Delimatavares 2009

Sci & Educ (2010) 19:573–598
DOI 10.1007/s11191-009-9206-6
Articulation of Conceptual Knowledge and

Argumentation Practices by High School Students
in Evolution Problems
Marina de Lima Tavares Æ Marı́a-Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre Æ

Eduardo F. Mortimer
Published online: 1 September 2009

Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009
Abstract The oral arguments of 12th grade students while solving tasks related to
evolution are examined. Two groups (N = 45), taught by the same teacher, were studied
during a complete teaching sequence. The paper focuses on data from the last sessions,
devoted to solving problems in small groups, problems related to different dimensions of
the evolutionary model. Data include video recordings, the students’ written productions
and the researcher (first author) field notes. The objective is to examine the process of
articulation of students’ argumentation practices with their use of evolutionary models. The
results show that participants were able to apply notions such as common ancestors,
radiation, or gradualism to different contexts. The arguments required the articulation of
evolution notions with argumentative practices as coordinating evidence with claims at
different epistemic levels. The influence of the teacher’s strategies in the students’ role is
discussed.
1 Introduction: Interaction Between Evolution Learning and Argumentation
There is a wealth of studies about teaching and learning evolution, which show students’
problems both with understanding it (Jiménez-Aleixandre 1992; Kampourakis and Zogza
2007, 2008, 2009) and with accepting it (Sinatra et al. 2003; Anderson 2007). In this paper
we explore the interplay between the use of evolutionary models and the processes of
M. de Lima Tavares E. F. Mortimer

Faculdade de Educação, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Av. Antônio Carlos, 6627,
Belo Horizonte, MG 31270-901, Brazil
M. de Lima Tavares
e-mail: marina_tavares@hotmail.com
E. F. Mortimer
e-mail: mortimer@netuno.ufmg.br
M.-P. Jiménez-Aleixandre (&)

Departamento de Didáctica das Ciencias Experimentais, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela,
Av. Xoan XXIII s.n., 15782 Santiago de Compostela, Spain
e-mail: marilarj.aleixandre@usc.es
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574 M. de Lima Tavares et al.
knowledge construction in the classroom, in particular the processes of justification of

claims, or argumentation.
The rationale for introducing argumentation in the science classrooms includes, for
instance, the relevance of the appropriation by students of practices of the scientific culture
and the importance of development of epistemic criteria for knowledge evaluation (Jimé-
nez-Aleixandre and Erduran 2008). As classrooms are systems where different dimensions
are interconnected, there is an assumption of some relationships between argumentation and
the learning of science, not only of science practices, but also of science concepts and
models. Several papers have explored either the effect of integrating argumentation in
students’ understanding of science, for instance Zohar and Nemet (2002) about genetics and
von Aufschnaiter et al. (2008) about science and socioscientific issues; or the influence of
students’ knowledge on the quality of their argumentation (Sadler and Zeidler 2005). Sadler
and Donnelly (2006) show the need of a threshold conceptual knowledge for argumentation,
although further knowledge seems not related to higher quality in it.
In this study we take a different approach to the relationships between science learn-
ing,—with a focus on evolution—and argumentation practices: rather than evaluating the
outcomes of one of them on the other, we examine the processes of articulation between
argumentation and use of evolution models, in particular how students back their argu-
ments appealing to evolution concepts. We intend to contribute to the question of how
evolutionary explanations are used by students, by examining their argumentation pro-
cesses, with a focus on the use of evidence to justify claims about evolution problems.
The objective of the study, part of a larger research about argumentation and epistemic
practices in the discourse of high school students in an evolution teaching sequence, is: To
examine students’ justification of claims appealing to their conceptual knowledge in
evolution. In particular:
To examine the articulation of conceptual knowledge about evolution and argumentation
practices, documented in the use of evidenced claims at different epistemic levels.
By evidenced claims we mean statements, either as answers to the tasks, or as reactions
to claims by other students, which are supported by data or justifications. By argumentation
practices we mean adding complexity to claims, elaborating justifications, co-constructing
arguments, offering rebuttals or adding modal qualifiers.
The first section reviews literature relevant for our work from two bodies: studies about
argumentation and about evolution learning. The second presents the methods and the task
performed by the students. Then the results about the articulation of conceptual knowledge
and argumentation practices at different epistemic levels, in constructing arguments are
presented, ending with a discussion of the significance of the study.
2 Rationale: Studies About Argumentation and About the Learning of Evolution
2.1 The Role of Argumentation in Science Learning
This work is grounded on a perspective assuming that knowledge is constructed in social

interactions (Vygotsky 1978) and that cultural practices, instrumental in knowledge pro-
duction and communication, are established through language (Crawford 2005). A central
practice in the construction of science is knowledge evaluation, and argumentation can be
defined as a social process of justification of claims, having knowledge evaluation at its
core (Jiménez-Aleixandre 2008). In the science community, theories are accepted or
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Articulation of Conceptual Knowledge 575
rejected according to criteria, and the appropriation of these criteria or standards by stu-
dents is an integral part of learning about science (Driver et al. 2000). In order to develop
the skills of argument, these authors propose that students need to practice argumentation,
for instance in small groups. Social dialog offers a way to make public internal thinking
strategies embedded in argumentation. Classroom studies about argumentation show how
arguments can be constructed by individuals or co-constructed among several students
(Jiménez-Aleixandre et al. 2000).
Can students work as scientists do? There is some debate about the extent of
involvement of students in the scientific culture. We agree with Sandoval and Reiser
(2004) who point out that students should engage in the reasoning and discursive practices
of scientists, while not necessarily engaging in activities mirroring those of professional
scientists. Authors as Driver et al. (2000) and Jiménez-Aleixandre et al. (2000) suggest that
science teaching should pay greater attention to discursive practices, in particular argu-
mentation as a tool for theory choice. For Driver et al. when the school science fails in
introducing in the classrooms the controversies between competing theories, the image of
science developed by the students is of an unequivocal and immutable body of knowledge.
It is suggested that introducing argumentation in the science classroom may support a
knowledge about science more aligned with contemporary perspectives, involving students
in ‘doing science’ rather than in just completing tasks that count only as ‘doing the lesson’
(Jiménez-Aleixandre et al. 2000).
In science classrooms we are concerned both with learning science and with learning
about science. In view of these two objectives, several studies have explored the rela-
tionships and mutual influences of argumentation and of science understanding, as revised
in the previous section. The focus of the present study is how students justify their claims
appealing to their knowledge about evolution concepts and models. Evolution teaching and
learning is far from unproblematic, and we now turn our attention to it.
2.2 Students’ Difficulties About Learning Evolution
Evolution is central to biology knowledge, and this centrality is acknowledged in most

curricula across the world. In Brazil evolution is one of the six key issues around which the
secondary school curriculum is structured. However, there are numerous studies showing
the difficulties experienced by students in different countries. Some of these problems have
to do with the interrelationship between students’ acceptance of evolution, their religious
views, their worldviews, and their views about the nature of science (Anderson 2007).
Sinatra et al. (2003) show the influence of epistemological beliefs in the acceptance
of human evolution among undergraduates. This strand of studies points to the influence of
social contexts in the learning of evolution. Smith and Siegel (2004) address the issue of
the relationship between belief and understanding, discussing instructional strategies for
overcoming the acceptance problems.
Another strand of studies is concerned with students’ difficulties—in secondary school
and in university—with understanding the content of evolutionary theories, with transfer-
ring their knowledge to other contexts of biological change (Jiménez-Aleixandre 1992). Part
of these studies are framed in the alternative conceptions and conceptual change model, for
instance Demastes et al. (1996), which showed how the students’ conceptions about evo-
lution are closely interwoven, rather than disconnected, so requiring multiple changes in
order to construct models closer to the consensual view. The interconnections among dif-
ferent notions in the Darwinian and non-Darwinian conceptual schemes about evolution,
and particularly about natural selection, are also explored by Jiménez-Aleixandre (1996).
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Jensen and Finley (1996) show the benefits of a problem-solving approach and of the use of
historically rich curricular materials over traditional lectures, in increasing Darwinian
conceptions in undergraduates. Traditional approaches, as evidenced in textbooks, have
been criticized for its inadequacy to cope with students’ difficulties (e.g., Jiménez-Aleix-
andre 1994). Alternative instructional strategies have been offered, for instance, focused on
the use of the model by high school students (Passmore and Stewart 2002; Kampourakis and
Zogza 2009).
As a summary of these studies over more than two decades, it can be said that students
bring to the classroom conceptions that are inconsistent with what is accepted by evolu-
tionary biologists (Kampourakis and Zogza 2007). Kampourakis and Zogza challenge the
use of the term ‘Lamarckian’, used by former researchers to characterize students’ alter-
native conceptions on this field, pointing to the differences between Lamarck’s thoughts
and students’ ideas. Patterns of students’ explanations have been explored by Southerland
et al. (2001), who found that teleological explanations were prominent in the four grades
studied, from the second to the twelfth, suggesting that the role of the need as a rationale
for change could be considered as a p-prim (phenomenological primitive) or knowledge
structure, a perspective viewing students’ difficulties with a lens different from the con-
ceptual frameworks model.
Kampourakis and Zogza (2007, 2008, 2009) also suggest a focus on students’ ideas of
need-driven evolution and on the role of chance. These authors are involved in a research
program with the objectives of characterizing secondary students’ explanations about
evolutionary processes, and then using the findings to design a teaching sequence aimed to
conceptual change. For the analysis of students’ explanations three categories are used:
evolutionary, proximate and teleological (Kampourakis and Zogza 2008), a coding
grounded in contemporary philosophy of science, which offers a more sophisticated
instrument that the distinction ‘Lamarckian’ versus ‘Darwinian’ found in the literature.
Need figured prominently in students’ explanations of the causes of homologies and
adaptations, and another finding, also consistent with previous studies, was the lack of
coherence among students’ explanations for the same phenomena in different contexts. In a
second phase, the authors implemented a teaching sequence (Kampourakis and Zogza
2009), bringing students to a conceptual conflict situation, and so challenging their
explanations; and then asking them to apply the new ideas to novel cases. The approach
was successful in increasing both the proportion of students’ using evolutionary expla-
nations and—to a certain extent—their explanatory coherence across tasks.
What we intend to add to this body of knowledge is situated in the crossroad between
empirical studies about evolution learning and about argumentation in the classroom. Our
purpose is to examine students’ argumentation processes about evolutionary explanations,
to study their justification of claims related to evolution. The focus is not on the differences
between evolutionary and other alternative forms of explanations, but rather on how stu-
dents perceived and used particular notions of the evolutionary explanation, which have
been subjected to debate among the scientific community, such as gradualism or exaptation.
3 Methods
3.1 Participants
The participants are two classes of 12th grade students (of 17–18 years of age) in a high
school in Belo Horizonte (Brazil) and their teacher, who taught both classes. The evolution
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Table 1 Students, tasks and

Group, strand Number Girls/Boys Number of
number of sessions in each group
of students sessions/h
Group P 20 11 G/9 B 16
(Pathology) 20 h, 50 min
Group M 25 1 G/24 B 13
(Mechanics) 17 h, 30 min
teaching sequence took 16 sessions (about 20 h and 50 min in total) in classroom P

(Pathology) and 13 sessions (about 17 h and 30 min) in classroom M (Mechanics) from
September to November 2007. Data collection included video recording of all sessions and
the first author was a participant observer in them. Table 1 summarizes information about
the students and the sessions in each group. It has to be noted that in group M all students
but one are boys, because it is a technical strand—mechanical instrumentation, M—usually
not chosen by many girls, while the other one, pathology (P), is more balanced. Despite the
differences in the groups’ gender profile, their engagement and performances during
the tasks were equivalent. Therefore the influence of gender balance was not examined in
the study.
3.2 Educational Context and Tasks
The teaching sequence on evolution was designed by the teacher, who, besides a MS in
biology, holds a PhD in education, and has more than 15 years of teaching experience. The
only changes introduced by the researchers were the problem-solving tasks carried in the
last sessions. These tasks were designed by the first author and another researcher (Charbel
Niño El-Hani) and are discussed below.
The teacher used a variety of strategies requiring the participation of students. These
included, besides lectures, films followed by discussion, activities and exercises, reading
and discussion of texts, practical tasks and fieldwork. In the activities the students were
oriented to work in pairs or in groups, and then whole class discussion followed. Table 2
summarizes the development of the evolution sequence in both groups and the way small
group activities alternated with lectures.
Students from group P were presented with three tasks (see 1 and 2 in Appendix 1),
referring, respectively to exaptation (although this term was not mentioned in the handout),
gaps in the fossil record and constraints to the range of living forms. They were asked to
choose one from two alternative explanations, one aligned with the received views in the
synthetic theory of evolution, another based in modulations to particular aspects of that
theory, such as gradualism. These two alternatives are considered arguments for or against
a claim presented in the question.
Students from group M were presented with three situations and two competing expla-
nations, one aligned with current evolutionary theories, the second not aligned with them.
In both cases the students, working in small groups of 4 or 5 students, were asked to
discuss the alternatives and to decide if they would choose one of them, both or neither and
to justify their options. Then a whole class discussion was conducted where each small
group had to present their options and justifications, or in other words their arguments. As
seen in Table 1 the tasks took three sessions in Group P and two sessions in Group M,
because the dynamics in each class were different and the teacher choose to follow their
discussions to the end.
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Table 2 Summary of the development of the evolution sequence
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Group P Group M Content/activities Teaching approach
Session/duration Session/duration
1 1–2 Viewing national geographic film (The shape of life) Viewing film
100 min 150 min Pre-test Exploration of ideas
2 – Origin of life Lecture
50 min
3 3 Theories on origin of species: Fixism and Evolutionism. Lecture & whole class debate
100 min 100 min Lamarck and Darwin. Debate about blindfishes in caves.
4 5 Biological change: students work in dyads to solve problem Students’ problem-solving in small
50 min 50 min about resistance to pesticides groups
5 4 Natural selection and adaptation: Fieldwork simulation with Students carry on simulation in small
100 min 100 min beans in small groups groups in the field
6 – Mutations and its causes; corn varieties Lecture
50 min
7–8 6–7 Populations genetics, Hardy–Weinberg law: experience in Students carry on hands-on activity in
150 min 150 min small groups small groups followed by debate
Populations genetics: exercises
9–10–11 8–9 Mutations, multiple alleles Lecture & text reading in dyads
250 min 200 min Diversity of living beings in connection with environment
changes. Human evolution. Plate tectonics. Species and
speciation mechanisms
12–13 10–11 Adaptive convergence. Scientific language in texts. Exercises in small groups & lecture
150 min 150 min Phylogenetic trees
14–15–16 12–13 Small group tasks: (see Appendix 1) Students work in small groups, followed
250 min 150 min by debate
M. de Lima Tavares et al.
In this paper we will focus on the discussion of two of the tasks discussed by group P,
contrasted with one question (Task 3) discussed by group M, all reproduced in Appendix 1.
Task 1 ‘feathered dinosaurs’ discusses the process of re-using of structures, consisting in
changes in the function of a structure or trait, implying that a trait may have been selected
because it served a particular function, and later, in the course of evolutionary processes,
may come to serve another function (Gould and Lewontin 1979), termed exaptation by
Gould and Vrba (1982). As seen in the Appendix, the term exaptation is not mentioned.
The task discusses the functions of feathers, a classical instance of exaptation: they are
found in dinosaurs, where it is assumed their function was related to temperature regu-
lation, but later they are found in birds with an auxiliary function in connection with flight.
The first alternative presents an explanation assuming that feathers could have more than
one function, while the second alternative assumes that feathers constitute adaptations for
flight, having only one function. Another example of exaptation are the penguins’ wings,
used for swimming, not for flying (Gould 1997).
Task 2 ‘gaps’, discusses the gaps in the fossil record, with one alternative assuming that
evolution is a gradual process, but that many forms are not preserved as fossils, and the
second explaining the gap as a consequence of rapid changes (as proposed by the punc-
tuated equilibrium perspective).
Task 3 ‘Lake Nabugabo’ discusses the process of speciation through geographic iso-
lation in Lake Nabugabo, formerly part of Lake Victoria, where there are five fish endemic
species, similar to Victoria species but not found there. The first alternative explains these
differences through common ancestry, the accepted view, while the second alternative
claims that the species from both lakes had always been different (see Appendix 1).
3.3 Data Collection and Analysis
Data collection included collecting the small group written reports, video recording all
sessions and the field notes of the first author as a participant observer. The recordings were
transcribed and the students were assigned pseudonyms, noting also the small group to
which they belonged, in order to examine both the participation of individual students, and
the position taken by each group in the construction and development of their arguments.
The first step in the analysis of the transcripts sought to identify: (a) the arguments
developed in each small group and the argumentative practices of the students in the
process of justifying and developing their claims; and (b) the evolutionary concepts that the
students used to support their arguments. In the second step we examined the relationship
between concepts and arguments in the episodes that constituted relevant steps in the
argumentation, and refined the analysis of the process of supporting arguments by iden-
tifying evidenced claims at different epistemic levels as detailed in the findings section.
The unit of analysis is a fragment of a turn defined by its content. In some cases, when all
the turn of speaking has the same content the entire turn is considered.
For the purposes of the analysis of the justification processes appealing to conceptual
knowledge, and the distinction among different types of justification, we draw on the work
of Kelly and colleagues. Kelly and Chen (1999) use a set of levels, specific for a physics
task, to distribute students’ evidenced claims, from lower, that is closer to facts, figures,
data, to higher or more abstract induction level. Kelly and Takao (2002) examine the
relative epistemic status of students’ written propositions about oceanography. We have
examined students’ actions and practices in a chemistry laboratory (Jiménez-Aleixandre
and Reigosa 2006), distributing them in categories, according to its epistemic status, and
students’ written claims and evidence about energy sources (Jiménez-Aleixandre et al.
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2006) These instruments are content-specific and we think that they constitute a promising
tool for the purposes of examining the articulation between conceptual knowledge and
justification practices in argumentation. To explore the range of evidenced claims about
evolution a coding scheme was elaborated in interaction with the data, as discussed in the
next section and illustrated with instances from students’ debates.
The analysis of the argumentative practices in the processes of construction (and
modification) of arguments draws on the elements of Toulmin (1958) argument pattern
involved in them, and establishing a repertoire of practices in interaction with the data:
(a) about claims: stating a claim (drawn from the problem); transforming one of the
alternative claims; offering a new claim.
(b) About data: appealing to data provided in the problem; appealing to data recalled
from previous knowledge.
(c) About justifications (or warrants): supporting a claim in theoretical justifications;
supporting a claim in theoretical justifications illustrated with data.
(d) About rebuttals: challenging the evidence of the opposing claim.
(e) About modal qualifiers: qualifying a claim through the use of modal qualifiers.
The analysis of argumentative practices about data and justifications is integrated in the
coding scheme of evidenced claims. It should be noted that we use rebuttal in Kuhn (1991)
sense of challenging the evidence of the opposing argument, which has some differences
with Toulmin (1958) definition that refers to the potential conditions under which the claim
cannot be supported. We also paid attention to the social aspects of argumentation, in
particular whether the process involved cooperation in the co-construction of an argument,
or dialectics between opposing arguments.
4 Evidenced Claims in Arguments About Evolution
The objective of the study is to examine the process of articulation of conceptual

knowledge and argumentation practices in students’ construction and justification of
arguments appealing to their conceptual knowledge in evolution, in the different contexts
of the three tasks. In particular, it explores the use of evidence at different epistemic levels
to support the students’ claims. It may be noted that the expectation was some variation
across the contexts, for, as Kampourakis and Zogza (2008, 2009) point out, students do not
always exhibit explanatory coherence when solving tasks related to evolution. In other
words, they bring different notions into play in response to different problem contexts. The
participants in our study are older than Kampourakis and Zogza’s sample, who belong to
the 9th grade (14–15 year-old), while ours belong to the 12th grade (17–18 year-old),
hence a higher degree of coherence may be expected.
Before turning to the discussion of the range of evidenced claims and of the concepts
used by the students, we will summarize briefly the options chosed by the small groups in
each context, which influenced the development of the debates. In task 1, class P, dis-
cussing the adaptive functions of feathers in birds and dinosaurs, the four small groups
chose alternative (a), accepting the claim about the possibility for feathers to have more
than one function along the evolutionary process. In task 2, also in P, the four small
groups chose alternative (a), explaining the gaps in the fossil record by changes at a slow
rhythm. In other words, in task 1 all small groups accepted the view modulating the
received synthetic theory, while in task 2 they aligned themselves with the received
perspective, gradualism, and against sudden changes. Despite this unanimity in choices,
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the processes of justification were sometimes different among the small groups, as
detailed below.
In task 3, class M, different choices were made, even inside each small group: groups 2
and 3 suported alternative (a), representing the evolutionary view; students from groups 1
and 4 supported alternative (b); and students from groups 1, 4 and 5 criticized both,
cooperating in the construction of a new alternative that, in fact, is a better wording of the
accepted view, as discussed below.
Table 3 summarizes the main evolutionary notions used in the debate, which took place
in the last sessions in both classes. These notions are distributed in three categories of
justifications, which are related to the levels of evidenced claims discussed below. The
students’ names are pseudonyms. In class P ten students (out of 18 that were present in that
session) contributed to the debate about these two tasks, the table reflecting contributions
from eight of them, although four (Maria, Keira, Miguel and Lucio) acted as speakers for
their small groups, which accounts for their higher participation. In class M, nine students
(out of 13 present in that session) contributed to the debate about this task, the table
reflecting contributions from six of them, more frequent from the gropups’ speakers
(Carlos, Decio, Julio, Alberto), as in class P. It has to be noted that the terms ‘speciation’,
‘exaptation’ or ‘cladogenesis’ were not mentioned by the students, being labels for the
purpose of summarizing the notions used; their actual wording can be seen in the excerpts
below. Although in some cases there is one notion situated both in the first and second
categories, in the first case it is an appeal to the concept, while in the second it is illustrated
with an example.
As seen in the table there are 12 concepts used in the justifications, with some dif-
ferences across tasks and classes: students from class P brought eight different notions in
task 1 and seven in task 2, while in class M four concepts were used. Three notions
making part of the evolution model were used across the three tasks: speciation, common
ancestry and adaptation. We think that the content of the tasks accounts for this promi-
nence. The students from class P used a variety of concepts in justifying their claims.
They considered that evolution acts in pre-existent variation; referred to chance and its
role in evolution; established relationships between selective pressure of the environment
and the process of speciation; criticized the idea of intentionality in evolution; explained
evolution based on the concepts of common ancestry, transitional forms and on the
possibility that the same structure has different functions in the process of evolution
(exaptation, term that they did not used); and explained the formation of news species
based on cladogenesis, analogous structures and adaptive convergence. In task 2, the
notion of gradualism was used by several students in order to justify their choice. The
students from class M, besides using the notions of common ancestry and the processes
by which new species arise, in particular geographical isolation, appealed to the mech-
anisms of natural selection, to adaptation, and denied the possibility of ancestral and
recent species to coexist at the same time.
For the analysis of the evidenced claims, a coding scheme was generated for evolution,
drawing from the model suggested by Kelly and Takao (2002), and sorting the students’
claims from the justifications appealing to data (categories DT, or Data from task, and DK,
or Data from previous knowledge) to theoretical claims illustrated with data (category
TC-D), to the more abstract claims, either specific to the evolutionary issue discussed in
each of the context (category STC) or general evolutionary processes (category GTC). The
categories do not represent a hierarchy, for, as Kelly and Takao point out, a good argument
should articulate evidence at different epistemic levels. Table 4 summarizes this analytical
tool with instances from the debate in the three tasks, and the number of claims, from these
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Table 3 Types of justifications and evolutionary concepts used in the three tasks
Justification type/class Class P Class M
Concepts used Concepts used (LN task)
Theoretical backings Pre-existing variation: FD (Keira), G (Roberto) Common ancestors: notion of (Carlos, Osvaldo, Gilson)
Chance: role in evolution, FD (Maria) Common ancestors: denying potential coexistence
Chance: random mutations, G (Keira) with living species (Carlos)
Adaptation: organisms (not structures) are adapted, FD (Miguel) Adaptation: to different environments (Julio, Alberto)
Mutation: occurs in individuals, G (Keira, Lucio) Natural selection: different survival (Alberto)
Speciation: adaptive radiation, G (Joana) Speciation: through geographical isolation (Decio, Carlos)
Speciation: reproductive isolation, G (Joana)
Speciation: sudden changes in environment do not cause (sudden)
changes in species, G (Roberto, Keira)
Gradualism: evolution is a slow, gradual process, G
(Lola, Roberto, Miguel, Lucio)
Denying intentionality: FD (Maria, Keira)
Theoretical notions illustrated Common ancestors: transitional forms, G, (Vanessa) Speciation: through geographical isolation (Carlos, Julio)
with empirical evidence Common ancestors: in birds, FD (Lucio, Roberto)
Natural selection: finches, G (Keira)
Speciation: cladogenesis, FD (Lucio)
Speciation: role of environment FD (Lucio)
Gaps in fossil record: organism may exist and fossils not
formed/preserved, G (Lola, Vanessa, Lucio)
Empirical evidence Speciation: not related to a single mutation, Hemoglobin, G (Lucio) Speciation: research about it (Carlos)
Exaptation: different functions of feathers in living birds, FD (Miguel)
Analogous structures: FD, (Keira)
FD Feathered dinosaurs, G Gaps in fossil record, LN Lake Nabugabo
Table 4 Categories of evidenced claims by levels of abstraction about evolution problems (in parentheses the number of claims in each category and task)
Level definition Examples from P Examples from M
FD = 47, G = 56 LN = 43
GTC General theoretical propositions describing FD, Maria: structures do not arise in order to have a Alberto: The variations along time they
evolutionary processes, not specific to the issue function, they arise by chance originate the new species
discussed G, Lola: to think only in terms of our lifetime, I think
(FD 6, G 14, LN 3) that it is wrong, you have to think in generations, the
number of generations (to form species)
STC Propositions in the form of theoretical claims FD, Lucio: structures as feathers could have more than Decio: It was not going to have the coincidence
specific to the evolutionary issue discussed one function along the evolutionary process to divide exactly… the populations
(FD 17, G 18, LN14) G, Roberto: a sudden change in the environment Carlos: the species in each lake, (…), it evolved
Articulation of Conceptual Knowledge
happens; then all die and those that have [a given in a different way because the environment
trait] stay. I think that they still belong to that species was different
TC-D Propositions in the form of theoretical claims or FD, Keira: Bird feathers, when assisting flight, they did Carlos: Then you are going to have the same
processes illustrated with data specific to the issue not lose their initial function, so they function as species from the beginning that you had in one
discussed thermic insulator and as aerodynamic tool lake, you will have in the other lake
(FD 15, G 10, LN 22) G, Vanessa: the climate, the sedimentary rocks would Julio: Or more than one species. Or existing the
not allow the formation of fossils same species at the same time in both portions.
We chose ‘b’.
DK Propositions using empirical data recalled from FD, Miguel: If you think that the feathers are only used Carlos: They [researchers] did not get anything
experience or previous knowledge for flight, you have the chicken that has feathers and [different species] from the mosquitoes. They
(FD 5, G 14, LN 3) does not fly did I don’t know what but the species is the
G, Lucio: he is the founder so he passes on this trait of S same.
hemoglobin to others. But this is not enough to say,
people with SS are a new species
DT Propositions making explicit reference to empirical FD, Keira: in the case of birds, the feathers assisted in Carlos: Years ago the lake, the lake was divided
data from the tasks the flight
(FD 4, G 0, LN 1) FD, Maria: as a thermic insulator, in the case of
dinosaurs
FD Feathered dinosaurs, G Gaps in fossil record, LN Lake Nabugabo
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portions of the debates, corresponding to the ‘Feathered dinosaurs’, ‘Gaps in the fossil
record’ and ‘Lake Nabugabo’ questions, placed in each category.
As seen in the table, there are not great differences across tasks and classes. Most claims
are placed in categories STC, corresponding to theoretical propositions specific to the
evolutionary issue discussed; and TC-D, theoretical claims illustrated with data specific to
the issue, which account for a half or more of the claims in the three tasks. In the Lake
Nabugabo task there are more utterances, over a half, placed in category TC-D, and fewer
in categories DK and DT, references to empirical data and GTC, general theoretical claims,
while in the Gaps in the fossil record task there is a substantial proportion of claims in this
more abstract level (and none in DT), perhaps due to the content of the task, which
prompted many general statements about gradualism. Even if the use of claims at different
levels depends on the nature of the task, these patterns from oral debates are similar to
those of previous studies (Jiménez-Aleixandre et al. 2006; Kelly and Takao 2002) about
written arguments on different topics. The results from the third task in class P, not
discussed here, GTC, 2; STC 8; TC-D, 9, DK, 3 and DT, 3, follow a similar pattern.
We will now discuss in detail the analysis with examples of the claims in the context of
students’ arguments, articulating several evidenced claims at different levels, as well as of
the argumentative practices. The references to the small groups in each context combine its
letter with the number of the small group: P1, P2 and so on. The speaking turn is inserted
between parentheses, and commentaries in italics between brackets. The excerpts and
analysis are summarized in tables. We separate with // the units of analysis; some frag-
ments with repetitions are ommitted, and denoted by (…).
4.1 Articulating Empirical Data with the Notions of Chance, Analogous Structures,
Pre-Existing Variation and Common Ancestry in the ‘Feathered Dinosaurs’ Task
In order to analyze the students’ practices it has been necessary to examine the articulation
of argumentation and knowledge about evolution. Early in the discussion, during task 1,
Keira states the group’s support to alternative ‘a’ bt reading their written report, P4, turns
summarized in Table 5.
We interpret that group P4 goes beyond the argument stated in alternative ‘a’, enriching
it with new dimensions. It is a substantive argument, in Toulmin’s sense of arguments
requiring a deep understanding of the content involved. It has to be noted that the text from
the task speaks about the two functions in sequential terms and there is no mention to their
potential simultaneous occurrence. The introduction of a new term, ‘aerodynamic tool’, is
an epistemic practice related to knowledge communication, implying transformation of a
statement from a concrete object/process to a defined object/process.
An instance of argument appealing to empirical evidence is the example of chickens,
produced by Miguel, from P1 and completed by Keira in consecutive turns, summarized in
Table 6.
Miguel’s support for their choice is an example of how arguments articulate evidence at
different levels of abstraction: a justification, coded as theoretical claim specific to the
issue discussed and a rebuttal of the opposed claim appealing to empirical data with the
example of chicken, which had not been discussed in the classroom. A rebuttal is some-
thing more than stating a counter-claim and for Kuhn (1991) it constitutes the higher level
in her scale of skills of argument: challenging the evidence of the opposed claim. Although
the existence of feathers in chicken may be viewed as evidence for a function different
from flight, or as a residuary trait, it constitutes a good application of the idea of several
functions. The use of ‘individuals’ is unclear, as usually refers to individuals from the same
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Table 5 Feathered dinosaurs: expanding the task argument

Actor, turn, transcription Argumentative practices Evidenced claims
Keira (2): Alternative ‘a’ said that the feathers Claim ‘a’ (Not coded)
could have more than one function along the Expanding ‘a’ argument,
evolutionary process (…). // We agreed with adding new notions:
this idea // because when one structure, in this
case feathers, acquires one new function, they (1) feathers could have TC-D
have, they have now a double function. // simultaneously two
Perhaps they can even have more than two functions
functions; I don’t know all the types of (2) feathers could even TC-D
feathers to know this. // But as they acquired serve to more than two
this new function assisting flight they do not functions
necessarily lose that feature of functioning as Justification for 1 & 2: TC-D
thermic insulator. feathers do not need to
lose one function in
order to acquire the new
one
Researcher (3): Can you read it?
Keira (6): [reading group P4 report] We agree Claim: agreement with ‘a’ (Not coded)
with the idea presented [in ‘a’] // taking into Justification: structures GTC
account that the same structure could assist in could have several
several functions adaptive to the environment. functions
// Bird feathers, when assisting flight, they did
not lose their initial function, so they function Epistemic practice: new TC-D
as thermic insulator and as aerodynamic tool. term, transformation
from concrete object/
process (feathers assist
flight) to defined object/
process (aerodynamic
tool)
species, but from the rest of the sentence, we interpret that Miguel is using it with the
meaning of different species, and that for the group it counts as empirical evidence of
different functions of feathers in various bird species.
Keira picks up Miguel example offering other data, which we interpret as a move to
further dissociate the presence of feathers and the ability to fly, showing the separation of
structure and function, the existence of analogous structures (although she does not
mention that term). Just as structures like feathers could have more than one function,
structures that are different and may belong to organisms not descending from common
ancestors could have the same function. This is an important concept in the understanding
of the diversity of living beings, as analogous structures reflect the process of convergent
evolution.
In terms of argumentative practices, we interpret this as an episode documenting the
shared development or co-construction of an argument by Miguel and Keira, articulating
justifications at different epistemic levels.
A few turns later Maria uses the notion of chance in support of their choice of ‘a’. She
connects this notion through an opposition, to the absence of intentionality in the evolu-
tionary processes. The appropriation of the role of chance, a relevant notion in the model of
evolution by natural selection, is an important step in the learning of the model of evolution
and, as Kampourakis and Zogza (2007) point out, it may support them in overcoming
alternative ideas about need-driven evolution. Evidence from Kampourakis and Zogza
(2009) study suggests the importance of emphasizing the role of chance and
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Table 6 Feathered dinosaurs: Co-constructing an argument

Actor, turn, transcription Argumentative practices Evidenced
claims
Miguel (12): We [group P1] chose ‘a’, and we Justification of choice STC
said that feathers exist in different individuals (‘a’)
and not all of them are going to use them with Rebuttal for opposed DK
the same function. // If you think that the claim appealing to
feathers are only used for flight, you have the empirical data with the
chicken that has feathers and does not fly. (…) example of chicken
Keira (13): And, even so, completing what (Rhetoric connection with
Miguel said, he talked about chicken, you last speaker)
know. // There are several animals that do not Data, supporting the DK
have feathers but fly, a lot of insects, a claim: the reverse of the
mammal, I don’t know if there are more, bats, chicken example,
which fly too. // Then the feather in birds, it is analogous structures
an assistance, you know, but it is not
something limiting. Claim TC-D
Maria (17): Well, we [group P3] said that Theoretical backing GTC
structures do not arise in order to have a (chance) supporting
function, they arise by chance, // then that ‘a’ ? opposition to
structure is not, not necessarily needs to intentionality
exhibit only one function during all evolution: Claim: structures could GTC
would it? // In the case there, of dinosaurs and have more than one
birds. // Then it is possible that the structure at function
one time were for [sic] evolution, for [sic]
adaptation as a thermic insulator, in the case of Data: feathers as thermic DT
dinosaurs that you have, the dinosaurs, // and insulators
later it shifted to the question of flight. Justification: shifting of TC-D
function
Teacher (18): May I ask a question?
You use the term ‘for adaptation’: What do you mean by it?
unpredictability, as its understanding supports students’ realization of the incompatibility

of evolution and purpose in nature. It has to be noted that chance is not mentioned in the
‘Feathered dinosaurs’ question. Maria articulates this theoretical justification with a claim,
that structures could have more than one function, data about dinosaurs, and a suggestion
of a shifting of function. Her argument moves from the theoretical notion of chance to data
from the question. It is interesting to note that she is qualifying her claims, through two
modal qualifiers, ‘not necessarily’ and ‘it is possible’, an instance of a practice found in
other students. Qualifiers tone down (or up) the extent of the claim. Perhaps their occur-
rence here is related to the content, a scientific theory with a certain degree of openness.
Maria has introduced the terms ‘for evolution’ and ‘for adaptation’, which were not
used in the lessons, but coined by group P3, as she acknowledges after the teacher
questions her. An exchange (not reproduced) follows, where the teacher legitimizes the use
of the words, as long as they can explain their meaning, and then the question arises about
why students thought that alternative ‘b’ was not appropriate.
Keira reads group P4 report, and then elaborates on the opposition against the idea of
intentional evolution, appealing to the notion of the action of natural selection on pre-
existing variation (that had been presented in the classroom, but was not mentioned in the
question). She argues that organisms having feathers were selected because they could fly
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better. The notion of intentional evolution, also questioned by Maria in turn 17, was not
explicit in ‘b’, but these students interpret that it embodied one idea of implicit intention
and post-adaptation. Pre-existing variation is one of the central notions in the model of
evolution by natural selection and one that the students find difficult to appropriate and
apply to instances of biological change (Jiménez-Aleixandre 1996).
In terms of argumentative practices, group P4 report and Keira subsequent elaboration
involve the rebuttal of the alternative argument in ‘b’, challenging the evidence of the
opposed claim, when Keira states that the animals, not the feathers, were the ones selected.
The students laugh at the image of feathers having the ‘idea’ of adapting. Noticing that the
students from P2 had not, so far, participated in the discussion, the researcher asks Lucio.
Lucio’s appeals to the same example of the chicken, and presents a new justification, about
a common ancestor of chicken and flying birds, in which feathers could have two functions
ending with a reference to the function of temperature regulation. He suggests that during
the evolutionary process, differences in the environment may have lead to new species,
whose feathers may serve different functions. Although the justification may be ques-
tioned, because in flying birds feathers also serve temperature regulation purposes, the
notions are used in a way coherent with the evolutionary model.
After turn 50, in which Lucio elaborates on the same issues, the teacher asks a question
about temperature regulation and the debate takes a different direction, raising some inter-
esting questions, but not directly related to evolutionary processes or notions. In the second
part of the same session the students discussed the task about gaps in the fossil record.
4.2 From Gaps in the Fossil Record to Speciation
In the discussions about task 2, beginning in turn 151, it can be seen how the focus changes
from justification of option ‘a’ (evolution as a slow process), to the mechanisms of spe-
ciation. The students report the choices of their small groups, and Roberto rewords the
statement in the task, using the term ‘gradual’. After turn 160 a discussion begins about
alternative ‘b’, the possibility of new species appearing suddenly. Several students from
group 4, Keira, Roberto, Lola, deny that possibility, claiming that a mutation is not enough
to produce a new species. In turn 165 Roberto elaborates on the process of formation of
new species, claiming that even if the proportion of a given trait in the population changes
(as a consequence of natural selection), this does not mean that the species is a different
one. The researcher asks students about their criteria for considering two populations as
different species, Joana answers that reproductive isolation and Maria refers to the role of
mutations (turns not reproduced). Lucio, in turns 185 and 187, offers an argument about
how a mutation is insufficient to produce a new species, supporting it with the example of
hemoglobin S. After Brita proposes the influence of environmental changes in speciation,
Roberto contradicts her supporting his claim with an example of a population splitting in
two habitats where different traits are advantageous. It is a sophisticated notion, as fre-
quently students view a given trait as advantageous per se, and have difficulties to realize
that different traits are advantageous in different environments. After more discussion
about reproductive isolation, Lola appeals to the number of generations necessary for
speciation, introducing a metacognitive statement about how people tend to think in terms
of human timescale.
In terms of argumentative practices, a higher number of claims (different from alter-
natives ‘a’ and ‘b’) were produced in this task that in the ‘feathered dinosaurs’ question.
These claims are part of arguments serving as justifications for higher level claims, in most
cases gradualism.
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4.3 Articulating Speciation, Common Ancestry and the Role of Environment

to Empirical Evidence in the Lake Nabugabo Task
In this task, most justifications are supported in theoretical backings. One of the most
significative argumentative practices, right at the beginning, was the presentation by
Carlos, from group 5, of a new alternative, different both from ‘a’ and ‘b’, which he
criticized. In doing so, he appealed to the notion of common ancestry, rejecting the pos-
sibility of coexistence of ancestral and currently living species.
We interpret that Carlos adequately recognizes the ambiguity in the wording of alter-
native ‘a’, which was meant to represent the accepted view, offering in his last sentence a
new alternative: that both species had common ancestors, and opposing the idea that the
species in the older lake were the ancestors of the species in the new lake. He justifies this
claim in the notion that in different environments species undergo different transforma-
tions. This is a relevant notion in evolution, as discussed for task 2: sometimes for students
it is difficult to understand that some traits are not inherently ‘better’ than other, but rather
some are selected in a given environment, while others may be selected in a different
environment. The view of ancestry relationships between currently living species, in terms
of one being the ancestor of the other (as in controversies in Darwin’s time about apes
being ancestors of humans) is one of the common misconceptions about evolutionary
theory. This claim is supported in data from the problem (not reproduced).
In terms of argumentative practices this is a complex argument, opposing not one
alternative but two, offering a new claim supported with theoretical notions and data from
the problem, and a justification (in different environments species undergo different
transformations) that is in turn the claim of a second argument. In turn 140 he opposes
again the idea that the species would be different at the time the lake was divided.
Still Decio, from group M2, is not convinced and, although admitting some uncertainty,
supports ‘a’. In turn 152 he uses, implicitly, the idea of speciation through geographical
isolation in his opposition to ‘b’. Decio criticizes the assumption, that he probably sees
implicit in ‘b’, that when the division of the lake happened, some species populations went
to one side and some to the other, suggesting instead the random distribution of fishes in
the resulting lakes, with individuals from a single species being present in both of them.
In terms of argumentative practices, besides the proposal of new arguments, it has to be
noted how students qualify their claims in several ways: by explicit references to uncer-
tainty, as Carlos, Decio and Osvaldo do from turn 138 onwards, and through other modal
qualifiers, as ‘not always’. This is a dimension related to the development of an image of
science as a tentative endeavor, where knowledge claims are not always fixed beyond any
doubt, and we interpret this as connected to the strategies of the teacher, and her classroom
explanations that supported this view.
Students from groups M1 (Julio) and M4 (Alberto) express their support to ‘b’, although
their argument, co-constructed in cooperation from turn 153 onwards, seems to have a
meaning closer to Carlos’ proposal. In this argument they use the idea of differential survival
as a driving mechanism in evolution by natural selection. Although alternative ‘b’ stated that
the species in both lakes ‘had always been different’, these students seem to interpret it in
terms of differential survival of given species in each of the resulting lakes after the division,
rather than as initial differences. Alberto uses this notion adequately, while Julio seems to
use ‘adapt’ with the alternative meaning of an active process, and not of the result of the
process. In turn 163 Julio, prompted by the researcher (first author) to explain why they chose
alternative ‘b’, makes an attempt to clarify their position, following closely the argument
made by Alberto. Their position seems to be related to the difficulties, reported in the
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literature (see for instance Otero 2002), that students experience in making meaning from
science texts. Nine, out of the 13 students present in the session, participated in the debate, a
higher proportion than in class P (10 out of 18), although with shorter utterances.
4.4 Summary of the Results
These results can be summarized in the following points:

Types of explanations: Although the types of explanations were not systematically
analyzed, it has to be noticed that the students who participated in the oral debates in both
classes did not used teleological explanations, found frequently in younger (and even not
so young) students, as Kampourakis and Zogza (2008, 2009) show. Instead they used both
evolutionary and proximate explanations. It is also noticeable that there were few cases of
alternative notions or meanings, as for instance the verb ‘adapt’ understood as implying an
active process. In some cases the students even explicitly critiziced alternative views, as for
instance intentionality or post-adaptation (in the ‘feathered dinosaurs’ task). In the dis-
cussion section some hypotheses are presented to account for this.
Conceptual knowledge used to support or critizice claims: the students used some of the
central theoretical notions of the synthetic model of evolution to support their choices,
retrieving them from previous knowledge, as most of them were not explicit in the wording
of the questions. As summarized in Table 3, speciation, common ancestry and adaptation
were used across the three tasks analyzed, and other nine notions were used in one or two of
the tasks. The discussions reproduced in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 show that this use does not
mean simply recalling terms, but applying them in a sophisticated way to make sense of the
issues discussed, as evidenced for instance when discussing how natural selection acts on
pre-existing variation (in the first and third tasks). The hypothesis related to this use are
related to the previous issue, types of explanations, and presented in the discussion section.
Argumentation practices: these practices ranged from offering data in support of their
claims (or choices), elaborating justifications, appealing to theoretical support, to con-
structing new, better worded claims when the alternatives from the task were not satis-
factory, or to challenging the evidence of opposed claims with rebuttals. In the
development of the argumentation, processes of co-construction among several students
were documented, both in the small groups and during the whole class discussion. As
argumentation was not taught, we suggest below some features of the course design and
teacher’s strategies to account for these practices.
Evidenced claims at different epistemic levels: conceptual knowledge and argumenta-
tion practices are articulated in evidenced claims. The analysis of these evidenced claims at
different levels of abstraction results in patterns that present similarities, both across the
three tasks and across the two classes. Most claims are placed in the categories theoretical
propositions specific to the evolutionary issue discussed (STC), and theoretical claims
illustrated with data specific to the issue (TC-D), while claims either more abstract, as
general theoretical claims (GTC) or more specific, as data (DK and DT) are less frequent.
The question of the relationships between learning evolution and learning to argument is
discussed in the next section.
5 Discussion: Articulation of Conceptual Knowledge and Argumentation Practices
A question implicit in studies about argumentation in science education is which contri-

butions can be expected of its development for science learning. Although the effects of
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590
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Table 7 Feathered dinosaurs: moving among epistemic levels
Keira (38): [reading P4 report] ‘We do not agree with that idea [b], // Claim: disagreement with ‘b’ (Not coded)
because first, structures like feathers, as was discussed before, may have Justification: feathers may have more than one function STC
more than one function // and second, feathers were not selected and later
adapted to the flight function, but some animals, which already possess Justification: pre-existing variation STC
that trait had the ability to fly, // that is, they were selected because they Justification: selection on pre-existing variation STC
already presented the trait.’ [ends reading] // In other words, what we Data: feathers’ function DT
mean is that they had feathers, in the case of birds, the feathers assisted
Rebuttal: denial of intentionality TC-D
in the flight and all, // but the feathers were not there, before as thermic
insulators, and then they began to adapt, they knew and… for, because Justification: advantage for these having feathers STC
birds had to fly. // The animals having feathers that assisted flight were Rebuttal: denial of intentionality TC-D
able to fly better than others. // It was not a question of, the feathers, not
of having an idea of adapting.
Students (39): [laugh]
Lucio (48): We [group P2] thought the same. The ‘a’, then, we think that it Claim: supporting ‘a’ (Not coded)
is the right one // (…). We thought that, for instance, using the same Data: chickens don’t fly DK
example of chicken. Chickens have feathers but don’t fly. // But we can
say that they had a common ancestor with another animal, some animal Justification: common ancestor TC-D
that does fly. // Then, we can say, departing from this common ancestor, Justification: two functions STC
when it diverged, the feathers, for instance in the ancestor could have Justification: influence of the environment STC
two functions, // but when the species were separated, by the
Data: function of temperature regulation DK
environment pressure, the feathers had a specific function. // Then, for
instance, [in] the chicken, it has rather the [function] of the process of
temperature regulation, while in other animals [inaudible]
Table 8 From gaps in the fossil record to speciation
Lola (153): We [group 4] also agree with ‘a’ talking Claim: agreement with ‘a’ (Not coded)
about the question // because it could be that fossils of Justification: not preserved TC-D
these animals were not formed or preserved, or even
not found. // (…) And about ‘b’ we do not agree // Claim: disagreement with ‘b’ (Not coded)
because it says that the change was sudden and we do Justification: slow changes STC
know that no, it is not possible these changes from 1 h
to the next
Roberto (154): Because evolution is gradual Claim: rewording task claim STC
Lucio (158): (…) it is a slow process that happens by Claim and opposition to ‘b’ STC
Articulation of Conceptual Knowledge
degrees, not suddenly as ‘b’ says.

Roberto (165): (…) a sudden change in the environment Justification: selection on pre-existing variation STC
happens; then all die and those that have [a given Claim: a change in the proportion of a trait is not STC
trait] stay. // I think that they still belong to that enough to change the species
species
(…)
Lucio (187): (…) he is the founder so he passes on this Data: mutation in a trait DK
trait of S hemoglobin to others. // But this is not Claim: not a new species TC-D
enough to say, people with SS are a new species
Roberto (203): I think that it is not necessary a change Claim: speciation does not require environment change STC
in environment. // (…) Let’s say that it has common Justification: selection on pre-existing variation TC-D
ancestors with traits A and B, they live in the same
environment. They begin to explore the environment
and some of them go to a habitat. Then in that place
trait A is more advantageous and that group is
selected. And in the other environment B would be
advantageous (…)
Lola (231): (…) to think only in terms of our lifetime, I Claim: Speciation requires many generations, long time GTC
think that it is wrong, you have to think in Metacognitive statement about timescale (Not coded)
generations, the number of generations [to form
species] (…) // because people tend to think about our
lifetime.
591
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Table 9 Lake Nabugabo
592
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Carlos (135): [alternative] ‘a’ is wrong. (…) // What Claim: ‘a’ is wrong (Not coded)
happened was that each species, the species in each Justification: in different environments species suffer STC
lake, (…) evolved in a different way because the different transformations
environment was different. // Then you can say that
they have common ancestors but not that the species New claim: both species had common ancestors STC
found there [in Lake Victoria] are the ancestral
populations, you know, of Lake Nabugabo.
Carlos (138): But you cannot be certain. Modal qualifier: uncertainty (Not coded)
Carlos (140): In ‘b’ also here [reads ‘b’] ‘The species (reading claim ‘b’) (Not coded)
found in Lake Nabugabo had always been different Claim: opposition to ‘b’ ? modal qualifier TC-D
from these found in Lake Victoria.’ // Not always,
because when it was [not] divided they would be the
same.
Decio (146): But the ‘a’ is more probable Claim ? modal qualifier (Not coded)
Decio (152): No [the species in both lakes were not Claim: opposition to ‘b’ (Not coded)
always different]. // If it were divided [the lake] then New claim: aleatory distribution of fishes TC-D
you would find, you would find in one of them as in
the other one. // It was not going to have the Justification: the species were not divided between the STC
coincidence to divide exactly… the populations. lakes
Alberto (154): Then, when the lakes were separated, Justification: different survival STC
one species would survive better in one lake and the
other survived better in the other.
Julio (163): We said that probably [inaudible] there Justification [for ‘b’]: several species in each lake TC-D
were species, more than one in that lake… // So when Justification: different survival STC
the lake was divided some of these species adapted
more to one portion of the lake and others to the other Claim: the species are different [in terms of survival] STC
lake. // So that is why it has that. But the species are
different. Because of that.
argumentation practices in evolution learning are not the specific focus of this study, we
think that its outcomes have some implications about it. Jiménez-Aleixandre and Erduran
(2008) have outlined the potential contributions of argumentation in science classrooms.
They do not mention among them conceptual understanding, but rather aspects related to
the appropriation by students of practices as the development of epistemic criteria for
evaluating claims, or the development of the capacity of talking and writing science, that is
of the meaning-making practices of science. In this perspective, we are not claiming that
engaging students in argumentation is going to have an effect, for instance in the type of
explanations they use about evolution.
Rather, what we think that our study shows is how students’ evaluation of scientific
claims about evolution requires from them the application of evolutionary notions to
contexts that are different from those used in instruction. This supports the construction of
a kind of knowledge that may become a usable tool, rather than being inert. What the
analysis of evidenced claims documents is, on the one hand, that understanding evolution
is necessary for constructing arguments, for supporting the claims with appropriate data
and justifications. On the other hand, we think that it also documents that these argu-
mentation practices can support a better understanding of evolutionary processes. This
claim is framed in a dynamic perspective about learning science and about discursive
practices, for we do not see learning as a process that is ‘completed’ once instruction is
finished (in this case in sessions 13 in class P and 11 in class M), and could then be tested.
On the contrary, we see the tasks proposed to students in the last sessions as a learning
opportunity, because they are required to retrieve appropriate evolutionary notions and
articulate them at different levels of abstraction in their arguments. For instance, they need
to use the concept of common ancestry, and critizice the idea that living species are
ancestors of other living species. We claim that in this process they are not just showing an
appropriate understanding of common ancestry, but refining this notion and connecting it
to other concepts relevant for sound evolutionary explanations. The same can be said about
other notions as pre-existing variation, chance or speciation.
The results show a range of evolutionary and proximate explanations (using Kampourakis
and Zogza categories) and no teleological ones. In both cases the students appealed to the
relevant notions in the synthetic model of evolution, and even criticized intentional or
teleological explanations. It has to be noted that, in terms of conceptual understanding, the
discussions revealed the existence of very few alternative ideas about evolution that are
frequently found in the literature. There are several factors that may contribute to it, on the
one hand, as the study is an examination of oral debates, the participation of only part of the
students: in class P ten out of eighteen spoke, while eight did not participated in the debate; in
class M, nine students participated, although some of them with only a few interventions.
There were about half a dozen of students in each class who dominated the debates. It seems
probable that these students hold appropriate explanations, and we cannot rule out the
potential existence of teleological explanations among other students who remained silent.
A second group of factors that may account for the quality of students’ understanding
are the instructional approach (summarized in Table 2) and teacher’s strategies. It has to be
noted (a) that the teaching sequence lasted about 21 h in one class and 17 and a half hours
in the other, longer than teaching sequences about evolution in other contexts; (b) that the
sequence involved a variety of learning tasks, as for instance problem-solving, simulations
in the field, or discussing texts and videos; in other words that students were assigned an
active role; (c) that the second session in both classes was devoted to an exploration of
students’ ideas, that were subsequently used by the teacher in her instruction; and (d) that
the teacher actively promoted students’ engagement with the issues discussed, payed
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attention to the questions raised by them, even when they seemed to divert the focus of the
session; probed their understanding with questions (‘how do you think that…?’), and
required them to justify their claims and statements (‘why do you say it?’).
The role of the teacher, a professional who holds a PhD in education and with long
involvement in collaboration in science education research may account, first for the
quality of the students’ explanations and use of concepts, and second for their ability in
argumentation, even if they had not been formally taught about it. In both classrooms all
the learning activities were designed by the teacher. This raises the question of the stu-
dents’ engagement in argumentative practices when argumentation had not been explicitly
taught. As discussed in Jiménez-Aleixandre (2008) argumentation learning environments
can be designed both by teaching it and by scaffolding it through the combination of
classroom culture, curriculum and particular teacher’s role. It seems that, on the one hand
the development of the sequence, which required them to solve problems in small groups,
to participate in simulations and to carry other hand-on activities, in summary to take an
active participation; and on the other hand the classroom environment created by the
teacher, who encouraged open discussions, changed the discourse flow in order to acco-
modate students’ questions and expressed interests in their inputs, cooperated in creating
an environment supporting argumentation. We think that argumentation is learned through
practice, and these students were used to being required to justify their claims.
The influence of the tasks in the students’ argumentation may also be considered. The
three tasks proposed in class P (from which task 1 and 2 have been discussed here) have as
a focus the differences between the received views in the synthetic theory of evolution, and
modulations to particular aspects of this theory. Taking as an instance the ‘feathered
dinosaurs’ question, we may say that the focus of the sequence (and of most evolution
teaching) on the mechanism of natural selection and population genetics means that a
minor detail of the accepted view before Gould, that structures had one function during the
evolutionary process, was not explicitly discussed. The wording of the feathered dinosaurs
question implicitly supports only exaptation (that is, the modulated perspective that, it
could be argued, makes part today of mainstream evolutionary science), for although two
alternatives are presented the introductory paragraph discusses in detail only the case of the
existence of feathers in animals that did not fly (see Appendix 1). There is not an
equivalent explanation supporting alternative ‘b’, the notion that feathers had only one
function (assisting flight) so it is not surprising that the four small groups chose alternative
‘a’, and accepted without discussion the possibility of thermic insulation as another
function of feathers. A consequence was that there were no competing arguments with
opposing claims, instead there were on the one hand cooperation in the co-construction of
arguments in support of alternative ‘a’, exaptation, and on the other hand opposition and
even rebuttal of alternative ‘b’. In the task about ‘gaps in the fossil record’ the situation
was the reverse, with all groups supporting gradualism, that is the received view. The range
of concepts used by the students and the articulation of evidenced claims at different levels
of abstraction show that the argumentation quality is not necessarily connected to a debate
between opposing claims. On the other hand it has to be acknowledged that although some
issues may be subject to debates in the scientific community—or were debated when first
proposed—this does not mean that students will perceive them as being debatable.
These results may be contrasted with the task in class M, where the question was
implicitly expected to produce a wider consensus, and where it could be said that the
introductory paragraph was neutral in respect to the two alternatives. In that case the
choices were split, two groups supported one of the alternatives, another two groups
supported the other and one group criticized both, offering a new one that in fact
123
constitutes a better wording of the accepted view. These results could be partly explained
in the ambiguity of alternative ‘a’, which could be interpreted, as Carlos did, as if the
present species in Lake Victoria were the ancestors of the present species in Lake Nab-
ugabo, to which he opposes the idea of the species in both lakes sharing common ancestors.
In fact the students supporting alternative ‘a’, as Decio for instance, seem to do so rather
because of the problems that they perceive in alternative ‘b’, due to the merits of alter-
native ‘a’. And, as discussed in the previous section, the students who declare their support
to alternative ‘b’, like Julio and Alberto, seem to give it the meaning of different survival in
different environments (which is not what ‘b’ states) making it closer to Carlos’ new
proposal. So, although the students used less concepts and had over a half of their evi-
denced claims in the level of theoretical claims illustrated with data specific to the issue,
some of them were able to modify and refine the alternatives presented, transforming the
first in a claim closer to the accepted view.
What this study adds to previous work about the relationships between science learning
and argumentation is a detailed examination of how the students need to articulate complex
knowledge with argumentation skills. To understand and apply the evolution model
requires mastering a range of ideas at different epistemic levels, so evolution is an adequate
topic to explore this articulation. For instance, Maria (turn 17, class P), uses the notion of
chance in support of her claim, connected to the opposition to intentionality. This use was
not required in order to construct an argument supporting alternative ‘a’, in fact the other
groups did not used it, but it underlines the issue discussed: whether or not structures can
have more than one function. What this instance shows is how she retrieved a piece of
knowledge, not mentioned in the question, identifying it as relevant for the issue discussed,
and used it in the construction of her argument, articulating it with other pieces of
evidence.
Acknowledgments M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre’s work makes part of a project supported by the Spanish

Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (MEC), partly funded by the European Regional Development Fund
(ERDF). Grant code SEJ2006-15589-C02-01/EDUC. Mortimer’s and Lima-Tavares’s work is part of two
projects supported by CNPq, the agency of the Brazilian Ministry for Science and Technology.
Appendix 1
Task 1, Class P: Feathered Dinosaurs
There are evidences showing that birds and dinosaurs are closely related. This notion is
based on the study of birds and dinosaurs morphology, revealing that these animals share a
number of structures. Since the late 1990 s animal fossils were found, which have dinosaurs’
morphological traits but are covered by feathers: the feathered dinosaurs. This constitutes an
evidence of the existence of feathers since the dinosaurs’ time, before birds appear. Because
the earlier feathered dinosaurs do not have morphological traits indicating the ability to fly, it
is believed that the feathers had another function in feathered dinosaurs: thermic insulation
related to the temperature regulation of these animals. Some authors think that it is possible
for structures to have more than one function during the evolutionary process. Feathers, for
instance, would have an initial function as insulators and only later would shift to function to
assist flight. Thinking in evolution terms: How do we view this possibility?
(a) The notion that structures like feathers may serve to more than one function along the
evolution process is acceptable and the example quoted above constitutes an evidence
of this shifting of functions.
123
(b) The notion that structures like feathers may serve to more than one function along the
evolution process is not adequate. Feathers, as we know them today, are structures
selected and adapted for birds’ flight.
Task 2, Class P: Gaps in the Fossil Records
The Earth is 4.6 billion year-old, but life originated about 3.5 billion years ago. The first
life records belong to prokaryotes, that is unicellular organisms that dominate the fossil
record for more than 2 billion years. Paleontological data reveal that the first fossils of the
majority of invertebrata appear for the first time about 570 million years ago. In this
Cambrian period we find a diversity of multicellular organisms, annelids, arthropods,
echinoderms, molluscs or sponges, and even chordata. It has to be noted that between this
fossil records of multicellular organisms and the earlier records of living organisms, no
fossils of intermediate forms are found. It is as if these multicellular organisms appeared in
an advanced stage of evolution. Thinking in evolution terms, and considering that the fossil
records may reflect the diversification of living beings in nature: How can we interpret
these data?
(a) The lack of intermediate fossils is due to the fact that very few fossils from periods
prior to 570 million years were formed or preserved. The evolution of multicellular
organisms was a slow process proceeding by little steps.
(b) The lack of intermediate fossils is due to the fact that these forms never existed.
Multicellular organisms appeared as a consequence of abrupt changes.
Task 3, Class M: Lake Nabugabo
Lake Nabugabo is a small fresh water lake in Uganda, close to Lake Victoria. Geological
evidences indicate that Lake Nabugabo was part of Lake Victoria in previous times and
was later separated from the main lake by a sandbar. Radio carbon dating shows that the
separation happened 4,000 years ago or even earlier. Something special happens in Lake
Nabugabo: there are five fish species from the cichlids family that are not found in any
other place, even in Lake Victoria. However, each one of these five species is similar to
one species in Lake Victoria, being the main differences the male color patterns. Thinking
in evolution terms we can conclude that:
(a) The species found in Lake Nabugabo must have developed from ancestral populations
found in Lake Victoria. It is an instance of population’s isolation that started a fast
species formation at evolutionary scale.
(b) The species found in Lake Nabugabo had always been different from these found in
Lake Victoria. Lake Nabugabo species are not found today in Lake Victoria because
they were not adapted to that environment.
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Sci & Educ (2010) 19:573–598

Articulation of Conceptual Knowledge and

Marina de Lima Tavares Æ Marı́a-Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre Æ

Published online: 1 September 2009

1 Introduction: Interaction Between Evolution Learning and Argumentation

M. de Lima Tavares E. F. Mortimer

M.-P. Jiménez-Aleixandre (&)

knowledge construction in the classroom, in particular the processes of justification of

2 Rationale: Studies About Argumentation and About the Learning of Evolution

2.1 The Role of Argumentation in Science Learning

This work is grounded on a perspective assuming that knowledge is constructed in social

2.2 Students’ Difficulties About Learning Evolution

Evolution is central to biology knowledge, and this centrality is acknowledged in most

Table 1 Students, tasks and

teaching sequence took 16 sessions (about 20 h and 50 min in total) in classroom P

3.2 Educational Context and Tasks

Table 2 Summary of the development of the evolution sequence

3.3 Data Collection and Analysis

4 Evidenced Claims in Arguments About Evolution

The objective of the study is to examine the process of articulation of conceptual

Table 5 Feathered dinosaurs: expanding the task argument

Table 6 Feathered dinosaurs: Co-constructing an argument

unpredictability, as its understanding supports students’ realization of the incompatibility

4.2 From Gaps in the Fossil Record to Speciation

4.3 Articulating Speciation, Common Ancestry and the Role of Environment

4.4 Summary of the Results

These results can be summarized in the following points:

5 Discussion: Articulation of Conceptual Knowledge and Argumentation Practices

A question implicit in studies about argumentation in science education is which contri-

degrees, not suddenly as ‘b’ says.

Actor, turn, transcription Argumentative practices Evidenced claims

Acknowledgments M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre’s work makes part of a project supported by the Spanish

Task 1, Class P: Feathered Dinosaurs

Task 2, Class P: Gaps in the Fossil Records

Task 3, Class M: Lake Nabugabo

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