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    PAMELA JULIETA GARCIA DI GRAZIA
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    Schweller Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?

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    PAMELA JULIETA GARCIA DI GRAZIA

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    oa NEOREALISM’S STATUS-QUO BIAS: WHAT SECURITY DILEMMA? RANDALL. SCHWELLER (1908), centers on a seeret society of seven tevolutionaties, known as the Central Anarchist Council, swom to destroy the world, For security reasons, the anarchitts call themselves by the names of the days of the week—Sunday, Monday, and so on. As the plot unfolds, we learn that all of the anarchists, with the exception of Sunday, ate actually undercover agents working for the ultrasecret New Detective Corps organized by Scotland Yard to overthrow the Anarchist Council. The Corps is so shad- ‘ow that none of its agents knows of the other’ true identities or purposes. “The story ends when Sunday, the lone anarchist and mastermind of the Council, manages to escape the pursuit of Scotland Yard by revealing that he, too, is not who or what he appears to be; in fact, he isnot even human: “Sunday's face] grew larger and larger, filing the whole sky; then every- thing went black.” In the end, anarchy tiumphs; mere mortals, no matter how rational they may be, cannot transcend their wretched condition and sceure a reassuring world of order and exfery. Chesterton's surrealistic story serves as a good metaphor for structural realiem. Just as six of the Council members prove to be law-enforcers in anarchists’ clothing fighting « nonexistent (non-human, at least) threat, 0€0- realist states are all seeurity-maximizers, who, because they exist under an- archy, sometimes act like aggressors, though none has any interest in non- security expansion. Also, ust as in Chesterton's tale there is no concrete anarchist society, only the inextinguishable crear of anarchy, in neurealisa, insecurity is eaused not by greedy actors but by the inescapable self-help nature of the system. Gisesa cree Randal}. Schule satan profesor in the Deparment of Poll Science, Ohio State Universi. 1.G. K Chesteton, The Man Why Wat Tharder A Negbimar (London: Penguin Books, {1908}, 986), 18. oe Vol 5 No. 4 pogee 0-14) Ou TV a omg nr rictony dima n In Chesterton’s story, the joke is that the evil Central Anarchist Council is the creation of Scotland Yard (except for Sunday). Yet, is not neoreal- ism’s perspective on wodld politics similar? It, t00, describes a wold of all ‘copt and no robbers, that is, all ecurity seeking states and no aggressors, Kenneth Walt, the father of neotealism, claims: “Balance-of-power politics ‘whenever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order bbe anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive.” The puzale is: If states are assumed to seek nothing more than their own sur- vival, why would they feel threatened? Why would they engage in balancing behavior? In 2 hypothetical world that has never experienced crime, the concept of security is meaningless. ‘Wale’ statement makes sense if, and only if, we assume the priot exis- tence of a threat. Otherwise, the need for security never arises in the frst place. What triggers secusity dilemmas under anarchy is the possibility of Predatory states exitting among the ranks of the units the system com- prises. Anarchy and self preservation alone are not sufficient to explain the ‘war of all against all or, more specifically, why states should balance eather than bandwagon, and why they should be concemed about relative, not absolute, gains and losses.” ‘Yet, neoeealsts posit that “the ultimate concem Of states is not for power but for security," that is, states seck maximum security not maxi- ‘mum power. By this claim, contemporary realists ignore the very states that Activate the systems and behaviors they seek to explain. Aside from the goal of self preservation, the objectives of the actors, whether they seek to ‘maintain or overthrow the status quo, is of no importance to neotealsts— though it was of great importance to traditional relists, such as Care and ‘Morgenthau. Theories of intemational politics that include only unit-level attributes as causal variables, Wale charges, are reductionist. ‘Treated a8 “ke units” wishing to survive, the states in Waltr’s theory may seek power for selftpreserviion or world dominion. According 10 neorealist logic, however, these unit-level variations do not affect the sta- bility of multipolar or bipolar systems, the formation of balances of power, 12 Keven Ws, Thay ara Pc (Reng Mat: Adon Wey, 179, 5. Pencis Pukuyana makes «sid point: “There i sbeolately no teaca to sae that acy so toch: eral ee shoal fe ened by soar tales fee i aed iim, RCE ton pact ae of War in Neowalit Theory” ia Robert L Rotherg cesT Dg ot Pree 9 ger Wage Cane snd These wate BS 92 REALISM: RESTATEMENTS AND RENEWAL the intensity of the security dilemma, oF the relative-gains problem for in- ternational cooperation. For instance, Waltz says, "In an anarchic domain, a state of war exists if all partes lust for power. So too, however, will a state of wat exist if all states seek ooly to ensure their own safery."> By excluding tunitlevel attbutes from his causal scheme, Waltz carefully resists the se- ductive “urge to reduce”® Unfortunately, structure alone, defined as the smumber of great powers and the anarchic order, cannot account for the ‘outcomes and behaviors Waltz claims to explain. In this estay I argue that neorealism overlooks the importance of revi- sionist goals (nonsecusity expansion) as the driving force—indeed, the sine qua non—behind most of its theoretic concep’. In an effort to deem- phasize state interests, structural realists have adopted, pechaps unwittingly, ‘2 status-quo (oe security) biss in their explanations of intemational politics ‘As a result, neoreait arguments about relative versus absolute guins, the ‘security dilemma, and balancing versus bandwagoning behavior are not ‘only misleading, but they cannot be logically deduced from the theory's assumption of security-secking units, To redress this error, neorealists must ‘bring the revisionist state back in. This means that, as in classical realism, differences in state goals—whether states seek the minimum power re- ‘quited for security or additional power for goals other than security—have to be accorded an equal consideration slong with anarchy and the distribu- sion of capabilities. ‘THE EVOLMON oF STATE INTEREST IN REALST THEORY S.A SYSTEMIC ot thirdimage theory of intemational politics, realism 1st posit some general assumption about the interests of states. Oth- ‘eewise, it would not be possible to assess the international system's causal impact—the degree to which structure shapes, shoves, and constrains states—on the observed outcomes one is aying to explain. Not surprise ingly, the notion of the “true interest” of states hat gone through various ‘stages in the theory’s historical development. Ths section traces this evolu- tion of state interest in realist theory from its initial assumption of greed during the era of power politics, to cultural hegemony in the eatly nine- teenth century, to living space in the late nineteenth century, to revisionist 5. Bid, 4. 6, Wak, Then oferta Poti, 19. Neorealum's States Qee Biase What Stcrity Dilemma? 93 and conservative forces in the eatly postwar period, to its present emphasis fon security. CLASSICAL REALISM, “The late eighteenth century saw the bicth of what is known as the school of the “the doctrine of the interests of states.” During this golden age of power politics, scholars of classical realism argued that the tue interest of states was to be found in a continual striving for grester power and expan- sion, ‘These writer coolly acknowledged that a brutal struggle fot power de- termined the relationship between state. Each state would expand tatil itw advancet were haked by countespessure...The tim of diplomacy ‘was to evaluate correctly the inteplay of opposing forces and interests tnd to create x constellation favorable to conquest and expansion? ‘This characterization of states as greedy, power-maximizers can be traced to Machiaveli’s concept of ambizon, by which he meant a stving for self- advancement at the expense of others.* In chapter 3 of Ii Prindpe, Ma- chiavell says: “The dese to sequire possessions is a very natural and ordi- nary thing, and when those men do it who can do so successfully, they aze always praised and not blamed, but when they cannot and yet want to do so stall cont, they make a mistake deserving of great blame. If France, there- fore, with her own forces could have taken Naples, she ought to have done 10; ifthe could not, she ought not to have shared it [with Spain} "> While condemning domestic of intemal ambizions because it secks to benefit the individual at the expense of the public good, Machiavelli ap- proved of extemal ambizione. Wars of expansion, when successful, improve the general welfare of the conquering state. Consistent with this notion, Machiavelli discounted moral principles and the concept of « universal ‘common good in the context of foreign affairs; intemnational relations is too “Thought” Hing of Pots Thang 3, 0.3 (Winer 1962) 389-5, 32 Neo Michal, Th i and Th Dr (New Yo Radom Ho, 1750), 10, Price, “Amigo In Machiavelie Thought” 430. 94 REALISM: RESTATEMENTS AND RENEWAL serious a business to entertain any form of voluntary self-limitation on the ‘use of force. This is the essence of “power politics,” translated from the Gecman Machipoltk, meaning “the politics of force—the conduct of inter- national relations by force or the threat of force, without consideration of sight of justice." “THE ORGANIC STATE: THE CLASH OF CULTURALIDEAS, "The work of the French philosopher M. Victor Cousin typifies the positiv- istic science and ettional inquiry that flourished in the early nineteenth ‘century. In a sexes of lectures entitled “Course of the History of Modern Philosophy” delivered in Paris in the years 1828-29," Cousin claimed to ‘make history intelligible by combining geological and biological laws in teleological “system” of evolutionary progrestive change." Cousin went so far as to challenge the gallery of two thousand auditors to give him “the sap of a country, its configuration, ite imate, ite waters, its winds, its ‘natural productions, its botany, its zoology, and al its physical geography, and I pledge myself to tell you what will be the man of this country, and ‘what place this country will occupy in history.” Likening nations to organisms, Cousin suggested that every state repre- sents a unique idea and war is nothing else than the violent encoustes, the coacustion of the caclusive ideas of different nations ia this concussion, the idea which stall be mont feeble will be destroyed by the strongest, that i, will be absorbed ty ig..{The} nation which represents the idea most in wecor- dance with the genera sist of the epock, is the nation called ro domin- jon. When the idea of a ation has served its tie, this mation disap- pears butt does not easy ge up its place, it is neceasry that another sation should dispute wit tits place, and should wrest its place from it hence was a ie ey Han Yo a 12. M. Vietoe Cousin, Th Cour af Medrn Phikuply, vl. 1, tans. 0. W. Wight (New eae une the order," he argued, ‘verifiable in all ri ne papa Spee siete ected ae Pe a at bat ee nei Neoreahom’s Status Que Bias: What Sesrity Dilemma? 98 Anticipating the work of Robert Gilpin, Paul Kennedy, and George ‘Modelski, Cousin declared: ‘Every tralyhistoccal nation hasan idea to realize; and when it has suf: ‘icieatly realized it t home, it exports it in some way by wa, it causes it to make the tour of the word; every cvilzaton which advances, ad- vances by conquest. Every hintocca ation it, therefore, for some tine, cengiged in conquests thea, after having beea engaged in conquests, a- ter having entirely displayed itself, after having shown and given to the ‘world al tha was ini afierkaving played is part and fulfilled its des- tiny, it exhaust itaelf it has secved is time, itis itvelf conquered; at that time it quite the wage ofthe world, and philosophy of history abandons it, because it has become useless to humanity.” “These last words echo the thoughts of Johann Gottried von Herder in his celebrated work, Oailner of a Phibsoply of the Hirtory of Max (1800): “Nations floutish and decay; but in 1 faded nation no new flower...ever blooms." In Herder’ Iden, “the history of mankind is pictured a8 a scties of national organisms... After a period of growth, each national organisin ‘manures, makes its contribution to the general scheme of things and then sinks into senility, making way for others which pass through the same cy- ce.” Viewing nations 4 complex “genetic individuals” endowed with a unique “personality,” Herder conceptualized the state as a unitary rational ‘ctor with an autonomous will ofits own®*—an assumption that has since become a Gixtute of modesn realism. Hegel, too, strove to demonstrate that “a nation consists on the one hhand of distinct moments which combine to give itis general character; on ‘the other, it also embodies the opposite principle of individuality, and these 16 Robert Gin, War nd Changi Wirt Palio (New Yor: Cambie Ere Toth, Pat Kcancdy, The Ra tnd Fal of ti Gra Pro Emme oa Ge eae ue Ce Nan, eng 2 (Apel 1978): 214-38. a ii ae 17 Con, Hin of Maes Ply, 11, Rey ation of ex, asi og we pis hn ty Sa Reng,“ 8 no 3 Gummer 9 22 in irc Pip Nl Ewe By el ay Av Ea ght Tras (ew Yok: Coaia Urey Pca 196108 = 1 Rae Reed ey Hrd Ema of Crm Nanni Ye (Octagon Books 1965), 65°F «good duce of Hsdee the mibenee SS arse ic FM re) Sa cd Pe Pgh Fr snot Neuer (Ovo: Czeado, 1965) cape 33 2. Fora calecon of Heer pla wrt, ee J. Hiro Sa! nd Pb Cal- famed FM Bara Cambrge airy Pron 199) 96 REALISM: RESTATEMENTS AND RENEWAL two principles together constitute the realty of the Idea." Like Herder and Cousin, Hegel claimed that the true interest of the state is to expand the unique “Idea” it represents to encompass, if possible, the whole of hu- sanity. At Palan and Bhi assert “In the Hegelian system, the state repre- sents a particular moment in the development of world spit. At this june- ture the state is universalized on the stage of world history by providing + more coherent and rational ordering of sociery."22 ‘While he did not glorify was, Hegel belicved that it performed a neces- sary fonction i the peefection ofthe state: ‘Waria not to be regarded a8 an absolut ei..by its agency. the ethial health of the peoples is preserved in thet indiffereace to the stabliza- tion of fit insiuions; just a8 the blowing ofthe winds preveres the ‘from foulness which would be the result of «long calm, 20 also cot- ‘upéoo ia nations would be the rerlt of prolonged, let alone ‘pesperua!” pence? Constant competition among states and their respective modes of social organization serves to advance all domestic institutions by providing « yardatick by which societies can measure their own internal coherence and For this reason, wat has a teleological and beneficial impact on the internal workings of the state and the creation of universal history. (GEOPOLITICS AND SOCIAL DARWINISM In the 1880s 1 school of German theorists established « new discipline called gepolitik, which applied the principles of geography and politcal sci- cence to the study of the global distubution of political power. In the words of Karl Haushofer, “Geopolitics is the scientific foundation of the art of political action in the life-and-death struggle of state organisms for Labyns- awn. Asserting that 2 state's power and wealth detive from its geo- graphical size, these theorists predicted that the great powers of the furure uh Sea Ee Mey i 7M. Kooe London: Ono Use Pr, EE ae aye gtd Te ratte Ug he ia Saleen eee as ei Remar aera tereate! LEE pean eeoiomeiy eae Goecreertass rma tale ad Et ue His W Wer, Gara Capp Ts aie of apie ce eS a ceudeana Noaruakio’s Status Qe Bias: What Stesrity Dilemma? 97 ‘would be those states that had acquired enough territory and raw materials ‘to achieve economic self-sufficiency > ‘The foundation for geopolitics had been laid by social Darwinism, a czeed that preached the singular importance of the “struggle” itvelf as the sole mechanism of racial progress and evolution. While contemporary real- ists define state interest in terms of the defense of vital interests, social Darwinists asserted that success in conflict, regardless of the intrinsic im- pportance ofthe actual bone of contention, was all that mattered. “To shaink of withdraw from a struggle was therefore, if possible, even more fatal to & nation than to be vanquished. It amounted to a public confession of irre- ” ‘Yer, his chim that states do not pursue power and profit atthe risk of their own security is not entirely convincing. Even if the system does in- dduce balancing behavior, this means that states ate faced with a tradeoff between secunty and power aggrandizement. Itis not clear why they should choote security over expansion. Neorealist logic privileges security over power by assuming that states value what they have mote than what they covet. Empitically, however, many large-scale wars were initiated by pre- cisely thove states that valued expansion more than their own safety. Con- temporary realists are free to assume these states out of existence, but they cannot then claim that their theory explains most great-power behavior in modem history. At a mote basic level, the secutty-before-profit assump- tion is 4 curious one because states secking to augment their territory and resources are, by definition, dissatisfied to some extent with what they cur- cently possess. The key question is, How dissatisfied? IE the state is only somewhat dissatisfied with its current sinuation, the assumption that it will act with concem for its safety and survival seems easonable enough. If the state is profoundly dissatisfied with the stacus que, however, the assumption makes less sense. Such states often sce 26-34. CE Tei, oll Reson: The Long March To Scenic Theo" Seay Se. 2 (ee: 195/90): $106, va nen Slcing ay be 0 of other ste’ reaction to an or atc atin pci oe dinachon ih xpnder of ego ofthe 5 Wl The Inia Pol, 28 oy ies vw of at the ten duce ser Randal 1” Sehuelet,“Buadgnig For Prod: Banging the Revisoust Beck ing” Iman Say 9; 0.1 (wer 94) 72-07. 56 Wal, "Warn Neral Theory,” 9. 57, Fareed alain “Realm nd Domestic Poi A Review Ease" Inrastioa Seariy 17,01 Geunener 1952, 191 Neerealism’s Stat Qua Biar: What Seorty Dikrema? 107 themelves possessing litle of value. Like terminally ill patients, very bun- ‘7 Mates are willing to take great cisks—even if losing the gamble means extinction—to is their condition, which they consider intolesable. Uninhibited by the fear of loss, they are free to pursuc teckless expansion. History is replete with examples of states whose first concern was to ‘naximize (or at least significantly increase) their power, who risked their security to improve, not maintain, their positions in the eystem. Alexander the Great, Rome, the Arabs in the seventh and eighth centuties, Chatles V, Philip 1, Napoleon t, and Hider all usted for universal empire and waged all-or-nothing, apocalyptic wars to attain it. Yet, not all states whose central goa is to increase theit power, let us call them revisionist states, seek world dominion. Some limit their expansionist ‘gotls to continental, regional, or local preponderance. Outstanding his- torical examples of limited-sims revisionist powers include: in the eight- ceenth century, Frederick the Great, Louis xv, Peter the Great, Catherine and Louis x1; in the nineteenth century, Metternich, Cavour, Napoleon tt, Bismarck; and in the twentieth century, Wilhelm 1, Mussolini, Matruoks, is ill-fated decision to fight on in 1985, when Iraq was suing for peace and there was litde hope of a wider Iranian victory, only to accept defeat in 1988, lusteates the problem with strictly securty-based explana- tions of state behavior # Iran fought not for survival but for total victory in ws Guy oon chap. Sand 9: Morgnts ase hopes ats tellnied,comincwal ot locined (Bd, 36-38, He so aes dc diferent fact see ES Eo Seecemes mene Deere (ibacx Comme Un 108 REALISM: RESTATEMENTS AND RENEWAL ‘var is not only 2 blessing for the world and all nations: itis form of cul- tural therapy. Tis precisely these states, whose objectives are to maximize their power ‘ot greatly increate it, that tigger balancing behavior. Such states do not prefer to join the weaker side, as Waltz chims. To modify the established btder, the revisionist coalition must games preponderant power, “balanced means the renunciation of their ultimate national goal: « substantial change in the existing order." ‘Seeking power and change, evisionist states side with the coalition call ing for a New Orde, pecially when itis stronger than the status-quo coalion. Even status-quo states, for that matter, sometimes bandwagon with the stronger side rather than balancing against it, Consides, for in- stance, the object of US. alliance policy ducing the years 1946-53. In a nar- row tease, US behavior was consistent with neotealist logic: alliances were formed to balance the Sino-Soviet Communist bloc for the purpose of achieving geeater security for America and its allies. More generally, how- fever, the aim of US policy was not merely negative and defensive. As Paul [Nitze argued at the time, the United States was competing with the Soviet ‘Union and its allies for the positive goal of deciding who would construct a new international order. Both sides expected, and at various times were beneficiaries of, “wave of the future”-type bandwagoning. In the end, the collapse of Soviet power in 1989, was accompanied by states in Eastem Europe bandwagoning with the West, contrary to the predictions of balanc- ing theory but entirely consistent with the original bancwagoning logic of ‘America’s cold-war strategy The general point is that interests, values, ideology, and strategic beliefs ar, in many cases, just as important as imbal- ances of power or threat in determining how states choose sides and why they wage war 61. Foe view of war as therpy, see Vamik lian, Tir Ned te Hae Baie "Fw Cla Pac borat (Noctiale, N= Jason AC ‘onuon, 1968) Volkan, diecnes the pects of the Tea Lag war ad ft on Seton wo the tae of Shite fundamental dung the iranian revolvon (62. Wolfers, “The Balance of Power” 126. 15, Paul H Nitze, “Conlon Policy aod the Concept of Weld Onde" in liana Pb ix the Cid War cd Arvold Wolfers (alemnor:Johos Hoplans University Press, 1959), 15-30 t,See Fareed Zalacn, “The Reagan Strategy of Coominment,” Pra Sara Qnatriy 105, 0. 3 (ll 1990), 392. Neoreaiom’s Stabes,Que Bias: What Seerity Dikmma? 109 [DEFENSIVE POSITIONALISTS AND RATIONAL ECOISTS Nena tenet is that states under anarchy fear for their sus- vival as sovereign actors. This is what distinguishes modern realism ‘rom the competing neoliberal and accounts for the two theo- fies differing views about the problem of international coopertion. Gricco explains: Neoliberals argue that they accept the salience of anarchy, which they say means that..states fear being cheated by others. Yet realists argue ‘that anarchy means that states fear not just being cheated but also being, dominated or even destroyed by others. As « esul, while neoliberal see ‘sates as ‘ational egoist’ interested in their own utility, realist view states a2 what I have called ‘defensive posionalis’ interested in achieving and maintaining relative capabilites sufficieat to remain secure ‘and independent in the seléhelp contest of international anarchy. In turn, while neoliberals focus on the problem of cheating for coopert- tion, seats argue that an equally big problem is the fear oa the part of ‘some states that others might achieve disproportionate gains and thereby become more domineering friends or even potentially mote adversaries. Realits therefore argue that states must solve both the cheating and the slative-gnins problem in order to achieve coopers- ‘As a realist myself, I agree with most of this passage. Yet, I disagree with the view that aff suites are defensive positionalists and not rational egoists My reasons for this disagreement, however, are entiely different from ‘hore put forth by the neoliberal school First, and less important for the purposes of this essay, the distinction between relative and absohite gains is somewhat artificial. According to the eorealist porition, state A will tum down a cooperative arrangement with 65 Jonegh M. Gazco, the Probe of Iteeaional Cooperation: Tee ae Te Go edie eo Haak Tice a Bal wma ‘ow end Neder, 303 cophass in vga 16, For the eecibenlncorealat debe on this theme, see Joueph N. Griec, Cnprtin song Nets Eure, Avra ood NewTanf Barins Trat (ehace: Cor Uaiveraty ‘res, 1990, Gece *Ararhy and the Limits of Cooperation A Realist Cinque of the ‘Newest iden fnsturionasen” Iatrnadon! Oem 42, a0. 3 (ummer 1986) 485-507; ober O. Keohane, far Hagen "ou Disord tv be Worl Patel Eman ncn: Pont Univ Pn 194, Rebet Poway “Aba nd Rees Gast {$0d-d0, Duncan Soi. “Réaive Gos and the Pater of Inerentonsl Cooperston” Anrinn Paes Se Ren 85, no. 3 (Septem: 1991): 71-26, Seda, “Lteeatona Relatve Gaine Maserizers” ntrnans Ste S004 ‘Cooperation (Deccober 1991) 387-402; Helen Me, “Iterasonal Theosee of Cooperation among ‘Netone Sregtha and Weaknesses” Word Pats #4, 00.3 (Apel 1992): 466-6. 110 REALISM RESTATEMENTS AND RENEWAL state B in which both sides make gains bat 8 achieves greater gains than A. “The logic is that anarchy forces states to be security, not power, maximiz~ ces. The problem with this argument is: if accepts ¥'s offer, it might be less secure with respect to 8, but by increasing its absolute capabilites A will be in a eelatvely better postion vs-i-vis all outsiders to the agreement. “Moreover, suppose that another state, C, accepts 8's offer. a, having re- fased to cooperate with 8, is now relatively less secure with respect to both 2 and ¢. In other worde, 4 loses two ways instead of one: it is weaker both in absolute and relative terms. In addition, 8 might be less ikely to seek future cooperation with 4, and may even be hostile t0 A, because it has proven to be « distrusting friend. In short, the realist view of the relative. {gains problem is misleading bectuse it does not take into account outside targets of comparison and alternative scenarios, chat is, that another state will accept the offer despite the gap in guins advantaging its parmner(s).7 ‘Second, the assumption of defensive positionality is inconsistent with Classical realism’s recognition of the importance of power in deciding who gets what in intemational relations. Suppose revisionist states A,B, and C are partitioning state D, and the relative power ratios of A, B, and C are 4:3:2 respectively. To maintain the proportionate strengths of the theee aggressor ‘states, state D should be dismembered in a ratio of 4:3:2 with the strongest state gaining the lion's share of the spoils. According to defensive post tionalists, however, 4, ®, and ¢ will only consummate the deal if state D is divided equally among the three states, since this formula avoids gape in ‘gains advantaging any of the partners. An equal division of the spoils, how- lever, slters the power ratios among the three states to the advantage of the weaker states—not what relism’s focus on power would lead us to expect. Tn discussing the relative-gains problem, Gtieco repeatedly confuses the term “unequal gain” to mean disproportionate gain and relative advantage. He writes, for example: “The main cealist statement about the relativegains pproblem...makes it clear that for realists, the emergence of the problem is [predicated upon the prospect of gains that sre unequal and lead to a change in relative position among partners.” Later, in his extique of Duncan Sni- daf’s relative-gains model, Grieco again equates unequal guins with 2 loss ia relative position: “In short, Snidal presents us with the following line of analysis: by axvanption, states ceceive equal gains from cooperation or readily 2. Whe Sail ex ti pe of bea “defensive competion," ican jut cay be te eB a ees Seen Coops 01 Pat ‘Ertaragocten about why sti une concres ay promote Cooperation ee Keohane, ‘Aosctaoad Theor” 277 “Gao, "The Relate Gains Probl," 730 (emphasis in ga Neorelio’s Stata: Quo Bias: What Srorty Dilemma? 111 redress gaps if they arise; therefore, states do not suffer losses in relative position if they cooperate..." ‘Geieco's confusion on this point echoes the error made by Waltz when he wrote: “If an expected gain ia to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to fone, one state may Use its daprperonat ain to implement a policy to darn- age ot destroy the other.”” If one of the partner is twice a8 strong 28 the ‘other, however, a two-to-one division in favor of the stronger state is not a

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