CASE NAME AND CITATION

R. v Kenneth Joseph Roberts [1971] EWCA Crim 4, (1972) 56 Cr. App. R. 95.

COURT AND JUDGES

Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Lord Justice Stephenson, Mr. Justice Thompson and Mr.
Justice Bridge.

PARTIES
Appellant: Kenneth Joseph Roberts. Respondent: Crown.

MATERIAL FACTS
The defendant stopped his car, assaulted the victim (his passenger) by trying to remove her
clothing forcibly (at 96).
The victim rejected his advances and he drove off at speed (at 96).
Whilst driving, the defendant threatened the victim and assaulted her again (at 96).
The victim jumped out of the moving vehicle, which caused her to suffer from some concussion,
grazing and was hospitalised for three days (at 97).

QUESTION OF LAW/ ISSUES

The issues before the court are:
(i) whether the defendant was responsible in law and in fact for the victim’s injuries caused by
her escaping from the defendant (Stephenson L.J. at 99), and if so, (ii) whether the victim’s act of
jumping out of the defendant’s car sufficient to break the chain of causation between the
defendant’s assaults and the injuries sustained by the victim (Stephenson L.J. at 102) (iii) whether
the defendant should be liable for the victim’s injuries if he did not foresee the consequence
(Stephenson L.J. at 101). (iv) Additionally, whether there was any misdirection by the trial judge
to the jury (ibid).

DECISION
The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed the defendant’s appeal against conviction and
upheld His Honour Judge David, Q.C. 's decision of directing the jury to convict upon accepting
the victim’s evidence (Stephenson L.J. at 103).

DETAILED REASONS FOR THE DECISION

The court dismissed the defendant’s appeal. Thus, his conviction of Section 47 Offences Against
the Person Act 1861 was upheld (at 103). The court relied on the case of Beech (1912) 7 Cr. App.
R. 197 as authority (Stephenson L.J. at 101 and 102). In this case, the Court of Criminal Appeal
supported the directions by the trial judge: (i) whether the defendant's conduct possesses a
threat of harming the victim, and subsequently (ii) whether the victim’s act of jumping out of the
window was related to the defendant’s conduct, hence (iii) whether the grievous bodily harm
suffered by the victim through that act was a result of the defendant’s conduct. Darling J. in Beech
(1912) concluded that the victim’s action “was a very likely thing” and thus foreseeable as a
“natural consequence” of the “threats of a man who was conducting himself as this man
indisputably was.”

In R. v Kenneth Joseph Roberts, on appeal, the counsel submitted that in order for the defendant
to be liable (at 98) for the victim’s actual bodily harm or grievous bodily harm (Stephenson L.J. at
102), the prosecution must prove that the defendant could foresee the victim’s action of jumping
out the vehicle and the consequences of doing so (at 98). However, with the decision in Beech
(1912) 7 Cr. App. R. 197 as the law, the court eventually rejected this submission. In fact, the
proper test should be: whether the victim’s injury was something that could have been
reasonably foreseen as a natural consequence of the defendant’s actions (Stephenson L.J. at
102)? If it is foreseeable by a reasonable man, then the chain of causation between the assault
and injury is not broken.

The court then mentions that this chain of causation could only be broken if the victim’s actions
was so “daft” or unanticipated that no reasonable man could have foreseen it (Stephenson L.J.
at 102). If this occurred, then the victim’s injury was not caused by the defendant’s words or
actions but occasioned by the victim’s voluntary act (ibid). However, in this case, the court ruled
that the victim’s acts were not so unexpected and her action was foreseeable by a reasonable
man. Hence, the chain of causation is not broken (at 103).

Overall, the trial judge, His Honour Judge David, Q.C. was not wrong in his approach to direct the
jury to convict if they thought the victim’s act had been a natural consequence of the defendant’s
conduct. The jury was directed to consider if the defendant’s assault led to actual bodily harm,
or taking the submissions of the appellant’s counsel that the defendant did not expect her to act
in that manner, with the exception of the influence of alcohol or her anger at him. Given that the
proper test for causation is the law, the trial judge was not wrong to direct the jury that upon
acceptance to the victim’s evidence, they have to be satisfied that the motive of the victim
jumping out of the moving vehicle was to escape the defendant, which was induced directly by
his verbal threats and his actions. In other words, accepting the victim’s evidence would make
him responsible in fact and in law for her injuries due to his conduct and that the victim’s act did
not break the chain of causation (at 103).

RATIO DECIDENDI
It does not matter if the defendant could not foresee the result of the victim’s actions as a natural
consequence of his conduct. The victim’s actions will break the chain of causation only when the
victim does something so “daft” that it ‘could not reasonably be foreseen’ by any reasonable man
(Stephenson L.J. at 102).

(880 words)