G.R. No.

182842 September 04, 2019

PCI LEASING & FINANCE, INC., PETITIONER,
V.
SPOUSES JAMES D. GUTIERREZ AND CATHERINE R. GUTIERREZ, RESPONDENTS.

Facts:
Capitol Allied Trading & Transport (Capitol Allied) is a single proprietorship owned by the spouses Dante
R. Gutierrez and Lourdes D. Gutierrez (spouses Gutierrez), the parents of spouses James Gutierrez and
Catherine Gutierrez (spouses James and Catherine). Beginning December 14, 1999, the spouses
Gutierrez obtained loans in the total amount of P48,246,000.00 from PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc. (PCI
Leasing), covered by Promissory Notes. To secure the payment of their loan obligations, the spouses
Gutierrez mortgaged to PCI Leasing several real properties. When the spouses Gutierrez defaulted in the
payment of their obligations, PCI Leasing extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages. As a result, the
Quezon City properties were sold at a public auction held on July 30, 2003, while the San Juan property
was sold on July 31, 2003. The certificates of sale covering the properties were then issued to PCI
Leasing as the highest bidder and were subsequently annotated on the titles. On October 15, 2003, PCI
Leasing allowed the spouses Gutierrez to sell their properties located in San Fernando, Pampanga which
were also mortgaged to PCI Leasing. Thus, for P14,500,000.00, said properties were sold to spouses
Andy Paredes and Wendy Paredes. The proceeds of the sale were applied to the spouses Gutierrez's
outstanding balance. As of December 12, 2003, therefore, the unpaid balance of the spouses Gutierrez
was reduced to P13,993,047.14, which was secured by chattel mortgages on their personal properties.
On March 25, 2004, the spouses Gutierrez wrote to PCI Leasing requesting, among others, the release of
the real estate mortgages on the Quezon City and San Juan properties. They believed that the
application of payment amounted to a redemption of the properties. PCI Leasing, however, did not
immediately reply to the letter-request. Subsequently, PCI Leasing filed a complaint against the spouses
Gutierrez in the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 105. Plaintiff PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc. (PCILF) and
defendants Spouses Dante Gutierrez and Lourdes Gutierrez, with the assistance of their respective
counsel, submitted a joint motion for judgment based on a compromise of agreement. The CA held that
although the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was to be heard ex parte and its issuance
was ministerial, it was equally true that the issuance of the writ may be stayed due to compelling
reasons. It declared that the trial court could not brush aside the spouses Gutierrez's credible showing of
a redemption of the Quezon City properties within the one-year period from the registration of the
certificate of sale through the application of payment effected on October 27, 2003. The spouses
Gutierrez moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
November 10, 2011. Aggrieved by the conflicting CA decisions, the spouses Gutierrez and PCI Leasing
filed before the Court their respective Petitions for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not PCI leasing is entitled to a writ of possession despite the spouses Gutierrez's claim of
redemption.

Ruling:
No. As a general rule, the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function of the court
In extrajudicial foreclosures, a writ of possession may be issued either within the redemption period; or
after the lapse of the redemption period. The first instance is based on a privilege provided under
Section 7 of Act No. 3135; the second is based on the purchaser's right of ownership. Thus, as a general
rule, the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial function of the
court, which cannot be enjoined or restrained, even by the filing of a civil case for the declaration of
nullity of the foreclosure and consequent auction sale. Exceptions to the rule that issuance of a writ of
possession is a ministerial function but none are present in this case for it to be grounded on the
exceptions. Issues concerning the sufficiency of the evidence presented to support the claim of
redemption should be threshed out in a separate action instituted for the purpose. The rule remains
that in petitions for the issuance of a writ of possession, the judge need not look into the validity of the
mortgages or the manner of their foreclosure. In the same manner, when the mortgagor claims
redemption, the judge is not mandated to determine whether the payment satisfies the obligation
secured by the foreclosed property. Hence, in accordance with the ministerial duty of the trial courts to
issue writs of possession and given that the issue of redemption is heavily disputed, the general rule
should apply and the writs of possession should issue as a matter of course. To reiterate, the ruling in
this case is not a final determination of the veracity of the spouses Gutierrez's claim of redemption. The
resolution of such issue is left to the sound discretion of the trial courts where the actions for
nullification of foreclosure, certificate of sale, and title and for reconveyance of the properties are
pending.
G.R. No. L-50054 August 17, 1988
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESIDENTS OF BAESA, CALOOCAN CITY, respondents.

Facts:
This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the order of the Intermediate Appellate Court which denied
the petitioner's motion to dismiss the respondent's appeal on the ground that the petitioner failed to
include a notice of hearing in its motion and the subsequent order which denied the motion to
reconsider the earlier order. Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation (Eternal Gardens)
applied for a certificate of clearance from the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), to operate
a memorial park at the former site of the Philippine Union College in Baesa, Caloocan City, Metro
Manila. The private respondents, Residents of Baesa opposed the application on the ground that the
project would cause pollution of water resources in the area. While hearings were being conducted by
the NPCC, the petitioner allowed an interment to take place in its cemetery. The private respondents
filed a telegram complaint with the NPCC requesting the latter to investigate and look into the legality of
the said interment, The complaint was incorporated with the original application for clearance filed by
the petitioner. Upon a finding that the objections raised by the respondents were not without remedy
and that the project had been approved by the Metro Manila Commission, the Regional Health Office
No. 4 and the Mayor of the City of Caloocan, the NPCC issued an order granting the petitioner a
certificate of clearance to operate a memorial park at Baesa, Caloocan City subject to the conditions set.
On May 4, 1978, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On August 22, 1978, the NPCC
denied the motion. However, it imposed a fine of P1,000.00 on the petitioner for causing an interment
to take place without any prior permit from the NPCC. On September 8, 1978, the respondents filed a
notice of appeal and an ex-parte urgent motion for extension of time to file appeal or petition for review
with the appellate court praying for an extension of thirty (30) days to perfect the appeal. The docket
fee, however, was paid only on October 2, 1978. In a resolution dated October 4, 1978, the appellate
court granted the respondents' motion, subject to the conditions that the same is filed within the
reglementary period and that the decision sought to be reviewed is appealable. Thereafter, the
respondents filed the corresponding appeal. On November 21, 1978, the petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the same was filed out of time. The respondents filed a motion to
expunge from the records the petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that the latter failed to state
the time and place for hearing in violation of sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The
appellate court granted the respondents' motion on January 10, 1979. The petitioner moved to
reconsider the court's order but the same was denied on February 8, 1979. On April 5, 1979, the
appellate court issued another resolution granting the petitioner's motion to dismiss the respondents'
appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time. In view of the aforementioned dismissal of the
appeal, the petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw the petition for certiorari filed
before this Court on the ground that it had become moot and academic.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents' appeal was timely submitted to the appellate court and should be resolved
on the merits.
Whether or not the said court had jurisdiction to issue motu proprio its resolutions.
Ruling:
No. It was not timely. It is clear from the above-quoted order that as far as the respondents are
concemed there was no amendment of the NPCC's previous orders which would justify the running
anew of the period to appeal. The only modification found in the order did not pertain to the
respondents but to the petitioner which was fined for allowing an illegal interment. The respondents
cannot allege that the order of August 22, 1978 was more adverse to them since it was the petitioner
which was fined. After the denial of the respondents' motion for reconsideration, they only had one day
to perfect their appeal which was on August 26, 1978. Therefore, their filing of an appeal on September
8, 1978 was definitely out of time. Even assuming arguendo that the fifteen (15) day period to appeal
started anew on August 25, 1978, the day when respondents received the order of August 22, 1978, still
their appeal was perfected out of time since the perfection of the same should be reckoned not from
the filing of the notice of appeal but from the payment of docketing fees. The respondents paid the
docket fees only on October 2, 1978. In as much as the respondents' appeal was perfected out of time,
the appellate court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. Consequently, its appealed orders before this
Court and all other orders it issued with regard to the present case are null and void. We have carefully
examined the records for any substantial considerations of equity which might warrant different
conclusions on the basic merits of the main case. We have found none.

Yes. It had jurisdiction. With regard to the jurisdiction of the appellate court in issuing the resolutions
dated March 27 and April 5, 1979 respectively, the petitioner argues that since it filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 which means that such a petition is a special civil action, the appellate court did
not lose its jurisdiction to correct interlocutory orders that may have been issued erroneously. On the
other hand, the respondents maintain that while under the Rules of Court, courts may amend, modify or
revoke any decision or order promulgated by them, such power of authority is not absolute. They state
that among the limitations thereof are when a judgment has become final and when an appeal has been
interposed on time. Accordingly, while it is true that what is pending in the present case is neither a final
judgment nor an appeal by certiorari, the effect thereof would be the same. Therefore, out of respect
and courtesy for the higher court, the lower court should have suspended all pending proceedings in the
elevated case as even without any restraining order, the lower court had lost jurisdiction to further act
on the case. Although this Court did not issue any restraining order against the Intermediate Appellate
Court to prevent it from taking any action with regard to its resolutions respectively granting
respondents' motion to expunge from the records the petitioner's motion to discuss and denying the
latter's motion to reconsider such, order, upon learning of the petition, the appellate court should have
refrained from ruling thereon because its jurisdiction was necessarily limited upon the filing of a petition
for certiorari with this Court questioning the propriety of the issuance of the above-mentioned
resolutions. Due respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations should have
prompted the appellate court to wait for the final determination of the petition before taking
cognizance of the case and trying to render moot exactly what was before this court.
G.R. No. 190253 June 11, 2014
JUAN TRAJANO a.k.a. JOHNNY TRAJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB, Respondent.

Facts:
Uniwide documented a grievance to have a fair amount of money returned of the all out worth of
misdelivered, unsaleable, deficient or potentially harmed products, and to enjoin Golden Sea and
Trajano from encashing the leftover post-dated checks in their control. The grumbling, docketed as Civil
Case No. 05-0265, was pooled to RTC of Parañaque Branch 274, which was directed by Judge Fortunito
Madrona. On August11, 2005, the RTC gave a writ of fundamental directive restricting Golden Sea and
Trajano from encashing the postdated checks.Trajano moved to reevaluate the issuance of the writ for
absence of verifiable basis. On December 22, 2005, the RTC gave an order sustaining the issuance of the
writ of starter directive. On January 11, 2006,Golden Sea and Trajano independently moved for the
deliberate restraint of Judge Madrona for his supposed predisposition towards Uniwide. On February
15, 2006, Judge Madrona recused himself from the case, yet Uniwide moved to rethink his deliberate
restraint. From there on, the case was re-pooled to the RTC of Parañaque Branch 195, which was
directed by Judge Aida Estrella Macapagal. Uniwide challenged the re-wagering of the case because of
its forthcoming movement for reexamination of Judge Madrona's intentional inhibition. On June 30,
2006, Judge Madrona denied Uniwide's movement for reevaluation and the records of the case were
thusly moved to Branch 195. On March 17, 2006, Trajano recorded an appeal for certiorari with petition
for the issuance of a transitory limiting request and a writ of starter directive docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
93492before the CA. In his request, Trajano sought to break up the writ ordering him from encashing
the post-dated checks. On January 22, 2008, the CA broke up the writ of preliminary order as for Trajano
for absence of verifiable premise. The CA held that Uniwide neglected to demonstrate that it had a clear
and obvious right to be safeguarded that warrants the issuance of the writ. This choice ultimately
became last and passage of judgment was made on February 27, 2008. On August 28, 2006, Uniwide
attacked Judge Madrona's hindrance from the situation in an appeal for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 95885 preceding the CA. Uniwide contended that Judge Madrona's apparent predisposition in
support of its was unwarranted, and that the safeguarding of the gatherings' trust and certainty was a
deficient ground for Judge Madrona's hindrance. The RTC held that the issue of whether Judge Madrona
ought to hear Civil Case No. 05-0265 introduced a jurisdictional inquiry that forestalled Branch 195 from
settling Trajano's forthcoming movements. Henceforth, Trajano recorded a request for certiorari
attacking the sets of the RTC before the CA. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101815. The CA
maintained the RTC decisions conceding the goal of Trajano's movements and suspending the
procedures in Civil Case No. 05-0265 during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 95885. The CA decided that
legal graciousness provoked the RTC to anticipate the last assurance of CA-G.R. SP No. 95885 preceding
taking awareness of Trajano's movements and going on with the procedures in Civil Case No. 05-
0265.35In the current appeal, Trajano demands that the RTC ought to settle on his forthcoming
movements since the legitimacy of an adjudicator's restraint doesn't decide the RTC's purview over the
topic of the case. He calls attention to that locale is vested in the court, not in its branch or in the
appointed authority directing the case. Trajano likewise thinks that whether Judge Madrona accurately
recused himself from the case only includes the activity of purview, not of ward itself. Trajano further
affirms that the CA mistakenly applied the guideline of legal politeness since the demeanor of his
movements before the RTC wouldn't deliver the legitimacy of Judge Madrona's intentional restraint
unsettled.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition lacks proper verification.
Whether or not the petition availed of the proper remedy in appealing the CA decision.

Ruling:
The petition has partly merit as the records of the case show that the appeal's confirmation page
contains Trajano's skilled proof of personality. Trajano's inability to outfit Uniwide a duplicate of the
appeal containing his skillful proof of personality is a minor blunder that this Court may and decides to
disregard in light of a legitimate concern for significant equity. In these cases, the standards of
methodology ought not be applied in an exceptionally specialized sense when it nullifies the point, for
which it had been authorized, i.e., to guarantee the efficient, just and quick regulation of cases.

Yes. The request isn't procedurally weak in light of the fact that Trajano appropriately benefited of a
Rule 45 request in pouncing upon the January 3, 2008 choice and the October 28, 2009 goal of the Court
of Appeals A request for survey on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court conjures the Court's
investigative locale over inquiries of regulation that has been chosen by the lower courts with
conclusion. The CA choice attacked by the current request includes its last request in regards to the
supposed grave maltreatment of attentiveness engaged with the RTC's interlocutory orders. This CA
choice ought not be mistaken for the RTC's interlocutory orders that had been questioned before the
CA, which was accurately challenged by Trajano through an appeal for certiorari. Along these lines,
Trajano accurately recorded an appeal for certiorari before the CA to strike down the RTC's interlocutory
orders that he professes to have been given with grave maltreatment of attentiveness. Along these
lines, Trajano's current appeal for survey on certiorari is additionally the appropriate cure, as it
questions the CA's last request in regards to the RTC's interlocutory orders.
G.R. No. 232189 March 7, 2018
ALEX RAUL B. BLAY, Petitioner
vs.
CYNTHIA B. BANA, Respondent

Facts:
The petitioner Alex Raul Blay documented before the Pasay City RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage, on the grounds of his mental insufficiency in accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code.
Respondent Cynthia B. Bana accordingly recorded her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim dated.
Afterward, candidate documented a Motion to Withdraw the objection, and in her remark/resistance to
the equivalent, respondent conjured Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, asking that her
counterclaims be announced as staying for the court's autonomous settlement. Candidate recorded his
answer, guaranteeing that respondent's counterclaims are banned from being arraigned in a similar
activity because of her inability to document an appearance therefor in the span of fifteen days from
notice of the Motion to Withdraw; solicitor asserted that respondent had gotten the Motion on March
11, 2015, yet just documented their resistance on March 30 or after 19 days. The RTC allowed the
Motion to Withdraw request, and conceded the respondent's counterclaim "as staying for free
settlement," and later denied the solicitor's documented movement for reevaluation against the choice
to allow the counterclaim to remain. Applicant then documented a request for certiorari before the CA,
which denied the said appeal and ensuing movement for reevaluation. The CA decided that it tracked
down no grave maltreatment of circumspection with respect to the RTC, holding that under Section 2,
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, assuming a counterclaim has been recorded by the litigant before the
assistance upon him of the candidate's movement for excusal, the excusal will be restricted to the
grumbling. Thus the ongoing request before the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC’s decision and orders.

Ruling:
Yes. Under Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court assuming a counterclaim has been argued by the
respondent preceding the help upon him of the offended party's movement for the excusal - as for this
situation - the standard is that the excusal will be restricted to the protest. An excusal of an activity is
not the same as a simple excusal of the grumbling. Hence, since just the objection and not the activity is
excused, the litigant inspite of said excusal may in any case indict his counterclaim in a similar activity.
Notwithstanding, the third sentence of Section 2, Rule 17, further adds that "assuming the respondent
cravings to arraign his counterclaim in a similar activity, he is expected to record a sign in something like
fifteen days from notice of the movement. Any other way, his counterclaim might be arraigned in a
different activity. In the ongoing case, the CA restricted the use of Section 2, Rule 17 to the second
sentence which expresses that "excusal will be restricted to the grumbling. Nonetheless, the CA
overlooked the third sentence, require the litigant to show his inclination to indict the counterclaim in
similar activity in the span of 15 days from the notification of the movement.
G.R. No. 219309 November 22, 2017
ANGELINA CHUA and HEIRS OF JOSE MA. CHENG SING PHUAN, Petitioners
vs.
SPOUSES SANTIAGO CHENG AND AVELINA SIHIYON, Respondents

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision
dated November 27, 2014 and Resolution dated May 25, 2015 issued by the Court of Appeals. Jose Ma.
Cheng Sing Phuan Santiago Cheng, and Petra Cheng Sing are siblings. The records show that Jose,
Santiago, and Petra are the registered owners of two parcels of land situated in Iloilo City, covered by
Transfer Certificates. On these lands stands a rice mill housing several pieces of milling equipment, also
in the name of the Cheng siblings. Santiago, together with his wife, Avelina Sihiyon sent Jose and his
wife Angelina several written and verbal demands for the physical partition of the Iloilo Lands, the rice
mill and the equipment therein. As their repeated demands were left unheeded, Respondents filed a
complaint against Jose and Angelina for partition and damages before the RTC. In their Answer, Jose and
Angelina averred that they advanced the funds necessary for the acquisition of the Disputed Properties,
and that Santiago and Petra failed to reimburse them for the cost of their respective shares.11 On such
basis, Jose and Angelina argued that Santiago, Petra, and their respective spouses do not possess any
right to demand the partition of the Disputed Properties. After submission of the parties' pre-trial briefs
and the conduct of a pre-trial conference, Judge Cedrick O. Ruiz, then Presiding Judge of the RTC, issued
a Pre-Trial Order. During the hearing held on January 16, 2008, Petitioners orally manifested in open
court that they would be presenting six additional witnesses in place of Petra, and sought leave for this
purpose. These additional witnesses were not among those listed in the Pre-Trial Order, nor were they
identified in Jose's Pre-Trial Brief. Respondents opposed, and later filed their written objection. In the
interim, Judge Maniba assumed the position of Presiding Judge of the RTC. On January 27, 2012, Judge
Maniba issued the RTC Resolution denying Petitioners' oral motion. Petitioners subsequently filed an
MR, which Judge Maniba also denied in the RTC Order dated June 13, 2012. Aggrieved, Petitioners filed
the CA Petition. Petitioners asserted that Jose, through counsel, reserved the right to present additional
witnesses in his Pre-Trial Brief. By completely ignoring such reservation made by Jose prior to his death,
Petitioners averred that Judge Maniba committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. On November 27, 2014, the CA issued the Assailed Decision dismissing the CA Petition for
lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred when it affirmed the RTC Resolution and Order denying Petitioners' oral
motion to present witnesses not listed in the Pre-Trial Order.

Ruling:
No. The Petition should be denied for lack of merit. The Court finds no ascribable error on the part of the
CA in affirming the RTC Resolution and Order, as these issuances merely enforce the rules governing pre-
trial. Paragraph (A)(2)(d) of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC does not apply. Petitioners assert that the rigid
application of the rules governing pre-trial will curtail the truth and frustrate the ends of justice at their
expense. Petitioners' reliance on the purported exception under paragraph A(2)(d) is misplaced. As its
introductory phrase clearly indicates, paragraph A(2) enumerates the matters which parties are required
to state in the pre-trial brief. Since paragraph A(2) does not prescribe rules on admissibility and
presentation of evidence, it should not be interpreted in this manner. In addition, paragraph (A)(2)(d)
refers to documentary and object evidence, and not testimonial evidence, which, in turn, are treated
separately under paragraph (A)(2)(f).38 Accordingly, the scope of the specific exception under paragraph
A(2)(d) should not be unduly extended to cover testimonial evidence. Even assuming, arguendo, that the
exception under paragraph A(2)(d) may be invoked as basis to allow the presentation of witnesses not
listed in the pre-trial order, its application remains contingent upon a showing of good cause sufficient
to justify the same. Petitioners attempted to satisfy this condition by citing special and extraordinary
circumstances which they claim should have impelled the RTC to allow the presentation of their
additional witnesses. The rules governing pre-trial remain controlling in this case. The importance of
pre-trial in civil cases cannot be overemphasized. Time and again, this Court has recognized "the
importance of pre-trial procedure as a means of facilitating the disposal of cases by simplifying or
limiting the issues and avoiding unnecessary proof of facts at the trial. The need for strict adherence to
the rules on pre-trial thus proceeds from its significant role in the litigation process. This is not to say,
however, that the rules governing pre-trial should be, at all times, applied in absolute terms. While
faithful compliance with these rules is undoubtedly desirable, they may be relaxed in cases where their
application would frustrate, rather than facilitate, the ends of justice. The relaxation of these rules,
however, is contingent upon a showing of compelling and persuasive reasons to justify the same. It is
the Court's considered view that Petitioners have failed to sufficiently show that such compelling and
persuasive reasons exist in this case. Consequently, the Petition must be denied.
G.R. No. 136051 June 8, 2006
ALFREDO P. ROSETE, OSCAR P. MAPALO and CHITO P. ROSETE, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIANO LIM and LILIA LIM, Respondents.

Facts:
Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim documented grievance for dissolution, explicit execution w harms against the
AFP Retirement and Separation Benfits Syste, Espreme Realty and Dev't Co., Alfredo Rosete, Maj. Oscar
Mapalo, Chito Rosete, BPI, and Register of Deeds of Mindoro Occidental. - Asks for revocation of deed of
offer, executed by AFP-RSBS to Espreme Realty of packages of land, and for the scratch-off of the titles
in Espreme Realty's name. They likewise request execution of docs to reestablish proprietorship and title
of the terrains to the Lims. Loads of procedural stuff occurred. Pertinent to us is that the respondents
recorded a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination, pulling out that on June 18 and 20 1997,
they will oust candidates Mapalo and Chito Rosete. Solicitors documented a Urgent Ex Parte Motion and
Objection to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination. - There are two forthcoming crook cases in
Mandaluyong and Pasig (BP 22 and Estafa) including similar arrangement of realities; permitting their
testimony would abuse their right against self-implication on the grounds that the statement would lay
out claim of truth in the objection oaths in the criminal cases. Lower court denied the candidates' ex
parte movement and booked the taking of the testimony. Candidates recorded a MR, trailed by a Urgent
Ex parte Motion to Cancel/Suspend the Taking of the Deposition of the Lower court again denied.
Appeal to CA denied. Engaged SC. Solicitors contentions were that the CA was off-base when it
neglected to perceive their right against self-implication while the taking of their testimonies was
permitted. While a normal observer might be constrained to take the testimony box, and guarantee
honor against self -incrimination as each inquiry requiring implicating answer is posed, blamed may
through and through decline to address all possible inquiries since right against self-implication right to
decline to affirm. They would be implicating themselves in the cases in light of the fact that the
declaration that would be inspired might be utilized in the crook cases.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring that the right against self-incrimination would not be
violated by the taking of their deposition in the civil case.

Ruling:
No, lower courts have given the right decision. The CA choice insisted. The Petitioners are off-base. The
Right against self-implication is agreed to each individual who gives proof, whether intentional or
through summon. The right must be asserted when a particular inquiry is really put to the observer, and
not at some other time. Witness can't decline to be show up under the steady gaze of the court or
decline to affirm. Summon should be complied. A denounced in a lawbreaker case might decline to take
the testimony box as an observer, as held in People v. Ayson where the court held a blamed to possess
an alternate level for security. Under the ROC, in all criminal arraignments the respondent is entitled
among others to be excluded from being an observer against himself, and to affirm as an observer for
his own benefit… his refusal to be an observer will not in any way bias or be utilized against him.
Obviously, just an ACCUSED in a CRIMINAL CASE can decline to take the testimony box. Or on the other
hand in cases which participate in the idea of a crook continuing or similar to thereto. Or then again in
common activities which are criminal in nature. The idea of the procedures controls, not the personality
of the suit in question. For this situation, what is involved is a common case for Annulment, Specific
Performance with Damages. It can't be considered in that frame of mind of a crook continuing. The
forthcoming lawbreaker cases don't give an option to decline to affirm in the common case. They might
conjure their right against self-implication just while the implicating questions are tossed their direction.
G.R. No. 174154 October 17, 2008
JESUS CUENCO, petitioner,
vs.
TALISAY TOURIST SPORTS COMPLEX, INCORPORATED AND MATIAS B. AZNAR III, respondents.

Facts:
The petitioner rented from respondent a property to be worked as a cockpit. Endless supply of the
agreement, respondent organization directed a public offering for the rent of the property. Applicant
partook in the offering. The rent was in the end granted to another bidder. From that point, candidate
officially requested, through a few interest letters, for the arrival of his store in the amount of P500,
000.00. It, nonetheless, all stayed unnoticed. Along these lines, applicant recorded a Complaint for
amount of cash keeping up with that respondents committed fraud in keeping how much the store with
no legitimate explanation. In their Answer, respondents countered that solicitor made actual harm the
rented premises and the expense of fix and substitution of materials added up to more than
P500,000.00. The RTC gave a Pre-preliminary Order wherein respondent conceded that there is no stock
of harms. The respondents later offered a stock which was conceded by the said preliminary court. The
RTC governed well for the applicant. The CA turned around said choice.

Issue:
Whether or not a judicial admission is conclusive and binding upon a party making the admission.

Ruling:
Yes. Clearly, it was on Coronado's declaration, as well as on the narrative proof of a supposed property
stock directed on June 4, 1998, that the CA based its decision that how much harm supported by the
rented premises while in the ownership of solicitor surpassed how much candidate's store. This goes
against the legal affirmation made by respondents' insight which ought to have been restricting on the
respondents. Area 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court gives that Judicial admission is an affirmation, verbal
or composed, made by a party throughout the procedures in a similar case, doesn't need evidence. The
affirmation might be gone against simply by an appearance that it was committed through obvious error
or that no such confirmation was made. A party might make legal affirmations in the pleadings, during
the preliminary, by verbal or composed indications or limitations, or in different phases of the official
action. The limitation of realities at the pre-preliminary of a case is legal confirmations. The veracity of
legal affirmations require no additional confirmation and might be contested exclusively upon an
unmistakable appearance that the affirmations were committed through discernible error or that no
confirmations were made. In this way, the confirmations of gatherings during the pre-preliminary, as
exemplified in the pre-preliminary request, are restricting and decisive upon them. Respondents didn't
deny the confirmation made by their direction, neither did they guarantee that the equivalent was
committed through tangible error. In that capacity, the expectation of realities is indisputable and might
be depended upon by the courts. The pre-preliminary structures part of the procedures and matters
managed in that may not be neglected in that frame of mind of direction. If not, the genuine
quintessence of obligatory pre-preliminary would be delivered unimportant and useless. Moreover, a
demonstration performed by counsel inside the extent of a general or suggested authority is viewed as a
demonstration of the client which renders respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is implied that an
affirmation or portrayal is indisputable upon the individual making it and can't be denied or invalidated
as against the individual depending subsequently. Along these lines, respondents are limited by the
confirmations made by their guidance at the pre-preliminary. Likewise, the CA committed a mistake
when it gave more than adequate evidentiary load to respondents' proof inconsistent to the legal
confirmation.
G.R. No. 155483 April 27, 2007
HEIRS OF PEDRO PASAG, represented by EUFREMIO PASAG; HEIRS OF MARIA PASAG, represented by
EPIFANIA LUMAGUI; HEIRS OF JUANITA PASAG, represented by ASUNCION ORTIOLA; HEIRS OF ISIDRO
PASAG, represented by VIRGINIA P. MENDOZA; HEIRS OF BASILIO PASAG, represented by MILAGROSA
P. NABOR; and HEIRS OF FORTUNATA PASAG, represented by FLORENTINA S. MEMBRERE, Petitioners.
vs.
Sps. LORENZO and FLORENTINA PAROCHA, PRISCILLA P. ABELLERA, and MARIA VILORIA PASAG,
Respondents.

Facts:
In 1996, the Heirs of Pedro Pasag recorded a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and
Titles, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, Reconveyance, Partition and Damages against the
Spouses Lorenzo and Florentina Parocha. In the wake of introducing their proof, the Heirs of Pasag
mentioned the preliminary court to permit them to present a composed conventional proposal of proof.
The preliminary court allowed them ten days to submit. Afterward, the Heirs requested an expansion of
time to record the conventional proposition. It was allowed. Even later, the Heirs again requested
another expansion which was additionally conceded. Notwithstanding, they couldn't present the
conventional proposal inside the drawn out period consequently, when the equivalent was submitted
five months in the wake of trusting the evidence speak for itself, the preliminary court prevented
confirmation from getting the proper deal. Thus, Spouses Parocha documented a protest to prove and
the cases recorded by the Heirs of Pasag were excused. The Heirs pursued the excusal and asserted that
they were denied fair treatment. Affirming the decision of the preliminary court, the CA held that
candidates neglected to demonstrate their case by a vast majority of proof. That's what it saw "no
substantial and significant proof was illustrated by solicitors to validate their claim that Severino, the
ancestor of respondents, falsely executed an oath of self-settlement to prohibit candidates from the
settlement of the home of Benito and Florentina Pasag.

Issue:
Whether or not the Heirs of Pasag were denied due process.

Ruling:
No. The standard on proper proposal of proof is certainly not a trivial issue. Inability to make a proper
proposal inside a significant timeframe will be considered a waiver to submit it. Thusly, as for this
situation, any proof that has not been offered will be avoided and dismissed. The Supreme Court
likewise underlined that the proper proposal of proof, when in doubt, should be made orally following
the last observer was introduced. A composed proper proposition might be had assuming the equivalent
was moved for and was allowed by the court. A composed conventional deal is a disputed movement
which should be outfitted to the unfriendly party and the party presenting a similar should set it for
hearing. Inability to do this will be lethal to the conventional deal. In the current case, we have
completely inspected the records and are persuaded that candidates have neglected to demonstrate
their claims adequately. It is a fundamental decide in proof that the obligation to prove any claims lies
on the party who makes the charges. Nonetheless, solicitors didn't validate their claims and just
contended that the Complaint ought to be sifted out in an out and out preliminary to lay out their
particular situations on issues which involve legal appreciation. No matter what the exposed contention
of candidates, nonetheless, we observe that the preliminary and re-appraising courts were right in
excusing the Complaint. The charge that Severino falsely rejected different successors to Benito and
Florentina Pasag in the settlement of the last's home was not upheld by substantial proof. While
candidates keep up with that the domain of Benito and Florentina was never divided among their main
beneficiaries, the declaration of their observer, Eufemio Pasag, demonstrates in any case. Essentially,
during questioning, Eufemio conceded that the offspring of Benito and Florentina, including the dad of
solicitors, had gotten properties as legacy from the said mates. It should be focused on that extortion
isn't assumed; and it should be demonstrated by clear and persuading proof, and not by simple guesses
or hypotheses. No such proof was introduced for this situation to support solicitors' claims.
G.R. No. 159708 September 24, 2004
JAIME BELTRAN LUZ, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION, respondent.

Facts:
On July 18, 1988, candidate was accused of infringement of Presidential Decree No. 1866 in the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City. On March 22, 2000, the solicitor recorded an application for reprieve with the
Local Amnesty Board for Metro Manila. The board denied the said application. On August 26, 2002, the
National Amnesty Commission (NAC) asserted the choice of the Local Amnesty Board. The movement
for reevaluation thereof was denied by the NAC, per its Resolution, a duplicate of which was gotten by
the solicitor on November 22, 2002. Under the NAC Administrative Order No. 2, solicitor had until
December 7, 2002, a Saturday, inside which to record a request for survey of the expressed goal with
the Court of Appeals. On December 9, 2002, the candidate recorded a movement in the investigative
court for an augmentation of fifteen days from December 9, 2002, or until December 24, 2002 inside
which to document his request. The applicant asserted in that that he had quite recently connected with
the administrations of advice who required extra opportunity to concentrate on the case and draft the
appeal. Nonetheless, the applicant neglected to document his appeal for survey. December 24, 2002
was announced a public occasion; December 25, 2002 was additionally an occasion. On December 26,
2002, the applicant documented a second movement for expansion of fifteen days from December 26,
2002 or until January 10, 2003, inside which to record his appeal. The candidate recorded his request for
survey with the Court of Appeals on January 10, 2003. On January 13, 2003, the CA gave a Resolution
conceding the applicant's most memorable movement for a fifteen-day augmentation counted from
December 7, 2002 or until December 22, 2002, inside which to document said appeal. On February 20,
2003, the CA gave a Resolution denying solicitor's second movement for having been recorded in bad
shape. The applicant documented a movement for reevaluation of the February 20, 2003 Resolution
asserting that, since the last day to record his request was a Saturday, December 7, 2002, and the
following day, December 8, 2002 was a Sunday, the last day for recording the appeal was December 9,
2002. He contemplated that since he recorded his movement for augmentation of time to document his
appeal for survey on the said date, the said movement was ideal recorded. On August 19, 2003, the CA
gave a Resolution denying the candidate's movement, depending on A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC gave on
February 29, 2000, which gives that any augmentation of time to document the necessary arguing ought
to be counted from the termination of the period no matter what the way that the said due date is a
Saturday, Sunday, or legitimate occasion.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner timely filed his second motion for extension of time to file his petition
for review.

Ruling:
No. The augmentation allowed by the Court of Appeals ought to be attached to the first time frame and
initiates following the lapse of such period. Under the Resolution of this Court in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC,
the CA has no circumspection to figure the initiation of the augmentation it allowed from a date later
than the lapse of such period, no matter what the way that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a
legitimate occasion. The Court of Appeals can't be blamed for giving the applicant's most memorable
movement for expansion of fifteen days inside which to record his request for survey, figured from
December 7, 2002, and not from December 9, 2002 as appealed to God for by the candidate. In this
manner, it just applied, with fealty, Section 1, Rule 22 of the Revised Rules of Court, as corrected, as
explained by the Court by means of its Resolution in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC. Had the CA conceded the
solicitor's most memorable movement for expansion and figured the fifteen-day time frame from
December 9, 2002, rather than from December 7, 2002, the re-appraising court would have acted with
grave maltreatment of its carefulness. Prescinding from the previous contemplations, we concur with
the solicitor's supplication for a liberal translation and utilization of A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC considering the
particular real mileu for this situation. Apparently the candidate's advice depended with honest
intentions on the decision of this Court in Moskowsky. Additionally, the candidate documented his
appeal for audit around the same time, January 13, 2003, even before the CA allowed his most
memorable movement for expansion of time to record his request for survey. In fine, when the CA
conceded the applicant's most memorable movement, the candidate had proactively documented his
appeal for audit even as his second movement for augmentation presently couldn't seem to be settled
by the CA. As we controlled in Labad v. College of Southeastern Philippines: The supporting thought in
Moskowsky, Vda. de Capulong and for the situation at bar, is the liberal understanding of the Rules to
accomplish significant equity. Applicant would be inside and out denied her entitlement to pursue if the
first time of December 26, 1998 would be the premise of the 15-day expansion period. While the option
to claim is a legal, not a characteristic right, in any case "it is a fundamental piece of our legal framework
and courts ought to tread carefully so as not to deny a party of the option to pursue, yet rather,
guarantee that each party-prosecutor has the amplest chance for the appropriate and only demeanor of
his objective, liberated from the requirements of details. The shamefulness of the circumstance turns
out to be significantly more obvious when we consider the way that candidate got notice that the
augmentation was to be counted from the first time frame and not from the date that she had appealed
to God for, a month after she had previously documented her request.
G.R. No. 159189 February 21, 2007
THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF BAGUIO, INC. and GROUP DEVELOPERS, INC., Respondents.

Facts:
On November 26, 1981, the in this solicitor allowed a ₱14 million credit line to the thus respondents for
the development of extra structures and acquisition of new hardware. For the college, then, at that
point, Vice-Chairman Fernando C. Bautista, Jr. marked PN Nos. 10660,10672, 10687, and 10708 and
executed a proceeding with guarantee arrangement. Notwithstanding, Bautista, Jr. redirected the net
returns of the credit. He embraced and conveyed the four checks addressing the net returns to
respondent Group Developers, Inc. The advance was not paid. On February 12, 1990,the bank
documented a grumbling for an amount of cash with application for primer connection against the
college, Bautista, Jr. also, his significant other Milagros, before the RTC of Makati City. After five years,
on March 31, 1995, the bank corrected the grumbling and impleaded GDI as extra litigant. Thusly,
regardless of whether the advance was late, the bank didn't request installment until February 8, 1989.
Via cross-guarantee, the college asked that GDI be requested to pay the college the sum it would need
to pay the bank. On December 14, 1995, the bank and GDI executed a deed of dacion en pago. On
March 19, 1998, the college moved to excuse the corrected grumbling. On October 14, 1999 the college
moved to set the case for pre-preliminary on December 2,1999. On August 3, 2000, the preliminary
court settled GDI's movement to determine the movement to excuse and concede pre-preliminary. On
August 29, 2001, the college recorded a sign with movement for reevaluation of the August 17, 1999
Order denying the college's movement to excuse the revised grumbling.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the amended complaint.

Ruling:
For this situation, the college's March 19, 1998 movement to excuse the changed protest was ill-advised
under Rule 16 since it was recorded after respondent college documented its responsive arguing, its
Answer. Likewise the movement's legitimacy couldn't be resolved founded exclusively on the charges of
the initiatory arguing, the altered protest, since the movement depended on the deed of dacion en
pago, which was not asserted in the grumbling. Also, since the deed of dacion en pago had been
canceled from the record, the preliminary court failed in its finding of installment and absence of reason
for activity base on the deed. It should be called attention to that while the Court permits an unwinding
in the utilization of procedural guidelines in certain occurrences, courts and prosecutors are ordered to
adhere to guidelines stringently in light of the fact that they are intended to work with the settlement of
cases. Rather than rules being observed, nonetheless, we observe their misapplication for this situation
coming about to conflicting decisions, disarray and deferral. Had the preliminary court practiced its
inborn ability to control its procedures, it could never have taken this long to reach pre-preliminary,
which had been first set on December 2, 1999 through respondent college's movement. Altogether,
even the preliminary court had probably set the pre-preliminary on June 7, however incorrectly excused
the changed grumbling on April 11, 2002.
G.R. No. 204729 August 6, 2014
LOURDES SUITES (Crown Hotel Management Corporation), Petitioner,
vs.
NOEMI BINARO, Respondent.

Facts:
Lourdes Suites, petitioner, is the owner and operator of a hotel located along Kalayaan Avenue, Makati
City. It executed two contracts with Noemi Binarao, respondent, for room accommodations for two
groups of students. According to petitioner’s records, respondent was able to pay the total contract
price above. However, petitioner claimed that there was an unpaid balance of ₱47,810.00 representing
the charges for damages to the furniture, a lost key and excess guests. Thus, on 25 July 2011, petitioner
sent a demand letter to respondent for the unsettled amount. Respondent failed to pay the amount,
prompting petitioner to file a Statement of Claim for collection of sum of money plus damages before
the MeTC. In her Response, respondent alleged that she is not obliged to pay the claimed amount
because petitioner billed the charges twice.6 Petitioner then impugned the validity of the Response,
stating that it was not made in the form of an Answer as required by Section 1, Rule 11 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Plaintiff failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence the existence of an
obligation in its favor and that the defendant has an unpaid account in the amount of Php47,810.00.
Defendant, on the other hand, confirmed that she requested plaintiff several times to make a proper
accounting to include specifically the actual number of students who stayed in the hotel and the number
of rooms actually used by the students. Defendant even asked for a computation [of the unpaid
amount], but was continuously ignored by the plaintiff. It would appear therefore that the defendant
has already paid her monetary obligation and even made an overpayment in the amount of
Php43,060.00. The MeTC dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of cause of action in its
Decision dated 15 March 2012. On the Counter Claim ordering the plaintiff Lourdes Suites to pay the
defendant the sum of Php43,060.00 in refund of overpayment made to plaintiff and the amount of
Php10,000.00 as moral damages. For failure of the defendant to prove that the plaintiff has acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner in the filing of the Complaint, her claim
for exemplary damages in the amount of Php50,000 is hereby denied. Aggrieved, petitioner then filed a
petition for certiorari before the RTC on 25 May 2012.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in its decision.

Ruling:
No. The petition must be denied. The RTC correctly upheld the MTC Decision. Petitioner argues that
even after the presentation of evidence by both parties, a complaint cannot be dismissed with prejudice
based on lack of cause of action because this ground is not expressly provided for under the Rules on
Small Claims Cases; and if there was a failure to prove a cause of action the only available remedy would
be a demurrer filed by the defendant. What is contemplated, therefore, is a failure to state a cause of
action which is provided in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. This is a matter of insufficiency of the pleading. Sec. 5 of
Rule 10, which was also included as the last mode for raising the issue to the court, refers to the
situation where the evidence does not prove a cause of action. This is, therefore, a matter of
insufficiency of evidence. Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to prove a cause of
action. The remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is
to demur to the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section. The
procedure would consequently be to require the pleading to state· a cause of action, by timely objection
to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted. The basis of
[the] public respondent in dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action is the failure of petitioner
to preponderantly establish its claim against the private respondent by clear and convincing evidence.
Hence, public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the Complaint for
lack of cause of action, as he referred to the evidence presented and not to the allegations in the
Complaint. The dismissal of the complaint with prejudice is likewise not an exercise of wanton or
palpable discretion. It must be noted that this case is an action for small claims where decisions are
rendered final and unappealable, hence, a decision dismissing the same is necessarily with prejudice.
G.R. No. 197380 October 8, 2014
ELIZA ZUNIGA-SANTOS, represented by her Attorney-in Fact, NYMPHA Z. SALES, Petitioners,
vs.
MARIA DIVINA GRACIA SANTOS-GRAN** and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA CITY, Respondents.

Facts:
The petitioner, Eliza Zuñiga-Santos, documented a Complaint for cancellation of offer and disavowal of
title against respondents and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City before the RTC. In her Amended
Complaint, solicitor affirmed, among others, that she was the enrolled proprietor of three packages of
land situated in the Municipality of Montalban, Province of Rizal, preceding their exchange for the sake
of private respondent Gran; she has a second spouse by the name of Lamberto C. Santos , with whom
she had no kids; she had to deal with Lamberto's supposed girl, Gran, whose birth testament was
produced to cause it to create the impression that the last option was solicitor's girl; as per void and
voidable archives, i.e., a Deed of Sale, Lamberto prevailed with regards to moving the subject properties
for and for the sake of Gran; notwithstanding industrious endeavors, expressed Deed of Sale couldn't be
found; Accordingly, applicant asked, bury alia, that Gran give up to her the subject properties and pay
harms, including expenses of suit. As far as concerns her, Gran recorded a Motion to Dismiss, battling,
entomb alia, that the Amended Complaint neglected to express a reason for activity as the void and
voidable archives looked to be invalidated were not as expected distinguished nor the substance thereof
put forward, along these lines, blocking the RTC from delivering a substantial judgment as per the
request to give up the subject properties. The RTC allowed Gran's movement and excused the Amended
Complaint for its inability to express a reason for activity, taking into account that the deed of offer tried
to be invalidated - a fundamental and irreplaceable piece of solicitor's reason for activity was not joined.
Disappointed, solicitor raised the make a difference to the CA. The CA supported the excusal of
candidate's Amended Complaint however on the ground of deficiency of genuine premise. Bothered,
solicitor moved for reevaluation, the CA denied applicant's movement, Hence, the moment appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in its denial.

Ruling:
No, an inability to express a cause of action which is given in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. This involves
inadequacy of the arguing. Sec. 5 of Rule 10, which was additionally included as the last mode for raising
the issue to the court, alludes to the circumstance where the proof doesn't demonstrate a reason for
activity. This is, subsequently, an issue of inadequacy of proof. Inability to express a reason for activity is
not quite the same as inability to demonstrate a reason for activity. The cure in the first is to move for
excusal of the arguing, while the cure in the second is to challenge to the proof, henceforth reference to
Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been wiped out in this part. The system would therefore be to require the arguing
to express a reason for activity, by convenient issue with its inadequacy; or, at the preliminary, to record
a protest to confirm, assuming that such movement is justified. A grumbling states a reason for activity
assuming that it adequately affirms the presence of the three fundamental components of a reason for
activity, to be specific a right for the offended party by whatever means and under anything regulation it
emerges or is made; a commitment with respect to the named litigant to regard or not to abuse such
right; and a demonstration or oversight with respect to the named respondent violative of the right of
the offended party or comprising a break of the commitment of litigant to the offended party for which
the last option might keep an activity for recuperation of harms. A prudent assessment of candidate's
Amended Complaint promptly shows its inability to express a reason for activity adequately. As opposed
to the discoveries of the CA, the charges in that don't proffer extreme realities which would warrant an
activity for invalidation of the deal and recuperation of the properties in contention, henceforth,
delivering the same as dismissible.
G.R. No. 138739 July 6, 2000
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
Spouses VICENTE and MA. SUMILANG DEL ROSARIO, respondents.

Facts:
On March 2, 1991, Spouses Del Rosario, thus respondents-life partners together and severally executed,
marked and conveyed for in this solicitor a promissory note for P138,948. Tragically, respondents
defaulted on the regularly scheduled payments. Notwithstanding rehashed requests, they neglected to
pay their commitments under their promissory note. On June 7, 1993 solicitor documented a grievance
for assortment of amount of cash, During the preliminary, Jasmer Famatico, the credit and assortment
official of candidate, introduced in proof the respondents' check installments, the interest letter dated
July 12, 1991, the client's record card for the respondents, another interest letter and Metropolitan Bank
shame slips. After the candidate offered its proof and trusted the jury to decide wisely respondents
documented a challenge to prove for supposed absence of reason for activity. On November 4, 1994,
the preliminary court excused the grievance for disappointment of solicitor to prove its cases, the proof
it had introduced being just prattle. On offer, the Court of Appeals (CA) turned around the preliminary
court and remanded the case for additional procedures. Abused, Radiowealth documented a request for
audit on certiorari scrutinizing the choice delivered by the investigative court.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA patently erred in its action the case.

Ruling:
Yes. While the CA accurately turned around the preliminary court, it failed in remanding the case for
additional procedures. As given by Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA ought to have
delivered judgment based on the proof presented by the applicant. The Court concurred with solicitor
that the CA had adequate proof on record to conclude the assortment suit. A remand isn't just disliked
by the Rules, it is additionally legitimately pointless based on current realities on record. Whenever a
protest to confirm conceded by a preliminary court is switched on advance, the inspecting court can't
remand the case for additional procedures. Rather, it ought to deliver judgment based on the proof
proffered by the offended party. Because litigants in the current case conceded the due execution of the
Promissory Note both in their Answer and during the pretrial, the investigative court ought to have
delivered judgment on the foundations of that Note and on different bits of proof illustrated during the
preliminary. Clearing up the outcome of a challenge for proof, the Court in Villanueva Transit v. Javellana
expressed that the reasoning behind the standard and convention is straightforward and intelligent. The
litigant is allowed, without deferring his entitlement to offer proof if his movement isn't conceded, to
move for an excusal on the ground that upon current realities as consequently settled and the
appropriate regulation, the offended party has shown no right to alleviation. On the off chance that the
preliminary court denies the excusal movement. The standard, notwithstanding, forces the condition at
the same time that assuming his challenge is allowed by the preliminary court, a nd the request for
excusal is turned around on bid, the movant loses his entitlement to introduce proof for his benefit and
he will have been considered to have chosen for stand on the inadequacy of offended party's case and
proof. In such occasion, the re-appraising court which switches the request for excusal will continue to
deliver judgment on the benefits based on offended party's proof. As such, respondents who present a
challenge to the offended party's proof hold the option to introduce their own proof, assuming the
preliminary court can't help contradicting them; in the event that the preliminary court concurs with
them, however on offer, the redrafting court can't help contradicting the two of them and turns around
the excusal request, the litigants lose the option to introduce their own proof. The investigative court
will, what's more, resolve the situation and render judgment on the benefits, while a protest plans to
put delayed prosecutions down.