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Mass Murder Goes to College: An Examination of

Changes on College Campuses Following Virginia Tech

Article  in  American Behavioral Scientist · April 2009

DOI: 10.1177/0002764209332558

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 American Behavioral Scientist
Volume 52 Number 10
June 2009 1465-1485
© 2009 SAGE Publications
Mass Murder Goes to College 10.1177/0002764209332558
http://abs.sagepub.com

An Examination of Changes on College hosted at

http://online.sagepub.com
Campuses Following Virginia Tech
James Alan Fox
Jenna Savage
Northeastern University, Boston

Notwithstanding the historical significance of the Columbine shooting, recent attention

has shifted to college campuses following high-profile massacres at Virginia Tech and
Northern Illinois University. In this article, the authors compile and discuss the recom-
mendations most often put forth by task force reports published in the wake of these epi-
sodes. Although some proposals can increase the security and well-being of the campus
community, others may be inappropriate and even carry unacceptable negative conse-
quences. The problem rests partly in the implicit assumption that effective strategies for
secondary schools will seamlessly translate to a college environment. However, campus
shootings are not just Columbine graduated to higher education, as differences in assailant
motivation and setting warrant divergent strategies for prevention and response.

Keywords:   campus violence; campus security; active shooters

T he 1990s witnessed a disturbing string of high-profile mass killings at middle

and high schools around the country, the most horrific of which was, of course,
the 1999 shooting spree commemorated by this special volume. The episode in
Littleton, Colorado, one decade ago was so powerfully and deeply ingrained in the
nation’s collective psyche that “doing a Columbine” became widely known code for
threatening the safety and security of a school.
Whereas the 1990s brought focus to conduct and disciplinary issues confronting
secondary schools, a radically different form of campus violence has commanded
our attention in recent years—specifically, shooting rampages at colleges and
universities, highlighted by massacres at Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois
University less than 10 months apart. Although incidents at middle schools, high
schools, and institutions of higher education all fall under the umbrella of “school
shootings,” there are, in fact, several characteristics of shootings at college campuses
that make them unique. As will be discussed, a major distinction surrounds the
motivation and age of the shooter, which are important differences for consideration
when fashioning appropriate steps for prevention. In addition, differences in the

Authors’ Note: All correspondence should be directed to James Alan Fox, College of Criminal Justice,
Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115.

1465
1466   American Behavioral Scientist

school environment—that is, a single building versus a sprawling campus—means

that a reasonable response to shootings at middle or high schools (for example,
lockdown) may not be feasible at colleges and universities. Thus, college administrators
should not hastily adopt preventive measures simply because they appear effective at
lower level schools. In fact, administrators should think very carefully before
adopting many measures that are popular among colleges and universities these days,
as some common strategies are not necessarily productive and may even potentially
have negative consequences.
Pervasive media images of the mass shootings at Virginia Tech and Northern
Illinois University have raised the specter of serious violence on college campuses.
By any measure, however, the risk of serious violence on campus remains remarkably
low, particularly in its most extreme form (see Fox, 2007). Although the chances of
serious violence may be remote, the potential consequences can be devastating and
long-lasting. Understandably, college officials have responded proactively to the risk,
as parents rightly expect a special level of care for their sons and daughters while they
are away at school. At least in the short term, while the possibility for copycatting is
not insignificant (see Fox, 2008b), it is prudent that colleges take reasonable steps to
ensure the safety of students as well as faculty and other employees.
Unfortunately, some of the measures colleges and universities are undertaking,
amidst an atmosphere of fear, go beyond what is reasonable. In some cases, they
may, in fact, do more harm than good. By overreacting to Virginia Tech and other
widely publicized incidents, not only are college administrators instituting security
measures that may well prove ineffective, but they are also undermining the carefree
atmosphere of campus life. They chance making students feel like walking targets,
thereby intensifying the level of anxiety. At the same time, obsessive attention to the
potential for bloodshed may actually increase the likelihood of a campus copycat.
The messages speak to the few unhappy souls who would welcome a campus
shooting, so long as they are on the back end of the gun.
This article critically examines a variety of institutional responses to the threat
of an “active shooter,” the term commonly used to characterize the perpetrator
of a seemingly random assault with a firearm. In the wake of the Virginia Tech
tragedy, various task forces were organized throughout the country to identify the
steps colleges and universities should take to prevent such an event and how to
respond effectively should an episode occur (e.g., State of Florida, 2007).
However, though the Virginia Tech incident was the impetus for these task forces
and provided the prototype for college/university shootings, the assailant in that
case was, in fact, quite different from most other shooters at college campuses. As
we will discuss in this article, these gunmen are often overworked, overstressed
graduate students confronting academic failure or disappointment, not troubled
undergrads with violent fantasies. By hyperfocusing on the Virginia Tech case,
colleges and universities may overlook important steps that can be taken for
preventing campus violence. In addition, many strategies that sound good on the
 Fox, Savage / Mass Murder Goes to College   1467

surface are, upon closer scrutiny, neither good nor sound. In this article, we examine
the top recommendations promoted by the various task forces with respect to their
appropriateness and effectiveness. Finally, we focus on the significant differences
between episodes that have occurred at middle/high schools and those that have
devastated colleges. Shootings at college campuses are not just Columbine graduated
to higher education, as the differences in assailant motivation and locale warrant
divergent strategies for prevention and response.

Prevalence of Campus Homicide

Notwithstanding the high-profile shootings at Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois

University and the resulting potential for contagion, it is important to maintain
perspective on the actual level of risk. Based upon data gleaned from the FBI’s
Uniform Crime Reporting program and the U.S. Department of Education’s records
mandated by the Clery Act, as well as detailed media reports gathered from searching
electronic newspaper databases, 76 homicides were reported on college campuses
nationwide between 2001 and 2005. Leaving aside cases involving faculty, staff, or
other nonstudents as victims, the count of undergraduates and graduate students
murdered at school numbered 51, an average of about 10 per year. And of these
homicides, as shown in Table 1, the majority involved acquaintance killings or drug
deals gone bad, not rampaging shooters.
Amidst a climate of panic and anxiety, notwithstanding the actual risks, we have
witnessed many new ways in which colleges and universities have tried to improve
their security and preparedness in the event of an on-campus shooter. Indeed, campus
safety has apparently become a significant factor in the college selection process for
countless applicants and their parents. Newsweek published a special edition in
August 2007, advising students and parents on how to tell whether a school is safe
(Murr, 2007). Reader’s Digest (2008) followed by grading colleges for safety based
on the availability of such measures as lockdown procedures and armed security
officers. Not only are schools feeling pressured to divert scarce resources away from
academic needs over to security, but an overemphasis on protecting the campus from
armed attackers can be counterproductive. Many American colleges are oversteering,
by instituting knee-jerk “campus safety” measures of questionable effectiveness.
Moreover, the call for safety readiness and vigilance for suspicious or alarming
behavior may actually be needlessly sustaining the level of fear.

Responding to Tragedy

To gather information about “best practices” in campus safety and violence

prevention, we reviewed 20 reports from various task forces and study groups
1468   American Behavioral Scientist

Table 1
Patterns of College Campus Homicide
in the United States, 2001–2005 (N = 76)
Characteristic Percentage

Weapon
   Gun 52.2
   Knife 11.6
   Personal 21.7
   Other 14.5
Sex of victim
   Male 61.3
   Female 38.7
Victim role
   Student 57.3
   Faculty 9.3
   Staff 9.3
   Child 5.3
   Other 18.7
Sex of offender
   Male 90.8
   Female 9.2
Offender role
   Student 35.5
   Former student 5.3
   Outsider 32.2
   Undetermined 27.0
Victim/offender relationship
   Partner 12.5
   Friend 28.3
   Acquaintance 6.6
   Stranger 27.6
   Undetermined 25.0

Source: Homicide reports drawn from the U.S. Department of Education, FBI Uniform Crime Reports,
and electronic newspaper archives.

around the country. A complete list of these reports and their recommendations is
provided in the appendix (see O’Neill et al., 2008). Several of these recommendations
are quite reasonable and practical, such as having a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) with community partners for such services as acute mental health care and
emergency response; having interoperable communications systems; conducting risk
and safety assessments; and educating faculty, staff, and students about recognizing
and responding to signs of mental illness and potential threats. Given the specific
details provided by many of these reports, it is not possible to consider every single
recommendation that was made. We shall, however, critically examine those
 Fox, Savage / Mass Murder Goes to College   1469

Figure 1
Security Responses of Colleges and Universities

Percent of schools with: Private Public

Emergency
response plan

Notification system

Lockdown plan

50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

recommendations that were the most commonly articulated. More specifically, we

will highlight the top 7 recommendations—those that were made by at least 70% of
the reports.

1. Create an all-hazards Emergency Response Plan (ERP). The most often rec-
ommended approach is the creation of an all-hazards ERP. It is no surprise, there-
fore, that a Reader’s Digest survey of 135 colleges and universities throughout the
country found that more than 90% of schools have ERPs in place (see Figure 1). This
is a relatively simple step that schools can take to be prepared in the event of an
emergency, be it a campus shooting, a natural disaster, or some other major threat to
the safety and well-being of the campus community.
However, as Figure 1 also reveals, many schools have moved beyond just an
ERP by having lockdown plans as well. Rooted in correctional nomenclature,
“campus lockdown” is a popular catchphrase on campus security, often raised in
parental inquiries about safety procedures. In fact, based on the Reader’s Digest
survey, a majority of schools reported having a full or partial lockdown plan in
place.
Leaving aside the impossibility of truly locking down a sprawling campus,
most college shootings take place in one location—in just one building, if not
just one classroom. It is also true, notwithstanding the unique lull in activity in
the Virginia Tech case, that campus shooting sprees typically begin and end so
quickly that locking down students in dorms and classrooms and turning away
off-campus students would not necessarily help (see Greenberg, 2007).
Furthermore, there is a significant downside to sealing off access to buildings
during an active shooter episode. Although a gunman loose on campus grounds
1470   American Behavioral Scientist

may not be able to enter classrooms and other buildings, so too would potential
victims be left stranded without refuge if stalked by the shooter.

2. Adopt an emergency mass notification and communications system. It is vital that

a college or university be able to communicate quickly and effectively with its entire
community in the event of an emergency in order to notify everyone about the situa-
tion and to relay critical information regarding the event. Nearly all of the reports
prescribed that every campus should have an emergency communications alerting
system to provide information on the nature of an emergency and action to be taken.
Judging from the Reader’s Digest survey results (see Figure 1), the vast majority
of schools around the country have invested in mass notification systems. These
devices range from low-tech alarms and sirens that signal an emergency of some
unspecified kind to high-tech electronic text alerts and digital message boards that
can provide detailed information. Whereas installation of such mass notification
systems seems incontrovertible, the effectiveness of these measures depends entirely
upon how they are implemented and the anticipation of foreseeable limitations. For
example, many students do not voluntarily provide schools with their personal cell
phone numbers (see Foster, 2007). And even when students do provide their contact
information, how effective can a text alert system be when many faculty members
require their students to turn off cell phones during class? In addition, many schools
have some bunker-like classrooms in the basements of old buildings where cell
service does not reach. Because newer technology often has such drawbacks and
limitations, many colleges combine high-tech methods with low-tech ones in an
attempt to ensure that emergency messages get through (Foster, 2007). For example,
a siren might be used to prompt students to check their cell phones for text messages
regarding an emergency on campus.
Even larger issues surround when and how to launch an alert. In one recent
incident, students at the University of Iowa franticly ran for cover following a
campuswide text alert informing them about an active shooter nearby. It turns out that
“nearby” was actually many miles away on the opposite side of town, posing very
little threat to the campus. In another incident that occurred a few years ago, public
safety officials at St. Johns University in New York City notified all its students and
staff about a possible gunman spotted on campus wearing a Fred Flintstone mask and
toting a .50-caliber rifle. What they failed to mention was which of its three campus
locations the possible gunman was at—Queens, Staten Island, or Manhattan—thereby
causing unnecessary panic at the unaffected locations (see Hoover & Lipka, 2007).
By virtue of the 2008 Higher Education Opportunity Act, college campuses must
publicize their emergency response plans (Lederman, 2008). Fortunately, a provision
of the act that did not pass was the requirement that colleges launch a notification
within 30 minutes of word of an emergency. Given how fluid and unreliable at times
such early information can be, critics of this provision were rightly concerned about
the potential “cry wolf” effect.
 Fox, Savage / Mass Murder Goes to College   1471

3. Establish a multidisciplinary team to respond to threats and other dangerous

behaviors. Many of the reports recommended that schools establish a multidisci-
plinary team, most commonly referred to as the Threat Assessment Team (TAT).
This is a standing group whose purpose is to receive and assess all reports of threats
and other alarming behaviors by any student or employee of the college or univer-
sity. If it determines that a threat to self or others exists, the TAT plans a course of
action for managing the case and continues to implement this plan over time until it
is determined that the threat no longer exists. The TAT should consist of representa-
tives from the administration, law enforcement, mental health, faculty, student ser-
vices, legal counsel, and human resources functions.
A TAT can be extremely helpful in identifying potential problem students and
guiding them toward the help they need (see Deisinger, Randazzo, O’Neill, & Savage,
2008). Not only can early identification and intervention help to avert violence on
campus, but it can also help prevent other negative outcomes such as suicide and
alcohol/drug abuse. However, special care must be taken not to overreact to relatively
harmless, although disturbing, behaviors. The TAT must be careful to consider all the
pieces of the puzzle, including the context in which behaviors occurred, before coming
to conclusions. In addition, it is important for TAT members not to confuse threat
assessment with other approaches that are commonly used for predicting violence,
such as profiling. Unlike threat assessment, which is based on concrete evidence (i.e.,
an individual’s behavior), profiling compares the characteristics of an individual to
that of a “prototypical” case to predict the likelihood of future violence (Reddy et al.,
2001). In the aftermath of a shooting, we inevitably search for clues—with 20/20
hindsight, of course—that may have alerted the campus to a student who was
profoundly suicidal or bent on revenge. Yet predicting rare events, such as a campus
shooting, is virtually impossible. The rate of false positives—those who fit a behavioral
profile yet do not act out—is exceedingly high. Thousands of college students exhibit
warning signs—yellow flags that only turn red after the blood spills. Thus, it is highly
important not to try to predict these rare events but, rather, to assess the evidence
presented by each individual presented to the TAT on a case-by-case basis.
The dilemma relates to how to interpret and handle disturbing or bizarre behavior.
Overaggressiveness in trying to identify and coerce a troubled and belligerent student
or employee into treatment can potentially intensify feelings of persecution and
precipitate the very violent act that we are trying to avert. That TAT must decide on
an appropriate course of action on an individual basis; there is no single response
that will work for everyone. Moreover, as with the shooter at Northern Illinois, the
warning signs are not necessarily obvious, if even present.
Finally, whereas threat assessment can be highly effective, it should not be the
only method of violence prevention utilized by an institution. It is intended and
helpful for only a portion of the types of violence that occur on campuses. TATs
should be only one part of a comprehensive violence prevention program implemented
on college and university campuses.
1472   American Behavioral Scientist

4. Train personnel regarding privacy matters associated with such regulations as

the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). The issue of student privacy is a frequent
cause of concern for academic administrators across the nation. With college students,
in particular, as they are no longer minors, there is a host of thorny privacy issues
related to HIPAA and FERPA that govern such information. Campus officials need to
be clear on the allowances and limits of federal and state regulations. Underutilizing
available information on students carries the potential for significant costs—both in
human and fiscal terms. Overreaching, however, can also impact the level of trust on
campus as well as create the potential for costly and time-consuming litigation.
There is much confusion about what information can be shared between schools
and between entities within the same school (see Van der Werf, 2007). Oftentimes, it
is assumed that HIPAA and FERPA prohibit all information sharing about students
when, in fact, they both provide broad exceptions for health and safety concerns. For
example, “in an emergency, FERPA permits school officials to disclose without
student consent education records, including personally identifiable information from
those records, to protect the health or safety of students or other individuals” (National
Association of Student Personnel Administrators [NASPA], 2008). Any confusion
should be addressed and clarified in the educational environment so that information
necessary to assess properly the risks and to safeguard campuses may be obtained.
Many of the published reports properly recommended that private information holders
should be trained regarding the limits of legal privacy and be familiar with the
circumstances under which information can be shared.
There currently is a movement in at least some state legislatures to dismantle the
privacy shield by mandating mental heath privacy waivers from all incoming college
students. Generally, however, the level of risk of campus violence does not trump
sacred rights of privacy.

5. Have an MOU with local health agencies and other key partners in the com-
munity. To respond adequately in an emergency situation, colleges and universities
will need to call on resources in their community, including mental health providers
and law enforcement agencies. Indeed, the availability of mental health services as a
supplement to those offered on campus may be critical to preventing violence as
well. Therefore, it is critical that institutions of higher education establish formal or
informal relationships with these outside agencies and private vendors, so that they
can be drawn upon quickly and efficiently when needed.

6. Practice emergency plans and conduct training. It is not sufficient for a col-
lege or university simply to have an ERP in place. To be prepared for an emergency
situation, reports recommended that schools practice and train for these plans.
National survey data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (see Reaves, 2008) reveal
that the campus police departments at many schools, including community col-
leges, maintain various approaches to emergency preparedness activities. Half of
 Fox, Savage / Mass Murder Goes to College   1473

the 2-year schools and two thirds of the 4-year colleges engage in emergency pre-
paredness exercises.
A number of colleges are preparing for the worst by engaging in active shooter
role-playing drills. Some, quite reasonably, are involving only campus security and
local authorities in training drills undertaken during school vacation. Others, not so
wisely, are involving the students in their tactical exercises. Some students volunteer
as victims, lying still in pools of ketchup, while others huddle in corners waiting out
the realistic drama. But given the incredibly low risk, it may not be worth the
potential emotional trauma.
It is one thing to train and prepare security personnel for handling an active
shooter emergency. However, given the limited risk of such an event, it is unwise,
potentially traumatizing, and simply counterproductive for students to be included
in such tactical drills.

7. Educate and train students, faculty, and staff about mass notification systems
and their roles and responsibilities in an emergency. Many campuses use mass noti-
fication systems, but these will have limited effectiveness if students, faculty, and
staff are not aware that they exist, are not registered in the system, or do not under-
stand how they work. For this reason, many reports recommended that students,
faculty, and staff should be educated about the mass notification system and what to
do in an emergency. Student orientations and faculty/staff training sessions provide
excellent opportunities to familiarize the campus community with these and other
emergency response procedures.
Some schools, however, are taking student preparation a step further. New to the
curriculum at many colleges is instruction for students in survival skills. This training
is not surrounding useful and practical advice on note taking, studying for exams, and
dealing with professors. Rather, a new security video, produced and distributed by a
security consulting firm especially for students, demonstrates tips and techniques on
how to survive an active shooter attack on campus, and has been adopted by many
colleges to prepare for a potential rampage (see Fox, 2008a). This step is understandable,
given the strong pressures that colleges and universities face from worried parents
who want some assurance that their children will be safe at college. Indeed, about 500
colleges and universities throughout the country purchased the video within months
of its release (Perez, 2008). However, it is important to consider the potential negative
side effects of this type of preparation. Although some parents and students may
simply view the tips as helpful, others may interpret this preparation as an indication
of a high risk of violence at the particular college or university. Indeed, they might
think, “If they’re suggesting that I watch this video, then there must be a good chance
of this actually happening here.” Of course, in reality, the likelihood of an active
shooter event on a college or university campus is remarkably low. Although a video
on how to act during such an event might allay the fears of some, it might serve to
heighten the fears of others. It is important that institutions of higher education take
1474   American Behavioral Scientist

these issues into consideration before promoting these and/or other similar resources
that are now available for teaching students how to survive a school shooting.

Higher Education Versus High School

The recommendations discussed here were set forth by task forces focused on
preventing shootings at colleges and universities. Just as some of these steps would
not necessarily be appropriate at middle and high schools, various steps being
adopted by middle/high schools throughout the nation are not necessarily appropriate
for institutions of higher education. There are important distinctions between these
two types of schools and the shootings that occur there, including the age and
motivation of the shooter, as well as the surrounding environment.
Although the Virginia Tech massacre may have been the largest school shooting
in American history, arguably the 1999 Columbine tragedy, commemorated by this
special issue, was the watershed event in terms of national consciousness about
school violence. It is important, therefore, that we note the many distinctions
between middle/high schools and colleges/universities in terms of both the nature of
the episodes and the appropriate measures for improving security.
Common safety and security measures adopted by middle schools and high schools
include physical access control (i.e., locks on building doors during school hours),
requiring faculty and staff to wear ID badges, random searches for drugs, and using
security cameras to monitor the school (National Center for Education Statistics,
2007). Nearly 11% of high schools use random metal detector checks on students (see
also Addington [2009 (this issue)] for a discussion of metal detectors and other
“visible” security measures adopted by schools since Columbine). Lockdown plans
have also become increasingly common among high schools, with many schools
conducting lockdown drills (Higgins, 2008). Because these schools are typically
housed in a single building where entrances and exits are easily controlled, these
measures are certainly feasible—whether or not they are reasonable based on an
assessment of risk. Colleges and universities, however, are usually spread across
sprawling campuses that include multiple buildings. As mentioned earlier, attempting
to lock down an entire college campus is impractical, if not impossible. In addition,
security measures for colleges and universities should in part be governed by the
community’s desire for a free and open campus. Colleges and universities offer unique
challenges to security because the nature of their existence depends upon a free flow
of individuals and expression. Care must be taken not to reinforce exaggerated
perceptions of vulnerability. Indeed, it is critical not to promote fear and anxiety
while attempting to reduce risk. Thus, whereas tight security measures might be
appropriate for middle and high schools where students generally have no choice of
attendance, the same approach on a college campus could create an environment so
distasteful to student prospects as to encourage them to look for options elsewhere.
 Fox, Savage / Mass Murder Goes to College   1475

In addition, the issues that motivate campus shooters and their younger counterparts
are vastly different. Shootings at high schools are often precipitated when students
feel bullied or persecuted by their classmates and/or teachers (Vossekuil, Fein,
Reddy, Borun, & Modzeleski, 2004). However, the perpetrators of mass shootings
at colleges and universities are often graduate students—older individuals who turn
to violence in response to what they perceive to be unbearable pressure to succeed
or the unacceptable reality of failure. Indeed, the most striking fact pattern among
campus shootings is the disproportionate involvement of graduate students as
perpetrators. Of the 14 fatal multiple shootings in the United States since 1990 (see
Table 2), 8 were committed by current or former graduate, law, medical, or nursing
students, compared to 3 by more traditional undergraduates and 3 by outsiders.
Unlike undergraduates, students in graduate and professional programs often lack
balance in their personal lives, narrowly focusing on academic work and training to
the exclusion of other interests and other people in their lives. Students who had
been at the top of their class in high school and college may come to find themselves
struggling to get by with just passing grades. No longer supported financially by
parents, they experience great pressure to juggle assistantship activities or outside
employment with coursework and thesis research, with little time for attending to
social networks. At some point, their entire lifestyle and sense of worth may revolve
around academic achievement. Moreover, their personal investment in reaching a
successful outcome can be viewed as a virtual life-or-death matter. This perception
can be intensified for foreign graduate students from certain cultures where failure
is seen as shame on the entire family. Foreign students also experience additional
pressures because the academic visas allowing them to remain in this country are
often dependent upon their continued student status. Indeed, a recent study of
student mental health at the University of California reported that both graduate
students and international students are particularly vulnerable to mental health
problems due in large part to their increased levels of stress (University of California
Student Mental Health Committee, 2006).
Compounding the problem is the fact that faculty mentors, the gatekeepers to
success, may be insensitive to the pressures placed upon their students. At the
extreme, some faculty may even maintain an oppressive relationship with graduate
students, perhaps perpetuating a power imbalance they themselves suffered in
graduate school. Regrettably, not all faculty members are sensitive to the enormous
and often unrestrained power they have over students.
For all of these reasons, it is important that graduate admissions committees look
beyond grades and test scores to discern evidence of possible academic or disciplinary
problems in the backgrounds of recruits. A record of attendance at multiple institutions
without completing a degree, for example, may warrant inquiry into the reasons for
such transiency. In addition, faculty advisors and academic standing committees
should be wary of retaining a marginal student when the prospects for degree
completion begin to appear remote. Mentors and advisors must be alert to situations
1476   American Behavioral Scientist

Table 2
Shootings Involving Multiple Fatalities on College
Campuses in the United States, 1990–2008
Date School Shooter, Age Role at School

November 1, 1991 University of Iowa Gang Lu, 28 Graduate student

December 14, 1992 Simon’s Rock College Wayne Lo, 18 Undergraduate student
January 26, 1995 University of North Wendell Williamson, 26 Former law student
Carolina
August 15, 1996 San Diego State University Frederick Davidson, 36 Graduate student
June 28, 2000 University of Washington Jan Chen, 42 Medical student
August 28, 2000 University of Arkansas James Easton Kelly, 36 Former graduate
student
May 17, 2001 Pacific Lutheran University Donald Cowan, 55 None
January 16, 2002 Appalachian School of Law Peter Odighizuwa, 42 Former law student
October 28, 2002 University of Arizona Robert Flores, 40 Nursing student
September 2, 2006 Shepherd University Douglas Pennington, 49 Parent of students
April 16, 2007 Virginia Tech Seung-Hui Cho, 23 Undergraduate student
February 8, 2008 Louisiana Tech University Latina Williams, 23 Undergraduate student
February 14, 2008 Northern Illinois University Steven Kazmierczak, 27 Former graduate
student
October 26, 2008 University of Central Four suspects None
Arkansas

in which a student’s dignity and entire sense of self-worth are on the line, with
nothing left to lose.
In light of these conditions, Fox (2008c) has advanced the following set of recommen-
dations for universities, particularly those with sizable graduate student populations:

• With a thorough system of assessment for academic progress, be prepared to with-

draw students whose chance of success in a reasonable amount of time appears
remote.
• Train faculty members to deal effectively with problem students and to be aware of
the appropriate limits of their power over the lives of students. Assessments of
student-faculty interactions need not be limited to just course evaluations.
• Encourage and support graduate student organizations that focus beyond academic
and professional matters. Strive not to set unreasonable expectations for graduate
and professional students that would force them to abandon or ignore other impor-
tant aspects of their lives.
• Ensure that graduate and professional students have adequate mental health insurance
coverage. These students may be especially in need of access to counseling services
through an on-campus facility or a contractual arrangement with an outside provider.

These recommendations, although designed to reduce the risk of a violent episode,

are smart and appropriate steps to take regardless. They will potentially enhance the
well-being of countless students.
 Fox, Savage / Mass Murder Goes to College   1477

Conclusion

Despite the development of impractical and sometimes counterproductive

changes, the heightened levels of fear on American college campuses, although
sometimes out of proportion with reality, have also motivated some important and
long-overdue changes that carry wide-ranging impact. Concerns that “Virginia Tech
could happen here” have brought a renewed and much-needed focus on mental
health services. These kinds of resources have been lacking, even though, in sharp
contrast to the low risk of random shootings, the risk for suicide and alcohol-related
deaths through incidents such as binge drinking continues to be relatively high
(Hingson, Heeren, Winter, & Wechsler, 2005). Rather than focusing on these “not
my son or daughter” concerns, however, many parents instead obsess about Virginia
Tech–type shootings.
In the year following the extraordinarily tragic event at Virginia Tech, one third
of campus counseling centers nationwide added at least one new staff member, and
15% have had their budgets enhanced (see Farrell, 2008). But apparently there is still
much more room for needed improvement. The International Association of
Counseling Services prescribes that colleges maintain a student-counselor ratio of
1,500 to 1. Yet, based on 2007 figures, the national average is almost 2,000 to 1
(Farrell, 2008).
Also, the concept of “student centeredness” should be seen as more than just
words. Although it may not be possible to single out the would-be avengers for
special consideration, be it benevolent or punitive, a move toward improving the
level of respect afforded all members of the university community will go a long
way to enhance the campus climate and the well-being of large numbers of students
and staff members.
Finally, promoting effective interactions with students should be a goal for
more than just student services providers. Schools should ensure that faculty and
administrators do not abuse their power over the lives and careers of students
(graduate students in particular) as well as colleagues. This extends to grading
issues, disciplinary matters, and advising roles, as well as mentoring and assessment
of faculty colleagues.
In conclusion, there are many important changes that have taken place in the
wake of the Virginia Tech massacre. Emphasizing student centeredness and upgrading
student services, including but not limited to counseling resources, will go a long
way to enhance the well-being of countless numbers of college students everywhere.
These are the right things to do, even if done for the wrong reasons.
Of course, no matter how diligent and responsible academic and police/safety
officials are in improving violence prevention and security, there can be no absolute
guarantee that a tragedy like Virginia Tech will not recur. If any prospective
student—undergraduate or graduate—requires 100% assurance of safety at school,
then the only recourse might just be an online degree.
 Appendix

1478  
Recommendations From Existing Reports on Campus Violence
U. U. VA VA
Rep. of of Tech Work
Recommendation AGs COPS Exp. FL IACLEA IL KY MO NJ NM NSU NC OK PA Pres. CA NC Panel Grp WI Percentage

Create an all-hazards • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 95
   Emergency Response Plan
Adopt an emergency mass • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 95
   notification and
   communications system
Establish multidisciplinary • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 80
   team to respond to crises
   (e.g., Threat
   Assessment Team)
Train personnel regarding • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 80
   privacy matter related to
   FERPA and HIPAA
Have a MOU with local • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 75
   health agencies and other
   key partners in
   the community
Practice/train for • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 75
   emergency plans
Educate and train students, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 70
   faculty, and staff about
   mass notification system,
   and their roles/responsibilities
   in an emergency
Educate faculty, staff, and • • • • • • • • • • • • 60
   students about recognizing
   and responding to signs of
   mental illness and other
   potential threats
Conduct risk and • • • • • • • • • • • • 60
   safety assessments

(continued)
 Appendix (continued)
U. U. VA VA
Rep. of of Tech Work
Recommendation AGs COPS Exp. FL IACLEA IL KY MO NJ NM NSU NC OK PA Pres. CA NC Panel Grp WI Percentage

Have an interoperable • • • • • • • • • • • 55
   communication system
   with all area responders
Ensure that all responder • • • • • • • • • • 50
   agencies are trained in
   National Incident
   Management System and
   Incident Command System
Regularly update • • • • • • • • • 45
   emergency plans
Provide on-campus counseling • • • • • • • • 40
Maintain full compliance • • • • • • • • 40
   with Clery Act
Install cameras/closed-circuit • • • • • • • 35
   TV at building entrances/
   exits and other critical areas
Create a culture of shared • • • • • • • 35
   responsibility for campus safety
Get public safety agency • • • • • • • 35
   accredited through CALEA
   [APPENDIX: PLEASE
   DEFINE CALEA.] and/or
   IACLEA
Establish protocol for identifying • • • • • • 30
   and responding to students
   who may pose potential threat
Address alcohol and drug abuse • • • • • • 30
   and other major issues
   on campus
Designate point of contact for • • • • • • 30
   external communication
   during/after emergency

(continued)

1479
 Appendix (continued)

1480  
U. U. VA VA
Rep. of of Tech Work
Recommendation AGs COPS Exp. FL IACLEA IL KY MO NJ NM NSU NC OK PA Pres. CA NC Panel Grp WI Percentage

Attempt to eliminate financial, • • • • • • 30

   cultural, and logistical barriers
   to students receiving mental
   health treatment (e.g.,
   sufficient staff, insurance, etc.)
Utilize Crime Prevention • • • • • 25
   through Environmental
   Design (CPTED)
Develop and keep updated policy • • • • • 25
   on bringing weapons
   on campus
Install locking systems in all • • • • • 25
   buildings, offices
   and classrooms
Conduct regular table- • • • • • 25
   top exercises
Regularly test mass • • • • • 25
   notification system
Secure buildings with keyless • • • • • 25
   locking devices (such as
   automated cards) that can
   be controlled remotely
Provide services for victims • • • • • 25
   and/or families of victims
Maintain up-to-date emergency • • • • • 25
   contact information for
   students and/or employees
Develop an active shooter • • • • 20
   response plan and provide
   training for police

(continued)
 Appendix (continued)
U. U. VA VA
Rep. of of Tech Work
Recommendation AGs COPS Exp. FL IACLEA IL KY MO NJ NM NSU NC OK PA Pres. CA NC Panel Grp WI Percentage

Train mental health personnel • • • • 20

   and first responders on
   requirements for involuntary
   hospitalization, treatment,
   and withdrawal
Ensure all physical safety • • • • 20
   mechanisms (locks, etc.),
   emergency call-boxes, and
   emergency lights are functional
Establish a hotline or some other • • • • 20
   mechanism for
   anonymous reporting
Conduct criminal background • • • 15
   checks for faculty, staff,
   and/or students
Develop contingency plans for • • • 15
   loss of power and
   telecommunications
Establish an Emergency • • • 15
   Operations Center
Ensure that campus is well-lit • • • 15
   and/or provide
   emergency lighting
Ensure that all outside first • • 10
   responders have campus maps
Develop messages to • • 10
   de-stigmatize mental illness
Use International Association of • • 10
   Counseling Services (IACS)
   guidelines for best practices in
   mental health services
Purchase satellite phones • • 10

(continued)

   1481
 Appendix (continued)

1482  
U. U. VA VA
Rep. of of Tech Work
Recommendation AGs COPS Exp. FL IACLEA IL KY MO NJ NM NSU NC OK PA Pres. CA NC Panel Grp WI Percentage

Create campus safety resource/ • • 10

   info website
Provide EMT/first-responder/ • • 10
   crisis intervention training for
   campus safety officers
Have campus police/security • • 10
   provide information about
   safety and mental health
   services during orientation
Equip classrooms with locking • • 10
   devices allowing them to be
   secured from within
Establish system to track and • 5
   communicate with campus
   members who disperse during
   an emergency
Expand opportunities for • 5
   incoming students to integrate
   into campus community
Place campus on lockdown in the • 5
   event of threatening conduct
   on or near campus
Equip all classrooms with • 5
   telephones and/or panic buttons
Encourage all incoming students • 5
   living in residence halls to
   consent to periodic searches
   and seizures
Ensure that all entrance/exit gates • 5
   are manned 24 hours a day

(continued)
 Appendix (continued)
U. U. VA VA
Rep. of of Tech Work
Recommendation AGs COPS Exp. FL IACLEA IL KY MO NJ NM NSU NC OK PA Pres. CA NC Panel Grp WI Percentage

Prepare mass notification • 5

   messages in advance for all
   identified potential threats
Inform students and employees • 5
   on locations of safe areas for
   waiting out emergency
Add “Intro to Mental Health” • 5
   course to undergraduate
   curriculum
Have employee • 5
   assistance programs
Maintain photographs • 5
   of all students
Institute program to end violence • 5
   against women

Source: AGs: Report and Recommendations of Task Force on School and Campus Safety, National Association of Attorneys General, 2007. COPS: National Summit on Campus Public Safety: Strategies for
Colleges and Universities in a Homeland Security Environment; COPS, 2005. Exp: Expecting the Unexpected: Lessons From the Virginia Tech Tragedy; American Association of State Colleges and
Universities, 2007. FL: Gubernatorial Task Force for University Campus Safety, State of Florida, 2007. IACLEA: Overview of the Virginia Tech Tragedy and Implications for Campus Safety: The IACLEA
Blueprint for Safer Campuses; The International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA), 2008. IL: State of Illinois Campus Security Task Force Report to the Governor, 2008.
KY: Report to the Governor: Examination of Safety and Security at Kentucky’s Public and Private Postsecondary Institutions; Governor’s Task Force on Campus Safety, 2007. MO: Securing our Future:
Making Colleges and Universities Safe Places to Learn and Grow; Missouri Campus Security Task Force, 2007. NJ: New Jersey Campus Security Task Force Report Submitted to Governor Jon S. Corzine,
2007. NM: (1) Recommendations for Action: Emergency Preparedness in Higher Education; New Mexico Governor’s Task Force on Campus Safety, 2007; (2) Final Report, Subcommittee on Mitigation,
Protocols, and Infrastructure, New Mexico Governor’s Task Force on Campus Safety, 2008. NSU: Campus Safety and Security Task Force Final Report, Norfolk State University, 2007. NC: Report to the
Campus Safety Task Force Presented to Attorney General Roy Cooper, North Carolina, 2008. OK: Campus Life and Safety and Security Task Force (CLASS) Final Report, Oklahoma, 2008. PA: Pennsylvania
College Campus Security Assessment Report; Pennsylvania State Police, 2007. Rep. to Pres.: Report to the President: On Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy; Leavitt, Gonzales, & Spellings, 2007. U.
of CA: The Report of the University of California Campus Security Task Force; University of California Office of the President, 2008. U. of NC: The University of North Carolina Campus Safety Task Force
Report to the President, 2007. VA Tech Panel: Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, Report of the Review Panel Presented to Governor Kaine, Commonwealth of Virginia, 2007. VA Work Grp: Findings and
Recommendations of the Virginia Working Group for Virginia Tech President Charles Steger, 2007. WI: Governor’s Task Force on Campus Safety, Wisconsin, 2007.

  1483
1484   American Behavioral Scientist

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James Alan Fox is The Lipman Family Professor of Criminal Justice and Professor of Law, Policy and
Society at Northeastern University. He has written seventeen books, including a forthcoming volume,
Violence and Security on Campus: From Pre-School to Post-Grad. He has also published dozens of
journal and magazine articles, primarily in the areas of multiple murder, juvenile crime, school violence,
workplace violence, and capital punishment. Among these are several recent articles in The Chronicle of
Higher Education on the topic of campus shootings. Finally, he has served in an advisory role for both
state and federal officials, including President Clinton and Attorney General Reno, on issues of school
violence and safety.

Jenna Savage is a doctoral candidate in criminology and justice policy at Northeastern University. Her
dissertation research explores how gender differences in socialization can lead to subsequent differences
in criminal and deviant behavior. She is also the special projects manager for Applied Risk Management
(ARM), LLC. She is a coauthor of the book The Handbook for Campus Threat Assessment and
Management Teams and also coauthored the report Campus Violence Prevention and Response: Best
Practices for Massachusetts Higher Education.

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