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The Power Politics Game:: Offensive Realism in Theory and Practice

David A. Reilly
Simulation Gaming 2003 34: 298
DOI: 10.1177/1046878103034002009

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SIMULATION
Reilly / THE POWER
& GAMING
POLITICS
/ JuneGAME
2003 ARTICLE
10.1177/1046878103252889

THE POWER POLITICS GAME:

Offensive realism in theory and practice

David A. Reilly
Niagara University

The behavior of states in the international system, according to theories of power politics, is centered on sur-
vival. Individuals become citizens, relinquishing their right to self-govern, to improve their security. Their
primary demand of the state, in return, is that it function to protect its citizens. The state, therefore, must
develop strategies to ensure its survival. This has led historically to a concern about the power of a state rel-
ative to others. Given that the international system lacks a centralized authority capable of dictating and
enforcing laws, each state must engage in self-help strategies. This simulation enables participants to expe-
rience power politics as they unfold and to serve as leaders attempting to ensure the survival of their state.
They will develop foreign policies intended to improve their security and bargain for foreign assistance. The
game is most effective as a learning tool when followed by a debriefing session that introduces the theories
behind many of the activities they engaged in. The simulation and debriefing can be conducted in 1.5 to 2
hours.

KEYWORDS: alliance building; anarchy; balance of power; cooperation; international organization;

international relations; political science; power politics; realism; simulation/gaming

Basic Data
Instructional objective: To help students understand concepts of power politics and realism
by simulating an environment where state survival is uncertain and “might makes right.”
Simulation objectives: Survival through a calculation of relative power and the development
of a self-help strategy that includes aggression and alliance-building.
Target audience: Anyone interested in the mechanisms of foreign policy.
Playing time: Game requires approximately 45 to 65 minutes to play (30 to 45 minutes when
replayed). It is most effective, however, when rounds are played on separate days during
the course of an extended period of time, such as a semester.
Debriefing time: 20 to 45 minutes.
Number of players: 5 or more.
Participation materials: A deck of cards, poker chips, timer, game rules, and chalkboard or
overhead projector.

Contemporary students are hearing, through the media, that the major power states
of the world are members of a family of nations, a community that strengthens the
prospects for prosperity and peace through increased interdependence and cooperative
interaction. However, have power politics really taken a back seat to collective security
agreements, joint humanitarian interventions, and multilateral trade?

SIMULATION & GAMING, Vol. 34 No. 2, June 2003 298-305

DOI: 10.1177/1046878103252889
© 2003 Sage Publications
298

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 Reilly / THE POWER POLITICS GAME 299

Through this simulation, students can usefully discover offensive realism

(Mearsheimer, 2001), which dominated foreign policy decision making for centuries.
Reading about alliance building, systemic anarchy, and relative power does not enable
students to grasp the intricacies of the strategies that evolved from theories of power
politics.
In Volume 29 of Simulation & Gaming, Wesley Chapin (1998) presents the
BALANCE OF POWER GAME, which is intended to simulate core elements of inter-
national relations. Gaming is an excellent approach for this topic because, since the
end of the Cold War, the idea of power balancing has been characterized by experts and
media as outdated and irrelevant. Accordingly, students have difficulty grasping the
relevance of this policy orientation for foreign affairs. The POWER POLITICS
GAME (PPG) goes beyond balance of power to experiment with a number of core con-
cepts related to offensive realism, which can be made explicit in the debriefing (see
below). For many students, the notion of power politics is best internalized when they
are able to experience firsthand how their decisions affect group dynamics and rela-
tions between players.
In the PPG, participants develop strategies of cooperation and aggression as they
attempt to survive the attacks of their counterparts. Power fluctuates between partici-
pants, requiring that bargaining, agenda setting, and reputation be integrated into a
long-term strategy for survival. Although there are no enforcement guarantees for the
agreements that develop within the game, participants will learn how self-regulating
mechanisms become an integral part of ensuring cooperation within the international
system. The ultimate victory comes from the establishment of hegemony and domi-
nance over others. However, participants quickly learn that survival is a victory in its
own right.

Facilitator’s guide

Reproduce and hand out the participants’ guide in advance of the simulation. This
will give them an opportunity to review the rules and to prepare a strategy. In addition,
make sure that participants have a copy of the rules to which they can refer during the
simulation.
Divide participants as equally as possible into six to twelve “states.” Have the par-
ticipants select a name for their state. List the name of each state on the board for all
participants to see. This will facilitate the tracking of events as the simulation unfolds.
Remind the participants that the central objective of the game is to survive. Encour-
age participants to negotiate, deliberate, and bargain with other states. Refer to partici-
pant guidelines whenever there is confusion about the steps in the game. Within the
participant guidelines, rules are ordered sequentially according to game play.
Although initially, participants will be unclear about how the game unfolds, with each
round, the options will become clearer.

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300 SIMULATION & GAMING / June 2003

To begin, take one suit (13 cards) from the deck of cards. Have a representative from
each state choose a card. The value of each card selected will represent that state’s level
of power for the subsequent round. Number cards represent their numeric value,
whereas face cards are valued as follows: ace = 1, jack = 11, queen = 12, and king = 13.
Write each state’s power score on the board and determine the order of play for the
round. The state with the highest power score acts first, the second highest moves next,
and so forth.
Set the timer for 4 minutes and begin play. During this first 4-minute period, the
most powerful state determines its course of action from the list of options below.
States are encouraged to communicate during this time. After the most powerful state
has selected an action, reset the timer to 4 minutes and have subsequent states deter-
mine their actions (or reactions) in turn. Note that each state need not take the full 4
minutes before selecting an action. Once again, encourage states to discuss their
options with other states and to bargain. Note that even when agreements are reached,
however, states are not compelled or bound by them. States may choose to make agree-
ments and then renege. When the second 4-minute period has ended, each remaining
state should be given 30 seconds to determine its course of action.
Keep track of all attacking and defending states on the board. Tally the results of all
attacks and defenses. Determine the winners of battles on the basis of these tallies. If a
state is defeated by more than 10 points, have the victorious state determine the spoils
of victory. Distribute poker chips as necessary to represent banked state power. A
banked point is given when a state abstains from action in any round, and when states
are successful in defending themselves from attack (i.e., their total points are more
than the total of the attacking state[s]). These banked resource points can be added to
the point total for an attack or defense at any point during future rounds. They may also
be given, allocated, or loaned to other states at any time during the game.
Have all states draw new power level cards at the start of the next round. Determine
the state power levels for the second and subsequent rounds by a combination of new
cards drawn and point adjustments from prior rounds. Make point adjustments for
states that have unsuccessfully defended an attack in the prior round. Subtract the
amount by which each state lost from its next round’s power total.
Set the timer to 4 minutes. Proceed as in the first round. Note that in the first round,
states have the basic choices of attacking, defending, or abstaining from action. In sub-
sequent rounds, additional choices and decisions will become necessary. Revolutions
may occur from within larger states. States that dominate in war will have to determine
how to allocate the spoils of victory. States with a preponderance of power can act
more than once in a single round. These more advanced stages are detailed in the par-
ticipants’ guide.

Participants’ guide
1. Participants will be divided as equally as possible into six to twelve “states.”
2. Each state has one main goal: self-preservation.

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 Reilly / THE POWER POLITICS GAME 301

3. The strength of states will vary from round to round. State power will be determined at the
start of each round through a random draw of cards. After the first round, these power lev-
els will be adjusted to account for banked points and unsuccessful defense from attack. In
these subsequent rounds, if there are two or more countries with equal power levels, those
countries will draw additional cards to determine the sequence of action. Note that those
additional cards will not affect power levels, only the order of action. Banked resource
points may be used for attack or defense at any point during future rounds. They may also
be given, allocated, or loaned to other states at any time during the game. Banked points
can be accumulated in one of two ways: (a) a state receives one banked point for abstain-
ing from action in any round of the simulation, and (b) all states involved in the successful
defense of a state (i.e., the total power points of defending states exceed the total power
points of all attacking states) receive a banked point.

Courses of action
Each state can take one course of action (except for the most powerful state; see the
section on preponderance of power) in each round of the simulation.

1. It can abstain from action. By abstaining, the state banks one resource point for future use.
Banked resource points may be used for attack or defense at any point during future
rounds. They may also be given, allocated, traded, or loaned to other states at any time
during the game.
2. It can attack another state. States that have initiated an attack earlier in the same round
may not be attacked.
3. It must defend itself if attacked. If a state abstains and then subsequently is attacked, it
must return the banked point.
4. It can join in an attack initiated by another state.
5. It can join in defending a state.
6. It can choose a new spokesperson. This action requires all state points, including banked
points. This occurs when more than half of the representatives of a state choose to revolt.
Upon declaring a revolt, all representatives of the state vote for a new spokesperson,
selected on the basis of the largest percentage of votes. This option is not possible until/
unless the state has defeated and disbanded at least two other states (see below).

Sequence of events
The sequence of events is as follows:

1. There will be a 4-minute period during which the most powerful state chooses a course of
action.
2. The largest state acts.
3. There is a 4-minute period during which all states ponder their options. State representa-
tives may communicate during either of the 4-minute periods but must strictly adhere to
the time constraints. Failure to do so may result in the loss of a turn, at the discretion of the
facilitator.
4. Declarations of the moves by each subsequent state will proceed sequentially in 30-
second increments, in descending order of power.
5. If the most powerful state chose to abstain during its turn, it may act to defend another
state at the conclusion of the round.

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302 SIMULATION & GAMING / June 2003

Attacking and defending

The results of attacks are determined as follows:

1. The points of all attacking states are added together.

2. The points of all defending states are added together.
3. If the defending states lose (i.e., if their total is less than the total of the attacking states),
the amount by which they lost is subtracted from their next round’s power score. The
amount by which the defending states lose is distributed as evenly as possible among the
losing coalition members. If the total cannot be equally distributed, the largest share is
assessed to the state that was initially attacked.
Example 1: A state loses to another state 10-9. In the next round, the state that lost draws a
power score of 8. Its power for that round, because it lost by 1 in the last round, is 7.
Example 2: Three defending states are defeated by three attacking states by a score of 14-
7. The state that was initially attacked is assessed a penalty of 3 points in the next round.
The other two defending states are each assessed a penalty of 2 points in the next round.
4. If the defending states win (i.e., if their total is more than the total of the attacking states),
each defending state receives a banked point.
5. In the event of a stalemate, no points are added or subtracted in the subsequent round.

Spoils of victory
If a state (and its coalition, if relevant) is defeated by more than 10 points, the most
powerful victorious attacker chooses how to distribute the spoils of victory:

1. The attacker may choose to disband the defeated state: (a) the representatives for the
defeated state become representatives for the most powerful attacker; (b) the attacker
receives an additional random power card draw for each country they have disbanded and
may choose the highest power score from among these draws; (c) the acquired state (with
the additional random power card draw each round) may be traded at any time; (d) the
points of the defeated state (however many points the defeated state defended with during
that round) are distributed as equally as possible among the victorious states, and if points
cannot be equally shared, the most powerful attacking states receive the disproportionate
share; and (e) coalition members of the defeated state are not disbanded—their loss is
simply subtracted from their next round’s power score.
2. The attacker may choose to prop up the defeated state as a satellite: (a) for each of the next
three rounds, the most powerful attacker receives two banked points; (b) the satellite state
may not draw power cards, and may not act during those three rounds; and (c) after three
rounds as a satellite, the state receives its independence and resumes play as usual.
3. An attacker may choose to grant independence to a defeated country’s satellite (if the
defeated country has a satellite) but will receive no remuneration.
4. An attacker may trade the satellite to another state. Regardless, the satellite receives its
independence after three rounds as a satellite.

Power preponderance

Although the most powerful state has an advantage in that it may abstain during its
initial turn in a round and then defend a state at the end of that round (see the section on
sequence of events), there are greater advantages for preponderant powers. After

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 Reilly / THE POWER POLITICS GAME 303

Round 1, the most powerful state may choose two actions if it has a preponderance of
power (i.e., it has at least four points more than any other state, based on banked points
and newly allocated points); it must define at the beginning of the round how it will
allocate points for each of the two actions and it must use all of its points (including
banked points). A preponderant state may not combine choosing a new spokesperson
with any other option.

Debriefing

This game is intended to simulate the decision-making process of state leaders

engaged in power politics. It may be useful to present the tenets of realism prior to
engaging in the simulation:

• First, international relations is centered on strategies of conflict and cooperation. Politics

is all about war and peace.
• Second, there is no central, overarching authority with the ability to dictate and enforce
laws. The system, therefore, can be thought of as anarchic—without guarantees of sur-
vival. There are also no hard-and-fast rules of the game in international relations, a fact
that is violated in this simulation.
• Third, states are the central actors. International organizations, multinational corpora-
tions, and other nonstate actors may influence policies and shape behavior in areas of
“low politics,” but states are the only actors that matter during times of crisis and for
issues of “high politics.”
• Fourth, states must engage in self-help. Because the system is anarchic, and because they
cannot rely on nonstate actors, states must fight for their own survival. This requires that
states take a self-interested, short-term approach to international relations, and that their
main objective is always to improve their position of power relative to other states.
• Fifth, foreign policy is conducted in a rational manner. Given that survival is not guaran-
teed and that relative power is the ultimate determinant of a state’s level of security, any
attention to domestic circumstances is reductionist and unnecessary. We do not need to
know, in other words, if a state is democratic or authoritarian to know that they will act to
improve their position of power relative to other states. The only internal conditions that
matter for international relations are the extent of economic and military resources and
whether the state has access to these.

For a supplement to these points, see Bull (1995), Jervis (1978), Mearsheimer (2001),
Morgenthau (1985), and Waltz (1979). According to balance-of-power theories, these
realist assumptions lead to behavior that is predictable and manageable. Leaders
should be suspicious of everyone because capabilities matter, not intentions or prom-
ises. In a dispute, the weaker side should always be allied with; friendships and moral-
ity should not be part of the calculation of international relations. Alliances should be
transitory and states should only be supported until out of immediate danger. Aggres-
sors should be shown moderation, after defeated, so that they are not susceptible to
attack from other states. And disputes should be settled, whenever possible, in periph-
eral areas so that the balance of power is not disturbed.

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304 SIMULATION & GAMING / June 2003

In practice, however, states do not behave according to the prescribed method.

Leaders harbor grudges. Alliances gang up on vulnerable states. Strong states press
their advantage against weak states. Some have argued that these things happen
because relative power and capabilities are difficult to measure. Others suggest that
breakdowns in communication or cultural differences account for irrational behavior.
Participants should be encouraged to recount their decision-making processes and
analyze what motivated their actions during the simulation. If participants do not see
the connections between the PPG and the realist tenets, facilitators may want to
recount the tenets of realism and encourage participants to consider the extent to which
their actions were self-interested and rational.
When debriefing this simulation, I prefer to encourage participant response before
structuring the discussion. Often, an open forum will result in comments about the
structure, process, and results of the game that reflect the theories of international rela-
tions. One option to stimulate this discussion is to list the five tenets of realism (pre-
sented above) and ask the participants whether these reflect what occurred in the
simulation.
A frequent response of participants is that they did not expect to act the way that
they did. Some plan an aggressive strategy and during the game engage in a coopera-
tive, bargaining approach. Others intend to take a conciliatory stance and find at the
end that they initiated a number of attacks. It is important to highlight for the students
that group dynamics in the simulation—intended to replicate the dynamics of the
interstate system—often shape decisions and behavior. This is the essence of realism:
the anarchic nature of the international system determines the behavior of states.
Another point of importance is the effect of preponderant power. States with the
most power points are able to establish the agenda. They become the focal point of bar-
gaining discussions and because they act first, others are required to follow their lead.
In some cases, the most powerful state is able to engage in two theaters simultaneously,
a rule that has important consequences for offensive and defensive strategies. Just as in
the real world, power often is self-perpetuating: Because the victor can disband or prop
up a defeated state, it has the luxury of determining the fate of others. Although these
decisions can improve the state’s position of power, it can also lead to resentment and
acts of revenge from the other participants. Beware the “phoenix factor”: States that
lose in war, if not disbanded, can rise from the ashes (Organski & Kugler, 1977).
Some of the results contradict realist expectations, however. One result that is fairly
consistent across the many times I have run this simulation is that the behavior of states
in the initial rounds shapes subsequent interactions. Aggressors in the first round are
often ostracized and attacked through the remainder of the game. States that in the first
round defend the targets of attack are often treated with loyalty. This behavior contra-
dicts the balance-of-power logic that no alliances are permanent, and that defeated
countries should be treated with moderation. One direction for discussion on this point
is the importance of long-range versus short-range strategies. Because this is an itera-
tive game, participants must acknowledge the “shadow of the future” (Axelrod, 1984).
When played a second time, participants in the simulation often practice a more
nuanced strategy of reciprocity. As Axelrod (1984) anticipates, “A community using

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 Reilly / THE POWER POLITICS GAME 305

strategies based upon reciprocity can actually police itself. By guaranteeing the pun-
ishment of any individual who tries to be less than cooperative, the deviant strategy is
made unprofitable” (p. 136).
The role of the domestic environment contrasts with the realist position. Partici-
pants will observe that dissent within the state can have negative effects on foreign pol-
icy decision making. Although this does not fit the traditional realist model, neorealists
have begun to investigate how foreign policy decision making is a two-level game
(e.g., see Mastanduno, Lake, & Ikenberry, 1989).
Finally, the importance of communication should be addressed. One of the differ-
ences I observe in students playing the game for a second time is the importance that
the bargaining sessions hold. Participants become more adept at lobbying for assis-
tance and requiring that actors state their objectives clearly. Participants seek transpar-
ency and predictability in light of their tenuous security. Axelrod (1984) notes that
communication is essential for reducing uncertainty: “The ability to recognize the
other player from past interactions, and to remember the relevant features of those
interactions, is necessary to sustain cooperation” (p. 139).
This game highlights the complexity of foreign policy decision making and the
extent to which foreign policy choices are dependent on domestic and international
actors. It can serve as a useful heuristic for introducing students to the theories of
power politics.

References

Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.

Bull, H. (1995). The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics (2nd ed.). New York: Columbia
University Press.
Chapin, W. D. (1998). The balance of power game. Simulation & Gaming, 29, 105-112.
Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30, 167-186.
Mastanduno, M., Lake, D. A., & Ikenberry, G. J. (1989). Toward a realist theory of state action. Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly, 33, 457-474.
Mearsheimer, J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. New York: Norton.
Morgenthau, H. J. (1985). Politics among nations (6th ed.). New York: Knopf.
Organski, A. F. K., & Kugler, J. (1977). The costs of major wars: The phoenix factor. American Political Sci-
ence Review, 71, 1347-1366.
Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of international politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.

David A. Reilly is an assistant professor of political science at Niagara University and the director of the
International Studies program. His research addresses the geopolitics of conflict and democratization. His
articles have appeared in World Politics, Geopolitics, and East European Politics and Societies. Currently
he is investigating the violent behavior of failing and failed states.

ADDRESS: DAR: Department of Political Science, Niagara University, 15 Timon Hall, Lewiston, NY
14109, USA; telephone: +1 716-286-8088; fax: +1 716-286-8079; e-mail: dreilly@niag-
ara.edu.

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