doctrine of in pari delicto is a universal doctrine
that holds that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal
contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to
recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money
agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation; and where the parties
are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to
one against the other. 17
Nonetheless, the application of the doctrine of in pari
delicto is not always rigid. An accepted exception arises when its
application contravenes well-established public policy. 18 In this demand by Tarnate, is imposed on the amount of P233,526.13. Not to
jurisdiction, public policy has been defined as "that principle of the afford this relief will make a travesty of the justice to which Tarnate
law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which was entitled for having suffered too long from Gonzalo's unjust
has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public enrichment.
good." 19
WHEREFORE,we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on
Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR February 18, 2003, but DELETE the awards of moral damages,
Builders, Inc., 20 "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss attorney's fees and litigation expenses; IMPOSE legal interest of
of another, or when a person retains money or property of another 6% per annum on the principal of P233,526.13 reckoned from
against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good September 13, 1999; and DIRECT the petitioner to pay the costs of
conscience." The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized suit.
public policy of the State, for Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly
provides that "[e]very person who through an act of performance by SO ORDERED.
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
Sereno, C.J.,Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes,
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground,
JJ., concur.
shall return the same to him." It is well to note that Article 22 "is part
of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions ||| (Gonzalo v. Tarnate, Jr., G.R. No. 160600, [January 15, 2014],
of which were formulated as basic principles to be observed for the 724 PHIL 198-209)
rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the
social order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience; guides for human conduct that should
run as golden threads through society to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of
justice." 21
There is no question that Tarnate provided the equipment,
labor and materials for the project in compliance with his obligations
under the subcontract and the deed of assignment;and that it was
Gonzalo as the contractor who received the payment for his contract
with the DPWH as well as the 10% retention fee that should have
been paid to Tarnate pursuant to the deed of
assignment. 22 Considering that Gonzalo refused despite demands to
deliver to Tarnate the stipulated 10% retention fee that would have
compensated the latter for the use of his equipment in the project,
Gonzalo would be unjustly enriched at the expense of Tarnate if the
latter was to be barred from recovering because of the rigid
application of the doctrine of in pari delicto.The prevention of unjust
enrichment called for the exception to apply in Tarnate's favor.
Consequently, the RTC and the CA properly adjudged Gonzalo liable
to pay Tarnate the equivalent amount of the 10% retention fee
(i.e.,P233,526.13).
Gonzalo sought to justify his refusal to turn over the
P233,526.13 to Tarnate by insisting that he (Gonzalo) had a debt of
P200,000.00 to Congressman Victor Dominguez; that his payment of
the 10% retention fee to Tarnate was conditioned on Tarnate paying
that debt to Congressman Dominguez; and that he refused to give the
10% retention fee to Tarnate because Tarnate did not pay to
Congressman Dominguez. 23 His justification was unpersuasive,
however, because, firstly, Gonzalo presented no proof of the debt to
Congressman Dominguez; secondly, he did not competently establish
the agreement on the condition that supposedly bound Tarnate to pay
to Congressman Dominguez; 24 and, thirdly, burdening Tarnate with
Gonzalo's personal debt to Congressman Dominguez to be paid first
by Tarnate would constitute another case of unjust enrichment.
The Court regards the grant of moral damages, attorney's
fees and litigation expenses to Tarnate to be inappropriate. We have
ruled that no damages may be recovered under a void contract,
which, being nonexistent, produces no juridical tie between the
parties involved. 25 It is notable, too, that the RTC and the CA did
not spell out the sufficient factual and legal justifications for such
damages to be granted. THacES
Lastly, the letter and spirit of Article 22 of the Civil
Code command Gonzalo to make a full reparation or compensation
to Tarnate. The illegality of their contract should not be allowed to
deprive Tarnate from being fully compensated through the imposition
of legal interest. Towards that end, interest of 6% per
annum reckoned from September 13, 1999, the time of the judicial
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 213233. August 5, 2015.]
BLISS DEVELOPMENT CORP./HOME
GUARANTY
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. MONTAN
O DIAZ, DOMINGO TAPAY, and EDGAR
H. ARREZA, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J p:
The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), promulgated on
January 21, 2014, and its subsequent Resolution dated June 27,
2014, both in CA-G.R. CV No. 99179. The assailed Decision
reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Makati City, Branch 59, dated November 21, 2011, in
Civil Case No. 96-1372. The assailed Resolution, meanwhile,
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Bliss Development Corporation (BDC)
(subsequently reorganized as Home Guaranty Corporation) is
the registered owner of Lot No. 27, Block 30, New Capitol
Estates I, Brgy. Matandang Balara, Diliman, Quezon City, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 331582. On
October 19, 1984, it entered into and executed a Deed of Sale
over the said property in favor of Spouses Emiliano and Leonila
Melgazo (Sps. Melgazo), both of whom are now deceased. 2
On May 7, 1991, a certain Rodolfo Nacua (Nacua)
sent a letter to BDC, saying that Sps. Melgazo transferred to him
their rights over the property. He further expressed willingness
to pay the outstanding obligations of Sps. Melgazo to BDC.
Before the property was fully paid, however, Nacua sold his
rights to Olivia Garcia (Garcia), through a Deed of Transfer of
Rights. Later, Garcia transferred her rights to Elizabeth Reyes
(Reyes). Reyes then transferred her rights to Domingo Tapay
(Tapay), who then later sold his rights to herein respondent
Montano Diaz (Diaz) for Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P600,000.00). Diaz then paid BDC the amortizations due on the
property, amounting to P406,915.15, and BDC issued a permit
to occupy the property in favor of Diaz. Diaz then introduced
improvements on the property, amounting to P700,000.00.
On April 14, 1992, BDC executed a Contract to Sell in
favor of Diaz. 3 On April 15, 1994, however, BDC informed
Diaz that respondent Edgar Arreza (Arreza) was claiming that
the heirs of Sps. Melgazo sold to him the rights over the
property. 4 BDC then placed Diaz's account in "inactive status."
To resolve the conflicting claims of Arreza and Diaz, BDC filed
a complaint for Interpleader against them, before the RTC,
Makati City, Branch 146. On March 27, 1996, the Makati City
RTC Branch 146 ruled that the signatures of Sps. Melgazo
transferring their rights to Nacua were mere forgeries. Thus, it
ruled that Arreza lead a better right over the property. This
decision became final and executory. 5
On August 27, 1996, Diaz filed the present complaint
for sum of money against BDC before the RTC, Makati City,
Branch 59. 6 This was later amended to include Arreza and
Tapay as defendants. Diaz argued that BDC and Tapay's
representations led him to believe that he had a good title over
the property, but due to the court's ruling in the interpleader
case, he was constrained to transfer the property to Arreza. Thus,
he prayed for the following:
(1) For BDC and Arreza to pay him P1,106,915.58,
plus interest, representing the amount he
paid for the assumption of Tapay's rights;
(2) For Tapay to pay him P600,000.00, plus interests,
representing the amount he paid
Tapay; cSEDTC
(3) For BDC and Tapay to pay him P500,000.00 as
moral damages;
(4) For BDC to pay him P500,000 as exemplary
damages; and
(5) For BDC, Tapay, and Arreza to pay him P100,000
as attorney's fees and costs of suit. 7
Both BDC and Tapay argued that their respective acts
were lawful and done in good faith. Arreza filed a Motion to
Dismiss, citing res judicata, arguing that the claim of Diaz is a
compulsory counterclaim that should have been pleaded in the
Interpleader case. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss,
which the CA, on certiorari, affirmed. When the issue reached
this Court in G.R. No. 133113, 8 this Court ruled that the claim
as against Arreza is barred by res judicata. The Court upheld the
argument that the claim is in the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim. Thus, the case against Arreza was dismissed.
The Decision of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision on
November 21, 2011, finding that Diaz failed to prove that he is
an assignee in good faith, and thus dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit in this wise:
Plaintiff must show that he
inquired not only into the title of the
assignor but also into the assignor's capacity
to convey. The failure of plaintiff to
diligently inquire as such, indicated that he
is not an assignee in good faith. Plaintiff
Diaz downplays the need to extend his
examination to intervening transferor farther
than Domingo Tapay from whom he
acquired the subject property. Such attitude,
however, is not in accord with what a
reasonably prudent person would do under
the circumstances.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, plaintiff's Complaint is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Defendant
Domingo Tapay's [counterclaim] is likewise
dismissed. No costs. 9
Aggrieved, Diaz appealed to the CA.
The Decision of the CA
In its presently assailed Decision promulgated on
January 21, 2014, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC and,
instead, ruled that Diaz is entitled to be paid reimbursement and
damages. The CA anchored its ruling on its finding that Diaz is
both a buyer in good faith and a builder in good faith, thus:
A careful examination of the
records convinces Us that Diaz is both a
buyer and builder in good faith. We note that
while Bliss executed a Deed of Sale with
Mortgage in favor of the spouses Emiliano
and Leonila Melgazo, title over the property
was in Bliss' name. The title remained in
Bliss' name when Tapay offered to transfer
his rights over the property to Diaz.
Considering that the property involved is
registered land, Diaz need not go beyond the
title to be considered a buyer in good faith.
Indeed, after Diaz accepted Tapay's offer, he
dealt directly with Bliss which received the
monthly amortizations due on the property.
For almost three years, from 1991 to 1994,
Bliss accepted Diaz's payment without
informing Diaz of Arreza's conflicting claim
over the property. Bliss even issued Diaz a
permit to occupy the property in 1992; thus,
allowing Diaz to introduce improvements on
the property. In other words, at the time
when Diaz purchased the property from
Tapay and when he introduced the
improvements, he had no notice that some
other person has a right over the property.
He also had a well-founded belief that the
property he was building on was his.
Accordingly, Diaz is a buyer and builder in
good faith. 10
In ruling that Diaz is a buyer in good faith, the CA
noted that Diaz need not go beyond the title to be considered a
buyer in good faith, because what is involved is a registered
land.
With regard to the liability of BDC, the CA ruled that
the provision in the Contract to Sell excusing it from
reimbursing the monthly amortizations to Diaz cannot exempt it
from liability, because it acted in bad faith. The CA said:
Next, Bliss' argument that the
Additional Provision in the Contract to Sell
excuses it from reimbursing the monthly
amortizations paid by Diaz cannot be given
credence. Any stipulation exempting the
vendor from the obligation to answer for
eviction shall be void, if he acted in bad
faith. The vendor's bad faith consists in his
knowledge beforehand at the time of the
sale, of the presence of the fact giving rise to
eviction, and its possible consequence. It is
undisputed that Bliss knew about Arreza's
claim in 1991. It even received amortization
payments from Arreza. Yet, Bliss is aware
that should Arreza pursue his claim in court,
Diaz may be evicted from the property. Yet,
Bliss only informed Diaz about Arreza's
claim in 1994 when Arreza followed up his
claim. Indubitably, Bliss acted in bad faith in
dealing with Diaz and should not be
absolved from liability by the Additional
Provision in the Contract to
Sell. 11 SDAaTC
Thus, the CA dispositively held:
FOR THESE REASONS, the
November 21, 2011 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
59, is SET ASIDE. The Court hereby
DIRECTS: (1) Defendant-appellee Bliss
Development Corporation/Home Guaranty
Corporation to PAY plaintiff-appellant
Montano Diaz P1,106,915.58 for the
amortizations paid and amount spent on
improvements on the property, P100,000.00
as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P25,000.00 as attorney's fee;
and (2) defendant-appellee Domingo Tapay
to PAY plaintiff-appellant Montano M. Diaz
P600,000.00, the amount he paid for the
transfer of rights.
Petitioner BDC moved for reconsideration, insisting
that Diaz cannot be declared a buyer in good faith, in light of the
March 27, 1996 Decision of the Makati City RTC, Branch 146
in the Interpleader case, which had long been final and
executory. Tapay also moved for reconsideration, arguing that
he was not aware of the defect in the title sold to Diaz, and,
hence, he should not be made liable for the P600,000.00 that
Diaz paid to him. In the CA's assailed Resolution dated June 27,
2014, 12 the CA denied both motions for reconsideration.
Hence, the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari filed by BDC, raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN NOT
DISMISSING THE APPEAL, IN VIEW OF
THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT IN
THE DECISION OF THE COURT IN G.R.
NO. 133113
II.
WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN
DECLARING BDC IN BAD FAITH
III.
WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THERE WAS
UNJUST ENRICHMENT ON THE PART
OF BDC
IV.
WHETHER DIAZ CAN STILL CLAIM
REIMBURSEMENT EVEN IF UNDER
THE CONTRACT, HIS POSSESSION IS
IN THE NATURE OF A LESSOR
V.
WHETHER BDC IS LIABLE TO
REIMBURSE DIAZ OF THE AMOUNT
OF P1,106,915.58
In fine, petitioner argues that it is not liable to
respondent Diaz, both for the amortizations that Diaz paid to it,
and the value of the improvements that Diaz introduced to the
property. AaCTcI
Meanwhile, Tapay failed to elevate before this Court
the CA's ruling against him.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partially granted. The CA committed
reversible error in ruling that Diaz was a buyer in good faith and
for value. Nevertheless, BDC is liable to Diaz because it acted in
bad faith, as discussed below.
The claim is not barred by the
doctrine of immutability of judgment
First, We dispose of the issue of the applicability of
the doctrine of immutability of judgment, in view of the ruling
of this Court in G.R. No. 133113. We find that the present claim
is not barred by the court's ruling in G.R. No. 133113 — to the
effect that Diaz can no longer claim reimbursement from Arreza
because of res judicata — for his failure to allege the claim in
the interpleader case between them.
In G.R. No. 133113, We ruled that the claim against
Arreza is barred by res judicata, because of a prior Interpleader
case between Arreza and Diaz. We ruled that the claim for
reimbursement should have been alleged and proved in the prior
case, and failure to do so bars any future action on such claims.
We reiterated the rule on res judicata, thus:
In cases involving res adjudicata,
the parties and the causes of action are
identical or substantially the same in the
prior as well as the subsequent action. The
judgment in the first action is conclusive as
to every matter offered and received therein
and as to any other matter admissible therein
and which might have been offered for that
purpose, hence said judgment is an absolute
bar to a subsequent action for the same
cause. The bar extends to questions
necessarily involved in an issue, and
necessarily adjudicated, or necessarily
implied in the final judgment, although no
specific finding may have been made in
reference thereto, and although such matters
were directly referred to in the pleadings and
were not actually or formally
presented. Said prior judgment is
conclusive in a subsequent suit between
the same parties on the same subject
matter, and on the same cause of action,
not only as to matters which were decided in
the first action, but also as to every other
matter which the parties could have properly
set up in the prior suit. 13 (emphasis
added) acEHCD
In the case at bar, We find that the essential elements
of res judicata are not present. First, the interpleader case was
between Arreza and Diaz. While it was BDC that initiated the
interpleader case, the opposing parties in that prior case is, in
fact, Arreza and Diaz. Second, the issues resolved in the
interpleader case revolved around the conflicting claims of
Arreza and Diaz, and not whatever claim either of them may
have against BDC. Thus, there is no identity of parties, nor
identity of subject matter, between the interpleader case and the
one at bar.
Petitioner BDC acted in bad faith
in dealing with respondent Diaz
On the second issue, We find that the CA committed
no reversible error in finding that BDC acted in bad faith, when
it allowed Diaz to take over the payment of the amortizations
over the subject property. As the CA correctly noted, "It is
undisputed that Bliss knew about Arreza's claim in 1991. It even
received amortization payments from Arreza. Yet, Bliss
acknowledged the transfer to Diaz and received the monthly
amortizations paid by Diaz. Also, Bliss is aware that should
Arreza pursue his claim in court, Diaz may be evicted from the
property." 14
BDC anchors its claim of good faith on the fact that it
did not act as seller to Diaz. Rather, BDC claims, it was Diaz
who came forward and presented himself to BDC as the lawful
successor-in-interest of Emiliano and Leonila Melgazo, by
virtue of the several deeds of transfer of rights, all of which he
presented to BDC. It was on the basis of this claim that BDC
allowed Diaz to occupy the property and pay amortizations
accruing over the property. 15
Nevertheless, BDC does not dispute that as early as
1991, even before respondent came forward presenting the deeds
of transfer to BDC, BDC was already aware of the claim of
Arreza. In fact, it even received amortizations from Arreza.
Despite this, BDC also later acknowledged the transfer to Diaz,
and also accepted amortizations from him. 16 This
uncontroverted sequence of events led the CA to correctly rule
that BDC, indeed, acted in bad faith.
When Diaz came forward and presented the deeds of
transfer, including the deed of transfer executed by Tapay in his
favor, BDC was already well aware of a conflicting claim by
Arreza. Instead of waiting for the resolution on the matter, BDC
immediately accepted the deed of transfer presented by Diaz, as
well as the amortizations he paid over the property. It was only
in 1994 that BDC filed the Interpleader case to resolve the
conflicting case. This is nothing short of evident bad faith.
Respondent Diaz is not a purchaser
for value and in good faith
We, however, fail to find sufficient basis for the CA's
ruling that Diaz is a purchaser for value and in good faith. In a
long line of cases, this Court had ruled that a purchaser in good
faith and for value is one who buys property of another without
notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such
property and pays full and fair price for the same at the time of
such purchase or before he or she has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property. 17 For one to be
considered a purchaser in good faith, the following requisites
must concur: (1) that the purchaser buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in
such property; and (2) that the purchaser pays a full and fair
price for the property at the time of such purchase or before he
or she has notice of the claim of another. 18 We find that in the
case at bar, the first element is lacking.
The CA, in disposing the issue of Diaz's good faith,
merely said that "considering that the property involved is
registered land, Diaz need not go beyond the title to be
considered a buyer in good faith." 19 We find this to be a serious
and reversible error on the part of the CA. In the first place,
while it is true that the subject lot is registered lot, the doctrine
of not going beyond the face of the title does not apply in the
case here, because what was subjected to a series of sales was
not the lot itself but the right to purchase the lot from BDC. The
CA itself observed: "while [BDC] executed a Deed of Sale with
Mortgage in favor of the spouses Emiliano and Leonila
Melgazo, title over the property was in [BDC's] name. The title
remained in [BDC's] name when Tapay offered to transfer his
rights over the property to Diaz." 20 Notably, the several
transfers themselves did not purport to be Deeds of Absolute
Sale, but merely deeds of assignment of rights. The subject of
those deeds of assignment was never the real right over the
subject property, but merely the personal right to purchase it.
Therefore, the mirror doctrine finds no application in the case at
bar.
A careful review of the records of this case reveals
that Diaz, in fact, failed to diligently inquire into the title of his
predecessor before entering into the contract of sale. As such, he
cannot be considered a buyer in good faith. There is no issue that
despite the several transfers of rights from Nacua to Garcia to
Reyes to Tapay to Diaz, title over the property remained in
BDC's name. When Diaz transacted with Tapay, it was also
clear that what was being transferred was merely rights to
purchase the property, and not title over the lot itself; if it were,
the sale would have been void because Tapay never had
ownership over the subject property. As the buyer in such a
transaction, it was incumbent upon Diaz not only to inquire as to
the right of Tapay to transfer his rights, but also to trace the
source of that right to purchase the property. Had he discharged
this duty diligently, he would have found out that Nacua's right
was without basis, because it was founded on a forged deed. For
his failure to inquire diligently and trace the source of the right
to purchase the property, Diaz cannot claim to be a purchaser in
good faith and for value. SDHTEC
Petitioner BDC is liable to return the
amortizations paid by respondent Diaz,
under the doctrine of unjust enrichment
Notwithstanding the fact that Diaz is not an innocent
purchaser in good faith and for value, BDC is nevertheless liable
to return to him the amortizations which he already paid on the
property, applying the rule on unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment exists when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles
of justice, equity and good conscience. Under Article 22 of
the Civil Code, 21 there is unjust enrichment when (1) a person
is unjustly benefited and (2) such benefit is derived at the
expense of or with damages to another. 22
Allowing BDC to keep the amortizations paid by Diaz
is tantamount to unjust enrichment. It would result in BDC
receiving amortizations twice the amount it should have
received, that is, the amortizations paid by Diaz and Arreza.
While BDC claims that it did not receive amortizations from
both Diaz and Arreza covering the same period, such a claim is
self-serving, and is not amply supported by any documentary
evidence.
Even if BDC can prove that there was no overlap
between the payments made by Diaz and those made by Arreza,
allowing it to keep the amortizations paid by Diaz still amounts
to unjust enrichment. As a direct result of the final and
executory ruling that Arreza is the rightful buyer of the subject
property, the buyer-seller relationship between Diaz and BDC is
rendered null and void. Consequently, there remains no valid
consideration whatsoever for the payments made by Diaz to
BDC. There being no indication of intent to donate, because
such payments were made under the impression that Diaz is the
rightful buyer of the property, it is only but just that Diaz be
allowed to claim back what he has paid. This is only a natural
consequence of the final and executory ruling that Diaz is not
the rightful buyer of the subject property. Allowing BDC to keep
such payments, at the expense of and to the damage or Diaz, still
amounts to unjust enrichment.
Both parties being in bad faith,
BDC is liable to Diaz for the value
of the improvements he introduced
on the subject property
Next, We resolve the issue of whether BDC is liable to
Diaz for the value of the improvements that Diaz introduced to
the property. Arts. 448, 453, 546, and 548 of the Civil Code are
material in resolving the issue:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on
which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay
the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder
or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land
if its value is considerably more than that of
the building or trees. In such case, he shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building
or trees after proper indemnity. The parties
shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in
case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof.
Art. 453. If there was bad faith,
not only on the part of the person who built,
planted or sowed on the land of another, but
also on the part of the owner of such land,
the rights of one and the other shall be the
same as though both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad
faith on the part of the landowner whenever
the act was done with his knowledge and
without opposition on his part.
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall
be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing
until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded
only to the possessor in good faith with the
same right of retention, the person who has
defeated him in the possession having the
option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or of paying the increase in value
which the thing may have acquired by
reason thereof. AScHCD
Art. 548. Expenses for pure luxury
or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the
possessor in good faith; but he may remove
the ornaments with which he has
embellished the principal thing if it suffers
no injury thereby, and if his successor in the
possession does not prefer to refund the
amount expended.
The CA may have made the erroneous conclusion that
Diaz acted in good faith, but because BDC equally acted in bad
faith, Art. 453 of the Civil Code commands that the rights of one
and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good
faith. The CA made the correct observation then, when it said:
Under Article 448, the landowner
is given the option, either to appropriate the
improvement as his own upon payment of
the proper amount of indemnity or to sell the
land to the possessor in good faith. Relatedly
Article 546 provides that a builder in good
faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all
the necessary and useful expenses incurred.
In this case, however, the option of selling
the land to the builder in good faith is no
longer viable in light of the ruling in the
interpleader case. Hence, there is only one
thing left for [BDC] to do: indemnify Diaz
for the improvements introduced on the
property. 23
 Nevertheless, because the law treats both parties as if
they acted in good faith, the CA committed reversible error in
awarding moral and exemplary damages, there being no basis
therefor. We find it proper to delete the award of P100,000.00 as
moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P25,000.00 as attorney's fees.
In sum, the CA correctly reversed the ruling of the
RTC, and ordered BDC to pay Diaz the amount he paid as
amortizations, as well as the value of the improvements that he
introduced on the subject property. However, because both
parties acted in bad faith, there is no basis for the award of moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the January
21, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
99179 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows: (1) petitioner
Bliss Development Corporation/Home Guaranty Corporation is
ordered to pay respondent Montano M. Diaz the amount of
P1,106,915.58 for the amortizations paid and the amount spent
on improvements on the property; and (2) Domingo Tapay is
ordered to pay respondent Montano M. Diaz the amount of
P600,000.00, the amount he paid for the transfer of rights.
SO ORDERED. HESIcT
Peralta, Villarama, Jr., Perez * and Jardeleza, JJ.,
concur.
||| (Bliss Development Corp. v. Diaz, G.R. No. 213233, [August 5,
2015])
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 225538. October 14, 2020.]
YON MITORI INTERNATIONAL
INDUSTRIES, * petitioner, vs. UNION
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J p:
The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 (Petition)
filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the February
3, 2016 Decision 2 (assailed Decision) and July 5, 2016
Resolution 3 (assailed Resolution) rendered by the Court of
Appeals (CA), Eleventh Division in CA-G.R. CV No.
102802. CAIHTE
The assailed Decision and Resolution affirmed, with
modification, the February 24, 2014 Decision 4 and May 19,
2014 Order 5 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 166, in Civil Case No. 71670.
The RTC granted the Complaint for Sum of Money
filed by Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) against
Rodriguez Ong Tan (Tan), the registered owner and operator of
Yon Mitori International Industries (Yon Mitori). 6
The Facts
The CA summarized the facts as follows:
[Tan], doing business under the
name and style of [Yon Mitori], is a
depositor, maintaining Current Account No.
027-03-000181-8, [with] the
Commonwealth, Quezon City branch of
[Union Bank].
On November 12, 2007, Tan
deposited in said Union Bank account, the
amount of P420,000.00 through Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 0180724
[(BPI Check)]. x x x
[The BPI Check was drawn
against the account of Angli Lumber &
Hardware, Inc. 7 (Angli Lumber), one of
Tan's alleged clients.] 8
[The BPI Check was entered in
Tan's bank record thereby increasing his
balance to P513,700.60 from his previous
deposit of P93,700.60. 9 In the morning of
November 14, 2007, Tan withdrew from the
said account the amount of P480,000.00.
Later that day, the BPI Check was returned
to Union Bank as the account against which
it was drawn had been closed. It was then
that Union Bank discovered that Tan's
account had been mistakenly credited. Thus,
the branch manager of Union Bank's
Commonwealth, Quezon City branch
immediately called Tan to recover the funds
mistakenly released. However, Tan refused
to return the funds, claiming that the BPI
Check proceeded from a valid transaction
between Angli Lumber and Yon Mitori. 10
During the course of its
investigation, Union Bank discovered that
Tan previously deposited five BPI checks
drawn by Angli Lumber against the same
BPI account, and that these five checks were
all previously dishonored. 11
Thereafter, on November 20,
2007, Union Bank [through the bank
manager of its Commonwealth
branch], 12 sent Tan a letter demanding
reimbursement of the amount of
P420,000.00, by reason of the fact that [the]
"(f)unds against said deposit was
inadvertently allowed due to technical error
on the system prior to actual return of your
check deposit which was not yet clear on
withdrawal date," it appearing that [the BPI
Check] was dishonored by BPI for being
drawn against a closed account. Tan refused
to return the said amount. Union Bank then
debited the available balance reflected in
[Tan's] account amounting to
P34,700.60 13 and thereafter instituted [a
Complaint for Sum of Money (Complaint)]
before the RTC, for the recovery of [the
remaining balance amounting to]
P385,299.40 plus consequential damages. 14
RTC Proceedings
In its Complaint, Union Bank alleged that the value of
the BPI Check had been inadvertently credited to Tan's account
due to a technical error in its system. 15
For his part, Tan alleged that the BPI Check had been
given to him for value in the course of business. Tan claimed
that he should not be faulted for withdrawing the value of said
check from his account since Union Bank made the
corresponding funds available by updating his account to reflect
his new balance. After ascertaining that the value of the BPI
Check had been credited, Tan withdrew P480,000.00 from his
account to pay one of his suppliers. 16
Tan further argued that Union Bank wrongfully and
unlawfully deducted the amount of P34,700.60 from his
account. 17
On February 24, 2014, the RTC ruled in favor of
Union Bank. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of [Union Bank] and against [Yon
Mitori and Tan] by ordering the latter:
1. To pay [Union Bank] the amount
of P385,299.40
representing the
withdrawal mistakenly
given to x x x Tan;
2. To pay [Union Bank] 12% per
annum legal interest
 computed from the time
judicial demand was made
on June 13, 2008 until the
same is fully paid;
3. To pay [Union Bank] the amount
of P100,000.00 as
attorney's fees; and
4. To pay the duly receipted cost of
suit in the amount of
P14,954.20.
SO ORDERED. 18
The RTC found all the requisites for the application
of solutio indebiti under Article 2154 of the Civil Code present.
It held that since Union Bank mistakenly released the amount of
P480,000.00 in favor of Tan without being obligated to do so,
Tan must be ordered to return said amount to preclude unjust
enrichment at Union Bank's expense. 19
Further, the RTC ruled that under Article 1980 of
the Civil Code, "fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in
banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the
provisions concerning [simple] loan." By reason of the
erroneous payment made in Tan's favor, Tan and Union Bank
became mutual debtors and creditors of each other. This gave
rise to Union Bank's right to set-off the erroneous payment made
against Tan's remaining deposit, consistent with the principle of
legal compensation under the Civil Code. 20
Finally, the RTC held that Union Bank should be
awarded attorney's fees and cost of suit since it was compelled to
litigate due to Tan's unjustified refusal to return the funds
mistakenly released to him. 21
Aggrieved, Tan filed a motion for reconsideration
which the RTC denied in its Order dated May 19, 2014. 22 The
RTC held that "[a]lthough [Union Bank may have been]
negligent when it paid to [Tan] the face value of the check as
alleged by [Tan]," 23 Tan is still liable to return the funds
mistakenly released to him since Union Bank was under no
obligation to release these funds in his favor. 24
CA Proceedings
Tan filed an appeal via Rule 41 and named Yon Mitori
as co-appellant. 25 Therein, Tan maintained that the proximate
cause of Union Bank's loss is its own gross negligence. 26
Following an exchange of pleadings, the CA issued
the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the
foregoing, the [D]ecision dated February 24,
2014 of Branch 166 of the [RTC] of Pasig
City in Civil Case No. 71670 is
hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the award of
attorney's fees and cost of suit in favor of
[Union Bank] are hereby deleted, and the
rate of legal interest imposed on the awarded
sum, reduced to six percent (6%) per annum.
SO ORDERED. 27 DETACa
Foremost, the CA stressed that the fact of dishonor of
the BPI Check for the reason "Account Closed" is undisputed.
On this basis, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings and held that
Tan would be unjustly enriched at Union Bank's expense if he
were permitted to derive benefit from the funds erroneously
credited to his account. 28 As well, the CA upheld the
application of legal compensation in the case. 29
Nevertheless, the CA found the award of attorney's
fees and cost of suit in favor of Union Bank improper. Since the
banking industry is impressed with public interest, all bank
personnel are burdened with a high level of responsibility
insofar as care and diligence in the custody and management of
funds are concerned. 30 Here, the evidence shows that the
proximate cause of the unwarranted crediting of the value of the
BPI Check was Union Bank's technical error. Thus, while Union
Bank was compelled to litigate to protect its rights, such fact
alone does not justify an award of attorney's fees and cost of suit
there being no showing that Tan acted in bad faith in refusing to
reimburse the amount so credited. 31
Finally, the CA modified the legal interest rate applied
on the awarded sum from 12% to 6% per annum, in accordance
with the Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames. 32
Subsequently, Tan filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, 33 still with Yon Mitori as co-appellant. Tan
argued that the uniform findings of the RTC and CA with
respect to Union Bank's negligence serves as sufficient basis to
hold the latter solely liable for its loss. 34 Tan also averred that
the principle of solutio indebiti applies only in cases where the
claimant unduly delivers something because of mistake,
and not when such delivery results from the claimant's
negligence, as in this case. 35
On July 5, 2016, the CA issued the assailed Resolution
denying said Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit. 36 Tan received a copy of the assailed Resolution on July
11, 2016. 37
Subsequently, Tan's counsel filed a "Motion for
Additional Time to File Appeal" 38 (Motion for Time) before
the Court, praying for an additional period of thirty (30) days
from July 26, 2016, or until August 25, 2016 to file a petition for
review. 39
On August 25, 2016, Tan's counsel filed this Petition.
Notably, the Petition names Yon Mitori as sole petitioner even
as it describes Yon Mitori as "a single proprietorship duly
registered under Philippine law, owned and operated by
[Tan]." 40
On November 9, 2016, the Court issued a
Resolution 41 granting the Motion for Time and directing Union
Bank to file its comment on the Petition within ten (10) days
from notice.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution, Union
Bank filed its Comment 42 on April 17, 2017, to which a
Reply 43 had been filed.
The Petition maintains that the proximate cause of
Union Bank's loss is its own gross negligence. Thus, it is barred
from recovering damages under Article 2179 of the Civil
Code.44
In addition, the Petition reiterates that Union Bank's
gross negligence also precludes the application of solutio
indebiti in this case 45 as there can be no reimbursement under
this principle if payment is made as a result of one's
negligence. 46 The Petition relies on the Court's ruling
in Philippine National Bank v. Cheah Chee Chong 47 (PNB v.
Cheah) where the Court held that under the principle of solutio
indebiti, no recovery is due "if the mistake done is one of gross
negligence." 48
Finally, the Petition contends that as collecting agent,
Union Bank is responsible for losses arising from its own
negligence pursuant to Article 1909 of the Civil Code.Thus, the
Petition argues that Article 1909 should be applied to hold
Union Bank solely liable for its own loss, based on the Court's
ruling in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Court of
Appeals 49 (Metrobank v. CA). 50
Issue
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether the
CA erred when it affirmed the RTC Decision directing Tan to
return the value of the BPI Check with legal interest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is denied for lack of merit.
Yon Mitori has no separate juridical
personality.
Before delving into the substantive issues, the Court
must emphasize that as a general rule, every civil action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest,
that is, the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. 51
In turn, Section 1, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Court provides that only natural and juridical persons or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. A single
proprietorship is not considered a separate juridical person under
the Civil Code. 52
The Petition was filed solely in the name of Yon
Mitori. As a single proprietorship, Yon Mitori has no juridical
personality separate and distinct from its owner and operator
Tan. Accordingly, the Petition should have been filed in Tan's
name, the latter being the real party in interest who possesses the
legal standing to file this Petition.
Nevertheless, the Court permits the substitution of Tan
as petitioner herein in the interest of justice, pursuant to Section
4, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Formal Amendments. —
A defect in the designation of the parties and
other clearly clerical or typographical errors
may be summarily corrected by the court
at any stage of the action, at its initiative
or on motion, provided no prejudice is
caused thereby to the adverse
party. (Emphasis supplied)
In Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza 53 (Juasing), the
Court held that the filing of a civil action in the name of a single
proprietorship is merely a formal, and not a substantial defect.
Substitution of the party in such cases would not constitute a
change in the identity of the parties, and would not cause any
prejudice on the adverse party, thus:
Contrary to the ruling of
respondent Judge, the defect of the
complaint in the instant case is merely
formal, not substantial. Substitution of the
party plaintiff would not constitute a change
in the identity of the parties. No unfairness
or surprise to private respondent Dolla,
defendant in the court a quo, would result by
allowing the amendment, the purpose of
which is merely to conform to procedural
rules or to correct a technical error. 54
In Juasing, the Court ruled that the lower court erred
in not allowing the amendment of the complaint filed therein to
correct the designation of the party plaintiff, for while the
complaint named the sole proprietorship "Juasing Hardware" as
plaintiff, the allegations therein show that said complaint was
actually brought by its owner. 55 aDSIHc
This Petition warrants the same course of action. As
in Juasing, no prejudice will result from Yon Mitori's
substitution in this case. Tan has been consistently named as
owner and operator of Yon Mitori throughout the proceedings
below. Moreover, the fact that this Petition was filed in
furtherance of Tan's interests is apparent from the allegations in
the pleadings filed before the Court and accordingly furnished to
Union Bank.
Having settled the foregoing procedural matter, the
Court now proceeds to resolve the substantive issues.
Tan is bound to return the proceeds of
the dishonored BPI Check based on
the principle of unjust enrichment.
Jurisprudence defines a collecting bank as "any bank
handling an item for collection except the bank on which the
check is drawn." 56 Upon receipt of a check for deposit, the
collecting bank binds itself to "credit the amount in [the
depositor's] account or infuse value thereon only after the
drawee bank shall have paid the amount of the check or [after]
the check [is] cleared for deposit." 57
In this case, Tan deposited the BPI Check in his
account with Union Bank for collection. Clearly, Union Bank
stands as the collecting bank in this case. By receiving the BPI
Check from Tan, Union Bank obliged itself, as collecting bank,
to credit Tan's account only after BPI, as drawee, shall have paid
the amount of the said check or after the check is cleared for
deposit. 58
As correctly observed by the CA, the dishonor of the
BPI Check is not disputed. Evidently, Union Bank was under no
obligation to effect payment in favor of Tan precisely because
the BPI Check which Tan deposited for collection had been
dishonored. Allowing Tan to retain the proceeds of the
dishonored BPI Check despite not being entitled thereto
would therefore permit unjust enrichment at Union Bank's
expense.
The principle of unjust enrichment is codified under
Article 22 of the Civil Code.It states:
ART. 22. Every person who
through an act of performance by another, or
any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him.
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles
of justice, equity, and good conscience. 59
For the principle to apply, the following requisites
must concur: (i) a person is unjustly benefited; and (ii) such
benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to
another. 60 Expounding on these requisites, the Court,
in University of the Philippines v. Philab Industries,
Inc., 61 held:
Unjust enrichment claims do not
lie simply because one party benefits from
the efforts or obligations of others, but
instead it must be shown that a party was
unjustly enriched in the sense that the term
unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.
Moreover, to substantiate a
claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant
must unequivocally prove that another
party knowingly received something of
 value to which he was not entitled and
that the state of affairs are such that it
would be unjust for the person to keep the
benefit. Unjust enrichment is a term used to
depict result or effect of failure to make
remuneration of or for property or benefits
received under circumstances that give rise
to legal or equitable obligation to account
for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one
must confer benefit by mistake, fraud,
coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is
not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a
prerequisite for the enforcement of the
doctrine of restitution. 62 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; italics omitted)
The requisites for the application of the principle of
unjust enrichment are clearly present in this case. Here, it was
unequivocally established that Tan withdrew and utilized the
proceeds of the BPI Check fully knowing that he was not
entitled thereto.
To note, Tan's transaction records show that prior to
the deposit of the BPI Check subject of the present case, Tan had
deposited five other checks drawn against the same
account. 63 During Tan's cross-examination before the RTC,
Tan admitted that Union Bank notified him that all five checks
he had previously deposited had all been dishonored for the
reason "Account Closed" — which notification was
made before he deposited the BPI Check subject of the present
case, thus:
"Q: Mr. Witness, it appears that you had
previously deposited BPI Checks
also issued or also made by [Angli
Lumber]. I think these x x x BPI
Checks were also deposited in your
bank, Union Bank, is that correct Mr.
Witness?
A: That is correct, sir.
Q: In fact on five (5) occasions you had
deposited BPI Checks [i]ssued by
[Angli Lumber] drawn against its
BPI [a]ccount and you deposited the
same to your bank, x x x Union Bank
in this case, is that correct, Mr.
Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In those five (5) occasions, Mr. witness,
do you confirm that all of these
checks were returned to you
because the account of [Angli
Lumber] was closed, is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir. x x x
Q: Mr. Witness, I have here a return Check
Advise dated November 5, 2007.
This is before the subject transaction.
Can you please tell this [court] if you
recognize this written Check Advise?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You also pointed to a signature. Are you
confirming that, that is your
signature, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Also, this refers to Check No. 0206925, BPI
San Fernando Highway, drawee
bank. It was deposited on October
30, 2007?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Mr. Witness, I also have here a return check
advise dated November 7, 2007, can
you please tell the court if you
recognize this document?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Whose signature is that, Mr. Witness?
A: My signature, sir.
Q: This return check advise refers to Check
No. 0206927 and also Check No.
0206926 and Check No. 0180723.
The drawee bank of these checks are
all BPI San Fernando Highway and
the date[s] of the deposits are as
follows: November 5, 2007 for
Check No. 0206926 and November
3, 2007 for Check No. 0180723 all of
these return check advise, Mr.
Witness [state] that the reason for the
return is account closed, do you
confirm that, Mr. Witness? ETHIDa
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: So as early as October, Mr. Witness, you
have been given [c]hecks by this
[Angli Lumber] and you have been
depositing the same in your bank
account and all of these checks
were returned to you because you
were informed that the account
had been closed, is that correct?
xxx xxx xxx
Q: So these checks were all returned to you
for being Account closed?
A: Yes, sir." x x x 64 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Tan's testimony confirms that he was fully aware that
Angli Lumber's account with BPI had been closed. So he could
not have expected that the BPI Check in question would be
honored. Stated differently, he was cognizant of the BPI Check's
impending dishonor at the time he withdrew its proceeds from
his Union Bank account. That Tan withdrew the proceeds of the
BPI Check soon after discovering that the corresponding funds
had been credited to his account despite his knowledge that the
account from which the BPI Check was issued had been closed
for some time smacks of bad faith if not fraud. Tan's refusal to
return the funds despite Union Bank's repeated demands is
reprehensible.
On this score, reference to the Court's ruling
in Equitable Banking Corporation v. Special Steel Products,
Inc. 65 (Equitable Banking) is proper. In said case, a certain Jose
Isidoro Uy (Uy), purchasing officer of International Copra
Export Corporation (Interco), presented three crossed checks
to Equitable Banking Corporation (Equitable) for collection.
These crossed checks were made payable to the order of Special
Steel Products, Inc. (SSPI), Interco's supplier.
The crossed checks bore the notation "account payee
only." Despite this notation, Equitable deposited the proceeds of
the three checks to Uy's personal account upon the latter's
instructions. Equitable claimed that it did so believing that Uy
was acting upon Interco's instructions. Due to the incident, SSPI
and its President Augusto Pardo (Pardo) filed an action for
damages against Equitable and Uy.
The Court adjudged Equitable and Uy jointly and
severally liable to pay SSPI and Pardo actual, moral, and
exemplary damages, as well as costs of suit. Nevertheless, to
preclude unjust enrichment, the Court directed Uy to reimburse
Equitable whatever amount it may be required to pay SSPI and
Pardo, thus:
Equitable then insists on the
allowance of [its] cross-claim against Uy.
The bank argues that it was Uy who was
enriched by the entire scheme and should
reimburse Equitable for whatever amounts
the Court might order it to pay in damages to
SSPI.
Equitable is correct. There is
unjust enrichment when (1) a person is
unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is
derived at the expense of or with damages to
another. In the instant case, the fraudulent
scheme concocted by Uy allowed him to
improperly receive the proceeds of the three
crossed checks and enjoy the profits from
these proceeds during the entire time that it
was withheld from SSPI. Equitable, through
its gross negligence and mislaid trust on Uy,
became an unwitting instrument in Uy's
scheme. Equitable's fault renders it solidarily
liable with Uy, insofar as respondents are
concerned. Nevertheless, as between
Equitable and Uy, Equitable should be
allowed to recover from Uy whatever
amounts Equitable may be made to pay
under the judgment. It is clear that
Equitable did not profit in Uy's scheme.
Disallowing Equitable's cross-claim
against Uy is tantamount to allowing Uy
to unjustly enrich himself at the expense
of Equitable. For this reason, the Court
allows Equitable's cross-claim against
Uy. 66 (Emphasis supplied)
The circumstances which impelled the Court to apply
the principle of unjust enrichment in Equitable Banking are
present in this case.
As stated, Union Bank's obligation to credit Tan's
account is contingent upon actual receipt of the value of the BPI
Check or notice of its clearance. Due to the dishonor of the BPI
Check, Union Bank's obligation to credit Tan's account with its
proceeds did not attach. Conversely, Tan's right to receive the
proceeds of said check did not arise. Nevertheless, Tan withdrew
the proceeds of the BPI Check with full and established
knowledge that the account against which it was drawn had been
closed. As in Equitable Banking, Tan, the depositor herein, was
unjustly benefited by reason of the erroneous credit made in his
favor. Such benefit, in turn, was derived at the expense of Union
Bank as the collecting bank.
Thus, based on the principle of unjust enrichment, Tan
is bound to return the proceeds of the BPI Check which he had
no right to receive.
PNB v. Cheah is inapplicable.
Tan argues that Union Bank should not be allowed to
recover the amount erroneously deposited in his account, since
said payment was made not because of any mistake of fact or
law, but because of Union Bank's own gross negligence.
According to Tan, such negligence on the part of Union Bank
precludes recovery, pursuant to the Court's ruling in PNB v.
Cheah.
The Court disagrees.
In PNB v. Cheah, petitioner Ofelia Cheah (Ofelia)
agreed to accommodate Filipina Tuazon's (Filipina) request to
have the latter's Bank of America (BOA) Check cleared and
encashed for a service fee of 2.5%. Filipina was a mere
acquaintance introduced to Ofelia by her friend Adelina Guarin
(Adelina). Filipina enlisted Ofelia's assistance since she did not
have a dollar account necessary to encash the BOA Check which
was drawn for the amount of $300,000.00.
On November 4, 1992, Ofelia deposited the BOA
Check to her joint PNB dollar savings account (DSA) with her
Malaysian husband Cheah Chee Chong. Five days later, PNB
received a credit advice from Philadelphia National Bank in the
United States, stating that the proceeds of the BOA Check had
been temporarily credited to PNB' s account as of November 6,
1992.
On November 16, 1992, PNB Division Chief Alberto
Garin called Ofelia to inform her that the BOA Check had been
cleared and that her joint DSA with Cheah Chee Chong had
been credited the amount of $299,248.37 (representing the face
value of the BOA Check sans bank charges). Hence, the
proceeds of the BOA Check were withdrawn and delivered to
Filipina.
On November 20, 1992, PNB received notice that the
BOA Check bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds.
PNB demanded that Ofelia and Cheah Chee Chong return the
funds withdrawn. In turn, Ofelia attempted to retrieve the funds
from Filipina, but Filipina claimed that the funds had already
been distributed to several other individuals. Thus, Ofelia and
Cheah Chee Chong (Spouses Cheah) requested the assistance of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to apprehend the
beneficiaries of the BOA Check. Meanwhile, Spouses Cheah
and PNB negotiated the terms of reimbursement pending NBI's
investigation. cSEDTC
After negotiations between Spouses Cheah and PNB
fell through, PNB filed a complaint for sum of money before the
RTC. As their main defense, Spouses Cheah claimed that the
proximate cause of PNB's injury was its own negligence in
paying the BOA Check without waiting for the expiration of its
own 15-day clearing period.
The RTC ruled in favor of PNB. However, the CA
reversed on appeal, finding that PNB exhibited negligence in
allowing the premature withdrawal of the proceeds of the BOA
Check. However, the CA also found Ofelia guilty of
contributory negligence. Thus, the CA ruled that Spouses Cheah
and PNB should be made equally responsible for the resulting
loss.
Unsatisfied, the parties filed their respective petitions
for review before the Court. Affirming the CA's Decision, the
Court ruled:
Here, while PNB highlights
Ofelia's fault in accommodating a stranger's
check and depositing it to the bank, it
remains mum in its release of the proceeds
thereof without exhausting the 15-day
clearing period, an act which contravened
established banking rules and practice.
It is worthy of notice that the 15-
day clearing period alluded to is construed
as 15 banking days. As declared by
Josephine Estella, the Administrative
Service Officer who was the bank's
Remittance Examiner, what was unusual in
the processing of the check was that the
"lapse of 15 banking days was not
observed." Even PNB's agreement with
Philadelphia National Bank regarding the
rules on the collection of the proceeds of US
dollar checks refers to "business/banking
days." Ofelia deposited the subject check on
November 4, 1992. Hence, the 15th banking
day from the date of said deposit should fall
on November 25, 1992. However, what
happened was that PNB Buendia Branch,
upon calling up Ofelia that the check had
been cleared, allowed the proceeds
thereof to be withdrawn on November 17
and 18, 1992, a week before the lapse of
the standard 15-day clearing period.
This Court already held that the
payment of the amounts of checks without
previously clearing them with the drawee
bank especially so where the drawee bank is
a foreign bank and the amounts involved
were large is contrary to normal or ordinary
banking practice. Also, in Associated Bank
v. Tan, wherein the bank allowed the
withdrawal of the value of a check prior
to its clearing, we said that "[b]efore the
check shall have been cleared for deposit,
the collecting bank can only 'assume' at
its own risk x x x that the check would be
cleared and paid out." The delay in the
receipt by PNB Buendia Branch of the
November 13, 1992 SWIFT message
notifying it of the dishonor of the subject
check is of no moment, because had PNB
Buendia Branch waited for the expiration of
the clearing period and had never released
during that time the proceeds of the check, it
would have already been duly notified of its
dishonor. Clearly, PNB's disregard of its
preventive and protective measure
against the possibility of being victimized
by bad checks had brought upon itself the
injury of losing a significant amount of
money.
It bears stressing that "the
diligence required of banks is more than that
of a Roman pater familias or a good father
of a family. The highest degree of diligence
is expected." PNB miserably failed to do its
duty of exercising extraordinary diligence
and reasonable business prudence. The
disregard of its own banking policy
amounts to gross negligence, which the
law defines as "negligence characterized
by the want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there
is duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally with a
conscious indifference to consequences in
so far as other persons may be
affected." x x x
Incidentally, PNB obliges the
[S]pouses Cheah to return the withdrawn
money under the principle of solutio
indebiti, which is laid down in Article 2154
of the Civil Code[.]
xxx xxx xxx
"[T]he indispensable requisites of
the juridical relation known as solutio
indebiti, are, (a) that he who paid was not
under obligation to do so; and (b) that the
payment was made by reason of an essential
mistake of fact.
In the case at bench, PNB
cannot recover the proceeds of the check
under the principle it invokes. In the first
place, the gross negligence of PNB, as
earlier discussed, can never be equated
with a mere mistake of fact, which must
be something excusable and which
requires the exercise of prudence. No
recovery is due if the mistake done is one
of gross negligence.
The [S]pouses Cheah are guilty of
contributory negligence and are
bound to share the loss with the bank
"Contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he
has suffered, which falls below the standard
to which he is required to conform for his
own protection."
The CA found Ofelia's
credulousness blameworthy. We agree.
Indeed, Ofelia failed to observe caution in
giving her full trust in accommodating a
complete stranger and this led her and her
husband to be swindled. Considering that
Filipina was not personally known to her
and the amount of the foreign check to be
encashed was $300,000.00, a higher degree
of care is expected of Ofelia which she,
however, failed to exercise under the
circumstances. Another circumstance which
should have goaded Ofelia to be more
circumspect in her dealings was when a
bank officer called her up to inform that the
[BOA C]heck has already been cleared way
earlier than the 15-day clearing period. The
fact that the check was cleared after only
eight banking days from the time it was
deposited or contrary to what [PNB Division
Chief Alfredo Garin] told her that clearing
takes 15 days should have already put Ofelia
on guard. She should have first verified the
regularity of such hasty clearance
considering that if something goes wrong
with the transaction, it is she and her
husband who would be put at risk and not
the accommodated party. However, Ofelia
chose to ignore the same and instead
 actively participated in immediately
withdrawing the proceeds of the check.
Thus, we are one with the CA in ruling
that Ofelia's prior consultation with PNB
officers is not enough to totally absolve
her of any liability. In the first place, she
should have shunned any participation in
that palpably shady
transaction. 67 (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)
In PNB v. Cheah, the Court ruled that PNB was guilty
of gross negligence as its own bank officer permitted Ofelia to
prematurely withdraw the proceeds of the BOA Check by
advising her of the funds' availability before the expiration of the
15-day clearing period mandated by its own internal rules (i.e.,
PNB General Circular No. 52-101/88). Despite PNB's gross
negligence, the Court nevertheless tempered PNB 's liability due
to Ofelia's contributory negligence. Thus, in PNB v. Cheah, the
parties were made to suffer the resulting loss equally.
A juxtaposition of the circumstances attendant in PNB
v. Cheah and the present case shows that Tan's reliance on PNB
v. Cheah does not support his cause. In fact, reliance on PNB v.
Cheah actually weakens Tan's claim. SDAaTC
It is well established that whoever alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it because mere allegation is not
evidence. 68 The records show that while Tan harped on Union
Bank's alleged gross negligence, he failed to cite the specific
provision of law, banking regulation, or internal rule which had
been violated by Union Bank. What is clear from the evidence
on record is that due to a technical error in Union Bank's system,
the funds corresponding to the value of the BPI Check were
credited to Tan's account before actual return and clearance.
Because of this error, said funds were inadvertently made
available for Tan's withdrawal upon Union Bank's mistaken
belief that the check had already been cleared. Upon notice of
the BPI Check's dishonor, Union Bank's officer immediately
notified Tan of such fact. 69 However, despite repeated
demands, Tan refused to return the amount he had withdrawn
insisting that the BPI Check was given to him for value and in
the course of business. 70
Clearly, Tan failed to substantiate his imputation of
gross negligence. While Union Bank concedes that a technical
error in its own system allowed Tan to withdraw the proceeds of
the BPI Check before clearance, this error cannot be likened to
the blatant violation of internal procedure committed by PNB' s
Division Chief in PNB v. Cheah.
More importantly, in PNB v. Cheah, respondent Ofelia
did not benefit from the proceeds of the dishonored BOA Check.
While Ofelia deposited said check to facilitate encashment, she
subsequently delivered the proceeds to Filipina. In this case, it is
established that the funds in dispute had been withdrawn by Tan
himself. In fact, Tan acknowledged that he used said funds to
pay one of his suppliers. 71 Allowing Tan to benefit from the
erroneous payment would undoubtedly permit unjust
enrichment at Union Bank's expense particularly in light of
circumstances which indicate that Tan withdrew in bad faith
the mistakenly released funds.
Article 1909 does not preclude
recovery on the part of Union Bank.
In an attempt to evade liability, Tan also argues that,
as his collecting agent, Union Bank should be held solely
responsible for losses arising from its own negligence, pursuant
to Article 1909 of the Civil Code.Tan invokes the Court's ruling
in Metrobank v. CA as basis.
Tan's reliance on Metrobank v. CA is misplaced.
In said case, a certain Eduardo Gomez (Eduardo)
deposited 38 treasury warrants with a total amount of
P1,755,228.37 to his account with Golden Savings and Loan
Association (Golden Savings). Since Golden Savings did not
have its own clearing facilities, its cashier Gloria Castillo
endorsed said warrants and deposited them in Golden Savings'
account with petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank).
Gloria went to Metrobank several times to confirm
whether the warrants had been cleared. While Gloria was
initially told to wait, Metrobank eventually allowed her to
withdraw the proceeds of the warrants on behalf of Golden
Savings due to "exasperation" over her repeated inquiries, and as
a form of accommodation to Golden Savings as a valued client.
Thereafter, Eduardo was allowed to withdraw from his deposit
account with Golden Savings.
Five days after Eduardo's last withdrawal, Metrobank
informed Golden Savings that 32 out of the 38 treasury warrants
were dishonored by the Bureau of Treasury. Thus, Metrobank
demanded that Golden Savings refund the proceeds previously
withdrawn to make up for the deficit in its account. Golden
Savings rejected the demand, causing Metrobank to file a
complaint for collection of sum of money with the RTC.
The RTC ruled in favor of Golden Savings. The CA
affirmed on appeal. Aggrieved, Metrobank filed a petition for
review before the Court, alleging, among others, that "[it] cannot
be held liable for its failure to collect on the warrants" since it
merely acted as a collecting agent. 72
In its Decision, the Court applied Article 1909 to hold
Metrobank liable for the losses suffered by Golden Savings as a
result of Metrobank's negligence. The Court held:
From the above undisputed facts,
it would appear to the Court that Metrobank
was indeed negligent in giving Golden
Savings the impression that the treasury
warrants had been cleared and that,
consequently, it was safe to allow [Eduardo]
to withdraw the proceeds thereof from his
account with it. Without such assurance,
Golden Savings would not have allowed the
withdrawals; with such assurance, there was
no reason not to allow the withdrawal.
Indeed, Golden Savings might even have
incurred liability for its refusal to return the
money that to all appearances belonged to
the depositor, who could therefore withdraw
it any time and for any reason he saw fit.
It was, in fact, to secure the
clearance of the treasury warrants that
Golden Savings deposited them to its
account with Metrobank. Golden Savings
had no clearing facilities of its own. It relied
on Metrobank to determine the validity of
the warrants through its own services. The
proceeds of the warrants were withheld
from [Eduardo] until Metrobank allowed
Golden Savings itself to withdraw them
from its own deposit. It was only when
Metrobank gave the go-signal that
[Eduardo] was finally allowed by Golden
Savings to withdraw them from his own
account. 73 (Emphasis supplied)
 By invoking Article 1909 as applied in Metrobank v.
CA, Tan appears to assert that he, as principal-depositor,
suffered losses because of the technical error in Union Bank's
system. This assertion is clearly false.
As stated, Tan had no right to receive the proceeds of
the BPI Check. Evidently, Tan did not suffer any loss as a
result of Union Bank's technical error. On the contrary, Tan
unduly gained from the technical error, as it allowed him to
withdraw and utilize funds which he had no right to receive.
The fact that Tan received the BPI Check for value in
the ordinary course of business does not negate his obligation to
return the funds erroneously credited in his favor. Tan's remedy,
if any, lies not against Union Bank, but against the drawer of the
BPI Check Angli Lumber. All told, Tan's obligation to return the
erroneously credited funds to Union Bank stands.
Amount due
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated February 3, 2016 and Resolution dated July 5,
2016 rendered by the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division in
CA-G.R. CV No. 102802 are AFFIRMED.
Petitioner Rodriguez Ong Tan, doing business under
the name and style Yon Mitori International Industries,
is ORDERED to pay respondent Union Bank of the Philippines
the amount of P385,299.40 with legal interest at the rate of 6%
per annum, computed from the time of extrajudicial demand on
November 20, 2007 until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, C.J., Lazaro-Javier,
Lopez and Rosario, ** JJ., concur.
||| (Yon Mitori International Industries v. Union Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 225538, [October 14, 2020])

The records show that Tan had a balance amounting to

P93,700.60 before the value of the BPI Check was erroneously
credited to his Union Bank account. 74 Due to Union Bank's
system error, Tan's account was credited with the amount of
P420,000.00, thereby increasing his balance to P513,700.60.
Subsequently, Tan's account was credited an additional amount
of P1,000.00 as a result of a separate encashment.
Later still, Tan withdrew the amount of P480,000.00.
This left Tan's account with the balance of P34,700.60. To
illustrate: acEHCD
 

Account balance prior to deposit P93,700.60

Amount credited due to system error 420,000.00

Separate encashment 1,000.00

  ––––––––––––

Account balance prior to withdrawal 514,700.60

Amount withdrawn (480,000.00)

  ––––––––––––

Account balance after withdrawal P34,700.00

 
Since Tan refused to return the mistakenly credited
amount of P420,000.00, Union Bank applied Tan's remaining
balance of P34,700.60 to set off his debt before it filed its
Complaint before the RTC.
Thus, the sum due to Union Bank is P385,299.40, as
stated in the RTC Decision. This awarded sum, not being a loan
or forbearance of money, is subject to 6% interest per annum. In
turn, such interest should be computed from the time when the
amount due had been established with reasonable certainty,
which, in this case, was the date of Union
Bank's extrajudicial demand on November 20, 2007.
The deletion of damages, attorney's
fees and costs of suit was not assailed.
Finally, the Court shall not delve into the issue of
damages, attorney's fees, and cost of suit in this Decision
considering that Union Bank no longer assailed the deletion of
these awards before this Court.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 180832. July 23, 2008.]
JEROME CASTRO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 emanated
from the complaint for grave oral defamation 2 filed by Albert
P. Tan against petitioner Jerome Castro.
The facts follow.
On November 11, 2002, Reedley International School
(RIS) dismissed Tan's son, Justin Albert (then a Grade 12
student), for violating the terms of his disciplinary
probation. 3 Upon Tan's request, RIS reconsidered its decision
but imposed "non-appealable" conditions such as excluding
Justin Albert from participating in the graduation
ceremonies. cTaDHS
Aggrieved, Tan filed a complaint in the Department of
Education (Dep-Ed) for violation of the Manual of Regulation of
Private Schools, Education Act of 1982 and Article 19 of the
Civil Code 4 against RIS. He alleged that the dismissal of his
son was undertaken with malice, bad faith and evident
premeditation. After investigation, the Dep-Ed found that RIS'
code violation point system allowed the summary imposition of
unreasonable sanctions (which had no basis in fact and in law).
The system therefore violated due process. Hence, the Dep-Ed
nullified it. 5
Meanwhile, on November 20, 2002, the Dep-Ed
ordered RIS to readmit Justin Albert without any
condition. 6 Thus, he was able to graduate from RIS and
participate in the commencement ceremonies held on March 30,
2003.
After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C.
Ching, a fellow parent at RIS. In the course of their
conversation, Tan intimated that he was contemplating a suit
against the officers of RIS in their personal capacities, including
petitioner who was the assistant headmaster.
Ching telephoned petitioner sometime the first week
of April and told him that Tan was planning to sue the officers
of RIS in their personal capacities. Before they hung up,
petitioner told Ching:
Okay, you too, take care and be
careful talking to [Tan], that's dangerous.
Ching then called Tan and informed him that
petitioner said "talking to him was dangerous".
Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral
defamation in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong
City against petitioner on August 21, 2003.
On November 3, 2003, petitioner was charged with
grave oral defamation in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60 7 under the following
Information:
That on or about the 13th day of
March, 2003 in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
[petitioner], with deliberate intent of
bringing ATTY. ALBERT P. TAN, into
discredit, dishonor, disrepute and contempt,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously speak and utter the following
words to Ms. Bernice C. Ching: AaITCS
"OK, YOU TOO, YOU
TAKE CARE AND BE CAREFUL
TALKING TO [TAN], THAT'S
DANGEROUS".
and other words of similar import
of a serious and insulting nature.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment.
The prosecution essentially tried to establish that
petitioner depicted Tan as a "dangerous person". Ching testified
that petitioner warned her that talking to Tan was dangerous.
Tan, on the other hand, testified that petitioner's statement
shocked him as it portrayed him as "someone capable of
committing undesirable acts". He added that petitioner probably
took offense because of the complaint he filed against RIS in the
Dep-Ed.
For his defense, petitioner denied harboring ill-
feelings against Tan despite the latter's complaint against RIS in
the Dep-Ed. Although he admitted conversing with Ching
(whom he considered as a close acquaintance) on the telephone
a few days after RIS' 2003 commencement exercises, petitioner
asserted that he never said or insinuated that Tan or talking to
Tan was dangerous. On cross-examination, however, he did not
categorically deny the veracity of Ching's statement.
The MeTC found that Ching's statements in her
affidavit and in open court were consistent and that she did not
have any motive to fabricate a false statement. Petitioner, on the
other hand, harbored personal resentment, aversion and ill-will
against Tan since the Dep-Ed compelled RIS to readmit his son.
Thus, the MeTC was convinced that petitioner told Ching
talking to Tan was dangerous and that he uttered the statement
with the intention to insult Tan and tarnish his social and
professional reputation.
In a decision dated December 27, 2005, the MeTC
found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of grave oral
defamation: 8
WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered finding accused, Jerome
Castro GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation,
sentencing him therefore, in accordance to
Article 358 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor as
minimum to 4 months and 1 day of arresto
mayor as maximum.
 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed
the factual findings of the MeTC. However, in view of the
animosity between the parties, it found petitioner guilty only of
slight oral defamation. But because Tan filed his complaint in
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City only on
August 21, 2003 (or almost five months from discovery), the
RTC ruled that prescription had already set in; it therefore
acquitted petitioner on that ground. 9
On April 19, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
(CA) assailing the decision of the RTC. 10 It contended that the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it downgraded
petitioner's offense to slight oral defamation. The RTC allegedly
misappreciated the antecedents which provoked petitioner to
utter the allegedly defamatory statement against Tan.
The CA found that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it misapprehended the totality of the
circumstances and found petitioner guilty only of slight oral
defamation. Thus, the CA reinstated the MeTC decision. 11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied. 12 Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner basically contends that the CA erred in
taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari inasmuch as the
OSG raised errors of judgment (i.e., that the RTC
misappreciated the evidence presented by the parties) but failed
to prove that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, double jeopardy attached when the RTC acquitted him.
We grant the petition.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. 13 This constitutional mandate
is echoed in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
Section 7. Former conviction or
acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted or
the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or in information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or
information. IcSHTA
xxx xxx xxx
Under this provision, double jeopardy occurs upon (1) a valid
indictment (2) before a competent court (3) after arraignment (4)
when a valid plea has been entered and (5) when the accused
was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. 14 Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or
appellate court, is final and unappealable on the ground of
double jeopardy. 15
The only exception is when the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion or, as we held in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan, 16 when there was mistrial. In such instances,
the OSG can assail the said judgment in a petition
for certiorari establishing that the State was deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. 17
The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment
rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was
issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void.
Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.
In this case, the OSG merely assailed the RTC's
finding on the nature of petitioner's statement, that is, whether it
constituted grave or slight oral defamation. The OSG premised
its allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's
"erroneous" evaluation and assessment of the evidence presented
by the parties.
What the OSG therefore questioned were errors of
judgment (or those involving misappreciation of evidence or
errors of law). However, a court, in a petition
for certiorari, cannot review the public respondent's evaluation
of the evidence and factual findings. 18 Errors of judgment
cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can
only correct errors of jurisdiction (or those involving the
commission of grave abuse of discretion). 19
Because the OSG did not raise errors of jurisdiction,
the CA erred in taking cognizance of its petition and, worse, in
reviewing the factual findings of the RTC. 20 We therefore
reinstate the RTC decision so as not to offend the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy.
At most, petitioner could have been liable for damages
under Article 26 of the Civil Code: 21 ETDAaC
Article 26. Every person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts,
though they may not constitute a criminal
offense, shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Intriguing to cause another to
be alienated from his
friends;
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator, he is
supposed to be a role model for the youth. As such, he should
always act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith. 22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The August 29, 2007 decision and December 5, 2007 resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98649 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The November 20, 2006 decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212 is
REINSTATED. Petitioner Jerome Castro is ACQUITTED of
slight oral defamation as defined and penalized in Article 358 of
the Revised Penal Code. ASHECD
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Carpio, Azcuna and Leonardo-de Castro,
JJ., concur.
||| (Castro v. People, G.R. No. 180832 (Resolution), [July 23, 2008],
581 PHIL 639-648)
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 54598. April 15, 1988.]
JOSE
B. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF A
PPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO DELMO and
SANCHA DELMO (as private
respondents), respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Luzel D. Demasu-ay for respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES;
AWARD THEREOF IS PROPER WHERE A PARTY
UNDERWENT A PAINFUL ORDEAL CAUSED BY
PETITIONER'S NEGLECT OF DUTY AND CALLOUSNESS.
— We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate
courts should be reversed. It cannot be disputed that
Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought
about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus,
moral damages are but proper. As we have affirmed in the
case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148
SCRA 440, 448): "There is no argument that moral damages
include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's
wrongful act or omission." (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62
[1984]).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY OF PETITIONER TO
ENFORCE THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION TO GIVE AN
HONOR AWARD TO THE DECEASED STUDENT. — The
Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate
omission to inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the
duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's
decision. Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the
petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could have
done so considering that he received the decision on April 27,
1966 and even though he sent it back with the records of the
case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it which
consisted of only three pages. Moreover, the petitioner should
have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father,
and inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the
petitioner likewise failed to do, and not without the attendant
bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out in its
decision.
3. ID.; ID.; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;
RATIONALE BEHIND AWARD. — Based on the undisputed
facts, exemplary damages are also in order. In the same
case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc.,
supra., at p. 450, we ruled: "The rationale behind exemplary or
corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an
example or correction for the public good (Lopez, et al. v. Pan
American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431)."
4. ID.; ID.; SEPARATE AWARD TO
RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITY, NOT APPROPRIATE. — The trial court awarded
P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo and P10,000.00 to her
parents for moral damages. However, we do not deem it
appropriate to award the spouses Delmo damages in the
amount of P10,000.00 in their individual capacity, separately
from and in addition to what they are already entitled to as sole
heirs of the deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus, the decision is
modified insofar as moral damages are awarded to the spouses
in their own behalf.
DECISION
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, adjudging the
petitioner, who was then the President of the West Visayas
College, liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines for failure to graduate a student with
honors.
The facts are not disputed.
An organization named Student Leadership Club was
formed by some students of the West Visayas College. They
elected the late Violeta Delmo as the treasurer. In that
capacity, Delmo extended loans from the funds of the club to
some of the students of the school. The petitioner claims that the
said act of extending loans was against school rules and
regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as President of the School, sent
a letter to Delmo informing her that she was being dropped from
the membership of the club and that she would not be a
candidate for any award or citation from the school.
Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but
the petitioner denied it. Delmo, thus, appealed to the
Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools.
The Director, after due investigation, rendered a
decision on April 13, 1966 which provided:
"Records of the preliminary
investigation conducted by one of the legal
officers of this Office disclosed the following.
That Violeta Delmo was the treasurer of the
Student Leadership Club, an exclusive student
organization; that pursuant to Article IX of the
Constitution and By-Laws of the club, it
passed Resolution No. 2, authorizing the
treasurer to disburse funds of the Club to
students for financial aid and other
humanitarian purposes; that in compliance with
said resolution and as treasurer of the Club,
Violeta Delmo extended loans to some officers
and members of the Club upon proper
application duly approved by the
majority of the members of the Executive
Board; and that upon receiving the report from
Mr. Jesse Dagoon, adviser of the funds of the
Club, that Office conducted an investigation on
the matter and having been convinced of the
guilt of Violeta Delmo and the other officers
and members of the Club, that Office rendered
the order or decision in question. In justifying
that Office's order or decision, it is contended
that approval by that Office of the Constitution
and By-Laws of the Club is necessary for its
effectivity and validity and since it was never
submitted to that Office, the Club had no valid
constitution and By-Laws and that as a
consequence, Resolution No. 2 which was
passed based on the Constitution and By-Laws
is without any force and effect and the
treasurer, Violeta Delmo, who extended loans
to some officers and members of the Club
pursuant thereto are illegal (sic), hence, she
and the other students involved are deemed
guilty of misappropriating the funds of the
Club. On the other hand, Raclito Castaneda,
Nestor Golez and Violeta Delmo, President,
Secretary and Treasurer of the Club,
respectively, testified that the Club had
adopted its Constitution and By-Laws in a
meeting held last October 3, 1965, and that
pursuant to Article I of said Constitution and
By-Laws, the majority of the members of the
Executive Board passed Resolution No. 2,
which resolution became the basis for the
extension of loans to some officers and
members of the Club, that the Club honestly
believed that its Constitution and By-Laws has
been approved by the superintendent because
the adviser of the Club, Mr. Jesse Dagoon,
assured the President of the Club that he will
cause the approval of the Constitution and By-
Laws by the Superintendent; the officers of the
Club have been inducted to office on October
9, 1965 by the Superintendent and that the
Club had been likewise allowed to co-sponsor
the Education Week Celebration. LexLib
"After a careful study of the records,
this Office sustains the action taken by the
Superintendent in penalizing the adviser of the
Club as well as the officers and members
thereof by dropping them from membership
therein. However, this Office is convinced that
Violeta M. Delmo had acted in good faith, in
her capacity as Club Treasurer, in extending
loans to the officers and members of the
Student Leadership Club. Resolution No. 2
authorizing the Club treasurer to discharge
funds to students in need of financial assistance
and other humanitarian purposes had been
approved by the Club adviser, Mr. Jesse
Dagoon, with the notation that approval was
given in his capacity as adviser of the Club and
extension of the Superintendent's personality.
Aside from misleading the officers and
members of the Club, Mr. Dagoon, had
unsatisfactorily explained why he failed to give
the Constitution and By-Laws of the Club to
the Superintendent for approval despite his
assurance to the Club president that he would
do so. With this finding of negligence on the
part of the Club adviser, not to mention laxity
in the performance of his duties as such, this
Office considers as too severe and unwarranted
that portion of the questioned order stating that
Violeta Delmo 'shall not be a candidate for any
award or citation from this school or any
organization in this school.' Violeta Delmo, it
is noted, has been a consistent full
scholar of the school and she alone has
maintained her scholarship. The decision in
question would, therefore, set at naught all her
sacrifice and frustrate her dreams of graduating
with honors in this year's commencement
exercises.
"In view of all the foregoing, this
Office believes and so holds and hereby directs
that appellant Violeta M. Delmo, and for that
matter all other Club members or officers
involved in this case, be not deprived of any
award, citation or honor from the school, if
they are otherwise entitled thereto." (Rollo, pp.
28-30)
On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the
decision of the Director and all the records of the case. On the
same day, petitioner received a telegram stating the following:
"AIRMAIL
RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT
OFFICE"
The Director asked for the return only of the records
but the petitioner allegedly mistook the telegram as ordering him
to also send the decision back. On the same day, he returned by
mail all the records plus the decision of the Director to the
Bureau of Public Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram
from the Director ordering him to furnish Delmo with a
copy of the decision. The petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter to
the Director informing the latter that he had sent the decision
back and that he had not retained a copy thereof. Cdpr
On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the
petitioner received another telegram from the Director ordering
him not to deprive Delmo of any honors due her. As it was
impossible by this time to include Delmo's name in the program
as one of the honor students, the petitioner let her graduate as a
plain student instead of being awarded the Latin honor of Magna
Cum Laude.
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5,
1966, wrote the Director asking for a reconsideration of the
latter's decision because he believed that Delmo should not be
allowed to graduate with honors. The Director denied the
petitioner's request.
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the
Registrar of the school to enter into the scholastic
records of Delmo the honor, "Magna Cum Laude."
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by
her parents in filing an action for damages against the petitioner.
During the pendency of the action, however, Delmo passed
away, and thus, an Amended and Supplemental Complaint was
filed by her parents as her sole and only heirs.
The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against
the petitioner and in favor of the spouses Delmo. The court said:
"Let us go to specific badges of the
defendant's (now petitioner's) bad faith. Per
investigation of Violeta Delmo's appeal to
Director Vitaliano Bernardino of the
Bureau of Public Schools (Exhibit "L"), it was
the defendant who inducted the officers of the
Student Leadership Club on October 9, 1965.
In fact the Club was allowed to co-sponsor the
Education Week Celebration. (Exh. "L"). If the
defendant did not approve of the constitution
and by-laws of the Club, why did he induct the
officers into office and allow the Club to
sponsor the Education Week Celebration? It
was through his own act that the students were
misled to do as they did. Coupled with the
defendant's tacit recognition of the Club was
the assurance of Mr. Jesse Dagoon, Club
Adviser, who made the students believe that he
was acting as an
extension of Mr. Ledesma's personality.
(Exhibit "L").
"Another badge of the defendant's
want of good faith is the fact that, although, he
knew as early as April 27, 1966 that per
decision of Director Bernardino, Exhibit "L,"
he was directed to give honors to Miss Delmo,
he kept said information to himself. He told
the Court that he knew that the
letter of Director Bernardino directed him not
to deprive Miss Delmo the honors due her, but
she (sic) says that he has not finished reading
the letter decision, Exhibit "L," of Director
Bernardino, directing him to give honors to
Miss Delmo. (Tsn, Feb. 5, 1974,
testimony of Mr. Ledesma, pp. 33-35). It could
not be true that he has not finished reading the
letter-decision, Exh. "L," because said letter
consisted of only three pages, and the portion
which directed that Miss Delmo 'be not
deprived of any award, citation or honor from
the school, if otherwise entitled thereto' is
found at the last paragraph of the same. How
did he know the last paragraph if he did not
read the letter.
"Defendant's actuations regarding
Miss Delmo's case had been one of bias and
prejudice. When his action would favor him,
he was deliberate and circumspect to the utter
prejudice and detriment of Miss Delmo. Thus,
although, as early as April 27, 1966, he
knew of the exoneration of Miss Delmo by
Director Bernardino, he withheld the
information from Miss Delmo. This is
eloquently dramatized by Exh. "11" and Exh.
"13." On April 29, 1966, Director Bernardino
cabled him to furnish
Violeta Delmo copy of the Decision, Exh. "L,"
but instead of informing Miss Delmo about the
decision, since he said he mailed back the
decision on April 28, 1988, he sent a night
letter on April 29, 1966, to Director
Bernardino, informing the latter that he had
returned the decision (Exh. "13"), together with
the record. Why a night letter when the matter
was of utmost urgency to the parties in the
case, because graduation day was only four
days ahead? An examination of the telegrams
sent by the defendant shows that he had been
sending ordinary telegrams and not night
letters. (Exh. "5," Exhibit "7"). At least, if the
defendant could not furnish a copy of the
decision, (Exh. "L"), to Miss Delmo, he should
have told her about it or directed that
Miss Delmo's honors and citation in the
commencement programs be announced or
indicated. But Mr. Ledesma is one who cannot
admit a mistake. Very ungentlemanly! this is
borne out by his own testimony, despite his
knowledge that his decision to deprive
Miss Delmo of honors due to her was
overturned by Director Bernardino, he insisted
on his wrong belief. To quote the defendant, 'I
believed that she did not deserve those honors.'
(Tsn. Feb. 5, 1974, p. 43, italics supplied).
Despite the telegram of Director Bernardino
which the defendant received hours before the
commencement exercises on May 3-4, 1966,
he did not obey Director Bernardino because
he said in his testimony that he would be
embarrassed. Tsn — Feb. 5, 1974, p. 46).
Evidently, he knew only his embarrassment
and not that of Director Bernardino whose
order was being flagrantly and wantonly
disregarded by him. And certainly, not the
least of Miss Delmo's embarrassment. His acts
speak eloquently of his bad faith and unjust
frame of mind — warped by his delicate
sensitivity for having been challenged by
Miss Delmo, a mere student. prLL
xxx xxx xxx
"Finally, the defendant's behaviour
relative to Miss Delmo's case
smacks of contemptuous arrogance, oppression
and abuse of power. Come to think of it. He
refused to obey the directive of Director
Bernardino and instead, chose to feign
ignorance of it." (Record on Appeal, p. 72-76).
The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the
estate of Violeta Delmo and P10,000.00 to her parents for moral
damages; P5,000.00 for nominal damages to Violeta's estate;
exemplary damages of P10,000.00 and P2,000.00 attorney's
fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Hence, this petition.
The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to the
sole question of whether or not the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
trial court's finding that petitioner is liable for damages under
Article 27 of the New Civil Code.
We find no reason why the findings of the trial and
appellate courts should be reversed. It cannot be disputed that
Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought
about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus,
moral damages are but proper. As we have affirmed in the
case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148
SCRA 440, 448):
"There is no argument that moral
damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of defendant's wrongful act or
omission." (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62
(1984)).
The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's
deliberate omission to inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was
not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the
Director's decision. Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless
the petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could have
done so considering that he received the decision on April 27,
1966 and even though he sent it back with the records of the  
case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it which
consisted of only three pages. Moreover, the petitioner should ||| (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 54598, [April 15, 1988],
have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, 243 PHIL 591-600)
and inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the
petitioner likewise failed to do, and not without the attendant
bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out in its
decision, to wit:
"Third, assuming that defendant
could not furnish Miss Delmo of a copy of the
decision, he could have used his discretion and
plain common sense by informing her about it
or he could have directed the
inclusion of Miss Delmo's honor in the printed
commencement program or announced it
during the commencement exercises.
"Fourth, defendant despite
receipt of the telegram of Director Bernardino
hours before the commencement exercises on
May 3-4, 1966, disobeyed his superior by
refusing to give the honors due
Miss Delmo with a lame excuse that he would
be embarrassed if he did so, to the
prejudice of and in complete
disregard of Miss Delmo's rights. Cdpr
"Fifth, defendant did not even extend
the courtesy of meeting Mr. Pacifico Delmo,
father of Miss Delmo, who tried several times
to see defendant in his office thus
Mr. Delmo suffered extreme disappointment
and humiliation.
xxx xxx xxx
"Defendant, being a public officer
should have acted with circumspection and due
regard to the rights of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch
as he exceeded the scope of his authority by
defiantly disobeying the lawful directive of his
superior, Director Bernardino, defendant is
liable for damages in his personal capacity. . . .
." (Rollo, pp. 57-58)
Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are
also in order. In the same case of Prudenciado v. Alliance
Transport System, Inc., supra., at p. 450, we ruled:
"The rationale behind exemplary or
corrective damages is, as the name implies, to
provide an example or correction for the public
good (Lopez, et al. v. Pan American World
Airways, 16 SCRA 431)."
However, we do not deem it appropriate to award the
spouses Delmo damages in the amount of P10,000.00 in their
individual capacity, separately from and in addition to what they
are already entitled to as sole heirs of the deceased
Violeta Delmo. Thus, the decision is modified insofar as moral
damages are awarded to the spouses in their own behalf.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with the slight modification as stated in the
preceding paragraph. This decision is immediately
executory. cdrep
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 8261. March 11, 2015.]
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C.
TORRES, complainants, vs. ATTY.
FEDERICO S. TOLENTINO, JR., ATTY.
RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL
F. VICTORIO, JR., and ATTY. ELBERT
T. QUILALA, respondents.
[A.C. No. 8725. March 11, 2015.]
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C.
TORRES, complainants, vs. ATTY.
CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR. and ATTY.
ELBERT T. QUILALA, respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J  p:
In this consolidated administrative case, complainants
Jessie T. Campugan and Robert C. Torres seek the disbarment of
respondents Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F.
Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala
and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a court
order that became the basis for the cancellation of their
annotation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis
pendens in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.
Antecedents
Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as
counsel of the complainants in a civil action they brought to seek
the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-
290546 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the first
week of January 2007 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-07-59598). They impleaded as
defendants Ramon and Josefina Ricafort, Juliet Vargas and the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. They caused to be annotated
on TCT No. N-290546 their affidavit of adverse claim, as well
as the notice of lis pendens. 1 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was the
counsel of defendant Ramon and Josefina Ricafort.
In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April
23, 2009 (later docketed as A.C. No. 8261), 2 the complainants
narrated that as the surviving children of the late Spouses
Antonio and Nemesia Torres, they inherited upon the deaths of
their parents a residential lot located at No. 251 Boni Serrano
Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-64333(35652) of the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City; 3 that on August 24, 2006, they
discovered that TCT No. RT-64333(35652) had been unlawfully
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. N-290546 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City under the names of Ramon and Josefina
Ricafort; 4 and that, accordingly, they immediately caused the
annotation of their affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No. N-
290546.
It appears that the parties entered into an amicable
settlement during the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 in
order to end their dispute, 5 whereby the complainants agreed to
sell the property and the proceeds thereof would be equally
divided between the parties, and the complaint and counterclaim
would be withdrawn respectively by the complainants (as the
plaintiffs) and the defendants. Pursuant to the terms of the
amicable settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to
Withdraw Complaint dated February 26, 2008, 6 which the RTC
granted in its order dated May 16, 2008 upon noting the
defendants' lack of objection thereto and the defendants'
willingness to similarly withdraw their counterclaim. 7 CAIHTE
The complainants alleged that from the time of the
issuance by the RTC of the order dated May 16, 2008, they
could no longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite
making several phone calls and visits to his office; that they
found out upon verification at the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City that new annotations were made on TCT No. N-290546,
specifically: (1) the annotation of the letter-request appearing to
be filed by Atty. Tolentino, Jr. 8 seeking the cancellation of the
affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis
pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546; and (2) the
annotation of the decision dated May 16, 2008 rendered in Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598 by the RTC, Branch 95, in Quezon City,
granting the complainants' Motion to Withdraw
Complaint; 9 and that a copy of the letter-request dated June 30,
2008 addressed to Atty. Quilala, Registrar of Deeds of Quezon
City, disclosed that it was defendant Ramon Ricafort who had
signed the letter.
Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants
filed an appeal en consulta with the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful
cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice
of lis pendens under primary entries PE-2742 and PE-3828-9,
respectively. The LRA set Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on
March 30, 2009, and directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda and/or supporting documents on or
before such scheduled hearing. 10 However, the records do not
disclose whether Consulta No. 4707 was already resolved, or
remained pending at the LRA.
Unable to receive any response or assistance from
Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite their having paid him for his
professional services, the complainants felt that said counsel had
abandoned their case. They submitted that the cancellation of
their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis
pendens without a court order specifically allowing such
cancellation resulted from the connivance and conspiracy
between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the
taking advantage of their positions as officials in the Registry of
Deeds by respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and
Atty. Cunanan, the acting Registrar and signatory of the new
annotations. Thus, they claimed to be thereby
prejudiced. aScITE
On July 6, 2009, the Court required the respondents to
comment on the verified complaint. 11
Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted in his Comment dated
August 17, 2009 12 that complainant Robert Torres had been
actively involved in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-07-
59598, which included the mediation process; that the
complainants, after having aggressively participated in the
drafting of the amicable settlement, could not now claim that
they had been deceived into entering the agreement in the same
way that they could not feign ignorance of the conditions
contained therein; that he did not commit any abandonment as
alleged, but had performed in good faith his duties as the
counsel for the complainants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that
he should not be held responsible for their representation in
other proceedings, such as that before the LRA, which required
a separate engagement; and that the only payment he had
received from the complainants were those for his appearance
fees of P1,000.00 for every hearing in the RTC.
In his Comment dated August 24, 2009, 13 Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. refuted the charge of conspiracy, stressing that he
was not acquainted with the other respondents, except Atty.
Victorio, Jr. whom he had met during the hearings in Civil Case
No. Q-07-59598; that although he had notarized the letter-
request dated June 30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to the Register
of Deeds, he had no knowledge about how said letter-request
had been disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and that the
present complaint was the second disbarment case filed by the
complainants against him with no other motive except to harass
and intimidate him.
Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September
1, 2009 14 that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr., another Deputy Register
of Deeds, who was the actual signing authority of the
annotations that resulted in the cancellation of the affidavit of
adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. N-
290546; that the cancellation of the annotations was undertaken
in the regular course of official duty and in the exercise of the
ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds; that no irregularity
occurred or was performed in the cancellation of the
annotations; and that the Register of Deeds was impleaded in
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 only as a nominal party, thereby
discounting any involvement in the proceedings in the case.
Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment. 15 DETACa
As the result of Atty. Quilala's allegation in his
Comment in A.C. No. 8261 that it had been Atty. Caluya, Jr.'s
signature that appeared below the cancelled entries, the
complainants filed another sworn disbarment complaint dated
August 26, 2010 alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the
signature of Atty. Cunanan. 16 This disbarment complaint was
docketed as A.C. No. 8725, and was later on consolidated with
A.C. No. 8261 17 because the complaints involved the same
parties and rested on similar allegations against the respondents.
Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to
belie the allegation of forgery and to reiterate the arguments he
had made in A.C. No. 8261. 18 On his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr.
manifested that he adopted Atty. Quilala's Comment. 19
Ruling
We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being
bereft of merit.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in
his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. 20 Verily,
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all
lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the
Legal Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code not to engage in any unlawful,
dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Failure to observe
these tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility exposes
the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, viz.:
Section 27. Disbarment or
suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. — A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for
a wilful disobedience appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
The complainants' allegations of the respondents' acts
and omissions are insufficient to establish any censurable
conduct against them.
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) enumerates the general duties of the
Register of Deeds, as follows:
Section 10. General functions of
Registers of Deeds. — . . .
It shall be the duty of the Register
of Deeds to immediately register an
instrument presented for registration dealing
with real or personal property which
complies with all the requisites for
registration. He shall see to it that said
instrument bears the proper documentary
science stamps and that the same are
properly canceled. If the instrument is not
registrable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and inform the presentor
of such denial in writing, stating the ground
or reason therefor, and advising him of his
right to appeal by consulta in accordance
with Section 117 of this Decree. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is
ministerial in nature. 21 A purely ministerial act or duty is one
that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when
its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion
nor the exercise of judgment. 22
In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, 23 the Court
underscores that registration is a merely ministerial act of the
Register of Deeds, explaining:
. . . [W]hether the document is invalid,
frivolous or intended to harass, is not the
duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a
court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is
his concern to see whether the documents
sought to be registered conform with the
formal and legal requirements for such
documents. aDSIHc
In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority
or irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty. Cunanan, and
Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice of
adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT
No. N-290546. Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16,
2008 or the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 had been falsified,
fraudulent or invalid was not for them to determine inasmuch as
their duty to examine documents presented for registration was
limited only to what appears on the face of the documents. If,
upon their evaluation of the letter-request and the RTC order,
they found the same to be sufficient in law and to be in
conformity with existing requirements, it became obligatory for
them to perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary
delay. 24
Should they be aggrieved by said respondents'
performance of duty, the complainants were not bereft of any
remedy because they could challenge the performance of duty
by bringing the matter by way of consulta with the LRA, as
provided by Section 117 25 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
But, as enunciated in Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, 26 it
was ultimately within the province of a court of competent
jurisdiction to resolve issues concerning the validity or invalidity
of a document registered by the Register of Deeds.
The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. with having conspired with each other to
guarantee that the parties in Civil Case No. Q-59598 would enter
into the amicable settlement, and then to cause the cancellation
of the affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis
pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546. The complainants
further fault Atty. Victorio, Jr. with having abandoned their
cause since the issuance of the RTC of its order dated May 16,
2008.
The complainants' charges are devoid of substance.
Although it is not necessary to prove a formal
agreement in order to establish conspiracy because conspiracy
may be inferred from the circumstances attending the
commission of an act, it is nonetheless essential that conspiracy
be established by clear and convincing evidence. 27 The
complainants failed in this regard. Outside of their bare
assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. had
conspired with each other in order to cause the dismissal of the
complaint and then discharge of the annotations, they presented
no evidence to support their allegation of conspiracy. On the
contrary, the records indicated their own active participation in
arriving at the amicable settlement with the defendants in Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598. Hence, they could not now turn their
backs on the amicable settlement that they had themselves
entered into.
Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. initiated and participated in the settlement of the
case, there was nothing wrong in their doing so. It was actually
their obligation as lawyers to do so, pursuant to Rule 1.04,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz.:
RULE 1.04 — A lawyer shall encourage his
clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if
it will admit of a fair settlement.
In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable
settlement of the complainants and the defendants in Civil Case
No. Q-07-59598 subsisted. 28
Anent the complainants' charge of abandonment
against Atty. Victorio, Jr., Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility are applicable, to wit:
CANON 18 — A lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the
client's request for information.
There is no issue that the complainants engaged the
services of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598. Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel. With
Atty. Victorio, Jr. assistance, the complainants obtained a fair
settlement consisting in receiving half of the proceeds of the sale
of the property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds
accruing to counsel as his legal fees. The complainants did not
competently and persuasively show any unfaithfulness on the
part of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far as their interest in the litigation
was concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable for
abandonment. ETHIDa
Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the
perceived inattention to any other matters subsequent to the
termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Unless otherwise
expressly stipulated between them at any time during the
engagement, the complainants had no right to assume that Atty.
Victorio, Jr.'s legal representation was indefinite as to extend to
his representation of them in the LRA. The Law Profession did
not burden its members with the responsibility of indefinite
service to the clients; hence, the rendition of professional
services depends on the agreement between the attorney and the
client. Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s alleged failure to respond to the
complainants' calls or visits, or to provide them with his
whereabouts to enable them to have access to him despite the
termination of his engagement in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598
did not equate to abandonment without the credible showing that
he continued to come under the professional obligation towards
them after the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless
disbarment complaints against Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr.,
Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty.
Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Perez and Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., concur.
||| (Campugan v. Tolentino, Jr., A.C. No. 8261 & 8725, [March 11,
2015], 755 PHIL 357-370)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 102007. September 2, 1994.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS Y With reference to Castillo's criminal
CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
ROMERO,J p:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC
Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and
eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned
by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction,
Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital
due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy
secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the
Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the
criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor
General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability
arising from his commission of the offense charged. LibLex
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view
that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil
liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The
Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v.
Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the
purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the
civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand,
opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of
the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal
extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his
position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals
in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil
obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and,
therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before
final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of
the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil
liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo,this issue
was settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was
phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his
criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the
alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
"Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
'ART. 89. How criminal
liability is totally extinguished.—
Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the
convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to the pecuniary penalties
liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment;
liability, there is no question. The law is plain.
Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said
liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a
problem. Such liability is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of
ascertaining the legal import of the term 'final
judgment.' Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory
order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and
executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The
legal precept contained in Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is
lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El
Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
'La responsabilidad penal
se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en
cuanto a las penas personales
siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias,
solo cuando a su fallecimiento no
hubiere recaido sentencia firme.'
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be
observed employs the term 'sentencia firme.'
What is 'sentencia firme' under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica
Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It
says:
'SENTENCIA FIRME. La
sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de
las definitivas por no haberse
utilizado por las partes litigates
recurso alguno contra ella dentro de
los terminos y plazos legalles
concedidos al efecto.'
'Sentencia firme' really should be
understood as one which is definite. Because, it
is only when judgment is such that, as Medina
y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed —
'en condena determinada;' or, in the words of
Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes —
'una verdad legal.' Prior thereto, should the
accused die, according to Viada, 'no hay
legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito ni
responsibilidad criminal de ninguna clase.'
And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a
defendant dies before judgment becomes
executory, 'there cannot be any determination
by final judgment whether or not the felony
upon which the civil action might arise exists,'
 for the simple reason that `there is no party
defendant.' (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the
same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code,
Book One, 2nd ed.,pp. 859-860).
The legal import of the term 'final
judgment' is similarly reflected in the Revised
Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal
body mention the term 'final judgment' in the
sense that it is already enforceable. This also
brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court which states that a judgment in
a criminal case becomes final 'after the lapse of
the period for perfecting an appeal or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied
or served, or the defendant has expressly
waived in writing his right to appeal.'
By fair intendment, the legal
precepts and opinions here collected funnel
down to one positive conclusion: The term
final judgment employed in the Revised Penal
Code means judgment beyond recall. Really,
as long as a judgment has not become
executory, it cannot be truthfully said that
defendant is definitely guilty of the felony
charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to
final judgment is without reason. For where, as
in this case, the right to institute a separate
civil action is not reserved, the decision to be
rendered must, of necessity, cover 'both the
criminal and the civil aspects of the case.'
People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942),2
O.G.,No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs.
Moll, 68 Phil.,626, 634; Francisco, Criminal
Procedure ,1958 ed.,Vol. I, pp. 234, 236.
Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as 'the
civil action is based solely on the felony
committed and of which the offender might be
found guilty, the death of the offender
extinguishes the civil liability.' I Kapunan,
Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the
present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out.
His civil liability is sought to be enforced by
reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we
dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let
the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with
the anomalous situation whereby we will be
called upon to clamp civil liability in a case
where the source thereof — criminal liability
— does not exist. And, as was well stated in
Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al.,CA-G.R. No.
19226-R, September 1, 1958, 'no party can be
found and held criminally liable in a civil suit,'
which solely would remain if we are to divorce
it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in
the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases
of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of
the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v.
Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused
pending appeal of said cases. prLL
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in
the Alison case:
"The death of accused-appellant
Bonifacio Alison having been established, and
considering that there is as yet no final
judgment in view of the pendency of the
appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the
said accused-appellant Alison was
extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised
Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev.
Ed.,p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and
Ofemia C.A.,56 O.G. 4045);consequently, the
case against him should be dismissed."
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases
of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto
Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the
former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability
of one accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is
extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefor
against his estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant
therein that the death of the accused prior to the final judgment
extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the
offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code. However, this court ruled therein:
"We see no merit in the plea that the
civil liability has been extinguished, in view of
the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that
became operative eighteen years after the
revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the
Court below, Article 33 of the Civil
Code establishes a civil action for damages on
account of physical injuries, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action.
'ART. 33. In cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of
evidence.'
Assuming that for lack of express
reservation, Belamala's civil action for
damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since
both proceedings were terminated without final
adjudication, the civil action of the offended
party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
separately."
In Torrijos,the Supreme Court held that:
"xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the
extinction of civil liability follows the
extinction of the criminal liability under
Article 89, only when the civil liability arises
from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated
differently, where the civil liability does not
exist independently of the criminal
responsibility, the extinction of the latter by
death, ipso facto extinguishes the former,
provided, of course, that death supervenes
before final judgment. The said principle does
not apply in instant case wherein the civil
 liability springs neither solely nor originally
from the crime itself but from a civil contract
of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx"
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability
of the accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace
its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said
accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the
property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore
concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused herein
extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil
liability based on the laws of human relations remains." LibLex
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the
civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his
criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to
survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money
claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final
judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI),then it can be inferred
that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on
appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had
rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the
name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case as
plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the
deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from
Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the
civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on
sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim
for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action
if it were solely based thereon, i.e.,civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et
al. 10 departed from this long-established principle of law. In this
case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the
lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of
his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss
Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability.
His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that
such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action
already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the
court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire
appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction
despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of
determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a
Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus: LLjur
"The claim of complainant Province
of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after
final judgment was rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted
him of three complex crimes of malversation
through falsification and ordered him to
indemnify the Province in the total sum of
P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability
is deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal action in the absence of express
waiver or its reservation in a separate action
(Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court).The
civil action for the civil liability is separate and
distinct from the criminal action (People and
Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs.
De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery
of money and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall
be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the
defendant dies after a money judgment had
been rendered against him by the Court of First
Instance, the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of
Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67
SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may
still be civilly liable for the funds improperly
disbursed although he has no criminal liability
(U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine
National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing,
notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of
the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his
criminal liability is concerned, the Court
Resolved to continue exercising appellate
jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for
the money claims of the Province of
Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal
acts complained of, as if no criminal case had
been instituted against him, thus making
applicable, in determining the civil liability,
Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that
purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this
Court within ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or
not his estate is under administration and has a
duly appointed judicial administrator. Said
heirs or administrator will be substituted for
the deceased insofar as the civil action for the
civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17,
Rule 3, Rules of Court)."
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have
maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego;in other words,
they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a
civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex
delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the
demise of the accused. prcd
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A
re-examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to
the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego:
The resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal
action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death
of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article
30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
"When a separate civil action is
brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings
are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall
 likewise be sufficient to prove the act
complained of."
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend
support to the ruling in Sendaydiego.Nowhere in its text is there a
grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over
the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes
during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and
separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability
arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action.
In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove
the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil
liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the
survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in
effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto
survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether
asserted in the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil
liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while
his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is
clear on this matter: prcd
"Art. 89. How criminal liability is
totally extinguished.— Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to
the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx"
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the
expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex
delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly
instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though
no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil
action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which
is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new
and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate
the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to
pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be
borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same
has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in
the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of
the criminal action due to death of the accused pending appeal
inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability.
Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from
crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition
precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the
criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant
pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim
for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if
true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable
consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and
enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from
that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which
refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its
life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July
8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction
when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action
referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a
summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said
civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under
Article 30. llcd
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did
not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding.
Thus, it was held in the main decision:
"Sendaydiego's appeal will be
resolved only for the purpose of showing his
criminal liability which is the basis of the civil
liability for which his estate would be
liable." 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil
liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether
Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense
charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and
pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability.
Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final
determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a
reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which
served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate:
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked
to serve as another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8,
1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made
in the inference that civil actions of the type involved
in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may
be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his
conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's
conclusion: prcd
"'When the action is for the recovery
of money' 'and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall
be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the
defendant dies after a money judgment had
been rendered against him by the Court of First
Instance, the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal."
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From
the standpoint of procedural law, this course taken
in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by
Justice Regalado:
"xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the
justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying
on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, drew the strained implication
therefrom that where the civil liability
instituted together with the criminal liabilities
had already passed beyond the judgment of the
then Court of First Instance (now the Regional
Trial Court),the Court of Appeals can continue
to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover
despite the extinguishment of the component
 criminal liability of the deceased. This
pronouncement, which has been followed in
the Court's judgments subsequent and
consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego,should
be set aside and abandoned as being clearly
erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of
civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There
is neither authority nor justification for its
application in criminal procedure to civil
actions. Nor is there any authority in law for
the summary conversion from the latter
category of an ordinary civil action upon the
death of the offender. ..."
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal
proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be
categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in
Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3
must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86
involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held
liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in
Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are
contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability
ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real
property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration
of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral
expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and
claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that
money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive
enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a
civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim
referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2)
allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of
the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon
extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the
accused pending finality of his conviction. LLjur
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon
extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages
from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject
to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the
felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The
source of obligation upon which the separate action is premised
determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from
quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person
or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused
pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
"SECTION 1. Actions which may
and which may not be brought against
executor or administrator.— No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or
interest thereon shall be commenced against
the executor or administrator; but actions to
recover real or personal property, or an interest
therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien
thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
injury to person or property, real or
personal,may be commenced against him."
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where
we held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an
independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the
same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate
of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86
because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral
expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for
money and claims arising from contract, express or implied.
Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely
personal obligations other than those which have their source in
delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also
arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the
estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court. cdrep
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling
herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e.,civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157
of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from
which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) ...
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This
separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above. Cdpr
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription,
in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior
to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on
the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that
the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and
the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,rape.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is
DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 Narvasa, C.J.,Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr.,Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza,
JJ.,concur.
Cruz, J.,is on leave.
||| (People v. Bayotas y Cordova, G.R. No. 102007, [September 2,
1994], 306 PHIL 266-284)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 210148. December 8, 2014.]
ANTONIO L. DALURAYA, petitioner, vs.
MARLA OLIVA, respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the
Decision 2 dated June 28, 2013 and the Resolution 3 dated November
22, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
125113 finding petitioner Antonio L. Daluraya (Daluraya) civilly
liable for the death of Marina Arabit Oliva (Marina Oliva) despite
having been acquitted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The Facts
On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an
Information 4 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide in
connection with the death 5 of Marina Oliva. Records reveal that
sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was
crossing the street when a Nissan Vanette, bearing plate number
UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue flyover in
Quezon City, ran her over. 6 While Marina Oliva was rushed to the
hospital to receive medical attention, she eventually died, prompting
her daughter, herein respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a
criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide against
Daluraya, the purported driver of the vehicle. 7
During the proceedings, the prosecution presented as
witness Shem Serrano (Serrano), an eye-witness to the incident, who
testified that on said date, he saw a woman crossing EDSA heading
towards the island near the flyover and that the latter was bumped by
a Nissan Vanette bearing plate number UPN-172. The prosecution
also offered the testimonies of (a) Marla, who testified as to the civil
damages sustained by her family as a result of her mother's
death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who presented his findings on
the autopsy conducted upon the body of Marina Oliva; and (c) Police
Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI Gomez), who conducted the
investigation following the incident and claimed that Marina Oliva
was hit by the vehicle being driven by Daluraya, albeit he did not
witness the incident. 8 TIDHCc
After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed an
Urgent Motion to Dismiss (demurrer) 9 asserting, inter alia, that he
was not positively identified by any of the prosecution witnesses as
the driver of the vehicle that hit the victim, and that there was no
clear and competent evidence of how the incident transpired. 10
The MeTC Ruling
In an Order 11 dated May 24, 2010, the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 38 (MeTC) granted Daluraya's
demurrer and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. It
found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were wanting
in material details and that they failed to sufficiently establish that
Daluraya committed the crime imputed upon him. 12
Deconstructing the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
individually, the MeTC found that: (a) Marla merely testified on the
damages sustained by her family but she failed to identify Daluraya
as the driver of the vehicle that hit her mother; (b) Serrano also did
not identify Daluraya as the driver of the said vehicle; (c) Dr. Ortiz
merely testified on the autopsy results; and (d) PSI Gomez, while he
did investigate the incident, likewise declared that he did not witness
the same. 13
Marla moved for reconsideration, 14 which the MeTC
denied in an Order 15 dated November 4, 2010, clarifying that the
grant of Daluraya's demurrer had the effect of an acquittal and that
reconsideration of its Order granting Daluraya's demurrer would
violate the latter's right against double jeopardy. 16 With respect to
the civil aspect of the case, the MeTC likewise denied the same,
holding that no civil liability can be awarded absent any evidence
proving that Daluraya was the person responsible for Marina Oliva's
demise. 17
Aggrieved, Marla appealed 18 to the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 76 (RTC), insisting that the MeTC failed to
make any finding as to the civil liability of Daluraya, 19 which
finding was not precluded by the dismissal of the criminal aspect of
the case.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision 20 dated September 8, 2011, the RTC
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the MeTC's ruling, declaring that
"the act from which the criminal responsibility may spring did not at
all exist." 21
Marla filed a motion for reconsideration 22 which, although
filed beyond the reglementary period, was nonetheless accepted.
However, the RTC found the same without merit and thus, sustained
the factual findings and rulings of the MeTC in its Order 23 dated
May 10, 2012. CAHaST
Dissatisfied, Marla elevated the case to the CA via petition
for review, maintaining that Daluraya must be held civilly liable.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 24 dated June 28, 2013, the CA granted the
petition and reversed the RTC Decision, ordering Daluraya to pay
Marla the amounts of PhP152,547.00 as actual damages,
PhP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and PhP50,000.00 as moral
damages. 25 In so ruling, the CA held that the MeTC's Order showed
that Daluraya's acquittal was based on the fact that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As such, Daluraya
was not exonerated from civil liability. 26
Moreover, the CA considered the following pieces of
evidence to support its finding that Daluraya must be held civilly
liable: (a) the inadmissible sworn statement executed by Daluraya
where he admitted that he drove the subject vehicle which hit Marina
Oliva; (b) the conclusion derived from Serrano's testimony that the
woman he saw crossing the street who was hit by a Nissan Vanette
with plate number UPN-172, and the victim who eventually died, are
one and the same; (c) the Philippine National Police Referral Letter
of one Police Chief Inspector Virgilio Pereda identifying Daluraya as
the suspect in the case of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide involving the death of Marina Oliva, and stating that he
brought the victim to the Quezon City General Hospital for treatment
but was declared dead on arrival; and (d) the subject vehicle was
registered in the name of Daluraya's aunt, Gloria Zilmar, 27 who
authorized him to claim the vehicle from the MeTC. 28
 Daluraya filed a motion for reconsideration, 29 which the
CA denied in a Resolution 30 dated November 22, 2013, hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue advanced for the Court's resolution is
whether or not the CA was correct in finding Daluraya civilly liable
for Marina Oliva's death despite his acquittal in the criminal case for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. The acquittal of an accused of the crime charged, however,
does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. 31 In Manantan v.
CA, 32 the Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal recognized
by our law and their concomitant effects on the civil liability of the
accused, as follows: EcICSA
Our law recognizes two kinds of
acquittal, with different effects on the civil
liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on
the ground that the accused is not the author of
the act or omission complained of. This
instance closes the door to civil liability, for a
person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and
can never be held liable for such act or
omission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and
the civil action, if any, which may be instituted
must be based on grounds other than
the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court. The second instance is an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may
be proved by preponderance of evidence
only. 33
In Dayap v. Sendiong, 34 the Court explained further:
The acquittal of the accused does not
automatically preclude a judgment against him
on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction
of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the
court declares that the liability of the accused
is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based
upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted. However, the civil action based
on delict may be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding on the final judgment in
the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist or where the accused did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the
accused is acquitted by the court, the accused
has the right to adduce evidence on the civil
aspect of the case unless the court also
declares that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist. This
is because when the accused files a demurrer to
evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both
on the criminal and civil aspects of the case.
The only evidence on record is the evidence
for the prosecution. What the trial court should
do is issue an order or partial judgment
granting the demurrer to evidence and
acquitting the accused, and set the case for
continuation of trial for the accused to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for
the private complainant to adduce evidence by
way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall
render judgment on the civil aspect of the
case. 35 (Emphases supplied)
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the
judgment state "whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist." 36
A punctilious examination of the MeTC's Order, which the
RTC sustained, will show that Daluraya's acquittal was based on the
conclusion that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to establish
that he was the author of the crime imputed against him. Such
conclusion is clear and categorical when the MeTC declared that "the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in material
details and they did not sufficiently establish that the accused
precisely committed the crime charged against him." 37 Furthermore,
when Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTC's Order acquitting
Daluraya, said court reiterated and firmly clarified that "the
prosecution was not able to establish that the accused was the driver
of the Nissan Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva" 38 and that
"there is no competent evidence on hand which proves that the
accused was the person responsible for the death of Marina
Oliva." 39 ICTaEH
Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings
of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC, that Daluraya's acquittal was
anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily call for a
remand of the case to the court a quo for the reception of Daluraya's
evidence on the civil aspect. Records disclose that Daluraya's
acquittal was based on the fact that "the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist" in view of the failure of the
prosecution to sufficiently establish that he was the author of the
crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil liability should be
deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated June 28, 2013 and the Resolution dated November 22, 2013 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 125113 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
September 8, 2011 and the Order dated May 10, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, * Leonardo-de
Castro and Reyes, ** JJ., concur.
 
||| (Daluraya v. Oliva, G.R. No. 210148, [December 8, 2014], 749
PHIL 531-539)
 FIRST DIVISION 1. By the death of the convict, as to
the personal penalties; and
as to pecuniary penalties,
[G.R. No. 207949. September 9, 2015.] liability therefor is
extinguished only when the
death of the offender
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
occurs before final
appellee, vs. ARMANDO DIONALDO y
judgment;
EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON,
MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR. y RAMOS, xxx xxx xxx
and RODOLFO LARIDO y
EBRON, accused-appellants. In People v. Amistoso, 6 the Court explained that the
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex
delicto. 7 Consequently, Renato's death on June 10, 2014
renders the Court's July 23, 2014 Resolution irrelevant and
RESOLUTION
ineffectual as to him, and is therefore set aside. Accordingly, the
criminal case against Renato is dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated July 23, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p: and September 24, 2014 of the Court are hereby SET
ASIDE and Criminal Case No. C-68329 before the Regional
On July 23, 2014, the Court rendered its Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129
Resolution 1 in this case finding accused-appellants Armando is DISMISSED insofar as accused-appellant RENATO
Dionaldo y Ebron, Renato Dionaldo y Ebron (Renato), Mariano DIONALDO y EBRON is concerned, in view of his demise.
Gariguez, Jr. y Ramos, and Rodolfo Larido y Ebron (accused-
appellants) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special SO ORDERED.
complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, the
||| (People v. Dionaldo y Ebron, G.R. No. 207949 (Resolution),
dispositive portion of which reads:
[September 9, 2015], 769 PHIL 555-558)
WHEREFORE, the appeal is
DISMISSED. The Decision dated February
15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
all the accused-appellants herein are equally
found GUILTY of the special complex
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide, and are sentenced to each suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, and to pay, jointly and
severally, the family of the kidnap victim
Edwin Navarro the following amounts: (1)
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2)
P100,000.00 as moral damages; and (3)
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of judgment
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellants collectively moved for
reconsideration 2 thereof, which the Court denied with finality
in its Resolution 3 dated September 24, 2014.
On even date, the Court received a letter 4 from the
Bureau of Corrections dated September 16, 2014 informing Us
of the death of one of the accused-appellants in this case,
Renato, on June 10, 2014, as evidenced by the Certificate of
Death 5 attached thereto. As Renato's death transpired before the
promulgation of the Court's July 23, 2014 Resolution in this
case, i.e., when his appeal before the Court was still pending
resolution, his criminal liability is totally extinguished in view of
the provisions of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code which
states: aScITE
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 189081. August 10, 2016.]
GLORIA S. DY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, MANDY
COMMODITIES CO., INC., represented by
its President, WILLIAM
MANDY, respondents.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J p:
Our law states that every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable. This civil liability ex delicto may be
recovered through a civil action which, under our Rules of
Court, is deemed instituted with the criminal action. While they
are actions mandatorily fused, 1 they are, in truth, separate
actions whose existences are not dependent on each other. Thus,
civil liability ex delicto survives an acquittal in a criminal case
for failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the
Rules of Court limits this mandatory fusion to a civil action for
the recovery of civil liability ex delicto. It, by no means,
includes a civil liability arising from a different source of
obligation, as in the case of a contract. Where the civil liability
is ex contractu, the court hearing the criminal case has no
authority to award damages.
The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Gloria S. Dy (petitioner)
seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated February 25, 2009 (Assailed Decision) 2 ordering her to
pay Mandy Commodities Company, Inc. (MCCI) in the amount
of P21,706,281.00. 3
The Facts
Petitioner was the former General Manager of MCCI.
In the course of her employment, petitioner assisted MCCI in its
business involving several properties. One such business
pertained to the construction of warehouses over a property
(Numancia Property) that MCCI leased from the Philippine
National Bank (PNB). Sometime in May 1996, in pursuit of
MCCI's business, petitioner proposed to William Mandy
(Mandy), President of MCCI, the purchase of a property owned
by Pantranco. As the transaction involved a large amount of
money, Mandy agreed to obtain a loan from the International
China Bank of Commerce (ICBC). Petitioner represented that
she could facilitate the approval of the loan. True enough, ICBC
granted a loan to MCCI in the amount of P20,000,000.00,
evidenced by a promissory note. As security, MCCI also
executed a chattel mortgage over the warehouses in the
Numancia Property. Mandy entrusted petitioner with the
obligation to manage the payment of the loan. 4
In February 1999, MCCI received a notice of
foreclosure over the mortgaged property due to its default in
paying the loan obligation. 5 In order to prevent the foreclosure,
Mandy instructed petitioner to facilitate the payment of the loan.
MCCI, through Mandy, issued 13 Allied Bank checks and 12
AsiaTrust Bank checks in varying amounts and in different dates
covering the period from May 18, 1999 to April 4, 2000. 6 The
total amount of the checks, which were all payable to cash, was
P21,706,281.00. Mandy delivered the checks to petitioner.
Mandy claims that he delivered the checks with the instruction
that petitioner use the checks to pay the loan. 7 Petitioner, on the
other hand, testified that she encashed the checks and returned
the money to Mandy. 8 ICBC eventually foreclosed the
mortgaged property as MCCI continued to default in its
obligation to pay. Mandy claims that it was only at this point in
time that he discovered that not a check was paid to ICBC. 9
Thus, on October 7, 2002, MCCI, represented by
Mandy, filed a Complaint-Affidavit for Estafa 10 before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. On March 3, 2004, an
Information 11 was filed against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Manila.
After a full-blown trial, the RTC Manila rendered a
decision 12 dated November 11, 2005 (RTC Decision)
acquitting petitioner. The RTC Manila found that while
petitioner admitted that she received the checks, the prosecution
failed to establish that she was under any obligation to deliver
them to ICBC in payment of MCCI's loan. The trial court made
this finding on the strength of Mandy's admission that he gave
the checks to petitioner with the agreement that she would
encash them. Petitioner would then pay ICBC using her own
checks. The trial court further made a finding that Mandy and
petitioner entered into a contract of loan. 13 Thus, it held that
the prosecution failed to establish an important element of the
crime of estafa — misappropriation or conversion. However,
while the RTC Manila acquitted petitioner, it ordered her to pay
the amount of the checks. The dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision states —
WHEREFORE, the prosecution
having failed to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, judgment
is hereby rendered ACQUITTING the
accused of the offense charged. With costs
de officio.
The accused is however civilly
liable to the complainant for the amount of
P21,706,281.00.
SO ORDERED. 14
Petitioner filed an appeal 15 of the civil aspect of the
RTC Decision with the CA. In the Assailed Decision, 16 the CA
found the appeal without merit. It held that the acquittal of
petitioner does not necessarily absolve her of civil liability. The
CA said that it is settled that when an accused is acquitted on the
basis of reasonable doubt, courts may still find him or her civilly
liable if the evidence so warrant. The CA explained that the
evidence on record adequately prove that petitioner received the
checks as a loan from MCCI. Thus, preventing the latter from
recovering the amount of the checks would constitute unjust
enrichment. Hence, the Assailed Decision ruled —
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The
Decision dated November 11, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 33 in
Criminal Case No. 04-224294 which found
Gloria Dy civilly liable to William Mandy is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 17
The CA also denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in a resolution 18 dated August 3, 2009.
 Hence, this Petition for Review
on Certiorari (Petition). Petitioner argues that since she was
acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements
of the crime charged, there was therefore no crime
committed. 19 As there was no crime, any civil liability ex
delicto cannot be awarded.
The Issues
The central issue is the propriety of making a finding
of civil liability in a criminal case for estafa when the accused is
acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements
of the crime charged.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
Civil Liability Arising from Crime
Our laws recognize a bright line distinction between
criminal and civil liabilities. A crime is a liability against the
state. It is prosecuted by and for the state. Acts considered
criminal are penalized by law as a means to protect the society
from dangerous transgressions. As criminal liability involves a
penalty affecting a person's liberty, acts are only treated criminal
when the law clearly says so. On the other hand, civil liabilities
take a less public and more private nature. Civil liabilities are
claimed through civil actions as a means to enforce or protect a
right or prevent or redress a wrong. 20 They do not carry with
them the imposition of imprisonment as a penalty. Instead, civil
liabilities are compensated in the form of damages.
Nevertheless, our jurisdiction recognizes that a crime
has a private civil component. Thus, while an act considered
criminal is a breach of law against the State, our legal system
allows for the recovery of civil damages where there is a private
person injured by a criminal act. It is in recognition of this dual
nature of a criminal act that our Revised Penal Code provides
that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. 21 This
is the concept of civil liability ex delicto.
This is echoed by the New Civil Code when it
recognizes acts or omissions punished by law as a separate
source of obligation. 22 This is reinforced by Article 30 of the
same code which refers to the filing of a separate civil action to
demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense. 23
The Revised Penal Code fleshes out this civil liability
in Article 104 24 which states that it includes restitution,
reparation of damage caused and indemnification for
consequential damages.
Rules of procedure for criminal
and civil actions involving the
same act or omission
The law and the rules of procedure provide for a
precise mechanism in instituting a civil action pertaining to an
act or omission which is also subject of a criminal case. Our
Rules of Court prescribes a kind of fusion such that, subject to
certain defined qualifications, when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability
arising from the offense is deemed instituted as well. 25
However, there is an important difference between
civil and criminal proceedings that require a fine distinction as
to how these twin actions shall proceed. These two proceedings
involve two different standards of proof. A criminal action
requires proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt while a civil
action requires a lesser quantum of proof, that of preponderance
of evidence. This distinction also agrees with the essential
principle in our legal system that while a criminal liability
carries with it a corresponding civil liability, they are
nevertheless separate and distinct. In other words, these two
liabilities may co-exist but their existence is not dependent on
each other. 26
The Civil Code states that when an accused in a
criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has
not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be filed. In the latter
case, only preponderance of evidence is required. 27 This is
supported by the Rules of Court which provides that the
extinction of the criminal action does not result in the extinction
of the corresponding civil action. 28 The latter may only be
extinguished when there is a "finding in a final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist." 29 Consistent with this, the
Rules of Court requires that in judgments of acquittal, the court
must state whether "the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment
shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist." 30
Thus, whether an exoneration from the criminal action
should affect the corresponding civil action depends on the
varying kinds of acquittal. In Manantan v. Court of
Appeals, 31 we explained —
Our law recognizes two kinds of
acquittal, with different effects on the civil
liability of the accused. First is an acquittal
on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of.
This instance closes the door to civil
liability, for a person who has been found to
be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held liable for such
act or omission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and
the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court. The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the
guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the
guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt
from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. This is the
situation contemplated in Article 29 of the
Civil Code, where the civil action for
damages is "for the same act or omission."
Although the two actions have different
purposes, the matters discussed in the civil
case are similar to those discussed in the
criminal case. However, the judgment in the
criminal proceeding cannot be read in
evidence in the civil action to establish any
fact there determined, even though both
actions involve the same act or omission.
The reason for this rule is that the parties are
not the same and secondarily, different rules
of evidence are applicable. Hence,
notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal,
the Court of Appeals in determining whether
Article 29 applied, was not precluded from
looking into the question of petitioner's
negligence or reckless imprudence. 32
In Dayap v. Sendiong, 33 we further said —
 The acquittal of the accused does
not automatically preclude a judgment
against him on the civil aspect of the case.
The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares
that the liability of the accused is only civil;
and (c) the civil liability of the accused does
not arise from or is not based upon the crime
of which the accused is acquitted. However,
the civil action based on delict may be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding on
the final judgment in the criminal action that
the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist or where the
accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him. 34
Hence, a civil action filed for the purpose of enforcing
civil liability ex delicto, even if mandatorily instituted with the
corresponding criminal action, survives an acquittal when it is
based on the presence of reasonable doubt. In these instances,
while the evidence presented does not establish the fact of the
crime with moral certainty, the civil action still prevails for as
long as the greater weight of evidence tilts in favor of a finding
of liability. This means that while the mind of the court cannot
rest easy in penalizing the accused for the commission of a
crime, it nevertheless finds that he or she committed or omitted
to perform acts which serve as a separate source of obligation.
There is no sufficient proof that the act or omission is criminal
beyond reasonable doubt, but there is a preponderance of
evidence to show that the act or omission caused injury which
demands compensation.
Civil Liability Ex Delicto in Estafa Cases
Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes
damage capable of pecuniary estimation through estafa under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. In general, the elements
of estafa are:
(1) That the accused defrauded another (a) by
abuse of confidence, or (b) by means
of deceit; and
(2) That damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.
The essence of the crime is the unlawful abuse of
confidence or deceit in order to cause damage. As this Court
previously held, "the element of fraud or bad faith is
indispensable." 35 Our law abhors the act of defrauding another
person by abusing his trust or deceiving him, such that, it
criminalizes this kind of fraud.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code identifies the
circumstances which constitute estafa. Article 315, paragraph 1
(b) states that estafa is committed by abuse of confidence —
Art. 315.  Swindling (estafa). — . .
. (b) By misappropriating or converting, to
the prejudice of another, money, goods, or
any other personal property received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation
be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property.
In this kind of estafa, the fraud which the law
considers as criminal is the act of misappropriation or
conversion. When the element of misappropriation or
conversion is missing, there can be no estafa. In such case,
applying the foregoing discussions on civil liability ex delicto,
there can be no civil liability as there is no act or omission from
which any civil liability may be sourced. However, when an
accused is acquitted because a reasonable doubt exists as to the
existence of misappropriation or conversion, then civil liability
may still be awarded. This means that, while there is evidence to
prove fraud, such evidence does not suffice to convince the court
to the point of moral certainty that the act of fraud amounts
to estafa. As the act was nevertheless proven, albeit without
sufficient proof justifying the imposition of any criminal
penalty, civil liability exists.
In this case, the RTC Manila acquitted petitioner
because the prosecution failed to establish by sufficient evidence
the element of misappropriation or conversion. There was no
adequate evidence to prove that Mandy gave the checks to
petitioner with the instruction that she will use them to pay the
ICBC loan. Citing Mandy's own testimony in open court, the
RTC Manila held that when Mandy delivered the checks to
petitioner, their agreement was that it was a "sort of loan." 36 In
the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision, the RTC Manila
ruled that the prosecution "failed to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt." 37 It then proceeded to order
petitioner to pay the amount of the loan.
The ruling of the RTC Manila was affirmed by the
CA. It said that "[t]he acquittal of Gloria Dy is anchored on the
ground that her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt
— not because she is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. . . . The trial court found no trickery nor deceit in
obtaining money from the private complainant; instead, it
concluded that the money obtained was undoubtedly a loan." 38
Our jurisprudence on this matter diverges.
Earlier cases ordered the dismissal of the civil action
for recovery of civil liability ex delicto whenever there is a
finding that there was no estafa but rather an obligation to pay
under a contract. In People v. Pantig, 39 this Court affirmed the
ruling of the lower court acquitting Pantig, but revoked the
portion sentencing him to pay the offended party the amount of
money alleged to have been obtained through false and
fraudulent representations, thus —
The trial court found as a fact that
the sum of P1,200, ordered to be paid in the
judgment of acquittal, was received by the
defendant-appellant as loan. This finding is
inconsistent with the existence of the
criminal act charged in the information. The
liability of the defendant for the return of
the amount so received arises from a civil
contract, not from a criminal act, and
may not be enforced in the criminal case.
The portion of the judgment
appealed from, which orders the defendant-
appellant to pay the sum of P1,200 to the
offended party, is hereby revoked, without
prejudice to the filing of a civil action for the
recovery of the said amount. 40
This was also the import of the ruling in People v.
Singson. 41 In that case, this Court found that "the evidence
[was] not sufficient to establish the existence of fraud or deceit
on the part of the accused. . . . And when there is no proven
deceit or fraud, there is no crime of estafa." 42 While we also
said that the established facts may prove Singson's civil liability
(obligation to pay under a contract of sale), we nevertheless
made no finding of civil liability because "our mind cannot rest
easy on the certainty of guilt" 43 considering the above finding.
The dispositive portion stated that Singson is acquitted "without
prejudice to any civil liability which may be established in a
civil case against her." 44
However, our jurisprudence on the matter appears to
have changed in later years.
In Eusebio-Calderon v. People, 45 this Court affirmed
the finding of the CA that Calderon "did not employ trickery or
deceit in obtaining money from the private complainants,
instead, it concluded that the money obtained was undoubtedly
loans for which [Calderon] paid interest." 46 Thus, this Court
upheld Calderon's acquittal of estafa, but found her civilly liable
for the principal amount borrowed from the private
complainants. 47
The ruling was similar in People v. Cuyugan. 48 In
that case, we acquitted Cuyugan of estafa for failure of the
prosecution to prove fraud. We held that the transaction between
Cuyugan and private complainants was a loan to be used by
Cuyugan in her business. Thus, this Court ruled that Cuyugan
has the obligation, which is civil in character, to pay the amount
borrowed. 49
We hold that the better rule in ascertaining civil
liability in estafa cases is that pronounced
in Pantig and Singson. The rulings in these cases are more in
accord with the relevant provisions of the Civil Code, and the
Rules of Court. They are also logically consistent with this
Court's pronouncement in Manantan.
Under Pantig and Singson, whenever the elements
of estafa are not established, and that the delivery of any
personal property was made pursuant to a contract, any civil
liability arising from the estafa cannot be awarded in the
criminal case. This is because the civil liability arising from the
contract is not civil liability ex delicto, which arises from the
same act or omission constituting the crime. Civil liability ex
delicto is the liability sought to be recovered in a civil action
deemed instituted with the criminal case.
The situation envisioned in the foregoing cases, as in
this case, is civil liability ex contractu where the civil liability
arises from an entirely different source of obligation. Therefore,
it is not the type of civil action deemed instituted in the criminal
case, and consequently must be filed separately. This is
necessarily so because whenever the court makes a finding that
the elements of estafa do not exist, it effectively says that there
is no crime. There is no act or omission that constitutes criminal
fraud. Civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded as it cannot be
sourced from something that does not exist.
When the court finds that the source of obligation is in
fact, a contract, as in a contract of loan, it takes a position
completely inconsistent with the presence of estafa. In estafa, a
person parts with his money because of abuse of confidence or
deceit. In a contract, a person willingly binds himself or herself
to give something or to render some service. 50 In estafa, the
accused's failure to account for the property received amounts to
criminal fraud. In a contract, a party's failure to comply with his
obligation is only a contractual breach. Thus, any finding that
the source of obligation is a contract negates estafa. The finding,
in turn, means that there is no civil liability ex delicto. Thus, the
rulings in the foregoing cases are consistent with the concept of
fused civil and criminal actions, and the different sources of
obligations under our laws.
We apply this doctrine to the facts of this case.
Petitioner was acquitted by the RTC Manila because of the
absence of the element of misappropriation or conversion. The
RTC Manila, as affirmed by the CA, found that Mandy
delivered the checks to petitioner pursuant to a loan agreement.
Clearly, there is no crime of estafa. There is no proof of the
presence of any act or omission constituting criminal fraud.
Thus, civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded because there
is no act or omission punished by law which can serve as the
source of obligation. Any civil liability arising from the loan
takes the nature of a civil liability ex contractu. It does not
pertain to the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal
case.
In Manantan, this Court explained the effects of this
result on the civil liability deemed instituted with the criminal
case. At the risk of repetition, Manantan held that when there is
no delict, "civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on
grounds other than the delict complained of." 51 In Dy's case,
the civil liability arises out of contract — a different source of
obligation apart from an act or omission punished by law — and
must be claimed in a separate civil action.
Violation of Due Process
We further note that the evidence on record never fully
established the terms of this loan contract. As the trial before the
RTC Manila was focused on proving estafa, the loan contract
was, as a consequence, only tangentially considered. This
provides another compelling reason why the civil liability
arising from the loan should be instituted in a separate civil case.
A civil action for collection of sum of money filed before the
proper court will provide for a better venue where the terms of
the loan and other relevant details may be received. While this
may postpone a warranted recovery of the civil liability, this
Court deems it more important to uphold the principles
underlying the inherent differences in the various sources of
obligations under our law, and the rule that fused actions only
refer to criminal and civil actions involving the same act or
omission. These legal tenets play a central role in this legal
system. A confusion of these principles will ultimately
jeopardize the interests of the parties involved. Actions focused
on proving estafa is not the proper vehicle to thresh out civil
liability arising from a contract. 52 The Due Process Clause of
the Constitution dictates that a civil liability arising from a
contract must be litigated in a separate civil action.
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights states that no person
shall be deprived of property without due process of law. This
provision protects a person's right to both substantive and
procedural due process. Substantive due process looks into the
validity of a law and protects against arbitrariness. 53 Procedural
due process, on the other hand, guarantees procedural
fairness. 54 It requires an ascertainment of "what process is due,
when it is due, and the degree of what is due." 55 This aspect of
due process is at the heart of this case.
In general terms, procedural due process means the
right to notice and hearing. 56 More specifically, our Rules of
Court provides for a set of procedures through which a person
may be notified of the claims against him or her as well as
methods through which he or she may be given the adequate
opportunity to be heard.
The Rules of Court requires that any person invoking
the power of the judiciary to protect or enforce a right or prevent
or redress a wrong 57 must file an initiatory pleading which
embodies a cause of action, 58 which is defined as the act or
omission by which a party violates a right of another. 59 The
contents of an initiatory pleading alleging a cause of action will
vary depending on the source of the obligation involved. In the
case of an obligation arising from a contract, as in this case, the
cause of action in an initiatory pleading will involve the duties
of the parties to the contract, and what particular obligation was
breached. On the other hand, when the obligation arises from an
act or omission constituting a crime, the cause of action must
necessarily be different. In such a case, the initiatory pleading
will assert as a cause of action the act or omission of respondent,
and the specific criminal statute he or she violated. Where the
initiatory pleading fails to state a cause of action, the respondent
may file a motion to dismiss even before trial. 60 These rules
embody the fundamental right to notice under the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution.
In a situation where a court (in a fused action for the
enforcement of criminal and civil liability) may validly order an
accused-respondent to pay an obligation arising from a contract,
a person's right to be notified of the complaint, and the right to
have the complaint dismissed if there is no cause of action, are
completely defeated. In this event, the accused-respondent is
completely unaware of the nature of the liability claimed against
him or her at the onset of the case. The accused-respondent will
not have read any complaint stating the cause of action of an
obligation arising from a contract. All throughout the trial, the
accused-respondent is made to believe that should there be any
civil liability awarded against him or her, this liability is rooted
from the act or omission constituting the crime. The accused-
respondent is also deprived of the remedy of having the
complaint dismissed through a motion to dismiss before trial. In
a fused action, the accused-respondent could not have availed of
this remedy because he or she was not even given an opportunity
to ascertain what cause of action to look for in the initiatory
pleading. In such a case, the accused-respondent is blindsided.
He or she could not even have prepared the appropriate defenses
and evidence to protect his or her interest. This is not the
concept of fair play embodied in the Due Process Clause. It is a
clear violation of a person's right to due process.
The Rules of Court also allows a party to a civil action
certain remedies that enable him or her to effectively present his
or her case. A party may file a cross-claim, a counterclaim or a
third-party complaint. 61 The Rules of Court prohibits these
remedies in a fused civil and criminal case. 62 The Rules of
Court requires that any cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party
complaint must be instituted in a separate civil action. 63 In a
legal regime where a court may order an accused in a fused
action to pay civil liability arising from a contract, the accused-
respondent is completely deprived of the remedy to file a cross-
claim, a counterclaim or a third-party complaint. This —
coupled with an accused-respondent's inability to adequately
prepare his or her defense because of lack of adequate notice of
the claims against him or her — prevents the accused-
respondent from having any right to a meaningful hearing. The
right to be heard under the Due Process Clause requires not just
any kind of an opportunity to be heard. It mandates that a party
to a case must have the chance to be heard in a real and
meaningful sense. It does not require a perfunctory hearing, but
a court proceeding where the party may adequately avail of the
procedural remedies granted to him or her. A court decision
resulting from this falls short of the mandate of the Due Process
Clause.
Indeed, the language of the Constitution is clear. No
person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
Due Process, in its procedural sense, requires, in essence, the
right to notice and hearing. These rights are further fleshed out
in the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court enforces procedural
due process because, to repeat the words of this Court
in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, it provides for "what process
is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due." 64 A court
ordering an accused in a fused action to pay his or her
contractual liability deprives him or her of his or her property
without the right to notice and hearing as expressed in the
procedures and remedies under the Rules of Court. Thus, any
court ruling directing an accused in a fused action to pay civil
liability arising from a contract is one that completely disregards
the Due Process Clause. This ruling must be reversed and the
Constitution upheld.
Conclusion
The lower courts erred when they ordered petitioner to
pay her civil obligation arising from a contract of loan in the
same criminal case where she was acquitted on the ground that
there was no crime. Any contractual obligation she may have
must be litigated in a separate civil action involving the contract
of loan. We clarify that in cases where the accused is acquitted
on the ground that there is no crime, the civil action deemed
instituted with the criminal case cannot prosper precisely
because there is no delict from which any civil obligation may
be sourced. The peculiarity of this case is the finding that
petitioner, in fact, has an obligation arising from a contract. This
civil action arising from the contract is not necessarily
extinguished. It can be instituted in the proper court through the
proper civil action.
We note that while there is no written contract of loan
in this case, there is an oral contract of loan which must be
brought within six years. 65 Under the facts of the case, it
appears that any breach in the obligation to pay the loan may
have happened between 1996 and 1999, or more than six years
since this case has been instituted. This notwithstanding, we find
that the civil action arising from the contract of loan has not yet
prescribed. Article 1150 of the Civil Code states —
Art. 1150. The time for
prescription for all kinds of actions, when
there is no special provision which ordains
otherwise, shall be counted from the day
they may be brought.
We held in numerous cases that it is the legal
possibility of bringing the action that determines the starting
point for the computation of the period of prescription. 67 We
highlight the unique circumstances surrounding this case. As
discussed in this decision, there has been diverse jurisprudence
as to the propriety of ordering an accused to pay an obligation
arising from a contract in the criminal case where the accused
was acquitted on the ground that there is no crime. Litigants,
such as MCCI, cannot be blamed for relying on prior rulings
where the recovery on a contract of loan in a criminal case
for estafa was allowed. We have found the opportunity to clarify
this matter through this decision. As it is only now that we
delineate the rules governing the fusion of criminal and civil
actions pertaining to estafa, it is only upon the promulgation of
this judgment that litigants have a clear understanding of the
proper recourse in similar cases. We therefore rule that insofar
as MCCI is concerned, the filing of an action, if any (that may
be sourced from the contract of loan), becomes a legal
possibility only upon the finality of this decision which
definitively ruled upon the principles on fused actions.
We add, however, that upon finality of this decision,
prospective litigants should become more circumspect in
ascertaining their course of action in similar cases. Whenever a
litigant erroneously pursues an estafa case, and the accused is
subsequently acquitted because the obligation arose out of a
contract, the prescriptive period will still be counted from the
time the cause of action arose. In this eventuality, it is probable
that the action has already prescribed by the time the criminal
case shall have been completed. This possibility demands that
prospective litigants do not haphazardly pursue the filing of
an estafa case in order to force an obligor to pay his or her
obligation with the threat of criminal conviction. It compels
litigants to be honest and fair in their judgment as to the proper
 action to be filed. This ruling should deter litigants from turning
to criminal courts as their collection agents, and should provide
a disincentive to the practice of filing of criminal cases based on
unfounded grounds in order to provide a litigant a bargaining
chip in enforcing contracts.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition
is GRANTED. The Decision of the CA dated February 25, 2009
is REVERSED. This is however, without prejudice to any civil
action which may be filed to claim civil liability arising from the
contract.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Dy v. People, G.R. No. 189081, [August 10, 2016], 792 PHIL
672-697)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 229856. November 20, 2017.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. RUBEN CALOMIA, accused-
appellant.
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
In Criminal Case Nos. 1317 and 1318, accused-
appellant Ruben Calomia was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50, with two counts of
qualified rape of his minor daughter, AAA, 1 which he allegedly
committed sometime in August 2007 and April 2008. 2
After trial on the merits, the RTC promulgated its
Decision on March 11, 2015 finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of both counts of qualified rape and
sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the
foregoing evidence, the court finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
(Qualified) Incestuous Rape in Crim. Case
No. 1317 and Statutory Incestuous Rape in
Crim. Case No. 1318.
Accordingly, in both cases, the
court has no recourse but to impose on the
accused the penalties mandated by law.
Although the crimes of Qualified Incestuous
Rape and Statutory Incestuous Rape would
have been punishable by death, in view of
the passage of R.A. [No.] 9346 (which
prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty), the penalty imposable for each of
the two offenses is only reclusion perpetua.
Because of the qualifying or
aggravating circumstance of relationship, the
victim is entitled to civil indemnity in each
case of P75,000 ex delicto, P75,000 in moral
damages (People v. Lauga, G.R. No.
186228, Mar. 15, 2010), and P30,000 in
exemplary damages (ibid.). 3
Accused-appellant's appeal before the Court of
Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 02040. In
its Decision dated August 26, 2016, the appellate court upheld
accused-appellant's conviction, but modified the award of
damages to AAA. The Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, We find no error committed by
the Trial Court and, hence, DENY the
appeal. The Decision dated 11 March 2015
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Loay, Bohol 7th Judicial Region, Branch 50,
in Criminal Case Nos. 1317 and 1318,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
As modified, [accused-]appellant
Ruben Calomia is ordered to pay the victim
AAA the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages,
and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Interest is imposed on all damages awarded
at the rate of 6% per annum from date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid. 4
On September 21, 2016, accused-appellant filed his
Notice of Appeal expressing his intention to appeal the
foregoing Decision before this Court.
The Court issued a Resolution dated April 25, 2017
requiring the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs,
if they so desired, within 30 days from notice; ordering the
Provincial Jail Warden, Bohol Detention and Rehabilitation
Center, Tagbilaran City, to transfer accused-appellant to the
Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City and to submit a report
of such transfer; and ordering the Director General of the Bureau
of Corrections to confirm the confinement of accused-appellant
to said prison and submit a report thereon.
However, the Court received on September 4, 2017 a
letter dated August 2, 2017 from Jail Chief Inspector (J/CINSP)
Felipe A. Montejo (Montejo), DDM, Bohol District Jail Warden,
stating thus:
Please be informed that the said
appellant [has] died while in the
confinement of Bohol District Jail last Sept.
29, 2015 due to Asphyxia due to
Strangulation, Self Inflicted, Hanging and
declared dead by Dr. Calvelo, Medical
Officer III, City Health Office, Tagbilaran
City, Bohol per Certificate of Death from
Local Civil Registrar.
Accused Ruben Calomia was due
for transfer at BUCOR Muntinlupa City at
that time pending the approval of budget but
unfortunately he died with the
aforementioned cause of death before the
scheduled date and time to transfer. 5
Attached to J/CINSP Montejo's letter is a copy of
accused-appellant's Death Certificate issued by the Office of the
Civil Registrar General indicating that accused-appellant died on
September 29, 2015 in Cabawan District, Tagbilaran City,
Bohol, of "Asphyxia due to Strangulation, Self Inflicted,
Hanging."
Paragraph 1 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, provides that the death of an accused pending his
appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil liability ex
delicto, thus:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is
totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as
to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefore is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment[.]
In People v. Bayotas, 6 the Court construed the above
provision and pronounced these guidelines:
 1. Death of the accused pending promulgation of its Decision in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No.
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his 02040 on August 26, 2016.
criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Irrefragably, accused-appellant's death extinguished
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the his criminal liability and his civil liabilities directly arising from
accused prior to final judgment and based solely on the crime/s he committed. Accused-
terminates his criminal liability appellant's conviction by the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of
and only the civil liability directly arising Appeals, must therefore be set aside as the same had already
from and based solely on the offense been rendered ineffectual.
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to SET
senso strictiore." ASIDE the Decision dated August 26, 2016 of the Court of
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 02040 and
liability survives notwithstanding the to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 1317 and 1318 before the
death of accused, if the same may also be Regional Trial Court of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50, by reason of
predicated on a source of obligation other the death of the sole accused therein, Ruben Calomia, on
than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code September 29, 2015.
enumerates these other sources of obligation SO ORDERED.
from which the civil liability may arise as a
result of the same act or omission: Sereno, C.J., Del Castillo, Jardeleza and Tijam, JJ.,
concur.
a) Law
||| (People v. Calomia, G.R. No. 229856 (Resolution), [November 20,
b) Contracts 2017])
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability
survives, as explained in Number 2 above,
an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate
civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended
party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription,
in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction,
the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension
on a possible privation of right by
prescription. (Emphases supplied.)
The death of an accused pending the appeal of his
conviction extinguishes the criminal action, as there is no longer
a defendant to stand as the accused; and the civil action
instituted therein for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
likewise ipso facto extinguished, as it is grounded on the
criminal action. 7
In the instant case, accused-appellant's death occurred
prior to the finality of the judgment of conviction rendered
against him. In fact, accused-appellant died way back on
September 29, 2015, during the pendency of his appeal before
the Court of Appeals. Unfortunately, the appellate court was not
timely informed of accused-appellant's death prior to the
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 214326. July 6, 2020.]
ALASTAIR JOHN
KANE, petitioner, vs. PATRICIA
ROGGENKAMP, respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J p:
An acquittal from a charge of physical violence
against women and their children is not a bar to the filing of a
civil action for damages for physical injuries under Article 33 of
the Civil Code if an acquittal was due to reasonable doubt,
without any declaration that the facts upon which the offense
arises are nonexistent.
This resolves the Petition for Review
on Certiorari 1 filed by Alastair John Kane, assailing the
Decision 2 and Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals reversed and set aside the Order 4 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City, dismissing Patricia
Roggenkamp's Complaint for Damages against Alastair John
Kane. The Complaint, which was based on Article 33 of
the Civil Code, was dismissed on the grounds of res
judicata and lack of jurisdiction.
Alastair John Kane (Alastair John) and Patricia
Roggenkamp (Patricia) are Australian citizens. 5 They met in
January 2004 in Brisbane, Australia, and became lovers
immediately. 6
Patricia decided to put up a business in the
Philippines, and eventually travelled with Alastair John to
Manila. They settled in a condominium unit located in
Parañaque City supposedly owned by Patricia. 7
On March 30, 2006, an Information for violation
of Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women
and Children Act of 2004 was filed against Alastair John, with
Patricia as the private complainant. The case, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-0413, was then raffled to Branch 260 of
the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City. 8
According to Patricia, she and Alastair John attended a
party hosted by her son, Ashley Richard Cayzer (Ashley
Richard) on November 30, 2004. The next day, December 1,
2004, after they had just arrived at their residence at about 1:00
a.m., Patricia confronted Alastair John for allegedly looking at
the underwear of other female guests at the party. Ignoring
Patricia, Alastair John went on to lie down on the bed. Patricia
then sat on a nearby chair. 9
Alastair John, angered by Patricia's remarks, allegedly
approached Patricia, lifted her off the chair, and dropped her on
the floor. Patricia further claimed that Alastair John punched her
in the head, dragged her by the hair to the bed, and pushed her
head against the pillow. Patricia fought back and, when she had
the chance, ran to the bathroom and locked herself inside. 10
The next day, on December 2, 2004, Patricia's son,
Ashley Richard, visited his mother and saw her lying in bed in
pain. Alastair John told Ashley Richard that his mother had too
much liquor the night of the party and, when they arrived home,
Alastair John tried to carry her to the bed. Unfortunately, he
accidently dropped her on the floor because the bed, which
allegedly had wheels, moved. 11
Ashley Richard then brought Patricia to the San Juan
de Dios Hospital where she was prescribed painkillers for 12
days. After the trip to the hospital, Patricia went home to
Alastair John. Their situation went back to being peaceful, and
they even went on vacation from December 26, 2004 to January
1, 2005. 12
On January 6, 2005, or merely five (5) days after,
Alastair John allegedly verbally abused Patricia. He then left the
next day, taking Patricia's car with him, as well as the keys to
their Parañaque residence and another condominium unit in
Pasig City where he stayed. Patricia, accompanied by her driver,
went to the Pasig condominium unit and recovered possession of
her car. 13
On February 4, 2005, Patricia finally reported the
incidents to the police. She explained that, prior to the December
1, 2004 incident, there were already prior incidents of abuse
committed against her by Alastair John. After preliminary
investigation, probable cause for violation of Republic Act
9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children
Act of 2004 was found against Alastair John. 14
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260,
Parañaque City acquitted Alastair John on the ground of
reasonable doubt. 15 The Parañaque trial court was of the
opinion that Alastair John's account of the events — that he
accidentally dropped Patricia on the floor while he was carrying
her — was "in accord with human experience[,]" 16 while that
of Patricia's was not. It further said that "if [Patricia] was really a
victim of violence or abuse, she should have told the same to her
son [Ashley Richard], especially because the latter, according to
her, is a lawyer." 17 The Parañaque trial court more particularly
said:
The Court noted that there was a
heated altercation between the private
complainant and the accused after they came
from the birthday party of the former's son
on December 1, 2004. Kane was accused of
looking and peeping at the girls during the
party. The Court is inclined to give credence
to the version of the accused. The same is in
accord with human experience. On the other
hand[,] the version of Patricia is not in
accord with human experience. She claimed
that she was grabbed by the hair, hit her
head and chest, neck, pelvic area and
shoulder but the clinical abstract does not
indicate any signs of physical violence. This
court finds it unnatural why Patricia
declared to the doctor that she accidentally
fell on a marble floor. This is her same
declaration to her son, Ashley. If she was
really a victim of violence or abuse, she
should have told the same to her son,
especially because the latter, according to
her, is a lawyer. This court is also surprised
why she did not leave the accused if it is true
that he manhandled her. She could easily do
those things because her relationship with
the accused was that only of lovers and there
was no marriage to protect and family to
 save. To reiterate, the version of Mr. Kane is
shown by the parties' actuations after the
date alleged in the information. They even
celebrated Christmas in a beach resort with
friends and with the accused playing Santa
[Claus]. Noteworthy is the filing of the case
almost one year after the alleged incident
and after the parties started to have issues on
property. 18
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, due to reasonable doubt,
the accused, ALASTAIR JOHN KANE, is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime [of]
violation of Sec. 5(a) of R.A. 9262,
penalized by Sec. 6 (a) of the said Act.
SO ORDERED. 19 (Emphasis in
the original)
Thereafter, Patricia filed a Complaint for Damages
based on Article 33 of the Civil Code before the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City, praying for actual, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Patricia argued that the
right of action provided in Article 33 in cases of physical
injuries is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action
earlier commenced against Alastair John. 20
Further, she added that the civil actions for damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code, called
independent civil actions, "are not deemed instituted with the
criminal action and may be filed separately by the offended
party even without reservation." Considering that Alastair John
was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, not because he
wasn't the author of the act complained of, Patricia argued that
he may still be held liable under Article 33 of the Civil Code.21
Opposing the civil action, Alastair John filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and improper
venue. 22 Alastair John claimed that the dismissal of the
criminal case barred the filing of the civil case, because the
cases allegedly involved identical causes of action. He
emphasized that the cases were both based on his alleged
physical abuse of Patricia, a matter already found to be not "in
accord with human experience." 23 With respect to the venue,
Alastair John argued that it was improperly laid. The action for
damages was a personal action, yet none of the parties resided in
Mandaluyong City where the civil action was filed. 24
In an April 20, 2009 Order, the Motion to Dismiss was
denied by the 214th Branch of the Regional Trial Court,
Mandaluyong City, then presided by Judge Edwin D.
Sorongon. 25
The trial court held that civil liability was not
extinguished, because Alastair John's acquittal was based on
reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the action filed by Patricia was
an independent civil action which, together with the actions
provided in Articles 32, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code, is
separate and distinct from the criminal action and may be
enforced against an offender, separately or simultaneously, with
his civil liability ex delicto under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code. Finally, the trial court held that venue was properly
laid because at the time of the filing of the civil complaint,
Patricia was already residing in Mandaluyong City. 26 In the
words of the trial court:
"The motion is unimpressive.
"While it is true that accused's
(herein defendant) guilt in the criminal case
had not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt by the trial court in Parañaque City,
the decision however did not state in clear
and [un]equivocal terms that he did not
commit the offense charged. Hence,
impliedly the trial court of Parañaque
acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since
civil liability is not extinguished in criminal
cases if the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt[,] then the instant civil complaint must
proceed. Civil liability arising from criminal
and civil liability arising from Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 quasi-delict for contract
(Art. 31) are entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action that may be brought
by injured party (International Flavors and
Fragrances, Inc. vs. Argos, 364 SCRA. 792)
[.]
"Even if the guilt of the accused
has not been [satisfactorily] established, he
is not exempted from civil liability which
may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only. This is the situation
contemplated in Article 33 of the Civil
Code where the civil action for damages is
"for the same act or omission." Although the
two actions have different purposes, the
matters discussed in the civil case are similar
to those discussed in the criminal case.
However, the judgment in the criminal
proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the
civil action to establish any fact there
determined, even though both actions
involve the same act or omission. The civil
liability is not extinguished where acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt (Manantan vs.
Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 387).
"An act or omission causing
damage to another may give rise to two
separate liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex deli[c]to,
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and (2) independent civil liabilities,
such as those (a) not arising from an act or
omission complained of felony, e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law
under Article 32 of the Civil Code,
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34,
and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, or (b) where the injured
party is granted a right to file an independent
and distinct criminal action (Article 33, Civil
Code). Either of these two possible liabilities
may be enforced against the offender
(separately and simultaneously) subject,
however, to the caveat under Article 2177 of
the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission or under both causes
(Cando, Jr. v. Isip, G.R. No. 133978,
November 12, 2002). However, a separate
civil action based on subsidiary liability
cannot be instituted during the pendency of
the criminal case (Remedial Law, Herrera).
"Likewise, the ground of improper
venue cannot be sustained. It was clarified
by plaintiff that when she testified on May
22, 2007 and May 13, 2008 she considered
 herself a resident of Parañaque, however, in
November 2008 and subsequently
thereafter[,] she stayed at the condominium
unit of her friend in . . . Mandaluyong City.
In other words, at the time of the filing of
the complaint on November 29, 2008 she
was already residing in Mandaluyong City[.]
Clearly, plaintiff for purposes of this instant
case is a resident of Mandaluyong
City." 27 (Emphasis in the original)
With his Motion for Reconsideration having been
denied by the trial court, Alastair John filed his Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim and Patricia, her Reply. Issues were
joined and the case was set for pre-trial. 28
In the meantime, Judge Sorongon was appointed
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. Judge Ofelia Calo
then acted as Presiding Judge of the Mandaluyong trial
court 29 and, in the June 8, 2010 Order, dismissed the case motu
proprio on the ground of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction. 30
The Mandaluyong trial court said that, after "[taking] a
closer look at the records extant to the instant case[,]" 31 any
subsequent proceeding in the civil case would be "a waste of
time" 32 since the decision of the Parañaque trial court had the
effect of res judicata. Specifically, the Mandaluyong trial court
declared that the Parañaque trial court's evaluation of the parties'
respective evidence meant that "the act from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist." 33
Consequently, the action based on Article 33 allegedly
had no basis, and Patricia effectively committed forum
shopping. Finally, it ruled that the Parañaque trial court's
decision in the criminal case already attained finality, thus
depriving the Mandaluyong trial court of jurisdiction over
Patricia's Complaint for Damages.
A closer look at the records of the
instant case filed by plaintiff would show
that this court has no jurisdiction over the
instant case.
The instant case which is for
damages was also the subject matter of
Criminal Case No. 06-413 litigated in
another court, the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque City, Branch 260 wherein a
Decision rendered by the said court
acquitting the accused, the herein defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
Although the motion to dismiss
filed by defendants on the grounds that the
instant complaint is barred by prior
judgment and improper venue was already
denied for lack of merit in an Order dated 20
April 2009, the undersigned acting presiding
judge deemed it proper to take a closer look
at the records extant to the instant case
considering that proceeding to the initial
trial will just be a waste of time and any
proceedings taken by the court will only be a
nullity if the court has no jurisdiction
because of the principle of res judicata.
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, the evaluation made by the
RTC, Branch 260, Parañaque City of the
criminal case giving credence to the version
of the accused, which the Court perceived to
be in accord with human experience, and
pointing to factual circumstances and
explaining why the version of Patricia is not
in accord with human experience, is a clear
showing that the act from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist.
With the decision rendered by the
RTC Branch 260, Parañaque City involving
the same cause of action and relief sought,
and identity [of] parties, this court perceives
that the filing of the instant case in this
jurisdiction constituted forum shopping. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that the RTC, Branch
260, Parañaque City has already taken
cognizance of the case involving the same
cause of action and identity of parties, and
has in fact rendered a decision which has
attained finality, this court therefore has no
jurisdiction to try the same action. 34
Patricia filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
subsequently denied in a November 19, 2010 Order. 35
Alleging error on the part of the Mandaluyong trial
court, Patricia appealed before the Court of Appeals. In the
March 25, 2014 Decision, 36 the Court of Appeals granted the
appeal and reversed the June 8, 2010 and August 23, 2010
Orders of the Mandaluyong trial court.
The Court of Appeals first discussed how an act or
omission may give rise to two (2) separate civil liabilities on the
part of an offender. The civil liability ex delicto or that arising
from the crime is provided in Article 100 of the Civil Code.On
the other hand, independent civil liabilities are provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code, which are
liabilities separate and distinct from the criminal action and may
be pursued independently of it. Reservation to file the civil
action is even unnecessary. Thus, an offended party may pursue
any of these civil liabilities, whether ex delicto or not, subject to
Article 2177 of the Civil Code prohibiting double recovery. 37
The Court of Appeals then emphasized that the civil
case filed by Patricia was based on Article 33 of the Civil Code,
an independent civil action. Thus, contrary to the Mandaluyong
trial court's ruling, the decision of the Parañaque trial court
acquitting Alastair John did not operate as res judicata so as to
bar the filing of the Complaint for Damages under Article 33. It
was immaterial that the decision of the Parañaque trial court had
already become final and executory, because the causes of
action between the case for violation of Republic Act No.
9262 and the one filed under Article 33 of the Civil Code are
different. 38
The Court of Appeals held that Patricia did not
commit forum shopping because the causes of action for the
criminal action and the Complaint for Damages are different.
There can also be no forum shopping, according the Court of
Appeals, when the law expressly allows the filing of an
independent civil action in cases of physical injuries. 39
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the venue was
properly laid. Under the Rules of Court, personal actions, such
as an action for damages, must be filed in the plaintiff or
defendant's residence, at the election of the plaintiff, unless the
parties agree on another venue. Considering that Patricia was
already residing in Mandaluyong City at the time of the filing of
the case, she correctly filed the Complaint for Damages before
the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong. 40
 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' March
25, 2014 Decision read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal
is GRANTED. The Orders dated June 8,
2010 and November 19, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 214 in Civil Case No. MC08-3871
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 214 is DIRECTED to reinstate Civil
Case No. MC08-3871, to continue with the
proceedings and to resolve the same with
deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED. 41 (Emphasis in
the original)
Alastair John then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied by the Court of Appeals in the September 3,
2014 Resolution. 42
On October 9, 2014, Alastair John filed his Petition for
Review on Certiorari. 43 Upon the directive of this Court,
Patricia filed her Comment, 44 to which Alastair John
replied. 45
Petitioner mainly argues that he may no longer be
made liable for damages under Article 33 of the Civil
Code.According to petitioner, the Parañaque trial court's
decision on the criminal case for violation of Republic Act No.
9262 clearly established that "the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist." 46 Therefore, there is no
basis to hold him liable for damages for the alleged physical
injuries sustained by respondent. 47
Further, petitioner maintains that respondent's
Complaint for Damages was already barred by res judicata. He
claims that the Complaint for Damages was based on the alleged
intentional physical injuries sustained by respondent. In the
criminal case, however, the Parañaque trial court already ruled
that the physical injuries resulted from an accident. With the
decision of the Parañaque trial court having attained finality, it is
allegedly binding upon the parties, and the Complaint for
Damages was correctly dismissed by the Mandaluyong trial
court. 48
It follows that in filing the Complaint for Damages,
respondent committed forum shopping. Specifically, respondent
allegedly sought damages after she failed to secure a favorable
ruling with the Parañaque trial court. 49
Finally, petitioner contends that the venue for the civil
action was improperly laid. Although the term "residence"
merely refers to a physical habituation or actual residence, the
physical presence and actual stay in that place must be more
than temporary and must be with continuity and consistency.
According to petitioner, respondent failed to establish such
continuity, as she testified under oath in two (2) proceedings that
she was a resident of Parañaque City: 50 (1) one in 2007; and (2)
another in 2008, both after the filing of the Complaint for
Damages. These declarations should bind respondent, since her
declarations were given under pain of prosecution for
perjury. 51
Respondent counters that the Court of Appeals
committed no error in ruling that petitioner may still be held
liable for damages, regardless of his acquittal in the criminal
case. According to respondent, nowhere in the text of the
Parañaque trial court decision could it be inferred that the fact
from which petitioner's civil liability might arise did not exist.
On the contrary, the Parañaque trial court explicitly
stated that it acquitted petitioner "due to reasonable
doubt[.]" 52 Consequently, the Mandaluyong trial court should
have proceeded to trial, and petitioner's liability for physical
injuries, if any, should have been ascertained. 53
Respondent further submits that res judicata does not
apply in the present case. She maintains that the civil actions
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are
independent civil actions which may be separately filed by the
offended party, even without reservation in the prosecution of
the criminal action. Therefore, respondent is legally "allowed to
file two (2) separate suits for the same act or omission. The first
a criminal suit where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-
delict[,]" 54 and the independent civil action may proceed
regardless of the result of the proceedings in the criminal
case. 55
On the issue of forum shopping, respondent contends
that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the issue. According
to respondent, the civil liability under Article 33 of the Civil
Code is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, an offended party
may pursue both kinds of civil liability, even simultaneously,
without offending the rule against forum shopping. 56
Lastly, respondent maintains that, as correctly found
by the Court of Appeals, the venue was properly laid. She argues
that "whether [she] lived in other places prior to [the filing of the
complaint] is irrelevant[,]" 57 and in this case, she clearly
established that she was a resident of Mandaluyong City when
she filed her Complaint for Damages under Article 33. 58
The issues for this Court's resolution are:
First, whether or not petitioner Alastair John Kane
may still be held civilly liable because his acquittal was based on
reasonable doubt;
Second, whether or not the Complaint for Damages
was already barred by res judicata;
Third, whether or not respondent Patricia
Roggenkamp committed forum shopping; and,
Fourth, whether or not the venue was properly laid.
This Petition must be denied. The Mandaluyong trial
court seriously erred in motu proprio dismissing respondent's
Complaint for Damages on the grounds of res judicata and lack
of jurisdiction.
I
Respondent based her Complaint for Damages against
petitioner on Article 33 of the Civil Code:
ARTICLE 33. In cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence.
Article 33 is explicit that in cases of defamation, fraud,
and physical injuries, the civil action is "entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action" and shall "proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution." Accordingly, Article
33 "contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that
is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the
case." 59 Even the quantum of proof required — preponderance
of evidence, as opposed to the proof beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal cases — is different, confirming that the civil action
under Article 33 is independent of the criminal action.
Reservation of the right to separately file a civil action
for damages under Article 33 need not even be made. The civil
action under Article 33 may be pursued before the filing of the
criminal case, 60 during the pendency of the criminal case, 61 or
even after the criminal case is resolved. 62 The only limitation is
that an offended party cannot "recover [damages] twice for the
same act or omission" of the defendant. Rule 111, Section 3 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
RULE 111
Prosecution of Civil Action
SECTION 3. When Civil Action
May Proceed Independently. — In the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.
Further, "defamation," "fraud," and "physical injuries,"
as used in Article 33, are to be understood in their ordinary
sense. Specifically, the "physical injuries" contemplated in
Article 33 is bodily injury, not the "physical injuries" referred to
in the Revised Penal Code. As first explained in Carandang v.
Santiago: 63
[Article 33] uses the words
"defamation," "fraud" and "physical
injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in
their ordinary sense because there are no
specific provisions in the Revised Penal
Code using these terms as means of offenses
defined therein, so that these two terms
defamation and fraud must have been used
not to impart to them any technical meaning
in the laws of the Philippines, but in their
generic sense. With this apparent
circumstance in mind, it is evident that the
term "physical injuries" could not have been
used in its specific sense as a crime defined
in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult
to believe that the Code Commission would
have used terms in the same article — some
in their general and another in its technical
sense. In other words, the term "physical
injuries" should be understood to mean
bodily injury, not the crime of physical
injuries, because the terms used with the
latter are general terms. In any case the Code
Commission recommended that the civil
action for physical injuries be similar to the
civil action for assault and battery in
American Law, and this recommendation
must have been accepted by the Legislature
when it approved the article intact as
recommended. If the intent has been to
establish a civil action for the bodily harm
received by the complainant similar to the
civil action for assault and battery, as the
Code Commission states, the civil action
should lie whether the offense committed is
that of physical injuries, or frustrated
homicide, or attempted homicide, or even
death. 64
Madeja v. Caro 65 reiterates that "physical injuries" in
Article 33 means bodily injury.
Alastair John was charged with violating Section 5 (a)
of Republic Act No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women
and Children Act of 2004:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence
Against Women and Their Children. — The
crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the
following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her
child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her
child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child
physical harm[.]
Section 5 enumerates the various "acts of violence
against women and their children," generally defined as:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.
— any act or a series of acts committed by
any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely
to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. 66
Paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of Section 5 specifically
refer to acts of "physical violence," which, under the law,
includes "acts that include bodily or physical harm[.]"
It is not hard to see that respondent properly availed
herself of a separate action for damages under Article 33 after
the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner. The
criminal action filed against petitioner was one for physical
injuries in the sense contemplated in Article 33, that is, bodily
injury.
Nevertheless, Alastair John claims that his acquittal
should have barred the filing of the Complaint for Damages. He
maintains that, as allegedly held by the Parañaque trial court, the
act or commission from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist; hence, there is no civil liability ex delicto to which the
Article 33 action may be anchored.
The contention is without merit.
Under Rule 120, Section 2 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, a judgment acquitting the accused must
state whether the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt
of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the judgment must determine if
the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist:
RULE 120
Judgment
xxx xxx xxx
 SECTION 2. Contents of the
Judgment. — If the judgment is of
conviction, it shall state (1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by
the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances
which attended its commission; (2) the
participation of the accused in the offense,
whether as principal, accomplice, or
accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty
imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil
liability or damages caused by his wrongful
act or omission to be recovered from the
accused by the offended party, if there is
any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been
reserved or waived.
In case the judgment is of
acquittal, it shall state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is essential to indicate whether the act or omission
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Without
such declaration, it must be presumed that the acquittal was due
to reasonable doubt, and the accused is civilly liable ex delicto.
Thus, the general rule shall apply: every person criminally liable
is also civilly liable. 67
In Manantan v. Court of Appeals, 68 accused George
Manantan was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. The trial court acquitted him of the crime charged,
leading the heirs of the deceased to appeal the civil aspect of the
trial court decision. Despite Manantan's acquittal, the Court of
Appeals granted the appeal, declared Manantan to be the
"proximate cause of the vehicular accident," 69 and held him
civilly liable.
Among Manantan's arguments before this Court was
that the Court of Appeals erred in finding him civilly liable,
because the trial court already found that he was neither
imprudent nor negligent. To this, this Court said that nowhere in
the text of the trial court decision can it be inferred that no
negligence or imprudence existed. All the judgment provided
was that Manantan was "NOT GUILTY of the crime
charged[.]" 70
Thus, the Court of Appeals "was not precluded from
looking into the question of [Manantan's] negligence or reckless
imprudence[,]" 71 for "even if [his guilt] has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only." 72 In
other words, Manantan's acquittal was not because the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Therefore, Manantan was correctly held civilly liable by the
Court of Appeals. Explained this Court:
Our law recognizes two kinds of
acquittal, with different effects on the civil
liability of the accused. First is an acquittal
on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of.
This instance closes the door to civil
liability, for a person who has been found to
be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held liable for such
act or omission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and
the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court. The second instance is
an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on
the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if
the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt
from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. This is the
situation contemplated in Article 29 of
the Civil Code, where the civil action for
damages is "for the same act or omission."
Although the two actions have different
purposes, the matters discussed in the civil
case are similar to those discussed in the
criminal case. However, the judgment in the
criminal proceeding cannot be read in
evidence in the civil action to establish any
fact there determined, even though both
actions involve the same act or omission.
The reason for this rule is that the parties are
not the same and secondarily, different rules
of evidence are applicable. Hence,
notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal,
the Court of Appeals in determining whether
Article 29 applied, was not precluded from
looking into the question of petitioner's
negligence or reckless
imprudence. 73 (Citations omitted)
Like in Manantan, nowhere in the decision of the
Parañaque trial court in the criminal case does it state that the act
or omission from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
On the contrary, the trial court was unequivocal that petitioner
was acquitted due to reasonable doubt:
WHEREFORE, due to
reasonable doubt, the accused, ALASTAIR
JOHN KANE, is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime [of] violation of Sec[.] 5(a)
of R.A. 9262, penalized by Sec[.] 6 (a) of
the said Act.
SO ORDERED. 74 (Emphasis
supplied)
Having been acquitted due to reasonable doubt,
petitioner is not exempt from civil liability. This is true even if
his guilt was not satisfactorily established.
II
Furthermore, contrary to petitioner's argument, the
decision of the Parañaque trial court acquitting him did not
operate as res judicata so as to bar the filing of the Complaint
for Damages under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
The concept of res judicata was expounded in Club
Filipino, Inc. v. Bautista: 75
Res judicata "literally means 'a
matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; [or] a thing or matter
settled by judgment.'" Res judicata "lays the
rule that an existing final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits, and without fraud or
collusion, by a court of competent
 jurisdiction, upon any matter within its
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies, in all other actions or
suits in the same or any other judicial
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the
points and matters in issue in the first suit."
Res judicata has two (2) aspects.
The first is bar by prior judgment that
precludes the prosecution of a second action
upon the same claim, demand or cause of
action. The second aspect is conclusiveness
of judgment, which states that "issues
actually and directly resolved in a former
suit cannot again be raised in any future case
between the same parties involving a
different cause of action."
The elements of res judicata are:
(1) the judgment sought to bar the
new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must
be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be as between the
first and second action identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of
action[.] 76 (Citations omitted; emphasis in
the original)
It is settled that a decision acquitting the accused is
not res judicata on the independent civil action, even if the latter
action arises from the same act or omission on which the
criminal action was based.
In Cancio v. Isip, 77 cases for estafa were filed against
Emerenciana Isip for issuing checks with insufficient funds.
After it had failed to present its second witness, the prosecution
moved to dismiss the estafa cases, but reserved the right to file a
separate civil action. The motion was granted, and the private
complainant, Jose Cancio, Jr., subsequently filed a case for
collection of sum of money to recover the amount of the checks
subject of the estafa cases.
Isip filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that that the
collection case was barred on the ground of res judicata. The
trial court agreed and dismissed the collection case. It held that
"the dismissal of the criminal cases . . . on the ground of lack of
interest or failure to prosecute is an adjudication on the merits
which amounted to res judicata on the civil case for
collection." 78
On appeal, this Court set aside the trial court's
decision. It explained that an act or omission causing damage to
another may give rise to two (2) separate civil liabilities: (1)
civil liability ex delicto, or that arising from the crime, and (2)
independent civil liabilities, i.e., those not arising from the
crime, or those where the law expressly grants the injured party
the right to file an independent and distinct civil action from the
criminal action. An action for collection of sum of money
is not an action arising from the crime but from contract, an
independent civil action which, according to this Court, may be
pursued even without reservation. 79
This Court rejected the contention that the collection
case was barred by res judicata. Among the elements of res
judicata is that there is an identity of causes of action between
the actions, and between a criminal case based on culpa
criminal and an action based on culpa contractual, there is no
such identity of causes of action. The independent civil action:
. . . remains separate and distinct
from any criminal prosecution based on the
same act. Not being deemed instituted in the
criminal action based on culpa criminal, a
ruling on the culpability of the offender will
have no bearing on said independent civil
action based on an entirely different cause of
action, i.e., culpa contractual. 80 (Citation
omitted; emphasis in the original)
The defense of res judicata was likewise raised but
nonetheless rejected in Lim v. Kou Co Ping. 81 The case
involved withdrawal authorities issued by a cement corporation,
thereby allowing holders of the instrument to withdraw cement
bags from the corporation's cement plant. Kou Co Ping had
earlier bought withdrawal authorities, which he subsequently
sold to Lily Lim. When Lim failed to withdraw cement bags
covered by the withdrawal authorities, she sued Kou Co Ping
for estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.
The trial court acquitted Kou Co Ping of estafa for
insufficiency of evidence. However, it set the case for reception
of evidence on Kou Co Ping's civil liability. After trial on the
criminal case, the trial court also absolved Kou Co Ping of civil
liability to Lim.
This caused Lim to subsequently file a complaint for
specific performance and damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. Moving to dismiss the complaint, Kou Co Ping
argued that his acquittal in the estafa case was res judicata on
the specific performance and damages case.
The Manila trial court denied the motion to dismiss,
which was affirmed by this Court. Citing Cancio, this Court
discussed how an act or omission may give rise to civil liability
arising from different sources. The source of the civil liability
arising from the offense is different from that arising from
contract, and an offended party may pursue either or both,
subject to the prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177
of the Civil Code.Considering that the complaint for specific
performance and damages is premised on a civil liability,
and not arising from crime but from contract, this Court held
that the decision on the civil aspect of the estafa case had no
bearing on the case for specific performance and damages.
In Lim:
A single act or omission that
causes damage to an offended party may
give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offender — (1) civil liability
ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from
the criminal offense under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, and
(2) independent civil liability, that is, civil
liability that may be pursued independently
of the criminal proceedings. The
independent civil liability may be based on
"an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony," as
provided in Article 31 of the Civil
Code (such as for breach of contract or for
tort). It may also be based on an act or
omission that may constitute felony but,
nevertheless, treated independently from the
criminal action by specific provision of
Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of
defamation, fraud and physical injuries").
 The civil liability arising from the and distinct from any
offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or criminal prosecution
omissions that constitute the criminal based on the same act.
offense; hence, its trial is inherently Not being deemed
intertwined with the criminal action. For this instituted in the criminal
reason, the civil liability ex delicto is action based on culpa
impliedly instituted with the criminal criminal, a ruling on the
offense. If the action for the civil liability ex culpability of the
delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to offender will have no
the filing of the criminal action, its bearing on said
proceedings are suspended until the final independent civil action
outcome of the criminal action. The civil based on an entirely
liability based on delict is extinguished different cause of
when the court hearing the criminal action action, i.e., culpa
declares that "the act or omission from contractual.
which the civil liability may arise did not
exist." In the same
vein, the filing of the
On the other hand, the collection case after the
independent civil liabilities are separate dismissal of
from the criminal action and may be pursued the estafa cases against
independently, as provided in Articles 31 [the offender] did not
and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that: amount to forum-
shopping. The essence
ART. of forum shopping is the
31. When the civil filing of multiple suits
action is based on involving the same
an obligation not parties for the same
arising from the act or cause of action, either
omission complained of simultaneously or
as a felony, such civil successively, to secure a
action may proceed favorable judgment.
independently of the Although the cases filed
criminal proceedings by [the offended party]
and regardless of the arose from the same act
result of the latter. or omission of [the
ART. 33. In offender], they are,
cases of defamation, however, based on
fraud, and physical different causes of
injuries a civil action for action. The criminal
damages, entirely cases for estafa are
separate and distinct based on culpa
from the criminal action, criminal while the civil
may be brought by the action for collection is
injured party. Such civil anchored on culpa
action shall proceed contractual. Moreover,
independently of the there can be no forum-
criminal prosecution, shopping in the instant
and shall require only a case because the law
preponderance of expressly allows the
evidence. filing of a separate civil
action which can
Because of the distinct and proceed independently
independent nature of the two kinds of civil of the criminal
liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the action. 82 (Citations
offended party may pursue the two types of omitted; emphasis in the
civil liabilities simultaneously or original)
cumulatively, without offending the rules on
forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res Applying the foregoing, petitioner's acquittal in the
judicata. As explained in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip: case for violation of Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 9262 is
not res judicata on the action for damages under Article 33 of
One of the the Civil Code.One of the elements of res judicata is the identity
elements of res of causes of action, with "cause of action" being the "act or
judicata is identity of omission by which a party violates a right of another." 83
causes of action. In the
instant case, it must be While the criminal action and the action for damages
stressed that the action arise from the same act or omission — the alleged physical
filed by petitioner is an violence committed by petitioner against respondent — these
independent civil action, actions violate two (2) different rights of respondent: (1) her
which remains separate right not to be physically harmed by an intimate partner
under Republic Act No. 9262; and (2) her right to recover
damages for bodily injury under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
In other words, the criminal case and the civil case do
not have identical causes of action, and respondent had the right
to pursue either petitioner's civil liability arising from the
violation of Republic Act No. 9262, or the independent civil
liability provided for in Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Even the finality of the acquittal is immaterial in the
present case. To reiterate: actions under Article 33 of the Civil
Code are "'separate, distinct, and independent' of any criminal
prosecution based on the same act [or omission]" 84 on which
the civil action was filed. As this Court said in Cancio, "a ruling
on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on [the]
independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of
action[.]" 85
All told, the Court of Appeals correctly rejected
petitioner's res judicata argument.
III
Corollarily, this Court affirms the Court of Appeals'
ruling that respondent did not commit forum-shopping when she
filed the Complaint for Damages under Article 33 of the Civil
Code.Forum shopping is committed:
by a party who institutes two or more suits
in different courts, either simultaneously or
successively, in order to ask the courts to
rule on the same or related causes or to grant
the same or substantially the same reliefs, on
the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition or
increase a party's chances of obtaining a
favorable decision or action[.] 86 (Citation
omitted)
To determine whether there is forum shopping, it is
necessary to ascertain "whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another[.]" 87 The test is "whether
in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties,
rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought." 88
Litis pendentia "refers to that situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for the same
cause of action, such that the second action becomes
unnecessary and vexatious." 89
The following requisites must concur for litis
pendentia to be present: (1) the identity of parties, or at least
such as representing the same interests in both actions; (2) the
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for; and (3) the
identity of the two (2) cases such that judgment in one,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other. 90
As discussed, the final judgment on the violation for
Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 9262 does not amount to res
judicata in the action for damages under Article 33 of the Civil
Code.Further, Article 33 expressly allows the filing of a separate
civil action for damages arising from physical injuries that can
proceed independently of the criminal action. With one of the
crucial elements of res judicata being absent, there can be no
forum shopping in this case.
IV
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the venue
was properly laid.
Venue is "the place where the case is to be heard or
tried[.]" 91 Under our Rules, the venue of an action generally
depends on whether it is a real or personal action.
Real actions are those affecting the title or possession
of a real property, or interest therein, to be commenced and tried
in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein
the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated. 92 All other actions, called personal actions, may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs reside, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants reside, at the election of the plaintiff. 93
The action for damages filed by respondent does not
involve the title or possession of a real property, or interest
therein. It is a personal action, and respondent, as plaintiff, had
the option of either filing it in her place of residence or the
defendant, petitioner's, place of residence. She chose to file the
civil case in her place of residence, that is, Mandaluyong City.
Petitioner, however, maintains that Mandaluyong City
is not respondent's place of residence. While respondent alleged
in her Complaint for Damages that she resides in a
condominium unit in Mandaluyong City, petitioner cites two (2)
instances where respondent testified that she resides at a
condominium unit in Parañaque City. The venue, petitioner
argues, was improperly laid and the Complaint for Damages
should be dismissed accordingly.
Looking into petitioner's allegations, he cites parts of
the proceedings in the criminal case, specifically, the hearing
held on May 22, 2007 94 and May 13, 2008 95 where
respondent testified that she resided in a condominium in
Parañaque.
The Complaint for Damages, however, was filed on
November 28, 2008, 96 and it could very well be that, as
respondent had alleged in her civil complaint, she was already a
resident of Mandaluyong City at that time. Absent proof to the
contrary, this Court affirms the findings of the Court of Appeals
that "[a]t the time of the filing of this case, [respondent] was
already residing [at Mandaluyong City]. Thus, venue was
properly laid at the [Regional Trial Court] of Mandaluyong
City." 97
As a final note, not only did the Mandaluyong trial
court err in dismissing the action based on Article 33 of the Civil
Code by assuming that the acquittal, by itself, is a declaration
that the facts upon which the civil action can arise did not exist
is already presumed. The court that tried the civil case also
possibly erred in the manner by which it interpreted the facts on
the basis of what it considered as which narrative is "in accord
with human experience." 98
The two (2) points articulated in the decision
regarding the criminal case seems to reveal the severe lack of
gender sensitivity and/or practical wisdom on the trial court
judge's part. The first is the assertion that the woman chose to
hide her lover's transgressions against her person before the
doctor, as well as her son. The second is the judge's assertion of
his conclusion that the hesitation of the woman to immediately
leave her lover is an unnatural act and, hence, unbelievable.
These assumptions that provide the filters for a judge
to eventually acquit, demonstrate that there is a possibility that
another civil action may interpret the facts differently. A more
enlightened interpretation of the evidence may involve a less
caricaturized, less patriarchal set of assumptions. For instance,
the capability of women to sacrifice their own welfare in favor
of those who they care for and love is known to many women.
Thus, protecting the husband's reputation before a
stranger, even if that stranger be a doctor, or sparing the son
 from a premature dilemma that undermines his view of his
father, is possibly a more ordinary and enlightened view of
respondent's motive, assuming the facts as established by the
court trying the criminal case.
Similarly, that someone, usually the woman, would
hesitate to simply leave her family and deprive them of her
caring for her part in maintaining the household, even at peril to
herself or her dignity, is not outlandish, inconceivable or, sadly,
even exceptional. Certainly, it is "in accord with human
experience." 99
These motives, often perpetuated by culture, are the
precise targets of our laws which underscore gender equality in
every type of relationship. It is the awareness of the possibility
of abuse that a more gendered perspective of human intentions is
privileged by laws on sexual harassment — including the law
which seeks to prohibit violence against women in intimate
relationships. The rather dismal failure to consider the
complexity of the human psyche in the criminal case may not be
how the judge in the civil case will consider the case given the
salve set of evidence. It is in these respects that we see the
wisdom of our current rules.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review
on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' March 25,
2014 Decision and September 13, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R.
CV No. 96341 are hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 214, is
hereby DIRECTED to reinstate Civil Case No. MC08-3871,
continue with the proceedings, and to resolve the same with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Carandang, Zalameda and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.
Gesmundo, * J., is on wellness leave.
||| (Kane v. Roggenkamp, G.R. No. 214326, [July 6, 2020])
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 110544. October 17, 1995.]
REYNALDO V. TUANDA, Mayor of the
Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental,
HERMINIGILDO FABURADA, (former
Vice-Mayor), SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA,
Incumbent Member of the Sangguniang
Bayan, MANUEL LIM, NICANOR R.
AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA,
MAXIMINO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA V.
SERILLO, ILUMINADO D.
ESTRELLANES, and FORMER
MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN OF JIMALALUD, NEGROS
ORIENTAL, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
(THIRD DIVISION), BARTOLOME
BINAOHAN and DELIA
ESTRELLANES, respondents.
Villareal, Rosacia, Dino, Samson & Patag Law Office for
petitioners.
Paras & Associates for private respondents.
The Solicitor General for public respondent. LLcd
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CIVIL CODE; PREJUDICIAL
QUESTION; DEFINED AND ELABORATED. — A prejudicial
question is one that must be decided before any criminal prosecution
may be instituted or before it may proceed (see Art. 36, Civil Code)
because a decision on that point is vital to the eventual judgment in
the criminal case. Thus, the resolution of the prejudicial question is a
logical antecedent of the issues involved in said criminal case. A
prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The
prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the
court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from "the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and
for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play
generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE AND ELEMENTS,
PRESENT. — The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential
elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and
unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the facts and
issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal case
(No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was
premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not
paying private respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral
representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to
resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as
sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law. More
importantly, the resolution of the civil case will certainly determine if
there will still be any reason to proceed with the criminal action.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS;
ELEMENTS TO QUALIFY AS DE FACTO OFFICER. — The
conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following: 1)
There must be a de jure office; 2) There must be color of right or
general acquiescence by the public; and 3) There must be actual
physical possession of the office in good faith. One can qualify as
a de facto officer only if all the aforestated elements are present.
There can be no de facto officer where there is no de jure office,
although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J p:
Petitioners institute this special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court to set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated 17
February 1992 and its order dated 19 August 1992 and 13 May 1993
in Criminal Case No. 16936 entitled "People of the Philippines
versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." denying petitioners' motion for
suspension of their arraignment.
The present controversy arose from the following
antecedents:
On 9 February 1989, private respondents Delia Estrellanes
and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral
representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative
respectively, for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of
Negros Oriental by then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department
of Local Government. Private respondents Binaohan and Estrellanes
took their oath of office on 16 February 1989 and 17 February 1989,
respectively.
Subsequently, petitioners filed an undated petition
with the Office of the President for review and recall of said
designations. The latter, however, in a letter dated 20 March
1989, denied the petition and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda
to recognize private respondents as sectoral representatives.
On 4 May 1990, private respondents filed a petition
for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental,
Branch 35, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 9661, for
recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was
dismissed on 23 July 1991.
Thereafter, on 20 June 1991, petitioners filed an action
with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City to declare null
and void the designations of private respondents as sectoral
representatives, docketed as Civil Case No. 9955 entitled
"Reynaldo Tuanda, et al. versus Secretary of the Department of
Local Government, et al."
 On 21 July 1991, an information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 16936 entitled
"People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al.,"
charging petitioners thus:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution
Officer of the Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses REYNALDO V. TUANDA,
HERMINIGILDO G. FABURADA,
MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P. AGOSTO,
ERENIETA K. MENDOZA, MAXIMO
VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO, and
SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA of Violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, committed as follows:
That during the period from February 1989 to February
1991 and subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Jimalalud,
Negros Oriental, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused, all public officers, Mayor REYNALDO V. TUANDA,
Vice-Mayor HERMINIGILDO G. FABURADA, Sangguniang
Members MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K.
MENDOZA, MAXIMO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO,
ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES and SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA
while in the performance of their official functions and taking
advantage of their public positions, with evident bad faith, manifest
partiality, and conspiring and confederating with each other did, then
and there, wilfully and unlawfully cause undue injury to Sectoral
Members Bartolome M. Binaohan and Delia T. Estrellanes by
refusing to pay despite demand the amount of NINETY FIVE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P95,350.00) and
ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED PESOS
(P108,900.00) representing respectively their per diems, salaries and
other privileges and benefits, and such undue injury continuing to the
present to the prejudice and damage of Bartolome Binaohan and
Delia Estrellanes.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
On 9 September 1991, petitioners filed a motion with the
Sandiganbayan for suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 16936 on the ground that a prejudicial question exists in Civil
Case No. 9955 pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City. 2
On 16 January 1992, the Regional Trial Court rendered a
decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued by
the Department of Local Government to the private respondents as
sectoral representatives for having been done in violation of Section
146 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code. 3
The trial court expounded thus:
The Supreme Court in the case of Johnny D. Supangan
Jr. v. Luis T . Santos, et al., G.R. No. 84663, along with 7
companion cases of similar import, (G.R. Nos. 85012, 87601, 87602,
87792, 87935, 89072, and 90205) all promulgated on August 24,
1990, ruled that:
B.P. Blg. 337 explicitly required that
before the President (or the Secretary of the
Department of Local Government) may
appoint members of the local legislative bodies
to represent the Industrial and Agricultural
Labor Sectors, there must be a determination to
be made by the Sanggunian itself that the said
sectors are of sufficient number in the city or
municipality to warrant representation after
consultation with associations and persons
belonging to the sector concerned.
The Supreme Court further ruled —
For that matter, the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Local
Government Code even prescribe the time and
manner by which such determination is to be
conducted by the Sanggunian.
Consequently, in cases where the
Sanggunian concerned has not yet determined
that the Industrial and Agricultural Labor
Sectors in their particular city or municipality
are of sufficient number to warrant
representation, there will absolutely be no basis
for the designation/appointments.
In the process of such inquiry as to
the sufficiency in number of the sector
concerned to warrant representation, the
Sanggunian is enjoined by law (B.P. Blg. 337)
to consult with associations and persons
belonging to the sector concerned.
Consultation with the sector concerned is made
a pre-requisite. This is so considering that
those who belong to the said sector are the
ones primarily interested in being represented
in the Sanggunian. In the same aforecited case,
the Supreme Court considers such prior
determination by the Sanggunian itself (not by
any other person or body) as a condition sine
qua non to a valid appointment or designation.
Since in the present case, there was
total absence of the required prior
determination by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Jimalalud, this Court cannot help but declare
the designations of private defendants as
sectoral representatives null and void.
This verdict is not without
precedence. In several similar cases, the
Supreme Court invariably nullified the
designations where the requirements of Sec.
146 (2), B.P. Blg. 337 were not complied with.
Just to cite one case, the Supreme Court ruled:
There is no certification from the Sangguniang Bayan of
Valenzuela that the sectors concerned are of sufficient number to
warrant representation and there was no consultation whatsoever with
the associations and persons belonging to the Industrial and
Agricultural Labor Sectors. Therefore, the appointment of private
respondents Romeo F. Bularan and Rafael Cortez are null and void
(Romeo Llanado, et al. v. Hon. Luis Santos, et al., G.R. No. 86394,
August 24, 1990). 4
Private respondents appealed the aforestated decision
to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 36769,
where the same is currently pending resolution.
Meanwhile, on 17 February 1992, respondent
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying the motion for
suspension of proceedings filed by petitioners. Said respondent
Sandiganbayan:
Despite the pendency of Civil Case
No. 9955 of the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Oriental, it appears, nevertheless, that
the private complainants have been rendering
services on the basis of their respective
appointments as sectoral members of the
 Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Jimalalud, Negros Oriental; and that their said
appointments enjoy the presumption of
regularity. Having rendered such services, the
private complainants are entitled to the salaries
attached to their office. Even
assuming arguendo that the said Regional Trial
Court shall later decide that the said
appointments of the private complainants are
null and void, still the private complainants are
entitled to their salaries and compensation for
service they have actually rendered, for the
reason that before such judicial declaration of
nullity, the private complainants are considered
at least de facto public officers acting as such
on the basis of apparently valid appointments
issued by competent authorities. In other
words, regardless of the decision that may be
rendered in Civil Case No. 9955, the private
complainants are entitled to their withheld
salaries for the services they have actually
rendered as sectoral representatives of the said
Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, the decision that
may be rendered by the Regional Trial Court in
Civil Case No. 9955 would not be
determinative of the innocence or guilt of the
accused.
WHEREFORE, the subject Petition
for the Suspension of Proceedings in Virtue of
Prejudicial Question filed by the accused
through counsel, is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned resolution in view of the decision promulgated by the
trial court nullifying the appointments of private respondents but it
was, likewise, denied in an order issued by respondent
Sandiganbayan on 19 August 1992 on the justification that the
grounds stated in the said motion were a mere rehash of petitioners'
original motion to hold the case in abeyance. 6 The dispositive
portion of its order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the arraignment of the accused
which was scheduled today is cancelled.
Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda, Hermenegildo
Faburada, Nicanor P. Agosto, Erenieta K.
Mendoza, Hacubina V. Serillo and Iluminado
Estrellanes are, however, hereby ordered to
show cause in writing within ten (10) days
from service hereof why they should not be
cited for contempt of court for their failure to
appear in court today for arraignment.
In case of an adverse resolution on
the motion to quash which is to be filed by the
counsel for the defense, set this case for
arraignment, pre-trial and trial on January 4 &
5, 1993, on all dates the trial to start at 8:30
o'clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED. 7
On 19 February 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan issued an
order holding consideration of all incidents pending the issuance of
an extended resolution. 8
No such resolution, however, was issued and in its assailed
order dated 13 May 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan set the
arraignment of petitioners on 30 June 1993. The dispositive portion
of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, considering the
absence of the accused from the scheduled
hearing today which We deem to be
excusable, reset this case for arraignment on
June 30, 1993 and for trial on the merits on
June 30 and July 1 and 2, 1993, on all dates the
trial to start at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
Give proper notice to the accused
and principal counsel, Atty. Alfonso Briones.
Considering that the accused come all the way
from Himalalud, Negros Oriental, no
postponement will be allowed.
SO ORDERED. 9
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition where petitioners attribute to respondent Sandiganbayan
the following errors.
A. The Respondent Court committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners' motions for the suspension of the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16936 in
spite of the pendency of a prejudicial issue
before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 36769;
B. The Respondent Court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing
to suspend the proceedings that would entail a
retrial and rehearing by it of the basic issue
involved, i.e., the validity of the appointments
of private respondents and their entitlement to
compensation which is already pending
resolution by the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. CV No. 36769; and
C. The Respondent Court committed
grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction in effectively
allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under
two alternative theories that private
respondents are de jure and/or de
facto officers in violation of petitioners' right
to due process. 10
In sum, the only issue in the case at bench is whether or not
the legality or validity of private respondents' designation as sectoral
representatives which is pending resolution in CA-G.R. No. 36769 is
a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case against petitioners.
A prejudicial question is one that must be decided before
any criminal prosecution may be instituted or before it may proceed
(see Art. 36, Civil Code) because a decision on that point is vital to
the eventual judgment in the criminal case. Thus, the resolution of the
prejudicial question is a logical antecedent of the issues involved in
said criminal case. 11
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a
case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case
before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question
must be lodged in another court of tribunal. 12 It is a question based
on a fact distinct and separate from "the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not
only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes
into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which
must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case." 13
private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days
after they took their oath of office. 17 Hence, private
respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as
sectoral representatives has not been established.
Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent
Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that private
respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may
still be considered de facto public officers entitled to
compensation for services actually rendered.
The conditions and elements of de facto officership
are the following:

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial 1) There must be a de jure office;
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 14It has two
2) There must be color of right or general
essential elements:
acquiescence by the public; and
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised 3) There must be actual physical possession of
in the criminal action: and the office in good faith. 18

(b) the resolution of such issue determines One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the
whether or not the criminal action aforestated elements are presents. There can be no de facto officer
may proceed. 15 where there is no de jure office, although there may be a de
facto officer in a de jure office. 19
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we
find that the issue in the civil case, CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, WHEREFORE, the resolution dated 17 February 1992
constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the and orders dated 19 August 1992 and 13 May 1993 of
arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16936 are
petitioners. hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is enjoined
from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of petitioners in
All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and Criminal Case No. 16936 pending final resolution of CA-G.R.
unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the facts and CV No. 36769. Llibris
issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal case
SO ORDERED.
(No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was
premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
paying private respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral
representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to Hermosisima, Jr., J ., took no part as he was
resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as the ponente of the appealed Resolution.
sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law. ||| (Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110544, [October 17, 1995],
More importantly, the resolution of the civil case will 319 PHIL 460-473)
certainly determine if there will still be any reason to proceed with
the criminal action. LexLib
Petitioners were criminally charged under the Anti-
Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, Sec. 3[e]) due to their
refusal, allegedly in bad faith and with manifest partiality, to pay
private respondents' salaries as sectoral representatives. This
refusal, however, was anchored on petitioners' assertion that said
designations were made in violation of the Local Government
Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and thus, were null and void. Therefore,
should the Court of Appeals uphold the trial court's decision
declaring null and void private respondent's designations as
sectoral representatives for failure to comply with the provisions
of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 146[2]), the
charges against petitioners would no longer, so to speak, have a
leg to stand on. Petitioners cannot be accused of bad faith and
partiality there being in the first place no obligation on their part
to pay private respondents' claims. Private respondents do not
have any legal right to demand salaries, per diems and other
benefits. In other words, the Court of Appeals' resolution of the
issues raised in the civil action will ultimately determine
whether or not there is basis to proceed with the criminal case.
Private respondents insist that even if their
designations are nullified, they are entitled to compensation for
actual services rendered. 16 We disagree. As found by the trial
court and as borne out by the records, from the start, private
respondents' designations as sectoral representatives have been
challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition filed with
the Office of the President copies of which were received by
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000.]
MEYNARDO L.
BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE
FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the
Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati
City, respondents.
Agoot Buensuceso & Associates for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner filed the instant petition seeking to review and set
aside the Order issued by respondent judge which denied his prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge
Alden Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of the concubinage
case against him. Petitioner contended that the pendency of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which he filed against
his wife based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the
suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by
his wife.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of
petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage
case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action
as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final
determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said
civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the import of
Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the
only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an
absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence
is acceptable. So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the
herein petitioner, need not present a final judgment declaring his
remarriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of
the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment
declaring his marriage void. SaITHC
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PREJUDICIAL QUESTION;
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS; PENDENCY OF CASE FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO CONCUBINAGE CASE. — The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The
pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage
is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case
to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the
suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil
case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same
facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil
action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; IN CONCUBINAGE CASE,
ACCUSED CAN ADDUCE EVIDENCE OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE OTHER THAN FINAL JUDGMENT DECLARING
THE MARRIAGE VOID. — "The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the import of
Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the
only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an
absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence
is acceptable. So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the
herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the
nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring
his marriage void.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONCUBINAGE; SUBSEQUENT
PRONOUNCEMENT THAT ACCUSED'S MARRIAGE IS VOID
FROM BEGINNING IS NOT A DEFENSE. — With regard to
petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of
concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it
to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is
void from the beginning is not a defense. Analogous to this case is
that of Landicho vs. Relova cited in Donato vs. Luna where this Court
held that: ". . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on
the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the
outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."
4. ID.; ID.; HE WHO COHABITS WITH A WOMAN
NOT HIS WIFE BEFORE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE ASSUMES THE RISK OF BEING PROSECUTED
THEREFOR. — It must also be held that parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is
that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he
who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred
in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court
ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not
pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
DECISION
BUENA, J p:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to review and set aside the Order
dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil
Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the
Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61." The said Order denied
petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of Criminal
Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on the
ground that the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
filed by petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial
question. prLL
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix
were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish
Church in Cubao, Quezon City. 1
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage
and four children, 2 petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-
30192. 3
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife
Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the
conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros
Salting. 4 Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage 5 under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against
petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of
Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found
probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information 6 against
them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer
Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the
criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for
declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to
the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez
Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order 7 dated August
31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order of
denial was likewise denied in an Order dated December 9, 1998. dctai
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings
in the concubinage case, petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders
dated August 31, 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge
Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. 8 In an Order 9 dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial
Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court
subsequently issued another Order 10 dated February 23, 1999,
denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his
petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage based on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial
question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for
concubinage filed against him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two
conflicting decisions might result from the civil case for annulment of
marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the
trial court might declare the marriage as valid by dismissing
petitioner's complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might
acquit petitioner because the evidence shows that his marriage is void
on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that the
possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage
can be avoided, if the criminal case will be suspended, until the court
rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is
declared void by reason of psychological incapacity then by reason of
the arguments submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has
never existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted
in the criminal case because he was never before a married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is
to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a)
the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 11
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of
petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage
case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action
as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final
determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said
civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. prLL
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
"The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage
void."
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court ruled that
the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the
only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an
absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence
is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said Decision read:
". . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive
of other instances where a party might well
invoke the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage for purposes other than remarriage,
such as in case of an action for liquidation,
partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well
as an action for the custody and support of
their common children and the delivery of the
latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases,
evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial
or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These needs not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void."
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the
herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the
nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring
his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be
acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be
declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent
pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs.
Relova 13 cited in Donato vs. Luna 14 where this Court held that:
". . . Assuming that the first marriage
was null and void on the ground alleged by
petitioner, that fact would not be material to
the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of the competent
courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy."
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to
the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents
and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore,
has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of
marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for
concubinage. prcd
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (Beltran v. People, G.R. No. 137567, [June 20, 2000], 389 PHIL
447-454)
 THIRD DIVISION (Annex "A") the letter of 28 June
(Annex "B") in response to which
the July 3rd letter had been sent to
[G.R. No. 134887. July 27, 2006.] PASI. Annex "B" precisely provides
that one slot (153º E, to which the
interim satellite was supposed to
PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE, INC.
migrate) was to be used for the
represented by MICHAEL C. U. DE
migration of the Russian satellite in
GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. SEC. JOSEFINA
time for the APEC Leaders' Summit.
TRINIDAD LICHAUCO and the HON.
This particular endeavor was not
OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
successful. The interim satellite
"Gorizont" never moved from its
orbital location of 130ºE Longitude.
Annex "C" is a letter from an official
DECISION of the Subic Bay Satellite Systems
Inc., with its attachments, addressed
to me stating that as of the 13th of
November, no such voyage to 153ºE
CARPIO MORALES, J p: orbital slot had been commenced. In
fact DHI hid this fact from me, and
On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of in fact stated that Gorizont had
Understanding 1 (MOU) was entered into by a consortium of private already moved and was on its way to
telecommunications carriers and the Department of Transportation 153ºE.
and Communications (DOTC) represented by then Secretary Jesus B.
Garcia, Jr. relative to the launching, ownership, operation and  Since this timely migration did not happen in
management of a Philippine satellite by a Filipino-owned or time for the APEC Leaders Meeting
controlled private consortium or corporation. on 24 November, this 153ºE
Longitude slot can no longer be
Pursuant to Article IV of the MOU, the consortium of assigned to PASI.
private telecommunications carriers formed a corporation and
adopted the corporate name Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI),  The other slot 161ºE Longitude is the one that
herein petitioner. can be made available for PASI's
eventual launch, in 1998 most likely,
By letter 2 dated June 28, 1996, PASI president Rodrigo A. in exchange for one free satellite
Silverio (Silverio) requested the then DOTC Secretary Amado S. transponder unit utilization, for all
Lagdameo, Jr. for official government confirmation of the assignment requirements of Government. These
of Philippine orbital slots 161ºE and 153ºE to PASI for its AGILA have yet to be embodied in a contract
satellites. between PASI and the DOTC.
In response to Silverio's letter, Secretary Lagdameo, by 2. I understand from my meeting with
letter 3 dated July 3, 1996, confirmed the government's assignment of DHI/PASI this morning, and from
Philippine orbital slots 161ºE and 153ºE to PASI for its AGILA the de Guzman letter you sent to me,
satellites. that the latter are still interested in
pursuing their "interim satellite
PASI thereupon undertook preparations for the launching,
project" and are applying for a loan
operation and management of its satellites by, among other things,
with your bank. Of course they can
obtaining loans, increasing its capital, conducting negotiations with
always pursue this as a business
its business partners, and making an initial payment of US$ 3.5
venture of DHI/PASI which is their
million to Aerospatiale, a French satellite manufacturer. CcTIAH
own corporate business decision. The
Michael de Guzman (de Guzman), PASI President and DOTC supports this venture but they
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), later informed Jesli Lapuz (Lapuz), will be getting only one orbital
President and CEO of the Landbank of the Philippines, by letter 4 of slot for both the Interim Satellite
December 3, 1996, of the government's assignment to PASI of orbital Project and for the Launch Project. I
slots 161ºE and 153ºE and requested the bank's confirmation of its understand from today's meeting
participation in a club loan in the amount of US$ 11 million, the with them that this is technically
proceeds of which would be applied to PASI's interim satellite. feasible.

It appears that Lapuz sent a copy of De Guzman's letter to
then DOTC Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco, (Lichauco) who, by
letter 5 of December 5, 1996, wrote Lapuz as follows:
1. Kindly be informed that there is simply no
basis for Michael de Guzman to
allege that the DOTC has assigned
two (2) slots to PASI. He
conveniently neglected to attach as
another annex, in addition to Sec.
Lagdameo's letter of 3 July 1996
3. As regards the use of the name "Agila", Mr.
de Guzman's allegation that
DHI/PASI has registered "Agila" as
a "corporate alias/trademark" is
FALSE. There is no such thing as
registration of a "corporate alias".
Nor for that matter can the trade
name of a satellite be registered for
just any satellite, where it was the
President who chose the name for the
first Philippine satellite in orbit. No
 one else coined that name but he. He
has therefore given the name "Agila
I" to the Mabuhay satellite now in
orbit at 144ºE, being the first
Philippine satellite in orbit. He made
this announcement in the presence of
all the APEC Heads of State just
before the presentation to him of the
Manila Action Plan for APEC.
(Underscoring supplied)
Lichauco subsequently issued, in December 1997, a Notice
of Offer 6 for several orbital slots including 153ºE.
PASI, claiming that the offer was without its knowledge
and that it subsequently came to learn that another company whose
identity had not been disclosed had submitted a bid and won the
award for orbital slot 153ºE, filed on January 23, 1998 a
complaint 7 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong
City against Lichauco and the "Unknown Awardee," for injunction to
enjoin the award of orbital slot 153ºE, declare its nullity, and for
damages. TCcIaA
PASI also filed on February 23, 1998 a complaint before
the Office of the Ombudsman against Secretary Josefina Trinidad
Lichauco. In his affidavit-complaint, de Guzman charged Lichauco
with gross violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act , as
amended, reading:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of
officers or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
The complaint was docketed as OMB Case No. 0-98-0416. The
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the
Office of the Ombudsman, by Evaluation Report 8 dated April
15, 1998, found the existence of a prejudicial question after
considering that "the case filed with the RTC involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based and that the guilt or the innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined in the resolution of the
issues raised in the civil case." It thus concluded that the filing
of the complaint before the Ombudsman "is premature since the
issues involved herein are now subject of litigation in the case
filed with the RTC," and accordingly recommended its
dismissal. Then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved on
April 24, 1998 the recommendation of the EPIB.
PASI moved to reconsider 9 the dismissal of the complaint,
but was denied by Order 10 dated July 17, 1998.
In the meantime, a motion to dismiss the civil case against
respondent was denied by the trial court. On elevation of the order of
denial to the Court of Appeals, said court, by Decision dated
February 21, 2000, ordered the dismissal of the case. This Court, by
Decision dated May 3, 2006, ordered the reinstatement of the case,
however. 11
PASI is now before this Court via petition for review
on certiorari, arguing that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the
complaint. HTDcCE
In issue are 1) whether there exists a prejudicial question
and, if in the affirmative, 2) whether the dismissal of the complaint
on that account is in order.
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial
question. — The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
The rationale for the principle of prejudicial question is that
although it does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the
accused, it tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint or
information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal
case. 12 Hence, the need for its prior resolution before further
proceedings in the criminal action may be had.
PASI concedes that the issues in the civil case are similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal case. It contends,
however, that the resolution of the issues in the civil case is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of Lichauco, it arguing that
even if she is adjudged liable for damages, it does not necessarily
follow that she would be convicted of the crime charged.
To determine the existence of a prejudicial question in the
case before the Ombudsman, it is necessary to examine the elements
of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for which Lichauco was charged and the
causes of action in the civil case.
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 which was earlier quoted has the
following elements:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging
administrative or official functions or
private persons charged in
conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited
act during the performance of his
official duty or in relation to his
public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross,
inexcusable negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the
Government or any private party, or
gave any party any unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference to
such parties. 13 
The civil case against Lichauco on the other hand involves
three causes of action. The first, for injunction, seeks to enjoin the
award of orbital slot 153ºE, the DOTC having previously assigned
the same to PASI; the second, for declaration of nullity of award,
seeks to nullify the award given to the undisclosed bidder for being
beyond Lichauco's authority; and the third, for damages arising from
Lichauco's questioned acts. ICDSca
If the award to the undisclosed bidder of orbital slot 153ºE
is, in the civil case, declared valid for being within Lichauco's scope
of authority to thus free her from liability for damages, there would
be no prohibited act to speak of nor would there be basis for undue
injury claimed to have been suffered by petitioner. The finding by
the Ombudsman of the existence of a prejudicial question is thus
well-taken.
Respecting the propriety of the dismissal by the
Ombudsman of the complaint due to the pendency of a prejudicial
question, PASI argues that since the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman is silent on the matter, the Rules of Court,
specifically Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which now
reads:
SECTION 6. Suspension by reason
of prejudicial question. — A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon
the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal
action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests. (Underscoring supplied),
applies in a suppletory character.
The Ombudsman, on the other hand, argues that the above-
quoted provision of the Rules of Court applies to cases which are at
the preliminary or trial stage and not to those, like the case subject of
the present petition, at the evaluation stage.
The Ombudsman goes on to proffer that at the evaluation
stage, the investigating officer may recommend any of several causes
of action including dismissal of the complaint for want of palpable
merit or subjecting the complaint to preliminary investigation, and
the evaluation of the complaint involves the discretion of the
investigating officer which this Court cannot interfere with. IcEaST
While the evaluation of a complaint involves the discretion
of the investigating officer, its exercise should not be abused 14 or
wanting in legal basis.
Rule II, Section 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman reads:
SECTION 2. Evaluation. — Upon
evaluating the complaint, the investigating
officer shall recommend whether it may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of
palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for
comment;
c) indorsed to the proper government
office or agency which has
jurisdiction over the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate
office or official for fact-
finding investigation;
e) referred for administrative
adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary
investigation.
(Underscoring supplied)
From the above-quoted provision, a complaint at the
evaluation stage may be dismissed outright only for want of palpable
merit. Want of palpable merit obviously means that there is no basis
for the charge or charges. If the complaint has prima facie merit,
however, the investigating officer shall recommend the adoption of
any of the actions enumerated above from (b) to (f). 15
When, in the course of the actions taken by those to whom
the complaint is endorsed or forwarded, a prejudicial question is
found to be pending, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court should
be applied in a suppletory character. 16 As laid down in Yap v.
Paras, 17 said rule directs that the proceedings may only
be suspended, not dismissed, and that it may be made only upon
petition, and not at the instance of the judge alone or as in this case,
the investigating officer. ACDTcE
To give imprimatur to the Ombudsman's dismissal of
petitioner's criminal complaint due to prejudicial question would not
only run counter to the provision of Section 6 of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court. It would sanction the extinguishment of criminal
liability, if there be any, through prescription under Article 89 vis a
vis Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code which respectively
read:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is
totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to
the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefore is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely
extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended
woman, as provided in Article 344 of this
Code. (Underscoring supplied)
ART. 90. Prescription of crimes. —
Crimes punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe
in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive
penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional
penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the
exception of those punishable by arresto
mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar
offenses shall prescribe in one year.
The offenses of oral defamation and
slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.
Light offenses prescribe in two
months.
When the penalty fixed by law is a
compound one, the highest penalty shall be
made the basis of the application of the rules
contained in the first, second, and third
paragraphs of this article. . . .
 ART. 91. Computation of
prescription of offenses. — The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence
to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted
or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him. TaHDAS
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 17, 1998 of
respondent Ombudsman dismissing OMB Case No. 0-98-0416
against respondent then Secretary Josefina Trinidad Lichauco is SET
ASIDE.
The Ombudsman is ORDERED to REINSTATE to its
docket for further proceedings, in line with the foregoing
ratiocination, OMB Case No. 0-98-0416.
SO ORDERED
Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. v. Lichauco, G.R. No. 134887,
[July 27, 2006], 528 PHIL 981-993)
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159186. June 5, 2009.]
JESSE Y. YAP, petitioner, vs. HON.
MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, General
Santos City; MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT,
Branch 1, General Santos City; COURT OF
APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, JOVITA DIMALANTA
and MERGYL MIRABUENO, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or issuance of status quo
order seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 17, 2003 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the Decision 2 dated April 30,
2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are
engaged in the real estate business through their company
Primetown Property Group.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased several real
properties from a certain Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In consideration
of said purchases, petitioner issued several Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter,
spouses Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie
and Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.
In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by
the bank, but in the early part of 1997, when the remaining
checks were deposited with the drawee bank, they were
dishonored for the reason that the "Account is
Closed". Demands were made by Spouses Mirabueno and
Spouses Dimalanta to the petitioner to make good the checks.
Despite this, however, the latter failed to pay the amounts
represented by the said checks. cDHAES
On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a
civil action for collection of sum of money, damages and
attorney's fee with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6231. 3 On December 15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta
followed suit and instituted a similar action, which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 6238. 4
Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several informations for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 against the
petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
General Santos City. The criminal complaints were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869, and
Criminal Case No. 35522-I. 5
In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions
to suspend proceedings on account of the existence of a
prejudicial question and motion to exclude the private
prosecutor from participating in the proceedings. 6 Petitioner
prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended
until the civil cases pending before the RTC were finally
resolved.
The MTCC, in its Orders 7 dated June 21, 2000 and
July 4, 2000, denied the motions for lack of merit. Petitioner
filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration 8 relative to Criminal
Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869 and a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Part of the Order Denying the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings on Account of the Existence of a
Prejudicial Question relative to Criminal Case No. 35522-
I. 9 The subsequent motions were denied in the Order 10 dated
October 18, 2000.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction 11 before the RTC, docketed as SPL.
Civil Case No. 539, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the MTCC Judge. On July 2, 2001, the RTC issued an
Order 12 denying the petition.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, 13 which was denied in an Order dated
October 18, 2001. 14
Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition
for Certiorari Prohibition and Mandamus with Urgent Prayer
for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, 15 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.
On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a
Decision 16 dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA
opined that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not pose a
prejudicial question to the prosecution of the petitioner for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The CA ruled: aAHISE
In the instant case, a careful perusal
of Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 reveals that
the issue involved therein is not the validity of
the sale as incorrectly pointed out by the
petitioner, but it is, whether or not the
complainants therein are entitled to collect
from the petitioner the sum or the value of the
checks which they have rediscounted from
Evelyn Te. It behooves this Court to state that
the sale and the rediscounting of the checks are
two transactions, separate and distinct from
each other. It so happened that in the subject
civil cases it is not the sale that is in question,
but rather the rediscounting of the checks.
Therefore, petitioner's contention that the main
issue involved in said civil cases is the validity
of the sale stands on hollow ground.
Furthermore, if it is indeed the validity of the
sale that is contested in the subject civil cases,
then, We cannot fathom why the petitioner
never contested such sale by filing an action
for the annulment thereof or at least invoked or
prayed in his answer that the sale be declared
null and void. Accordingly, even if Civil Cases
Nos. 6231 and 6238 are tried and the resolution
of the issues therein is had, it cannot be
deduced therefrom that the petitioner cannot be
 held liable anymore for violation of B.P. Blg.
22. 17
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, 18 which was denied in the Order 19 dated
July 17, 2003.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
IN THE CIVIL CASES (FOR COLLECTION
OF SUMS OF MONEY INSTITUTED BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS
ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER, CIVIL
CASE NOS. 6238 AND 6231) THAT
WOULD WARRANT SUSPENSION OF
THE CRIMINAL CASES (CASE NO. 35522-
1, FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, SUBJECT
OF WHICH ARE THE VERY SAME
CHECKS).
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND/OR STATUS QUO ORDER. 20
The main contention of the petitioner is that a
prejudicial question, as defined by law and jurisprudence, exists
in the present case. It is the petitioner's assertion that Civil Case
Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and
damages were filed ahead of the criminal cases for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. He further alleged that, in the pending civil
cases, the issue as to whether private respondents are entitled to
collect from the petitioner despite the lack of consideration, is an
issue that is a logical antecedent to the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For if the court rules that there is no
valid consideration for the check's issuance, as petitioner
contends, then it necessarily follows that he could not also be
held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. cASTED
Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically
requires, among other elements, that the check should have been
issued for account or for value. There must be a valid
consideration; otherwise, no violation of the said law could be
rightfully pursued. Petitioner said that the reason for the
dishonor of the checks was his order to the drawee bank to stop
payment and to close his account in order to avoid necessary
penalty from the bank. He made this order due to the failure of
Evelyn to deliver to him the titles to the purchased properties to
him.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) contends that there is no prejudicial question in Civil
Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 which would warrant the suspension
of the proceedings in the criminal cases for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 against the petitioner. The issue in the civil cases is not
the validity of the sale between the petitioner and Evelyn, but
whether the complainants therein are entitled to damages arising
from the checks. These checks were issued by the petitioner in
favor of Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same checks to
private complainants. The checks were subsequently dishonored
due to insufficiency of funds. The OSG maintains that the
resolution of such issue has absolutely no bearing on the issue of
whether petitioner may be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg.
22. 21
The present case hinges on the determination of
whether there exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the
suspension of the proceedings in the MTCC.
We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to
deny the petition.
A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and
there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively
resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle
of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It
has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed. 22
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or
the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the
other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided
the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not
only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution
of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the
resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the
criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action
based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil
case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the
civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. 23 Neither is
there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action
can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. 24
The issue in the criminal cases is whether the
petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the civil
case, it is whether the private respondents are entitled to collect
from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they
have rediscounted from Evelyn.
The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is
not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that the
civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner
is declared not liable for the payment of the value of the checks
and damages, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless
checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support
the checks is in itself an offense. 25
In Jose v. Suarez, 26 the prejudicial question under
determination was whether the daily interest rate of 5% was
void, such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said
interest were likewise void for being contra bonos mores, and
thus the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In
resolving the issue, We ruled that "whether or not the interest
rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for
being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the BP
Blg. 22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the
mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial
question posed before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is
whether the law has been breached; that is, if a bouncing check
has been issued".
Further, We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado, 27 that:
The gravamen of the offense
punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check
that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. In Lozano v. Martinez, we have
declared that it is not the non-payment of an
 obligation which the law punishes. The law is
not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to
pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making and circulation of worthless checks.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property, but an offense against public
order. In People v. Nitafan, we said that a
check issued as an evidence of debt — though
not intended to be presented for payment —
has the same effect as an ordinary check and
would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in
affirming the decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
Decision dated April 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated July 17,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, * Corona ** and Nachura,
JJ., concur.
||| (Yap v. Cabales, G.R. No. 159186, [June 5, 2009], 606 PHIL 415-
426)

xxx xxx xxx

. . . The mere act of issuing a
worthless check — whether as a deposit, as a
guarantee or even as evidence of pre-existing
debt — is malum prohibitum.
To determine the reason for which checks are issued,
or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode
the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value
of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade
and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it
was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.
The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum
prohibitum. 28 ASEIDH
Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul 29 is
misplaced. The case of Ras involves a complaint for
nullification of a deed of sale on the ground of an alleged double
sale. While the civil case was pending, an information
for estafa was filed against Ras (the defendant in the civil case)
arising from the same alleged double sale, subject matter of the
civil complaint. The Court ruled that there was a prejudicial
question considering that the defense in the civil case was based
on the very same facts that would be determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused in the estafa case.
The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as
the determination of whether the petitioner is liable to pay the
private respondents the value of the checks and damages, will
not affect the guilt or innocence of the petitioner because the
material question in the criminal cases is whether petitioner had
issued bad checks, regardless of the purpose or condition of its
issuance.
Guided by the following legal precepts, it is clear that
the determination of the issues involved in Civil Case Nos. 6231
and 6238 for collection of sum of money and damages is
irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in the
criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of consideration
may be raised as a defense during the trial of the criminal cases
against him. The validity and merits of a party's defense and
accusation, as well as the admissibility and weight of
testimonies and evidence brought before the court, are better
ventilated during trial proper.
Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law is to
ascertain the respective rights of the parties, to examine and to
put to test all their respective allegations and evidence through a
well designed machinery termed "trial". Thus, all the defenses
available to the accused should be invoked in the trial of the
criminal cases. This court is not the proper forum that should
ascertain the facts and decide the case for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 filed against the petitioner.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 184861. June 30, 2009.]
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION,
INC., petitioner, vs. CLEOFE
S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A.
FAMINI, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J p:
The Case
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the
reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision 1 in SCA No. 08-0005
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Piñas
City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16,
2007 2 and March 12, 2008 3 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61
issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las
Piñas City.
The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President,
Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and
Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit
dated October 5, 2004 4 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. The case was
docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner
filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against
private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by
her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by
filing a Complaint dated August 2006 5 for the rescission of an
alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as
for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in
Las Piñas City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197.
Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the
MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction
agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a
Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 2007 6 in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and
criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately
related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the
civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal
cases. cISDHE
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings
in the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to
Accused's Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial
Question 7 on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial
question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which
the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue
from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22;
and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one
of the elements of a prejudicial question is that
"the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in
this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.
Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16,
2007, granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and
reasoned that:
Should the trial court declare the
rescission of contract and the nullification of
the checks issued as the same are without
consideration, then the instant criminal cases
for alleged violation of BP 22 must be
dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case
by the herein accused did not detract from the
correctness of her cause, since a motion for
suspension of a criminal action may be filed at
any time before the prosecution rests (Section
6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court). 8
In an Order dated March 12, 2008, 9 the MTC denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated November 29,
2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a
Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued the
assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition.
On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC
ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that
the requirement of a "previously" filed civil
case is intended merely to obviate delays in the
conduct of the criminal proceedings.
Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to
delay by private respondent was shown. The
criminal proceedings are still in their initial
stages when the civil action was instituted.
And, the fact that the civil action was filed
after the criminal action was instituted does not
render the issues in the civil action any less
prejudicial in character. 10
Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.
The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE
PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN
THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND
PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS.
55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF
"PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL
CASE NO. LP-06-0197. 11 DTCSHA
The Court's Ruling
This petition must be granted.
The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988
and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are
contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:
 SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial
question. — The two (2) essential elements of
a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases 12 that the
elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted
provision and in Beltran  v. People, 13 are:
The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the
civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, however, became effective and the above provision
was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now
provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial
question. — The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7 (a) to mean that in order for
a civil case to create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a
criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case was
filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner
argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a
party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a
pending criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the
latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36
of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which
must be decided before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed, shall be governed by rules of court
which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and
which shall not be in conflict with the
provisions of this Code. (Emphasis
supplied.) HTASIa
Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" must be
interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the
civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal
action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private
respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the
provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the
latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial
question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil
case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction
that a "change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of
law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the
provision from that it originally had". 14 In the instant case, the
phrase, "previously instituted", was inserted to qualify the nature
of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to
the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by
the insertion of "subsequent" directly before the term criminal
action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments
except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal
actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres  v.
Garchitorena 15 that:
Even if we ignored petitioners'
procedural lapse and resolved their petition on
the merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did not
abuse its discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in denying their omnibus
motion for the suspension of the proceedings
pending final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160.
Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, reads:
Sec. 6. Suspension by
reason of prejudicial question. — A
petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in
a civil action may be filed in the
office of the prosecutor or the court
conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal
action has been filed in court for
trial, the petition to suspend shall be
filed in the same criminal action at
any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of
prejudicial question. — The
elements of a prejudicial question
are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action,
and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a
prejudicial question is understood in law as
that which must precede the criminal action
and which requires a decision before a final
judgment can be rendered in the criminal
action with which said question is closely
connected. The civil action must be
instituted prior to the institution of the
criminal action. In this case, the Information
was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the
State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis
supplied.) EDaHAT
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction
that "a statute should be construed not only to be consistent with
itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject
matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible
system." 16 This principle is consistent with the
maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus
interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. 17
In other words, every effort must be made to
harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when
harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to
choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec.
7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an
interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The
phrase "previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111
is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative
interpretations. The clause "before any criminal prosecution may
be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may,
however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the
criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation
with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation,
or during the trial with the court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of
the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but
also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides
for the situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action
during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be
filed. Sec. 6 provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of
prejudicial question. — A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon
the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal
action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it
is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should
govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of
law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in
the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil action and the
subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason
of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere
afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal  v. Tongco, 18 we found no prejudicial
question existed involving a civil action for specific
performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal
complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil action would
not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. In resolving the case, we said: AEScHa
Furthermore, the peculiar
circumstances of the case clearly indicate that
the filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay
the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner
filed the civil case three years after the
institution of the criminal charges against him.
Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an
afterthought to delay the proceedings in the
criminal cases. 19
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the
institution of the criminal complaint and from the time that
private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the
job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted
more than two and a half (2 1/2) years from the time that private
respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed
building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case
praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack
of consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the
execution of the construction agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances
surrounding the filing of the cases involved here show that the
filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the part of
private respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly
argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondent's
positions cannot be left to stand.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted
prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question
to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings
in the criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question
under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a
prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of
the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to
the present controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if
the construction agreement between the parties is declared null
and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in
consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of
paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the elements of the crime
punishable under BP 22 are as follows:
(1) the making, drawing, and
issuance of any check to apply for account or
for value; AHDaET
(2) the knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there
are no sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in
full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the
check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment. 20
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract
or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that the
checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up
the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long
line of cases 21 that the agreement surrounding the issuance of
dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation
of BP 22. In Mejia  v. People, 22 we ruled:
It must be emphasized that the
gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance
of a bad check. The purpose for which the
check was issued, the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance, or any agreement
surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the
 prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To the issue in the civil action would determine whether the
determine the reason for which checks are criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus,
issued, or the terms and conditions for their no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable
issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public to the case before us.
reposes in the stability and commercial value
of checks as currency substitutes, and bring WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We
havoc in trade and in banking communities. hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008
The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las
to make the mere act of issuing a worthless Piñas City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and March 12,
check malum prohibitum. DaECST 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in
Las Piñas City. We order the MTC to continue with the
Lee  v. Court of Appeals 23 is even more poignant. In proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with
that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of valuable dispatch. cSDIHT
consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on No costs.
dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of
a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit: SO ORDERED.
Third issue. Whether or not the Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Nachura and Peralta,
check was issued on account or for value. JJ., concur.
Petitioner's claim is not feasible. We ||| (Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, [June
have held that upon issuance of a check, in the 30, 2009], 609 PHIL 245-259)
absence of evidence to the contrary, it is
presumed that the same was issued for valuable
consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn,
may consist either in some right, interest, profit
or benefit accruing to the party who makes the
contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss
or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or
service given, suffered or undertaken by the
other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do
in favor of the party who makes the contract,
such as the maker or indorser.
In this case, petitioner himself
testified that he signed several checks in blank,
the subject check included, in exchange for
2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that
will be made from said account. This is a
valuable consideration for which the check was
issued. That there was neither a pre-existing
obligation nor an obligation incurred on the
part of petitioner when the subject check was
given by Bautista to private complainant on
July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer
connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July
1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier
discussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove
that he has severed his relationship with
Bautista or Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that
what the law punishes is the mere act of
issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose
for which it was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance. This is
because the thrust of the law is to prohibit
the making of worthless checks and putting
them into circulation. 24 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares
that the construction agreement between the parties is void for
lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of
private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is
that private respondent indeed issued checks which were
subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that
is subject of prosecution under BP 22.
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required
for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 172060. September 13, 2010.]
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, petitioner, vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL
and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the
Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March
2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals' decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y
Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC
Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to
appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch
72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No.
04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito
Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section
36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent
motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City
on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the
offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon
City. TEacSA
The Decision of the Trial Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May
2005 3 holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC
Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City
held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the
injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be
tried even if the validity of petitioner's marriage with respondent
is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the
foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings
on the [Ground] of the Existence of a
Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit,
DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22
August 2005 Order, 5 the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13
May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the
criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the
offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide
directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the
civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared
void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior
to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the
crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The
Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of
frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the
crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court
assailing the Court of Appeals' decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of
the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide against petitioner. AcIaST
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure 6 provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial
Question. — The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted
first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the
Information 7 for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August
2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as
per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC
Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial
and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons
in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005. 8 Respondent's
petition 9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November
2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case
for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since
the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal
action.
 Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question the Court ruled in Tenebro that "[t]here is . . . a
in Criminal Case for Parricide recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a consequences." 18 In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a
prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground
criminal action. of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and as the State's penal laws are concerned." 19
a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the
action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No.
criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil
in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence
or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. 10 A of petitioner in the criminal case.
prejudicial question is defined as:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
. . . one that arises in a case the We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
the issue involved therein, and the cognizance
of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a SO ORDERED. IHEaAc
question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected Peralta, Bersamin, * Abad and Villarama,
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence Jr., ** JJ., concur.
of the accused, and for it to suspend the
||| (Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060, [September 13, 2010],
criminal action, it must appear not only that
645 PHIL 1-8)
said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution
of the issue or issues raised in the civil case,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. 11 HIEAcC
The relationship between the offender and the victim
is a key element in the crime of parricide, 12 which punishes any
person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse." 13 The relationship between the
offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from
murder 14 or homicide. 15 However, the issue in the annulment
of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the
criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the
offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused
killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the
acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of petitioner's will. 16 At the time
of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is
granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was
committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In
short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at
the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still
married to respondent.
We cannot accept petitioner's reliance on Tenebro v.
Court of Appeals 17 that "the judicial declaration of the nullity
of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as
the vinculum between the spouses is concerned . . . ." First, the
issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of
nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy.
There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second,
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 161075. July 15, 2013.]
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING,
JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the
defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to stop the
proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant
for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the
independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence
of the accused. THIAaD
The Case
On appeal is the amended decision promulgated on August
18, 2003, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the writ
of certiorari upon petition by the State in C.A.-G.R. No. 71252
entitled People v. Hon. Winlove M. Dumayas, Presiding Judge,
Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Makati City and Rafael Consing,
Jr., and set aside the assailed order issued on November 26, 2001 by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, in Makati City deferring
the arraignment of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-120
entitled People v. Rafael Consing, Jr. upon his motion on the ground
of the existence of a prejudicial question in the civil cases pending
between him and the complainant in the trial courts in Pasig City and
Makati City.
Antecedents
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his
mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz) various loans totaling
P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital, Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were
secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land
(property) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
687599 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite registered
under the name of de la Cruz. 2 In accordance with its option to
purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-
half of the property for a total consideration of P21,221,500.00.
Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital
under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount
of P18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount of
P3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus
Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital. 3
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the
property, they learned that the title to the property was really TCT
No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the
parties from whom the property had been allegedly acquired by de la
Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious. 4
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total
amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999 that had been paid to
and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the
demands. 5
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the
Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Pasig civil case) for
injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from
proceeding against him for the collection of the P41,377,851.48 on
the ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother.
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint
for estafa through falsification of public document against Consing
and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor's Office. 6
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in
Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of a sum of
money and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary
attachment (Makati civil case). 7 CSDcTA
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati City filed against Consing and De la Cruz an information
for estafa through falsification of public document in the RTC in
Makati City (Criminal Case No. 00-120), which was assigned to
Branch 60 (Makati criminal case). 8
On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his
arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the ground of existence of
a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati
civil cases. On September 25, 2001, Consing reiterated his motion for
deferment of his arraignment, citing the additional ground of
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the CA. On November 19,
2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion. 9
On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order
suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal case on the ground
of the existence of a prejudicial question, and on March 18, 2001, the
RTC denied the Prosecution's motion for reconsideration. 10
The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the
RTC in the Makati criminal case via petition for certiorari (C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 71252).
On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 71252, 11 dismissing the petition for certiorari and
upholding the RTC's questioned orders, explaining:
Is the resolution of the Pasig civil
case prejudicial to the Cavite and Makati
criminal cases?
We hold that it is. The resolution of
the issue in the Pasig case, i.e., whether or not
private respondent may be held liable in the
questioned transaction, will determine the guilt
or innocence of private respondent Consing in
both the Cavite and Makati criminal cases.
The analysis and comparison of the
Pasig civil case, Makati criminal case, Makati
civil case and Cavite criminal case show that:
(1) the parties are identical; (2) the transactions
in controversy are identical; (3) the Transfer
Certificate of Titles (TCT) involved are
identical; (4) the questioned Deeds of
Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the dates in
question are identical; and (6) the issue of
private respondent's culpability for the
questioned transactions is identical in all the
proceedings.
As discussed earlier, not only was
the issue raised in the Pasig civil case identical
to or intimately related to the criminal cases in
Cavite and Makati. The similarities also extend
 to the parties in the cases and the TCT and
Deed of Sale/Mortgage involved in the
questioned transactions. EDHTAI
The respondent Judge, in ordering
the suspension of the arraignment of private
respondent in the Makati case, in view of CA-
G.R. SP No. 63712, where Unicapital was not
a party thereto, did so pursuant to its
mandatory power to take judicial notice of an
official act of another judicial authority. It was
also a better legal tack to prevent multiplicity
of action, to which our legal system abhors.
Applying the Tuanda ruling, the
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 may be
validly invoked to suspend private respondent's
arraignment in the Makati City criminal case,
notwithstanding the fact that CA-G.R. SP No.
63712 was an offshoot, merely, in the Cavite
criminal case. 12
In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders
commenced its own suit for damages against Consing (Civil Case No.
99-95381) in the RTC in Manila (Manila civil case). 13
On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through
falsification of public document was filed against Consing and De la
Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite, docketed as Criminal Case No.
7668-00 and assigned to Branch 21 (Cavite criminal case). Consing
filed a motion to defer the arraignment on the ground of the existence
of a prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila
civil cases. On January 27, 2000, however, the RTC handling the
Cavite criminal case denied Consing's motion. Later on, it also denied
his motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, Consing commenced in
the CA a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 63712), seeking to enjoin
his arraignment and trial in the Cavite criminal case. The CA granted
the TRO on March 19, 2001, and later promulgated its decision on
May 31, 2001, granting Consing' petition for certiorari and setting
aside the January 27, 2000 order of the RTC, and permanently
enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the arraignment and trial
until the Pasig and Manila civil cases had been finally decided.
Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the CA in
this Court (G.R. No. 148193), praying for the reversal of the May 31,
2001 decision of the CA. On January 16, 2003, the Court granted the
petition for review in G.R. No. 148193, and reversed and set aside the
May 31, 2001 decision of the CA, 14 viz.:
In the case at bar, we find no
prejudicial question that would justify the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in
Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case)
for Injunctive Relief is whether or not
respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent
of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in
Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil
case), for Damages and Attachment, the
question is whether respondent and his mother
are liable to pay damages and to return the
amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the
disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared
merely an agent of his mother in the
transaction involving the sale of the questioned
lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal
liability. An agent or any person may be held
liable for conspiring to falsify public
documents. Hence, the determination of the
issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for
Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or
innocence of the respondent in the criminal
case for estafa through falsification of public
document. EDIHSC
Likewise, the resolution of PBI's
right to be paid damages and the purchase
price of the lot in question will not be
determinative of the culpability of the
respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI
is held entitled to the return of the purchase
price plus damages, it does not ipso
facto follow that respondent should be held
guilty of estafa through falsification of public
document. Stated differently, a ruling of the
court in the civil case that PBI should not be
paid the purchase price plus damages will not
necessarily absolve respondent of liability in
the criminal case where his guilt may still be
established under penal laws as determined by
other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a
prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal
action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111,
Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, the
petitioner was accused in a criminal case for
violation of Article 319 of the Revised Penal
Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on
personal property in favor of another party
without consent of the previous mortgagee.
Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case
for termination of management contract, one of
the causes of action of which consisted of
petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage
while the previous chattel mortgage was still
valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the
arraignment and trial of the criminal case be
held in abeyance on the ground that the civil
case was a prejudicial question, the resolution
of which was necessary before the criminal
proceedings could proceed. The trial court
denied the suspension of the criminal case on
the ground that no prejudicial question exist.
We affirmed the order of the trial court and
ruled that:
. . . the resolution of the
liability of the defendant
in the civil case on the
eleventh cause of action
based on the fraudulent
misrepresentation that
the chattel mortgage the
defendant executed in
favor of the said CMS
Estate, Inc. on February
 20, 1957, that his D-6 In his opposition to the State's motion for reconsideration,
"Caterpillar" Tractor Consing contended that the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 was not
with Serial No. 9-U- binding because G.R. No. 148193 involved Plus Builders, which was
6565 was "free from all different from Unicapital, the complainant in the Makati criminal
liens and encumbrances" case. He added that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 did not yet
will not determine the become final and executory, and could still be reversed at any time,
criminal liability of the and thus should not control as a precedent to be relied upon; and that
accused in the said he had acted as an innocent attorney-in-fact for his mother, and
Criminal Case No. should not be held personally liable under a contract that had
56042 for violation of involved property belonging to his mother as his principal.
paragraph 2 of Article
319 of the Revised Penal On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision,
Code. . . . (i) That, even reversing itself. It relied upon the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, and held
granting for the sake of thusly:
argument, a prejudicial
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is similar
question is involved in
with the case at bench. The transactions in
this case, the fact
controversy, the documents involved; the issue
remains that both the
of the respondent's culpability for the
crime charged in the
questioned transactions are all identical in all
information in the
the proceedings; and it deals with the same
criminal case and the
parties with the exception of private
eleventh cause of action
complainant Unicapital.
in the civil case are
based upon fraud, hence However, the Supreme Court, upon
both the civil and review of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, People of
criminal cases could the Philippines vs. Rafael Jose Consing,
proceed independently Jr. (G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003) held
of the other pursuant to that "Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages
Article 33 of the new and attachment on account of alleged fraud
Civil Code which committed by respondent and his mother in
provides: "In cases of selling the disputed lot to Plus Builders, Inc. is
defamation, fraud and an independent civil action under Article 33 of
physical injuries, a civil the Civil Code.As such, it will not operate as a
action for damages, prejudicial question that will justify the
entirely separate and suspension of the criminal case at bar." In view
distinct from the of the aforementioned decision of the Supreme
criminal action shall Court, We are thus amending Our May 20,
proceed independently 2003 decision.
of the criminal
prosecution, and shall WHEREFORE, the petitioner's
require only a motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The
preponderance of Orders dated November 26, 2001 and March
evidence." (j) That, 18, 2002 issued by the respondent Judge are
therefore, the act of hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
respondent judge in Respondent Judge is hereby ordered to proceed
issuing the orders with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 00-120
referred to in the instant with dispatch.
petition was not made
with "grave abuse of SO ORDERED. 16 aTSEcA
discretion." CIaHDc Consing filed a motion for reconsideration, 17 but the CA
In the instant case, Civil Case No. denied the motion through the second assailed resolution of
99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on December 11, 2003. 18
account of the alleged fraud committed by Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
respondent and his mother in selling the
disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil Issue
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.As
Petitioner reiterates his contention that the decision in G.R.
such, it will not operate as a prejudicial
No. 148193 was not controlling in relation to C.A.-G.R. No. 71252,
question that will justify the suspension of the
which involved Plus Builders, not Unicapital, the complainant in
criminal case at bar. 15
Criminal Case No. 00-120. He posits that in arriving at its amended
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State moved decision, the CA did not consider the pendency of the Makati civil
for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the CA, citing the case (Civil Case No. 99-1418), which raised a prejudicial question,
ruling in G.R. No. 148193, supra, to the effect that the Pasig and considering that the resolution of such civil action would include the
Manila civil cases did not present a prejudicial question that justified issue of whether he had falsified a certificate of title or had willfully
the suspension of the proceedings in the Cavite criminal case, and defrauded Unicapital, the resolution of either of which would
claiming that under the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig and determine his guilt or innocence in Criminal Case No. 00-120.
Makati civil cases did not raise a prejudicial question that would
In its comment, 19 the Office of the Solicitor General
cause the suspension of the Makati criminal case.
(OSG) counters that Unicapital brought the Makati civil case as an
independent civil action intended to exact civil liability separately
from Criminal Case No. 00-120 in a manner fully authorized under
Section 1 (a) and Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. 20 It
argues that the CA correctly took cognizance of the ruling in G.R.
No. 148193, holding in its challenged amended decision that the
Makati civil case, just like the Manila civil case, was an independent
civil action instituted by virtue of Article 33 of the Civil Code; that
the Makati civil case did not raise a prejudicial question that justified
the suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120; and that as finally
settled in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig civil case did not also raise any
prejudicial question, because the sole issue thereat was whether
Consing, as the mere agent of his mother, had any obligation or
liability toward Unicapital.
In his reply, 21 Consing submits that the Pasig civil case
that he filed and Unicapital's Makati civil case were not intended to
delay the resolution of Criminal Case No. 00-120, nor to pre-empt
such resolution; and that such civil cases could be validly considered
determinative of whether a prejudicial question existed to warrant the
suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120.
Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the
existence of a prejudicial question that warranted the suspension of
the proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari is absolutely
meritless.
Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm
holding in the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to the effect that the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be suspended
because the Makati civil case was an independent civil action, while
the Pasig civil case raised no prejudicial question. That was wrong
for him to do considering that the ruling fully applied to him due to
the similarity between his case with Plus Builders and his case with
Unicapital. cSTHaE
A perusal of Unicapital's complaint in the Makati civil case
reveals that the action was predicated on fraud. This was apparent
from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the effect that
Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a "wanton, fraudulent,
oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as security and later
object of sale, a property which they do not own, and foisting to the
public a spurious title." 22 As such, the action was one that could
proceed independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to
Article 33 of the Civil Code, which states as follows:
Article 33.In cases of defamation,
fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation,
fraud and physical injuries may be independently instituted pursuant
to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case. 23 This
was precisely the Court's thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:
Moreover, neither is there a
prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal
action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111,
Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, Civil Case No.
99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on
account of the alleged fraud committed by
respondent and his mother in selling the
disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.As
such, it will not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of the
criminal case at bar. 24
Contrary to Consing's stance, it was not improper for the
CA to apply the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to his case with
Unicapital, for, although the Manila and Makati civil cases involved
different complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital), the civil
actions Plus Builders and Unicapital had separately instituted against
him were undeniably of similar mold, i.e., they were both based on
fraud, and were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Clearly,
the Makati criminal case could not be suspended pending the
resolution of the Makati civil case that Unicapital had filed. DHITSc
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of
Consing's being a mere agent of his mother who should not be
criminally liable for having so acted due to the property involved
having belonged to his mother as principal has also been settled in
G.R. No. 148193, to wit:
In the case at bar, we find no
prejudicial question that would justify the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in
Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case)
for Injunctive Relief is whether or not
respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent
of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in
Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil
case), for Damages and Attachment, the
question is whether respondent and his mother
are liable to pay damages and to return the
amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the
disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared
merely an agent of his mother in the
transaction involving the sale of the
questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free
from criminal liability. An agent or any
person may be held liable for conspiring to
falsify public documents. Hence, the
determination of the issue involved in Civil
Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is
irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the
respondent in the criminal case for estafa
through falsification of public
document. 25 (Words in parentheses supplied;
bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended
decision promulgated on August 18, 2003; and ORDERS petitioner
to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama,
Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Consing, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 161075, [July 15, 2013], 714
PHIL 1-15)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 205972. November 9, 2016.]
CATERPILLAR,
INC., petitioner, vs. MANOLO P.
SAMSON, respondent.
[G.R. No. 164352. November 9, 2016.]
CATERPILLAR,
INC., petitioner, vs. MANOLO P.
SAMSON, respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
The determination of probable cause to charge a
person in court for a criminal offense is exclusively lodged in
the Executive Branch of the Government, through the
Department of Justice. Initially, the determination is done by the
investigating public prosecutor, and on review by the Secretary
of Justice or his duly authorized subordinate. The courts will
respect the determination, unless the same shall be shown to
have been made in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
The Cases
Before us are the consolidated cases of G.R. No.
205972 1 and G.R. No. 164352. 2
G.R. No. 164352 involves the appeal by petition for
review on certiorari of Caterpillar, Inc. (Caterpillar) to reverse
the decision promulgated on January 21, 2004 3 by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75526, and the resolution
promulgated on June 30, 2004 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof. 4
G.R. No. 205972 relates to the appeal brought by
Caterpillar to assail the decision and resolution promulgated in
CA-G.R. SP No. 102316 respectively on May 8, 2012 5 and
February 12, 2013, 6 whereby the CA affirmed the resolutions
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) finding that there was no
probable cause to indict Manolo P. Samson (Samson) for unfair
competition.
Antecedents
Caterpillar is a foreign corporation engaged in the
manufacture and distribution of footwear, clothing and related
items, among others. Its products are known for six core
trademarks, namely, "CATERPILLAR," "CAT,"
"CATERPILLAR & DESIGN," "CAT AND DESIGN,"
"WALKING MACHINES" and "TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR &
DESIGN" (Core Marks), 7 all of which are alleged as
internationally known. On the other hand, Samson, doing
business under the names and styles of Itti Shoes Corporation,
Kolm's Manufacturing Corporation and Caterpillar Boutique and
General Merchandise, is the proprietor of various retail outlets in
the Philippines selling footwear, bags, clothing, and related
items under the trademark "CATERPILLAR," registered in 1997
under Trademark Registration No. 64705 issued by the
Intellectual Property Office (IPO). 8
G.R. No. 164352
On July 26, 2000, upon application of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 56, in Makati City issued Search Warrants Nos. 00-022
to 00-032, inclusive, all for unfair competition, 9 to search the
establishments owned, controlled and operated by Samson. The
implementation of the search warrants on July 27, 2000 led to
the seizure of various products bearing Caterpillar's Core Marks.
Caterpillar filed against Samson several criminal
complaints for unfair competition in the Department of Justice
(DOJ), docketed as I.S. Nos. 2000-1354 to 2000-1364, inclusive.
Additionally, on July 31, 2000, Caterpillar
commenced a civil action against Samson and his business
entities, with the IPO as a nominal party 10 — for Unfair
Competition, Damages and Cancellation of Trademark with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction — docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
00-41446 of the RTC in Quezon City. In said civil action, the
RTC denied Caterpillar's application for the issuance of the TRO
on August 17, 2000. CAIHTE
The DOJ, through Senior State Prosecutor Jude R.
Romano, issued a joint resolution dated November 15,
2001 11 recommending that Samson be criminally charged with
unfair competition under Section 168.3 (a), 12 in relation to
Section 123.1 (e), 13 Section 131.1 14 and Section 170, 15 all
of Republic Act No. 8293, or the Intellectual Property Code of
the Philippines (IP Code).
However, because Samson and his affiliate companies
allegedly continued to sell and distribute products clothed with
the general appearance of its own products, Caterpillar again
applied for another set of search warrants against Samson and
his businesses. The RTC, Branch 172, in Valenzuela City issued
Search Warrants Nos. 12-V-00, 16 13-V-00, 17 20-V-00 18 and
29-V-00 19 upon application of the NBI, by virtue of the
implementation of which several goods were seized and
confiscated by the NBI agents.
As a consequence, Caterpillar filed 26 criminal
complaints for unfair competition on January 31, 2001, docketed
as I.S. Nos. 2001-42 to 2001-67, against Samson and/or the
occupants of his affiliate entities before the DOJ. 20 In due
course, the DOJ, through State Prosecutor Zenaida M. Lim,
issued a joint resolution dated September 28,
2001 21 recommending the filing of criminal complaints for
unfair competition under Section 168.3 (a), in relation to Section
123.1, Section 131.1 and Section 170 of the IP Code.
Accordingly, six criminal complaints were filed in the RTC,
Branch 256, in Muntinlupa City, presided by Judge Alberto L.
Lerma, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 02-238 to 02-243.
On January 17 and 22, 2002, Samson filed a petitions
for review with the Office of the Secretary of Justice to appeal
the joint resolutions in I.S. Nos. 2000-1354 to 2000-1364 22 and
I.S. Nos. 2001-042 to 2001-067. 23
 On May 30, 2002, Samson filed a Motion to Suspend
Arraignment in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-238 to 243, 24 citing the
following as grounds: 25
I.
THERE EXISTS PREJUDICIAL
QUESTIONS PENDING LITIGATION
BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 90,
IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-00-41446
ENTITLED: "CATERPILLAR, INC., ET AL.
VS. ITTI SHOES CORPORATION, ET AL.,"
THE FINAL RESOLUTIONS OF WHICH
WILL DETERMINE THE OUTCOME OF
THE INSTANT CRIMINAL CASES.
II.
ACCUSED HAS FILED PETITIONS FOR
REVIEW WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE ASSAILING THE
RESOLUTIONS OF THE CHIEF STATE
PROSECUTOR WHO CAUSED THE
FILING OF THE INSTANT CASES AND
ARE STILL PENDING THEREIN UP TO
THE PRESENT.
In the meanwhile, on July 10, 2002, the DOJ, through
Secretary Hernando B. Perez, issued a resolution 26 denying
Samson's petition for review in I.S. Nos. 2000-1354 to 2000-
1364. Samson's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
on May 26, 2003.
On September 23, 2002, Presiding Judge Lerma of the
RTC granted Samson's Motion to Suspend Arraignment, and
suspended the arraignment and all other proceedings in Criminal
Cases Nos. 02-240 to 02-243 until Civil Case No. Q-00-41446
was finally resolved, 27 holding:
After a careful scrutiny of the
case, this Court finds that private
complainant, in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446,
seeks for the cancellation of the trademark
"CATERPILLAR" which is registered in the
name of the accused and to prevent the latter
from using the said trademark
("CATERPILLAR"), while the issue in the
instant case is the alleged unlawful use by
the accused of the trademark
"CATERPILLAR" which is claimed to be
owned by the private complainant. From the
foregoing, this Court believes that there
exists a prejudicial question since the
determination of who is really the lawful or
registered user of the trademark
"CATERPILLAR" will ultimately determine
whether or not the instant criminal action
shall proceed. Clearly, the issues raised in
Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 is similar or
intimately related to the issue in the case at
bar for if the civil case will be resolved
sustaining the trademark registration of the
accused for the trademark CATERPILLAR,
then the latter would have all the authority to
continue the use of the said trademark as a
consequence of a valid registration, and by
reason of which there may be no more basis
to proceed with the instant criminal
action. 28 DETACa
After the RTC denied its motion for
reconsideration 29 on December 5, 2002, 30 Caterpillar elevated
the matter to the CA by petition for certiorari on February 14,
2003, 31 docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 75526
entitled Caterpillar, Inc. v. Hon. Alberto L. Lerma, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 256 of the Regional Trial
Court, Muntinlupa City, and Manolo P. Samson, alleging grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the RTC in suspending the arraignment and other
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-238 to 02-243 on the
ground of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question in
Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 then pending in the RTC in Quezon
City whose resolution would determine the outcome of the
criminal cases.
Meanwhile, on January 13, 2003, Acting Justice
Secretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez reversed and set aside the
resolution issued by State Prosecutor Lim in I.S. No. 2001-042
to 2001-067, and directed the Chief State Prosecutor to cause the
withdrawal of the criminal informations filed against Samson in
court, 32 disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed
joint resolution is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Chief State Prosecutor is directed to
forthwith cause the withdrawal of the
informations filed in court against
respondent Manolo P. Samson and to report
action taken hereon within ten (10) days
from receipts hereof. 33
Acting Justice Secretary Gutierrez based her
resolution on the order dated June 26, 2001, whereby the RTC of
Valenzuela City, Branch 172, had quashed the 26 search
warrants upon motion of Samson. 34 Consequently, the goods
seized and confiscated by virtue of the quashed search warrants
could no longer be admitted in evidence.
Correspondingly, Presiding Judge Lerma of the RTC
ordered the withdrawal of Criminal Cases Nos. 02-240 to 02-
243 on February 4, 2003. 35
Aggrieved, Caterpillar assailed the order of Judge
Lerma for the withdrawal of Criminal Cases Nos. 02-240 to 02-
2432003 by petition for certiorari in the CA on October 16,
2003, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79937, 36 and the CA
ultimately granted the petition for certiorari, 37 setting aside the
assailed January 13, 2003 resolution of the Acting Justice
Secretary and directing the re-filing of the withdrawn
informations against Samson. The Court ultimately affirmed the
CA's decision through the resolution promulgated on October
17, 2005 in G.R. No. 169199, and ruling that probable cause
existed for the re-filing of the criminal charges for unfair
competition under the IP Code. 38
In the assailed January 21, 2004 decision, 39 the CA
dismissed Caterpillar's petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
75526, viz.:
Petition has no merit.
The mere fact that public
respondent denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration does not justify this petition
on the ground of abuse of discretion. Grave
abuse of discretion means such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other
words where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility and it must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
 at all in contemplation of law. (Benito vs. Caterpillar moved for the reconsideration of the
Comelec, 349 SCRA 705). dismissal, but State Prosecutor Abad denied the motion on June
18, 2004. 44
Petitioner in this case failed to
overcome the burden of showing how public The Secretary of Justice affirmed the dismissal of the
respondent acted with grave abuse of complaint through the resolution issued on September 19,
discretion in granting private respondent's 2005, 45 and denied Caterpillar's motion for reconsideration on
motion and denying his own motion for December 20, 2007.
reconsideration. What is clear is that public
respondent court acted judiciously. A Accordingly, Caterpillar appealed to the CA through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of petition for review under Rule 43, Rules of Court (C.A.-G.R. SP
the Rules of Court will prosper only if there No. 102316). 46
is showing of grave abuse of discretion or an On May 8, 2012, 47 however, the CA denied due
act without or in excess of jurisdiction on course to Caterpillar's petition for review, viz.:
the part of respondent tribunal (Garcia vs.
HRET, 312 SCRA 353). WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petition
Granting arguendo that public is DENIED DUE COURSE, and
respondent court erred in its ruling, still a accordingly, DISMISSED.
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 cannot
be justified. Where the court has jurisdiction SO ORDERED. 48
over the subject matter, the orders or The CA opined that an appeal under Rule 43 to assail
decision upon all questions pertaining to the the resolution by the Secretary of Justice determining the
cause are orders or decisions within its existence or non-existence of probable cause was an improper
jurisdiction and however erroneous they remedy; and that while it could treat an appeal as a special civil
may be, they cannot be corrected action for certiorari under Rule 65, it could not do so therein
by certiorari (De Baron vs. Court of because the allegations of the petition did not sufficiently show
Appeals, 368 SCRA 407). grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice
WHEREFORE, foregoing in issuing the assailed resolutions.
premises considered, the Petition having no Caterpillar filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
merit in fact and in law is hereby DENIED CA denied the motion for its lack of merit on February 12,
DUE COURSE and ordered DISMISSED. 2013. 49
With costs to Petitioners.
Hence, Caterpillar commenced G.R. No. 205972.
SO ORDERED. 40
Caterpillar sought the reconsideration of the dismissal,
but the CA denied the motion on June 30, 2004. 41 aDSIHc Issues
Hence, Caterpillar appealed the CA's decision in C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 75526 (G.R. No. 164352). Caterpillar submits that the CA erred as follows:
G.R. No. 164352
A.
G.R. No. 205972
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
In the meanwhile, in August 2002, upon receiving the DENYING DUE COURSE TO
information that Samson and his affiliate entities continuously CATERPILLAR, INC.'S PETITION
sold and distributed products bearing Caterpillar's Core Marks FOR CERTIORARI.
without Caterpillar's consent, the latter requested the assistance B.
of the Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division of the THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
National Region Public Police (RIID-NCRPO) for the conduct SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
of an investigation. Subsequently, after the investigation, the HOLDING THAT THE ORDER
RIID-NCRPO applied for and was granted 16 search warrants SUSPENDING PROCEEDINGS IN
against various outlets owned or operated by Samson in CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 02-238 TO 02-
Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Manila, Caloocan, Makati, 243, ON THE BASIS OF AN ALLEGED
Parañaque, Las Piñas, Pampanga and Cavite. The warrants were PREJUDICIAL QUESTION, WAS
served on August 27, 2002, 42 and as the result products bearing CONTRARY TO LAW AND
Caterpillar's Core Marks were seized and confiscated. ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
Consequently, on the basis of the search warrants issued by the C.
various courts, Caterpillar again instituted criminal complaints THE HONORABLE COURT OF
in the DOJ for violation of Section 168.3 (a), in relation to APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
Sections 131.3, 123.1 (e) and 170 of the IP Code against REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
Samson, docketed as I.S. Nos. 2002-995 to 2002-997; 2002-999 HOLDING THAT A CRIMINAL
to 2002-1010; and 2002-1036. COMPLAINT FOR UNFAIR
COMPETITION CAN PROCEED
After the conduct of the preliminary investigation, the INDEPENDENTLY OF, AND
DOJ, through State Prosecutor Melvin J. Abad, issued a joint SIMULTANEOUS WITH, THE CIVIL
resolution dated August 21, 2003 dismissing the complaint upon CASE FOR THE SAME. 50 ETHIDa
finding that there was no probable cause to charge Samson with
unfair competition. 43
 Caterpillar posits that the suspension of proceedings in
Criminal Cases Nos. 02-238 to 02-243 was contrary to Rule 111
of the Rules of Court, Article 33 of the Civil Code on
independent civil actions, and Section 170 of the IP Code, which
specifically provides that the criminal penalties for unfair
competition were independent of the civil and administrative
sanctions imposed by law; that the determination of the lawful
owner of the "CATERPILLAR" trademark in Civil Case No. Q-
00-41446 would not be decisive of the guilt of Samson for unfair
competition in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-238 to 02-243 because
registration was not an element of the crime of unfair
competition; that the civil case sought to enforce Samson's civil
liability arising from the IP Code while the criminal cases would
enforce Samson's liability arising from the crime of unfair
competition; and that the Court already ruled in Samson v.
Daway 51 that Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 was an independent
civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code and, as such,
could proceed independently of the criminal actions.
In his comment, 52 Samson counters that the issues of
the lawful and registered owner of the trademark, the true owner
of the goodwill, and whether "CATERPILLAR" was an
internationally well-known mark are intimately related to the
issue of guilt in the criminal actions, the resolution of which
should determine whether or not the criminal actions for unfair
competition could proceed.
G.R. No. 205972
In this appeal, the petitioner interposes that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR REVIEW
SOLELY ON THE GROUND OF AN
ALLEGED WRONG REMEDY, DESPITE
PETITIONERS HAVING CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED THAT THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING
THE RESOLUTIONS DATED 19
SEPTEMBER 2005 AND 20 DECEMBER
2007, AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF
THE INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR
THAT NO PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS
TO CHARGE THE RESPONDENT OF
THE CRIME OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION. 53
Caterpillar seeks the liberal interpretation of
procedural rules in order to serve the higher interest of
substantial justice following the denial by the CA of its petition
for being an incorrect remedy; and insists that it presented
substantial evidence to warrant a finding of probable cause for
unfair competition against Samson.
In sum, the issues to be resolved in these consolidated
cases are: firstly, whether or not the CA committed a reversible
error in ruling that the trial court a quo did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in suspending the criminal proceedings on
account of a prejudicial question; and, secondly, whether or not
the CA committed reversible error in upholding the decision of
the Secretary of Justice finding that there was no probable cause
to charge Samson with unfair competition.
Rulings of the Court
G.R. No. 164352
The appeal in G.R. No. 164352 is meritorious.
We note, to begin with, that Civil Case No. Q-00-
41446, the civil case filed by Caterpillar in the RTC in Quezon
City, was for unfair competition, damages and cancellation of
trademark, while Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44 were the
criminal prosecution of Samson for unfair competition. A
common element of all such cases for unfair competition —
civil and criminal — was fraud. Under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action may be brought by the injured party in cases of
fraud, and such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution. In view of its being an independent civil
action, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 did not operate as a
prejudicial question that justified the suspension of the
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44.
In fact, this issue has already been raised in relation to
the suspension of the arraignment of Samson in Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-02-108043-44 in Samson v. Daway, 54 and the Court
resolved it against Samson and in favor of Caterpillar
thusly: cSEDTC
Anent the second issue, petitioner
failed to substantiate his claim that there was
a prejudicial question. In his petition, he
prayed for the reversal of the March 26,
2003 order which sustained the denial of his
motion to suspend arraignment and other
proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-
108043-44. For unknown reasons, however,
he made no discussion in support of said
prayer in his petition and reply to comment.
Neither did he attach a copy of the
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 nor
quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove
the existence of a prejudicial question.
At any rate, there is no prejudicial
question if the civil and the criminal action
can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule
111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
In the case at bar, the common
element in the acts constituting unfair
competition under Section 168 of R.A. No.
8293 is fraud. Pursuant to Article 33 of
the Civil Code, in cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil
Case No. Q-00-41446, which as admitted
by private respondent also relate to unfair
competition, is an independent civil action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code.As
such, it will not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of
the criminal cases at bar. 55 (Bold
emphasis supplied)
 Secondly, a civil action for damages and cancellation
of trademark cannot be considered a prejudicial question by
which to suspend the proceedings in the criminal cases for unfair
competition. A prejudicial question is that which arises in a civil
case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issues
to be determined in the criminal case. It must appear not only
that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action
is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the
civil action will necessarily be determinative of the criminal
case. 56 As stated in Librodo v. Judge Coscolluela, Jr.: 57
A prejudicial question is one based
on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of
the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that
said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. It
comes into play generally in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending and there exists in the
former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal
action may proceed, because howsoever
the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et
de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. 58 (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)
The elements of a prejudicial question are provided in
Section 7 of Rule 111, Rules of Court, to wit: (a) a previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar to or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. 59
An examination of the nature of the two kinds of cases
involved is necessary to determine whether a prejudicial
question existed.
An action for the cancellation of trademark like Civil
Case No. Q-00-41446 is a remedy available to a person who
believes that he is or will be damaged by the registration of a
mark. 60 On the other hand, the criminal actions for unfair
competition (Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44) involved
the determination of whether or not Samson had given his goods
the general appearance of the goods of Caterpillar, with the
intent to deceive the public or defraud Caterpillar as his
competitor. 61 In the suit for the cancellation of trademark, the
issue of lawful registration should necessarily be determined, but
registration was not a consideration necessary in unfair
competition. 62 Indeed, unfair competition is committed if the
effect of the act is "to pass off to the public the goods of one
man as the goods of another;" 63 it is independent of
registration. As fittingly put in R.F. & Alexander & Co. v.
Ang, 64 "one may be declared unfair competitor even if his
competing trade-mark is registered."
Clearly, the determination of the lawful ownership of
the trademark in the civil action was not determinative of
whether or not the criminal actions for unfair competition shall
proceed against Samson.
G.R. No. 205972
The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No.
205972 is denied for being bereft of merit. SDAaTC
Firstly, Caterpillar assailed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice by filing a petition for review under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court. Such resort to the petition for review
under Rule 43 was erroneous, 65 and the egregious error
warranted the denial of the appeal. The petition for review under
Rule 43 applied to all appeals to the CA from quasi-judicial
agencies or bodies, particularly those listed in Section 1 of Rule
43. However, the Secretary of Justice, in the review of the
findings of probable cause by the investigating public
prosecutor, was not exercising a quasi-judicial function, but
performing an executive function. 66
Moreover, the courts could intervene in the
determination of probable cause only through the special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not by
appeal through the petition for review under Rule 43. Thus, the
CA could not reverse or undo the findings and conclusions on
probable cause by the Secretary of Justice except upon clear
demonstration of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction committed by the Secretary of
Justice. 67 Caterpillar did not so demonstrate.
And, secondly, even discounting the technicalities as
to consider Caterpillar's petition for review as one brought under
Rule 65, the recourse must still fail.
Probable cause for the purpose of filing an information
in court consists in such facts and circumstances as would
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the accused may probably be guilty thereof. 68 The
determination of probable cause lies solely within the sound
discretion of the investigating public prosecutor after the
conduct of a preliminary investigation. It is a sound judicial
policy to refrain from interfering with the determination of what
constitutes sufficient and convincing evidence to establish
probable cause for the prosecution of the accused. 69 Thus, it is
imperative that by the nature of his office, the public prosecutor
cannot be compelled to file a criminal information in court if he
is not convinced of the sufficiency of the evidence adduced for a
finding of probable cause. 70 Neither can he be precluded from
filing an information if he is convinced of the merits of the case.
In not finding probable cause to indict Samson for
unfair competition, State Prosecutor Abad as the investigating
public prosecutor discharged the discretion given to him by the
law. Specifically, he resolved as follows:
It appears from the records that
respondent started marketing his (class 25)
products bearing the trademark Caterpillar
as early as 1992. In 1994, respondent caused
the registration of the trademark "Caterpillar
with a Triangle Device beneath the Letter
[A]" with the Intellectual Property Office.
Sometime on June 16, 1997, the IPO issued
Certificate of Registration No. 64705 which
appears to be valid for twenty (20) years, or
up to June 16, 2017. Upon the strength of
this registration, respondent continued with
his business of marketing shoes, slippers,
sandals, boots and similar Class 25 items
bearing his registered trademark
"Caterpillar." Under the law, respondent's
operative act of registering his Caterpillar
trademark and the concomitant
approval/issuance by the governmental
entity concerned, conferred upon him the
exclusive right to use said trademark unless
otherwise declared illegal. There being no
 evidence to controvert the fact that
respondent's Certificate of Registration No.
64705 covering Caterpillar trademark was
fraudulently or illegally obtained, it
necessarily follows that its subsequent use
and/or being passed on to the public
militates malice or fraudulent intent on the
part of respondent. Otherwise stated and
from the facts obtaining, presumption of
regularity lies, both from the standpoint of
registration and use/passing on of the
assailed Caterpillar products.
Complainant's argument that
respondent may still be held liable for unfair
competition by reason of his having passed
on five (5) other Caterpillar products like
"Cat," "Caterpillar," "Cat and Design,"
"Walking Machines" and "Track-Type
Tractor Design" is equally difficult to
sustain. As may be gleaned from the records,
respondent has been engaged in the sale and
distribution of Caterpillar products since
1992 leading to the establishment of
numerous marketing outlets. As such, it
would be difficult to assail the presumption
that respondent has already established
goodwill insofar as his registered Caterpillar
products are concerned. On the other hand,
complainant's registration of the other
Caterpillar products appears to have been
caused only in 1995. In this premise,
respondent may be considered as prior user,
while the latter, a subsequent one.
Jurisprudence dictates that prior user of the
trademark by one, will controvert the claim
by a subsequent one. 71 acEHCD
We reiterate that the full discretionary authority to
determine the existence of probable cause is lodged in the
Executive Branch of the Government, through the public
prosecutor, in the first instance, and the Secretary of Justice, on
review. Such authority is exclusive, and the courts are prohibited
from encroaching on the executive function, unless there is a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public prosecutor or the
Secretary of Justice. As declared in Callo-Claridad v.
Esteban: 72
A public prosecutor alone
determines the sufficiency of evidence that
establishes the probable cause justifying the
filing of a criminal information against the
respondent because the determination of
existence of a probable cause is the function
of the public prosecutor. Generally, the
public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude
of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. Consequently, it is a sound
judicial policy to refrain from interfering in
the conduct of preliminary investigations,
and to just leave to the Department of
Justice the ample latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause for the
prosecution of supposed offenders.
Consistent with this policy, courts do not
reverse the Secretary of Justice's findings
and conclusions on the matter of probable
cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of
discretion. By way of exception, however,
judicial review is permitted where the
respondent in the preliminary investigation
clearly establishes that the public prosecutor
committed grave abuse of discretion, that is,
when the public prosecutor has exercised his
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, patent and
gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law. Moreover, the trial
court may ultimately resolve the existence or
non-existence of probable cause by
examining the records of the preliminary
investigation when necessary for the orderly
administration of justice. Although policy
considerations call for the widest latitude of
deference to the public prosecutor's findings,
the courts should never shirk from
exercising their power, when the
circumstances warrant, to determine whether
the public prosecutor's findings are
supported by the facts, and by the law.
Relevantly, grave abuse of discretion means such
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave, as
when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all,
in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted
without jurisdiction. 73 Herein, Caterpillar did not show the
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for
review in G.R. No. 164352; SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on January 21, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No.
75526; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City
to reinstate Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44 and forthwith
try and decide them without undue delay; DENIES the petition
for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 205972;
and ORDERS respondent Manolo P. Samson to pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Perlas-
Bernabe and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
||| (Caterpillar, Inc. v. Samson, G.R. Nos. 205972 & 164352,
[November 9, 2016], 799 PHIL 286-310)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-26795. July 31, 1970.]
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, suing through
her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and
JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.
DECISION
REYES, J p:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison
Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a
complaint for support and damages, and another order denying
amendment of the same pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as
follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her
parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it
was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and
had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao,
although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with
plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her
consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and
drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying.
Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and
attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for
lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the
child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge
sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to
allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given
birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's
objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the
original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the
plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be
untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given
by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes
favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right
to support from it progenitors, particularly of the defendant-
appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of
the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre
de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn,
may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same
Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may
result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of
the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the
death of the testator (Article 854, Civil Code)
"ART. 742. Donations made to conceived
and unborn children may be accepted by those persons
who would legally represent them if they were already
born."
"ART. 854. The preterition or omission of
one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
"If the omitted compulsory heirs should die
before the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of representation."
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article
291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support
to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides
imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article
291.
It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the
conceived child shall be considered born for ail purposes that are
favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus
be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's
womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to
the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of
Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.
Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding
Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:
"Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no
son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico
que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica, sino
que constituyen un caso de los propiamente llamados
'derechos en estado de pendencia'; el nacimiento del
sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no
determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya
existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho
que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit.,
page 271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed
from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to
yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case)
constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that
entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says
Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
"ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.'
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of
the same Code:
"ART. 2219. Moral damages may be
recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other
lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
 (10) Acts and actions referred to in
Articles 21 , 26, 27, 28 . . ."
Thus, independently of the right to support of the child
she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for
damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order
dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in
error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed
and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against
appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ.,
concur.
 
||| (Quimiguing v. Icao, G.R. No. L-26795, [July 31, 1970], 145 PHIL
43-50)
 THIRD DIVISION Section 4. DEATH AND
ACCIDENT INSURANCE. — The Company
shall grant death and accidental insurance to
[G.R. No. 182836. October 13, 2009.] the employee or his family in the following
manner: IHSTDE
CONTINENTAL STEEL xxx xxx xxx
MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. 4.3 DEPENDENTS — Eleven
ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG employees legitimate dependents (parents,
CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION- spouse, and children). In case the employee is
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE single, this benefit covers the legitimate
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT parents, brothers and sisters only with proper
AND REFORMS (NMCSC- legal document to be presented (e.g., death
SUPER), respondents. certificate). 4
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano's
unborn child. Hortillano's wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a
DECISION premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th
week of pregnancy. 5 According to the Certificate of Fetal Death
dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to
fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. 6
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p: Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano's
claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement
Before Us is a Petition for Review leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and
on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the accident insurance. 7
Decision 1 dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution 2 dated 9
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel
May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697,
of Hortillano's claims for bereavement and other death benefits,
affirming the Resolution 3 dated 20 November 2007 of
the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the
respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S.
CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still
Montaño (Montaño) granting bereavement leave and other death
failed to settle their dispute, 8 prompting the Union to file a
benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the
Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and
death of his unborn child.
Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR). 9 In a
Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole
Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave
respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2 and
Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA. 10 The parties mutually
Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a chose Atty. Montaño, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to
claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and resolve said issue. 11
Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental When the preliminary conferences again proved futile
and the Union, which reads: in amicably settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to submit
their respective Position Papers, 12 Replies, 13 and
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE Rejoinders 14 to Atty. Montaño.
xxx xxx xxx The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to
bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to the
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT
CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and
LEAVE. — The Company agrees to grant a
Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state
bereavement leave with pay to any employee
that the dependent should have first been born alive or must
in case of death of the employee's legitimate
have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent
dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers
death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union
and sisters) based on the following:
cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel),
Marilao, Bulacan — 7 days sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as
Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila provisions of their CBAs.
— 11 days
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L.
xxx xxx xxx Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also
prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave,
bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA
between his union and Mayer Steel. 15 Dugan's child was only
24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to
Hortillano's child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb
and only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel
and Mayer Steel are located in the same compound as
Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and
Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective
employees' unions were the same as the representatives of
Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the
Union. HECTaA
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil
Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and
labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and
decent living for the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the
express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of
an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed
that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits,
namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none
of which existed in Hortillano's case. Continental Steel, relying
on Articles 40, 41 and 42 16 of the Civil Code, contended that
only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn
child never died because it never acquired juridical personality.
Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel
reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery
was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be
applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A
fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered
a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever
acquire the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the
CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties
qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted
definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both
parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included
in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA — the death
of whom would have qualified the parent-employee for
bereavement leave and other death benefits — bound the Union
to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases
involving the employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and
Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and
incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct
personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain
its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other death
benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child
constituted "company practice".
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution 17 ruling
that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and
death benefits.
Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement
to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the
entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave
with pay by the covered employees as provided
under Article X, Section 2 of the parties' CBA,
three (3) indispensable elements must be
present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death
must be of employee's "dependent"; and (3)
such dependent must be "legitimate".
On the otherhand, for the entitlement
to benefit for death and accident insurance as
provided under Article XVIII, Section 4,
paragraph (4.3) of the parties' CBA, four (4)
indispensable elements must be present: (a)
there is "death"; (b) such death must be of
employee's "dependent"; (c) such dependent
must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal
document to be presented. 18 CTSAaH
Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the
death of an employee's legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus
had the right to be supported by the parents from the very
moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another
for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained
himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else,
specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a
dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery.
There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were
lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child,
legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING
[herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay
Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos
(P4,939.00), representing his bereavement
leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand
Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00)
representing death benefits, or a total amount
of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy,
however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby
ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein
dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 19 under Section 1,
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in
granting Hortillano's claims for bereavement leave with pay and
other death benefits because no death of an
employee's dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at
whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of
the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the
death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not
acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out
that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the
term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It
asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon
said child's birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be had.
Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano's entitlement
to bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA
were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27
February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño's Resolution dated 20
November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean
as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental
Steel's] exposition on the legal sense in which
the term "death" is used in the CBA fails to
impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant
 for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of
bereavement leave and death benefits
thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is
no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the
acquisition of civil personality of a child or
fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon
delivery, it does not follow that such event of
premature delivery of a fetus could never be
contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by
the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event
causing loss and grief to the affected
employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in
a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has
proposed a narrow and technical significance
to the term "death of a legitimate dependent" as
condition for granting bereavement leave and
death benefits under the CBA. Following
[Continental Steel's] theory, there can be no
experience of "death" to speak of. The Court,
however, does not share this view. A dead
fetus simply cannot be equated with anything
less than "loss of human life", especially for
the expectant parents. In this light,
bereavement leave and death benefits are
meant to assuage the employee and the latter's
immediate family, extend to them' solace and
support, rather than an act conferring legal
status or personality upon the unborn child.
[Continental Steel's] insistence that the
certificate of fetal death is for statistical
purposes only sadly misses this crucial
point. 20 CSHcDT
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008
Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. The assailed Resolution dated
November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby
AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner
Continental Steel]. 21
In a Resolution 22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of
Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration 23 of
Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel
persistently argues that the CBA is clear and unambiguous, so
that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied.
Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus
never acquired a juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for
bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are:
(1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent,
spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3)
legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The
requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII,
Section 4 (3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of
a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a
married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single
employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to
prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion
of Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear and
unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillano's
claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the
purportedly proper interpretation of the terms "death" and
"dependent" as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA
are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort
to the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover,
Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor
the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement
leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the
CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41
and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is
misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a
child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil
personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant
herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural
persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the
same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil
personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is
the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost
only through death. Capacity to act, which is
the power to do acts with legal effect, is
acquired and may be lost. CDHacE
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child
herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a
person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the
unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations
prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the
child's parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death
benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the
unborn child upon the latter's death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do
not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while
the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those
who have acquired juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of
life. 24 Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need
not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life. No less than
the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception, 25 that the State must protect equally with the life
of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation
thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies
as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered
a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines,
a dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not
able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of
someone else". Under said general definition, 26 even an unborn
child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano's child could not
have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without
depending upon its mother, Hortillano's wife, for sustenance.
Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that
the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married
employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee.
The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child
dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have
acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without
such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more
general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother's
womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent
child's status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v.
Maglaya, 27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate
child, viz.:
A legitimate child is a product of,
and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful
marriage. Remove the element of lawful union
and there is strictly no legitimate filiation
between parents and child. Article 164 of the
Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the
matter: "Children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate".
(Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel, 28 we identified an
illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the
various types of illegitimate children have been
eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are
only two classes of children — legitimate (and
those who, like the legally adopted, have the
rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate.
All children conceived and born outside a
valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law
itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis
ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and
the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it
was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly
married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able
to comply with the fourth element entitling him to death and
accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death
certificate of his unborn child. CSaIAc
Given the existence of all the requisites for
bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA,
Hortillano's claims for the same should have been granted by
Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death
benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if
possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family
who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the
parents' grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their
unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39
weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents
whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions
on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be
interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time
and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case
of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting
labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. 29 In the
same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted
in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 30 we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the
declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed
decision that "when the pendulum of judgment
swings to and fro and the forces are equal on
both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of
labor". While petitioner acknowledges that all
doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code
shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists
that what is involved-here is the amended CBA
which is essentially a contract between private
persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the
avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our
Constitution, to accord utmost protection and
justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise,
sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph &
Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA
451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:
When conflicting interests
of labor and capital are to be
weighed on the scales of social
justice, the heavier influence of the
latter should be counter-balanced by
sympathy and compassion the law
must accord the underprivileged
worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and
Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA
265 (1991)], we declared:
Any doubt concerning the
rights of labor should be resolved in
its favor pursuant to the social justice
policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697,
affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to
Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death
benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-
Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of
his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental
Steel Manufacturing Corporation.
SO ORDERED. DHSaCA
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Peralta,
JJ., concur.
 
||| (Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. v. Montaño, G.R. No.
182836, [October 13, 2009], 618 PHIL 634-650)
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 203770. November 23, 2016.]
MANUELA AZUCENA
MAYOR, petitioner, vs. EDWIN TIU and
DAMIANA CHARITO
MARTY, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the October 5, 2011 1 and
September 24, 2012 2 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 06256, which dismissed the
petition filed by Remedios Tiu (Remedios) and Manuela
Azucena Mayor (Manuela) for procedural infirmities. The said
CA petition challenged the January 20, 2011 3 and June 10,
2011 4 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban
City (RTC-Br. 6), in Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-30, a case for
Probate of Last Will and Testament and Issuance of Letters of
Testamentary.
The Antecedents:
On May 25, 2008, Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin
Casilan (Rosario), the widow of the late Primo Villasin (Primo),
passed away and left a holographic Last Will and
Testament, 5 wherein she named her sister, Remedios
Tiu (Remedios), and her niece, Manuela Azucena
Mayor (Manuela), as executors. Immediately thereafter,
Remedios and Manuela filed a petition for the probate of
Rosario's holographic will 6 with prayer for the issuance of
letters testamentary (probate proceedings). The petition was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban
City (RTC-Br. 9) and docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-30.
They averred that Rosario left properties valued at
approximately P2.5 million.
On May 29, 2008, respondent Damiana Charito
Marty (Marty) claiming to be the adopted daughter of Rosario,
filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC,
Branch 34, Tacloban City (RTC-Br. 34), docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 2008-05-32, but it was not given due course because of the
probate proceedings. Per records, this dismissal is subject of a
separate proceeding filed by Marty with the CA Cebu City,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 04003. 7
On June 12, 2008, in its Order, 8 the RTC-Br. 9 found
the petition for probate of will filed by Remedios and Manuela
as sufficient in form and substance and set the case for
hearing. AcICHD
Consequently, Marty filed her Verified Urgent
Manifestation and Motion, 9 dated June 23, 2008, stating that
Remedios kept the decedent Rosario a virtual hostage for the
past ten (10) years and her family was financially dependent on
her which led to the wastage and disposal of the properties
owned by her and her husband, Primo. Marty averred that until
the alleged will of the decedent could be probated and admitted,
Remedios and her ten (10) children had no standing to either
possess or control the properties comprising the estate of the
Villasins. She prayed for the probate court to: 1) order an
immediate inventory of all the properties subject of the
proceedings; 2) direct the tenants of the estate, namely, Mercury
Drug and Chowking, located at Primrose Hotel, to deposit their
rentals with the court; 3) direct Metrobank, P. Burgos Branch, to
freeze the accounts in the name of Rosario, Primrose
Development Corporation (Primrose) or Remedios; and 4) lock
up the Primrose Hotel in order to preserve the property until
final disposition by the court.
On July 8, 2008, Remedios and Manuela filed their
Comment/Opposition 10 to the urgent manifestation averring
that Marty was not an adopted child of the Villasins based on a
certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of
Tacloban City, attesting that no record of any adoption
proceedings involving Marty existed in their records. They also
argued that the probate court had no jurisdiction over the
properties mistakenly claimed by Marty as part of Rosario's
estate because these properties were actually owned by, and
titled in the name of, Primrose. Anent the prayer to direct the
tenants to deposit the rentals to the probate court, Remedios and
Manuela countered that the probate court had no jurisdiction
over properties owned by third persons, particularly by
Primrose, the latter having a separate and distinct personality
from the decedent's estate.
In her Reply, 11 dated July 15, 2008, Marty cited an
order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte (CFI Leyte) in SP
No. 1239, 12 claiming that as early as March 3, 1981, the veil of
corporate entity of Primrose was pierced on the ground that it
was a closed family corporation controlled by Rosario after
Primo's death. Thus, Marty alleged that "piercing" was proper in
the case of Rosario's estate because the incorporation of
Primrose was founded on a fraudulent consideration, having
been done in contemplation of Primo's death.
Further, on July 22, 2008, in her Opposition to the
Petition for the Approval of the Will of the Late Rosario Guy-
Juco Villasin Casilan, 13 Marty impugned the authenticity of her
holographic will.
Meanwhile, Edwin Tiu (Edwin), a son of Remedios,
also filed his Opposition, 14 dated June 13, 2008.
After a protracted exchange of pleadings, the parties
submitted their respective memoranda.
The January 14, 2009 Order
In its January 14, 2009 Order, 15 the RTC-Br. 9
granted the motion of Marty and appointed the OIC Clerk of
Court as special administrator of the Estate. The Probate Court
also ordered Mercury Drug and Chowking to deposit the rental
income to the court and Metrobank to freeze the bank accounts
mentioned in the motion of Marty. The doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil was applied in the case considering that Rosario
had no other properties that comprised her estate other than
Primrose. According to the probate court, for the best interest of
whoever would be adjudged as the legal heirs of the Estate, it
was best to preserve the properties from dissipation.
On January 22, 2009, Remedios and Manuela filed
their Motion for Inhibition 16 on the ground of their loss of trust
and confidence in RTC-Br. 9 Presiding Judge Rogelio C.
Sescon (Judge Sescon) to dispense justice. Later, they also filed
their Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam, 17 dated
February 3, 2009, arguing that Rosario's estate consisted only of
shares of stock in Primrose and not the corporation itself. Thus,
the probate court could not order the lessees of the corporation
to remit the rentals to the Estate's administrator. With regard to
the appointment of a special administrator, Remedios and
Manuela insisted that it be recalled. They claimed that if ever
there was a need to appoint one, it should be the two of them
because it was the desire of the decedent in the will subject of
the probation proceedings.
In its Order, 18 dated March 27, 2009, the RTC-Br. 9
denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and
affirmed its January 14, 2009 Order. The presiding judge, Judge
Sescon, also granted the motion for inhibition and ordered that
the records of the case be referred to the RTC Executive Judge
for reraffling. The case was later re-raffled to RTC-Br. 6, Judge
Alphinor C. Serrano, presiding judge.
Aggrieved by the denial of their motion for
reconsideration, Remedios and Manuela filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA in Cebu City, docketed as CA-G.R.
S.P. No. 04254, assailing the January 14, 2009 and March 27,
2009 Orders of the RTC-Br. 9. 19
Ruling of the CA
In its October 16, 2009 Decision, 20 the
CA reversed the assailed orders of the RTC Br. 9, except as to
the appointment of a special administrator insofar as this relates
to properties specifically belonging to the "Estate." It held
that Primrose had a personality separate and distinct from
the estate of the decedent and that the probate court had no
jurisdiction to apply the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil.
According to the CA, nowhere in the assailed orders
of the probate court was it stated that its determination of the
title of the questioned properties was only for the purpose of
determining whether such properties ought to be included in the
inventory. When the probate court applied the doctrine of
"piercing," in effect, it adjudicated with finality the ownership of
the properties in favor of the Estate. The CA stated that RTC-Br.
9 had no jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership of a property
claimed by another based on adverse title; and that questions
like this must be submitted to a court of general jurisdiction and
not to a probate court.
The CA added that assuming that the probate court's
determination on the issue of ownership was merely intended to
be provisional, Marty's contentions still had no merit. The
properties, which she claimed to be part of the estate of Rosario
and over which she claimed co-ownership, comprised of real
properties registered under the Torrens system. As such,
Primrose was considered the owner until the titles to those
properties were nullified in an appropriate ordinary action. The
CA further stated that the RTC erroneously relied on the order
issued by the CFI Leyte in 1981, in the probate proceedings
involving the estate of Primo. Whatever determination the CFI
made at the time regarding the title of the properties was merely
provisional, hence, not conclusive as to the ownership.
By reason of the favorable decision by the CA,
Remedios and Manuela filed their Motion to Partially Revoke
the Writ of Execution Enforcing the January 14, 2009 Order of
the Honorable Court and Manifestation in Compliance with the
October 21, 2009 Order (Ad Cautelam), 21 dated October 27,
2009.
In its Order, 22 dated November 17, 2009, the RTC-
Br. 6 partially granted the motion as it revoked the power of the
special administrator to oversee the day-to-day operations of
Primrose. It also revoked the order with respect to Mercury Drug
and Chowking, reasoning out that the said establishments dealt
with Primrose, which had a personality distinct and separate
from the estate of the decedent. In the said order, Atty. Blanche
A. Salino nominated by oppositors Marty and Edwin, was
appointed special administrator to oversee the day-to-day
operations of the estate. The same order also upheld the January
14, 2009 Order, as to the conduct and inventory of all the
properties comprising the estate.
This order was not questioned or appealed by the
parties.
Omnibus Motion
On September 24, 2010, or almost ten (10) months
after the November 17, 2009 Order of the probate court was
issued, Marty, together with her new counsel, filed her Omnibus
Motion, 23 praying for the probate court to: 1) order Remedios
and Manuela to render an accounting of all the properties and
assets comprising the estate of the decedent; 2) deposit or
consign all rental payments or other passive income derived
from the properties comprising the estate; and 3) prohibit the
disbursement of funds comprising the estate of the decedent
without formal motion and approval by the probate
court. ICHDca
Ruling of the RTC-Br. 6
In its January 20, 2011 Order, the RTC-Br. 6 granted
Marty's Omnibus Motion. Although it agreed with the October
16, 2009 CA Decision reversing the January 14, 2009 Order of
the RTC-Br. 9, nonetheless, it acknowledged the urgency and
necessity of appointing a special administrator. According to the
probate court, considering that there was clear evidence of a
significant decrease of Rosario's shares in the outstanding capital
stock of Primrose, 24 prudence dictated that an inquiry into the
validity of the transfers should be made. A final determination of
this matter would be outside the limited jurisdiction of the
probate court, but it was likewise settled that the power to
institute an action for the recovery of a property claimed to be
part of the estate was normally lodged with the executor or
administrator. Thus, the probate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons
aforestated, and so as not to render moot any
action that the special administrator, or the
regular administrator upon the latter's
qualification and appointment, may deem
appropriate to take on the matter (i.e.,
Whether or not to institute in the name of the
estate the appropriate action for the recovery
of the shares of stock), this Court
hereby GRANTS Oppositor Marty's
Omnibus Motion, dated September 24,
2010, and thus hereby:
1. DIRECTS petitioners, either
individually or jointly, to: (a) RENDER AN
ACCOUNTING of all the properties and
assets comprising the estate of the decedent
that may have come into their possession;
and, (b) DEPOSIT OR CONSIGN all the
rentals payments or such other passive
incomes from the properties and assets
registered in the name of Primrose
Development Corporation, including all
income derived from the Primrose Hotel and
the lease contracts with Mercury Drug and
Chowking Restaurant, both within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of this Order;
2. DIRECTS the Special
Administrator to take possession and charge
of the properties comprising the decedent's
estate, specially those pertaining to the
 shareholding of the decedent in Primrose IT HELD THAT PETITIONER MAYOR
Development Corporation, to determine DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
whether or not action for the recovery of the MATERIAL DATE RULE.
shares of stock supposedly transferred from III.
the decedent to petitioners Remedios Tiu, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
Manuela Azucena Mayor should be APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
instituted in the name of the estate against REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE
the said transferees and to submit a Report APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE
on the foregoing matters to this Court, RULES WARRANTING REVIEW
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this WHEN IT DECLARED THAT
Order; and, PETITIONER MAYOR FAILED TO
COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT
3. ORDERS that no funds OF SECTION 1, RULE 65 FOR
comprising the estate of the decedent shall FAILING TO ATTACH CERTIFIED
be disbursed without formal Motion TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE
therefor, with the conformity of the Special TRIAL COURT. TCAScE
Administrator, duly approved by this Court. IV.
SO THE HONORABLE COURT OF
ORDERED. 25 [Underscoring supplied] APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE
The partial motion for reconsideration of the above APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE
order filed by Remedios and Manuela was denied in the other RULES WARRANTING REVIEW
assailed order of the RTC-Br. 6, dated June 10, 2011. 26 WHEN IT DECLARED THAT
Dissatisfied, Remedios and Manuela availed of the PETITIONER MAYOR DID NOT
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, and filed a COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT
petition before the CA. OF VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM
Action by the CA SHOPPING.
V.
The CA, however, in its October 5, 2011
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
Resolution, 27 dismissed the same based on the following
APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
infirmities: 1) there was no proper proof of service of a copy of
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE
the petition on the respondents which was sent by registered
APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE
mail; 2) petitioners failed to indicate on the petition the material
RULES WARRANTING REVIEW
date when the motion for reconsideration was filed; 3) the copy
WHEN IT ALLOWED
of the assailed order was not certified true and correct by the
TECHNICALITIES TO BE USED TO
officer having custody of the original copy; and 4) the serial
DEFEAT SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF
number of the commission of the notary public, the province-
THE PARTIES.
city where he was commissioned, the office address of the
VI.
notary public and the roll of attorney's number were not properly
PETITIONERS HAVE GOOD CAUSE
indicated on the verification and certification of non-forum
AND A MERITORIOUS CASE
shopping.
AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENTS AS
Remedios and Manuela moved for reconsideration of PARAGRAPH 1(B) OF THE
the assailed CA resolution, but to no avail, as the appellate court DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF
denied the motion in its September 24, 2012 Resolution. THE FIRST ASSAILED
ORDER SHOULD HAVE BEEN
Hence, this petition before the Court, filed only by REVERSED BECAUSE IT
Manuela as Remedios had also passed away, and anchored on OVERTURNS THE DECISION OF THE
the following: COURT OF APPEALS DATED 16
GROUNDS OCTOBER 2009 WHICH HAS LONG
I. BECOME FINAL AND
THE HONORABLE COURT OF EXECUTORY. 28
APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND Petitioner Manuela argued that:
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE
APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE 1) There was actual compliance with Section
RULES WARRANTING REVIEW 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.
WHEN IT MISAPPLIED SECTION 13, The CA petition was accompanied
RULE 13 OF THE RULES OF by a notarized affidavit of service
COURT AND DECLARED THAT and filing of registered mail. At the
THERE WAS NO PROPER PROOF OF time the petition was filed, this was
SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL. the best evidence of the service. The
II. other registry receipts for the other
THE HONORABLE COURT OF parties were also attached to the
APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND petition. Further, the available
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE registry return card was furnished the
APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE CA in the motion for
RULES WARRANTING REVIEW reconsideration. 29
WHEN IT MISAPPLIED 2) The failure of the petition to comply with
JURISPRUDENCE AND RULE 65 AND the rule on a statement of material
 dates could be excused because the
dates were evident from the
records. 30
3) The petitioner went to the RTC of Tacloban
to secure certified true copies of the
assailed orders. Only the stamped
name of the Clerk of Court, however,
appeared thereon, because the
particular branch had no stamp pad
which had the phrase for
certification. The branch did not
even have a typewriter in order to
affix the phrase on the copies. These
inadequacies could not be attributed
to the petitioners. 31
4) The lack of information pertaining to the
notary public in the verification and
certification against forum-shopping
should not invalidate the same
because, again, it was not attributable
to the parties. 32
5) Technicalities should never be used to
defeat the substantive rights of a
party. 33
In its January 23, 2013 Resolution 34 the Court
ordered the respondents to file their respective comments.
Marty, in her Comment, insisted that the petitioner failed to
comply with the procedural requirements as stated by the CA. 35
In her Reply to Comment, 36 petitioner Manuela
clarified that the affidavit of service was executed on August 31,
2011, which was after the petition was signed by the lawyers
and after it was verified by the petitioner herself. After
contesting Marty's arguments on the alleged procedural
infirmities of the petitions with the CA and this Court, Manuela
asserted that the final and executory October 16, 2009 Decision
of the CA already held that Primrose had a personality separate
and distinct from the estate of decedent Rosario.
Meanwhile, in his Manifestation, 37 dated May 29,
2013, Edwin affirmed that he and Manuela decided to patch up
their differences and agreed to settle amicably. Accordingly, he
manifested that he was withdrawing from the case pursuant to
their agreement.
On June 18, 2014, Manuela filed her Motion for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction 38 on the ground that a flurry of orders
had been issued by the RTC-Br. 6 in the implementation of the
assailed January 20, 2011 Order, such as the Order, 39 dated
May 27, 2013, wherein the probate court vaguely ordered "the
inventory of the exact extent of the 'decedent's estate.'" Then
another order was issued appointing an auditing firm to conduct
an inventory/audit of the Estate including the rentals and
earnings derived from the lease of Mercury Drug and Chowking
Restaurant, as tenants of Primrose. 40 According to petitioner
Manuela, although an inventory of the assets of the decedent
was proper, the probate court ordered an inventory of the assets
of Primrose, a separate and distinct entity. Manuela asserts that
it was clearly in error.
In her Supplement to the Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, 41 dated June 17, 2013, Manuela informed the Court
that the inventory and accounting of Primrose would already
commence on June 19, 2013.
Marty filed her Opposition, 42 dated July 3, 2013,
stating that the petition of Manuela had been rendered moot and
academic as the probate court had declared her as the sole heir
of Rosario and appointed her administrator of the estate. She
argued that an injunctive relief would work injustice to the estate
because of the total assimilation by petitioner of the
shareholdings of the decedent in Primrose and her share in the
corporation's income corresponding to her
shareholdings. cTDaEH
Finding that the requisites for preliminary injunctive
relief were present, 43 the Court issued the TRO 44 in favor of
Manuela on October 14, 2013. At the outset, the Court was
convinced that the rights of Primrose sought to be protected by
the grant of injunctive relief were material and substantial and
the TRO was issued in order to prevent any irreparable damage
to a corporate entity that could arise from the conduct of an
accounting by the court-appointed inventory.
The Court's Ruling
The Court now resolves the subject case by the
issuance of a permanent injunction, as prayed for by petitioner
Manuela. This position is supported by law and jurisprudence, as
follows:
First. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or
succession of natural persons forming a corporation; and (2) a
collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of
having rights and duties. This class of artificial persons is
recognized only to a limited extent in our law. Example is the
estate of a bankrupt or deceased person. 45 From this
pronouncement, it can be gleaned that the estate of the deceased
person is a juridical person separate and distinct from the person
of the decedent and any other corporation. This status of an
estate comes about by operation of law. This is in consonance
with the basic tenet under corporation law that a corporation has
a separate personality distinct from its stockholders and from
other corporations to which it may be connected. 46
Second. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has
no relevant application in this case. Under this doctrine, the
court looks at the corporation as a mere collection of individuals
or an aggregation of persons undertaking business as a group,
disregarding the separate juridical personality of the corporation
unifying the group. Another formulation of this doctrine is that
when two business enterprises are owned, conducted and
controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when
necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal
fiction that two corporations are distinct entities and treat them
as identical or as one and the same. 47 The purpose behind
piercing a corporation's identity is to remove the barrier between
the corporation and the persons comprising it to thwart the
fraudulent and illegal schemes of those who use the corporate
personality as a shield for undertaking certain proscribed
activities. 48
Here, instead of holding the decedent's interest in the
corporation separately as a stockholder, the situation was
reversed. Instead, the probate court ordered the lessees of the
corporation to remit rentals to the estate's administrator without
taking note of the fact that the decedent was not the absolute
owner of Primrose but only an owner of shares thereof. Mere
ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of
all or nearly all of the capital stocks of a corporation is not of
itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate
corporate personalities. 49 Moreover, to disregard the separate
juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing cannot be
presumed, but must be clearly and convincingly established. 50
Third. A probate court is not without limits in the
determination of the scope of property covered in probate
proceedings. In a litany of cases, the Court had defined the
parameters by which a probate court may extend its probing
arms in the determination of the question of title in probate
proceedings. In Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 51 the Court
explained that, as a rule, the question of ownership was an
extraneous matter which the probate court could not resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should, or should not, be included in the inventory of
estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title
thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive,
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve
title. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge
of proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate but
which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. It can
only determine whether they should, or should not, be included
in the inventory or list of properties to be overseen by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot
do so. 52
In this case, respondent Marty argues that the subject
properties and the parcel of land on which these were erected
should be included in the inventory of Rosario's estate. More so,
the arrears from the rental of these properties were later on
ordered to be remitted to the administrator of the estate
grounded on the allegation that Rosario had no other properties
other than her interests in Primrose. To the Court's mind, this
holding of the probate court was in utter disregard of the
undisputed fact the subject land is registered under the Torrens
system in the name of Primrose, a third person who may be
prejudiced by the orders of the probate court. In Valera vs.
Inserto: 53 the Court stated:
. . ., settled is the rule that a Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court),
acting as a probate court, exercises but
limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power
to take cognizance of and determine the
issue of title to property claimed by a third
person adversely to the decedent, unless the
claimant and all the other parties having
legal interest in the property consent,
expressly or impliedly, to the submission of
the question to the probate court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons
are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the
exception being that the question of whether
or not a particular matter should be resolved
by the Court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a
special court (e.g., probate, land registration,
etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in
essence of procedural one, involving a mode
of practice which may be waived. cSaATC
xxx xxx xxx
. . . These considerations assume
greater cogency where, as here, the
Torrens title to the property is not in the
decedent's names but in others, a
situation on which this Court has already
had occasion to rule. 54 [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
Thus, the probate court should have recognized the
incontestability accorded to the Torrens title of Primrose over
Marty's arguments of possible dissipation of properties. In fact,
in the given setting, even evidence purporting to support a claim
of ownership has to yield to the incontestability of a Torrens
title, until after the same has been set aside in the manner
indicated in the law itself. In other words, the existence of a
Torrens title may not be discounted as a mere incident in special
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons.
Put clearly, if a property covered by Torrens title is involved,
"the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given
due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to
the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the
owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or
modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as
in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the
persons named in the title." 55
Additionally, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529 56 proscribes a collateral attack on a Torrens title:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral
attack. — A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.
In Cuizon vs. Ramolete, 57 the property subject of the
controversy was duly registered under the Torrens system. To
this, Court categorically stated:
Having been apprised of the fact that the
property in question was in the possession of
third parties and more important, covered by
a transfer certificate of title issued in the
name of such third parties, the respondent
court should have denied the motion of
the respondent administrator and
excluded the property in question from
the inventory of the property of the estate.
It had no authority to deprive such third
persons of their possession and ownership
of the property. 58 . . . [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
A perusal of the records of this case would show that
that no compelling evidence was ever presented to substantiate
the position of Marty that Rosario and Primrose were one and
the same, justifying the inclusion of the latter's properties in the
inventory of the decedent's properties. This has remained a
vacant assertion. At most, what Rosario owned were shares of
stock in Primrose. In turn, this boldly underscores the fact that
Primrose is a separate and distinct personality from the estate of
the decedent. Inasmuch as the real properties included in the
inventory of the estate of Rosario are in the possession of, and
are registered in the name of, Primrose, Marty's claims are bereft
of any logical reason and conclusion to pierce the veil of
corporate fiction.
Fourth. The probate court in this case has not
acquired jurisdiction over Primrose and its properties. Piercing
the veil of corporate entity applies to determination of liability
not of jurisdiction; it is basically applied only to determine
established liability. It is not available to confer on the court a
jurisdiction it has not acquired, in the first place, over a party not
impleaded in a case. 59 This is so because the doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction comes to play only during
the trial of the case after the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over the corporation. Hence, before this doctrine can
be even applied, based on the evidence presented, it is
imperative that the court must first have jurisdiction over the
corporation. 60
Hence, a corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be
subject to the court's process of piercing the veil of its corporate
fiction. Resultantly, any proceedings taken against the
 corporation and its properties would infringe on its right to due
process.
In the case at bench, the probate court applied the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil ratiocinating that Rosario
had no other properties that comprise her estate other than her
shares in Primrose. Although the probate court's intention to
protect the decedent's shares of stock in Primrose from
dissipation is laudable, it is still an error to order the
corporation's tenants to remit their rental payments to the estate
of Rosario.
Considering the above disquisition, the Court holds
that a permanent and final injunction is in order in accordance
with Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which provides
that "[i]f after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant
is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently
enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually
restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or
continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary
mandatory injunction." Undoubtedly, Primrose stands to suffer
an irreparable injury from the subject order of the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Temporary Restraining Order, dated June 14, 2013, is hereby
made PERMANENT, effective immediately. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City, is ENJOINED from
enforcing and implementing its January 20, 2011 and June 10,
2011 Orders, insofar as the corporate properties of Primrose
Development Corporation are concerned, to avert irreparable
damage to a corporate entity, separate and distinct from the
Estate of Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., * Del Castillo and Leonen, JJ.,
concur.
||| (Mayor v. Tiu, G.R. No. 203770, [November 23, 2016], 800 PHIL
700-721)