LINA JOY V MAJLIS WP

2 0 0 7
Appellant was a Malay woman born on 8 January 1964, brought up as a Muslim
and her given name is Azlina bte Jailani.
21 February 1997; she applied to national Registration Department (NRD) to
change her name to Lina Lelani. Statutory reason: she had renounced Islam for
Christianity as she intended to marry a Christian.
Application was rejected by NRD without any reason (11 August 1997) so she
made second application for name change to Lina Joy on 15 March 1999.
Ultimately, in October 1999, her application for change of name was approved but
her replaced identity card (IC) states that her religion as Islam. Lina Joy made an
application to NRD office to remove the statement “Islam” and her original name
from her replacement IC. Lina Joy did not file an application with the Sharia Court.
ART 11. FC
CASE SUMMARY
The High Court rejected her application, as did the Court of Appeal (in 2005) and Federal
Court of Appeal (in 2007). Each court consistently decided that the civil courts did not have
jurisdiction to hear applications for conversion out of Islam. The civil courts also did not
have the authority to order the NRD to remove the word Islam from Lina Joy’s NRIC. NRD
refused her application on the ground that it was incomplete without an order of the Syariah
Court to the effect that she had renounced Islam. Lina Joy then sought legal remedies.
the Federal Court of Malaysia ultimately refused to recognize Lina Joy’s conversion from
Islam to Christianity. As a consequence, her marriage is considered invalid by the state.
She was forced into hiding, afraid to start a family, because any children she had would be
considered Muslim by the state and could on those grounds be taken away from her
Christian mother. Given that the state would view her marriage as invalid, children could
also be treated as “evidence of adultery.”
 HELD
The court dismissed the application on basis;
Article 11 of the FC speaks of freedom of religion but this did not mean that the plaintiff was to be given the
freedom of choice to profess and practice the religion of her choice. The issue of change of a person's religion
is directly connected to the rights and obligations of that person as a Muslim and this is an affair of Muslim
falling under the first defendant's jurisdiction provided by art 11(3)(a) of the FC read with s 7(1) of the 1993 Act.
Article 11(1) should not be read in isolation. It must be construed harmoniously with the other relevant
provisions on Islam, namely, art 3(1), 12(2), 74(2), 121(1A) and 160 (where a Malay is defined as a person who
professes the religion of Islam). The declaration in art 3(1) has the consequence of qualifying a Muslim's
absolute right to murtad in art 11(1) by requiring the compliance to the relevant syariah laws on apostasy
enacted pursuant to art 74 List II
The plaintiff cannot hide behind the provision of art 11(1) of the FC without first settling the issue of renunciation
of her religion (Islam) with the religious authority which has the right to manage its own religious affairs under
art 11(3)(a) of the FC. Since the plaintiff was still a Muslim, art 121(1A) provides that the finality of her decision
to convert out of Islam was within the competency of a Syariah Court, and not the civil courts
 ISSUES
1. Whether NRD is entitled in law to impose a requirement for deleting the entry of Islam
in Lina Joy’s IC that she produce a certificate or a declaration or an order from the
Syariah court that she has apostatized?
2. Whether NRD has correctly construed its power under the National
Registration Regulations 1990, in particular reg. 4 and 14, to impose the requirement
as stated above when it is not expressly provided for in the Regulations?
3. Whether Soon Singh was rightly decided when it adopted the implied jurisdiction
theory propounded in Md Hakim Lee v. Majlis Agama [1997] 3 CLJ Supp 419 in
preference to Ng Wan Chan v Majlis Agama (No.2) [1991] 3 MLJ 487 and Lim Chan
Seng v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam [1996] 3 CLJ 231, which declared that unless
an express jurisdiction is conferred on the Syariah Court, the civil courts will retain
their jurisdiction.
 ISSUE 1: NRD ENTITLED
Ahmad Fairuz CJ: if NRD accepts one’s declaration that he or she has converted out from the
religion of Islam, then NRD could run the risk of wrongfully certify a person as non-Muslim who in
fact, according to the Islamic laws, he or she is still a Muslim.
NRD has made a correct decision that mere statutory declaration by the applicant is not
adequate to remove the statement “Islam” from a Muslim’s IC: matters of converting out of the
religion of Islam is a matter related to Islamic laws. If the Court rules that the decision made by
NRD is unreasonable, this would mean that the Court wants the NRD to accept the facts that
under Islamic laws, a Muslim can be regarded as converted out of Islam and is no longer a Muslim
when he says that he has been converted out. This raises issues that it contradicts Art 11.
His Lordship viewed that Article 11 requires Muslim to abide with the practice and rules
of Islam, in particular when it comes to the issue of converting out of Islam.
A person desires to convert out of a religion shall follow the practice, rules and requirements as
prescribed by that religion. Only when all requirements for converting out of Islam are followed and
the relevant authorities under the Islamic laws have certified the apostasy, Lina Joy is considered a
non-Muslim, or a Christian in her case

ISSUE 2: nrd IS RIGHT

Richard Malanjum FC: NRD had acted beyond the requirements stated in the National Registration
Regulations 1990. NRD should consider Lina Joy’s application within the context of the said
regulations and should not bring in any extraneous factor. Lina Joy claimed she had never professed
or practiced Islam since birth, she even embraced Christianity and had been baptized.
It is not the function of NRD to ensure that Lina Joy has properly apostatized as such matter should
be left to the relevant authorities. The decision made by the NRD to request order or certificate of
apostasy from the Syariah Court is legally irrelevant, and has acted ultra vires its power under the
regulations, besides being irrational and unreasonable and breach of natural justice
Chief Justice took into account the public interest in reaching his conclusion, if the Court permits
Muslim to convert out of Islam at his/her own wishes and fancies, the Muslim society would be in
chaos. In the circumstance, consideration of public interests override individual interest.

ISSUE 3: SOON SINGH CASE IS RIGHTLY DECIDED

Dr Cyrus Das; case wrongly decided. The case stated that the Syariah Court’s jurisdiction derived
from the State List described in Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, it does not need to be expressly
granted by an Act of Legislatives. Soon Singh case fails to differentiate between the power to make
law on a subject matter and the law enactment itself. The entries in the list are merely heads or
fields of legislation, which demarcate the area over which the appropriate legislature can operates.
Ahmad Fairuz FCJ: disagreed with Cyrus; since Syariah Court has been clearly given the
jurisdiction to adjudge matters relating to embracing Islam, it is only logic and by necessary
implication, the Syariah Court has jurisdiction to adjudge matters on conversion out of Islam or
apostasy
fin