Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Populist Leadership - The Superhero Donald Trump As Savior in Times of Crisis (2020)
Populist Leadership - The Superhero Donald Trump As Savior in Times of Crisis (2020)
research-article2020
PSX0010.1177/0032321720916604Political StudiesSchneiker
Article
Political Studies
Andrea Schneiker
Abstract
The current debate on populism is mainly concerned with populist parties and movements. Less is
written about populist leadership. Yet, political scientists need to pay more attention to populist
leadership, especially in order to understand how populism functions in the absence of a populist
party. In situations in which a political leader adopts a populist way of exercising political power
without the backing of what is considered a populist party, populism is often reduced to a particular
style of acting and speaking of that particular politician. By formulating a theory-based concept of
political leadership based on the literature of celebrity politicians—the superhero—I show that
populist leadership is not limited to a particular style, but also allows to explain particular policy
choices. The concept of the superhero goes beyond that of charismatic leadership, because it
explains how the leader’s exceptionality is performed and how this performance can be analyzed.
Keywords
populism, leadership, celebrity politicians, Donald Trump
Introduction
In the current burgeoning wave of literature on populism, the discussion focuses much
more on populist parties and movements than on populist leadership. However, more
attention needs to be paid to the latter in order to assess the populist quality of situations
in which political leaders are not backed by what is considered a populist party (Weyland,
2001). In such cases, there might seem to be a gap between the populist style of a politi-
cian and the politics enacted, which may not easily be placed into one populist camp or
another or may not even be considered populist at all. Here, I formulate a theory-based
concept of populist leadership that allows this seeming mismatch between style and con-
tent to be reconciled: that of the populist superhero as a savior in times of crisis.
Corresponding author:
Andrea Schneiker, Department of Social Sciences, University of Siegen, Adolf-Reichwein-Str. 2, 57068 Siegen,
Germany.
Email: schneiker@sozialwissenschaften.uni-siegen.de
2 Political Studies 00(0)
Authors concerned with populist leadership generally start from the assumption that
populism, in addition to being anti-elitist and anti-pluralist (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser,
2017: 5–16; Müller, 2017a: 2–3), is “a specific way of competing for and exercising
political power” (Weyland, 2001: 11). According to Moffitt, “populism’s reliance on new
media technologies, its relationship to shifting modes of political representation and iden-
tification, and its increased ubiquity have seen the phenomenon transform in nuanced
ways” (Moffitt, 2016: 3), and he suggests to conceive of populism “as a political style that
is performed, embodied and enacted across a variety of political and cultural contexts”
(Moffitt, 2016: 3; emphasis in original). Based thereon, in addition to a particular dis-
course, a leader’s performance and the particular relationship between the leader and her
support base are considered the central elements of populism (Moffitt, 2016: 83–87; see
also Weyland, 2001: 12). Casullo, for example, argues that repertoires (defined as
“socially shared discursive templates”) act as “possible paths to leadership” in that they
“determine legitimate or accepted ways for populist leaders to act, talk, dress” (Casullo,
2019: 56). Yet, the literature on populist leadership does not tell us where to find relevant
repertoires. Acknowledging the importance of performance for populist leadership, I,
therefore, turn to the literature on political branding of politicians—and specifically to the
literature on celebrity politicians—because it discusses relevant repertoires of action (Van
Zoonen, 2005; Wood et al., 2016). Celebrity, like populism, “is a potentially important
phenomenon that politicians can use to connect better with a disaffected public” (Wood
et al., 2016: 582, referring to Street, 2004). Based on studies of celebrity politicians, I
formulate a new type of populist leadership—the populist superhero—and show that such
a conceptualization allows us to understand not only the tone but also the substance of
populist leaders’ policies. From this perspective, the ideational flexibility of populist
leaders is neither discretionary nor solely the result of the constraints of the political sys-
tem, but instead follows a pattern.
The populist superhero has some commonalities with the ideal type of the charismatic
leader as it was originally formulated by Max Weber (1947). The concept of charismatic
leadership relies on “exceptional [. . .] qualities” of the leader (Weber, 1947: 358) who
needs to have some objective success as proof of her exceptionality and to be recognized
as exceptional by her followers (Weber 1947). In addition, some argue that “a situation of
crisis” (Trice and Beyer, 1991: 151) is needed for a leader to be considered charismatic
because ordinary situations do not require exceptional qualities of a leader. The populist
superhero “is a version of charismatic leadership for the 21st century”1 that relies on social
media and on techniques from entertainment. Populist leaders can “be superb masters of
political showmanship, whose theatrics provide welcome entertainment to a voting public
often bored by conventional politics” (Heinisch, 2003: 95). In this sense, the populist
superhero fits Moffitt’s understanding of populism as “a performative political style”
whereby “the leader is seen as the performer, ‘the people’ as the audience, and crisis and
media as the stage on which populism plays out upon” (Moffitt, 2016: 5, emphasis in
original). The present analysis thereby goes beyond Weber’s concept of charismatic lead-
ership by specifically explaining how the situation of crisis and the leader’s exceptional-
ity are performed and how these performances can be analyzed.
Donald Trump is a case in point. Whereas “we can hardly call the Republican Party a
populist radical right party” (Fenger, 2018: 193), Trump’s presidential campaign was
widely considered to be populist (Nai and Maier, 2018; Oliver and Rahn, 2016; White,
2016) and candidate Trump to be “the populist par excellence” (Oliver and Rahn, 2016:
189). But the assessment of his presidency is more ambiguous. On the one hand, his
Schneiker 3
policies cannot be classified into one single category of populist politics (Norris and
Inglehart, 2019; Verbeek and Zaslove, 2017). On the other hand, with the shift from his
campaign to the presidency, the populist quality of Trump is argued to be constrained and
limited by the US political system (Dombrovski and Reich, 2017; Pierson, 2017). I argue
that the difficulties in assessing the populist nature of the Trump presidency stem from the
focus on structure and the neglect of agency. Yet, if we conceive of Trump as a populist
superhero in times of crisis, the populist nature of his policy choices becomes evident.
This perspective also allows for situating Trump in comparison with other US Presidents.
Although “populism in American politics is far from a new development” (Bimes and
Mulroy, 2004; Stewart, 2018: 95) and other presidents have been charismatic as well,
Trump is outstanding (Lieberman et al., 2019; Nai et al., 2019: 634).
This article is organized as follows. Based on my review of the current literature on
populism, I first show that this literature does not permit a full explanation of Trump’s
policies. I then turn to the literature on political branding, and on celebrity politicians, in
particular, to formulate a new type of populist leadership—the populist superhero—
before applying this concept to Trump. The article ends with a discussion of my
findings.
people by, for example, implementing tax reform and tax cuts (White House, 2017a).
Similar to his domestic politics, Trump’s foreign policy, according to the typology devel-
oped by Verbeek and Zaslove, can be situated somewhere between ideological approaches
of the radical right and those of market liberalism.
Regarding trade issues, on the one hand, Trump is in favor of protectionist measures,
as populists from the radical right would be, having increased tariffs on steel imports and
announced tariffs on car imports from Europe. On the other hand, he signed a new free-
trade agreement with Canada and Mexico in 2018, replacing NAFTA, the so-called
United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA). Not only is this agreement in
favor of free trade, but it is also a multilateral agreement, whereas Trump has often
rejected multilateralism, not just with respect to trade. To name only a few of his anti-
multilateral actions, he withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
(January 2017), quit UNESCO (October 2017) and the UN Human Rights Council (June
2018), and pulled out of the so-called Iran Deal (June 2018).
Similar to the assessment of Trump’s policies based on the typology offered by Verbeek
and Zaslove, Norris and Inglehart argue that
the President’s speeches, tweets, and executive actions mix together advocacy of inconsistent
principles across the conventional left-right spectrum. Some economic priorities are right-wing:
this includes supporting small-states laissez faire economic policies, which reflect the
mainstream Republican Congressional leadership and the role of the GOP Freedom Caucus on
issues such as the aggressive deregulation of environmental protection, [. . .] and rolling back
corporate taxes. [. . .] But Trump has also followed economic protectionism for American
industry, imposing tariffs on trade, renegotiating NAFTA, and seeking to restore coal-mining
jobs (Norris and Inglehart, 2019: 219–220).
Hence, Trump’s policies seem to lack coherence, whether in terms of substance (free
trade vs protectionism) or in terms of form (multilateral or unilateral). His behavior seems
even to be erratic. For example, at the G7 summit in Canada in June 2018, he initially
participated in the negotiations with the other heads of state, but on his way home he
decided to abandon the joint statement.
Pierson even classifies Trump’s policies as mainly non-populist and serving the “inter-
ests and concerns of plutocrats” (Pierson, 2017: 106):
On the big economic issues of taxes, spending and regulation—ones that have animated
conservative elites for a generation—he has pursued, or supported, an agenda that is extremely
friendly to large corporations, wealthy families, and well-positioned rent-seekers. His budgetary
policies [. . .] will, if enacted, be devastating to the same rural and moderate-income communities
that helped him win office (Pierson, 2017: 106).
which the military operates; between rhetoric and behavior” (Dombrovski and Reich,
2017: 1015).
In sum, not only Trump’s policies seem to lack coherence. There also seems to be a
contradiction between Trump’s style and speech, on the one hand, and his policies, on the
other. Yet, and as Kurt Weyland shows based on a study of populism in Latin America in
the 1980s and 1990s, such divergence between political leaders who follow a populist
style but “deviate to varying degrees from classical populist policies” (Weyland, 2001: 7)
is neither a new empirical phenomenon nor a new conceptual challenge. Similarly, there
have been previous cases in which populists exhibit some flexibility regarding the adop-
tion of different policies and positions (Weyland, 2001: 10). Although Weyland does not
formulate a theory of populist leadership, he acknowledges the relevance of leadership
for understanding populism, which is why, in the following section, I refer to his under-
standing of populism as a particular way of ruling. Based thereon, I approach Trump’s
policies in terms of populist leadership. From this perspective, his policies seem to follow
a populist pattern.
individual to [. . .] utilize these repertoires is a personal feature, the repertoires them-
selves are nonetheless social” (Casullo, 2019: 56). This understanding of repertoires cor-
responds to the concept of political branding that distinguishes between the “human
brand,” which is “the actual personality of the person,” and the “brand persona,” which is
“the image that the human brand seeks to project” (Speed et al., 2015: 141–142). Although
a person’s projected image is not identical to that person’s personality, it must correspond
to the latter in order to allow for authenticity, which, in turn, is necessary to establish
credibility in the eyes of the voters (Speed et al., 2015: 142–143). In short, a political
product in terms of a brand, in the case of a politician, is convincing if the performance of
the person “is not perceived as acting” (Tolson, 2001: 445, as cited in Speed et al., 2015:
143).
Celebrity politicians are a particular type of political brand that politicians may seek to
project. They are often seen as a type of leadership that has emerged in response to anti-
political sentiments and that relies on extensive use of the media. In this sense, “celebrity
is a potentially important phenomenon that politicians can use to connect better with a
disaffected public” (Wood et al., 2016: 582, referring to Street, 2004). The literature on
celebrity politicians has identified various types of celebrity politicians (Marsh et al.,
2010; Street, 2004, 2018; Wood et al., 2016), but there is one type that can be considered
a populist type of leadership because its features correspond to the populist characteristics
of anti-elitism and anti-pluralism: the superhero (Schneiker, 2018).
The populist superhero presents herself as having superpowers and as the only one
being able to save others (i.e. her country) in case of an emergency. This is in line with the
populist “leader’s promise to protect the people from a pernicious enemy” (Weyland,
2001: 11). Such promise, according to Weyland, is especially made by populist leaders
who are not backed by a populist party and who have to “compensate for the fragility of
their mass support” and therefore “seek to create a particular intense connection to their
followers” (Weyland, 2001: 13). This is exactly what the figure of the superhero offers
because
such intensity requires [. . .] a supernatural capacity to represent and lead the people, rescue
them from adversity, and usher in progress. Therefore, populist leaders constantly demonstrate
their closeness to common people and stimulate popular identification with their leadership.
They seek frequent face-to-face contacts with the masses, now often through television, act in
ways that embody and live out the dreams of the common man, promise to include the long
neglected populace in the mainstream of development and protect it from sinister forces, and
instill in their followers a sense of mission to transform the status quo and transcend the confines
of the established institutional framework in order to find redemption under their savior’s
guidance (Weyland, 2001: 14).
In this sense, the populist superhero shares some commonalities with the ideal type of
charismatic leader originally formulated by Max Weber (1947). Weber defined charisma
as the quality in an individual “by virtue of which he is set apart from other men and
treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional
powers or qualities” (Weber, 1947: 358). Charismatic leadership requires followers who
believe in the exceptionality of the leader. This belief is sustained by successful perfor-
mances or policies whereby success is assessed based on the well-being of the followers
which the latter attribute to the influence of the leader (Weber, 1947). The concept of
charismatic leadership has been widely discussed in the social sciences with some argu-
ing that charismatic leadership not only involves the qualities of an individual and the
Schneiker 7
leader’s relation to her followers but also requires “a situation of crisis” and a vision of
the leader on how to solve the crisis (Trice and Beyer, 1991: 151–152). Thereby, a crisis
is defined as “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms
of a social system” (Rosenthal et al., 1989: 10).
I argue that the populist superhero, similar to the concept of charismatic leadership, is
believed to have some exceptional qualities that allow her to solve a crisis and to save her
followers from an emergency. In the following, I explain how a populist superhero—that
could also be called a charismatic leader 2.0—relies on techniques from entertainment
and on social media to perform herself as successful problem-solver in times of crisis. By
theorizing the populists’ performances, the article offers a concept of leadership that goes
beyond the one of charismatic leadership.
The populist superhero’s claim of being the only one able to solve a crisis is based on
an ambiguous anti-elitism. On the one hand, the populist superhero presents herself as an
ordinary citizen who is part of the common people, no matter whether the leader is actu-
ally an outsider to the establishment or part of it (Casullo, 2019: 57). Based thereon, the
populist superhero can claim to dispose of the “common sense” (Mudde, 2004: 547) that
populists refer to in their formulation of solutions to solve pressing problems. In this
sense, the populist superhero claims to see the problems that ordinary citizens are con-
cerned with, to know what has to be done in order to solve these problems, and to have
the ability to fix the situation (Schneiker, 2018). On the other hand, this everyday knowl-
edge is what makes the populist leader exceptional in comparison with politicians who
are said to belong to the elite and who dispose only of exclusive knowledge. As a conse-
quence, politicians are not able to solve a crisis and the related problems of citizens. Only
the populist superhero is. Hence, the populist superhero is by definition an anti-politician
(Schneiker, 2018). The populist superhero is also anti-pluralist in that she dismisses alter-
native opinions and positions (Schneiker, 2018).
In order to differentiate herself from her competitors and politicians, the populist
superhero must convince the audience, especially her electorate, that she is better suited
than anyone else to deliver on her promise (Needham, 2005: 348), that is, to solve prob-
lems. Hence, the populist superhero needs the world to know that she, and only she, can
fix and has fixed a situation. Otherwise, she could not use this alleged exceptional prob-
lem-solving capacity as a unique selling point. Consequently, populist superhero leaders
have to communicate to their (potential) supporters that they are superb in this role. Social
media are communication channels that perfectly fit this requirement of such populist
leadership (Moffitt, 2016). They are seemingly anti-elitist in that they are not only easily
accessible but also allow for direct communication and interaction between the leader and
her followers (Engesser et al., 2017: 1113). Hence, through social media and especially
network services such as Twitter, the populist superhero can directly tell her followers
about her exceptional problem-solving capacity without any mediator. The public, in turn,
does not have to buy a newspaper or attend an official press conference in order to learn
about the performance of the leader but can connect to the leader through wireless tech-
nology anytime and anywhere.
But populist superheroes not only have to present themselves as successful problem-
solver. Given that they might lack a populist political party that supports them, they also
need to provide evidence of their popular support. Thus, according to Weyland,
elections, plebiscites, mass demonstrations, and most recently opinion polls are the crucial
instruments with which populist leaders mobilize and demonstrate their distinctive power
8 Political Studies 00(0)
capability. Populist aspirants whip up support from largely unorganized masses to win office.
Populist chief executives constantly invoke their broad mass support to boost their own influence
and overpower their opponents’ institutional bastions (Weyland, 2001: 12).
In times of the web 2.0, one needs to add likes, shares, retweets, and followers as indi-
cators of popular support, although they might only give evidence of the attention that
populists receive (Engesser et al., 2017: 1113; Klinger and Svensson, 2016). Such atten-
tion can be garnered, on the one hand, based on entertainment techniques such as “agita-
tion, spectacular acts, exaggeration, calculated provocations, and the intended breech of
political and socio-cultural taboos” (Heinisch, 2003: 94). On the other hand, it can be
achieved based on “personal action frames” (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012: 743). Given
that “these frames are highly inclusive and align people with different personal back-
grounds and motives under a common cause” (Engesser et al., 2017: 1114; referring to
Bennett and Segerberg, 2012: 744) and are based on “flexible political identifications”
(Bennett and Segerberg, 2012: 744), they fit the populist criteria of a thin ideology
(Engesser et al., 2017: 1114).
In the following section, I will show, first, that Trump can be considered as a populist
superhero, and second, that this concept will help us understand his policy choices.
When Trump promises to tell the truth (Muslims are terrorists; some women are uglier than
others; Mexicans are rapists), he aligns himself with opposition to political correctness, with a
stance that rejects rhetorical caution regarding minority religions, genders, and ethnicities. Yet
as entertainment, his gestures intensify the force of his words, attracting and holding the attention
of the wider public as they dominate the news cycle (Hall et al., 2016: 74).
Although some consider Trump’s language to be in bad taste and disgusting, “Trump’s
entertaining, sensational, inflammatory words and actions make him the kind of phe-
nomenon we just can’t look away from” (Lawrence and Boydstun, 2017: 150). As an
entertainer, Trump has the “license to disobey rules” (Hall et al., 2016: 73) so that “rela-
tions between form and meaning established in one discursive field (entertainment)
excuse[.] behavior in another (politics)” (Hall et al., 2016: 76). Although Trump is not
the first US politician or even President with a past in show business, “Trump’s dense
use of a derisive form of comedic entertainment to attract media attention [. . .] is a
strategy that previous entertainer candidates such as Ronald Reagan did not pursue”
(Hall et al., 2016: 75). Thus, it is Trump’s past as an entertainer in the Wrestling busi-
ness, in beauty pageants and especially in the NBC game show The Apprentice that
provides the populist superhero Trump with credibility and authenticity. Similar to real-
ity TV that succeeds in “manufacturing ‘authenticity’” (Hall et al., 2016: 76) in that
those who are depicted are not perceived as acting, so does Trump create authenticity
by copying his political personality from his persona in The Apprentice (Hall et al.,
2016: 76).
Third, and relatedly, scholars of social psychology argue that it is “in part because of
his politically incorrect rhetoric that [Trump] garnered support” (Conway et al., 2017:
246, emphasis in original). In the words of a commentator from the Washington Post,
“It’s not just that Trump is willing to be provocative—he’s exciting to many people
because he says things they feel they can’t say” (Guo, 2015). According to social psy-
chologists, this paradox can be explained with the salience of political correctness (PC)
norms in the United States that restrict communication and “explicitly attempt[.] to
remove negative group-relevant language” (Conway et al., 2017: 246). As these norms
became “ever more salient and heavy-handed” (Conway et al., 2017: 255), they were
considered as a “forced consensus” (Conway et al., 2017: 254). Yet, such a consensus “is
psychologically fragile and prone to break” (Conway et al., 2017: 254). As a conse-
quence, the PC norms “ultimately backfire and instead produce long-term deviance”
(Conway et al., 2017: 245; emphasis in original) in the sense of having an effect that is
in opposition to the original goals. Hence, Trump’s use of politically incorrect language
is welcomed by his followers, because he thereby breaks rules that those followers con-
ceive of as being imposed on them and no longer want to accept. This explanation is
supported by findings according to which people like Trump’s provocative language.
According to a survey carried out by RAND corporation, it was especially voters who
felt powerless and voiceless who supported Trump in the election campaign in 2016
(Pollard and Mendelsohn, 2016).
Whether during the election campaign or as President, Trump’s performances are
placed within a “situation of crisis” (Trice and Beyer, 1991: 151). Analyzing the 2016
presidential election, Aswad finds that Trump used a crisis rhetoric more often than
Clinton (Aswad, 2019: 66). As an example, she cites from Trump’s speech at the
Republican National Convention in Cleveland, Ohio, in which he accepted the presiden-
tial nomination. In that speech, Trump states that
10 Political Studies 00(0)
Our Convention occurs at a moment of crisis for our nation. The attacks on our police, and the
terrorism in our cities, threaten our very way of life. Any politician who does not grasp this
danger is not fit to lead our country. [. . .] Our roads and bridges are falling apart, our airports
are in Third World condition, and forty-three million Americans are on food stamps. [. . .] Not
only have our citizens endured domestic disaster, but they have lived through one international
humiliation after another (Trump cited in Politico, 2016).
terrible crimes. [. . .] When that same Secretary of State rakes in millions of dollars trading
access and favors to special interests and foreign powers I know the time for action has come. I
have joined the political arena so that the powerful can no longer beat up on people that cannot
defend themselves. Nobody knows the system better than me, which is why I alone can fix it
(Trump cited in Politico, 2016).
Regarding unemployment and jobs, Trump declares that “since my election, America has
gained over 7 million jobs—a number unthinkable. [. . .] The average unemployment rate
for my administration is the lowest for any U.S. President in recorded history” (White
House, 2020c). Thereby, Trump claims that positive developments, such as a low unem-
ployment rate, are the result of his exceptional problem-solving capacity whereby
Schneiker 11
I am reading that the great border WALL will cost more than the government originally thought,
but I have not gotten involved in the design or negotiations yet. When I do, just like with the
F-35 FighterJet or the Air Force One Program, price will come WAY DOWN! (11 February
2017).
He also regularly tweets about his success with respect to the creation of jobs, such as
“Record 157,005,000 Employed; 19th Record of Trump Era” (5 July 2019). In addition,
he claims to be successful with respect to any other policy field: “We have the Best
Economy in History, the Best Employment Numbers in History, Most People Working in
History, Highest Stock Market in History, Biggest Tax and Regulation Cuts in History,
. . .” (23 July 2019) and calls himself “great looking and smart, a true Stable Genius!” (11
July 2019). In addition, Trump tweeted that he, unlike politicians, would have saved the
US from evil such as the attacks on the World Trade Center: “Of course we should have
captured Osama Bin Laden long before we did. I pointed him out in my book just
BEFORE the attack on the World Trade Center. President Clinton famously missed his
shot” (19 November 2018).
His use of Twitter also allows Trump to provide the world with evidence of his “broad
mass support” (Weyland, 2001: 12). He therefore frequently refers to opinion polls or
ratings in his tweets: “Wow, television ratings just out: 31 million people watched the
Inauguration, 11 million more than the very good ratings from 4 years ago” (22 January
2017); “94% Approval Rating in the Republican Party, an all time high. Ronald Reagan
was 87%. Thank you!” (13 July 2019). He also tweets pictures of large numbers of sup-
porters gathering to listen to him, with headlines such as “massive crowd in NC for
President Trump” (18 July 2019). Next to mass support, pictures showing Trump amid a
crowd of people also evoke a sense of closeness between the President and the popular
masses.
Yet, this proximity is just an illusion, because both the superhero type of populist lead-
ership and the use of Twitter to communicate it denigrate democratic politics. The popu-
list political superhero reflects an understanding of political decision-making as an
12 Political Studies 00(0)
multilateral forms of decision-making because they do not allow him to present himself
as the one in command. Accordingly, it is not surprising that Trump abandoned the joint
statement of the G7 summit in Canada in June 2018. This joint agreement did not allow
him to present himself as the one who led the process. It even allowed others, such as the
Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau, to sit in the driver’s seat and to tell the story from their
perspective; something that is incompatible with the presentation of Trump as a
superhero.
The same pattern applies to trade agreements and negotiations in that Trump rejects
those that do not allow him to appear to be the final decision-maker. Trump withdrew the
US from the TPP (January 2017), which his predecessor Obama had negotiated, and
instead seeks to carry out bilateral trade negotiations, for example, with Japan. Trump
also ended the existing trade agreement with Canada and Mexico, NAFTA, and negoti-
ated a new trade agreement—although multilateral—with these two countries.
All these decisions might be motivated by ideational considerations, but they can also
be explained based on the requirements that follow from presenting himself as savior in
the sense of a populist superhero. Negotiations with only a few other states, especially
bilateral negotiations or what Trump calls “deals,” allow him to at least give the impres-
sion that he is in control of the process, for example, by continuously updating the public
via Twitter on the state of the negotiations. Although the public cannot verify whether
what Trump states on Twitter is correct and whether he is the one who actually sits in the
driver’s seat, Twitter allows Trump to present himself as the only person who can negoti-
ate agreements with other states. This becomes apparent when one looks at trade negotia-
tions. Regarding NAFTA, Trump tweeted, for example, “I will renegotiate NAFTA. If I
can’t make a great deal, we’re going to tear it up. We’re going to get this economy run-
ning again” (20 October 2016). Although the agreement was trilateral in the end, some of
the negotiations were bilateral (e.g. between the US and Mexico), giving Trump the
chance to present himself as a problem-solver and to threaten to move ahead with a bilat-
eral deal without Canada (Swanson et al., 2018). Regarding domestic politics, Trump
similarly claims to be able to make great deals for workers, such as in the case of the
Carrier factory in Indianapolis (tweet 30 November 2016).
Based on Weyland’s argument that populist leaders use “economic and social policy as
an instrument” to “win and exercise power” (Weyland, 2001: 11), it becomes clear that
both protectionist measures, such as tariffs on foreign products, and free-trade agree-
ments, such as the one with Mexico and Canada, can be justified as necessary measures
to save the US from unfair practices by these countries and in order to “Make America
Great Again.” Thus, although these measures are incoherent at first sight, they serve a
purpose.
Conclusion
In this article, I formulated a new concept of populist leadership: the one of a superhero
as a savior in times of crisis. This concept is based on the literature on political branding
in general and on celebrity politicians in particular because the latter strand of literature
is concerned with how political leaders can establish close links with a disinterested elec-
torate. This goal is of great concern to populist leaders, especially those who lack the
support of a populist party. By taking the case of Trump as an example, I have shown that
we can find empirical evidence for this conception of populist leaders. Its added value is
that it allows us to make sense of the policies of populist leaders when such leaders cannot
Schneiker 15
be classified according to the common typologies of populist parties. The concept of the
populist superhero explains policy decisions made so that the leader can appear to be
leading—even if this results in inconsistent policy choices. While the concept of the pop-
ulist superhero shares some characteristics with that of the charismatic leadership, it
exceeds the latter by allowing for theorizing how the leader performs herself as successful
problem-solver who is saving her country and its people in times of crisis. Further research
will be needed to show whether what has been demonstrated here based on the example
of Trump is also applicable to other cases of populist leaders—such as Bolsonaro in
Brazil, Salvini in Italy—and especially to those in which a populist leader is not backed
by a populist party, such as Boris Johnson in the UK.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers, Bertjan Verbeek, Anja Jakobi, Jutta Joachim, Gabi Schlag,
and Jens Taken for their excellent comments and feedback as well as my research assistants Cory Gregg and
Alexandra Weber for their support.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iD
Andrea Schneiker https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7369-0063
Note
1. I would like to thank one of the reviewers for this formulation which was suggested in one of the very
good reviews that I received.
References
Aswad NG (2019) Exploring Charismatic Leadership: A Comparative Analysis of the Rhetoric of Hillary
Clinton and Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election. Presidential Studies Quarterly 49 (1): 56–74.
Bennett WL and Segerberg A (2012) The Logic of Connective Action. Information, Communication & Society
15 (5): 739–768.
Bimes T and Mulroy Q (2004) The Rise and Decline of Presidential Populism. Studies in American Political
Development 18: 136–159.
Blondel J (1993) A Framework for the Analysis of Political Leadership. Oriente Moderno 73 (1–6): 5–21.
Boswell J and Corbett J (2015) Stoic Democrats? Anti-politics, Élite Cynicism and the Policy Process. Journal
of European Public Policy 22 (10): 1388–1405.
Cassella M (2018) Farmers Are Losing Money Thanks to Trump — But They Still Support Him. Politico,
1 November. Available at: https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/01/trump-farmers-trade-900623
(accessed 24 January 2020).
Casullo ME (2019) How to Become a Leader: Identifying Global Repertoires for Populist Leadership. In Stengel
FA, MacDonald DB and Nabers D (eds) Populism and World Politics: Exploring and Transnational
Dimensions. Berlin: Springer, pp.55–72.
Chou M and Ondaatje ML (2017) Dramatic Rationalities: Electoral Theater in the Age of Trump. In: Fitzduff
M (ed.) Why Irrational Politics Appeals: Understanding the Allure of Trump. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO, pp.191–204.
16 Political Studies 00(0)
Chou M, Bleiker R and Premaratna N (2016) If Trump Is Just “Playing a Part,” Then Here’s How to Understand
His Brand of Theater. Washington Post, 9 June. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/09/these-two-theatrical-devices-give-away-trumps-performance/?utm_term=.
c98f86df17e3 (accessed 30 August 2017).
Collinson S (2019) Going It Alone on the Wall Would Be Peak Trump. CNN, 13 February. Available at: https://
edition.cnn.com/2019/02/13/politics/donald-trump-immigration-wall-congress-executive-power/index.
html (accessed 23 January 2020).
Conway LG III, Repke MA and Houck SC (2017) Donald Trump as a Cultural Revolt Against Perceived
Communication Restriction: Priming Political Correctness Norms Causes More Trump Support. Journal
of Social and Political Psychology 5 (1): 244–259.
Crooks E (2019) Trump Administration Unveils Rules to Help Coal Industry. Financial Times, 19 June.
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/0da01384-92b0-11e9-aea1-2b1d33ac3271 (accessed 23 January
2020).
De Beus J (2009) Populist Leadership. In Kane J, Patapan H and ‘t Hart P (eds) Dispersed Democratic
Leadership: Origins, Dynamics, and Implications. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.83–103.
Dombrovski P and Reich S (2017) Does Donald Trump Have a Grand Strategy? International Affairs 93 (5):
1013–1037.
Engesser S, Ernst N, Esser F, et al. (2017) Populism and Social Media: How Politicians Spread a Fragmented
Ideology. Information, Communication & Society 20 (8): 1109–1126.
Fenger M (2018) The Social Policy Agendas of Populist Radical Right Parties in Comparative Perspective.
Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy 34 (3): 188–209.
Finnemore M (2005) Fights about Rules: The Role of Efficacy and Power in Changing Multilateralism. Review
of International Studies 31: 187–206.
Guo J (2015) The Real Reasons Donald Trump’s So Popular — For People Totally Confused by It.
The Washington Post, 12 December. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2015/12/12/the-four-basic-reasons-that-explain-why-donald-trump-actually-is-so-popular/ (accessed
23 January 2020).
Hall K, Goldstein DM and Ingram MB (2016) The Hands of Donald Trump: Entertainment, Gesture, Spectacle.
HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 6 (2): 71–100.
Heinisch R (2003) Success in Opposition—Failure in Government: Explaining the Performance of Right-Wing
Populist Parties in Public Office. West European Politics 26 (3): 91–130.
Keohane R (1990) Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research. International Journal 45: 731–764.
Klinger U and Svensson J (2016) The End of Media Logics? On Algorithms and Agency. New Media & Society
20 (12): 4653–4670.
Lawrence RG and Boydstun AE (2017) What We Should Really Be Asking about Media Attention to Trump.
Political Communication 34 (1): 150–153.
Lemon J (2019) Trump’s China Trade War Bailout “Nowhere Near” Covers Farmers’ Losses, Minnesota
Farmers Union President Says. Newsweek, 19 August. Available at: https://www.newsweek.com/trump-
china-trade-war-bailout-farmers-losses-1455101 (accessed 24 January 2020).
Levine M (2019) Dems to Force Another Vote on Trump’s Border Emergency Declaration. Politico, 10
September. Available at: https://www.politico.com/story/2019/09/10/democrats-national-emergency-
trump-border-wall-1487983 (accessed 23 January 2020).
Lieberman RC, Mettler S, Pepinsky TB, et al. (2019) The Trump Presidency and American Democracy: A
Historical and Comparative Analysis. Perspectives on Politics 17 (2): 470–479.
Marsh D, ‘t Hart P and Tindall K (2010) Celebrity Politics: The Politics of the Late Modernity? Political Studies
Review 8 (3): 322–340.
Moffitt B (2016) The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Morse JC and Keohane RO (2014) Contested Multilateralism. The Review of International Organizations 9
(4): 385–412.
Mudde C (2004) The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition 39 (4): 541–563.
Mudde C and Rovira Kaltwasser C (2017) Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Müller J-W (2017a) What Is Populism?. London: Penguin.
Müller J-W (2017b) Donald Trump’s Use of the Term “The People” Is a Warning Sign. The Guardian, 24
January. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/24/donald-trumps-warn-
ing-sign-populism-authoritarianism-inauguration (accessed 4 September 2019).
Schneiker 17
Nai A and Maier J (2018) Perceived Personality and Campaign Style of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump.
Personality and Individual Differences 121: 80–83.
Nai A, Martínez I, Coma F, et al. (2019) Donald Trump, Populism, and the Age of Extremes: Comparing the
Personality Traits and Campaigning Styles of Trump and Other Leaders Worldwide. Presidential Studies
Quarterly 49 (3): 609–643.
Needham C (2005) Brand Leaders: Clinton, Blair and the Limitations of the Permanent Campaign. Political
Studies 53: 343–361.
Norris P and Inglehart R (2019) Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Oliver EJ and Rahn WM (2016) Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Election. The ANNALS of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 667: 189–206.
Ott BL (2017) The Age of Twitter: Donald J. Trump and the Politics of Debasement. Critical Studies in Media
Communication 34: 59–68.
Pierson P (2017) American Hybrid: Donald Trump and the Strange Merger of Populism and Plutocracy. The
British Journal of Sociology 68: 105–119.
Politico (2016) Full Text: Donald Trump 2016 RNC Draft Speech Transcript. Available at: https://www.
politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974
(accessed 23 January 2020).
Pollard M and Mendelsohn J (2016) RAND Kicks Off 2016 Presidential Election Panel Survey. Commentary
(The RAND Blog), 27 January. Available at: https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/01/rand-kicks-off-
2016-presidential-election-panel-survey.html (accessed 23 January 2020).
Quinton S (2019) As Trump Presses Trade War, Farmers Feel the Squeeze. Pew, 21 August. Available at:
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/08/21/as-trump-presses-trade-
war-farmers-feel-the-squeeze (accessed 24 January 2020).
Rooduijn M (2018) What Unites the Voter Bases of Populist Parties? Comparing the Electorates of 15 Populist
Parties in Western Europe. European Political Science Review 10: 351–368.
Rosenthal U, Charles MT and ‘t Hart P (1989) Coping with Crises: The Management of Disasters, Riots, and
Terrorism. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas Publisher.
Sabur R (2018) Donald Trump Can’t Block People on Twitter, Judge Rules. The Telegraph, 23 May. Available
at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/05/23/donald-trump-cant-block-people-twitter-judge-rules
(accessed 4 September 2019).
Schneiker A (2018) Telling the Story of the Superhero and the Anti-Politician as President: Donald Trump’s
Branding on Twitter. Political Studies Review 17: 210–223.
Speed R, Butler P and Collins NC (2015) Human Branding in Political Marketing: Applying Contemporary
Branding Thought to Political Parties and Their Leaders. Journal of Political Marketing 14: 129–151.
Stewart JA (2018) In Through the Out Door: Examining the Use of Outsider Appeals in Presidential Debates.
Presidential Studies Quarterly 48 (1): 93–109.
Street J (2004) Celebrity Politicians: Popular Culture and Political Representation. The British Journal of
Politics and International Relations 6: 435–452.
Street J (2018) What Is Donald Trump? Forms of “Celebrity” in Celebrity Politics. Political Studies Review
17: 3–13.
Swanson A, Rogers K and Rappeport A (2018) Trump Reaches Revised Trade Deal with Mexico, Threatening to
Leave Out Canada. The New York Times, 27 August. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/
us/politics/us-mexico-nafta-deal.html (accessed 4 September 2019).
Trice HM and Beyer JM (1991) Cultural Leadership in Organizations. Organization Science 2 (2): 149–169.
Van Zoonen L (2005) Entertaining the Citizen: When Politics and Popular Culture Converge. Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Verbeek B and Zaslove A (2017) Populism and Foreign Policy. In: Rovira Kaltwasser C, Taggart P and Ochoa
Espejo P, et al. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.384–405.
Wagner J, Dawsey J and Sonmez F (2018) . The Washington Post, 30 October. Available at: https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-eyeing-executive-order-to-end-citizenship-for-chil-
dren-of-noncitizens-born-on-us-soil/2018/10/30/66892050-dc29-11e8-b3f0-62607289efee_story.
html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.20fd7ea3d620 (accessed 4 September 2019).
Weber M (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: Oxford University Press.
Weyland K (2001) Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics.
Comparative Politics 34: 1–22.
18 Political Studies 00(0)
White House (2017a) President Donald J. Trump’s Weekly Address: Budget & Spending (Issued on 8
September 2017). Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-
trumps-weekly-address-11 (accessed 4 September 2019).
White House (2017b) Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly
(Issued on 19 September 2017). Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
president-trump-72nd-session-united-nations-general-assembly (accessed 4 September 2019).
White House (2017c) Remarks of President Donald J. Trump—As Prepared for Delivery (Inaugural Address,
Friday, January 20, 2017. Washington, D.C.). Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-state-
ments/the-inaugural-address (accessed 4 September 2019).
White House (2018) Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly
(New York, NY, Issued on 25 September 2018). Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-73rd-session-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-ny
(accessed 4 September 2019).
White House (2019a) Remarks by President Trump at the Pledge to America’s Workers One-Year Celebration
(Issued on 25 July 2019). Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presi-
dent-trump-pledge-americas-workers-one-year-celebration/ (accessed 23 January 2020).
White House (2019b) Remarks by President Trump During Visit to the Border Wall (San Diego, CA, 19
September 2019). Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-visit-border-wall-san-diego-ca/ (accessed 23 January 2020).
White House (2020a) Remarks by President Trump at Signing of the U.S.-China Phase One Trade Agreement
(Issued on 15 January 2020). Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
president-trump-signing-u-s-china-phase-one-trade-agreement-2/ (accessed 23 January 2020).
White House (2020c) Remarks by President Trump at the World Economic Forum (Davos, Switzerland, 21
January 2020). Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
world-economic-forum-davos-switzerland/ (accessed 23 January 2020).
White House (2020b) Remarks by President Trump at the American Farm Bureau Federation Annual
Convention and Trade Show (Issued on 19 January 2020). Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-american-farm-bureau-federation-annual-convention-
trade-show/ (accessed 23 January 2020).
White JK (2016) Donald Trump and the Scourge of Populism. The Forum 14: 265–279.
Wood M, Corbett J and Flinders M (2016) Just Like Us: Everyday Celebrity Politicians and the Pursuit of
Popularity in an Age of Anti-politics. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 18:
581–598.
Zanona M (2019) House Fails to Override Trump Veto on Border Emergency. Politico, 26 March. Available at:
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/26/house-veto-override-border-emergency-1235896 (accessed
23 January 2020).
Author Biography
Andrea Schneiker is Junior Professor of Political Science at the University of Siegen (Germany). She received
her PhD in political science from the University of Münster, after which she was an assistant professor at
Leibniz University of Hannover and the University of Bremen. She was also visiting scholar at New York
University, Radboud University Nijmegen, and the Graduate Institute in Geneva. Her research interests focus
on international and transnational governance, on celebrity politicians, on social media, and on peace and con-
flict studies. She is the author of Humanitarian NGOs, (In)Security and Identity (Routledge 2015) and co-editor
(together with Andreas Kruck) of Researching Non-state Actors in International Security (Routledge 2017).
Her articles have appeared in, among others, International Studies Review, International Studies Perspectives,
Comparative European Politics, Millennium, Security Dialogue, Cambridge Review of International Affairs,
Contemporary Security Policy, European Policy, and Global Policy.