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| POLITICS | CENTRAL ASIA

There Won’t be
Political Reform
in Uzbekistan.
Here’s Why
Genuine reform takes
place not through
quashing free thinkers and
critics but in encouraging
and even embracing
them. 

By Dilmira Matyakubowa
December 22, 2020
 Credit: Unsplash

On December 10, International Human Rights

Day, a group of human rights defenders,
activists, researchers, artists and filmmakers
gathered in Tashkent’s 139 Documentary
Center. They were there for the premier of a
documentary film about former political
prisoners who were released from the
notorious Jaslyk prison, a facility synonymous
with torture, and where they had been
condemned to sentences of up to 24 years after
falling foul of the Karimov regime.  
The release of the prisoners in 2017, and the
closure of Jaslyk in 2019 symbolized a new era
for Uzbekistan as Shavkat Mirziyoyev
ascended to power following the late dictator’s
death in 2016. The release, which came about
largely because of international pressure, was
an effort by the new government to improve
the country’s international reputation.
But the shadows of the past continue to linger.
Many of the people who presided over that era
of repression remain in government today –
the very people who committed atrocities
against prisoners in Jaslyk. While those
imprisoned have since been released, they
have yet to be rehabilitated, and democratic
freedoms such as freedom of thought,
expression and assembly remain suppressed.
Meanwhile, journalists, scholars and activists
continue to be persecuted and surveilled.
Recently, after a number of media agencies
reported on crippling energy shortages in the
country, the Agency for Information and Mass
Communications (AIMC) objected to the
“negativity” of some of the reporting,
threatening the media agencies responsible
with “serious legal consequences” if they do
not rein in their coverage. The internet
remains tightly controlled with politically
motivated filtering and blocking of critical
content. Parliament remains merely a
simulacrum of debate rather than a voice of
the people or genuine forum for policy
discussion.
Despite this, some scholars continue to argue
that serious change is taking place. 
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In a recent interview, Farkhod Tolipov,
political scientist, director of the Uzbek non-
government research institution Caravan of
Knowledge, wrote that “[Mirziyoyev] will
speed up political reforms and work toward
consolidation of a more open and pluralist
political system” if he is elected in 2021. But it
is difficult to see how. In an authoritarian
country like Uzbekistan, with no opposition,
and widespread persecution of critics, changes
to basic human rights and freedoms remain a
distant hope. 
Far from a reform-oriented government,
Mirziyoyev’s agenda has so far appeared
populist in nature. While promoting rhetoric
of a “new Uzbekistan” through top-down mega
urban redevelopment projects like the billion-
dollar “Tashkent City” to attract foreign
investment, the government largely neglected
the interests and concerns of the local
population. 
Plans like the one above are part of the
government’s strategy to improve the
country’s investment and business climate,
with the aim of raising the country to 20th
place from its current low of 69 on the World
Bank’s Ease of Doing Business ranking. But far
from cutting through the red tape and
inefficiencies, Mirziyoyev has continued down
the well-trodden path of kleptocracy. 
We have witnessed massive, illegal, forced
land grabs by government-backed
corporations, leaving people and businesses
without homes, livelihoods and destruction of
cultural heritage. Half of the protests in the
country since 2018 have been related to
property and land according to Oxus Society’s
Central Asia Protest Tracker. While the elites
continue to line their pockets, 20 percent of the
population live on less than $1.90 a day.
And like Karimov, Mirziyoyev continues to
block the emergence of NGOs, and filling the
civil-society vacuum with government-
sponsored NGOs (GONGOs) that parrot official
narratives. Despite this, the successful
registration of one or two independent NGOs
this March should be noted, even if it only
happened after multiple failed attempts
thanks to international pressure. No new
political parties have been able to register in
the country. There is still no genuine
opposition, and this does not look like it will
change soon. According to the law on
presidential elections, it is practically
impossible to form a political party. Anyone
interested in doing so needs to collect
signatures from 1 percent of the population in
eight of the country’s administrative-territorial
units to do so.
Despite these restrictions on freedom of
speech and assembly, the country is able to
reposition itself in world ratings and forums.
In December, the United States government
removed Uzbekistan from the special watch
list of “countries of particular concern” for
governments that engage or tolerate “severe
violations of religious freedom”, with
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stating that
Uzbekistan had made “concrete progress” in
the field of religious freedom and human
rights. While Uzbekistan’s government has
relaxed repression, stopping raids on
unregistered religious groups, measures to
actively promote religious freedom are
lacking. No new religious group has managed
to register in the country due to the restrictive
legal environment.  
In another PR coup, Uzbekistan became a
member of the UN Human Rights Council and
was applauded by world leaders and the
international press. Reputation laundering is a
serious business, and Mirziyoyev is using it to
burnish his government in Washington and
London without having altered the very
nature of its authoritarian governance. 
We need to avoid treating the populist regime
of Mirziyoyev as if it is implementing genuine
reforms for the benefit of the people. Genuine
reform takes place not through quashing free
thinkers and critics but in encouraging and
even embracing them. Pluralism lies in diverse
ideas and opinions – not in opposition to
them. 
Dilmira Matyakubowa, a researcher and co-
director at UzInvestigations and research fellow
at the U.K.-based Foreign Policy Center. Follow
her on Twitter @MatyakubowaMira
This article was originally published by the
Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs
TAGS

Crossroads Asia Politics Central Asia Uzbekistan

Shavkat Mirziyoyev Uzbekistan Uzbekistan politics

Uzbekistan reforms