REMEDIAL LAW Hernando CDD 2023

SBCA
CENTRALIZED
BAR
OPERATIONS
CASE DIGESTS
& DOCTRINES 2023
D&D
CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
#HERNANDOITBAR2023
REMEDIAL
Law
#HernanDoItBar2023 #ParaSaBARyan
THAT IN ALL THINGS, GOD MAY BE GLORIFIED
SBCA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
This work is the intellectual property of the SAN BEDA COLLEGE
ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW and SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG
CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 2023. It is intended solely for the
use of the individuals to which it is addressed – the Bedan
community.
Publication, reproduction, dissemination, and distribution, or

copying of the document without the prior consent of the SAN BEDA
COLLEGE ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW CENTRALIZED BAR
OPERATIONS ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2023 is strictly prohibited.
Material includes both cases penned by Justice Hernando and recent

landmark cases decided by the Supreme Court.
COPYRIGHT © 2023
SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW
SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 2023
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED BY THE AUTHORS.
CASE DIGESTS
JURISDICTION
Doctrines of Hierarchy of Courts and Adherence to Jurisdiction
PALAFOX JR. V. MENDIOLA 1
OLIVIA D. LEONES v. HON. CARLITO CORPUZ, ET AL. 3
VILLAFUERTE V. SEC 6
PROVINCE OF BATAAN V. CASIMIRO 9
Jurisdiction of Various Philippine Courts and Tribunals

Court of Appeals
PHILAM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Inc. v. DE LUNA 11
Sandiganbayan
ZALDIVAR-PEREZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN 13
Aspects of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over the Parties
JORGENTICS SWINE IMPROVEMENT CORPORATION V. THICK 15
& THIN AGRI-PRODUCTS INC.
Jurisdiction v. Exercise of Jurisdiction 17

HEIRS OF BORRAS V. BORRAS
Jurisdiction over Cases Covered by Barangay Conciliation

NGO V. GABELO 19
CIVIL PROCEDURE
General Provisions
PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN FIFTH DIVISION 21
EDDA V. HENSON vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 25
Cause of Action
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. PTT PHILIPPINES TRADING 27
CORP.
ASIS V. HEIRS OF CALIGNAWAN 30
SANTOS VENTURA HORCORMA FOUNDATION INC. v. 33
MABALACAT INSTITUTE
Parties to Civil Actions

PNB-REPUBLIC BANK V. SIAN-LIMSIACO 35
TESDA v. ABRAGAR 37
CASE DIGESTS
Pleadings
Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
ALPHA PLUS INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES CORP. V. 39
PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORP.
Filing and Service

Rules on Payment of Docket Fees; Effect of Non-Payment
BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. CIR 42
Efficient Use of Paper; E-filing (A.M. No. 10-3-7-SC and A.M. No. 11-9-
4-SC, as revised, approved on February 22, 2022)
RAMOS-YEO V. SPOUSES CHUA 45
Summons
Personal Service
SABADO VS. SABADO 48
Pre-Trial
Appearance of Parties; Effects of Failure to Appear
GEMINA V. HEIRS OF ESPEJO JR. 50
Intervention
COMMISSION ON AUDIT v. PAMPILO, JR. 52
Judgment and Final Orders

Summary Judgment
ALJEM’S CREDIT INVESTOR CO. V. SPOUSES BAUTISTA 55
Post-Judgment Remedies
Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration
RAMIREZ v. ELOMINA 57
AROMIN v. HEIRS OF SOMIS 59
Appeals
PARAYDAY v. SHOGUN SHIPPING CO., INC. 62
BRUAL V. CONTRERAS 64
MEGA FISHING CORP V. ESTATE OF GONZALES 67
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. TICO INSURANCE 70
PEOPLE V. MALLARI 72
TANINGCO V. HERNANDEZ 74
EASTWEST BANKING CORPORATION V. CRUZ 76
CASE DIGESTS
HORCA v. PEOPLE 79
GABUTINA V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN 81
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION V. ALO 83
MONTERDE V. JACINTO 86
GRANA vs. PEOPLE 89
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. QUILIT 90
LOPEZ V. SALUDO, JR. 94
BELARSO v. QUALITY HOUSE, INC. 97
TELETECH CUSTOMER CARE MANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC. 99
v. GERONA, JR.
REPUBLIC V. KIKUCHI 102
EQUITABLE PCI V. MANILA ADJUSTERS AND SURVEYORS 104
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v. SENO JR. 106
REPUBLIC V. CASTILLO 108
KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES v. TIONGCO 110
PACIFIC ROYAL BASIC FOODS, INC. v. NOCHE 113
Annulment of Judgment
CALUBAD V. ACERON 117
ANCHETA V. CAMBAY 120
GAOIRAN V. CA 123
Execution, Satisfaction, and Effect of Judgment

ANGONO MEDICS HOSPITAL V. AGABIN 125
VILLAROMAN V. ESTATE OF ARCIAGA 127
PNB V. DARADAR 130
PINEDA V. MIRANDA 133
LINDEN SUITES, INC. vs. MERIDIEN FAR EAST PROPERTIES, INC. 136
HEIRS OF CASIÑO, SR. V. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE 139
PHILIPPINES, MALAYBALAY BRANCH, BUKIDNON
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
Preliminary Attachment
CHUA V. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION 142
DUMARAN V. LLAMEDO 144
Preliminary Injunction
METROPLEX BERTHAD V. SINOPHIL CORP. 146
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SPOUSES DE JESUS 149
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS v. COURT OF APPEALS-CAGAYAN DE 152
ORO STATION
CASE DIGESTS
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus
Definition and Distinctions
PEOPLE V. SERGIO 155
INTER-ISLAND INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC. v. CA 159
DORMIDO V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN 161
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL BANK V. LAGUNA NAVIGATION, 164
INC.
DY BUNCIO V. RAMOS 167
Requisites, When and Where to File

PURISIMA JR. V. PURISIMA 169
PHILHEALTH. v. USSH (Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital) 172
REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF BORJA 174
PATDU JR. v. CARPIO-MORALES 178
DEBUQUE V. NILSON 181
CERVANTES V. AQUINO 183
METRO RAIL TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. 185
TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT ADVERTISING, VENDING AND
PROMOTIONS, INC.
MAYNILAD WATER SERVICES INC. V. SECRETARY OF 188
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Expropriation
Ascertainment of Just Compensation
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ESCARO 190
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

SPOUSES LIU V. ESPINOSA 194
TINA V. STA. CLARA ESTATE 197
PALAJOS V. ABAD 199
DAYRIT V. NORQUILLAS 201
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. V. MABALACAT 204
INSTITUTE, INC.
Contempt
HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL, INC v. LA FILIPINA 206
UYGONGCO CORP
CASE DIGESTS
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIAL WRITS

Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons
Venue and Processes
ENDE v. ROMAN CATHOLIC PRELATE OF THE PRELATURE 208
NULLIUS OF COTABATO, INC.
Sales, Mortgages, and Other Encumbrances of Property of
Decedent
RAMON JACINTO v. ATTY. BENEDICT LITONJUA 211
Writ of Habeas Corpus

MIGUEL V. DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS 214
Writ of Amparo
MORADA V. RIAS 216
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Prosecution of Offenses
TALABIS V. PEOPLE 218
RADAZA V. SANDIGANBAYAN 221
PEOPLE V. BERNABE EULALIO y ALEJO 223
KHO V. SUMMERVILLE GENERAL MERCHANDISING & CO. 226
Arrest
Arrest without Warrant; When Unlawful 229
ROLANDO UY Y SAYAN V. PEOPLE
EVIDENCE
Direct and Circumstantial Evidence
PEOPLE v. AL-SAAD y BAGKAT 232
Object (Real) Evidence

Exclusionary Rules
PEOPLE V. HERNANDEZ 234
Documentary Evidence
Parol Evidence Rule
SAO PAULO ALPARGATAS S.A. v. KENTEX MANUFACTURING 236
CORPORATION AND ONG KING GUAN
CASE DIGESTS
EVIDENCE
Testimonial Evidence
Qualification of Witnesses
PEOPLE v. GALUGA y WAD-AS 238
PEOPLE V. LACRETE 241
PEOPLE v. SANTIAGO 243
PEOPLE v. XXX 245
PEOPLE V. CABALES 248
Hearsay and Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule

ARRIOLA V. PEOPLE 250
Burden of Proof and Presumptions

CIR V. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION 253
PRIETO v. CAJIMAT 256
GERODIAS V. RIVERAL 258
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORP. V. UY 260
MAULANA v. NOEL, Jr. 262
CASE DOCTRINES
JURISDICTION
Doctrines of Hierarchy of Courts and Adherence to Jurisdiction
PALAFOX JR. V. MENDIOLA 264
OLIVIA D. LEONES v. HON. CARLITO CORPUZ, ET AL. 264
VILLAFUERTE V. SEC 266
PROVINCE OF BATAAN V. CASIMIRO 266
Jurisdiction of Various Philippine Courts and Tribunals

Court of Appeals
PHILAM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Inc. v. DE LUNA 267
Sandiganbayan
ZALDIVAR-PEREZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN 267
Aspects of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over the Parties
JORGENTICS SWINE IMPROVEMENT CORPORATION V. THICK 268
& THIN AGRI-PRODUCTS INC.
Jurisdiction v. Exercise of Jurisdiction 268

Jurisdiction over Cases Covered by Barangay Conciliation

NGO V. GABELO 269
CIVIL PROCEDURE
General Provisions
PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN FIFTH DIVISION 269
EDDA V. HENSON vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 271
Cause of Action
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. PTT PHILIPPINES TRADING 271
CORP.
ASIS V. HEIRS OF CALIGNAWAN 272
SANTOS VENTURA HORCORMA FOUNDATION INC. v. 272
MABALACAT INSTITUTE
Parties to Civil Actions

PNB-REPUBLIC BANK V. SIAN-LIMSIACO 273
TESDA v. ABRAGAR 273
CASE DOCTRINES
Pleadings
Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
ALPHA PLUS INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES CORP. V. 274
PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORP.
Filing and Service

Rules on Payment of Docket Fees; Effect of Non-Payment
BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. CIR 275
Efficient Use of Paper; E-filing (A.M. No. 10-3-7-SC and A.M. No. 11-9-
4-SC, as revised, approved on February 22, 2022)
RAMOS-YEO V. SPOUSES CHUA
276
Summons
Personal Service
SABADO VS. SABADO 277
Pre-Trial
Appearance of Parties; Effects of Failure to Appear
GEMINA V. HEIRS OF ESPEJO JR. 277
Intervention
COMMISSION ON AUDIT v. PAMPILO, JR. 278
Judgment and Final Orders

Summary Judgment
ALJEM’S CREDIT INVESTOR CO. V. SPOUSES BAUTISTA 278
Post-Judgment Remedies
Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration
RAMIREZ v. ELOMINA 279
AROMIN v. HEIRS OF SOMIS 279
Appeals
PARAYDAY v. SHOGUN SHIPPING CO., INC. 280
BRUAL V. CONTRERAS 281
MEGA FISHING CORP V. ESTATE OF GONZALES 281
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. TICO INSURANCE 282
PEOPLE V. MALLARI 282
TANINGCO V. HERNANDEZ 283
EASTWEST BANKING CORPORATION V. CRUZ 284
CASE DIGESTS
HORCA v. PEOPLE 284

GABUTINA V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN 285
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION V. ALO 286
MONTERDE V. JACINTO 287
GRANA vs. PEOPLE 287
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. QUILIT 288
LOPEZ V. SALUDO, JR. 288
BELARSO v. QUALITY HOUSE, INC. 289
TELETECH CUSTOMER CARE MANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC. 290
v. GERONA, JR.
REPUBLIC V. KIKUCHI 290
EQUITABLE PCI V. MANILA ADJUSTERS AND SURVEYORS 291
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v. SENO JR. 292
REPUBLIC V. CASTILLO 292
KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES v. TIONGCO 293
PACIFIC ROYAL BASIC FOODS, INC. v. NOCHE 294
Annulment of Judgment
CALUBAD V. ACERON 295
ANCHETA V. CAMBAY 295
GAOIRAN V. CA 296
Execution, Satisfaction, and Effect of Judgment

ANGONO MEDICS HOSPITAL V. AGABIN 297
VILLAROMAN V. ESTATE OF ARCIAGA 297
PNB V. DARADAR 298
PINEDA V. MIRANDA 299
LINDEN SUITES, INC. vs. MERIDIEN FAR EAST PROPERTIES, INC. 299
HEIRS OF CASIÑO, SR. V. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE 300
Preliminary Attachment
CHUA V. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION 301
DUMARAN V. LLAMEDO 302
Preliminary Injunction
METROPLEX BERTHAD V. SINOPHIL CORP. 302
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SPOUSES DE JESUS 303
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS v. COURT OF APPEALS-CAGAYAN DE 304
ORO STATION
CASE DIGESTS

Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus
Definition and Distinctions
PEOPLE V. SERGIO 305
INTER-ISLAND INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC. v. CA 306
DORMIDO V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN 306
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL BANK V. LAGUNA NAVIGATION, 307
INC.
DY BUNCIO V. RAMOS 307
Requisites, When and Where to File

PURISIMA JR. V. PURISIMA 308
PHILHEALTH. v. USSH (Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital) 309
REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF BORJA 309
PATDU JR. v. CARPIO-MORALES 310
DEBUQUE V. NILSON 311
CERVANTES V. AQUINO 312
METRO RAIL TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. 312
TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT ADVERTISING, VENDING AND
PROMOTIONS, INC.
MAYNILAD WATER SERVICES INC. V. SECRETARY OF 313
Expropriation
Ascertainment of Just Compensation
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ESCARO 313
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

SPOUSES LIU V. ESPINOSA 314
TINA V. STA. CLARA ESTATE 314
PALAJOS V. ABAD 315
DAYRIT V. NORQUILLAS 315
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. V. MABALACAT 316
INSTITUTE, INC.
Contempt
HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL, INC v. LA FILIPINA 316
UYGONGCO CORP
CASE DIGESTS

Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons
Venue and Processes
ENDE v. ROMAN CATHOLIC PRELATE OF THE PRELATURE 317
NULLIUS OF COTABATO, INC.
Sales, Mortgages, and Other Encumbrances of Property of
Decedent
RAMON JACINTO v. ATTY. BENEDICT LITONJUA 317
Writ of Habeas Corpus

MIGUEL V. DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS 318
Writ of Amparo
MORADA V. RIAS 319
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Prosecution of Offenses
TALABIS V. PEOPLE 319
RADAZA V. SANDIGANBAYAN 320
PEOPLE V. BERNABE EULALIO y ALEJO 321
KHO V. SUMMERVILLE GENERAL MERCHANDISING & CO. 321
Arrest
Arrest without Warrant; When Unlawful
ROLANDO UY Y SAYAN V. PEOPLE 322
EVIDENCE
Direct and Circumstantial Evidence
PEOPLE v. AL-SAAD y BAGKAT 322
Object (Real) Evidence

Exclusionary Rules
PEOPLE V. HERNANDEZ 323
Documentary Evidence
Parol Evidence Rule
SAO PAULO ALPARGATAS S.A. v. KENTEX MANUFACTURING 323
CASE DIGESTS
EVIDENCE
Testimonial Evidence
Qualification of Witnesses
PEOPLE v. GALUGA y WAD-AS 324
PEOPLE V. LACRETE 325
PEOPLE v. SANTIAGO 325
PEOPLE v. XXX 326
PEOPLE V. CABALES 326
Hearsay and Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule

ARRIOLA V. PEOPLE 327
Burden of Proof and Presumptions

CIR V. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION 327
PRIETO v. CAJIMAT 328
GERODIAS V. RIVERAL 328
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORP. V. UY 329
MAULANA v. NOEL, Jr. 329
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
caseS
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
JURISDICTION
PALAFOX VS MENDIOLA
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 209551 February 15, 2021
JURISDICTION - DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS
DOCTRINE
Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is
improper because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in
order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to
devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing
the overcrowding of its docket.
FACTS
This case stemmed from the Complaint for Damages filed by Sen. Angara against
Palafox, Jr., wherein Sen. Angara alleged that Palafox, Jr. authored an unsigned letter
containing defamatory statements against him. In the Complaint, Sen. Angara indicated
that he was holding office in Pasay City.
In his Answer, Palafox, Jr. argued that the venue was improperly laid since the
Complaint was filed in the RTC of Pasay City instead of Makati City where both parties
reside. He then moved to set the preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses, raising
such issue of improper venue, among others. Sen. Angara opposed this motion and pointed
out that Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code allows the filing of the civil action where
the public officer holds office. In response, Palafox, Jr. argued that Article 360 is
inapplicable because the action involved is a civil action for damages and not a criminal
action for libel.
The trial court held that the venue was proper since the filing of a separate civil
action for damages where the public officer holds office is allowed under Article 360.
Palafox, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court.
Thus, this Petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE
Was the filing of the Petition for Certiorari in the Supreme Court proper?
HELD
No, the filing of the Petition for Certiorari in the Supreme Court was not proper.
The Court dismissed the Petition for violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts.
1
In the case of Dy v. Bibat-Palamos, the Court held that under the principle of
hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is improper because the Supreme Court
is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform
its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its docket.
Nonetheless, the invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
has been allowed in certain instances on the ground of special and important reasons
clearly stated in the petition, such as, (1) when dictated by the public welfare and the
advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice; (3)
when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and
compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of
the case.
Here, Palafox, Jr. filed his Petition directly to this Court despite the concurrent
jurisdiction of the appellate court. Significantly, he did not bother to provide any reason
or explanation to justify his noncompliance to the rule on hierarchy of courts. Further,
when he was required to reply to Sen. Angara's Comment containing the latter's argument
on the violation of hierarchy of courts, he simply manifested his adoption of his previous
arguments in the Petition. This constitutes a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts and
merits the dismissal of the Petition.
2
OLIVIA D. LEONES V. HON. CARLITO CORPUZ, ET AL.
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 204106 November 17, 2021
DOCTRINE
Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA in petitions
for certiorari, a direct resort is allowed only when there are special or compelling reasons
that justify the same, to wit:
1) When dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public policy;
2) When demanded by the broader interest of justice;
3) When the challenged orders were patent nullities; or
4) When analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and
justified the immediate and direct handling of the case.
Leones also ignored the qualifying conditions for certiorari , viz.:

1) One must show that the respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and
2) There is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
For res judicata to bar a subsequent action, the following elements must be
present:
1) The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
2) The decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties;
3) The disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
4) There must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action.
A compromise agreement must contain the same elements of a valid contract:

1) Consent of the parties;
2) Object certain that is the subject matter of the compromise; and
3) Cause of the obligation established.
FACTS
Olivia D. Leones (Leones), herein petitioner was appointed municipal treasurer of
the Municipality of Bacnotan, La Union (Municipality of Bacnotan). During Leones' stint in
the Provincial Treasurer's Office, she was not paid her Representation and Transportation
Allowances (RATA). Leones sued for mandamus before the regional trial courts (RTC) of
San Fernando, La Union against the officers of the Municipality of Bacnotan. The suit was
3
dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the dismissal. Leones then wrote the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) and DBM Secretary Boncodin responded that Leones was entitled to RATA only for
the fiscal year of 1999.
Unsatisfied, Leones filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. She sought to
compel Boncodin & Ma. Minda Fontanilla (Minda), herein respondent, then Municipal
Mayor of Bacnotan, La Union, to pay her RATA. CA ordered Boncodin and Minda to pay
Leones' RATA "from December 1996 up to the present or during the entire period of her
reassignment. This Court affirmed the CA's Decision in G.R. No. 169726.
Leones' RATA, however, remained unpaid. She again filed a petition for mandamus
against Rufino Fontanilla (Rufino), incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Bacnotan at
the time, before the RTC, Branch 27, City of San Fernando, La Union docketed as SCA No.
007-11. Proposals for amicable settlement ensued and the case ended in a compromise
between Leones and Mayor Rufino (Compromise Agreement):
4. [Leones], upon fulfillment of the above conditions, shall obligate

herself to retire from her position on May 31, 2012;.
Leones then learned that she was dropped from the payrolls of the Municipality of
Bacnotan. She was also told to stop reporting for work. Mayor Rufino then filed a motion
for issuance of a writ of execution of the compromise agreement. The RTC granted and
issued the writ prayed for. The sheriff, however, returned the writ, stating that the same
had been served but Leones refused to comply. Leones moved to quash the writ of
execution of the compromise agreement. Mayor Rufino opposed Leones' motion to quash.
The RTC upheld the compromise judgment. Aggrieved by the RTC's ruling, Leones sought
recourse directly to this Court via the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE
1. Did Leones fail to observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts?
2. Did the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 169726 constitute res judicata in Special Civil
Action No. 007-11?
3. Is the compromise agreement and compromise judgment null and void?
HELD
1. Yes. From the RTC, Leones skipped the appellate tribunal and proceeded straight to
this Court for recourse. This is an open disregard of the hierarchy of courts. Although
this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA in petitions for certiorari, a direct
resort is allowed only when there are special or compelling reasons that justify the
same. Leones' cause against the jurisdiction of the RTC is far too generic, personal, and
non-transcendental to fall under any of these four exceptions. Thus, there is no valid
reason for her to take this remedial shortcut. Leones also ignored the qualifying
conditions for certiorari. While the present petition did allege grave abuse of discretion,
it did not demonstrate any act of whimsicality, arbitrariness, or untoward hostility on the
4
part of the RTC judge in denying Leones' motion to quash. Leones failed to prove res
judicata in this case.
2. No. The Court's Decision in G.R. No. 169726 did not constitute SCA No. 007-11 as res
judicata. Bar by prior judgment is one of the two facets of res judicata. This is embodied
in Section 47 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. For res judicata to bar a subsequent
action, the following elements must be present: (1) The judgment sought to bar the
new action must be final; (2) The decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) The disposition of the case must
be a judgment on the merits; and (4) There must be as between the first and second
action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. The first three requisites
are established with the finality of the Court's Decision that disposed G.R. No. 169726 on
the merits. The fourth and the most important element, however, is lacking. Contrary
to the conclusions of the trial court, the parties in G.R. No. 169726 and SCA No. 007-11
are identical. However, G.R. No. 169726 determined the factual and legal bases of Leones'
entitlement to payment of her RATA, whereas SCA No. 007-11 is concerned with the
manner of execution of the actual payment of the RATA judicially awarded to Leones. To
consider SCA No. 007-11 as barred by the prior judgment in G.R. No. 169726 will run
counter to the very meaning of res judicata.
Incidentally, estoppel has no application here. There is no more issue on

jurisdiction as it has been established that the RTC properly assumed and exercised
jurisdiction over the case in dispute.
3. No. The compromise agreement and compromise judgment are valid. Judgments,
once final and executory, are incontestable and unappealable. The winning litigant
receives the right to the favorable awards contained in such executory judgment, and the
losing party has to comply with the order of the court that is enforceable by a writ of
execution. Consent is the heart of all contracts: it bears reiterating that it should be
given intelligently, freely, and spontaneously, otherwise, the contract is voidable.
Here, the compromise cannot be said to have been tainted by any defect of will. Leones
had never offered quality proof of, or even slightly alleged, such vices of consent that
could affect the validity of the compromise agreement.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED.
5
VILLAFUERTE V. SEC
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 208379 March 29, 2022
DOCTRINE
Hierarchy of courts is the mechanism that ordains a sequence of recourse to courts
vested with concurrent jurisdiction. The invocation of the Court's original jurisdiction to
issue extraordinary writs may be allowed on the ground of special and important reasons
or transcendental importance, the Court clarified that direct recourse is allowed only
when the issues presented are purely legal.
FACTS
The petition alleges that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, through their assailed
regulations, and with the help of private respondent Bankers Association of the
Philippines (BAP), enabled the PDS Group to establish and maintain a monopoly and
impose unlawful restraint of trade and unfair competition in the market for fixed-income
securities and the over-the-counter (OTC) market for government securities.
Petitioners allege that the creation of the monopoly began in the early 2000s when
private respondent Vicente E. Castillo (Castillo) and his colleagues in BAP exploited the
lack of market for privately-issued securities in the country.
This led to the establishment of the Fixed-Income Exchange (FIE), a marketplace

or facility for fixed-income securities. To implement the FIE, the PDS Group was created,
with each company tasked to provide a specific service: (1) PDEx, to provide the trading
platform for the FIE; (2) PSSC, to operate as the central clearing and settlement
institution for trading activities; (3) PDTC, to act as the depository, registry, and custodian
of fixed-income securities; and (4) PDSHC, to be the holding company for the three
corporations.
The FIE, according to petitioners, failed as a financial venture. Such losses

purportedly persisted despite the illegal capital infusion by banks to PDEx, which banks
were unlawfully ordered by BAP to invest therein.
These financial losses led Castillo and BAP to intrude upon the stable OTC market
for government securities in 2008, which was then operated by the Money Market
Association of the Philippines (MART). In intruding upon the said market, MART was
allegedly unlawfully eased out.
ISSUE
Did the Villafuete violate the constitutional filtering mechanism of hierarchy of courts?
6
HELD
Hierarchy of courts is the mechanism that ordains a sequence of recourse to courts
vested with concurrent jurisdiction. The hierarchy begins from the trial courts, then the
Court of Appeals and the other intermediate courts, then finally the Supreme Court.
This sequence recognizes; (1) the various levels of courts in the country as they
are established under the Constitution and by law; (2) their ranking and effect of their
rulings in relation with one another; and (3) how they interact with one another. Given
the differences in these aspects, the questions these courts resolve also differ: trial
courts decide questions of fact and law at first instance; the Court of Appeals and the
other intermediate courts, both questions of fact and law; and this Court, only questions
of law in general.
Here, petitioners filed the case directly before this Court despite the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of
certiorari and prohibition they pray for. Petitioners invoke "special and important reasons"
and "transcendental importance" to justify their action.
The invocation of the Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs may
be allowed on the ground of special and important reasons or transcendental importance,
the Court clarified that direct recourse is allowed only when the issues presented are
purely legal.
Some of the issues here are not purely legal.
First, what petitioners ask is for this Court to nullify the various rules, orders,
issuances, and acts of public respondents for essentially perpetuating the alleged
monopoly of the PDS Group in the market for fixed-income securities and the OTC market
for government securities. Its existence is a question of fact.
Because petitioners are assailing the supposedly subsisting monopoly of the PDS
Group, it is necessary to determine first whether there actually is a monopoly. This
question is clearly factual in nature; thus, it is imperative that it be threshed out before a
tribunal that is competent to receive evidence and to resolve such question: a court that
is a trier of facts.
Even if this Court disregards the factual assertions of the parties on the existence
of monopoly, and simply rule on the legal issues raised by petitioners, there is still a need
to receive evidence to fully resolve the case since some of these issues are inextricably
intertwined with underlying questions of fact.
To resolve this issue, the Court must closely examine and compare the
specifications of the PDEx trading system with the specifications described in the OTC
Rules. To determine this factual matter would require a great deal of time and attention
7
from this Court — resources that are better devoted to matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction.
Petition dismissed.
8
PROVINCE OF BATAAN V. CASIMIRO
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. Nos. 197510-11 & 201347 April 18, 2022
DOCTRINE
It is settled that as a “quasi-judicial agency, decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may only be appealed to the Court of
Appeals through a Rule 43 petition” in order to respect the hierarchy of courts. Withal, it
is only proper that the administrative aspect of the cases be resolved by the CA, in proper
observance of the hierarchy of courts, and in accordance with prevailing rules and
jurisprudence. When an Ombudsman, in an administrative case, renders a decision and
imposes a penalty, it is performing a quasi-judicial function. Its decision has the same
effect as a court judgment.
FACTS
To aid the efforts of the Bataan Provincial Anti-Illegal Fishing Task Force, Provincial
Agriculturist Inieto requested for a patrol boat equipped with a 6-cylinder gas engine thru
Purchase Request No, 442, costing Php 150,000. Asistin offered the lowest bid of Php
150,000. As a result, a Notice of Award was given to Asistin and the award pertained to
the delivery of a 4-cylinder gas engine patrol boat for Php 150,000.
Inieto prepared a Justification stating that the increase in price of the 6-cylinder
gas engine can no longer be covered by the Purchase Request, and that the replacement
of the 6-cylinder gas engine to 4-cylinder gives the same performance with cheaper fuel
consumption. Accused Provincial Treasurer Talento issued a check in the amount of Php
142,500 with a notation that it was being issued for the payment of the 4-cylinder gas
engine patrol boat. However, the Journal Entry Voucher indicated Php 150,000 for the
patrol boat.
The Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a
Supplemental Complaint recommending the filing of criminal and administrative cases
against the involved public officials and individuals for violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The FIO alleged that the purchase of the patrol
boat is tainted with anomalies as the documents related to its procurement were altered,
the process occurred without public bidding, and because it gave undue advantage to
Asistin.
ISSUE
Should the actions taken by respondent Casimiro, charging the petitioner’s officials
and employees before the Sandiganbayan and dismissing them from service be valid?
9
HELD
No. There is a defect in the Province of Bataan’s petition, as it does not have the
personality to file the same. According to Rule 3, Section 2, only real parties-in-interest
can file an action in court. In this case, the Province of Bataan is not a “person aggrieved”
within the contemplation of the Rules which can properly avail of the special civil action
of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, as it was not a party in the proceedings before
the Ombudsman.
Even if the Province of Bataan had standing to file the petitions, it is settled that
as a “quasi-judicial agency, decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases may only be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a Rule 43
petition” in order to respect the hierarchy of courts. In this case, the decision of the
Ombudsman in the administrative case to charge Casimiro for violation of RA 3019 was
directly lodged to the SC. Therefore, it is only proper that the administrative aspect of
the cases be resolved by the CA, in proper observance of the hierarchy of courts, and in
accordance with prevailing rules and jurisprudence. When an Ombudsman, in an
administrative case, renders a decision and imposes a penalty, it is performing a
quasi-judicial function. Its decision has the same effect as a court judgment. The
procedurally correct way to elevate the administrative aspect of the case is to file a
petition before the CA.
10
PHILAM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. V. DE LUNA
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 209473 March 17, 2021
JURISDICTION - JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
DOCTRINE
The CA is empowered to examine the records and evaluate the pieces of evidence
in order to confirm materiality and significance when it is necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice; and when necessary to arrive at a just
decision of the case
FACTS
Petitioner Philam Homeowners Association, Inc. (PHAI) is a non-stock, non profit
organization of homeowners at Philam Homes, Quezon City; Caguiat was its President and
Chief Executive Officer at the time of the termination of employment of respondents De
Luna and Bundoc.
De Luna is PHAI’s Office Supervisor and Bundoc was the Cashier. Several
irregularities were discovered during audit of PHAI’s books of accounts. The Committee
disclosed that De Luna and Bundoc were involved in the disbursement of PHAI’s funds.
De Luna and Bundoc failed to participate and attend in the investigation despite
given opportunity. PHAI issued a Memorandum addressed to De Luna demanding payment
and informing her of her dismissal from service by reason of dishonesty, misappropriation
and malversation of funds.
De Luna and Bundoc filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment
and non-payment of wages, underpayment of retirement benefits, illegal suspension,
attorney’s fees and damages. Both contended that they were subjected to an
investigation and were made to answer questions without the documents supporting the
alleged irregularities they committed.
ISSUE
Did the Hon. Court of Appeals exceed its appellate jurisdiction by making itself a
trier of facts in its review of this case under the petition for certiorari (Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court) considering that it can do so only when the factual findings of the labor
arbiter contradict or are at variance with those of the NLRC?
HELD
No. The expertise and authority of quasi-judicial bodies such as the NLRC in
ascertaining matters specifically delegated to their jurisdiction shall be considered. The
latter is in the best position to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses.
11
Hence, the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC are competent in resolving labor dispute
questions.
However, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA is empowered to examine the
records and evaluate the pieces of evidence in order to confirm their materiality and
significance, and to regard the labor tribunal’s factual findings whenever its conclusions
were not substantiated by the evidence on record. The CA may review evidence alleged
to have been capriciously, whimsically and arbitrarily relied upon or disregarded cand is
not only limited to inquire into factual findings whenever there is a variance between the
findings of the LA and the NLRC.
It is settled that in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, the
issues are limited to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. x x x.
x x x when the factual findings complained of are not supported by the

evidence on record; when it is necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice; when the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the LA; and
when necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case. To make this finding, the
CA necessarily has to view the evidence if only to determine if the NLRC ruling
had basis in evidence.
Hence, the CA did not exceed its jurisdiction when it made itself a trier of facts in
its review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
12
LUNA ZALDIVAR-PEREZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 204739 November 13, 2019
JURISDICTION - JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE
As ruled in the case Garcia vs Sandiganbayan, “from the filing of information, any
disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound
discretion of the court, which becomes the sole judge on what to do with the case before
it. Pursuant to said authority, the court takes full authority over the case, including the
manner of the conduct of litigation and resort to processes that will ensure the
preservation of its jurisdiction. Thus, it may issue warrants of arrest, HDOs and other
processes that it deems warranted under the circumstances.”
FACTS
In 2006, Numeriano Tamboong filed a complaint against Salvacion Zaldivar-Perez,
petitioner,for unlawful appointment, which is punishable under Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code. Perez was the Provincial Governor of Antique. Tamboong alleged that Perez
appointed Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza as the Provincial Legal Officer of the province
despite knowing that he did not meet the minimum requirement of five (5) years in the
practice of law under the Local Government Code of 1991.
In her counter-affidavit, Perez argued that the appointment of Fortaleza is

well-deserved because during his tenure as Provincial Legal Officer, he has been
performing his duties and responsibilities with competence, honesty and integrity. She
added that the position is confidential and co-terminus, thus experience can be dispensed
with as provided under the rules of the Civil Service Commission. She also averred that as
Provincial Governor, she is authorized to appoint employees embraced in the Non-Career
Service in the Government.
In 2009, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor ruled that there was probable
cause for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code. In 2011, the original records
of the case were forwarded to the Deputy Ombudsman for approval. Same year, the case
was endorsed to the Office of Ombudsman for preliminary investigation. The case was
finally indorsed for approval for the filing of information in 2012. The same year, the
information indicting Perez was filed before the Sandiganbayan. Perez filed a motion for
reconsideration on the endorsement made to the Office of the Ombudsman but was
denied.
Perez again filed another motion for reconsideration, contending that the
proceeding of the case should be deferred because of the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration with the Office of the Ombudsman. It was again denied, hence, this
petition.
13
ISSUE
Did the Sandiganbayan properly acquire jurisdiction over the person of Perez?
HELD
NO. As ruled in the case Garcia vs Sandiganbayan, “from the filing of
information, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on
the sound discretion of the court, which becomes the sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. Pursuant to said authority, the court takes full authority over the case,
including the manner of the conduct of litigation and resort to processes that will ensure
the preservation of its jurisdiction. Thus, it may issue warrants of arrest, HDOs and other
In that case, the Sandiganbayan acted within its jurisdiction when it issued the
HDOs against the petitioner. That the petitioner may seek reconsideration of the finding
of probable cause against her by the OMB does not undermine nor suspend the jurisdiction
already acquired by the Sandiganbayan. There was also no denial of due process since the
petitioner was not precluded from filing a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
the OMB. In addition, the resolution of her motion for reconsideration before the OMB and
the conduct of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan may proceed concurrently
Here, As correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution did not commit
any violation considering that the Ombudsman approved the September 8, 2011 Review of
the August 6, 2009 Resolution on April 24, 2012 and when it was filed on May 24, 2012,
the Information bore the approval of Ombudsman Carpio-Morales.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it violated Perez’ right to
speedy disposition of her case, which is enshrined in Section 16, Article III of the
Constitution. After a careful review of the facts and circumstances, it was shown that
there was a long delay of approximately 6 years from the time the complaint was filed in
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor up to the time the case was filed in the
Sandiganbayan. The lapse of 6 years subjected Perez to anxiety, suspicion and even
hostility. Clearly, Perez’ constitutional right to the speedy disposition of her case had
been infringed.
Petition is therefore granted and the criminal case against Perez is dismissed.
14
JORGENTICS SWINE IMPROVEMENT CORPORATION V. THICK & THIN AGRI-PRODUCTS INC.
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. Nos. 201044 & 222691 May 5, 2021
JURISDICTION - ASPECTS OF JURISDICTION - JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES
DOCTRINE
A defendant is deemed to have voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court if they seek affirmative relief from the court.
FACTS
Thick & Thin Agri-Products, Inc. (TTAI) entered into an agreement with Jorgenetics
Swine Improvement Corporation (Jorgenetics) where TTAI would supply feeds and other
supplies necessary for Jorgenetics' hog raising business. While TTAI delivered feeds and
supplies pursuant to the agreement, Jorgenetics failed to pay for the same despite
demand.
TTAI filed a complaint for replevin with damages against Jorgenetics, seeking
possession of 4,765 heads of hogs that were the subject of a chattel mortgage between
the parties. Jorgenetics moved to dismiss the complaint for replevin on the ground of
invalid service of summons, since service was made on its farm in Rizal instead of its
place of business in Quezon City, and in view of the lack of justification from the sheriff
for availing of substituted service of summons.
The trial court issued an order directing the dismissal of the complaint for replevin
for failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of Jorgenetics by reason of the invalid
service of summons. Thereafter, Jorgenetics filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Execution with Application for Damages against the replevin bond, alleging that it
incurred damages on account of the alleged wrongful seizure of the hogs.
The trial court ruled that Jorgenetics was entitled to damages against the replevin
bond. TTAI moved to quash the writ of execution. The Court of Appeals rendered an order
nullifying the order of dismissal and reinstating TTAI's complaint for replevin. The CA
opined that in filing an application for damages and motion for issuance of a writ of
execution after the trial court's issuance of a decision dismissing the complaint for
replevin, Jorgenetics have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
ISSUE
Was the Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution with Application for
Damages amounted to Jorgenetic’s voluntary submission to the trial court's jurisdiction?
15
HELD
Yes. Jorgenetics, in seeking to recover damages in the main action on the bond of
the writ of replevin, is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired by service
of summons. However, "even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant if the latter voluntarily appears before it."
"If the defendant knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack
of personal jurisdiction as to [them], like voluntarily appearing in the action, [they are]
deemed to have submitted [themselves] to the jurisdiction of the court."
Thus, a defendant is deemed to have voluntarily submitted themselves to the

jurisdiction of the court if they seek affirmative relief from the court. This includes the
filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of
a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration.
Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, the Court finds that
Jorgenetics voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when it filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution and an application for damages against the
replevin bond without objecting to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Jorgentic's act of filing an application for damages against the replevin bond in the
same action is tantamount to requesting the trial court to conduct a trial on the merits of
the case and adjudicating rightful possession to Jorgenetics, and to thereafter conduct a
hearing on Jorgenetics' application for damages. This is clearly an invocation of the court's
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case. Hence, Jorgenetics is
deemed to have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.
16
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 213888 April 25, 2022
JURISDICTION - JURISDICTION V. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
DOCTRINE
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from
the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the
decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the
jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are
merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. Section 12, in
relation to Section 15, of Republic Act No. 26, the governing law for judicial
reconstitution, instructs when reconstitution of a title should be allowed.
FACTS
Procopio Borras (Procopio) was the owner of several parcels of land, one of which
was located at Barrio Bigaa, Legazpi City covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT).
Upon Procopio's death, the properties were inherited by his five children namely:
Inocencio, Vicente, Aurelia, Severina and Leonila. Upon the death of all the siblings, the
properties were inherited by their respective children, including Eustaquio Borras
(Eustaquio), son of Inocencio. The respondents as Heirs of Eustaquio claimed ownership
which was contested by petitioners. The dispute was referred to barangay conciliation
which resulted to the discovery of petitioners that the subject lot was already registered
in the name of Eustaquio Borras. It appears that during his lifetime, Eustaquio claimed
ownership over the lot when he filed a petition for reconstitution before the then CFI of
Albay for the reconstitution of OCT, with prayer for issuance of a transfer certificate of
title in his name which was granted. Pursuant thereto, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
was issued in the name of Eustaquio. Upon learning of the existence of TCT, petitioners
filed an action for quieting of title before RTC of Legazpi City which rendered a decision
in favor of petitioners.
Respondents filed an appeal before the CA questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC
in declaring TCT null and void. CA granted such and ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction
to pass upon the validity of TCT in an action for quieting of title. It held that while a TCT
should not have been issued to Eustaquio in an action for reconstitution, the declaration
of its nullity can only be had either in an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court before the CA, or in an action for reconveyance before the RTC. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners but was denied by the CA. Thereafter,
petitioners filed before the CA a petition for annulment of judgment of the Order of the
CFI insofar as it ordered the cancellation of OCT in the name Procopio and the issuance of
a TCT in favor of Eustaquio which was dismissed on January 15, 2014, on the ground that
petitioners failed to prove the existence of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction of the
17
CFI when it promulgated its July 7, 1980 Order. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the appellate court denied it. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Did CA gravely erred in ruling that the proper remedy is a case for reconveyance
and not petition for annulment of judgment given that the assailed order of trial court
was discovered by petitioners only in 2004 or almost 24 years, and that the trial court has
no jurisdiction when it allowed cancellation of reconstituted title in the name of Procopio
Borras and ordered the issuance of TCT in favor of Eustaquio Borras?
HELD
No, there is no question that the then CFI had jurisdiction over the petition for
reconstitution at inception. The purpose of a reconstitution action is merely to reproduce
a certificate of title, after proper proceedings, in the same form it was when it was lost
or destroyed. Hence, in such action, a trial court cannot order the cancellation of the
original title nor direct the issuance of a new TCT in favor of another. Here, while there is
no question that the CFI acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it went beyond ordering
the reconstitution of OCT by ordering its cancellation, and directing the issuance of a new
TCT in favor of Eustaquio, nevertheless, such order of the CFI was done in the exercise of
its jurisdiction and not the lack thereof. Section 12, in relation to Section 15, of Republic
Act No. 26, the governing law for judicial reconstitution, instructs when reconstitution of
a title should be allowed.
Petitioners also cannot rely on the ruling of the CA to claim that a petition for
annulment of judgment is the proper recourse. Annulment of judgment may either be
based on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment
was obtained by extrinsic fraud. It is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it
may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting. The cancellation of the title of
Eustaquio Borras and its restoration in the name of Procopio Borras may be achieved
either under a Rule 47 action with the Court of Appeals or in an action for reconveyance
with the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The proper action would be
dependent on the ground that petitioners would invoke in questioning the July 7, 1980
Order of the then CFI. Unfortunately, petitioners erroneously filed a petition for
annulment of judgment based on the ground of the trial court's exercise in excess of its
jurisdiction, which is not a ground in an action for annulment of judgment. The proper
action would be dependent on the ground that petitioners would invoke in questioning the
July 7, 1980 Order of the then CFI. Unfortunately, petitioners erroneously filed a petition
for annulment of judgment based on the ground of the trial court's exercise in excess of
its jurisdiction, which is not a ground in an action for annulment of judgment.
18
NGO V. GABELO
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 207707 August 24, 2020
JURISDICTION - JURISDICTION OVER CASES COVERED BY BARANGAY CONCILIATION
DOCTRINE
All disputes between parties actually residing in the same city or municipality are
subject to barangay conciliation. A prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a
complaint in court or any government office. Non-compliance with the said condition
precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his
complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but
the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of
adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants failed to object to such
exercise of jurisdiction.
FACTS
Ngo alleged that he is the lawful and absolute owner of the subject property by
virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale between himself and Philippine Realty Corporation
(PRC) and pursuant to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 111743. He averred that despite
several demands, Gabelo, et al., refused to vacate the subject property. On the other
hand, Gabelo, et al., in their Answer with special Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory
Counterclaims maintained that Ngo has no legal personality to sue. Moreover, the Court
did not declare him in G.R. No. 111743 as the absolute owner of the subject property but
merely identified him as one of those who could buy the lot from PRC. They insisted that
Ngo failed to comply with the condition precedent for filing the action since he failed to
bring the matter to the barangay for conciliation. Additionally, they averred that the
validity of the alleged TCT No. 250439 under the name of Ngo is already being assailed
before RTC of Manila Branch 37 and docketed as Civil Case No. 00-98807.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. Ngo admitted that
the case did not undergo the required barangay conciliation proceedings before it was
filed with the court. RTC granted the motion for reconsideration.
The CA ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA
ratiocinated that the barangay justice system was established primarily as a means of
easing up the congestion of cases in judicial courts and for it to be truly effective it
should be made compulsory. Moreover, the Local Government Code expressly mandated
that resort to barangay conciliation proceedings is a precondition to the filing of
complaints for disputes between parties actually residing in the same city or municipality
and non-compliance therewith could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of
action.
19
ISSUE
Is the case dismissible for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of
barangay conciliation?
HELD
Yes. All disputes between parties actually residing in the same city or municipality
are subject to barangay conciliation. A prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition before
filing a complaint in court or any government office. Non-compliance with the said
condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and
make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from
exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants failed
to object to such exercise of jurisdiction.
In the instant case, while no motion to dismiss was filed, the Ngo et. al. had been
constantly pleading for dismissal of the case in their answer and their subsequent
pleadings submitted to the lower court. This is allowed under Section 6, Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court which provides that if no motion to dismiss has been filed, any grounds for
dismissal provided for in the Rules may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the
answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if
a motion to dismiss had been filed.
It is undisputed that the case was never referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa for
conciliation. The petitioners successfully prevented the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction over the case by timely invoking the ground in their answer as an affirmative
defense. Thus, the complaint is dismissible for failure to comply with the mandatory
requirement of barangay conciliation as a condition precedent before filing an action.
20
CIVIL PROCEDURE
GENERAL PROVISIONS
PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN FIFTH DIVISION
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 239878 February 28, 2022
GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING IF THERE IS A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION
OF CASES
DOCTRINE
Court ruling in Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan stated:
First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy
trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be
invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of
cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial.
What is important is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for
the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a
conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the
Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard
to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken
against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing
of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of whether there has
been inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the
right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court
resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of
the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably
invoked.
If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the
prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay. If the defense has the burden of
proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only
politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the
defense did not contribute to the delay.
21
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove
first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation
and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the
volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered
by the accused as a result of the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must

consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to
the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.
An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the

case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or
when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may
be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious
prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be
dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay.
Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy
disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused
acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be invoked. In all cases of
dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and
discussed by the relevant court.
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be
timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the
lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived
their right to speedy disposition of cases.
FACTS
This case arose from a complaint filed by Task Force Abono, Field Investigation
Office (Task Force) of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) against respondents local
government officials of Surigao City. The task force alleged that in early 2004, the
Department of Budget and Management Office issued a special allotment order amounting
to P723,000,000.00 for the implementation of the Farm Inputs and Farm Implements
Program of the Department of Agriculture.Out of the amount, the City Government of
Surigao, Surigao del Norte received P5,000,000.00.
Thus, the city, through respondents, entered into a contract with Palacio and Rosa
"Mia" Trading for the purchase of 3,332 kilograms of Elements 15-15-30+T.E. Foliar
Fertilizer for P1,500 per kilogram, or a total amount of 4,998,000.00. This was allegedly
done without the requisite public bidding under the procurement law. The city paid Rosa
"Mia" Trading in two tranches.
Subsequently, the Commission on Audit (COA) post-audited the transaction. It was

discovered that there is a variance between the cost of fertilizers procured and the cost
of fertilizers locally canvassed resulting to an overpricing. As a result, the COA issued on
22
June 14, 2006 a Notice of Disallowance (NOD), which was subsequently amended on March
19, 2007.
Then on September 22, 2017, respondent Monteros filed a motion to quash

information/dismiss the case and a motion (A) to quash/hold in abeyance the release of
the warrant of arrest; and (B) to defer arraignment and other proceedings. Monteros
claimed that her right to speedy disposition of cases was violated because of the length of
time that had passed from the COA investigation in 2006 to the filing of the Information
before the Sandiganbayan in 2017. There was inordinate delay of 11 years and three
months on the part of the OMB. This delay, according to Monteros, divested the OMB of
the authority to file the case against her; the instant Information therefore is void, and
the anti-graft court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Monteros subsequently moved to hold the release of the warrant of arrest and to
defer arraignment and other proceedings as a consequence of the pendency of the
question on the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in granting the motions filed by respondents, which resulted in the
dismissal of the criminal case and their acquittal?
HELD
NO. The Court, in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, laid down the guidelines for
determining if there is a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases. It is very
clear in Cagang that the period taken for fact-finding investigations shall not be included
in the determination of whether there is inordinate delay; the period shall be reckoned
from the filing of a formal complaint. In other words, inordinate delay on cases filed with
the OMB primarily pertains to the period taken for preliminary investigation.
In this regard, the Sandiganbayan erred in including the period for fact-finding in
its determination of the period relevant to inordinate delay.
Cagang states that the burden of proof to justify the delay shifts depending on
when the right was invoked. The defense bears the burden if the right was invoked within
the periods prescribed by this Court, the Rules of Court, or the OMB for the conduct of
preliminary investigation; the prosecution bears the burden if the right was invoked
beyond the set periods, and it must show that the delay was justifiable under the factors
provided in Cagang.
As the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, then in effect do not
provide for the period within which the preliminary investigation shall be concluded, the
periods provided for in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court shall have suppletory application.
Applying Sections 3(f) and 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the graft investigation officer
shall have 10 days after the investigation to determine probable cause; then, he has five
23
days from resolution to forward the records of the case to the Ombudsman, who shall act
upon the resolution within 10 days from receipt.
Cagang requires that the right to speedy disposition of cases must be timely
raised. In Catamco86 and Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,87 the Court, applying Cagang,
considered the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the OMB resolution finding
probable cause as a timely invocation of the right.
Here, the Court considers the motion for reconsideration88 filed by Monteros
before the OMB sufficient for purposes of determining whether the respondents' right to
speedy disposition had been violated. Her invocation of the right in the motion is deemed
to cover the other respondents as they are co-respondents in a single case and it assails a
single resolution that applies to all of them. In any event, worthy of great consideration is
respondents' immediate filing of the motions to quash before the Sandiganbayan after the
filing of the Information. These circumstances show that respondents did not in any way
sleep or waive their right to speedy disposition of cases.
24
EDDA V. HENSON VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 230185 July 7, 2020
TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION
DOCTRINE
It bears stressing that "in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court
of a change of address, the service of the order or resolution of a court upon the parties
must be made at the last address of their counsel of record.
FACTS
The Intramuros Administration (IA) is a government agency created under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1616 on April 10, 1979. Under its charter, it is mandated to
undertake the orderly restoration and development of Intramuros as a monument to the
Hispanic Period of Philippine history.
In Dec. 1991, IA, under the administration of Petitioner Edda V. Henson (Henson),
held a public bidding for the construction of 3 houses in Plaza San Luis Cultural
Commercial Complex. 3 bidders participated but their bids exceeded the Agency
Approved Estimate (AAE). Because of time constraints, the lowest bidder Argus
Development Corporation (Argus) negotiated with the Bidding and Awards Committee of
IA to reduce their bid to match the amount of the AAE. Argus agreed on the condition that
IA would supply construction materials and that the architectural details would be
downgraded
Argus completed the project and after such completion, a COA audit team was
created to conduct a post-inspection of the project and a re-examination of related
documents in view of inherent and hidden defects in the construction of the project. A
notice of Disallowance was issued for the construction amounting to P2.3M and Henson
and Pelagio Alcantara (Alcantara), Chief of Urban Planning and Community Development
Office, were held liable.
RULING of Regional Director: The Director of National Government Audit Office

upheld the disallowance on Dec. Mar. 1998
RULING of respondent COA-CP: It partially granted the appeal insofar as Alcantara

not being afforded due process. Respondent COA affirmed the disallowance however on
Dec, 13. 2011.
ISSUE
Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of COA when it failed to disclose
their findings to the petitioner, decide the petition for review and motion for
reconsideration within reasonable time?
25
HELD
No. The Court sided with respondent COA-CP.
In the case of Gatmaytan v. Sps. Dolor the Court gave no credence to the
allegation of the petitioner that her counsel received a copy of the decision on a later
date for lack of evidentiary basis. In that case, the petitioner claimed that the Court of
Appeals erroneously reckoned the date of service on an earlier date as the service on that
date was ineffectual having been made on her counsel's former address. Though the
Court, in that case, found that the service earlier made to petitioner's counsel was indeed
ineffectual, it nevertheless affirmed the dismissal of the appeal due to the failure of the
petitioner to discharge the burden of proving the actual date of receipt of her counsel.
The Court emphasized that the burden of proving a fact lies on the party who alleges it
and that mere allegation does not suffice.
Similarly, in this case, petitioner contends that the counting of the period should
commence on March 13, 2017 in the absence of proof that service was made on January
17 and 26, 2017. Petitioner, however, fails to realize that the burden of proving the
timeliness of the instant Petition lies with her, not respondent COA-CP. It is incumbent
upon her to prove, first, that the service made on her counsel's former address was
ineffectual because her counsel was able to promptly inform respondent COA-CP of her
change of address, and second, that her counsel received the December 27, 2016
Resolution only on March 13, 2017. These she failed to do.
It bears stressing that "in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court
of a change of address, the service of the order or resolution of a court upon the parties
must be made at the last address of their counsel of record." Hence, in case there is a
change in address, it is the duty of the lawyer to promptly inform the court and the
parties of such change to ensure that all official and judicial communications sent by mail
will reach him.
Here, based on the letters attached to her Compliance, it appears that petitioner's
counsel belatedly informed respondent COA-CP of her change of address. Thus, the
service made by respondent COA-CP on January 17 and 26, 2017 at the old address of
petitioner's counsel are deemed valid and effectual.
26
CAUSE OF ACTION
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V. PTT PHILIPPINES TRADING CORP.
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. Nos. 203138-400 February 15, 2021
FORUM SHOPPING
DOCTRINE
Forum shopping exists when a party repeatedly avails himself of several judicial
remedies in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, all of which are
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already
resolved adversely by some other court.
FACTS
A Special Audit Team (Audit Team) was formed to conduct an audit on the import
shipments and inventory of all sale transactions of PTTPTC. In its Initial Audit Findings,
the Audit Team declared PTTPTC to have mislabeled some of its imported fuel to make it
eligible to avail of special tax benefits. The Audit Team found the firm liable to pay
P4,236,530,193.00 representing assessed Customs Duties, Value Added Tax and Penalties.
Thereafter, then Commissioner Napoleon Morales (Commissioner Morales) of the

BoC sent a demand letter to PTTPTC to settle its P4,236,530,193.00 outstanding
obligation within seven (7) days from notice. PTTPTC, through counsel, sent a letter to
Commissioner Morales, asking for reconsideration or reinvestigation of the Audit Team's
conclusion and recommendation. PTTPTC tendered, under protest, to the BoC the amount
of P117,681,394.00 as partial payment of its obligation.
On November 7, 2007, a Demand Letter was sent to PTTPTC to settle its

discrepancy assessment of basic duties and taxes. Thereafter, PTTPTC filed with the CTA
Second Division a Petition for Review docketed as CTA Case No. 7707 assailing, among
others, the validity of the P4,236,530,193.00 assessment and the final demand letter
dated November 7, 2007. On September 30, 2009, it filed CTA Case No. 7981 praying for
the refund of the P117,681,394.00 it paid under protest. On December 1, 2009, PTTPTC
instituted CTA Case No. 8002 before the CTA First Division asking for the refund of the
P176,522,091.50 it paid on November 29, 2007. On January 13, 2010, PTTPTC commenced
another Petition for Review, docketed as CTA Case No. 8023, praying for the refund of
the amount of PI 76,522,091.50 it paid on December 18, 2007. The same was raffled to
the Third Division of the CTA.
27
Then, the Commissioner of Customs attributed that PTTPTC is guilty of forum
shopping in filing four petitions for review questioning the same November 7, 2007
demand letter.
On August 26, 2010, the CTA Second Division issued a Resolution in CTA Case No.
7707 granting the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner and dismissing the
Petition for Review filed by PTTPTC on the ground of forum shopping. PTTPTC likewise
filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon. On August 31, 2010, the CTA Third Division
resolved to grant the Motion to Dismiss in CTA Case No. 8023 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and forum shopping. PTTPTC also lodged a motion for reconsideration thereon
which was denied. The CTA-EB reversed the questioned resolutions of its three divisions
and reinstated CTA Case Nos. 7707, 8002 and 8023. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the CTA Cases are dismissible on the ground of forum
shopping since all three cases similarly assail the validity of the demand letter from the
BoC. The petitioner alleges that the prayer for refund in the CTA Cases did not alter the
cause of action of PTTPTC since the issue of refund is dependent on the resolution of the
legality of the demand letter. Petitioner argues that the CTA Cases were filed beyond the
30-day period to protest the demand letter. Even if both cases are to be treated as claims
for refund of erroneously paid taxes and duties instead of a protest of assessment, they
should be dismissed since the CTA has no jurisdiction over actions questioning the ruling
of the Commissioner of Customs under RA 9262.
ISSUE
Were the CTA cases dismissible on the ground of forum shopping?
HELD
NO, the CTA cases were not dismissible on the ground of forum shopping.
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways, to wit:

(1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same
prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (litis pendentia);
(2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same
prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (res judicata); or
(3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different
prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also
either litis pendentia or res judicata).
Forum shopping exists when a party repeatedly avails himself of several judicial
remedies in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, all of which are
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
Hence, to constitute forum shopping, the following elements must be present:

28
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests
in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amounts to res judicata in the action under consideration.
In finding that there was no forum shopping, the CTA-EB held that the causes of
action of the three petitions differ. We agree.
CTA Case No. 7707 is a protest to an alleged erroneous customs duties assessment.
In this case, PTTPTC prayed for the nullification of the assessment as well as the
November 7, 2007 demand letter ordering PTTPTC to settle the obligation. On the other
hand, CTA Case Nos. 8002 and 8023 are claims for refund of the amount that respondent
paid under protest to the BoC representing its assessment balance pursuant to the
November 7, 2007 demand letter it was contesting in CTA Case No. 7707. Taking into
consideration the prayer of PTTPTC in CTA Case No. 8002, on one hand, and CTA Case No.
8023, on the other hand, the logical conclusion is to regard both petitions as supplements
to CTA Case No. 7707 despite being filed and docketed as separate petitions.
Rules of procedure should not be rigidly applied if it will tend to obstruct rather
than serve the broader interests of justice. Depending on the prevailing circumstances of
the case, such as where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the
petition, the Court may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
Verily, the Court has relaxed on numerous occasions the observance of procedural
rules to advance substantial justice. Legal technicalities may be excused when strict
adherence thereto will impede the achievement of justice it seeks to serve. Ultimately,
what should guide judicial action is that a party is given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his or her action or defense rather than for him or her to lose life,
honor, or property on mere technicalities.
29
ASIS V. HEIRS OF CALIGNAWAN
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 242127 September 15, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - FORUM SHOPPING; SPLITTING OF CAUSES OF ACTION
DOCTRINE
While the observation of petitioners as to Rosello's commission of forum-shopping
is correct, raising said issue on appeal is already too late in the day. Jurisprudence is
replete with pronouncements as to the elements of forum-shopping.
FACTS
Cesario and Romana were married. They had 2 children, Felipe and Angeles. Felipe
had four children: Evangeline, Erma, Felicitation, and Cesar. Rosello was taken in by
Angeles and her husband. There were lots under the name of Romana (mother) and
Angeles (daughter).
According to Rosello, when Romana died, ¾ of the land was owned by Angeles (one
half of the whole lot as her share, while ¼ as inheritance from Romana), while ¼ by
Felipe- Rosello also said that Angeles donated some land to him. But, Rosello discovered
that the subject lots have already been transferred to the names of the 4 children of
Felipe, and his own (collectively). Rosello claimed that the documents he discovered were
forged as he never signed them. He also said that at the time the documents were
supposedly executed, Felipe and Angeles were still both alive. Hence, the 4 children still
had no right to inherit. So, Rosello filed an action to nullify the documents.
Felipe, in his Answer, argued in this wise: (a) when Romana died, she was survived
by Felipe and Angeles; (b) Angeles died without issue, and her nearest kin was Felipe; (c)
Rosello was neither a natural nor adoptive child of the spouses Vicente and Angeles, but
was merely taken in by the latter to their household out of pity; (d) the Deed of Donation
executed by Angeles in favor of Rosello was spurious; and (e) on January 30, 1989, the
estate of the Spouses Engao was settled in Special Proceeding No. 1425.
The Felipe heirs manifested in their separate Answer that they agreed to partition
the subject properties among themselves and Rosello. The Deed of Adjudication In 1982
was cancelled and superseded by an Extrajudicial Settlement in 1985 where they,
together with Rosello, affixed their signatures in order to transfer and partition the
subject properties among themselves. They insisted that either the Deed of Donation was
a forgery or that the signature of Angeles was obtained through undue influence. They
also claimed that there was impossibility of having the document notarized before a
notary public in Tanauan, Leyte which was considerably remote from the location of
Angeles who was frail and already too weak to travel such distance.
30
RTC Ruled that the lot was owned by Romana and Angeles based on the strength of
the certificates of title. Rosello was not a natural nor an adoptive son, so not an heir of
Angeleso since there is no evidence provided to prove his filiation. The Deed of Donation
from Angeles to Rosello as invalid. Since Angeles not physically fit to travel from Tanuan
to Tacloban to swear before the notary public, the witnesses on the deed were
questionable.
CA held that the Deed of Donation was valid because it had already attained
finality per the Resolution dated February 15, 2010. The appellate court stressed
that Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertaining to res judicata
governs. The principle of conclusiveness of judgment, which requires identity of parties
and issues, is particularly applicable in this case.
ISSUE
Did the Court of Appeals err in allowing Rosello to belatedly file his brief and
committing forum shopping?
HELD
No. The CA did not err in allowing Rosello to belatedly file his brief. In this case,
there is forum shopping because Rosello filed in two different RTCs, one upheld the deed
of donation, while the other avoided it.
On another point, Asis et al. contend that the appellate court exercised
unwarranted liberality in the application of procedural rules in favor of respondents when
it admitted the belated filing of fee Appellant's Brief despite several motion for extension
of time and absent any compelling reason to grant the same. Conversely, respondents
emphasized that their previous counsel was reckless and grossly negligent in the handling
of the case, even though Rosello religiously sought update and follow-ups from said
counsel. Nonetheless, petitioners claim that the text messages which showed that Rosello
conducted follow-ups were made after the lapse of several motions of extension of time.
First, there must be identity of parties. Both petitioners and respondents or their
predecessors were the contending parties in the Complaints for Declaration of Nullity and
Recovery of Ownership.
Second, there must be similarity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, where
the relief is anchored on the same facts. While the caption of both complaints are
evidently distinct, the allegations contained in their respective bodies seek a similar
relief, that is, the entitlement to the properties and reconveyance thereof in favor of
Rosello and eventually to the respondents who are the latter's heirs. It is a hornbook
doctrine that the cause of action is determined by the allegations of the complaint and
not the caption or designation by the parties, considering that the latter is not even
indispensable to the complaint.
Third, the judgment rendered in any of the actions would amount to res judicata
as to the other. The finality of the Decision rendered by the RTC of Burauen, as affirmed
31
by the appellate court and which subsequently reached this Court in G.R. No. 188676
entitled Heirs of Felipe Engao, Namely: Erma E. Trocino. Felicitacion E. Bausita, Cesar
Engao and Evangeline E. Asis vs. Rosello Calignawan, operated as res judicata on the
matter of the Deed of Donation's validity.
Since the three elements are attendant in this case, Rosello indeed committed
forum-shopping.
32
SANTOS VENTURA HORCORMA FOUNDATION INC. V. MABALACAT INSTITUTE
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 211563 September 29,2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - FORUM SHOPPING; RES JUDICATA; LITIS PENDENCIA
DOCTRINE
Forum Shopping is the practice of resorting to multiple for a for the same relief to
increase the chances of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when a party initiates
two or more actions, other than appeal or certiorari, grounded on the same cause to
obtain a more favorable decision from any tribunal. The determinative factor in violations
of this rule against forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present,
or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another
FACTS
Santos Ventura Hecorma Foundation Inc. (Santos Ventura) is the registered owner
of a parcel of land. Mabalacat Institute Inc. (Mabalacat) occupies the lot without paying
rent and only through its tolerance. Nevertheless, Santos Ventura informed Mabalacat
that it will start charging a rental fee. Mabalacat refused to comply with the demand. In
view of this, Santos Ventura demanded payment of the unpaid rent accumulated over the
years, to which Mabalacat again refused comply with. Thus, Santos Ventura filed a
complaint for a collection of sum of money against Mabalacat. For its part, Mabalacat
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court had not validly acquired jurisdiction
because it was not properly served summons.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss which prompted Mabalacat to file a
motion for reconsideration which was also denied. Hence, Mabalacat sought to nullify the
RTC decision before the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which was
denied in the appellate court’s decision. Mabalacat then again moved for reconsideration,
which was likewise denied in the appellate court’s resolution.
Unfazed, Mabalacat filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on
Certiorari. However, it was dismissed on the grounds that: the petition was considered an
unsigned pleading for failure to verify the same; and the petition lacks sufficient showing
that the assailed judgment was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Mabalacat filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim with the court a quo
which set the collection case for pre-trial. However before the pre-trial, Mabalacat filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum shopping and violation of the Rule on Splitting
a Single Cause of Action.
The Court a quo granted Mabalacat’s motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals
sustained the decision. Thus, both parties filed their respective petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
33
Mabalacat asserts that the appellate court failed to resolve the issue as to whether
or not it should be allowed to present evidence to prove its compulsory counterclaim,
claiming that the dismissal was without prejudice to the prosecution in the same or
separate action of a counter claim pleaded in the answer.
Santos Ventura argues that the appellate court erred in sustaining the trial court’s
finding that it is guilty of forum shopping, asserting that the identity of the rights asserted
in a collection of rent is different from an ejectment proceeding.
ISSUE
Was forum shopping committed?
HELD
No. Santos Ventura did not violate the rule on Forum Shopping when it filed the
Ejectment Case while the Collection Case has been pending for years.
Forum Shopping is the practice of resorting to multiple for a for the same relief to
or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of
the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other. On the other hand, the elements of res
judicata, also known as bar by prior judgment, are: (a) the former judgment must be
final; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first
and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
Here, the cause of action in the Ejectment Case stemmed from the prejudice that
Santos Ventura allegedly suffered due to the loss of possession of the subject lot. On the
other hand, the Collection Case was founded on the appropriate amount of rental fees
that are allegedly due and the damages that Santos Ventura allegedly suffered but which
have no direct relation to its loss of material possession.
Therefore, this Court finds Santos Ventura not guilty of forum shopping when it
filed the Ejectment Case subsequent to the Collection Case, while the latter is still
pending. In both cases, there is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, and
any judgment on any of these cases would not amount to res judicata on the other.
34
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS
PNB-REPUBLIC BANK V. SIAN-LIMSIACO
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 196323 February 08, 2021
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
DOCTRINE
An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal
may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal.
The Rules allow agents to bring actions for the principals in their own name
without joining their principals, provided that the contract does not involve things
FACTS
Sometime in 1979, respondent Remedios Sian-Limsiaco (Remedios) obtained a
sugar crop loan from Maybank which was payable within one year. Through a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA), Remedios executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) on several
parcels of land. In 1984, Remedios obtained another sugar crop loan also secured by a REM
on Lot 8 owned by Sian Agricultural Corporation. After a lapse of 17 years, Remedios and
Roy filed a Petition before RTC to cancel the liens annotated on the titles of the
mortgaged properties on grounds of prescription and extinction of their loan obligation.
Maybank referred the case to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to which it had
assigned its assets and liabilities including its receivables. Hence, by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment, Maybank argued that PNB should be treated as substitute respondent.
Unconvinced and not satisfied with the aforementioned Deed of Assignment, the RTC
required additional documents to justify the substitution, which PNB failed to provide.
Atty. Kenneth Alovera (Atty. Alovera), for and on behalf of the PNB, filed a Motion
to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence which the trial court denied, in view of Atty. Alovera's
failure to submit proof that he was authorized to appear on Maybank's behalf.
Subsequently, the receivables were transferred to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
The RTC ruled in favor of Remedios, the respondent and declared the Certificates
of Title of the properties mortgages as unenforceable and of no force and effect due to
prescription. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
35
PNB essentially argues that the real parties-in-interest in the present action are
the registered owners of the lands mortgaged and thus, since they were not impleaded in
the case, any judgment resulting from such case should be considered as null and void. It
also argued that the CA erred when it affirmed in toto the RTC's judgment despite the
respondent being not the real parties-in-interest, hence having no cause of action against
petitioner.
ISSUE
Can an agent bring action for the principals in their own name without joining
their principals?
HELD
Yes. Remedios has been acting on behalf of the mortgagors-principals throughout
the whole course of the proceedings. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party in interest.(Section 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of
Court). PNB, despite having knowledge that respondent was not the registered owner of
the mortgaged properties and was merely acting in her capacity as an agent of the
mortgagors-principals, failed to raise the issue of joining these mortgagors-principals at
the earliest opportunity, which is during the proceedings before the trial court. The
appellate court should not have even entertained the issue in the first place.
As applied in this case, while it may seem that the mortgage contracts "involve"
real property of the principals, such contracts are actually not of that nature. The
mortgage contract itself does not involve real property, but merely the right to foreclose
upon such real property should the necessary legal pre-conditions are met, such as a
breach in the principal contract to which the mortgage is merely an accessory of. Since
neither the subject mortgage contracts nor the instant case involved the
mortgagors-principals' real property rights, there was no need to join them and hence,
respondent validly instituted the action in her own name but still in her capacity as an
agent of the mortgagors-principals. Hence, respondent Remedios acted on behalf of the
mortgagors-principals when she initiated the action to cancel the mortgages. There was
no need to join such principals as the subject mortgage contracts were merely accessory
contracts that were entered into for the purpose of securing respondent's loans and
merely involved the right to foreclose upon the lands specified therein upon the
fulfillment of certain contingencies, such as when there is default.
36
TECHNICAL EDUCATION ANDSKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (TESDA) V. ERNESTO
ABRAGAR
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 2010220 March 17, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS
DOCTRINE
The joinder of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise
of judicial power. While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a
ground for the dismissal of an action, considering that said party may still be added by
order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and/or such times as are just, it remains essential — as it is jurisdictional — that
any indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings before the court renders
judgment.
FACTS
Respondent Abragar filed a complaint before the Regional Arbitration Branch of
the NLRC in San Fernando City, Pampanga for underpayment and non-payment of
salaries/wages, service incentive leave, and 13th month pay against Marble Production
Training Center (Center) and his supervisor, Philip Bronio (Bronio). No amicable settlement
was reached. Abragar described the Center as a corporation organized and existing in
accordance with Philippine laws whose address is at the TESDA Compound. He claimed
that the Center suddenly cut down his working days from six to twice or thrice a week,
without giving him the usual salary he received for the week. Also, his 13th month pay
was reduced despite his pleas that he be allowed to maintain his former work schedule
and such amounted to constructive dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) in its decision found that Abragar was constructively
dismissed and granted his claim. Bronio alleged he is merely an employee and
trainor-supervisor thus cannot be held liable for any of the acts of the Center. Further, he
claimed that there was no employer-employee relationship between Abragar and the
Center which merely serves as a training ground for workers who intend to work in the
private sector pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the cooperation of
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Provincial Government of Bulacan, the Marble
Association of the Philippines (MAP), National Manpower and Youth Council (now renamed
TESDA).
The NLRC gave due course to TESDA's appeal in intervention. It emphasized that
nothing on record shows that the Center is a juridical person authorized to be made a
party to any case as it is not clothed with legal personality to be sued. It ruled that the
question remained on how it can be held liable for illegal dismissal and payment of money
claims under the Labor Code. The CA reversed said decision on the basis that the Center
and Bronio failed to perfect their appeal in the manner within the period fixed by law.
37
Under the Revised Rules of Court which apply suppletorily to labor cases, a motion to
intervene may be filed any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. Thus,
TESDA should have filed its pleading in intervention with the Regional Arbitration Branch
and before the LA decision. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE
Did the CA erred in annulling the NLRC's grant of petitioner TESDA Appeal
Memorandum in Intervention?
HELD
YES. The Supreme Court held that the CA erred in annulling the NLRC's grant of
petitioner TESDA Appeal Memorandum in Intervention.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that Compulsory joinder of

indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Here, the Court finds that the MOA Parties are indispensable parties as their
interest in the controversy is such that a final adjudication cannot be made in their
absence, without injuring or affecting their interest. As alleged by respondent himself, his
claims are anchored in his employer-employee relationship with the Center. There are two
consequences of a finding on appeal that indispensable parties have not been joined, 1.
all subsequent actions of the lower courts are null and void for lack of jurisdiction; and 2.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for the inclusion of indispensable parties.
Further, Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandate that only natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action and every
action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real parties-in-interest.
Thus, the failure to implead TESDA and the other parties to the MOA renders the
proceedings void.
38
PLEADINGS
ALPHA PLUS INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES CORP. V. PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE
CORP.
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 2045260 February 10, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - AMENDED PLEADING; PRESCRIPTION
DOCTRINE
The settled rule is that the filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the
date of the filing of the original pleading; hence, the statute of limitation runs until the
submission of the amendment. It is true that as an exception, this Court has held that an
amendment which merely supplements and amplifies facts originally alleged in the
complaint relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred
by the statute of limitations which expired after the service of the original complaint.
Thus, when the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, cause of action, or
demands, the suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the original complaint was
filed.
FACTS
Petitioner Alpha Plus International Enterprises Corporation, a company engaged in
optical media business, obtained two fire insurance policies from respondent Philippine
Charter Insurance Corp. covering the period of June 9, 2007 to June 9, 2008.
On February 24, 2008, petitioner's warehouse was gutted by fire destroying its
equipment and pieces of machinery stored therein. Thus, it sought to recover from its
insurance policies with the PCIC but its claim was denied.
On January 20, 2010, Alpha Plus filed a Complaint before Branch 84 of the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan against respondent PCIC and its officers for Specific Performance,
Collection of Sum of Money and Damages.
Respondents filed Motions to Dismiss on grounds of lack of cause of action and

insufficient payment of docket fees, but these were denied by the RTC. In their Answer
Ad Cautelam with Compulsory Counterclaim, respondents averred that petitioner's
insurance claim is already barred by prescription based on Condition No. 27 of the fire
insurance policies.
Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Affirmative

Defenses and/or Motion to Dismiss anchored on the RTC's failure to acquire jurisdiction
over the case due to insufficient payment of docket fees, lack of cause of action and
prescription.
39
RTC denied respondents' Motion. It also did not pass upon the issue of prescription
despite the fact that it was squarely raised by the respondents in their motion to dismiss.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC. Thus,
respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
CA. The appellate court granted the Petition for Certiorari of respondents, relying on the
prescriptive period of 360 days, found that "prescription had already set in" and that the
RTC oddly "chose to be silent about the said issue.
ISSUE
Did CA egregiously erred in holding that the prescriptive period had already
prescribed and should be counted from the time the amended complaint was filed?
HELD
The petition is bereft of merit. In the present case, We agree with the CA's finding
that the petitioner's insurance claim had already prescribed and that the RTC should
dismiss the complaint before it based on said ground. Nonetheless, We differ with the
appellate court in the computation of the prescriptive period. Instead of the 360-day
period used by the CA in computing whether or not petitioner's action has already
prescribed, We find that the 365-day period should be utilized instead.
To determine the prescription of the subject insurance claim, Article 63 of the

Insurance Code as well as Condition No. 27 of the two fire insurance policies should be
considered.
Thus, contrary to the finding of the appellate court that the 12-month period
should mean 360 days,We hold that the 12-month period in Condition No. 27 of the
parties' fire insurance policies should refer to the period of one (1) year, or 365 days, in
line with Section 63 of the Insurance Code and prevailing jurisprudence. This is also
consistent with Article 13 of the Civil Code which provides that when the law speaks of a
year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days.
An amended complaint supersedes an original one. As a consequence, the original

complaint is deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record.
filed.
In the present case, We find that the exception does not apply to petitioner's case
as to allow the period of prescription to run and for prescription to ultimately set in. A
40
perusal of petitioner's Complaint and Amended Complaint reveals that the latter pleading
introduced new demands that were not specified and averred expressly in the original
complaint. In paragraph 26 of the original complaint, what was merely claimed was actual
damages against respondents without specifying therein any definite amount. Legal
interest was also claimed by petitioner.
On the other hand, in paragraph of petitioner's Amended Complaint, it was

specified therein that the actual damages being claimed is in the amount of P300 million
and that payment of respondents shall be for "two times the legal interest per annum on
the proceeds of the policies."
Clearly, petitioner essentially introduced new demands against respondents in

their Amended Complaint. The disparity of the claims between the original complaint and
the amended complaint is magnified by the fact that petitioner was required to pay
additional docket fees in the amount of P6,056,465.0066 for its Amended Complaint.
With petitioner's filing of the Amended Complaint which raised new demands, the
original complaint of petitioner must be deemed to have been abandoned and to have
been rendered functus officio. Consequently, petitioner could not argue that the filing of
the Amended Complaint should retroact to the date of filing of the original complaint.
Verily, as the Amended Complaint superseded the original complaint of petitioner, the suit
of the latter is deemed to have been commenced on the date of filing of the Amended
Complaint on February 9, 2010. During this time, prescription had already set in as
petitioner had only until January 24, 2010 within which to file its insurance claim.
In sum, We agree with the appellate court as to its ruling that petitioner's
Amended Complaint should have been dismissed by the RTC on the ground of prescription.
No hearing by the RTC was even needed thereon since it could determine the fact of
prescription by simply looking at the date of filing of the complaints.
41
FILING AND SERVICE
BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. CIR
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 205466 January 11, 2021
RULES ON PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES; EFFECT OF NON-PAYMENT; DOCKET FEES IN RE TO
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
DOCTRINE
The BCDA is a government instrumentality and therefore exempt from payment
of docket fees as provided under Section 22, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.
Section 2 (10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of
1987 provides for the definition of a government "instrumentality" and a "GOCC”. The
grant of these corporate powers is likewise stated in Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7227, also known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which provides for
BCDA's manner of creation.
It is clear that government instrumentality may be endowed with corporate powers

and at the same time retain its classification as a government "instrumentality" for all
other purposes.
A notice of hearing is required in BCDA's Motion for Reconsideration as provided

under Section 5, Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the CTA expressly requires a
notice to the parties of the hearings conducted by the CTA En Banc. Specifically for
motions for reconsideration, Section 3, Rule 15 of the same requires the notice to be set
for hearing. Suppletorily, notice of hearing is likewise required under Sections 4 and 5,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS
On February 16, 2011, BCDA filed a Petition for Review with Request for Exemption
from Payment of Filing Fees with the CTA involving its claim for refund against the CIR.
On March 1, 2011, BCDA received a letter from Atty. Apolinario informed the BCDA
that she was returning the said Petition for Review as it was not deemed filed without the
payment of the correct legal fees.
BCDA paid the docket fees under protest on April 7, 2011.
The CIR filed a Motion to Dismiss and argued that since the deadline to file the
Petition for Review was on February 16, 2011, and the docket fees were paid only on April
42
7, 2011, then the Petition for Review was not filed on time. Thus, the CTA Second Division
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. The CTA Second Division and en banc ruled in
favor of CIR and dismissed the case.
BCDA maintains that it is exempt from payment of docket fees pursuant to Section
22, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
It anchors its status as a government instrumentality on Section 1 of Executive

Order No. 596, series of 2006, Republic Act (RA) No. 10149, and this Court's
pronouncements in Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals and
Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, where this Court discussed
the nature of Manila International Airport Authority as a government instrumentality and
cited the BCDA as among the other government instrumentalities in the country.
As to the lack of notice of hearing in its Motion for Reconsideration, the BCDA
argues that such notice is not applicable to the CTA En Banc since it is not a trier of fact.
Further, the BCDA notes that under the Revised Rules of Court of Tax Appeals, the filing of
a motion for reconsideration is only optional. Assuming arguendo that a notice of hearing
is required, the BCDA requests for liberality from the Court since the motion is on its face
meritorious and the interest of substantial justice would be served by giving due course to
such motion.
In its Manifestation dated November 6, 2019, the BCDA calls this Court's attention
to the promulgation of the June 20, 2018 case of Bases Conversion and Development
Authority v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, which involves the same parties and the
same issue of the BCDA's exemption from payment of docket fees. In the said case, this
Court ruled in favor of the BCDA and pronounced it to be exempt from payment of docket
fees pursuant to its status as a government instrumentality.
ISSUE
1. Is BCDA is exempt from payment of docket fees before the CTA?
2. Is a notice of hearing required in BCDA’s Motion for Reconsideration?
HELD
1. Yes. The BCDA is a government instrumentality and therefore exempt from
payment of docket fees.
Under Section 22, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, as amended:
Section 22. Government exempt. — The Republic of the

Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying
the legal fees provided in the rule. Local governments and
government-owned or controlled corporations with or without
independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees.
43
Significantly, this issue has already been resolved in Bases Conversion and
Development Authority v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, where this Court affirmed
BCDA's status as a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers. As such, it is
exempt from payment of docket fees.
Section 2 (10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of
1987 provides for the definition of a government "instrumentality" and a "GOCC,":
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. — x x x (10) Instrumentality

refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within
the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. x x x
The grant of these corporate powers is likewise stated in Section 3 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7227, also known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which
provides for BCDA's manner of creation:
Sec. 3. Creation of the Bases Conversion and Development

Authority. — There is hereby created a body corporate to be known as
the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, which shall have the
attribute of perpetual succession and shall be vested with the
powers of a corporation.
It is clear that a government instrumentality may be endowed with corporate

powers and at the same time retain its classification as a government "instrumentality" for
all other purposes.
2. Yes. A notice of hearing is required in BCDA's Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 5, Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the CTA expressly requires a
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the BCDA was required to include a notice of hearing
in its Motion for Reconsideration. That the filing of the motion is optional did not excuse
non-compliance since the BCDA opted to file such motion.
44
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. Nos. 236075 & 236076 April 18, 2022
CIVIL PROCEDURE - EFFICIENT PAPER RULE
DOCTRINE
The Court has already received and considered the Comments that are required to
be submitted by the parties within the prescribed period of filing the same. The directive
to subsequently file soft copies of the Comments to the Petitions is only for the parties to
comply with A.M. Nos. 10-3-7-SC (Rules on E-Filing), and 11-9-4-SC (Efficient Use of Paper
Rule), the hard copies thereof we have already received, examined and assessed. It,
therefore, does not preclude this Court from resolving the instant case since the
Comments to the Consolidated Petitions have already been deemed filed one month
before we rendered judgment.
In terms of the proper service of summons, in an assailed Decision, it was

discussed that Sheriff Liboro did not exert serious effort to personally serve the summons
to the Gos before resorting to substituted service. Clearly, the substituted service of
summons on the persons of the Gos is improper, hence the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over their persons.
FACTS
Marilyn Go Ramos-Yeo, Laurence Go and Montgomery Go (the Gos), petitioners,
filed a petition for motion for reconsideration for the Decision of the CA in denying the
Amended Petition for Annulment of Judgment regarding the accion reinvidicatoria case. In
the assailed ruling, it was held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
persons of the Gos because of invalid substituted service of summons.
In their Consolidated Motion for Reconsideration, Spouses Chua, respondents,

ascribed the following errors on the part of this Court in granting petitioners' petition:
First, the arguments raised therein by the Gos and Multi-Realty were the same as
those raised in the CA which were already exhaustively discussed and ruled upon by the
said appellate court.
Second, petitioners raised issues that are factual in nature, which is beyond the
purview of a Rule 45 petition. In particular, they contend that the issue on improper
substituted service is a question of fact as it requires the re-examination of the evidence
for its resolution. In any case, the Spouses Chua argue that strict observance of the rule
on substituted service is not warranted as the Gos deliberately avoided to personally
receive the summons thereby prompting a resort to a substituted service.
45
Third, the complaint for accion reinvindicatoria of the Chuas did not assail the
final decrees of registration that were granted in favor of petitioners Go and Multi-Realty.
They never alleged that the final decrees were fraudulently obtained, which is necessary
for a court sitting as a land registration court, to acquire jurisdiction. The Spouses Chua
further allege that it is the RTC which has jurisdiction not only on applications for original
registration of title, but also on all petitions filed after the registration of the same.
Hence, the trial court has the authority to alter or amend the technical descriptions of a
land which can be brought in an ordinary civil action, such as an accion reinvindicatoria,
like in this case, being the correct remedy.
Lastly, the Spouses Chua question the promulgation of the Court's Decision and
Resolution on the same date. In the Resolution, the Court noted the Comment filed by the
Gos, and granted the motion for substitution of party filed by ECI Trading Corporation. We
also noted the Comments filed by Spouses Chua and Multi-Realty, and required them to
submit a soft copy of the same. Therefore, there is no merit in the motion.
ISSUE
Did the petition for motion for reconsideration have merit and the trial court has
jurisdiction over the matter?
HELD
No. The Court ruled that in the first Spouses Chua's query on the promulgation of
the assailed Decision and Resolution on the same date. In their motion, there is no
procedural misstep can be attributed to the Court in rendering the Resolution and the
assailed Decision on the same date. The Gos and Multi-Realty already submitted a hard
copy of their respective Comments to the Petition on October 5, 2018. On the other hand,
Spouses Chua filed a hard copy of their Comment on October 4, 2018.
These dates constitute as the dates the parties, including the Spouses Chua, filed
their Comment upon our directive. As such, the Court's actions of taking note of the
Comments filed by the parties constitute as an acknowledgment of receipt thereof on
October 4 and 5, 2018. In other words, it simply means that the Court has already
received and considered the Comments that are required to be submitted by the parties
within the prescribed period of filing the same. The directive to subsequently file soft
copies of the Comments to the Petitions is only for the parties to comply with the
Efficient Use of Paper Rule and Rules on E-filing, the hard copies thereof we have already
received, examined, and assessed. It, therefore, does not preclude this Court from
resolving the instant case since the Comments to the Consolidated Petitions have already
been deemed filed one month before we rendered judgment. Considering that all the
pleadings and the records of the case had already been submitted before the Court, it,
therefore, can now fully resolve the issues presented by parties in the case pursuant to
our constitutional mandate to promptly dispense justice.
Contrary to the Spouses Chua's claim, the determination of the propriety of

substituted service effected on the Gos is a question of law. It is a question of what and
46
how the law should be applied. Hence, the petition is within the purview of an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45.
Accordingly in the assailed Decision that Deputy Sheriff Bienvenido Liboro (Sheriff
Liboro) did not exert serious efforts to personally serve the summons to the Gos before
resorting to substituted service. Clearly, the substituted service of summons on the
persons of the Gos is improper; hence, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons.
On the Spouses Chua's claim that the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case, the Court reiterates that the amended complaint of accion reinvidicatoria is a
disguise to review a final decree of registration in the names of the Gos and Multi-Realty
in violation of Section 108 of PD 1529. The trial court's judgment in favor of the Chuas
materially altered the boundaries of the properties owned by the Gos and Multi-Realty,
affecting the integrity of their title over their respective lands.
The petition for motion for reconsideration has no merit. The RTC Amended
Decision is null and void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject
matter. The Gos and Multi-Realty are therefore not barred by laches. No rights were also
conferred in favor of the Spouses Chua or imposed obligations against the parties.
47
SUMMONS
SABADO V. SABADO
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 214270 May 12, 2021
PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS - NOTICE TO COUNSEL
DOCTRINE
The purpose of summons is two-fold: (1) to notify the defendant that an action has
been brought against him; and (2) to acquire jurisidiction over the person of the
defendant.
The notice to counsel is equivalent to notice to client, however, it must be one

sent to the counsel of record in order to bind the client.
The voluntary appearance of Jay, in effect, cured the improper service of

summons when he sought the lifting of the TPO and the denial of the issuance of PPO in
his opposition, without raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. By such
conduct, he can no longer subsequently object to the court's jurisdiction.
FACTS
Tina Marie L. Sabado (Tina), respondent, is a bank employee who is married to Jay
V. Sabado (Jay), petitioner, who works overseas as a ship captain. Their marriage bore two
(2) children. However, their relationship became rocky which resulted in Jay’s
abandonment and utter disregard for his family. Because of this, Tina suffered
psychological and emotional abuse.
Tina filed a petition for Temporary And Permanent Protection Order (TPO & PPO),
Support And Support Pendente Lite against Jay. The trial court issued the TPO in favor of
Tina and ordered Jay to stay away at a distance of 200 meters, and desist from publicly
humiliating her and other forms of abuse. Jay is given five (5) days from notice within
which to file an opposition. The court sheriff made several attempts to personally serve
the summons, petition, and TPO to Jay at his address, and at the office of his employer,
but to no avail. Instead, Atty. Palmero, Jay’s counsel in a criminal case, received a
copy of the order and petition on November 16, 2012.
On January 17, 2013, Jay filed an Entry of Appearance with Opposition to the
Issuance of Permanent Protection Order where he asserted that he was merely a chief
officer and not a ship captain. He also claimed that the couple acquired four (4)
properties during their marriage, and that the condominium unit and parking slot are
under the name of Tina. He also denied humiliating her in public although they had
disagreements, and claimed that he has been a good provider. He prayed for the lifting of
48
the TPO, denial of the PPO, the determination of support and relieving the respondent
from posting a bond. He also questioned the validity of the service of summons which is
fatal to the acquisition of jurisdiction over his person as he claimed that he was out of the
Philippines for his overseas work.
RTC Makati issued a TPO and PPO in favor of Tina, and denied the admission of
Jay’s opposition for having been belatedly filed two (2) months after the issuance of the
TPO, instead of the non-extendible period of five (5) days under A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.
CA affirmed the findings of RTC and ruled that there was no improper service of
summons. The notice received by counsel representing a party in an action in court is
equivalent to notice to the party himself. Consequently, when Atty. Palmero received the
copy of the Order and TPO, Jay was considered to have been duly notified as well.
ISSUE
Was the serving of the order and TPO to Atty. Palmero considered a valid service of
summons?
HELD
No, the serving of the order and TPO to Atty. Palmero is not considered a valid
service of summons. Under the Rules of Court and quoting GCP-Manny Transport Services,
Inc. v. Prinsipe, the notice to counsel is equivalent to notice to client, however, it must be
a notice sent to counsel of record in order to bind the client. In the case at hand, Atty.
Palmero was Jay's counsel in a separate criminal case filed against the latter for violation
of RA 9262 pending at that time before Branch 140 of the RTC of Makati. Therefore, Jay
had no counsel of record yet with Branch 136 of the RTC of Makati at the time Atty.
Palmero received the copy of the order and TPO. Jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant cannot be acquired notwithstanding his knowledge of the pendency of a case
against him, unless he was validly served with summons. Thus, serving the order and TPO
to Atty. Palmero cannot be considered a valid service of summons.
However, We note that Jay voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of

the trial court when he filed the Entry of Appearance with Opposition to the Issuance of
the Permanent Protection Order on January 17, 2013. By seeking affirmative relief in his
opposition without objecting to the jurisdiction of the trial court, he thereby voluntarily
submitted to its jurisdiction. In effect, this cured the invalid service of summons.
49
PRE-TRIAL
GEMINA V. HEIRS OF ESPEJO
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 232682 September 13, 2021
APPEARANCE OF PARTIES; EFFECTS OF FAILURE TO APPEAR
DOCTRINE
When the party-defendant is present, the absence of his counsel during pre-trial
shall not ipso facto result in the plaintiff's ex parte presentation of evidence.
FACTS
According to Gemina, he purchased, owned and occupied with his family and
possessed the subject property located in Woodcrest peacefully and in the concept of an
owner since the 70s. In 2004, The Espejo heirs, through their representative, sent Gemina
a demand letter asserting their ownership over the subject property, and demanding him
and his family to vacate said property because they have been unlawfully occupying the
lot where the latter's house was built. Gemina, refused. The Espejo’s initially filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTC Q.C., subsequently withdrew and re-filed
for accion publiciana. On the scheduled trial Gemina was present but his counsel failed to
attend. The pre-trial was reset for a last time however, Gemina’s counsel still failed to
attend the said pre-trial schedule. The trial court allowed the heirs of Espejo to present
their evidence ex parte. In 2013, the trial court granted the withdrawal of Gemina's
counsel and directed Gemina to secure the services of a new counsel. However, the trial
court regarded the motion for reconsideration as a mere scrap of paper since it lacked the
requisite notice of hearing. Meantime, the heirs of Espejo's ex parte presentation of
evidence proceeded as scheduled. Through a new counsel, the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO).
RTC ruled for the heirs of Espejo anchored on the submitted documentary
evidence. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC allowing the Espejos to present evidence ex
parte since he already filed a motion for reconsideration albeit denied for lack of notice
of hearing. Since the Withdrawal of Counsel with Attached Motion for Reconsideration
failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of notice of hearing in a motion for new
trial or reconsideration, Gemina is bound by the Order of the trial court allowing ex parte
presentation of evidence.
ISSUE
Can a court allow an adverse party to present ex - parte due to the absence of
opposing counsel during pre-trial?
50
HELD
No. Section 4 and Section 5, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate the
appearance of the parties and their counsels, and the consequences for their failure to
appear during the scheduled pre trial. Gemina's cause of action should not have been
prejudiced by the non-appearance of his counsel, particularly since on record, the former
had been religiously appearing in the course of the proceedings, including during the
pre-trial. Hence, Espejo’s ex-parte presentation cannot be countenanced.
51
INTERVENTION
COMMISSION ON AUDIT V. PAMPILO
HERNANDO, J.
GR Nos. 188760, 189060 & 189333 June 30, 2020
CIVIL PROCEDURE - INTERVENTION; LEGAL INTEREST
DOCTRINE
Section 1, 92 Rule 19 of the Rules of Court requires that: (1) the movant must have
a legal interest in the matter being litigated; (2) the intervention must not unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties; and (3) the claim of the
intervenor must not be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The
right to intervene, however, is not an absolute right as the granting of a motion to
intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and may only be allowed if the
movant is able to satisfy all the requirements.
FACTS
Before this Court are Consolidated Petitions for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Orders issued by the RTC in Civil Case No. 03-106101, on:
April 27, 2009, May 5, 2009,June 23, 20094 and July 7, 20095 (collectively referred to as
the Assailed Orders).
Private respondent Social Justice Society (SJS), a political party duly registered
with the Commission of Elections, filed with the RTC of Manila, a Petition for Declaratory
Relief, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-106101, against Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation
(Shell); Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex), and Petron Corporation (Petron), collectively
referred to as the “Big 3.” In its Petition, private respondent SJS raised as an issue the oil
companies’ business practice of increasing the prices of their petroleum products
whenever the price of crude oil increases in the world market despite the fact that they
had purchased their inventories at a much lower price long before the increase. SJS
argued that such practice constitutes monopoly and combination in restraint of trade,
prohibited under Article 1867 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). SJS likewise contended
that the acts of these oil companies of increasing the prices of its oil products whenever
their competitors increase their prices fall under the term “combination or concerted
action” used in Section 11(a) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8479, otherwise known as the
Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1998 (Approved on February 10, 1998).
The Big 3 separately moved for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of lack of
legal standing, lack of cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, and failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
52
1st assailed order: The RTC issued the first assailed Order, which resolved to: (1)
deny the motions to dismiss of the Big 3; (2) grant private respondents’ motion to open
and examine the books of accounts of the Big 3; and (3) order the Commission on Audit
(COA), Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) to open and
examine the books of accounts of the Big 3.
The Big 3 separately sought reconsideration. Private respondents, on the other

hand, moved for the production of records and the inclusion of private respondent
Cabigao as part of the team that would open and examine the books of accounts of the
Big 3.
2nd assailed order: The RTC directing the Chairman of COA and the Commissioners
of the BIR and the BOC to form a panel of examiners to conduct an examination of the
books of accounts of the Big 3 and to submit a report thereon within three (3) months
from receipt of the Order.
Though not parties to the case, the COA, the BIR, and the BOC, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), were constrained to file a Motion for Reconsideration20 of
the April 27 and May 5, 2009 Orders on the ground that the order of examination is
unwarranted and beyond their respective jurisdictions.
Meanwhile, private respondent-intervenor Pangkalahatang Sanggunian Manila and

Suburbs Drivers’ Association Nationwide (Pasang Masda), Inc. filed a Motion for
Intervention with attached Petition-in-Intervention,21 which the Big 3 opposed.
3rd assailed order: The RTC issued the third assailed Order,granting Pasang Masda’s
Motion for Intervention and thereby admitting its Petition-in-Intervention.
4th assailed order: The RTC issued the fourth assailed Order denying the motions
for reconsideration of the Big 3 and the OSG and granting private respondents’ motion to
include private respondent Cabigao as part of the panel of examiners. Public respondent
RTC stood pat on its April 27, 2009 Order citing the doctrine of parens patriae.
A few days later, the RTC, acting on the manifestation of private respondents that
the government agencies have not acted to comply with its order, directed the COA, the
BIR, and the BOC to explain within 72 hours from notice why they should not be cited in
contempt for failure to comply.
ISSUE
Did Pasang Masda satisfy the requirements for intervention?
HELD
NO. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court requires that: (1) the movant must
have a legal interest in the matter being litigated; (2) the intervention must not unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties; and (3) the claim of the
intervenor must not be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The
53
right to intervene, however, is not an absolute right as the granting of a motion to
intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and may only be allowed if the
movant is able to satisfy all the requirements.
In this case, Pasang Masda’s allegation that its members consume petroleum
products is not sufficient to show that they have legal interest in the matter being
litigated considering that there are other oil players in the market aside from the Big 3.
Jurisprudence mandates that legal interest must be actual, substantial, material, direct
and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant Such is not the situation in this
case. In fact, there is no showing that Pasang Masda has something to gain or lose in the
outcome of the case. Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondent RTC in allowing Pasang Masda to intervene despite its failure to comply with
the first requirement.
Besides, even if the Court relaxes the definition of “legal interest” in the instant
case, the granting of the motion to intervene would still be improper because the subject
matter of the petition-in-intervention, just like the petition, cannot be the subject of an
action for declaratory relief. Since an intervention is not an independent action but is
ancillary and supplement to the main case, the dismissal of the main case would
necessarily include the dismissal of the ancillary case.
54
JUDGMENT AND FINAL ORDERS
ALJEM’S CREDIT INVESTOR CO. V. SPOUSES BAUTISTA
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 218210 April 25, 2022
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DOCTRINE
An issue of fact is genuine if it requires presentation of evidence to be resolved.
FACTS
This case is an offshoot of an action for accion publiciana, rescission of contract to
sell, with damages and attorney's fees, filed by petitioner against the spouses Bautista.
Petitioner alleged that a parcel of land owned by the spouses Bautista was mortgaged to
it as security for a loan.
The Bautistas failed to pay the loan; thus, the petitioner foreclosed the mortgage.
As the spouses Bautista did not redeem the property within the reglementary period, title
to the property was consolidated in petitioner's name.
When the petitioner was about to take possession of the property, Catalina
Bautista (Catalina), the wife, offered to repurchase the property. Petitioner accepted the
offer, so they entered into a Contract to Sell on August 29, 2000. The Spouses Bautista,
however, failed to comply with the Contract to Sell resulting in its cancellation. The
parties entered into another Contract to Sell on September 27, 2001; however, despite
several demands to pay or vacate the property, the spouses Bautista still failed to comply
even with a new contract.
Thus, the petitioner sent demand letters to Catalina to vacate the property. The
last demand letter to vacate was sent on January 18, 2006. All demands were to no avail,
resulting in the petitioner's filing of the complaint.
The spouses Bautista alleged that the mortgage contract is void as it did not bear
the conformity of Porferio Bautista (Porferio), the husband. They also contended that the
contract to sell contains a provision on pactum commissorium, which is illegal, and that
the contract should be considered as an equitable mortgage. They likewise contested the
high interest rates imposed.
Petitioner filed its Reply. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment, alleging that there is no genuine issue of fact because: (a) the spouses Bautista
admitted that the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the property is in petitioner's
name; (b) there were no specific denials of the material allegations of the complaint; (c)
55
the defense of the spouses Bautista are legal issues, not factual; and, (d) there is no
genuine issue of fact.
The spouses Bautista opposed the motion contending that a full-blown trial is
necessary to determine: (a) whether there is an equitable mortgage; (b) the propriety of
the imposition of the interest rates; (c) presence of pactum commissorium; and, (d)
whether Porferio's signature was forged.
ISSUE
Is the RTC's denial of petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment proper?
HELD
YES. Summary judgment is a procedural device that allows parties to avoid long
litigation and delays, where the pleadings show that there are no genuine issues of fact to
be tried. A genuine issue of fact is "such issue of fact which requires the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived, or false claim." As such, an
issue of fact is genuine if it requires presentation of evidence to be resolved.
When a party moves for a summary judgment, the trial court is duty-bound to
examine the motion and the supporting documents, as well as the corresponding
opposition thereto, to determine if there are genuine issues of fact that should be
resolved by the trial court.
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment claims that: (a) the spouses Bautista
admitted that the TCT of the property is in petitioner's name; (b) the Bautistas did not
specifically deny the material allegations of the complaint; and (c) the defenses of the
spouses Bautista (pactum commissorium, equitable mortgage), are legal issues, not
factual.
On the other hand, the spouses Bautista's Opposition (to the Motion) insists that
there are genuine issues of facts in the case, such as the existence of equitable mortgage,
imposition of interest, and whether the contract to sell is pactum commissorium, and
forgery. These issues are likewise reflected in the spouses Bautista's Answer.
The Court finds that summary judgment will be improper. The RTC is correct in
holding that there are genuine issues of fact to be threshed out in the trial.
56
POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES
RAMIREZ V. ELOMINA
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 202661 March 17, 2021
PERIOD TO EXTEND THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
DOCTRINE
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely
a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with
the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal.
Settled is the rule that anyone seeking exemption from the application of the
reglementary period for filing an appeal has the burden of proving the existence of
exceptionally meritorious instances warranting such deviation.
FACTS
On May 11, 1994, Ramirez was issued an Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
pursuant to Free Patent granted on May 2, 1994 over a lot in Laguna. On July 11, 2000,
Felomino filed a letter-protest against the approval of the application and issuance of the
free patent to Ramirez. On Dec. 29, 2003, the Regional Executive Director issued an order
cancelling and revoking the free patent of Ramirez. Ramirez’s application for free patent
was found as having been tainted with misrepresentations constituting fraud and rendered
void.
On Dec. 12, 2005, Felomino sued for reconveyance of title and damages before the
RTC, Binan, Laguna against Ramirez and the Registry of Deeds of Calamba City, Laguna.
Ramirez filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum-shopping but the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss. RTC ruled that the cause of action had already prescribed.
Ramirez’s OCT was issued in May 1994 while Felomino filed the action more than 10 years
later or in December 2005. The trial court held that an action for reconveyance resulting
from fraud prescribes in four years from discovery, which was deemed to have taken place
when the property was registered in 1994. Felomino moved for reconsideration. In the
Nov. 14, 2008 order, the trial court denied Felomino’s Motion for Reconsideration on the
ground that the action has already prescribed and that he is not the real party in interest,
since he is neither an applicant nor a registered owner of the Subject land.
Felomino appealed but in the appellate court’s decision in Oct. 12, 2011, the
judgment of the trial court was reversed. Ramirez received a copy of the decision on Oct.
17, 2011. After 17 days from receipt thereof, or on Nov. 3, 2011, she filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. In a Resolution on Dec. 21, 2011, the appellate court denied the said
Motion for late filing and therefore its jurisdiction to act on it had been lost. Thus, in a
57
Resolution on May 25, 2012, the appellate court ordered the issuance of an Entry of
Judgment and noted that on Jan. 19, 2012, its Oct. 12, 2011 decision had become final
and executory. Thereafter, Ramirez filed the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 75
of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
Did the appellate court commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying Ramirez’s Motion for Reconsideration for having been
filed belatedly?
HELD
No. Sec. 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides for the period to file a Motion
for Reconsideration: “Section 1. Period of filing. – A party may file a motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution within fifteen (15) days from notice
thereof, with proof of service on the adverse party.” Rule 36, Section 2 of the same Rules
also provides that a judgment or final order shall become final unless a Motion for
Reconsideration is timely filed. In the case at bar, the 15th day of the allowable period for
Ramirez to file her Motion for Reconsideration fell on a holiday, Nov. 1, 2011. Thus,
Ramirez had until Nov. 2, 2011 to file the same, reckoned from the date of receipt of the
appellate court’s Decision. However, she filed the Motion the following day, or Nov. 3,
2011.
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely
a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with
the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal. In
the case at present, Ramirez admits having committed the procedural infraction but asks
for the relaxation of the rules. She explains that the inadvertent late filing of the Nov. 3,
2011 Motion for Reconsideration with the appellate court was due to forgetfulness in view
of her old age and frail condition. Settled is the rule that anyone seeking exemption from
the application of the reglementary period for filing an appeal has the burden of proving
the existence of exceptionally meritorious instances warranting such deviation.
Therefore, due to her disregard of the Rules, the appellate court was justified in denying
her motion.
58
BAUTISTA AROMIN V. HEIRS OF SOMIS
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 204447 April 26, 2021
EXTRINSIC FRAUD
DOCTRINE
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation
committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from
fully exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a false promise of a
compromise, or where the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without
authority connives at his defeat. These instances show that there was never a real contest
in the trial or hearing of the case so that the judgment should be annulled and the case
set for a new and fair hearing.
A lawyer's neglect in keeping track of the case and his failure to apprise his client
of the developments of the case do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Fraud is not extrinsic if
the alleged fraudulent act was committed by the petitioner's own counsel. The fraud must
emanate from the act of the adverse party and must be of such nature as to deprive the
petitioner of his/her day in court.
FACTS
Maria alleged that she and her deceased husband Rufino owned three parcels of
land (lots A,B, and C). According to her, she instructed her son, Briccio, to pay the realty
tax for the said lots. Briccio then discovered that Lots A and C were sold to the Spouses
Somis, through a Deed of Sale with the Right to Repurchase, allegedly signed by Maria and
Rufino. Maria filed a Complaint for Annulment of Documents with damages, alleging that
she did not sign the Deed of Sale, hence it is void. Summonses were served on the Somises
who filed their answer. Subsequently, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement
which provided that in consideration of the withdrawal of the case filed by Maria against
Leonila Somis, the latter agreed that Lot A shall belong to Maria and in turn, Maria agreed
that the Lot B shall belong to Leonila Somis. The Compromise Agreement was approved by
the Trial Court’s decision which became final. Later on, a Writ of Execution was issued.
Maria filed a motion to set aside the Order granting the issuance of the Writ of execution,
asserting that the description or PIN of the property given to the spouses Somis under the
agreement was erroneous. The RTC granted the motion. The spouses Somis moved for
reconsideration but they were denied. The Somises filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the appellate court which was granted.
Maria, through her counsel, Atty. Indasen, filed a Motion to Annul the Compromise
Agreement. However, the trial court denied the Motion for being moot and academic. The
Trial Court pointed out that the agreement has become final and executory. Maria filed a
59
Petition for Relief from judgment assailing the trial court’s Jan. 17, 2008 decision, which
held that the parties are enjoined to comply strictly with the terms and conditions set
forth of the said agreement. However, the Petition was dismissed for non-payment of
docket fees. Subsequently, Maria hired a new lawyer, who then filed a Petition for
Reformation of Compromise Agreement. Afterwards, the Petition was withdrawn when
Maria opted to file the instant Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the CA. In her
petition, Maria claimed that the trial court acquired no jurisdiction and that the trial
court’s Jan. 17, 2008 Decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud when her former
counsel connived with the mediator and the counsel of the spouses Somis in giving Lot B
to the latter by writing the incorrect PIN of the property in the agreement. Thus, she
pointed out that Atty. Indasen was grossly negligent in handling the case. The appellate
court dismissed Maria's Petition. Later on, Maria moved for reconsideration which the
appellate court denied.
ISSUE
Is the Compromise Agreement between the parties valid and binding?
HELD
Yes. When a decision becomes final and executory, it becomes valid and binding
upon the parties and their successors in interest. Such a decision or order can no longer
be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may have been. The Compromise
Agreement was approved by the trial court in its decision which became final.
Consequently, a Writ of Execution was issued. The final and executory nature of the
Compromise Agreement was likewise reiterated in the appellate court's Decision. Thus,
the agreement is binding between and among the parties. Moreover, the appellate court
correctly ruled that the Compromise Agreement was valid and binding since there was a
meeting of the minds between the parties. Article 1305 of the Civil Code provides that a
contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons, whereby one is bound to give
something or to render some service to the other. And under Art. 1318 of the same Code,
a valid contract requires the concurrence of the following essential elements: (1)
Consent of the contracting parties; (2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the
contract; (3) Cause of the obligation which is established. The Compromise Agreement
was clear that the contracting parties mutually agreed to transfer to each other the
properties indicated therein. Even if it was Maria's counsel who prepared the written
instrument, she or her representative was expected to exercise due diligence in reviewing
the entries therein before signing the instrument. Moreover, if indeed there was a mistake
on which property should be transferred to the spouses Somis, Maria should have availed
of her remedies immediately.
The appellate court correctly denied the Petition for Annulment of Judgment.
Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an annulment of judgment may be
based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Courts acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff upon the filing of the complaint, while
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in a civil case is acquired either through the
service of summons upon them in the manner required by law or through their voluntary
appearance in court and their submission to its authority. In this case, the appellate court
60
correctly held that jurisdiction over the spouses Somis was acquired by the trial court
when summonses were duly served on them. With regard to Celso, jurisdiction was
likewise acquired over his person when he voluntarily appeared before the court by
signing and filing the Compromise Agreement. The authority of Celso to represent the
spouses Somis was affirmed when he filed the Petition for Certiorari before the appellate
court to uphold the accuracy of the contents in the Compromise Agreement. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. In the case at
present, the subject matter of the complaint before the RTC was the annulment of a
Compromise Agreement which was essentially a Deed of Sale allegedly executed by Maria
in favor of the spouses Somis. We pointed out that an action to annul a contract and
reconveyance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus, within the jurisdiction of the
RTC. Hence, the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of Maria's complaint.
Maria was not deprived of due process on the ground of extrinsic fraud. Extrinsic
fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed outside
of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his
side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by
keeping him away from court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise, or where
the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of
the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his
defeat. These instances show that there was never a real contest in the trial or hearing of
the case so that the judgment should be annulled and the case set for a new and fair
hearing. In this case, Maria actively participated in the proceedings and was properly
assisted by her counsel both in the RTC and the appellate court. Thus, when she found out
about the alleged error in the Compromise Agreement, she filed a motion to amend the
same, which was initially granted per the trial court's Order. However, said Order was set
aside by the appellate court. Thereafter, she filed a motion to annul the Compromise
Agreement before the trial court but the same was denied. Subsequently, she filed a
petition for relief from judgment with the trial court but it was likewise dismissed for
non-payment of docket fees. Consequently, Maria was indeed accorded with due process
to defend her case. But Maria accused her previous counsel with negligence and of
conniving with the spouses Somis in depriving her of Lot B. allegation is unsupported by
any evidence on record. Even assuming Atty. Indasen was negligent, it still does not
constitute extrinsic fraud. A lawyer's neglect in keeping track of the case and his failure
to apprise his client of the developments of the case do not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Fraud is not extrinsic if the alleged fraudulent act was committed by the petitioner's own
counsel. The fraud must emanate from the act of the adverse party and must be of such
nature as to deprive the petitioner of his/her day in court.
61
PARAYDAY V. SHOGUN SHIPPING CO., INC.
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No.204555 July 6, 2020
APPEALS
DOCTRINE
It is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a
given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling
factor as to settlement of rights of the parties. Once a decision or order becomes final
and executory, it is removed from the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it
to further alter or amend it. Thus, parties who do not appeal from a judgment can no
longer seek modification or reversal of the same.
FACTS
This is a PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
This case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal and regularization,
underpayment of wages, overtime pay, rest day pay, holiday pay, holiday premium,
service incentive leave (SIL), thirteenth (13th) month pay, and night shift differential pay,
and claims for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees filed by Parayday and
Reboso against respondent Shogun Shipping Co., Inc.7(Shogun Ships), and Vicente R.
Cordero (Cordero) and Antonio “Nonie” C. Raymundo (Raymundo), President and Vice
President, respectively, of Shogun Ships.
LA: It ordered Respondent Shogun Ships Co., Inc. to reinstate complainants Pedrito
R. Parayday and Jaime Reboso to their former position without loss of seniority rights with
full backwages from time of dismissal until fully reinstated. On the issue of illegal
dismissal, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners and held that respondent failed
to prove that petitioners were dismissed for just or authorized cause and that they were
afforded procedural due process. Parayday did not appeal the decision of the LA. It was
only before the Supreme Court that Parayday resurrected their claims.
NLRC: The NLRC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings of the Labor
Arbiter that petitioners were regular employees of Shogun Ships and that they were
illegally dismissed from employment
CA: The CA rendered its assailed Decision granting respondent’s Petition for
Certiorari and setting aside the August 28, 2009 Decision and October 27, 2009 Resolution
of the NLRC.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration26 but the CA denied the same in its
November 19, 2012 Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition.
62
Petitioners raised issues for resolution before this Court.
ISSUE
Is Parayday barred from its claims considering it failed to appeal the decision of
the LA?
HELD
YES. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides: ART. 229(223). Appeal.— Decisions,
awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards, or orders.
Section 21, Rule V of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended, provides - If
no appeal is filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin within the time provided
under Article 223 (now 229) of the Labor Code, as amended, and Section 1, Rule VI of
these Rules, the decision or order of the Labor Arbiter shall become final and executory
after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the counsel or authorized
representative or the parties if not assisted by counsel or representative. (As amended by
En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012)
It is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a

given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling
factor as to settlement of rights of the parties. Once a decision or order becomes final
and executory, it is removed from the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it
to further alter or amend it.
Here, petitioners did not appeal from the April 27, 2009 Decision of the Labor
Arbiter. It was only before this Court that herein petitioners resurrected their claims for
underpayment of wages and benefits, including damages and attorney’s fees.
Considering that petitioners failed to question the findings of the Labor Arbiter, as
even affirmed by the NLRC, that they are not entitled to their monetary claims consisting
of underpayment of salaries and benefits, and claims for damages and attorney's fees,
including Shogun Ship's exclusive liability for payment of petitioners' backwages, said
findings have therefore long become final and can no longer be impugned in this action.
63
BRUAL V. CONTRERAS
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 2054510 March 7, 2022
NATURE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
DOCTRINE
Appeal is neither a natural nor a constitutional right, but merely statutory, and the
implication of its statutory character is that the party who intends to appeal must always
comply with the procedures and rules governing appeals, or else the right of appeal may
be lost or squandered.
FACTS
Petitioner Elizabeth Brual (Elizabeth), as instituted heir and co-executor, filed
before the RTC a petition for probate of the last will and testament of her aunt, the late
Fausta Brual (Fausta), who she and her husband, Irineo Brual (Irineo), took care of. As the
special proceedings ensued, the respondents Jorge Brual Contreras, Lourdes
Brual-Nazario, Erlinda Brual-Binay, Rodolfo Brual, Renato Brual, Violeta Brual, David De
Jesus and Antonio De Jesus (respondents Bruals), as nephews and nieces, filed a
manifestation and motion for intervention and supplemental allegations before the
probate court, alleging that the testamentary act of Fausa leaving all her properties to
Elizabeth and Irineo was dubious and the petition for probate was defective.
On November 4, 2010, in its Order/Resolution, the RTC denied the respondent

Bruals’ motion for intervention and supplemental allegation, holding that Fausta, who
died single and without compulsory heirs, may dispose of her entire estate by will under
Art. 842 of the Civil Code. In its January 14, 2011 Order, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent Bruals.
On February 3, 2011, respondent Bruals’ filed their notice of appeal of the

November 4, 2010 Order/Resolution and January 14,2011 Order. In its April, 27, 2011
Order, the RTC dismissed the respondent Bruals’ appeal due to their failure to file a
record on appeal pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The
respondent Bruals filed their omnibus motion for reconsideration and admit records on
appeal, reasoning that their failure to submit a record on appeal together with the notice
of appeal was due to excusable negligence, as they believed that the submission of a
record would only come after the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of docket
fees.
In its July 27, 2011 Resolution/Order, the RTC denied respondent Brual’s omnibus
Motion, holding that their failure to file a record on appeal cannot be considered as mere
excusable negligence. A petition for certiorari was filed before the CA, wherein it
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. The CA found that it was the honest belief
of the respondent Bruals that the submission of a record of appeal would only come after
the submission of a notice of appeal. In its January 16, 2013 Resolution, the CA denied the
64
motion for reconsideration filed by Elizabeth because an appeal must not be dismissed
based on mere procedural technicalities. The appellate court gave weight to respondent’s
admission that they were of the honest belief that the submission of a record of appeal
would only come after the submission of a notice of appeal. Thereafter, she filed a
petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.
ISSUE
Was the failure of respondent Bruals to file a record on appeal considered an
excusable negligence making the dismissal of the appeal by the RTC not valid?
HELD
No, the failure of the respondent Bruals to file a record on appeal is not an
excusable negligence. The dismissal of the appeal by the RTC is valid.
Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court provides that the remedy of appeal in
special proceedings extends to other orders or dispositions that completely determine a
particular matter in the case, such as a denial of a motion for intervention. Section 2,
Rule 41 of the Rules Court, which provides the modes of appeal, requires a record on
appeal to be filed, in cases of special proceedings, with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appeal from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that a party who wants to appeal a
judgment or final order in special proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or
final order within which to perfect an appeal, because he will be filing not only a notice
of appeal but also a record on appeal that will require the approval of the trial court with
notice to the adverse party. While it is not necessary that a notice of appeal and a record
on appeal be filed simultaneously, the rule is unequivocal that the notice of appeal and
record on appeal shall be filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order.
In the case at bar, respondent Bruals’ counsel received the notice of final order
dismissing the motion for intervention on November 15, 2010. They had a period of 30
days to appeal by record on appeal from receipt of notice of the final order, or until
December 15, 2010 within which to file their notice and record on appeal. On November
26, 2010, they filed their motion for reconsideration, duly interrupting the period for
filing an appeal. On January 24, 2011, when respondent Bruals received the final order
denying their motion for reconsideration, the period to appeal resumed giving them 30
days thereafter or until February 23, 2011 to perfect their appeal. On February 3, 2011,
they filed their notice of appeal without a record on appeal. On April 27, 2011, the RTC
dismissed their notice of appeal due to their failure to file the required record on appeal.
It was only on June 27, 2011 that they filed their omnibus motion for reconsideration with
motion to admit record on appeal while claiming inadvertence and lack of knowledge on
the timing of the filing of the record on appeal.
Both a notice of appeal and a record on appeal are required for appealing final
orders in a special proceeding case. Appeal is neither a natural nor a constitutional right,
but merely statutory, and the implication of its statutory character is that the party who
intends to appeal must always comply with the procedures and rules governing appeals, or
65
else the right of appeal may be lost or squandered. Excusable negligence, to be
"excusable", must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded
against. A mere reading of the rules could have prevented respondent Bruals’ blunder.
The mere inadvertence and honest belief that the record on appeal is not yet due are
simply unacceptable. Therefore, the dismissal of the appeal due is valid.
66
MEGA FISHING CORP V. ESTATE OF GONZALES
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 214781 March 9, 2022
NATURE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
DOCTRINE
The rules of procedure must be strictly followed because the “right to appeal is
not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. A party who
seeks to avail of the right must, therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules,
failing which the right to appeal is invariably lost.
However, this court previously allowed the relaxation of the rigid rules of
procedure in order to serve substantial justice in considering (1) matters of life, liberty,
honor or property; (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (3) the merits
of the case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; or (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.
FACTS
The Deceased Francisco Gonzales (deceased Francisco, respondent) owned a 1,667
sqm property (subject property) located in Navotas covered by TCT No. 280406 issued on
April 20, 1994. By virtue of a deed of sale, TCT No 280406 was canceled and TCT No 21297
was issued on April 30 1999, TCT 21297 was canceled, and at the exact time, a new TCT
21299 was issued in the name of Esperanza Consigna.
On May 18, 1999, Mercedita Valenciano (Mercedita), representative of Esperanza,

executed an affidavit of loss of TCTs 280406, 280407, and 280409. Esperanza, who claims
to be the beneficial owner of the properties covered by the said titles and filed a petition
for the reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate copies of the three titles.
On September 19, 1999, the original copy of TCT 280406 was annotated reflecting
the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy.
On November 5, 1999, Mega Fishing Corporation (MFC, petitioner) purchased the

subject property from Esperanza for P9,601,920.00 by virtue of a Kasulatan ng Ganap at
Lubos na Bilihan. Accordingly, TCT 21299 was canceled and TCT 21926 was issued in the
name of MFC.
As early as 1999, records reveal that Francisco’s last will and testament were
submitted to probate before the RTC of Manila.
67
In May 2000, the estate of Francisco through Teresita, filed a case against
Esperanza, Mercedita, MFC, Vicente Garcia (Garcia), and Sarah Principe, seeking to annul
and cancel TCT 21297, 21299, and 21296, and the reinstatement of TCT No. 280406.
On November 22, 2011, the RTC ruled in favor of Francisco. It found that the new
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT 280406 in the name of Francisco was null and void for
being fraudulently obtained. Additionally, it held that the then Acting Register of Deeds,
Garcia, may be personally liable for damages for unlawfully causing the issuance of a new
owner’s duplicate copy. The RTC also found that MFC was not a buyer in good faith for
its failure to discharge the burden of proving the same.
The MFC filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision but it was denied.
MFC then filed a notice of appeal.
ISSUE
Did the CA gravely abuse its discretion when it did not allow MFC’s appeal brief
and ordered the case closed and terminated?
HELD
Citing Government of the Kingdom of Belgium v. CA, in case of late filing of an
appellant’s brief, the court has the power to allow an appeal provided that: (a) the
circumstances obtaining a warrant the court’s liberality; (b) that strong considerations of
equity justify an exception to the procedural rule in the interest of substantial justice; (c)
no material injury has been suffered by the appellee and by the delay; and (e) there is no
motion to dismiss filed.
MFC claims that the foregoing circumstances are present in the case at bar
because (1) herein Francisco did not file a motion to dismiss; (2) there is no contention
that Francisco’s cause was prejudiced; (3) no material injury has been suffered by
Francisco; (4) MFC duly instructed its farmer counsel to file the appellant’s brief by
making numerous follow-ups and reminders to its counsel; (5) the appellant’s brief was
only filed a few days late.
The Court also cited the case CMTC International marketing Corp v. Bhagis
International Trading Corp, where this Court allowed the late filing of the appellant’s
brief due to its counsel’s negligence.
When the petitioner filed its motion attaching therewith its

appellant’s brief, there was a clear intention on the part of the
petitioner not to abandon his appeal... It bears stressing that the rule
states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, and may not be
strictly followed where observance of it would result in outright
deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of
justice so requires.
68
The Court rules that MFC should be afforded the ample opportunity for its case to
be decided on the merits and not on mere technicalities. When MFC filed with the
attached appellant’s brief, it was a clear indication that it did not abandon its appeal. We
have previously allowed the relaxation of these rigid rules of procedure in order to serve
substantial justice in considering (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (2) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; or (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. The Court notes
that MFC stands to lose its property rights due to a technicality for the belated filing of its
appellant’s brief attributed to its former counsel’s negligence. The Court admits that the
belated filing of its brief was an honest mistake and not an attempt to delay the
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Mega Fishing

Corporation’s Appellant’s Brief is ADMITTED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals which is DIRECTED to proceed with the proceedings with dispatch.
69
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. TICO INSURANCE
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 204226 April 18, 2022
NATURE OF APPEAL
DOCTRINE
It is settled that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. This means that the failure to
interpose a timely appeal deprives the appellate body of any jurisdiction to alter the final
judgment, more so to entertain the appeal.
A successful litigant who has secured a final judgment in its favor cannot later be
impleaded by its defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove its
claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack
upon the judgment. In other words, an action for interpleader may not be utilized to
circumvent the immutability of a final and executory judgment. It is settled that when a
decision has attained finality, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law.
FACTS
TICO Insurance Company (TICO) is an insurance company engaged by Glowide and
Pacific Mills (PMI) to provide a fire insurance policy over several properties. When a fire
gutted the insured properties, Glowide and PMI filed a claim to TICO. However, TICO
failed to pay in full the insurance proceeds, prompting Glowide and PMI to file a
complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against
TICO. The writ of preliminary attachment was granted and issued on two condominium
units owned by TICO. A judgment was rendered in favor of Glowide and PMI, with a
subsequent writ of execution being issued over the condominium units annotated on the
Certificate of Title of the two units. The redemption period lapsed without any payment
from TICO, as such a final deed of sale was issued in favor of Glowide and PMI.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) sent TICO several final assessment notices for
its tax deficiencies. TICO failed to pay its tax liabilities, prompting the BIR to issue a
warrant of distraint and/or levy over the two aforementioned condominium units of TICO
annotated on the Certificate of Title of the two units. TICO then underwent liquidation
proceedings, leading it to file a Complaint for Interpleader to resolve the conflicting
claims over the two condominium units.
Glowide and PMI contends that TICO’s complaint for interpleader was improper
since it collaterally attacks a final and executed judgment in their favor.
70
The BIR argues that the complaint for interpleader was proper since it was
intended to determine which among the creditors had a better right to the condominium
units.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a decision holding that the claim of BIR
was superior to that of Glowide and PMI. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC and
ruled in favor of Glowide and PMI. The BIR belatedly filed its motion for reconsideration
but was admitted by the CA in the interest of justice.
ISSUE
May BIR’s appeal still be entertained and was the TICO’s Complaint for
Interpleader proper?
HELD
No. The Supreme Court ruled that failure to interpose a timely appeal deprives the
appellate court of any jurisdiction to alter the final judgment and that a motion for
reconsideration must necessarily be filed within the period to appeal. The BIR’s
contention that the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time due to its counsel’s
negligence is of no moment.
As for the issue of the appropriateness of TICO’s Complaint for Interpleader, the
Supreme Court held that it was improper since it was a belated attempt to assail the final
and executed judgment in favor of Glowide and PMI. Aside from the judgment which ruled
in favor of Glowide and PMI, the RTC had previously ruled that Glowide and PMI's credits
enjoy preference over BIR's claim over the condominium units. This was then affirmed by
the CA which became final and executory. The court further stating that a successful
litigant who has secured a final judgment in its favor cannot later be impleaded by its
defeated adversary in an interpleader suit, and compelled to prove its claim anew against
other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the
judgment.
71
PEOPLE V. MALLARI
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 1971640 December 4, 2019
DOCTRINE OF FINALITY/IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGEMENTS
DOCTRINE
Judgments or orders become final and executory by operation of law and not by
judicial declaration. The finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or no motion for reconsideration
or new trial is filed. The court need not even pronounce the finality of the order as the
same becomes final by operation of law.
FACTS
Revenue Delegation Authority Order (RDAO) No. 202007, Regional Director Alfredo
V. Misajon of the Bureau of Internal Revenue(BIR), Revenue Region No. 6 of Manila filed a
criminal complaint against respondents Benedicta Mallari (Mallari) and Chi Wei-Neng
(Wei-Neng), President and General Manager of Topsun International (Topsun) for violation
of Section 255 in relation to Sections 253and 256 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC) before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila before the Office of
the City Prosecutor. CTA 1st Division dismissed the criminal complaint for failure of ACP
Mendorza to obey a lawful order of the court to submit a certified true copy of the
Memorandum of the CIR authorizing Misajon to prosecute.
On January 18, 2010, the counsels/prosecutors of the BIR Manila filed their Entry
of Appearance with Leave to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration maintaining that
RD Misajon can sign approval and referral letters to authorize the institution of criminal
actions/cases from the regional office with the courts, government agencies, or
quasi-judicial bodies under Section 220 of the NIRC in accordance with the delegated
authority vested by the CIR to RD under RDAO No. 2-2007. Further, on March 27,2007, a
Memorandum issued by the CIR gives authority to specific BIR legal offices to prosecute
and conduct criminal proceedings with respect to violation of tax laws like in the instant
case. CTA En Banc dismissed Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court affirming CTA 1st Division decision which has already become final.
ISSUE
Is the decision of the CTA First Division final?
HELD
Yes. Resolution of the CTA First Division has already attained finality, it now
"becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even
if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether
it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land." Although
there are recognized exceptions to this rule, petitioner failed to prove that the case falls
72
under any of the instances. By virtue of the doctrine of immutability, the said Resolution
can no longer be reviewed nor modified event is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion
of law and facts of the said tax court.
A perusal of the records shows that the BIR Main Office and the Office of the City
Prosecutor received the Notice of the December 14, 2009 Resolution of the CTA First
Division on December 17, 2009 and December 21, 2009, respectively. From the date of
receipt, petitioner only had until January 4, 2010 and January 5, 2010, respectively, to
file its Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner, however, filed its motion only on January
18, 2010 or 14 days beyond the prescribed period. Thus, we find no cogent reason to
depart from the findings of the CTA Special First Division, which was affirmed by the CTA
En Banc, that petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration beyond the 15-day
reglementary period.
Consequently, petitioner's failure to duly file on time a Motion for Reconsideration

of the CTA First Division's December 14, 2009 Resolution resulted in losing its right to
assail the CTA First Division's judgment before this Court. This is in accordance with the
basic rule that a party who fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper
remedy within the period prescribed by law for the purpose loses the right to do so.
Therefore, the decision of CTA First Division has already attained finality.
73
TANINGCO V. HERNANDEZ
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 215615 December 9, 2020
DOCTRINE OF FINALITY/IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGEMENTS
DOCTRINE
DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT — a decision or order that has attained
finality can no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law and whether it be made by the court that
rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.
EXCEPTIONS — The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final

judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments
NOTICE TO COUNSEL IS NOTICE TO PARTY – Verily, Mrs. Taningco is presumed

authorized to receive the CA Decision on behalf of Atty. Taningco that was sent to the
office address on record. It necessarily follows that petitioners, through Atty. Taningco,
duly received the said decision in the ordinary course of business. Hence, in the absence
of competent evidence to prove otherwise, the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty with respect to service of notice stands.
FACTS
On January 2, 2014, The Taningco received a copy of the November 25, 2013 CA
Resolution declaring the February 28, 2013 Decision to have become final and executory
on May 7, 2013 thus forcing him and his entire family clan to vacate there ancestral land.
Taningco immediately filed with the CA a motion to set aside its November 25,
2013 Resolution and Entry of Judgment on the ground that they did not receive a copy of
the appellate court's February 28, 2013 Decision. However, the CA denied the motion
finding that their counsel, Atty. Dennis M. Taningco (Atty. Taningco), had actually received
a copy of the February 28, 2013 Decision as evidenced by Registry Return Card No. 1873.
Taningco insists that Atty. Taningco did not receive a copy of the said CA Decision.
Claiming counsel's home and office addresses are one and the same. Atty. Taningco lives
with his wife and son. However, neither his wife nor his son received on his behalf the CA
Decision.
CA denied the motion for reconsideration there being no new substantial

arguments to warrant the grant of the same. According to the CA the registry return card
clearly showed that a certain Mrs. Taningco received the appellate court's notice of
decision. Hence, the CA reiterated its stance that notice to counsel is notice to client.
74
ISSUE
1. Is notice to the spouse of the counsel sufficient service binding upon the
parties?
2. Has the judgment become final and immutable?
HELD
1. Yes. Atty. Taningco, the counsel of record and also one of the petitioners in the case, was
served with a copy of the CA Decision on April 8, 2013 as evidenced by Registry Return
Card No. 1873, at his office address on record, which is also his home address. Said copy
was duly received by Mrs. Taningco. Mrs. Taningco is presumed authorized to receive the
CA Decision on behalf of Atty. Taningco that was sent to the office address on record. It
necessarily follows that petitioners, through Atty. Taningco, duly received the said
decision in the ordinary course of business. Hence, in the absence of competent evidence
to prove otherwise, the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
with respect to service of notice stands.
2. Yes, the Decision had become final and executory hence immutable.
Taningco received a copy of the February 28, 2013 Decision of the appellate court on April
8, 2013. Despite receipt thereof, they failed to file a motion for reconsideration within
the 15-day reglementary period. Therefore, the appellate court's Decision became final
and can no longer be assailed by then for being immutable and unalterable.
A decision or order becomes final and executory if the aggrieved party fails to appeal or
move for a reconsideration within 15 days from his or her receipt of the court's decision or
order disposing of the action or proceeding.
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of
immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true
whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in
the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional
errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law.
The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental
principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations.
Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who
exercise the power of adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle, must
immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior
adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily
known as courts, but extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been
conferred. The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1)
the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments.
75
EASTWEST BANKING CORPORATION V. CRUZ
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 221641 July 12, 2021
NATURE OF APPEAL
DOCTRINE
Issues involving pure questions of law cannot be appealed through a notice of
appeal under Rule 41. An appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals raising only
questions of law shall be dismissed; and that an appeal erroneously taken to the Court of
Appeals shall be dismissed outright.
FACTS
On June 11, 2012, petitioner East West Banking Corporation (petitioner/Bank) filed
a Complaint before the RTC for Sum of Money with Application for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment against respondents Ian Y. Cruz (Ian) and Paul Andrew Chua Hua
(Paul), seeking to recover the total amount of P16,054,541.66. In the same Complaint, the
Bank impleaded respondents Francisco T. Cruz (Francisco), Ian's father, and Alvin Y. Cruz
(Alvin), Ian's brother, as unwilling co-plaintiffs. Apparently, Ian, Francisco, and Alvin
maintained separate accounts at the Bank's Davao-Lanang Branch. Paul, as the Bank's
Sales Officer, handled their deposit accounts.
In its complaint, the petitioner Bank alleged that Paul debited the above
mentioned amount from the accounts of Francisco and Alvin and then credited the same
amount to Ian's account by representing that Francisco and Alvin undertook to "regularize"
the transactions later on. Using the debited amounts, Ian successfully obtained a
"back-to-back" loan from the Bank and thereafter used the same amount to pay for the
same. However, instead of "regularizing" the transactions, Francisco and Alvin demanded
the payment of P16,054,541.66 from the Bank as evidenced by Foreign Exchange Forward
Contracts (FEFCs).
The Bank, however, rejected Francisco and Alvin's demand stating that the FEFCs
are spurious. The incident prompted the Bank to conduct an audit of all the transactions
of the respondents. The Bank asserted that the issuance of spurious FEFCs was part of the
scheme of Ian and Paul to defraud Francisco, Alvin, and the Bank.
In the hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
conducted by the trial court, the Bank presented Mr. Renato Sampang (Renato) who
detailed the transactions involving the accounts of Francisco, Alvin and Ian which were
orchestrated by Paul, and discussed the purported spurious FEFCs. However, Renato
affirmed that Ian paid the loans. Furthermore, he confirmed that the Bank did not pay
Francisco and Alvin after they demanded payment upon presentation of the FEFCs, which
was supposedly a legitimate transaction since they even brought the issue to the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas.
76
The RTC thereafter granted the Bank’s application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against Paul and Ian for having “a sufficient cause of action
against the defendants.” In this consideration, Ian filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that the Complaint failed to state a cause of action; claiming that the Bank did not assert
any right which belonged to it, having rejected Alvin and Francisco’s demand. In its
opposition, the Bank asserted that it was the legal owner of the money and thus had the
legal right to institute the action and that the demand of Alvin and Francisco was wrongly
premised on a spurious transaction.
RTC: The RTC dismissed the Complaint for failure to state cause of action and
plaintiff’s lack of legal personality to institute the case.
The Bank then elevated the case to the CA by filing a Notice of Appeal under Rule
41 of the Rules of Court. To which Ian, Francisco, and Alvin filed a Motion to Dismiss
claiming that only pure questions of law were involved, so the correct remedy would have
been to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Supreme Court.
CA: The CA granted the motion to Dismiss, agreeing that the Bank should have
filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 and non an
appeal under Rule 41 because the issues of whether or not a complaint states a cause of
action and whether or not a litigant is a real party-in-interest are questions of law, as
these do not involve an evaluation of facts.
The Bank thereafter asked for a reconsideration but the CA denied the same.
Finally, the Bank filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE
Did the Bank avail of the correct remedy in assailing the RTC’s order of dismissal?
HELD
No, the Court ruled in the negative. The Court reiterated that the CA correctly
dismissed the Bank’s appeal because the issues involved are pure questions of law which
cannot be appealed through a notice of appeal under Rule 41, in accordance with Section
2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court which states that "an appeal from the RTC to the Court of
Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed; and that an appeal erroneously
taken to the Court of Appeals shall be dismissed outright."
The Court explained that there is a question of law when the issue does not call
for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law
and jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the
doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. In this case, the
Supreme Court affirmed that the Bank was not able to show through its averments that it
had a right which the defendants had the obligation to honor, and that the alleged right
was violated. The Court explained that failure to state a cause of action refers to the
77
insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while lack of cause of action refers to the
insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. A dismissal for failure to state a cause of
action may be raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss
under Rule 16 of the Rules. On the other hand, a dismissal for lack of cause of action may
be raised at any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of
stipulations, admission, or evidence presented by the plaintiff.
The Bank's failure to state a cause of action, then, justifies the RTC's dismissal of
its Complaint. Given that Ian called for the dismissal of the Complaint, the trial court
correctly considered the allegations in the Complaint and the annexes in eventually
assessing that the Bank failed to state a cause of action. Moreover, the trial court
declared that the Bank was not the real party- in-interest to institute the action – another
question of law.
Therefore, the Court held that since the Bank availed of the wrong mode of
appeal, its case was correctly dismissed by the CA. As a consequence, the RTC's November
25, 2013 Order became final and executory, given that the filing of a notice of appeal did
not toll the reglementary period to file a petition for review on certiorari, the proper
remedy to assail the dismissal order of the trial court.
78
HORCA V. PEOPLE
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 224316 November 10, 2021
APPEALS FROM THE RTC
DOCTRINE
It is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been
raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought
to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not
be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late
stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised for
the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel.
It is a cardinal principle that, in all criminal prosecutions, it is the prosecution that

bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In
discharging such burden, the prosecution has the duty to prove each and every element of
the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or any
other crime that is necessarily included therein. Further, the prosecution likewise carries
the burden to prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense.
Corollary thereto, it is essential that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense. This burden of proof placed upon the prosecution is anchored on the
presumption of innocence granted in favor of the accused, which no less than our
Constitution has guaranteed.
FACTS
Elizabeth Horca (Horca) was charged with the crime of theft through an
information which alleges that Horca willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, steal and carry
away cash money amounting to P1,005,626.50 which she received from the Sisters of
Providence, represented by Sister Linda Jo Reynolds (Sister Reynolds), under express
obligation of delivering nineteen (19) Swiss Air plane tickets to Rome. Sister Reynold
allege that Horca failed to deliver the ticket and misappropriated the given payment for
her own personal use and benefit.
Sister Reynolds averred that she issued two BPI checks, in which the Expert Travel
and Tours Inc. (Expert Travel), through Horca, acknowledged and issued an official receipt
for the payment of the tickets. However, Horca informed the Sisters that the other fifteen
(15) tickets were stolen, while four (4) tickets could not be used because the flight was
canceled. The Sisters made several demands for Horca to return the amount. However,
despite Horca’s promise to pay back the Sisters the full amount, only P90,000.00 was
returned. Thus, this prompted the Sisters to file the complaint before the RTC.
79
Horca contented that as a consultant for Expert Travel, she confirmed receiving
the two checks from Sister Reynolds. However, she was not able to deliver all of the
tickets because the airline company filed for bankruptcy and the flight was eventually
canceled. Horca claimed that Swiss Air refunded the value of the checks to Expert Travel
but she was unable to get the money from the agency. To save face and thinking that the
travel agency would reimburse her, petitioner voluntarily refunded Sister Reynolds the
amount of P90,000.00, with the rest of the amount to be paid on installment and the
interest amortized.
The trial court found Horca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft.
Horca filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC. In the motion for reconsideration, Horca insisted that the crime
charged is not supported by evidence on record and that her liability is merely civil in
nature.
ISSUE
Can Horca raise issues for the first time during appeal?
HELD
No, Horca may not raise issues for the first time during appeal. It is axiomatic that
issues raised for the first time on appeal should not be entertained because to do so
would be anathema to the rudiments of fairness and due process.
In S.C. Megaworld vs. Parada, the court ruled that: it is well-settled that no
question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below.
Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a
reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic
considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first
time on appeal is barred by estoppel.
In Horca’s Motion for Reconsideration, she raised for the first time the argument
that the allegations in the Information constitute Estafa as it contains the following
statement: "she instead misappropriated and converted the same to her own personal use
and benefit to the damage and prejudice of Sisters of Providence in the amount of
P1,005,626.50, Philippine Currency." Nonetheless, even if the Court were to entertain
such argument, the same is without merit because not all misappropriation is estafa. Thus
it is correct for the Court to reject Horca’s contention.
80
GABUTINA V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 218210 October 9, 2019
APPEALS FROM THE CTA, CSC, AND QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES
DOCTRINE
The Court cannot anymore relax the rules for Gabutina, as his delay in filing a
Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the CA spanned more than
six years, when, in the first place, he only had 15 days under the law to do so. The Court
has consistently held that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law.
His six-year delay was not justified by any compelling reason; thus, his Petition for Review
must fail.
FACTS
John Kenneth T. Moreno (Moreno) filed an Affidavit-Complaint against Patrick U.
Gabutina (Gabutina), Chief of Staff of Congressman Oscar S. Moreno (Congressman
Moreno). Accused Baldivino allegedly demanded for Php 500,000.00 which, according to
him, will be given to Congressman Moreno as an advance "SOP'' so that they will cause the
award of the Farm to Market Project to Moreno. Allegedly, it was in the same meeting
where accused Baldivino called Petitioner Gabutina to confirm the amount demanded, to
which the latter approved. They latter asked for more and reassured complainant that he
would be given the projects but the projects was given to another. Complainant tried to
get his money back but Gabutina denied the allegations. The ombudsman found Gabutina
guilty and denied his motion for reconsideration. Instead of filing an appeal under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court with the CA, Gabutina filed a Motion for Leave to File and Admit 2nd
Motion for Reconsideration.
While his 2nd Motion for Reconsideration was pending with the Office of the
Ombudsman, Gabutina also filed on May 10, 2005 with the same Office a Petition for
Review of the Decision dated 29 October 2004 which the ombudsman treated as his 3rd
motion for reconsideration. Both were denied for being against the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of Ombudsman which allowed only one motion for reconsideration. Gabutina
filed a petition for review with the CA but was dismissed stating that his previous motions
did not stop the running of the reglementary period for appeal and did not prevent the
October 29, 2004 Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman from attaining finality.
ISSUE
Did the CA err in dismissing the case stating that the Ombudsman decision
obtained finality?
81
HELD
No, Section 5(g), Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, also known as the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17,
enumerates the prohibited pleadings in administrative cases filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Section 7, Rule III of the same Administrative Order, which is essentially similar to
Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. In the case at
bar, the facts and the multiple number of pleadings filed by Gabutina are undisputed.
After the Office of the Ombudsman promulgated its Decision on October 29, 2004 finding
him guilty of Grave Misconduct and Violation of Anti-Graft laws, Gabutina filed his first
and only legally allowable Motion for Reconsideration dated December 14, 2004.
When Gabutina received the February 18,2005 Order of the Office of the
Ombudsman denying his December 14, 2004 Motion for Reconsideration, Gabutina had
only 15 days from the date of receipt of the written Order on March 17, 2005, or until
April 1, 2005, within which to file a verified petition for review with the CA. Instead,
Gabutina filed the following pleadings before the Office of the Ombudsman on the
following dates:
(1) Motion for Leave to File and Admit 2nd Motion for Reconsideration on March
27, 2005;
(2) 2nd Motion for Reconsideration on March 27, 2005;
(3) Petition for Review on May 10, 2005 while the Motion for Leave and 2nd
Motion for Reconsideration were still pending; and
(4) Motion for Reinvestigation on June 21, 2011.
Gabutina finally filed a Petition for Review with the CA on December 21, 2011, or
more than six years from his receipt of the February 18, 2005 Order on March 17, 2005.
Since the filing of the said pleadings did not stop the reglementary period for
taking an appeal, their filing necessarily did not prevent the October 29, 2004 Decision of
the Ombudsman from attaining finality. Even the June 21, 2011 Motion for Reinvestigation
wherein Gabutina allegedly raised new evidence, should be stricken off the record as well
for having been filed out of time and for being a prohibited pleading. Gabutina's filing of
multiple pleadings, despite the clear restrictions under the law, constitute a clear
mockery of the judicial system. He must be reminded that though access to the courts is
guaranteed, there is and there must be a limit to it.
Finally, the Court cannot anymore relax the rules for Gabutina, as his delay in
filing a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the CA spanned
more than six years, when, in the first place, he only had 15 days under the law to do so.
The Court has consistently held that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the
provisions of law. His six-year delay was not justified by any compelling reason; thus, his
Petition for Review must fail.
82
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION V. ALO
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 214435 February 14, 2022
CIVIL PROCEDURE - NATURE OF APPEAL
DOCTRINE
There is no law granting the PRC exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases
decided by the Board, nor is there any law excluding such cases from being taken
cognizance by the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as
will be discussed further below. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court grants the CA exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of
RTCs and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions.
FACTS
Dayamon Didato Alo (Alo) was formally charged with unprofessional conduct
and/or dishonorable conduct before the Board for Professional Teachers (Board), which
operates under Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), for using fraud or deceit in
obtaining a certificate of registration and professional license, by using a falsified Board
Resolution No. 671.
Alo alleged in her counter-affidavit that she is a holder of a degree in Bachelor of

Science in Elementary Education and had been a public elementary school teacher in
Kalanganan Elementary School from 1995 to 2006, and is currently a public school teacher
in Tambo Cadayonan Elementary School. Alo, who was not a passer of the board
examination for professional teachers, allegedly went to the PRC Head Office in Manila to
apply for a Professional Teacher's License based on Section 26 (C) of Republic Act No. (RA)
7836. This law provides certain conditions which grants a certificate of registration and
professional license to qualified applicants without the need for examination. She filled
out forms by the PRC, and was subsequently issued a professional identification card a
few days later. Further, she stressed that she never submitted the alleged falsified Board
Resolution No. 671.
The Board rendered a decision against Alo, who then files a motion for
reconsideration which the Board denied. Without elevating the case to the PRC, Alo
directly filed a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. CA
issued a Minute Resolution requiring the Board and the PRC, which was impleaded in the
petition, to file their comment on Alo's petition for review. However, since the Board and
the PRC failed to file their comment within the reglementary period, the CA deemed that
they waived the filing of their comment and submitted the instant case for decision
without comment.
83
Thus, CA rendered the assailed Decision, granting Alo's petition for review and
reversing the ruling of the Board. The Board and the PRC filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied. PRC argues that the CA has no jurisdiction to directly
review the September 11, 2012 decision of the Board. To support this contention, the PRC
cites Section 9 (c) of RA 8981, which enumerates the powers of the Board, including the
power to make decisions, and the mode of appeal of an aggrieved party.
ISSUE
Does the CA have jurisdiction to directly review the Board's decision, considering
that the same belongs to the PRC?
HELD
Yes, the CA has jurisdiction to directly review the Board’s decision.
This Court has long held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to
hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is
conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by
erroneous belief of the court that it exists.
PRC cited the provision of Sec. 9(c) of R.A8981, while showing that they may have
appellate jurisdiction over decisions or orders of the Board, this does not divest the CA of
its own appellate jurisdiction. To put it simply, there is no law granting the PRC exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over cases decided by the Board, nor is there any law excluding
such cases from being taken cognizance by the CA through a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as will be discussed further below.
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court grants the CA exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of RTCs and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
provides:
RULE 43. Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the
Court of Appeals
Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders
of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration
Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy
Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian
Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees
Compensation Commission, Agricultural Invention Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine
Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
84
Section 2. Cases not covered. — This Rule shall not apply to judgments or final
orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines.
It is clear from the above provisions that a Rule 43 petition to the CA includes all
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Given this, there is no question that the September 11, 2012 Decision of the Board
is covered by the jurisdiction of the CA and can be subject of a Rule 43 petition.
85
MONTERDE V. JACINTO
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 214102 February 14, 2022
CIVIL PROCEDURE - APPEALS FROM THE CTA, CSC, AND QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES
DOCTRINE
The filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review before the Office
of the Ombudsman does not operate to stay the immediate implementation of the
foregoing Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions.
Only a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, duly

issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, stays the immediate implementation of the
said Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions.
FACTS
The case stemmed from the administrative complaint filed by Evelyn A. Conag
(Conag), respondent, in 2011 against the vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang
bayan of Esperanza, Masbate (local government officials), for Gross Negligence, and
violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
The complaint was grounded on the local government officials' failure to respond to the
request of a certain organization for an ordinance establishing a marine reserve and fish
sanctuary in Masbate. Jonathan G. Monterde and Roy C. Conag (petitioners) are among
the members of the sangguniang bayan impleaded in the complaint.
The petitioners contend that the assailed Decision and the assailed of the Orders
of the Ombudsman should be nullified for being rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners insist that they can no longer be administratively disciplined following their
re-election.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that (1) petitioners availed the
wrong remedy and thus the petition should be dismissed; (2) the doctrine of condonation
should be abandoned; and (3) in any event, the doctrine is not applicable to petitioners
because they were merely fined and not removed from office, and further because the
assailed decision was rendered before their re-election.
Conag also filed a comment and opined that the petition has no basis in fact and in
law because the case was already decided before petitioners' re-election. Petitioners and
the OSG further filed separate memoranda, 34 reiterating their arguments in their earlier
pleadings.
On February 22, 2013 Decision (assailed Decision), the Ombudsman found merit in
the complaint and held that the local government officials were indeed remiss in their
duties. The Ombudsman thus imposed upon them the penalty of suspension for six
months.
86
The petitioners, filed two separate motions for reconsideration, arguing in
common that the assailed Decision has no basis in fact and law, and that the suspension
was too harsh a penalty. The Ombudsman partially granted the motions in its May 1, 2013
Order, and reduced the penalty to a fine equivalent to three-months' salary.
In the meantime, petitioners were re-elected during the May 13, 2013 elections.
Unsatisfied with the reduction of the penalty, Conag moved to reconsider the
Ombudsman's May 1, 2013 Order. However, this was denied by the Ombudsman for lack of
merit in its June 19, 2013 Order (first assailed Order).
Thereafter, the local government officials filed a Motion to Stay Execution of the
Ombudsman's assailed Decision as modified by its May 1, 2013 Order (modified assailed
Decision), grounded, among others, on the application of the condonation doctrine.
Acting on such motion, the Ombudsman rendered its March 24, 2014 Order (second
assailed Order), holding that the condonation doctrine does not apply in petitioners' case
because the decision that found them guilty of the offense had already become executory
even before their re-election. Thus, it denied the motion.
ISSUE
Did the Ombudsman act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it rendered the assailed Decision and the assailed Orders.
HELD
No. The Ombudsman cannot be considered to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners' motion to stay execution. It was merely doing its duty as
required by law.
Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure provides that where the
respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one-month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable.
In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified
petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or
Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
In the case at the bar, it is well-settled that appeals from the decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals
under the provisions of Rule 43. As held by the Court in Fabian v. Desierto. Such ruling has
been reiterated in many subsequent cases, and has been later on incorporated in the first
paragraph of Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure.
In view thereof, and insofar as it seeks to nullify the assailed Decision and the first
assailed Order which are both final issuances, the instant petition should be dismissed. As
87
to the second assailed Order, which is an interlocutory order, even though the special civil
action of certiorari may be the proper remedy, petitioners still violated the hierarchy of
courts when they filed the petition directly to this Court without citing any exception to
the rule. Thus, the petition should be dismissed on this ground.
88
GRANA V. PEOPLE
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 202111 November 25, 2019
APPEALS BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
DOCTRINE
A petition for review on certiorari must be limited to the issues on legal questions
only.
FACTS
Freddie Bolbes, the complainant, filed a case for malicious mischief against the
accused Teddy Grana, Gil Valdes, Ricky Dimaganti, Olive Grana, and Teofilo Grana. Bolbes
alleged that the accused went inside the premises of his house by destroying an iron fence
and, afterward, proceeded with the destruction of the cement foundation and made
diggings until it reached the foundation of his apartment, thus, exposing his apartment to
the danger of being destroyed. The accused, in their defense, alleged that the diggings
were made on the basis that they are the owners of the property and that the purpose of
such diggings is only to build a fence for the protection of both of parties.
The municipal trial court ruled in favor of the complainant. On appeal, the
regional trial court affirmed the decision of the municipal trial court. Upon appeal to the
CA, it affirmed the decision of the lower courts on the charge of malicious mischief
against the accused.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioners Teddy and
Teofilo.
ISSUE
Is the present petition for review on Certiorari correct?
HELD
NO. The issues raised by petitioners require a re-appreciation and reexamination
of the evidence which are evidentiary and factual in nature. On this ground alone, the
petition must be denied because "one, the petition for review thereby violates the
limitation of the issues to only legal questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier of
facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the CA, unless they were mistaken, absurd,
speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings
reached by the court of origin,' which was not shown to be the case here."
89
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No.194167 February 10, 2021
DOCTRINE
Well-settled is the rule that "this Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not its
function to examine, review, or evaluate the evidence all over again." Along the same
lines, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only
questions of law. Thus, in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Court is
generally limited to reviewing only errors of law and not of facts.
Nevertheless, the Court has enumerated several exceptions to this rule, such as
when:
(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are
based;
(7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence
on record;
(8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed
facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and
(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties."
FACTS
Respondents Mauricio Laoyan, now deceased, and Magdalena Quilit filed with the
RARAD a petition for annulment of sale of an agricultural land and redemption. The case
involves two parcels of land located at La Trinidad, Benguet containing areas of 219 sqm.
and 3,042 sqm, including improvements thereon, which were formerly owned by the
Spouses Pedro and Erenita Tolding. These lots were mortgaged by the Spouses Tolding and
were later acquired by petitioner through foreclosure, by virtue of which petitioner was
issued TCTs.
RARAD rendered a Decision holding, among others, that respondents may exercise
their right of redemption for both parcels of land.
90
DARAB issued a Resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari of petitioner on
the ground that the DARAB, being only a quasi-judicial body with limited jurisdiction,
cannot acquire jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari.
Citing Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, the DARAB

held in this wise: In resolving the petition, this Board notes the ruling of the Supreme
Court in Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board Et al., vs. Josefina S. Lubrica,
et al. (G.R. No. 159145) dated April 29, 2005 hereby quoted, to wit:
"The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction does not
include authority over petitions for certiorari in the absence of an express grant in R.A.
No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A."
Petitioner thus filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied by
the DARAB in its Resolution.
Petitioner, in its Petition for Review filed with the CA, averred, among others, that
the RARAD acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it denied its Notice of
Appeal. CA rendered its assailed Decision denying LBP's petition for review. Hence the
instant petition.
ISSUE
Did the CA commit an error for not resolving; like the DARAB, the merit of the case
inspite of showing by petitioner landbank that the decision of the RARAD it had originally
challenged by certiorari was patently not in accord with law?
HELD
At the outset, we find that the CA committed no reversible error when it did not
categorically rule on the substantive merits of petitioner's petition for review and merely
resolved to rule on the propriety of the DARAB's decision to dismiss petitioner's petition
for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction. Having found that the remedy of certiorari is not
cognizable by the DARAB, it would be futile on its part to still pass upon the other
assignments of error of petitioner which, we note, essentially involve a review of the
Decision of the RARAD.
On this point, it bears emphasis that findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies,

such as the RARAD, are "generally accorded great weight and even finality," owing to the
fact that they are deemed experts on "matters within its specific and specialized
jurisdiction." Thus, considering that the RARAD has acquired expertise in specific matters
within its jurisdiction, its findings deserve full respect "in the absence of substantial
showing that such findings were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence
presented."
The jurisprudential pronouncement in Lubrica remains to be good law, and is

doctrinal and controlling.
91
DARAB's lack of authority over special civil actions for certiorari is not merely
attributed to the absence of a statutory grant thereof. Zoleta, in consonance with
Lubrica, clarified further that the power to issue writs of certiorari is an incident of
judicial review. DARAB, not being a court of law exercising judicial power, is, therefore,
inherently powerless and incapable by constitutional fiat of acquiring jurisdiction over
special civil actions for certiorari, and issuing writs of certiorari to annul acts of the
PARAD or RARAD even when it exercises supervisory powers over them.
At any rate, we find that petitioner may not repeatedly seek protection under the
provisions of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure. Proceeding from our
pronouncements in Lubrica and Zoleta, they cannot conveniently invoke rules of
procedure in asserting their supposed right to file a petition for certiorari with the DARAB.
As extensively explained by the Court in Lubrica, RA 6657 or the the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which is the very law creating the DARAB, does not confer it
authority to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari.
Thus, to otherwise allow petitioner to avail the extraordinary remedy of writ of

certiorari with the DARAB would necessarily sanction an act outside the statutory
authority granted by law. Worse still, following the logic of petitioner's position would
lead to an absurd situation where this Court itself will unduly confer a quasi-judicial
agency the authority to correct errors of jurisdiction, which, as discussed in Zoleta, is
lodged only with the regular courts by virtue of express constitutional grant.
A rule granting the DARAB judicial certiorari powers is an "executive encroachment

into the judiciary," and therefore, constitutionally infirm. Petitioner cannot seek
protection behind the protective veil of equity and fair play when the very rule invoked
by it has been annulled by this Court for running afoul with the Constitution. Accordingly,
it confers no right to petitioners, affords no protection to them, and in legal
contemplation, inoperative and cannot be cured by mere judicial accommodation.
Well-settled is the rule that "this Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not its
function to examine, review, or evaluate the evidence all over again." Along the same
lines, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only
questions of law. Thus, in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Court is
generally limited to reviewing only errors of law and not of facts.
when: "(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the
inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings
are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of
evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10)
92
the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties."
We find that the petitioner failed to show that this case falls under any of the
exceptions. Thus, we will not delve into the factual issues of the case. Moreover, having
disposed of the case in the foregoing manner, there is no need to pass upon the other
issues raised by petitioner.
At any rate, the disallowance of the petitioner's notice of appeal signifies the
disallowance of the appeal itself. Petitioner should have elevated the matter through a
special civil action under Rule 65. Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a
petition for certiorari shall be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment,
the order or the resolution sought to be assailed. The February 28, 2000 Order of the
RARAD denying petitioner's notice of appeal was received by it on March 10, 2000.
Thus, petitioner only had sixty 60 days from that date, or from the date it
received the April 10, 2000 Order of the RARAD, to file its petition for certiorari with the
CA. For failure of petitioner to timely file its petition for certiorari with the proper
appellate court, the said order remained valid and effective. Accordingly, the December
17, 1999 of the RARAD remains final and executory and beyond the ambit of judicial
review.
93
LOPEZ V. SALUDO
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 233775 September 15, 2021
DOCTRINE
Questions of fact, which would require a re-evaluation of the evidence, are
inappropriate under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The jurisdiction of the Court under
Rule 45, Section 1 is limited only to errors of law as the Court is not a trier of facts. While
Rule 45, Section 1 is not absolute, none of the recognized exceptions, which allow the
Court to review factual issues, is present in the instant case.
FACTS
This Petition for Review on Certiorari challenges the February 9, 2017 Decision and
August 30, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals which denied petitioner Doris Marie
Lopez’s (Lopez) appeal.
Respondent Aniceto G. Saludo (Saludo) alleged that sometime in April or May 1997,
Lopez told him that she knew of two parcels of land that were being offered for sale at a
reasonable price. He was eventually convinced to purchase the subject properties due to
the persistent assurances of Lopez that: (a) the titles thereto were clean; (b) the transfer
certificates of title (TCT) would be issued in respondent's name after the execution of the
sale; and (c) that the offered selling price was very reasonable and even bordering on a
bargain sale considering the location of the properties and their proximity to business
centers. Lopez then offered to pose as the buyer because the seller only wanted to deal
with her to keep his financial constraints within his close family friends. Saludo then
entrusted to Lopez the P15,000,000.00, with the agreement that petitioner would be the
signatory in the Deed of Sale but will hold the properties in trust for, and subsequently
reconvey the same to, Saludo.
After the execution of the sale, Saludo noticed that Lopez started evading him and
did not give any update as to the registration of the sale in his name. When Saludo
inquired on the status of the properties, he found out that the properties were already
registered in the name of Lopez issued by the Register of Deeds of Pasig City, pursuant to
a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 25, 1999 executed by Bulalacao Realty Corporation
(BRC) in favor of Lopez. This prompted Saludo to immediately assume possession of the
properties and introduce major renovations on the house amounting to a total of
P9,000,000.00. He likewise paid the real property taxes thereon for 13 years. Since then,
he has been in actual possession of the properties. As the occupant thereof, he is also the
one paying the homeowner's association dues.
Respondent made several demands, both oral and written, upon petitioner to
reconvey the subject properties to him, but to no avail. Hence, respondent filed an
94
Affidavit of Adverse Claim on July 31, 2001 against petitioner over the properties and had
it annotated on the TCTs.
On July 19, 2006, Saludo filed the instant Complaint for Reconveyance and
Damages imputing bad faith on the part of petitioner. He claimed that he is the true
owner of the subject properties and that petitioner merely holds the same in trust for
him. In support thereof, he presented the four checks that he issued in the name of
petitioner for the payment of the purchase price. He also reiterated that he has been in
actual possession of the properties in question from the time he had fully paid them up to
the filing of the instant complaint.
In her Answer, Lopez claimed that she purchased the subject properties from BRC
in 1997 pursuant to a Deed of Sale under Pacto de Retro. Since the properties were not
repurchased by the vendor-a-retro, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in her favor for
the two lots. By virtue of the said sale, TCT No. PT-111136 and TCT No. PT-111137 were
issued in her name. Thereafter, Lopez effected major renovations on the house
constructed thereon.
Petitioner claimed that Saludo volunteered to finance the renovation of the house
on account of their special relationship. Thereafter, Saludo and his family occupied the
said properties. However, when their relationship turned sour, Saludo surreptitiously filed
an adverse claim over the subject properties with the Register of Deeds of Pasig City,
falsely claiming ownership thereof.
This prompted the petitioner to file a complaint with the barangay against Saludo
for "Pagpapaalis sa tinitirahang bahay o Ejectment" on June 9, 2006. However, despite due
notice, Saludo failed to attend the barangay proceeding. Repeated demands made by
petitioner upon respondent to vacate the properties in question proved futile. Instead,
Saludo filed the instant complaint against petitioner before the lower court.
On November 5, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring respondent as the

true and rightful owner of the subject properties.
Dissatisfied with the RTC's ruling, petitioner elevated the case to the CA. On
February 9, 2017, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a Resolution dated
August 30, 2017.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE
Is the Petition for Review on Certiorari the proper remedy in this case?
HELD
No. Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law. The Supreme Court deems it
necessary to emphasize that a petition for review under Rule 45 is limited only to
95
questions of law. Factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari.
This Court will not review facts, as it is not our function to analyze or weigh all over again
evidence already considered in the proceedings below.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain set of facts; a question of fact, on the other hand, exists when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Unless the case falls
under any of the recognized exceptions, the Supreme Court is limited solely to the review
of legal questions.
Rule 45 petition is limited to errors of the appellate court. Furthermore, the

"errors" which we may review in a petition for review on certiorari are those of the CA,
and not directly those of the trial court or the quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, or officer
which rendered the decision in the first instance. It is imperative that we refrain from
conducting further scrutiny of the findings of fact made by trial courts, lest we convert
this Court into a trier of facts. As held in Reman Recio v. Heirs of the Spouses Agueda and
Maria Altamirano, etc., et al., our review is limited only to the errors of law committed
by the appellate court, to wit:
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, jurisdiction is generally limited to the review
of errors of law committed by the appellate court. The Supreme Court is not obliged to
review all over again the evidence which the parties adduced in the court a quo. Of
course, the general rule admits of exceptions, such as where die factual findings of the
CA and the trial court are conflicting or contradictory.
The Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review for lack of merit.
96
BELARSO V. QUALITY HOUSE, INC.
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 209983 | November 10, 2021
APPEALS BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT; EXCEPTIONS TO RULE 45
DOCTRINE
The Court may review the factual findings of the LA and the NLRC when they are
conflicting. While the Court's jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of
questions of law, this rule admits of exceptions, one of which is when the factual findings
of the LA and the NLRC are conflicting.
FACTS
Quality House, Inc. (QHI), respondent, is a manufacturer and distributor of leather
products. It hired Evelina E. Belarso (Belarso), petitioner, and she was initially assigned at
the belt department of QHI. Belarso was then transferred from the belt department to
the raw materials warehouse and thereafter promoted as supervisor of the Raw Materials
Warehouse. Before leaving the warehouse, Belarso submitted herself to the routinary
outgoing inspection and body frisking of employees at the QHI gate. When her bag was
inspected, Lady Guard Salamanca found a belt buckle inside the bag. Belarso then denied
any knowledge on why and how the belt buckle got inside her bag. An incident report was
immediately filed, and she received a notice from QHI placing her under preventive
suspension and requiring her to submit a written explanation within 48 hours from receipt
of the notice why she should not be subjected to disciplinary action.
Belarso submitted her written explanation denying all the accusations against her
and claimed that her bag was placed outside her workstation and was visible to everyone.
A conference was held on January 4, 2010 and Belarso alleged that she was framed-up by
her co-employees by putting the belt buckle inside her bag without her knowledge.
Pending the result of the conference, On January 5, 2010, Belarso filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against QHI and indicated that she was illegally dismissed by QHI on
December 13, 2010. On January 6, 2010, QHI expressed that it found Belarso’s explanation
to be unsatisfactory and informed her that her employment was being terminated
effective January 7, 2011 for stealing company property and for loss of trust and
confidence.
Procedural History:
Labor Arbiter (LA) declared that Belarso had been illegally dismissed. LA
determined that the affidavits executed by the guards and Belarso's co-employees were
more likely an afterthought considering that they were similarly worded and were
executed a month after filing of the complaint. Aggrieved, QHI appealed to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA after finding
that QHI, through its evidence, was able to establish that Belarso's dismissal was for a just
cause, i.e., loss of trust and confidence. Unsatisfied, Belarso filed a Motion for
97
Reconsideration (MR), but it was denied for lack of merit. Thus, her appeal before the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA sustained the NLRC’s findings and agreed that the evidence
on record supports QHI's position. It rejected Belarso's defense of a frame-up as she did
not submit any proof to corroborate the same. Belarso's MR was denied by the CA in the
assailed Resolution. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE
1. Can the Court take cognizance of decisions made by the NLRC and LA?
2. Should the affidavits executed by the guards and co-employees be invalidated?
HELD
1. Yes. The Court may review the factual findings of the LA and the NLRC when
they are conflicting. While the Court's jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the
review of questions of law, this rule admits of exceptions, one of which is when the
factual findings of the LA and the NLRC are conflicting. Since such exception is present in
this case, the court may review the contradictory factual findings.
2. No. Belarso assails that the affidavits executed by the guards and her
co-employees for being similarly worded and executed on the same day, and for being
dated two months after the incident. However, these do not automatically invalidate the
contents of the affidavits. Being duly notarized, they carry with them the presumption of
regularity and authenticity which may be rebutted only by "strong, complete and
conclusive proof." This, Belarso was unable to present.
As to the supposed material discrepancy in the inspecting guard's affidavit (i.e.,

that the belt buckle was found in Belarso's raincoat, contrary to the incident report,
wherein the same was found inside Belarso's bag covered by a raincoat), said discrepancy
is but negligible and reconcilable. Regardless of whether the belt buckle was covered by
the raincoat or was inside the same, the fact remains that it was found inside her bag
during the inspection.
Hence, Belarso's dismissal for loss of trust and confidence is valid. The State can
regulate the right of an employer to select and discharge his or her employees, an
employer cannot be compelled to continue the employment of an employee in whom
there has been a legitimate loss of trust and confidence."
98
TELETECH CUSTOMER CARE MANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC.
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 209983 | November 10, 2021
APPEALS BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT; PETITION FOR REVIEW
DOCTRINE
It must be stressed that a petition for review under Rule 45 is limited only to
questions of law as factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by
certiorari. The Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not its function to evaluate the
However, as the findings of the LA and NLRC on the one hand, and the CA, on the
other, are conflicting, the present case falls under jurisprudential exemptions. Thus, in
the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, this Court is compelled to re-evaluate the factual
issues and re-examine the questioned findings.
FACTS
Teletech Customer Care Management Philippines, Inc. (Teletech), herein petitioner
is a domestic corporation engaged in business process outsourcing (BPO). Teletech
answers queries and concerns on behalf of their clients, such as Accenture and Telstra.
Mario Gerona, Jr. (Gerona), herein respondent was hired as one of Teletech's technical
support representatives and was assigned to the Accenture account and became a regular
employee. Teletech's human resource office informed Gerona that he would be
transferred to the Telstra account and that his refusal to take the examinations would
result in the termination of his services on the ground of redundancy. Gerona then refused
to undergo training and take the examinations under the belief that he was entitled to
security of tenure.
Gerona received a notice informing him of his dismissal due to redundancy and
through his counsel, he sent a demand letter to Teletech asserting that: 1) there was no
redundancy in the company considering that they were even continuously hiring other
technical support representatives, 2) as a regular employee, he should no longer be
required to take another examination to prove his qualifications. Thereafter, Gerona filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal against Teletech before the arbitration branch of the
NLRC in Bacolod City. During the mandatory conciliation conference, Teletech offered to
pay Gerona his separation pay but the latter still refused. For their failure to amicably
settle, both parties were required to submit their respective position papers.
Teletech argued that the decrease in volume of calls for the Accenture account
resulted in an excess in the number of technical support representatives assigned to their
account. Instead of immediately dismissing its employees, it offered to transfer several
representatives to the Telstra account and to undergo training due to the differences
99
between the two accounts since Telstra catered to Australian customers while Accenture
had American customers.
Procedural History:
Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Gerona's complaint for illegal dismissal and held that
Gerona's allegations were not grounded on clear and convincing evidence. It noted that by
dismissing Gerona, Teletech correctly exercised its management prerogative as a response
to the decrease in volume of calls in the Accenture account. Aggrieved, Gerona appealed
to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC denied Gerona’s appeal for
lack of merit. It held that Teletech validly exercised its business judgment. It noted that
Teletech even offered to transfer Gerona to the Telstra account with the same rank and
pay rather than outrightly dismissing him. Hence, this displayed good faith on the part of
Teletech. Aggrieved, Gerona filed a Petition for Certiorori under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA granted the petition in favor of Gerona, the
CA found that the position he held was not redundant. Teletech failed to show that
Gerona's position was redundant in relation to the whole business organization of
Teletech. Moreover, Teletech notified DOLE and Gerona of the latter's termination less
than a month prior to its effectivity. The CA also found the offer of transfer to the Telstra
account prejudicial since Gerona's continued employment depended on passing the
assessment and examinations. By imposing such condition, his right to security of tenure
as a regular employee was infringed. Teletech filed a Motion for Partial Consideration
which was denied Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court
ISSUE
Can the Court take cognizance of the case?
HELD
Yes. At the outset, it must be stressed that a petition for review under Rule 45 is
limited only to questions of law as factual questions are not the proper subject of an
appeal by certiorari. The Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to evaluate
the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. However, as the findings of the
LA and NLRC on the one hand, and the CA, on the other, are conflicting, the present case
falls under jurisprudential exemptions. Thus, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, this
Court is compelled to re-evaluate the factual issues and re-examine the questioned
findings.
In deciding petitions under Rule 45 assailing the CA's decision from an appeal under
Rule 65, the CA's decision must be examined from the context of whether it correctly
determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC, rather than
deciding whether the NLRC decision was correct on the case's merits.
In labor disputes, there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when,
inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not grounded on substantial evidence, or such
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might sufficiently accept to justify
a conclusion. Guided by the following considerations, we find that the CA correctly ruled
100
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it held that Gerona was validly
dismissed on the ground of redundancy.
101
REPUBLIC V. KIKUCHI
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 209837 | Date June 22, 2022
DOCTRINE
Exceptions to rule 45 of the Rules of Court:
(4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
based;
(7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence
on record;
(8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;
(9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and
(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
FACTS
This petition for review on certiorari is about the judicial recognition of the
divorce between Respondent Jocelyn Asusano Kikuchi (Jocelyn), Filipino, and Fumio U.
Kikuchi (Fumio), Japanese.
She alleged that she was married to Fumio in 1993, and in 2007, they jointly filed
for divorce before the City Hall of Sakado City, Saitama Prefecture. As the divorce was
accepted, Jocelyn sought the recognition thereof here in the Philippines.
The Republic argued that Jocelyn failed to comply with the requirements of
authentication and proof of documents concerning the Acceptance Certificate, and the
Authentication by the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan.
The trial court held that Jocelyn indeed was able to establish the fact of divorce
and the national law of Japan. The CA held that Jocelyn was able to present documents
proving the fact of divorce and the law of Japan.
ISSUE
Can the Republic’s contention be raised as a question in Court.
102
HELD
No. The Republic’s contention cannot be raised as a question in Court. Under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, such questions are generally barred as the Court is not a trier of
facts. However, the rule admits of exceptions:
(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the

discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; ( 5) the findings of fact
evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (9)
the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond
the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
parties.
Here, the Republic posits that the CA manifestly overlooked certain facts which, if
considered, would justify a different conclusion, and that the factual findings are
contradicted by the evidence on record. As these are both recognized exceptions to the
rule, the Court will proceed to review the factual findings of the lower courts.
Hence, the contention of the Republic that Jocelyn failed to comply with the
requirements of authentication and proof of documents can be raised as a question in
Court.
103
EQUITABLE PCI V. MANILA ADJUSTERS AND SURVEYORS
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 166726 | November 5, 2019
DOCTRINE
A petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 of the Rules of Court is only
limited to questions of law. A re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a
petition for review on certiorari because this court is not a trier of facts.
is on a certain set of facts; a question of facts arises when there is doubt or difference as
to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.
FACTS
On June 27, 1975, the Federation and the Philippine American General Insurance
Co., Inc. (Philam), represented by its adjuster, Manila Adjusters and Surveyors, Company
(MASCO), executed a Deed of Sale involving salvaged fertilizers which were stored in
warehouses in San Fernando, La Union. The agreement provided that the Federation
would pay for the stocks of fertilizers in installments in accordance with an agreed
schedule for the total amount of P5,159,725.00. Moreover, the Federation would be
accountable for the storage and warehousing charges. The Federation was also required
to open an irrevocably confirmed without recourse Letter of Credit (LOC) amounting to
P1,000,000.00 which will be forfeited in favor of MASCO in case of the Federation's
non-compliance with the terms and conditions of the contract. However, Phil-Am
Insurance already availed of the domestic letter of credit on June 23, 1975 from Equitable
PCI Bank with the same amount in favor of MASCO. The letter of credit was amended to
extend the expiry date and that the said letter be drawable by respondents upon
submission to the bank of a certification that Phil-Am Insurance failed to comply with the
conditions and terms of the sale. Phil-Am Insurance, however, only managed to pay the
first installment and part of the second installment. Although Phil-Am Insurance tendered
a personal check, the same bounced due to lack of funds, and thereafter no longer made
additional payments. MASCO then demanded from Phil-Am insurance but the latter failed
to settle the obligation. The Regional Trial Court ruled that Phil-Am insurance company
did not comply with the terms and conditions and that MASCO properly complied for the
claim against the letter of credit with the petitioner. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling of the RTC and ruled that MASCO was entitled to interest under the Civil Code.
ISSUE
Did the CA err in not holding that strict compliance in the handling of documents
in a letter of credit transaction is necessary.
104
HELD
No. Under the law, a petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is only limited to questions of law. A re-examination of factual findings cannot be
done through a petition for review on certiorari because this court is not a trier of facts.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain set of facts; a question of facts arises when there is doubt or difference as to the
truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. The jurisprudential doctrine that findings of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when these
coincide with the factual findings of the trial court, must remain undisturbed, unless
factual findings are not supported by the evidence on record. In the present case,
petitioner’s contention that it did not receive the required documents from respondent in
order for respondent to claim the proceeds of the letter of credit. But such contention
can be easily verified by assessing the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted
to the parties during trial, which is clearly a question of fact. Therefore, the petition for
review on certiorari must be denied for failure to establish reversible error on the part of
the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in not holding that strict
compliance in the handling of documents in a letter of credit transaction necessary.
105
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM V. SENO JR.
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 183478 | February 10, 2020
DOCTRINE
It is a settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts. Hence, it will not entertain questions of facts as it is bound by the findings of fact
made by the CA when supported by substantial evidence.
FACTS
Respondents are members of the Board of Directors of JMA Transport Services
Corporation (JMA Transport), a domestic corporation. Sometime in 2000, SSS filed an
Affidavit-Complaint against respondents together with Ruth De Leon (De Leon), Celso
Librando (Librando), and Edgar Froyalde (Froyalde), in their capacities as JMA Transport's
Board of Directors before the Prosecutor's Office of Muntinlupa City for failure to remit
the social security (SS) contributions of their employees in violation of Section 22(a)11 in
relation to Sections 22(d)12 and 28(e)13 and (f)14 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1161, as
amended by R.A. No. 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Act of 1997.
In its complaint, SSS averred that after inspecting the account of JMA Transport, it
discovered that the company was delinquent in its payment of contributions for the
period September 1997 to July 1999. As of August 31, 1999, the amount due was
P838,488.13 inclusive of the 3% penalty per month. As a result thereof, a Letter of
Introduction dated December 16, 1998 was served to JM Transport to monitor its
compliance with the Social Security Act of 1997 and to inspect its SSS records. This was
followed by a Billing Letter dated August 25, 1999 and a Demand Letter dated September
16, 1999 informing the company of its outstanding obligation and demanding to pay it
within 10 days from receipt of the demand. However, JMA Transport failed to settle its
obligations which prompted SSS to file the said Complaint before the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Muntinlupa City.
During the preliminary investigation, respondents proposed to pay in installment

JMA Transport's outstanding obligation. Manuel issued 24 postdated checks in the total
amount of P609,370.50 as payment of JMA Transport's obligation inclusive of the penalty
charges. SSS, in turn, accepted the postdated checks. Thus, the Complaint was
provisionally withdrawn in view of the settlement between the parties. However, when
two of the postdated checks were dishonored by the drawee-bank, SSS notified JMA
Transport to replace the said checks and to pay its obligation. However, the company did
not heed the demand.
106
FACTS
Did the CA commit a reversible error when it ruled that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in the issuance of the assailed May and September Orders.
HELD
Yes. It is a settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts. Hence, it will not entertain questions of facts as it is bound by the findings of
fact made by the CA when supported by substantial evidence. However, There are
exceptions to the rule wherein the Court may pass upon and review the findings of fact by
the CA. These instances are:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or

conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
The instant case falls under the exceptions since the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the RTC, and is based on the supposed absence of
evidence, i.e., the Franchise Verifications, but is contracted by the evidence on record.
True, the issues of whether the Franchise Verifications were indeed attached to the
Reply-Affidavit filed by SSS so as to prove that JMA Transport was still in operation after
1999, and whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in directing the prosecution to
conduct reinvestigation for the purpose of admitting respondents' controverting evidence
against the same are both factual in nature. The Court observes that the findings of the
CA were premised mainly on the Franchise Verifications which were allegedly not found in
the records. However, upon our review of the records, the Court finds that the said
Franchise Verifications were actually appended to the Reply of SSS contrary to the
observation of the appellate court. Therefore, the CA committed a reversible error when
it ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in the issuance of the assailed May and
September Orders.
107
REPUBLIC V. CASTILLO
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 209983 | November 10, 2021
DOCTRINE
Rule 45 of the Rules provides that the petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what
the law is on a certain set of facts, while a question of fact arises when there is doubt as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, it must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.
The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
facts and circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law
or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same;
rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue without examining or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question
of fact.
FACTS
The Solicitor General, acting in behalf of petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(RP), filed a Complaint for Expropriation before the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of
Dagupan City against respondents Jorge Castillo (Jorge), Sofia Achacoso (Sofia), Benjamin
Fernandez (Benjamin), and others, who are co-owners of the subject property located in
Dagupan City.
The petitioner RP filed an Amended Complaint alleging that the Dagupan City
National High School (School) has been in continuous possession of the subject property
since 1947 and that the market value of the said properties during that time was fifty (50)
centavos per sqm.
The RTC dismissed the Amended Complaint and ordered RP to restore the
possession of the subject property. Upon appeal, the CA reversed and remanded the case
to the RTC to compute just compensation.
On July 6, 2004, the RTC fixed the just compensation in the amount of P15,000 per
sqm which was the current fair market value as of February 2, 1989, that is, the date of
the filing of the Amended Complaint. Upon RP's appeal, the CA agreed with the RTC that
the just compensation shall be determined based on the value of the property on the date
of the filing of the Amended Complaint and not on the date of taking in 1947 which had
not been proven.
108
Hence, RP filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing
that it had actual possession of the subject property since 1947 as the School constructed
a building and planted crops therein. Thus, contrary to respondents' claim that they were
in possession of the subject property, petitioner RP actually had beneficial enjoyment
thereof; and that for failure of the respondents to specifically deny RP's averment,
respondents are deemed to have admitted that petitioner RP has indeed the possession of
the subject property since 1947.
ISSUE
Are questions of fact raised in this petition for review not proper under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court?
HELD
Yes, questions of fact are raised in this petition are not proper under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court (Rules).
Rule 45 of the Rules provides that the petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what
the law is on a certain set of facts, while a question of fact arises when there is doubt as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, it must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.
The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
facts and circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law
or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same;
rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue without examining or
of fact.
Here, petitioner RP alleges that there was taking of the subject property in 1947
as the School constructed a building and planted crops therein, which means that
petitioner RP had actual beneficial enjoyment thereof. It argues that the courts erred
when it did not give weight to the testimony of the school principal, Perla, that the
School had been occupying the subject property since 1947. Applying the test of whether
the question is one of law or of fact, the foregoing is a question of fact because petitioner
RP assails the appreciation of evidence by the CA and RTC.
As a general rule, this Court is not a trier of facts. Absent the recognized
exceptions to this general rule, this Court will not review the findings of fact of the lower
courts. In this case, petitioner RP failed to show that the exceptions to justify a review of
the appreciation of facts by the CA and RTC are present.
109
KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES V. TIONGCO
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 209983 | November 10, 2021
DOCTRINE
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Court is not a trier of facts. Hence, it is not the court’s
function to re-evaluate the probative value of the evidence of both parties which were
already considered in the proceedings.
FACTS
Respondent Dr. Jose M. Tiongco (Dr. Tiongco), a prominent surgeon, was invited by
the United Nations - World Health Organization (UN-WHO) to be a keynote speaker in the
20th Anniversary of Alma-Ata Declaration to be held in Almaty, Kazakhstan from
November 27-28, 1998.
There being no direct flight from Manila to Kazakhstan, Dr. Tiongco had to fly to
Singapore via Singapore Airlines where he would then take two connecting flights to
Almaty on board petitioner KLM, his main carrier.
Upon his arrival, Dr. Tiongco searched for a KLM employee. After two hours, he
found a KLM employee whom he informed at once about his missed flight to Almaty, as
well as his speaking engagement and his checked-in suitcase. The employee assured him
that his suitcase would be traveling with him. He also instructed the doctor to approach a
Turkish Airlines employee to assist with the logistics of his trip to Almaty. The KLM
employee then took Dr. Tiongco's boarding pass and gave him a new itinerary.
When Dr. Tiongco arrived in Almaty, nobody from KLM, Lufthansa, or Turkish
Airlines assisted him. His suitcase was still nowhere to be found. He then exited the
airport, hailed a taxi cab, and proceeded to Regency Hotel where the UN-WHO convention
would be held.
Dr. Tiongco then delivered his lecture without any of his visual aids and despite
being inappropriately attired. When he finished his speech, some of the attendees
approached him and asked for his resource materials. However, he was unable to give
them the materials since these were also in his missing suitcase.
On December 14, 1998, Dr. Tiongco returned to the Philippines. Three months
passed and still there was no news about what happened to his luggage. Thus, on March
15, 1999, Dr. Tiongco wrote Singapore Airlines, KLM and Lufthansa, demanding
110
compensation for his lost luggage and the inconvenience he suffered. Lufthansa denied his
claim for compensation while KLM and Singapore Airlines, in separate letters, asked for
time to investigate the incident. In a letter Singapore Airlines denied any liability. KLM,
unfortunately, did not write back to Dr. Tiongco.
Dr. Tiongco filed a Complaint for Damages and Attorney's Fees against KLM, Turkish
Airlines, Singapore Airlines, and Lufthansa. KLM, Singapore Airlines, and Lufthansa filed
their separate answers. They all denied liability for the lost suitcase of Dr. Tiongco, and
instead asked for indemnification from Dr. Tiongco.
Dr. Tiongco filed an Omnibus Motion before the RTC praying for the dropping of
Turkish Airlines as one of the defendants and for the admission of his Amended Complaint.
The RTC granted respondent's Omnibus Motion and admitted the Amended Complaint.
The RTC ruled that KLM is solely liable for the damages suffered by Dr. Tiongco on
account of his lost suitcase. KLM failed to exercise extraordinary care in handling the
suitcase of Dr. Tiongco. Further, the RTC rejected KLM's claim that Singapore Airlines and
Turkish Airlines, being the first and last carriers of Dr. Tiongco, should be held liable
instead of KLM. KLM filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC.
Hence, KLM appealed to the CA.
The appellate court agreed with the trial court on KLM's liability for breach of
contract of carriage. However, it modified the awards of damages for being excessive.
KLM sought for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE
Are the issues raised in the instant petition factual in nature, therefore, not
subject to review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court?
HELD
Yes, the parameters of a judicial review under a Rule 45 petition is discussed in
Miro v. Vda. De Eredoros,viz.:
a. Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law
The Court deems it necessary to emphasize that a petition for review under Rule
45 is limited only to questions of law. Factual questions are not the proper subject of an
appeal by certiorari. This Court will not review facts, as it is not our function to analyze
or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings. This is already
outside the province of the instant Petition for Certiorari.
is on a certain set of facts; a question of fact, on the other hand, exists when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Unless the case falls
111
under any of the recognized exceptions, the Court is limited solely to the review of legal
questions.
b. Rule 45 petition is limited to errors of the appellate court
Furthermore, the "errors" which the Court may review in a petition for review on
certiorari are those of the CA, and not directly those of the trial court or the
quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, or officer which rendered the decision in the first
instance.
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, jurisdiction is generally limited to the review
of errors of law committed by the appellate court. The Supreme Court is not obliged to
review over again the evidence which the parties adduced in the court a quo. However,
the rule is not without exception. In Medina v. Asistio, Jr.,the findings of fact of the CA
may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court in the following instances:

conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting: (6) When the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
Upon careful perusal of the issues raised by KLM, the Court finds that these are
factual in nature which is beyond our jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari.
The arguments it posited in the petition are also noticeably similar to those raised before
the CA.
Unfortunately, KLM failed to substantiate its claim that the CA misapprehended

any facts or failed to consider relevant facts to warrant a reversal of its assailed decision.
Mere assertion and claim that the case falls under the exceptions is insufficient. Assuming
arguendo that the Court gives due course to the petition, the Court finds that the CA, in
affirming the findings of the RTC, did not commit any reversible error.
112
PACIFIC ROYAL BASIC FOODS, INC. V. NOCHE
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 202392 | October 4, 2021
DOCTRINE
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed before
the Supreme Court covers pure questions of law - questions on the application of the law
on a certain set and state of established facts. Questions of fact, or those seeking to
verify the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, will not be entertained. Essentially, a
petition for review on certiorari excludes a reassessment of the disputed facts of the
case.
For a question to be one of law, its resolution must not involve an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants, but must rely solely on
what the law provides on the given set of facts. If the facts are disputed or if the issues
require an examination of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact. The test,
therefore, is not the appellation given to a question by the party raising it, but whether
the appellate court can resolve the issue without examining or evaluating the evidence, in
which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
FACTS
Petitioner Pacific Royal Basic Foods, Inc. (PRBFI) is a business entity engaged in the
manufacturing, processing, and distribution of coconut products for export.
PRBFI employed respondents Violeta Noche, Juliana L. Abrigunda, Crisanta A.

Talavera, Ma. Asuncion A. Arguelles, Ciriaca A. Velasco,Severa B. Quitain, Rosalinda
Balahadia, Anicia Dagle, Norma K. Plata, Zenaida B. Bulahan, and Susana D. Amparo
(herein individually referred to by their last names and collectively as respondents) as
coconut parers.
Respondents filed a complaint for non-regularization with the Department of Labor

and Employment (DOLE), Quezon Field Office. They anchored their complaint for
non-regularization on PRBFI's supposed failure to regularize their employment despite the
length of time that they had been working for PRBFI.
PRBFI dismissed respondents from work. Respondents filed a complaint against

PRBFI for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, regularization, damages, and reinstatement
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch IV.
PRBFI maintained that respondents were properly and correctly dismissed from
employment.
113
The Labor Arbiter ruled for the respondents. In finding respondents to have been
illegally dismissed, the Labor Arbiter held that PRBFI had no just cause for their dismissal.
The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter. It held that respondents left the fact of
product contamination undisputed and failed to show any ill motive on PRBFI's part in
accusing them of having caused such contamination.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. They imputed grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC for entertaining PRBFI's appeal, the requisite
bond of which was posted only almost a month after the appeal period had lapsed.
The CA granted respondents' Petition for Certiorari. Hence, PRBFI's Petition for
Review before this Court.
ISSUE
Is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court proper in
the case at bar?
HELD
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed before
the Supreme Court covers pure questions of law - questions on the application of the law
on a certain set and state of established facts. Questions of fact, or those seeking to
verify the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, will not be entertained. Essentially, a
petition for review on certiorari excludes a reassessment of the disputed facts of the
case.
Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. People delineated the parameters in
the determination of whether a legal question raised is of law or of fact:
In assailing the CA's actions on the respective procedural obedience of herein

parties and its favorable appreciation of the arguments raised by respondents, PRBFI
necessarily prays for the reopening of the factual records of the case. PRBFI cannot do so
in a Rule 45 proceeding.
Note, however, that this is not an inflexible rule. A factual probe into the case
may be conducted in a Rule 45 petition if it falls under the exceptional circumstances laid
out by jurisprudence: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
114
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the finding of
fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record. The case at hand does not fall under any of these
exceptions.
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court instructs that the failure of the petitioner
to comply with any of the formal requirements of a petition for certiorari shall be
sufficient ground for its dismissal.
The CA is not compelled to automatically order the dismissal of a formally-infirm

pleading. Section 5, Rule 46 of the same Rules states:
SEC. 5. Action by the court. - The court may dismiss the petition outright with
specific reasons for such dismissal or require the respondent to file a comment on the
same within ten (10) days from notice. x x x.
Two basic options are given to the CA under the foregoing provision: (1) to dismiss
the petition outright, with specific reasons, or (2) to require the respondent to file a
comment on the same within ten (10) days from notice.
The CA, however, holds a wide discretionary latitude in the disposition of the cases
filed before it and is not restricted to those provided under Section 5, Rule 46. It may
make an initial determination of the necessity for the submission of copies of pleading
and other documents under the guidelines provided by Air Philippines Corp. v. Zamora:
y
First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the
petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of
relevancy is whether the document in question will support the material allegations in the
petition, whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of
discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition.
Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not
be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also be found in another
document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position
paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true
copy of the judgment is attached.
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still
be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later
115
submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that
the case be decided on the merits.
In resolving respondents' Petition for Certiorari, the appellate court exercised such
judicial discretion by first instructing respondents to complete the documentary
attachments. Respondents did so, albeit inaccurately. While petitioner pointed out that
respondents attached the allegedly wrong pleadings to their Compliance, the CA noted
the same, directed PRBFI to file a Comment, and proceeded to decide respondents'
Petition for Certiorari on the merits.
Contrary to PRBFI's insinuations, the CA did not act arbitrarily. The CA correctly
relied on the available documents already submitted by the parties; after all, litigants in
a labor case must allege all their arguments and evidence in their position papers and
pleadings before the labor arbiter, and no other argument or evidence will be considered
other than those raised during the proceedings before the labor arbiter.
The Court affirms the CA's decision to gloss over the other technical issues raised
by PRBFI against respondents' Petition for Certiorari before the CA, i.e., allegedly
unnotarized Amended Verification and Certification and lack of Affidavit of Service
attached to respondents' Compliance to the CA Resolution dated March 9, 2010. These
claims are unfounded. Per the CA records, the Amended Verification and Certification was
notarized,and the Affidavit of Service required by the CA was attached to respondents'
Compliance.
Even if PRBFI was correct, such lapses are mere formal, not jurisdictional, errors.
Labor cases have never been strictly bound by technicalities of form and procedure. Also,
a grant of liberality to one does not automatically connote bias against the other party.
An allegation of bias is a grave accusation that requires proof, and there can be no bias
ascribable upon a tribunal if its actions were clearly done in accordance with the law.
116
CALUBAD V. ACERON
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 209983 | November 10, 2021
APPEALS BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT; EXCEPTIONS TO RULE 45
DOCTRINE
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in
exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. In addition, it
may be invoked only on two grounds, namely, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS
Sometime in April 1992, Billy M. Aceron (Aceron) and Oliver R. Soriano (Oliver)
entered into an unnotarized Deed of Conditional Sale for a consideration of P1.6 million
over a parcel of land located in Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 15860 registered in the name of spouses Francisco R. Soriano and Rosa R.
Soriano (Spouses Soriano). The latter had donated the subject property to their son,
Oliver. Since the title over the subject property was yet to be reconstituted in the name
of Oliver, the parties entered into a Deed of Conditional Sale which provided that Oliver
shall cause the reconstitution of title and transfer of ownership to Aceron. Meanwhile,
Aceron may take possession of the subject property upon payment of P300,000.00.
In October 1992, the title was reconstituted, prompting Aceron to demand from
Oliver the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale. However, Oliver informed Aceron that he
would cancel the Deed of Conditional Sale. Hence, on October 19, 1993, Aceron filed a
Complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.On the other hand, Oliver
claimed that he had to cancel the Deed of Conditional Sale because Aceron failed to pay
the total amount of the contract.
RTC: Rendered in favor of Aceron. Filed an appeal for payment of moral and
exemplary damages
CA: Denied the appeal and affirmed the decision.
On August 5, 2003, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued TCT No.
N-25337314 in the name of Oliver. Thereafter, on November 5, 2003, Oliver informed
Aceron of the notarial rescission of the Deed of Conditional Sale and demanded that he
vacate the subject property within five days. On December 17, 2003, Oliver obtained a
loan in the amount of P1.6 million from petitioner Calubad and as a security therefor, he
mortgaged the subject property covered by TCT No. N-253373.
Thereafter, on January 9, 2004, Aceron moved for the execution of the RTC's
December 26, 1996 Decision which was granted by the trial court in its March 5, 2004
117
Order. Thus, on April 1, 2004, Aceron deposited the amount of P970,000.00 at the Office
of the Clerk of Court. However, Oliver failed to deliver TCT No. N-253373 as ordered.
Hence, Aceron moved that Oliver be divested of his title over the subject property
and that it be transferred to him.However, Oliver manifested that he could not surrender
the title because it was already mortgaged to petitioner Calubad before the issuance of
the RTC's March 5, 2004 Order. On July 23, 2004, Aceron moved that Oliver's title and
ownership over the subject property be transferred to his name, free from all liens and
encumbrances, pursuant to the CA's Decision dated February 18, 2002. On October 3,
2004, Aceron filed an Omnibus Motion22 praying that: (a) petitioner Calubad deliver TCT
No. N-253373 in the name of Oliver; (b) Oliver and Calubad refrain from doing acts that
would adversely affect the delivery of TCT No. N-253373; (c) Oliver execute a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Aceron; (d) Oliver be divested of his title over the subject
property; and (e) the ownership over the subject property be transferred to Aceron free
from all liens and encumbrances.
Trial Court: Granted the omnibus motion.

CA: Denied Calubad’s petition for being an improper remedy
ISSUE
Was the appellate court correct in dismissing the petition for annulment?
HELD
Yes. Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in
exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. In addition, it
may be invoked only on two grounds, namely, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
None of these grounds are present in this case.
First, the RTC acted within its jurisdiction when it resolved the motion for
execution filed by Aceron and consequently issued Resolution dated December 13, 2004
which divested Oliver of his ownership over the subject property and directed the
Register of Deeds to issue a new title in the name of Aceron. It further declared petitioner
Calubad's real estate mortgage and foreclosure sale as null and void.\
Jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case, and not the decision rendered
therein. Evidently, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
persons of Oliver and Aceron. Moreover, the present case has already become final and
executory when the court a quo issued its assailed Resolution which justifies its
subsequent issuance thereof to put the judgment into effect. In a petition for annulment
of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner Calubad must show not merely abuse
of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of authority to hear and decide the case
which he failed to do so.
Neither is there extrinsic fraud in the case at bar which would deprive petitioner
Calubad to intervene and present his case in Civil Case No. Q-93-18011. The records show
that Oliver, admittedly, mortgaged the subject property to petitioner Calubad after the
118
decision in Civil Case No. Q-93-18011 had become final and executory. Hence, at the time
Oliver mortgaged the subject property to petitioner Calubad, the issue of ownership over
the subject property was already settled in favor of Aceron. On these reasons, petitioner
Calubad failed to convince this Court that there are valid grounds to grant the petition for
annulment of judgment.
119
ANCHETA V. CAMBAY
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 204272 | January 18, 2021
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGEMENT
DOCTRINE
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. This means that the remedy of
annulment of judgment, albeit a "last remedy," is not an alternative remedy to the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or a petition for relief. It must show or allege that
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. But this requirement to
aver is not imposed when the ground for the petition is lack of jurisdiction (whether
alleged singly or in combination with extrinsic fraud), simply because the judgment or
final order, being void, may be assailed at any time either collaterally or by direct action
or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is
invoked, unless the ground of lack of jurisdiction is meanwhile barred by laches.
FACTS
On June 12, 2003, Vivian Ancheta (Vivian) obtained a loan from Cambay. As
security for the loan, Vivian executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Cambay over a
parcel of land located in Nueva Vizcaya. The parcel of land was registered under the
names of Ancheta and her former common-law spouse Ricardo Dionila. On June 16, 2003,
Vivian obtained another loan from Cambay in the amount of P25,000.00 evidenced by a
Promissory Note. Cambay filed a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage against
Vivian, Ancheta, and Dionila before the RTC alleging that Vivian failed to settle her
obligation upon maturity despite repeated demands. Ancheta narrated that while
summons were served on and received by Vivian, no summons ever reached her (Ancheta)
and/or Dionila. Vivian filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer with the RTC,
which the latter granted but Vivian, Ancheta, nor Dionila filed an Answer to Cambay’s
complaint.
The RTC rendered a decision by default against Vivian, Ancheta, and Dionila and
directed them to pay P50,000 plus interest at the rate of 24% per annum. On September
26,2005 the decision of the RTC became final and executory, and entered in the book of
entries of judgment.
Ancheta filed with the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment arguing among
others, that: (1) Ancheta came to know of the case docketed as SPL Civil Action No. 64
only sometime in February 2006; (2) no summons was personally served on her and/or
Dionila; and (3) the June 10, 2003 SPA purportedly executed by Ancheta and Dionila
empowering Vivian to utilize the land as security for her loan with Cambay was falsified,
and thus, null and void.
120
The RTC dismissed Ancheta’s petition on the ground that the rule is explicit and
mandatory that the petition must be filed within 60 days after he/she learns of the
judgment and not later than 6 months after judgment or final order was entered. Ancheta
filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of Ancheta and Dionila but the same was dismissed by the appellate court. The CA
held that the petitioner had already availed of the remedy of petition for relief of
judgment, she could no longer avail of a petition for annulment of judgment.
ISSUE
Did the appellate court err in dismissing Ancheta’s Petition for Annulment of
Judgement?
HELD
Yes. Ancheta is not precluded from filing a petition for annulment of judgment
with the CA. Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides for the remedy of annulment of
judgment with the appellate court of the judgments, final orders, and resolutions of the
RTCs in civil actions for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. Significantly, Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules limits the ground for the action of
annulment of judgment to either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction which provides:
“the annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have
been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.”
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. This means that the remedy of
annulment of judgment, albeit a "last remedy," is not an alternative remedy to the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or a petition for relief. It must show or allege that
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. But this requirement
to aver is not imposed when the ground for the petition is lack of jurisdiction (whether
In the case at bar, considering that the ground relied upon in the petition for
annulment is lack of jurisdiction over the persons of Ancheta and Dionila, it was not
necessary nor was it essential on the part of the CA to establish first, before it could have
ruled on the merits of the petition for annulment, whether the remedy of petition for
relief was earlier availed of by Ancheta. Ancheta may have been barred from raising the
defense of fraud in her petition for annulment with the CA. However, this should not have
prevented the appellate court from ruling on the merits of the petition for annulment
filed before it, and definitively rule on the issue of lack of jurisdiction raised therein.
Moreover, Ancheta had previously availed of the remedy of a petition for relief with the
121
RTC, she is not precluded from filing with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment –
one that is essentially anchored on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. If she can prove that
she and Dionila were indeed not duly served with summons, the RTC never acquired
jurisdiction over them, hence, its August 31, 2005 Judgment would be void ab initio, and
the CA would thus be duty-bound to strike it down. However, instead of fully addressing
the issue of lack of jurisdiction raised before it, the CA opted to dismiss the case outright
based on a mere technical, albeit erroneous, interpretation of the rules.
122
GAOIRAN V. CA
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 215925 | March 07, 2022
ANNULMENT OF JUDGEMENT
DOCTRINE
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the
claim. In case of absence, or lack, of jurisdiction, a court should not take cognizance of
the case. Thus, the prevailing rule is that where there is want of jurisdiction over a
subject matter, the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect
no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no right can be obtained, which
neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing
out are void. It is not a decision in contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become
executory. It also follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another
case by reason of res judicata.
FACTS
The property subject of the instant petition is a 275-square meter parcel of land
situated in Barangay Poblacion San Miguel & San Pedro, City of Laoag, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. (TCT) T-34540 issued under the name of respondent Perlita S.
Pablo (Perlita), married to Timoteo Pablo (Timoteo). The petitioner claimed that on
September 22, 2009, her acquaintances introduced her to a man named Timoteo H. Pablo,
Jr., who reportedly wanted to sell a piece of property that was registered in his wife
Perlita S. Pablo's name. To the petitioner and her husband, Timoteo made the offer to sell
the concerned property. By claiming that his wife Perlita had given him permission to sell
the property, Timoteo was able to persuade the petitioner to buy it. On the same day,
petitioner delivered the purchase price to Timoteo in the amount of P500,000.00 and in
exchange, Timoteo surrendered the first owner's duplicate copy of TCT T-34540 to
petitioner and undertook to deliver a deed of absolute sale signed by his wife on or before
October 22, 2009. Timoteo, however, did not make good his promise.
In exchange for Timoteo turning over the initial owner's duplicate copy of TCT
T-34540 to the petitioner and promising to submit a deed of absolute sale signed by his
wife on or before October 22, 2009, the petitioner paid Timoteo the purchase price of
P500,000.00 on the same day. But Timoteo didn't follow through on his pledge.
Finding sufficient, competent and credible evidence in support of the petition for
issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title, the RTC of Laoag City, Branch 12,
in a Decision 14 dated August 28, 2012, ordering the issuance of a second owner's
duplicate copy of TCT T-34540. Pursuant to which, the RTC of Laoag City declared the lost
owner's duplicate copy as null and void.
123
The CA dismissed the petition or annulment of judgment declaring that a petition
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court cannot be used to impugn the second owner's
duplicate certificate of title which was issued in the reconstitution proceeding before the
trial court for to do so would constitute a collateral attack upon the issued certificate of
title which is sanctioned by Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529.
ISSUE
Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for
annulment of judgment.
HELD
YES. The Court finds that CA erred in denying petitioner’s petition for annulment
of judgment holding that the same was a subtle experiment to a collaterally dispute the
owner’s duplicate certificate of title which was issued in favor of Perlita. A lost or
destroyed document attesting a person's title to a plot of land may be restored in its
original form and condition by reconstitution of a certificate of title. The goal of title
reconstitution is to have the title replicated exactly as it had been prior to the loss or
destruction, while adhering to the legal requirements.
When the petitioner submitted a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the Court
in an effort to challenge the August 15, 2014 Decision and November 14, 2014 Resolution
of the CA, she chose the incorrect method of appeal. According to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, a petition for certiorari is a special civil action that may only be used in the
absence of an appeal or any other simple, prompt, and sufficient remedy available under
the law as it currently stands.
Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the only grounds for annulment of
judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. In this case, petitioner alleges that
the CA erred in failing to annul the Decision of the RTC on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

From the aforementioned, it appears that proof of the loss or destruction of the
certificate of title is required before issuing an order of reconstitution. The reconstituted
title is null and void, and the court that made the ruling lacked jurisdiction if a certificate
of title has not actually been lost but is instead in the ownership of another person.
124
EXECUTION, SATISFACTION, AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENT
Angono Medics Hospital v. Agabin
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 202543 | December 9, 2020
IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENTS; RES JUDICATA
DOCTRINE
CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT — Any right, fact or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent
court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether or
not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
RES JUDICATA — 'a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment.' It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or
decree rendered on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
Angono Medics filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the 2012
Resolution of the CA G.R. S.P No 114001.
FACTS
In 2007, Agabin was hired by Angono Medic Hospital as a staff midwife, she was
also simultaneously allows to study nursing simultaneously. However from June 29-Sept 15
of that year Agabin had to work as an affiliate as part of the school requirement, the
Chief Nurse Antiojo approved her request for leave. Upon returning to work on Sept. 19
she was berated by the President of Angono Medics, the next day she was ordered not to
report for work anymore. A case for illegal dismissal was spurred which resulted in a
decision unsatisfying to both parties!
Hence 2 petitions for Certiorari arose! Both which were denied consolidation!
1st. SP no. 113939 - AMHI's Petition for Certiorari before the CA, raised the issue of
the Arbiter's alleged abuse of discretion "in not granting the motion for examination and
in not setting the case for formal hearing before deciding the case on its merits, and the
NLRC's abuse of discretion in affirming a clearly illegal act of said arbiter.
125
2nd. SP no. 114001 - Agabin's Petition for Certiorari before the CA raising the issue
in the computation of Agabin's separation pay and backwages and no longer the finding of
illegal dismissal.
Angono mainly argues that the decision in SP No. 113939 (G.R. No. 194465), which
is already final and executory, has the effect of res judicata upon SP No. 114001. It opines
that the decision in SP No. 114001 should be considered null and void since there is
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the two cases
contemplated herein.
Agabin also argues that SP No. 114001 should not be considered as a subsequent
case to SP No. 113939 for the purpose of the application of res judicata because both SP
No. 113939 and SP No. 114001 stemmed from the same issuances. The mere fact that SP
No. 113939 was filed a week earlier and decided ahead of SP No. 114001 should not
prejudice her as she just exercised her statutory right to file a certiorari petition to assail
the Resolutions of the NLRC which limited her award of backwages.
ISSUE
Does res judicata exist to bar two appeals stemming from the same NLRC issuances
/ resolutions?
HELD
No. The instant case should be resolved on the basis of the rule on "conclusiveness
of judgment" since although there is identity of parties in both SP Nos. 113939 and
114001, the causes of action are not identical, as earlier discussed.
There is only conclusiveness of judgment insofar as the finding of illegal dismissal

is concerned and not as to the computation of the monetary awards.
The elements of res judicata are:
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action.
The Court found no conflict between the two CA rulings. In SP No. 113939, the
appellate court dealt with the illegal dismissal aspect of the case as well as the Arbiter's
denial of AMHI's motion to further examine Agabin's documents and to set the case for
formal hearing. On the other hand, in SP No. 114001, the CA delved on the correct basis
and computation of Agabin's backwages and separation pay. Relevantly, the appellate
court in SP No. 113939 did not discuss at all the computation of the monetary awards; it
merely quoted the rulings of both the Arbiter and the NLRC.
126
VILLAROMAN V. ESTATE OF ARCIAGA
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 210822 | June 28, 2021
RES JUDICATA; FORUM SHOPPING
DOCTRINE
Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; or a thing or matter settled by judgment." Under this rule, final judgment or
decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction "is conclusive as to the rights of
the parties or their privies in all later suits, and on all points and matters determined in
the former suit.
"[a] cause of action may give rise to several reliefs, but only one action can be
filed. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided into
two or more different actions. The rule prohibiting the splitting of a single cause of action
is clear."
FACTS
Petitioners Florante Villaroman and Carlos Villaroman are the heirs of Agrifina
Cawili Vda. De Villaroman (Agrifina). Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs of
Jose Arciaga (Jose), one of the registered owners of a parcel of land known as Lot 965,
Friar Land Estate, with an area of 950 square meters and previously covered by Transfer
Certificate Title (TCT) No. S-59600 and registered with the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal.
On September 4, 1968, Jose sold a 300-square meter portion of Lot 965 to Ricardo
Florentino (Florentino) for P6,000.00, as evidenced by a Kasunduan ng Bilihan dated
September 4, 1968.
On January 8, 1969, Florentino paid the remaining balance of P1,000.00 to Jose's

wife, Felicidad Fulgencio (Felicidad). Despite full payment of the purchase price, Jose
allegedly failed to deliver and transfer the title of the 300-square meter portion of Lot
965 in the name of Florentino.
Subsequently, on January 12, 1971, Florentino sold the said 300-square meter
portion of Lot 965 to Agrifina. In view of her purchase of the subject property, Agrifina
erected her house thereon and other improvements, such as a three-door apartment and
a store. The title to the property had not been transferred to either Florentino or Agrifina
even after Jose's demise on November 25, 1976.
After the death of Jose, his wife, Felicidad, together with Jose's brother, Alfredo
Arciaga (Alfredo), caused the execution of a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Ganap dated April 2,
1980, which involved the absolute sale of Lot 965 in favor of Agrifina, a certain Emilia
Fresnedi (Emilia), and Artemio Arciaga (Artemio). Notably, the same agreement was
127
executed and signed by Felicidad, Alfredo, including Jose, among others, on April 2, 1980,
or four years after Jose's death in 1976. By virtue of the said Kasulatan ng Bilihang Ganap,
a certificate of title covering the 300-square meter portion of Lot 965 was issued in the
name of Agrifina. Meanwhile, titles over the remaining 550- square meter and 100-square
meter portions of Lot 965 were transferred in the names of Emilia and Artemio,
respectively.
The RTC held that there was no res judicata or a violation of the prohibition
against forum shopping. The CA, however, found that all the elements of res judicata in
the concept of bar by prior judgment attended the suits involving the parties.
ISSUE
Is there res judicata and forum shopping in the case at hand?
HELD
Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; or a thing or matter settled by judgment." Under this rule, final judgment or
decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction "is conclusive as to the rights of
the parties or their privies in all later suits, and on all points and matters determined in
the former suit."
In this case, petitioners presented the same documentary evidence to prove their
claims in Civil Case No. 11993 and Civil Case No. 00-133, as both actions ultimately seek
to establish their title over a certain portion of Lot 965. In this regard, petitioners
presented three documents in both actions, namely: (1) the Kasunduan ng Bilihan dated
September 4, 1996 executed by Jose in favor of Florentino; (2) the handwritten receipt
executed by Felicidad, Jose's wife, of the remaining balance amounting to P1,000.00; and
(3) the Kasulatang Tapos at Lubos na Bilihan ng Piraso ng Lupa dated January 12, 1971
between Florentino and Agrifina involving the said property in dispute.
The underlying objectives or reliefs sought in both cases are essentially the same:
i.e., adjudication of the ownership of the disputed portion of Lot 965. It is readily
apparent that the same evidence or set of facts as those considered in Civil Case No.
11993 would also be used in Civil Case No. 00-113. Clearly, the courts would have to
re-examine the same evidence in Civil Case No. 11993 to support petitioners' cause of
action in Civil Case No. 00-113. The similarity in the pieces of evidence in these two cases
therefore strongly suggests the identity of petitioners' causes of action.
That one case is an action for damages and the other for specific performance is of
no moment. The variations in the forms of the complaints or actions of petitioners, or the
fact that they presented the issue in different methods, should not escape the operation
of the doctrine of res judicata. The fact remains that the January 30, 1997 Decision of the
CA in relation to Civil Case No. 11993 made a definitive finding that: (1) the two
documents relied upon by petitioners are insufficient bases of ownership over the
property in dispute; and (2) there was absence of proof that there was full payment of
the purchase price of the property in dispute. Notably, the grant of the relief prayed for
128
by petitioners in the instant case would effectively result in the reexamination of the
above mentioned documents, and a reversal of a final and executory decision involving
the same issues, parties, and subject matter.
Lastly, settled is the rule that "[a] cause of action may give rise to several reliefs,
but only one action can be filed. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand
cannot be split up or divided into two or more different actions. The rule prohibiting the
splitting of a single cause of action is clear."
As already discussed above, this cause of action pursued in Civil Case No. 11993
and on which the lower courts rendered their decisions was similarly brought forth in Civil
Case No. 00-113. Applying Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, petitioners cannot split
their cause of action by filing a case in court to recognize them as lawful owners of a
property, and thereafter file another separate complaint for specific performance that
ultimately seeks to determine with finality their title or ownership over the same
property.
129
PNB V. DARADAR
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 180203 | June 28, 2021
EFFECT OF JUDGEMENTS
DOCTRINE
There is nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides for a
provisional dismissal of a civil case.
Moreover, a judgment must be definitive; the decision itself must purport to

decide finally the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted by specifically denying or
granting the remedy sought by the action. It is significant to note that in Cu Unjieng E.
Hijos v. Mabalacat Sugar Company the Court held that when a definitive judgment cannot
be rendered since the judgment is subject to a contingency, the judgment contains no
disposition at all and is null and void. Guided by the foregoing, the Court is convinced
that the First Order which provisionally dismissed Civil Case No. 21375 is void and without
legal effect for lack of basis.
A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect for any purpose. In
contemplation of law, it is non-existent and may be resisted in any action or proceeding
whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a
void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored. All acts performed pursuant to it
and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. In this sense, a void order can
never attain finality. Being void, the issuance of the First Order never became final nor
operated to divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the complaint.
For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1)
there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits;
and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action.
FACTS
Petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) and respondent Romeo B. Daradar
(Daradar) entered into a Deed of Promise to Sell (Deed) covering two parcels of land and
improvements therein that were owned by PNB. Due to Daradar's failure to pay, PNB
rescinded the Deed through a Notarial Notice of Rescission.
Thus, Daradar filed an action for Annulment of Rescission, Accounting and

Damages against PNB in the RTC to annul the notarial rescission of the Deed. Due to
Daradars's failure to appear at the scheduled hearing, the RTC, in an April 5, 1995 Order
(First Order) provisionally dismissed the case without prejudice. After the lapse of four
years, the RTC motu proprio issued its June 17, 1999 Order (Second Order) finally
130
dismissing Daradar’s case on the ground of his failure to prosecute the case under Section
3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, in view of his failure to reinstate or revive the case
despite the lapse of more than four years from the first dismissal.
On October 18, 1999, Daradar filed another complaint for declaration of nullity of
notarial rescission of the Deed with the RTC. PNB, moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the Second Order was an adjudication on the merits, thereby barring the
subsequent filing on the ground of res judicata.
RTC granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. Thus, Daradar
appealed the same before the CA. The CA, granted his petition. The appellate court
reasoned that the First Order operated to divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the
case; thus, the Second Order is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Hence the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the CA ruling.
ISSUE
Did the Second Order supersede the First Order and have the effect of an
adjudication on the merits which barred Daradar from reviving the case?
HELD
The First Order provisionally dismissing the case is void for lack of legal basis.
Moreover, the Second Order already attained finality and is beyond the courts' power to
amend or revoke. Therefore, the Second Order bars the revival of the case through a new
complaint and thus, the trial court did not err in granting PNB's motion to dismiss on the
ground of res judicata.
There is nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides for a
provisional dismissal of a civil case. Moreover, a judgment must be definitive; the decision
itself must purport to decide finally the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted by
specifically denying or granting the remedy sought by the action. We find that the
provisional dismissal before Us fails to meet this standard of definitiveness discussed in Cu
Unjieng and hence should not be sanctioned.
A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect for any purpose. Being
void, the issuance of the First Order never became final nor operated to divest the trial
court of jurisdiction over the complaint. Nevertheless, while the present Rules of Civil
Procedure do not provide for provisional dismissals, this Court in a 1940 case equated a
provisional order with an interlocutory order that was subject to vacation or amendment
at any time before final judgment is rendered or has become executory. Hence, even
assuming arguendo that provisional dismissals of civil cases such as the First Order could
be sanctioned, the First Order should be considered interlocutory and could not have
operated to divest the trial court of jurisdiction. The trial court accordingly acted within
its jurisdiction in issuing its Second Order and in motu proprio dismissing the case for
(Daradar's) failure to prosecute under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
131
causes of action.
All elements of res judicata are present in the instant case. Anent the first and
second elements, the Second Order is a final judgment which has already attained finality
and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. It is likewise undisputed that
there is an identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between Civil Case
Nos. 21375 and 25981. Finally, the third element of res judicata is present as the Second
Order dismissing Civil Case No. 21375 operated as a judgment on the merits. Here, the
Second Order did not state that the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice. A
dismissal based on any of the grounds in Section 3, Rule 17 operates as an adjudication on
the merits. Unless otherwise qualified by the court, a dismissal under said rule is
considered with prejudice, which bars the refiling of the case.
132
PINEDA V. MIRANDA
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 204997 | August 4, 2021
REVIVAL OF JUDGEMENTS
DOCTRINE
The revival action is a new action altogether; it is different and distinct from the
original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. It is a new and independent action,
wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon
which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. The Court agrees with the CA in
citing Saligumba v. Palanog, especially when it ruled that revival of judgment is premised
on the assumption that the decision to be revived, either by motion or by independent
action, is already final and executory.
FACTS
On October 27, 1997, herein respondents Abelardo Miranda, Elias Miranda and
Miranda (respondents) filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Pineda et. al. who
are residents of Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, before the MTC. On
December 15, 1998, the MTC, Branch 3 rendered a Decision in favor of respondents,
holding the latter to be the registered owners of 24 parcels of land located in Barangay
Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga which petitioners surreptitiously and arbitrarily
occupied without, respondents' consent and knowledge.
The petitioners thereafter filed an Appeal before the RTC of San Fernando City,
Pampanga. On May 17, 1999, the RTC affirmed the MTC Decision with modification.
On January 6, 2000, respondents, through their counsel, filed a Motion for Issuance
of Writ of Execution, which was granted by the MTC on February 14, 2000.
On May 9, 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Revival of Judgement, holding

that the Writ of Execution issued on February 14, 2000 was not implemented within five
years from the finalization of the decision.
In their Answer, Petitioners alleged that the Complaint for Revival of Judgement
should be dismissed on the ground that the case does not fall within the ambit of unlawful
detainer, thus, the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore, they averred that
the Complaint must have been filed with the MTC, the court that rendered the decision
sought to be revived, not with the RTC.
On July 20, 2006, petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Quash Writ of

Execution for failure of respondents to implement Writ of Execution within 5 years from
the time of its issuance. The MTC, however, quashed the same on November 15, 2006,
finding that:
133
“From the date of rendition of decision by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, on
May 17, 1999 as well as from the date of issuance of the writ of execution in the instant
case on February 14, 2000, more than five (5) years had clearly elapsed. Hence, under the
provisions of Sec. 6, Rule 39, both decisions in the instant case - either that issued by this
Court on December 15, 1998 or that issued by the appellate court on May 17, 1999 - can
no longer be implemented by a mere motion. A revival of the judgment by an action is
necessary before its execution. The reason is that after the lapse of the five year period,
the judgment is reduced to a mere right of action, which judgment must be enforced, as
all other ordinary actions, by institution of a complaint in a regular form.”
Pending the RTC Branch 43's resolution on respondents' Complaint for Revival of
Judgment, petitioners filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the CA, assailing
the Decisions respectively rendered by the MTC and the RTC Branch 42 in an action for
unlawful detainer.
RTC: The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents, holding that the RTC Branch
Decision can still be revived because the filing of the Complaint for Revival of Judgement
was still within the 10-year period. Further, in an Order dated July 23, 2009, the RTC
Branch 43 denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. On September
24, 2009, the RTC Branch 43 issued an Order dismissing petitioners' Notice of Appeal and
granting herein respondents' Motion to Dismiss. On December 28, 2009, the RTC Branch 43
issued another Order granting herein respondents' Motion to Remand Record of Case to the
Municipal Trial Court of Origin.
Finally, the Petitioners elevated the matter to the CA through a Petition for
Mandamus and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to compel the RTC to give
due course to their Notice of Appeal.
CA: The CA dismissed the petitioners’ Petition for Annulment of Judgement. The
CA ruled that it had no jurisdiction to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions
issued by the MTC. Furthermore, the CA held that petitioners failed to show why no
appeal was first taken from the RTC Branch 42 Decision which affirmed with modification
the MTC Decision. The CA former First Division thereafter acted on the Petition for
Mandamus and Prohibition, granting the same. Then the CA Fifteenth Division
promulgated a Decision and acted on the respondents’ ordinary appeal from the RTC
Branch 43 denying the same.
ISSUE
Did the CA Fifteenth Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 97317 err in denying the appeal
pursuant to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court?
HELD
No, the Court ruled in the negative. According to the Court, an action for revival
of judgment is an action with the exclusive purpose of enforcing a judgment which could
134
no longer be enforced by a motion. The action is best explained in Rule 39, Section 6 of
the Rules of Court:
6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory

judgment or executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry.
After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced
by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action
before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
Both the Rules of Court and the Civil Code provisions relating to an action for
revival of judgment are clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the
prevailing party has two remedies:
(1) [To have the judgment] executed as a matter of right by mere motion
within five years from the date of entry of judgment; or
(2) If the prevailing party fails to have the judgment enforced by motion after
the lapse of five years, to have the judgment enforced as a right of action
by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within 10 years from the
time the judgment became final.
The revival action is a new action altogether; it is different and distinct from the
original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. It is a new and independent action,
wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon
which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. The Court agrees with the CA in
citing Saligumba v. Palanog, especially when it ruled that revival of judgment is premised
on the assumption that the decision to be revived, either by motion or by independent
action, is already final and executory.
In this case, the RTC Branch 42 Decision dated May 17, 1999 became final and
executory when no further legal action was undertaken by petitioners concerning the RTC
Branch 42 Decision. Thus, on January 6, 2000 or less than a year after the RTC Branch 42
Decision became final, respondents filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution.
The Motion was granted on February 14, 2000. However, seven years later, the RTC Branch
42 Decision had not yet been executed. Thus, on May 9, 2006, the respondents filed a
Complaint for Revival of Judgment in accordance with the above legal provisions. On the
premise that the RTC Branch 42 Decision was already final and executory, respondents
filed a revival suit as a procedural means of securing the execution of the RTC Branch 42
Decision which had become dormant after the passage of several years. The revival suit
filed by respondents did not intend to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the case
or the propriety or correctness of the first judgment.
Therefore, the Supreme Court denied the petition.
135
LINDEN SUITES, INC. V. MERIDIEN FAR EAST PROPERTIES
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 211969 | October 4, 2021
EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECT OF JUDGEMENT
DOCTRINE
Section 5 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court provides that every court has the
inherent power to "amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice." The court, in carrying out its jurisdiction, can thus issue
"auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect" and to adopt
any suitable process or mode of proceeding "which appears conformable to the spirit of
the said law or rules.
FACTS
The Linden Suites, Inc.(Linden Suites) filed a complaint for damages against
respondent Meridien Far East Properties, Inc.(MFEPI) before the RTC of Pasig City, wherein
Linden Suites averred that while doing excavation works for the construction of their
building, it discovered that the concrete retaining wall of the adjacent building owned by
MFEPI, had encroached on its property line. Linden Suites demanded payment of the cost
for the removal but MFEPI refused, which led to the filing of the complaint.
The RTC, in its Decision dated November 18, 2005, held MFEPI liable for the cost of
the demolition. The CA affirmed with modification the RTC's Decision. MFEPI's subsequent
motion for reconsideration was denied by this Court, thus, an Entry of Judgment was
subsequently issued on January 23, 2009. Considering that the RTC Decision had already
attained finality, Linden Suites filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution before
the RTC, which it granted in its Order dated August 6, 2009. However, the writ was
unserved as per Sheriff's Return dated June 18, 2010.
On November 8, 2010, Linden Suites filed an Urgent Motion to Examine Judgment

Obligor before RTC of Pasig City, the same trial court which rendered the final judgment.
It prayed that MFEPI's officers be directed to appear before the court for an examination
of the income and properties owned by MFEPI for the satisfaction of the RTC Decision, and
also sought the grant by the trial court of other reliefs as are just and equitable. MFEPI,
on the other hand, argued for the dismissal of the motion alleging that the persons sought
to be examined are not the judgment obligors in the RTC Decision.
In its Order dated February 18, 2011, the RTC denied Linden Suites’ motion and
held that to call upon the officers to ascertain the properties and income of MFEPI for
purposes of satisfying the execution of the final judgment would be violative of the
doctrine of separate juridical entity. Hence, Linden Suites filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the CA, which was dismissed and held that under Section 36, Rule 39 of the Rules
136
of Court, a judgment obligor cannot be compelled to appear before a court or
commissioner outside the province or city in which he or she resides or is found.
Since MFEPI's principal business address is in Makati City, it is clearly not within the
trial court's territorial jurisdiction and hence, the RTC of Pasig City cannot compel its
officers to appear before the said trial court for an examination or before an appointed
commissioner. Linden Suites’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA, hence this
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE
May the RTC Pasig, as the court that rendered judgment on Linden Suite’s
complaint, examine MFEPI’s officers?
HELD
Yes. RTC Pasig, as the court that rendered judgment on Linden Suite’s complaint,
may examine MFEPI’s officers.
It is settled that the court which rendered the judgment has supervisory control
over the execution of its judgment. It does not, however, give the court the power to
alter or amend a final and executory decision in the absence of the recognized
exceptions, namely: (a) if there is a need to correct clerical errors which cause no
prejudice to any party, (b) void judgments, and (c) if circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable.
Nonetheless, Section 5 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court provides that every court
has the inherent power to "amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
the said law or rules. The court may stay or suspend the execution of its judgment if
warranted by the higher interest of justice. It has the authority to cause a modification of
the decision when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it.
In the case at bench, the writ of execution was returned unserved, as shown in the
Sheriff's Return dated June 18, 2010. It was therefore imperative for the judgment court
to issue an order for examination of MFEPI after the writ of execution was returned
unsatisfied. Such order would have ensured the satisfaction of its judgment, all the more
so if it has already attained finality. In other words, the RTC, pursuant to its residual
authority, should have issued auxiliary writs and employed processes and other means
necessary to execute its final judgment. Moreover, the RTC disregarded the general
prayer for "other reliefs just and equitable" by the petitioner in its motion. The general
prayer appearing on the motion enables the court to award reliefs supported by the same
or other pleadings, by the facts admitted at the trial, and by the evidence adduced by the
parties, even if these reliefs are not specifically prayed for in the same.
137
The trial court should have proceeded to conduct a permissible examination of
MFEPI, through its officers, so as to disclose the properties which can be subjected to
execution. The trial court, in denying Linden Suites’ motion, exclusively confined itself
with the one and only limitation stated in the provision, thereby ultimately defeating the
purpose of the rule, i.e., to ascertain the properties or earnings of a judgment obligor
that are to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment. Worse, the RTC's denial to
examine MFEPI curtailed the execution of its very own final judgment, MFEPI's liability
against Linden Suites having been already duly recognized by this Court. Had the trial
court allowed the examination of MFEPI through other permissible means, its judgment,
which had attained finality in 2009, would have long been executed.
In sum, the Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in finding that the
RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner's motion to examine
respondent's officers.
138
HEIRS OF CASIÑO, SR. V. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, MALAYBALAY
BRANCH, BUKIDNON
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. NOS. 204052-53 | MARCH 11, 2020
RES JUDICATA ; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
DOCTRINE
Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by
former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.The second concept which is
conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former
suit and was judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and
persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future
action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the
judgment remains unreversed by proper authority.
Execution Pending Appeal (Rule 39)

Section 2(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that "Discretionary execution
may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing." The
Court restates the rule that the trial court's discretion in allowing execution pending
appeal must be strictly construed. Its grant must be firmly grounded on the existence of
"good reasons," which consist of compelling circumstances that justify immediate
execution.
FACTS
Spouses Baldomero and Leonarda Casiño (Spouses Casiño) obtained a loan from
herein respondent, Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) secured by a real estate
mortgage over three parcels of land situated within the municipalities of Valencia and
Lantapan, Bukidnon, respectively. After Spouses Casiño failed to settle their loan
obligation, DBP caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on March 24, 1977,
and won the bid in the auction sale. Spouses Casiño failed to redeem the properties
within the prescribed redemption period, hence, the title of the subject properties were
consolidated under DBP's name.
Baldomero filed a complaint against DBP for annulment of real estate mortgage
and foreclosure proceedings, quieting of title, redemption, and damages before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC Br. 8) Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon [Civil Case No. 1465].
After due proceedings, the RTC Br. 8 dismissed the complaint and the decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Baldomero elevated the case to the Supreme Court
(SC) but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 10 July 1996 and became final and
executory.
139
Meanwhile, Baldomero executed a document denominated as Kasabotan dated 25
April 1994, where he relinquished it to his son, Aurio T. Casiño (Aurio), all his rights over
the three properties. On the other hand, on January 13, 1997, DBP sold the Kibulay
property (one of the three properties) in favor of Green River Gold, Inc. (Green River).
Subsequently, DBP and Green River filed before the RTC Br. 8 an ex-parte petition
for issuance of a writ of possession over the Kibulay property. Aurio filed with the RTC Br.
8 an affidavit of third-party claim, alleging that he is the owner and possessor of the
Kibulay property.
The next day, Aurio filed the instant complaint for quieting of title with the RTC
Branch 10 in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon (RTC Br. 10), claiming that he is the true, lawful,
and absolute owner of a certain property situated in Bukidnon. DBP filed an answer
arguing that Aurio's complaint is already barred by res judicata as the former already has
ownership over the subject property through an extrajudicial foreclosure sale held as
valid by RTC Br. 8 and affirmed by the CA and SC.
The RTC Br. 10 rendered a judgment in favor of Aurio, which declared that the
subject property being claimed by Aurio is different from that being claimed by DBP and
Green River; and that the Decision in Civil Case No. 1465 is not binding on Aurio or his
heirs because they were not parties to the said case.
DBP and Green River separately filed their motions for reconsideration (MR), while
Aurio, who died pending proceedings and was now represented by his heirs, herein
petitioners, filed a motion for execution of judgment pending appeal. The RTC Br. 10
denied the MR and granted the motion for execution pending appeal.
Aggrieved, DBP and Green River elevated the case to CA, asserting that the RTC Br.
10, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
when it granted Aurio's motion for execution pending appeal.
The CA granted the appeals of respondents, vacated and set aside the Judgment of
RTC Br. 10, and ruled that Aurio's complaint lacks merit and is indeed barred by res
judicata; and that the RTC Br. 10 committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted
Aurio's motion for execution pending appeal. Hence, the petition.
ISSUES
1. Is Aurio's complaint barred by res judicata?
2. Did the RTC Br. 10 commit grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion for
Execution pending appeal in favor of Aurio?
HELD
1. Yes, Aurio's complaint is barred by res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata
actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b)
conclusiveness of judgment.
140
The second concept which is conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or
question which was in issue in a former suit and was judicially passed upon and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned
and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in
the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or
different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. In
order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another
action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical.
If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will
depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment
between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that
same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit.
Here, the validity of the real estate mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure sale
can no longer be attacked in a new complaint for quieting of title, more so because the
Decision in Civil Case No. 1465 has become final and an entry of judgment has already
been entered in our books. Hence, granting the reliefs sought by Aurio and his heirs would
be inconsistent with the ruling in Civil Case No. 1465 and will disturb the final and
executory Decision in the said case. Thus, it is clear that the Decision of RTC Br. 8, which
was affirmed by the CA and this Court, constitutes res judicata to the extent of the
property subject of the writ of possession, which is part and parcel of petitioners' claimed
property.
2. Yes, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion for
Execution pending appeal in favor of Aurio.
execution. The sufficiency of "good reasons" depends upon the circumstances of the case
and the parties thereto.
Here, the RTC Br. 10 granted the motion for execution pending appeal primarily
based on the advanced age of Aurio's spouse, Patricia, who was supposed to be sixty-five
(65) years old at the time. However, such advanced age will not be considered as a good
reason by itself, since it must be supported by special reasons, which were not provided
in this case. Verily, the RTC Br. 10 committed grave abuse of discretion when it allowed
execution pending appeal not based on good reasons.
141
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
CHUA V. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 202004 | November 04, 2020
DOCTRINE
A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon the order of
the court where an action is pending. Through the writ, the property or properties of the
defendant may be levied upon and held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the
satisfaction of whatever judgment might be secured by the attaching creditor against the
defendant. The provisional remedy of attachment is available in order that the defendant
may not dispose of the property attached, and thus prevent the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be secured by the plaintiff from the former.
To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in

contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The
fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason
which induced the other party into giving consent which he[/she] would not have
otherwise given. To constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court, fraud should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A
debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it the debtor has a
preconceived plan or intention not to pay.
FACTS
On several occasions, Interbrand Logistics & Distribution, Inc., (Interbrand)
represented by its duly authorized officer, Almer L. Caras (Caras), applied with China
Bank for the issuance of Domestic Letters of Credit (L/C) for the purchase of goods from
Nestle Philippines. Due to advances made by China Bank, the parties jointly executed two
Surety Agreements whereby in the first Agreement, Interbrand and its officers, Chua,
Carlos Francisco Mijares (Mijares), and Caras served as sureties; When the obligation
became due, Interbrand failed to pay China Bank despite repeated demands. China Bank
likewise demanded payment from the sureties, including Chua, but the latter failed and
refused to pay.
China Bank filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with Application for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Attachment. The trial court granted the preliminary
injunction. In response, Chua et. at. filed a motion to lift the preliminary attachment on
the ground that they are not the debtors. Chua specifically argue that he is neither the
142
owner, director, or stockholder of Interbrand. The court ordered the lifting of the
Preliminary Attachment. In response, Chinabank filed for a motion for reconsideration on
the ground that Chua was one of the directors of Interbrand who approved the authority
of its President, San Luis, and CFO-Director Caras to obtain loans from and sign trust
receipt and loan documents with China Bank. Trial Court denied the motion for
reconsideration.
On appeal, the CA reinstated the preliminary injunction on the ground that Chua
voluntarily signed the Surety Agreement and his liability therein is not limited during his
incumbency as an officer and stockholder of Interbrand. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE
Did the CA err in granting the writ of attachment.
HELD
No, A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon the order
of the court where an action is pending. Through the writ, the property or properties of
the defendant may be levied upon and held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the
satisfaction of whatever judgment might be secured by the attaching creditor against the
defendant. The provisional remedy of attachment is available in order that the defendant
may not dispose of the property attached, and thus prevent the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be secured by the plaintiff from the former.
Under Sections 12 and 13, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, there are two ways to
secure the discharge of an attachment, as mentioned by the CA. First, the party whose
property has been attached or a person appearing on his/her behalf may post a security.
Second, said party may show that the order of attachment was improperly or irregularly
issued. In this case, Chua successfully had the attachment against him initially discharged
on the second ground.

However, instead of remitting the sales proceeds to China Bank, Interbrand

misappropriated the same by deliberately diverting the delivery of the goods covered by
the L/Cs to a location different from that indicated in the sales invoice. This act of
misappropriation demonstrates a clear intent of fraud. Chua, having signed the surety
agreement, bound himself to jointly and solidarily fulfill the obligation of Interbrand to
China Bank.
143
DUMARAN V. LLAMEDO
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 201380 | August 4, 2021
DOCTRINE
Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides the grounds upon which an
attachment may issue. These are:
In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other

than moral and exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract,
delict or quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with
intent to defraud his creditors;
In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or
converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney,
factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other
person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
In an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken,
detained or converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been concealed,
removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an
authorized person;
In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt
or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance
thereof;
In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his property, or is
about to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors; or
In an action against a party who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines,
or on whom summons may be served by publication.
FACTS
Dumaran is an authorized dealer of Pilipinas Shell Philippines operating two
gasoline stations within General Santos City, namely Linmax Shell Station and Lagao
Traveller Shell Station. (Magallanes), a former employee of Linmax Shell Station,
introduced Teresa Llamedo (Llamedo) and Ginalyn Cubeta (Cubeta) to Dumaran. They
proposed for Dumaran to supply them diesel and gasoline fuel. They all agreed that
Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta will pay in cash. Although they initially paid in cash,
they subsequently paid for the purchase of the fuel using Llamedo's personal checks.
November 2009, Dumaran filed a Complaint for Sum of Money, Damages and Attorney's
Fees with a Prayer for the Ex-Parte Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against
Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta alleging, among others: that Llamedo, Magallanes and
Cubeta opened a joint account in Peninsula Rural Bank and with post-dated checks from
that account, purchased on credit diesel and gasoline fuel from him; that they incurred an
outstanding obligation of P7,416,918.55 in October and November 2009 alone; that the
144
post-dated checks Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta issued to pay the obligation were
dishonored for insufficient funds/account closed; and despite demands, they failed to pay
the total outstanding obligation. Subsequently, Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta filed
their Very Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Attachment and Notice of Levy on Attachment,
alleging that the said Writ of Attachment and Notice of Levy on Attachment is illegal,
improper and unjustly issued in violation of their right to due process; has no basis in fact
and in law, therefore, null and void; and violates Rule 39, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
RTC denied Llamedo’s motion to quash and subsequent motion for reconsideration. CA
granted the MR and set aside the writ of preliminary attachment ordered by the RTC.
Dumarans MR was denied.
ISSUE
Did CA erred when it held that allegations of fraud do not meet the requirements
of law to sustain the issuance of a writ of attachment?
HELD
No. Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides the grounds upon which
an attachment may issue. These are: (a) In an action for the recovery of a specified
amount of money or damages, other than moral and exemplary, on a cause of action
arising from law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict against a party who is
about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors; m(b) In an
action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his
own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker,
agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a
fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty; (c) In an action to recover the
possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken, detained or converted, when the
property, or any part thereof, has been concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its
being found or taken by the applicant or an authorized person; (d) In an action against a
party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation
upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof; (e) In an action against a
party who has removed or disposed of his property, or is about to do so, with intent to
defraud his creditors; or (f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, or on whom summons may be served by publication.
In this case, allegations in both his Complaint and Affidavit failed to show that
Dumaran was defrauded into accepting the offer of Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta.
Non-payment of a debt does not automatically equate to a fraudulent act. The fraud
alleged must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason
which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise
given. Hence, the CA was correct.
145
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
METROPLEX BERTHAD V. SINOPHIL CORP.
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 208281 | June 28, 2021
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
DOCTRINE
Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a TRO may be granted only
when:
(a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained
of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts

complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) The party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to

do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the
rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual.
FACTS
In August 1998, Sinophil entered into a Share Swap Agreement (Swap Agreement)
with Metroplex and Paxell. Under the Swap Agreement, Metroplex and Paxell would
transfer 40% of their shareholdings in Legend International Resorts Limited (Legend) for a
combined 35.5% stake in Sinophil.
On February 18, 2002 and June 3, 2005, the shareholders of Sinophil voted for the
reduction of Sinophil's authorized capital stock.
On March 28, 2006, the CRMD and the CFD approved the first amendment of the
Articles of Incorporation of Sinophil, reducing its authorized capital stock by 1.87 billion
shares. The following day, or on March 29, 2006, the approval of the reduction of
Sinophil's authorized capital stock was disclosed to the Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc.
(PSE).
On June 21, 2007, the shareholders of Sinophil again approved the proposal of the
Board of Directors to reduce its authorized capital stock by another one billion shares.
146
On June 24, 2008, the CRMD and the CFD approved the second amendment of the
Articles of Incorporation of Sinophil which further reduced its authorized capital stock by
one billion shares. On June 30, 2008, the approval of the reduction of Sinophil's
authorized capital stock was likewise disclosed to the PSE.
On July 21, 2008, petitioners Yaw Chee Cheow (Yaw), Metroplex and Paxell filed a
Petition for Review Ad Cautelam Ex Abundanti before the SEC assailing the approval by
the CRMD and the CFD of the amendments by Sinophil of its Articles of Incorporation.
On February 26, 2009, the SEC issued its assailed Order denying petitioners'
Petition for Review Ad Cautelam Ex Abundanti and essentially affirming the acts of the
CRMD and CFD regarding the decrease in the capital stock of Sinophil.
On July 17, 2013, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit as all the issues raised were a mere rehash of the
arguments already passed upon.
ISSUE
Is Metroplex Berhad entitled to the application for injunctive relief against the
respondents as prayed under the instant petition.
HELD
No. a Temporary Restraining Order may not be granted. According to Section 4,
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a TRO may be granted only when:
perpetually;


In this case, Metroplex argue that unless the questioned act of Sinophil of
irregularly or illegally reducing Sinophil's issued capital stock is restrained permanently,
"the same will operate as a fraud on investors such as the Petitioners and will also likely
cause grave or irreparable injury or prejudice to the investing public."
However, the court finds that the alleged fraud as well as the grave or irreparable
injury or prejudice to the investing public are not present in the case. Firstly, there is no
fraudulent act committed by respondents as has been held by both the CA and this Court,
147
as discussed above. Secondly, petitioners failed to show how the investing public would be
prejudiced by the decrease and delisting in view of its disclosure to the PSE.
Disclosure of corporate actions to the stock exchange is intended to apprise the

investing public of the condition and planned corporate actions of the listed corporation,
thereby providing investors with sufficient, relevant and material information as to the
nature of the investment vehicle and the relationship of the risks and returns associated
with it.38 The corporation's simple act of disclosing the decrease and delisting to the PSE
was more than enough notice to the investing public. Therefore, there was nothing in the
corporation's act that resulted in grave or irreparable injury or prejudice to the investing
public.
148
LAND BANK PHILIPPINES V. SPOUSES DE JESUS
OF THE
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 221133 | June 28, 2021
REDEMPTION; NATURE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
DOCTRINE
If the redemption period expires without the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest
redeeming the foreclosed property within one year from the registration of the sale with
the Register of Deeds, the title over the property consolidates in the purchaser. The
consolidation confirms the purchaser as the owner entitled to the possession of the
property without any need for him to file the bond. The issuance of a writ of possession to
the purchaser becomes a matter of right upon the consolidation of title in his name, while
the mortgagor, by failing to redeem, loses all interest in the property.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or

proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or
a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. Its essential role is preservative of the
rights of the parties in order to protect the ability of the court to render a meaningful
decision, or in order to guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper or
prevent the granting of the proper relief after the trial on the merits.
Another essential role is preventive of the threats to cause irreparable harm or

injury to a party before the litigation could be resolved. It is resorted to only when there
is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences that cannot be redressed under any
standard of compensation. The application for the writ rests upon an alleged existence of
an emergency or of a special reason for such an order to issue before the case can be
regularly heard, and the essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief
are that the complaint alleges facts that appear to be sufficient to constitute a cause of
action for injunction and that on the entire showing from both sides, it appears, in view
of all the circumstances, that the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal
rights of plaintiff pending the litigation.
An application for preliminary injunction may be denied even without the conduct
of a hearing separate from that of the summary hearing of an application for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order.
FACTS
Respondents Spouses Milu and Rosalina De Jesus (spouses De Jesus) filed a
Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage, Promissory Note and Foreclosure Sale
and Damages with an Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of against petitioner Land
Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank). According to them, consolidation was impending
since a Certificate of Sale was already issued in Land Bank's favor and the same was
149
already registered with the Registry of Deeds. They later withdrew their motion for TRO
in view of the commitment by Land Bank's counsel, Atty. Latosa, that the bank will not
consolidate for the duration of the hearing on the preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the
RTC ordered the continuation of the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction,
as well as the main case. Days before the scheduled hearing on the spouses De Jesus'
application for preliminary injunction, they moved to set the main case for pre-trial.
Thus, the RTC ordered the setting of the pre trial conference to be held on December 9,
2009, in lieu of the originally scheduled hearing for the preliminary injunction.
The bank later stated that it will proceed to consolidate its ownership considering
that the one-year redemption period already lapsed without the spouses redeeming the
properties, and because the period for issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, which
was the duration of Atty. Latosa's commitment not to consolidate, lapsed without the RTC
issuing the same. Spouses De Jesus argued that Land Bank may not consolidate its
ownership in view of Atty. Latosa's commitment not to consolidate for the duration of the
main case. Since Land Bank was supposedly threatening to violate such commitment,
Spouses De Jesus prayed for an order setting the case for hearing on the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and requiring Land Bank to maintain status quo by not
proceeding with consolidation.
RTC denied the spouses De Jesus' motion for a status quo order after finding that
consolidation became a matter of right on the part of the bank when the one-year
redemption period lapsed without them redeeming the properties. CA held that the RTC
committed a grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion for the issuance of a
statu quo order.
ISSUE
Did the RTC commit any grave abuse of discretion when it denied the spouses De
Jesus' motion for issuance of a status quo order and when it no longer conducted the
hearing on their application for preliminary injunction?
HELD
The RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
exists when "an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or
(2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal
bias." Here, the RTC did not act with such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
when it issued its Order denying the spouses De Jesus' motion for a status quo order. On
the contrary, it acted within its jurisdiction and in accordance with the law.
On the propriety of a status quo order: Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
that "[n]o preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the
party or person sought to be enjoined." Clearly, the RTC may not grant the spouses De
Jesus' motion for status quo order without running afoul of such express prescription.
On the propriety of injunctive relief: the court find no legal impediment to
prevent Land Bank from consolidating ownership. The RTC is correct that upon the
expiration of the period for redemption, without the mortgagor or his or her successor-in
150
interest redeeming the property, consolidation becomes a matter of right: If the
redemption period expires without the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest redeeming
the foreclosed property within one year from the registration of the sale with the Register
of Deeds, the title over the property consolidates in the purchaser. The consolidation
confirms the purchaser as the owner entitled to the possession of the property without
any need for him to file the bond.
The only possible hindrance to consolidation in this case is Land Bank's

commitment not to consolidate during the hearing on the spouses De Jesus' application for
preliminary injunction. However, the court convinced that the De Jesus couple already
abandoned their application when they moved for the conduct of the pre-trial of the main
case, instead of proceeding with the originally scheduled hearing on their application for
preliminary injunction, and when it took them two years to finally move for the conduct
of such hearing.
Generally, injunction, being a preservative remedy for the protection of

substantive rights or interests, is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional
remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity
to avoid injurious consequences that cannot be redressed under any standard of
compensation. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the
writ of injunction is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
investigated and advisedly adjudicated. The application for the writ rests upon an alleged
existence of an emergency or of a special reason for such an order to issue before the
case can be regularly heard, and the essential conditions for granting such temporary
injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts that appear to be sufficient to
constitute a cause of action for injunction and that on the entire showing from both sides,
it appears, in view of all the circumstances, that the injunction is reasonably necessary to
protect the legal rights of plaintiff pending the litigation.
By moving for the pre-trial of the main case, instead of proceeding with the
hearing on preliminary injunction as originally scheduled, the spouses De Jesus revealed
the lack of urgency in obtaining injunctive relief, which is precisely the basis of their
prayer therefor. Without any pressing necessity or emergency, the trial court is
duty-bound to proceed with trial on the merits, consistent with the policy of courts to
"avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main
case without trial"
151
BUREAUCUSTOMS V. COURT OF APPEALS-CAGAYAN DE ORO
OF
HERNANDO, J.
GR Nos. 192809,193588,193590-91 & 201650 | April 26, 2021
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
DOCTRINE
The requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are as follows:
(a) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right
in esse; (b) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (c) there is an urgent
need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and, (d) no other
ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable
injury.
A writ of preliminary injunction, being an extraordinary event, one deemed as a

strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy, must be granted only in the face of injury
to actual and existing substantial rights. A right to be protected by injunction means a
right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. An
injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it
will not issue to protect a right not in esse, and which may never arise, or to restrain an
act which does not give rise to a cause of action. When the complainant's right is doubtful
or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, injunction is not proper.
While it is not required that the right claimed by the applicant, as basis for seeking
injunctive relief, be conclusively established, it is still necessary to show, at least
tentatively, that the right exists and is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or
contradiction.
FACTS
Reta is the owner and operator of Acquarius Container Yard (ACY) which the
operation as a container yard outside the customs territory has been approved by the
BOC. On Jan. 9, 2009, Reta entered into a MOA with the BOC for the free use of his
container yard as the designated examination area for the container vans in the Port of
Davao for a period of 25 years. The agreement also provided that the parties may revoke
it for cause at any time. BOC claimed that on Feb. 26, 2010, Reta closed the container
yard and barred customs examiners from entering the premises. On the same date, Atty.
Castigador informed Reta, through a letter, of his intention to conduct the examination of
the container vans and to reexamine the MOA as its purpose no longer exists. This
prompted Reta to file a Complaint with Application for Preliminary injunction and Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against petitioners. Reta claimed that after the
BOC agreed to use ACY, he invested in various machineries and equipment for the
examination and inspection of container vans. He denied closing the container yard; he
alleged that it was Atty. Castigador who directed the stoppage of the hauling and scanning
of the container vans in ACY. The Executive Judge of the RTC issued a TRO prohibiting the
BOC from removing the container vans in ACY and directing the BOC to resume its
152
operations inside ACY. After raffle of the case, Presiding Judge Carpio of RTC Branch 14
extended the TRO for another 17 days. BOC, through a letter dated March 5, 2010,
revoked the MOA citing strained relations between the parties arising from Reta’s closure
of the container yard and the filing of baseless suits against BOC. Consequently, Judge
Carpio denied Reta’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The
case was re-raffled to Judge Omelio and now under a different judge, Reta moved for
reconsideration. Petitioners filed their Answer to the Complaint. Days after, Judge Omelio
granted the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, prohibited
them from closing the designated examination are in ACY and from revoking the MOA with
Reta. It also directed the BOC to resume operations inside the subject container yard.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petitioner for Certiorari with the CA, supplemented by a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the RTC from
enforcing the assailed order. The CA decided on the main case dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari for lack of merit and further ruled that the trial court was justified in issuing
the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Reta.
ISSUE
Did the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Reta.
HELD
Yes. A writ of preliminary injunction, governed by Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, is
a preservative remedy for the protection of substantial rights and interests. It is not a
cause of action itself, but a mere provisional remedy adjunct to a main suit. It is granted
at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a
party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts; it may also
require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a
preliminary mandatory injunction. It may be granted by the court where the action or
proceeding is pending. The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied, and its
sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are fully heard. The
requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are as follows: (a) the
applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in
esse; (b) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (c) there is an urgent
need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and, (d) no other
ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable
injury.

or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, an injunction is not
153
proper. While it is not required that the right claimed by the applicant, as basis for
seeking injunctive relief, be conclusively established, it is still necessary to show, at least
contradiction.
In the case at bar, the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction were not met. First, Reta has no clear and unmistakable right on the conduct
of examination in ACY. The conduct of examination is governed by the MOA between Reta
and the BOC. The parties consented to the agreement in which it is stipulated that any of
the parties may revoke it for cause at any time before the end of its term. Consequently,
BOC has already revoked the MOA on the ground of strained relations and such revocation
was made before the issuance of the assailed RTC order. Such revocation is clearly within
the BOC’s right as provided in the MOA. Second, there is no substantial or material
invasion of Reta’s right. As such a right does not exist, there can be no substantial or
material invasion thereof. Lastly, the damage or injury allegedly sustained by Reta is not
irreparable. The damages or injury suffered by the party applying for injunction must be
unquantifiable. It was mentioned that Reta was able to state in his Complaint an amount
pertaining to the loss of earnings he suffers for each day the BOC is not conducting
examination in ACY. Therefore, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of
Reta is not proper and it follows that RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ
because Reta is not entitled thereto.
154
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, AND MANDAMUS

PEOPLE V. SERGIO
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 240053 | October 9, 2019
WRIT OF CERTIORARI, GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
DOCTRINE
A writ of certiorari — being a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character,
whose purpose is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction, or to
prevent an inferior court from committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts (i.e., acts that
courts have no power or authority in law to perform) — is not a general utility tool in the
legal workshop, and cannot be issued to correct every error committed by a lower court.
The power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances
or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of
certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Under Section 1, Rule 65, the petitioner must
show that, (1) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, (2) there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or
nullifying the proceeding.
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "capricious or whimsical exercise of

judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." It arises when a lower court or tribunal
violates and contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
FACTS
Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius L. Lacanilao (Julius) were friends and
neighbors in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire situation and
susceptibility, Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in
Malaysia.Mary Jane, together with Cristina, eventually left the Philippines for Malaysia.
However, to Mary Jane's dismay, she was informed by Cristina upon their arrival in
Malaysia that the job intended for her was no longer available. After spending a few days
in Malaysia, Cristina sent Mary Jane to Indonesia for a seven-day holiday with a promise
that she will have a job upon her return in Malaysia. Upon Mary Jane's arrival in
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, she was apprehended by the police officers for allegedly carrying
2.6 kilograms of heroin inside her luggage and was charged with drug trafficking.
155
The District Court of Sleman Indonesia, convicted Mary Jane of drug trafficking and
sentenced her to death by firing squad. Meanwhile, Cristina and Julius were arrested by
the operatives of the Anti-Human Trafficking Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation. Thereafter, they were charged with qualified trafficking in person in
violation of Section 4 (a) in relation to Sections 3 (a) and 6 of the "Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2003" and two separate counts of illegal recruitment.
Due to President’s Widodo’s clemency, Mary Jane’s execution was indefinitely

postponed pursuant to the ongoing investigation on the illegal recruiters in the Philippines
who are now in police custody. This is to afford Mary Jane an opportunity to present her
case against Cristina, Julius, and "Ike" who were allegedly responsible for recruiting and
exploiting her to engage in drug trafficking.Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave
of Court to Take the Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon
Written Interrogatories.
Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition should be
made before and not during the trial. The depositions under Rules 23 and 25 of the Rules
of Court are not designed to replace the actual testimony of the witness in open court and
the use thereof is confined only in civil cases. Also, they argued that such method of
taking testimony will violate their right to confront the witness, Mary Jane, or to meet
her face to face as provided under Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution.
The RTC granted the prosecution’s motion provided the trial judge will preside the
deposition of Mary Jane in Indonesia and the answers of Mary Jane taken verbatim by
competent staff in the Office of the Philippine Consulate in Indonesia and the Court shall
schedule the conduct of the cross interrogatory questions for the deposition of Mary Jane
Veloso in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, which shall be presided by the undersigned trial judge.
The Omnibus motion for reconsideration by Cristina and Julius was denied. Finding grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the CA reversed the decision of the Trial
Court. It held that, contrary to the RTC's findings, the conditional examination of
witnesses in criminal proceedings are primarily governed by Rule 119 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. According to the appellate court, the State failed to establish
compelling reason to depart from such rule and to apply instead Rule 23 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure which only applies in civil cases and reasoned that to allow the
prosecution to take the deposition of Mary Jane through written interrogatories will
violate the right of Cristina and Julius as the accused to confront a witness or to meet the
witness face to face.
ISSUES
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in granting the writ of certiorari to Cristina and
Julius?
2. Was there a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial Court?
HELD
1. YES. A writ of certiorari is limited in scope and narrow in character. It is
available only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or
156
with grave abuse of discretion. In other words, certiorari is proper to correct errors of
jurisdiction, and not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the
lower court. Thus, any alleged errors committed by the trial court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction and in the exercise of its discretion are mere errors of judgment, correctible
by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and not by a
petition for certiorari.
In Cruz v. People , citing Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, the
court elucidated that a writ of certiorari — being a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible
in character, whose purpose is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction, or to prevent an inferior court from committing such grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of
courts (i.e., acts that courts have no power or authority in law to perform) — is not a
general utility tool in the legal workshop, and cannot be issued to correct every error
committed by a lower court. The power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated
by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court
may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Under Section 1, Rule 65,
the petitioner must show that, (1) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, (2) there is neither an appeal
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose
of amending or nullifying the proceeding.
Here, it must be emphasized that the errors imputed against the trial court by
Cristina and Julius in their Petition for Certiorari pertained only to its appreciation of the
factual milieu, and the application of pertinent law and rules. Plainly, their Petition for
Certiorari did not contain factual allegations that can support a finding of grave abuse of
discretion. These alleged errors, if at all, amounted only to erroneous exercise of the
lower court's judgment, an error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction, which does not
justify Cristina and Julius's resort to a certiorari proceeding.
2. NO. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "capricious or whimsical exercise of

In the case at bench, respondents did not even attempt to show that the trial
court abused its discretion, much less that the exercise thereof was so patent and gross
and to amount to lack of jurisdiction; in fact, even the appellate court simply stated in its
assailed Decision that the trial court merely erred, and not abuse its discretion, much
more grave, in applying Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure instead of Rule 119 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which particularly deals with the conditional examination of
a prosecution witness, like Mary Jane in this case, in criminal cases. There was absence of
any proof that the grant of the taking of deposition through written interrogatories by the
trial court was made in an arbitrary, whimsical, and capricious manner.
157
There was no patent abuse of discretion which was so gross in nature thereby
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. What was only apparent in the
instant case was that the trial court properly considered the extraordinary circumstances
surrounding the plight of Mary Jane, in relation to applicable rules and jurisprudence.
Suffice it to state that the Decision of the trial court was not without rhyme or reason.
Clearly, there was an honest effort on the part of the trial court to support its
ratiocination and conclusion based on facts and law.
Accordingly, the decision of the CA should be reversed and the decision of the RTC
be reinstated for the deposition to take place in the Consular Office in Indonesia pursuant
to the Rules of Court and Principles of Jurisdiction.
158
INTER-ISLAND INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC. V. CA
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 187323| June 23, 2021
DISTINCTION OF RULE 45 AND RULE 65 CERTIORARI
DOCTRINE
Section 1 of Rule 45 provides that when a party desires to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment, final order or resolution of the CA, he or she may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari which shall raise only questions of law.
FACTS
Inter-Island Information Systems, Inc. (Inter-Island), petitioner, is an internet
service provider which hired Cham Q. Ibay (Ibay), respondent, as a technical support in its
Network Operations Center (NOC). Into seven (7) months of his employment, Ibay
received a memorandum issued by Scott Lam (Lam) informing him of his inclusion in the Q
Linux Schedule of Training. However, in a revised memorandum, Ibay was delisted due to
the expiration of his contract. Two (2) days later, Lam urged Ibay to submit his resignation
letter so that HR Manager, Jesse Tan Ting (Ting) would not get angry at him, in exchange
for the issuance of a Certificate of Employment which Ibay could use as reference for his
job applications. Lam also threatened to block his applications with other companies
should he refuse to resign.
Ibay filed a complaint for Illegal dismissal after he was prevented from entering
Inter-Island’s premises. Later on, he tendered his resignation which was not accepted by
the company. The latter alleged that Ibay incurred several infractions during his tenure in
the company.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of Ibay and ordered his reinstatement. The
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissed the company’s appeal for lack of
merit, and affirmed the LA’s decision.
Inter-Island filed a petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals (CA) issued a
resolution directing Ibay to file a comment within ten (10) days from receipt. However,
the Resolution sent to Ibay’s counsel was returned unserved. The CA issued a resolution
directing Inter-Island to furnish the court within ten (10) days from notice the present and
complete address of both Ibay and his counsel. However, Inter-Island failed to comply.
Thus, CA dismissed the petition for failure of Inter-Island to comply with its resolution.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE
Did Inter-Island resort to a wrong mode of appeal?
159
HELD
Yes, Inter-Island resorted to a wrong mode of appeal by filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Section 1 of Rule 45 provides that when a party desires to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment, final order or resolution of the CA, he or she may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari which shall raise only questions of law. Clearly,
the assailed September 12, 2008 and February 6, 2009 Resolutions of the appellate court
may be elevated to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 on pure
questions of law. However, as can be gleaned from the records, the petitioner availed of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead. It is settled that an extraordinary remedy of
certiorari will not lie if there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, as in this case. Petitioner should have availed of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as its petition was
dismissed by the appellate court based on Section 3 of Rule 117 which is an adjudication
on the merits and not merely an interlocutory order.
160
DORMIDO V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 198241 | February 24, 2020
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS
DOCTRINE
Higher tribunals may disturb the findings of a fact-finding body and its ensuing
conclusions upon a determination of grave abuse of discretion through the writ of
certiorari. For certiorari to issue against the public officer, court, or tribunal complained
of, the standard is: Grave abuse of discretion is such “capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or an exercise of power in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law. The
very basic prerequisite of a petition for certiorari is to allege the acts constituting grave
abuse purportedly committed by the public officer, tribunal, or court.
FACTS
Milagros Manotok Dormido (Dormido) and the Spouses Felicitas Manahan and
Rosendo Manahan (Spouses Manahan) ahd brought their respective disputing claims over
Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, a parcel of land located in Quezon City (Lot 823) before the
Land Management Bureau (LMB). At that time, Ernesto Adobo, Jr. (Adobo) was the LMB’s
OIC Director of Lands.
Adobo sought the opinion of Roseller De la Peña (De la Peña), then Undersecretary
for Legal Affairs of the Department of Natural Resources (DENR), on the matter. In
response, De la Peña issued a Memorandum stating that he was not in a position to
question Adobo’s factual conclusions as to the validity of the Spouses Manahan’s claims of
ownership over Lot 823; that the government no longer retains ownership thereof; and
that the title to the said property supposedly by Dormido family, the Manotoks, was void
ab inition. De la Peña also recommended in his Memorandum that it was ministerial upon
the LMB to issue a deed of conveyance in favor of the Spouses Manahan.
Thereafter, Adobo issued Deed of Conveyance No. V-2000222 conveying Lot 823 in
favor of the Spouses Manahan. Aggrieved by this issuance, Dormido filed a complaint
before the Ombudsman charging Adobo and De la Peña with conspiracy and violation of
Section 3(e) in relation to Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 3019. Dormido alleged that Adobo and
De la Peña disregarded the basis of her claims on Lot 823, particularly the existence of
the Manotoks’ titles thereto. She also posited that the validity of a Torrens title may only
be questioned in a direct proceeding before the trial courts.
Dormido’s complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman was dismissed, which
held that while the complaint charged Adobo and De la Peña with violation fo R.A. No.
161
3019, the main issue therein was who between the Manotoks and the Spouses Manahan
hold a valid title over the disputed property. Dormido’s Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied. Hence, this present Petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE
Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in dismissing Dormido’s criminal complaint against Adobo and De la Peña
for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
HELD
NO, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Dormido’s criminal complaint against Adobo and De
la Peña for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Higher tribunals may disturb the findings of a fact-finding body and its ensuing
conclusions upon a determination of grave abuse of discretion through the writ of
certiorari. For certioari to issue against the public officer, court, or tribunal complained
of, the standard is:
Grave abuse of discretion is such “capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment

as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or an exercise of power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law.
The very basic prerequisite of a petition for certiorari is to allege the acts
constituting grave abuse purportedly committed by the public officer, tribunal, or court.
In the case at hand, Dormido aims to overturn the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the Ombudsman and summed up her arguments in her Petition for
Certiorari. However, her arguments did not allege errors of jurisdiction but errors of
judgment. In gist, Dormido complains that Adobo and De la Peña, in the exercise of their
official duties, gave the Spouses Manahan an unwarranted benefit and that despite prima
facie showing violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the Ombudsman dismissed her
complaint. Such accusations against the Ombudsman, without more, cannot be seen as
grave abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of positive duty. At most, these only
express mere disagreement with the Ombudsman’s judgment that do not proceed from
grave abuse of discretion. Plainly, the Petition contained no allegations of the
Ombudsman’s supposed acts of grave abuse of discretion adequate to reverse the latter’s
pronouncements and indict De la Peña, Adobo, and the Spouses Manahan for the charges
of graft and corruption.
Even if so alleged, there is no clear showing of arbitrariness on the part of the

Ombudsman in dismissing Dormido’s complaint. The Ombudsman based its dismissal of
Dormido’s complaint on the fact that she has an adequate remedy in another judicial body
and her complaint pertains to a matter outside of the jurisdiction of the Office of the
162
Ombudsman. Although Dormido charged De la Peña, and Adobo with violation of R.A. No.
3019, as amended for issuing a new deed of conveyance to the Spouses Manahans despite
existence of the Manotok’s titles, the main issue in this case, however, is who between
the Manotoks (including Dormido) and the Spouses Manahan has a valid title on Lot 823.
Evidently, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over such matter or issue.
Under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein. Hence, the dismissal of Dormido’s
complaint.
In dismissing Dormido’s complaint and denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the
Ombdusman relied on the Ombudsman Act of 1989, cited relevant jurisprudence, and
squarely applied the foregoing to the facts at the case at hand. This negates Dormido’s
allegation that grave abuse of discretion might have attended the Ombudsman’s
conclusions.
163
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL BANK V. LAGUNA NAVIGATION, INC.
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 195236 | February 08, 2021
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
DOCTRINE
The general rule is that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to resolve questions
of fact in a petition for review on certiorari, subject to exceptions laid down in case law.
There is a question of fact when the issue at hand invites a review of the evidence
presented. The test, therefore, of whether a question is one of law or of fact is "whether
the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact."
FACTS
On September 8, 1972, PCIB filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money
against the respondents before the then Court of First Instance of Manila. PCIB alleged
that Spouses Lim executed a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land in favor of PCIB to
secure letters of credit. Eventually, PCIB foreclosed the mortgage on failure of the Lims to
satisfy their obligation. A deficit remained after the auction of the mortgaged property.
Laguna Navigation applied with PCIB for the opening of various letters of credit in favor of
Overseas Investors, Inc. The Spouses Lim and Aldanese executed a Contract of Continuing
Guaranty in favor of PCIB, for and in consideration of Laguna Navigation's indebtedness.
The obligations became overdue, but the respondents failed to pay despite PCIB's
repeated demands. Hence, PCIB filed the complaint.
Laguna Navigation claimed that the suit was premature because it has executed a
chattel mortgage over one of its vessels in PCIB's favor as security for its debts and
obligations.
On the other hand, the Spouses Lim and Aldanese insisted that PCIB's causes of
actions have not yet accrued at the time. Their liability under the Contract of Continuing
Guaranty is not solidary with Laguna Navigation. The trial court issued an Order
recognizing the parties' agreement to enter into a partial stipulation of facts to simplify
the issues.
RTC of Manila thus ordered the parties to appear to discuss the proper disposition
of the case. They were able to provide copies of the TSNs for trial dates July 2, 1976 and
March 28, 1979. However, the TSNs for trial dates March 26 & 31, 1976, and February 4,
1980 which pertained to the direct examination of Atty. De Jesus, PCIB's witness, were not
restored. Several postponements and re-settings of the trial followed. On June 2, 1998,
PCIB moved for a re setting as its lone witness had already terminated his relationship
164
with the bank and needed more time to refresh his memory with the facts and
proceedings of the case, which the RTC granted.
Several postponements and re-settings again transpired thereafter. In its October

20, 1998 Order, the RTC dismissed the case for PCIB's utter lack of interest and failure to
prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. PCIB moved for reconsideration which the
trial court granted with a warning that its failure to present its witness in the next
scheduled hearing will result in a dismissal.
The RTC dismissed the case. PCIB moved for reconsideration which the trial court
granted with a warning that its failure to present its witness in the next scheduled hearing
will result in a dismissal. On the scheduled hearing date, PCIB stated that its witness no
longer wished to testify and again asked the RTC for an opportunity to present a different
witness. On appeal, the CA agreed with the RTC that the case cannot be fairly and justly
disposed of without the records being complete and intact, especially since all the parties
were asserting diametrically opposed versions of the facts and PCIB had the burden of
proving its case.
ISSUE
Did the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of the instant case?
HELD
No. The Court has held in the past that a court may dismiss a case on the ground
of non prosequitur, but the real test of the judicious exercise of such power is whether,
under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of fitting assiduousness in not
acting on his complaint with reasonable promptitude. Unless a party's conduct is so
indifferent, irresponsible, contumacious or slothful as to provide substantial grounds for
dismissal, i.e., equivalent to default or non-appearance in the case, the courts should
consider lesser sanctions which would still amount to achieving the desired end. In the
absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or of a wanton failure
to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the
case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to
dismiss. There is failure to prosecute when the party evidently no longer desires to pursue
its case by not appearing or by showing a pattern to delay the disposition of the case. In
the instant case, it is not accurate to state that the PCIB failed to prosecute its case
considering its repeated failure to present a new witness after the destruction of the TSNs
pertaining to its witness.
The general rule is that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to resolve questions
of fact in a petition for review on certiorari, subject to exceptions laid down in case law.
There is a question of fact when the issue at hand invites a review of the evidence
presented. The test, therefore, of whether a question is one of law or of fact is "whether
the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact." In the
case, the issues raised by PCIB are clearly questions of fact. The bank seeks mainly for the
examination by the Court of the evidence in the records. This entails appreciation of
165
evidence that the trial court has passed upon. Doing so would be disturbing the findings of
fact made by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. It is well settled that the RTC is in a better
position to determine which party was able to present evidence with greater weight.
166
DY BUNICO V. RAMOS
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 206120 | March 23, 2022
APPEALS BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT (RULE 45), PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
(RULE 65)
DOCTRINE
A factual review of the case, is an issue beyond the purview of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which covers only questions of
law. A resort to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules at the stage
where the petitioner was not without any plain, speedy, or adequate remedy as her cause
could very well be adequately advanced before the DAR is very much premature.
In the case of Department of Agrarian Reform v. Cuenca, the Court ruled that "all
controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the DAR, even though they raise questions that are
also legal or constitutional in nature. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR,
since the law has granted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian
matters.”
FACTS
The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which denied the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Raquel G. Dy
Buncio (Buncio) on the ground that she availed of the improper remedy.
Petitioner Buncio filed a complaint for accion reinvindicatoria and damages

claiming that she is the registered co-owner of a parcel of land located at Nueva Ecija.
Buncio alleged that the respondents Leontina Ramos (Leontina) and Fernando Ramos
(collectively, the Ramoses) are the unlawful and unauthorized possessors of the land who
should be directed to vacate the same. The Ramoses argued that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter because the subject case involves the lease
agreement between the De Guzmans, the registered owners of the subject property, and
Hilario, Leontina’s late husband.
The RTC initially held that it had jurisdiction over the case since the Ramoses
failed to prove the existence of all elements of agricultural tenancy relationship.
However, the Ramoses filed a motion with the RTC and reiterated their claim to refer the
case to DAR, as they are tenants-lessees of the subject land. The RTC found that the
entire area of 3.7302 hectares devoted to palay production and traversed by a cemented
City Road of Cabanatuan City. Thus, the trial court referred the case to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Buncio filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied.
167
Buncio filed a petition for certiorari with the CA but was dismissed. The CA ruled
that Buncio was not without any plain, speedy, or adequate remedy as her cause could
very well be adequately advanced before the DAR. Thus, the resort to a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules at this stage is very much premature.
ISSUE
Did the CA correctly dismiss Buncio's Petition for Certiorari.
HELD
Yes, the CA correctly dismissed Buncio’s petition for certiorari.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law. Further, Section 50-A of
RA 6557, as amended by RA 9700, expressly provides that "if there is an allegation from
any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer,
farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred by the judge or the
prosecutor to the DAR which shall determine and certify within fifteen (15) days from
referral whether an agrarian dispute exists: Provided, that from the determination of the
DAR, an aggrieved party shall have judicial recourse."
Here, the instant petition asks for a factual review of the case, an issue beyond
the purview of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
which covers only questions of law. Although an accion reinvindicatoria falls within the
jurisdiction of the RTC, agrarian reform matters, as well as original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform falls within the jurisdiction of
the DAR as provided under Sec. 50 of RA 6657 and Section 17 of Executive Order No. (EO)
229. Further, in order for tenancy agreement to arise, it is essential to establish all its
indispensable elements, viz.: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the
subject matter is agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the
harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Pursuant
to the leasehold agreement, Leonita’s allegations that she and her husband, Hilario, have
been paying the agreed rentals of the landholdings, to the lessors or Buncio's parents,
suffice for the referral of the dispute to the DAR.
Hence, the petition for certiorari is an improper remedy in this case because the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court can only be availed of provided
that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. As stated by law, a mere allegation of an agrarian dispute is enough for Buncio to
have another plain, speedy, or adequate remedy before the DAR.
168
PURISIMA JR. V. PURISIMA
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 200484 | November 18, 2020
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
DOCTRINE
Petition for Review on Certiorari is a remedy under the law which is confined to
settling questions of law and not questions of facts. However, this Court may take
exceptions when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual
findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of fact are contradicted by the presence of
parties.
The doctrine that the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, being
conclusive in nature, are binding on this Court, applies even if the Court of Appeals was in
disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of evidence with a consequent
reversal of its findings of fact, so long as the findings of the Court of Appeals are borne
out by the record or based on substantial evidence.
FACTS
Macaria Purisima (Macaria) and the Spouses Erlinda and Daniel Medrano (Spouses
Medrano; respondents, collectively) filed a complaint for reconveyance, cancellation and
quieting of title against their late brother's heirs, Pascual Purisima, Jr. (Purisima Jr.),
Leonardo Purisima, Eufrata Purisima and Estelita Daguio, (collectively, petitioners).
Banking on mutual trust, the survey as well as the sale was not recorded by the
parties. Since the 1960s and prior to the death of Purisima Sr. on April 12, 1971,
respondents had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the apportioned
properties. They had been paying realty taxes thereon and had their own tenants tilling
their respective portions of land.
Petitioners, as heirs of Pascual Sr., executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate

of Deceased, Pascual Purisima and Sale over the unregistered property of their father
which included the sale of the properties apportioned to the respondents. Upon learning
of the inclusion of their land in the extrajudicial settlement, respondents repeatedly
requested Purisima Jr. to surrender OCT P-5968 in order to annotate the Extrajudicial
169
Settlement of Estate of Deceased, Pascual Purisima, Sr. and Sale, register the previous
subdivision plan and finally secure their own titles covering their respective lots.
However, petitioners ignored respondents' pleas and despite barangay conciliation

proceedings, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Thus Respondents filed a
case to remove the cloud on their title over the apportioned lots and for their ownership
to be not disturbed which was denied by the RTC but was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE
Did the CA err in reversing the RTC’s decision and found that the reconveyance of
the apportioned properties was proper.
HELD
No, Petition for Review on Certiorari is a remedy under the law which is confined
to settling questions of law and not questions of facts. However, this Court may take
exceptions when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual
findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of fact are contradicted by the presence of
parties.
A question of fact requires this Court to review the truthfulness or falsity of the
allegations of the parties. This review includes assessment of the "probative value of the
evidence presented." There is also a question of fact when the issue presented before this
Court is the correctness of the lower courts' appreciation of the evidence presented by
the parties. Delving on questions of facts is merely discretionary on this Court and subject
only to the limited exceptions as stated above. Hence, petitioners must not merely allege
the grounds for exceptions but must fully explain why the rule must be relaxed. It should
bear stressing that while the factual findings of the appellate court are contrary to those
of the trial court, this alone does not automatically warrant a review of factual findings
by this Court.
It bears emphasizing that mere disagreement between the Court of Appeals and
the trial court as to the facts of a case does not of itself warrant this Court's review of the
same. It has been held that the doctrine that the findings of fact made by the Court of
Appeals, being conclusive in nature, are binding on this Court, applies even if the Court of
Appeals was in disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of evidence with a
consequent reversal of its findings of fact, so long as the findings of the Court of Appeals
are borne out by the record or based on substantial evidence. While the foregoing
doctrine is not absolute, petitioner has not sufficiently proved that his case falls under
the known exceptions.
170
The issues raised by the petitioners essentially ask this Court to review the
evidence presented during the trial. Clearly, this is not the role of this Court because the
issues presented are factual in nature. Petitioners allege that the CA and RTC made
conflicting factual findings and that the appellate court failed to notice certain relevant
facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. They also aver
that the CA's findings of fact are contradicted by the evidence. A careful review of the
Petition, however, reveals that the petitioners utterly failed to substantiate their
arguments. On this ground alone, the Petition must be denied.
All the same, we subscribe to the findings of the trial court that indeed there was
a valid consideration in the sale that transpired in 1960. The testimonies of the parties
were consistent that Purisima Sr. received the amounts for the purchase of the
apportioned lots. Further, respondents at the outset have already established that
payments were made because Purisima, Sr. was in dire need of money due to his poor
health condition. We do not see how this would affect or be in conflict with the validity of
the payment already given. Hence, for all intents and purposes, payment for the purchase
price of the property was already given.
171
PHILHEALTH V. USSH (URDANETA SACRED HEART HOSPITAL)
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 214485 | January 11,2021
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF JUDICIAL REMEDIES
DOCTRINE
DOCTRINE ON EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; EXCEPTIONS — When
strong public interest is involved. Technicalities should not be allowed to defeat the right
of the health care provider to be reimbursed, since it will result in a deprivation of legal
rights.
FACTS
PhilHealth filed Petition for Review Certiorari assailing the decision of the RTC
which ruled in favor of the Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital (USHH) for not abiding by
Philhealth procedure of asserting claims.
USHH is a health care institution duly accredited PhilHealth. USHH has been
providing PhilHealth members the necessary treatments and procedures which are
deemed compensable under PhilHealth rules. USHH filed claims for cataract treatments,
160 claims remained unreimbursed. Thus USHH filed a Complaint with the RTC, that
Philhealth. Philhealth argued it is prohibited from reimbursing services from medical
missions or recruitment schemes.
Philhealth maintains that since USHH's claim is administrative in nature, it is

reviewable by the courts only after exhaustion of administrative remedies. RA No. 7875,
as amended, vests Philhealth with the sole jurisdiction over claims for reimbursement.
PHIC Circular No. 3 requires that a claim for reimbursement under the NHI Act shall be
filed with the PHIC RO where the accredited health care provider is conducting business.
That proper complaint should have been filed with the PhilHealth Regional Office, and
upon denial, with Philhealth’s Protest and Appeals Review Board (PARD). USHH failed to
exhaust administrative remedies and that the case should not be considered as an
exception to the doctrine on the exhaustion of administrative remedies since (a) PHIC has
not decided on some of USHH's claims and (b) USHH did not allege extraordinary
circumstances which would warrant its exemption.
USHH contends that it filed its reimbursement claims properly and seasonably. It
maintains that it had no other option but to institute the Complaint before the RTC
because the matter had already been decided by the Philhealth's Board, rendering any MR
before the PARD useless. Additionally, it asserts that there is no law which vests exclusive
jurisdiction upon Philhealth over USHH's claims. It argues that the It maintains that the
case is an exception to the application of the doctrine on exhaustion of administrative
remedies, as the case involves public interest.
172
The RTC noted that USHH did not comply with the PhilHealth procedure but took
cognizance of the case on the basis of “strong public interest” as an exemption to the
citrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies. The CA held that USHH is an accredited
member of the Philhealth, however reiterated that the doctrine admits of exceptions, as
when strong public interest is involved. echnicalities should not be allowed to defeat the
right of the health care provider to be reimbursed, since it will result in a deprivation of
legal rights.
ISSUE
Was USHH correct in filing directly with RTC.
HELD
Yes. Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies was justified. The instant case
may also fall under the following exceptions:
(a) "when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be

unreasonable" and (b) "when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.
The trial court and the appellate court also correctly considered USHH's Complaint
as an exception to the application of the doctrine on exhaustion of administrative
remedies on the basis of strong public interest.
PHIC's President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is directly appointed by the
President of the Republic while its Board of Directors (the Board) is composed of several
cabinet secretaries (or their permanent representatives) and representatives of different
stakeholders." Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the PHIC Board exercises a higher
authority than the ROs or the PARD, and that to file an MR or appeal to it would be futile
since the PHIC Board already directed its denial.
173
REPUBLIC V. HEIRS OF BORJA
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 207647 |January 11, 2021
LATE FILING OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
DOCTRINE
It has been settled that the 60-day period within which a petition for certiorari
should be filed is non-extendible, except in meritorious cases in Adtel v. Valdez. In Laguna
Metts Corporation, this Court ruled that the 60-day period was non-extendible and the CA
no longer had the authority to grant the motion for extension in view of A.M. No.
07-7-12-SC which amended Section 4 of Rule 65.
In Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, this Court held that
the strict observance of the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari is not absolute.
This Court ruled that absent any express prohibition under Rule 65, a motion for extension
is still permitted, subject to the Court's sound discretion. Likewise, in Mid-Islands Power
Generation v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a motion for extension was allowed in
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 subject to the Court's sound discretion and only
under exceptional or meritorious cases.
The exception to the 60-day rule to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was
also applied by this Court in a more recent case in Republic of the Philippines v. St.
Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc., to wit: "under exceptional circumstances, however, and
subject to the sound discretion of the Court, [the] said period may be extended pursuant
to [the] Domdom and Mid-Islands Power cases."
Therefore, the rule is that in filing petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, a motion
for extension is a prohibited pleading. However in exceptional or meritorious cases, the
Court may grant an extension anchored on special or compelling reason.
FACTS
Respondent heirs of Spouses Mauro Borja and Demetria Bajao filed with the RTC of
Butuan City a Petition for Issuance of OCT over a lot in Agusan del Norte. Respondents
alleged that they are the lawful owners of the subject property by virtue of succession.
The RTC granted the petition due to the failure of Provincial Prosecutor to comment
within 15 days from receipt of the formal offer of exhibits. The CA declared the case
closed and terminated as the OSG did not pursue appeal.
Acting on a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution, the trial court directed the
LRA to issue the corresponding OCT. Despite said Order, the LRA refused to comply,
prompting the trial court to issue a show cause order.
174
LRA filed a Manifestation praying that an order be issued cancelling the previous
Decree and directing the Administrator of the LRA to re-issue new decree of registration
in the name of the same decreed owner Spouses Mauro Borja and Demetria Borja. The
Court granted the same, provided, the respondents will submit to this Court a
certification to the effect that no OCT was ever issued on the land subject of this
litigation which the respondents complied with. The trial court then issued a Resolution,
cancelling the decree and directing the issuance of the OCT.
The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, averring that respondents failed to
comply with the trial court's order considering that all that the Registry of Deeds of
Agusan del Norte certified was that it did not have any record showing that a title
pursuant to the subject decree has been issued. The OSG insisted that there must be a
categorical statement that "no OCT was ever issued."
On March 5, 2012, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration and
ordered the execution of its decision directing the LRA to issue a new decree and OCT
covering the subject land.
Considering that the OSG received a copy of the March 5, 2012 Resolution on March
19, 2012, it had had 60 days or until May 18, 2012 within which to file a Petition for
Certiorari before the appellate court. Instead of filing the petition on May 18, 2012, the
OSG filed a Motion for Extension, praying for an additional 15 days within which to file the
Petition. On June 4, 2012, the OSG filed the Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
The CA dismissed the Petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period. The appellate court explained that pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC as interpreted
in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, there can no longer be any extension of
the 60-day period within which to file a Petition for Certiorari. The appellate court did
not find any justification in the case to warrant a relaxation of the rule.
Additional to its earlier contention, petitioner pleads for relaxation of the rules of
procedure on the grounds that the two lawyers assigned to handle the case had resigned
and the Petition raises a matter of strong public interest, i.e., the efficacy and integrity
of the Torrens System.
The OSG restates that this case is exempted from the prohibition of filing a motion
for extension to file a Petition for Certiorari on the grounds that petitioner has a
meritorious case and the Legal Division of the OSG is understaffed. The OSG maintains
that the LRA Certification as worded did not unconditionally state that no certificate of
title was ever issued on the subject land.
Respondents lament the fact that a simple case for re-issuance of a decree and
OCT has lasted for more than 11 years. They claim to have unduly suffered from the long
delay incurred by the LRA. Respondents are at a loss as to what kind of certification does
the LRA require them to produce when the very office that issued the certification, the
Registry of Deeds of Agusan del Norte, is under the supervision of the LRA. Lastly,
175
respondents contend that pursuant to Laguna Metts, the 60-day period within which to
file the Petition for Certiorari cannot be extended. Moreover, respondents argue that the
Petition did not raise any question of law.
ISSUE
Whether the appellate court committed a reversible error in dismissing outright
petitioner's Petition for Certiorari for having been filed late.
HELD
It has been settled that the 60-day period within which a petition for certiorari
should be filed is non-extendible, except in meritorious cases in Adtel v. Valdez.
In Laguna Metts Corporation, this Court ruled that the 60-day period was
non-extendible and the CA no longer had the authority to grant the motion for extension
in view of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC which amended Section 4 of Rule 65.
The recognized exceptions to the strict observance of the aforementioned rule are
encapsulated in the case of Labao v. Flores:
1. most persuasive and weighty reasons;
2. to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with [their] failure
to comply with the prescribed procedure;
3. good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a
reasonable time from the time of the default;
4. the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
5. the merits of the case;
6. a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules;
176
7. a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory;
8. the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby;
9. fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence without appellant's fault;
10. peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case;
11. in the name of substantial justice and fair play;
12. importance of the issues involved; and
13. exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the party
invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for
their failure to comply with the rules.
The circumstances in this case do not fall under any of the exceptions to warrant a
relaxation of the rule. Petitioner invokes an understaffed office to justify the extension of
the 60-day period. We find petitioner's explanation unacceptable.
It must be further stressed that this case has dragged on for 17 years to date. This
very judgment is the subject of appeal by petitioners before the appellate court. Instead
of timely filing its appeal to a then 10-year old case, petitioners filed a Motion for
Extension, which is prohibited under the rule. If, indeed, petitioner considered the
importance of this case, it should have diligently and timely pursued its appeal.
It bears stressing that "the right appeal is not a natural right but a statutory
privilege, and it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the
requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost."
Petitioner also touched on the merits of the case when it cited that the
certification provided by respondents was insufficient end did not comply with what was
agreed upon by the parties. We cannot tackle this issue. At the outset, the appellate
court dismissed the Petition solely on a procedural technicality. The only issue raised
before us is whether the appellate court committed reversible error when it denied
petitioner's motion for an additional period of 15 days to file the Petition for Certiorari
and subsequently dismissed the latter's petition. Moreover, the substantial issue raised
relates to the factual findings of the RTC, which is beyond the purview of a Petition for
Review.
177
PATDU JR. V. CARPIO-MORALES
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 230171 | September 27, 2021
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
DOCTRINE
Decisions or orders of the Ombudsman finding the existence of probable cause (or
the lack thereof) should be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
filed with the Supreme Court. The rule was not anchored on Section 14 of R.A. 6770, but
was instead a rule prescribed by the Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers. The
declaration of unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 was immaterial insofar as the
appellate procedure for orders and decisions by the Ombudsman in criminal cases is
concerned. The remedy to assail the OMB's findings of probable cause in criminal or
non-administrative cases Is still by filing a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court,
and not with the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
The Department of Budget Management allotted a budget for the purchase of
communications equipment for Region VI. Domingo Samuel Jonathan L. Ng (Ng) submitted
a purchase order for units of Nokia 1100. Upon receiving the purchase order, DOTC
Management Technical Inspector Danilo M. Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) issued a technical
inspection stating that the cellphone units have been delivered, inspected, and found to
be working properly. However, it was claimed that Ng received payment without
delivering the cellphone units. Hence, the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge
Ildefonso Patdu Jr., Rebecca S. Cacatian, and Geronimo V. Quintos (petitioners) together
with Representative Syjuco, Secretary Mendoza, Reyes, Soneja, Santidad, Desiderio, Dela
Rosa, and Ng, with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and Malversation through
Falsification finding that these individuals, conspired with each other through seemingly
separate but collaborative acts to defraud the government.
Padu et. Al. (petitioners) moved for the reconsideration of the criminal aspect of
the Ombudsman resolution which was denied. Aggrieved, Padu et al. filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA to assail the criminal aspect of the Ombudsman Resolution.
The CA dismissed the petition outright for having been filed with the wrong court
reasoning that the remedy to assail the Ombusdman findings of probable cause in criminal
cases is by filing an original action for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Adding further
that the second paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770,93 which states that "No court shall
hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law," has been declared
unconstitutional in Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Carpio-Morales) for increasing this
Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence. The CA explained that
178
this invalidation does not mean that all kinds of remedies from the decisions or findings of
the Ombudsman may now be brought to the CA.
Patdu et al. filed an instant petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme
Court contending that the invalidation of the second paragraph of Section 14 in
Carpio-Morales is all encompassing as the Court did not make a distinction on whether the
ruling is exclusively applicable to administrative cases. Hence, the ruling in
Carpio-Morales likewise applies to findings of probable cause in criminal cases and that
the striking down of the second paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770 necessarily abandoned
the earlier rulings on the remedy to assail findings of probable cause.
The ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General argue that
Carpio-Morales has no application in the instant case, because its doctrine is limited to
administrative cases. They contend that the findings of probable cause are cognizable by
this Court via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As this Court has jurisdiction over the instant
case, Patdu et al. lost their remedy when they filed their petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Is Certiorari under Rule 65 that is appealed in the Court of Appeals the correct
remedy in assailing decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases?
HELD
No. The proper mode to assail the OMB's finding of probable cause in criminal
cases is by filing a petition for certiorari before this Court. The doctrine laid down in
Carpio-Morales has no application in criminal cases before the OMB. What was assailed
therein was the preventive suspension order arising from an administrative case filed
against a public official. Morales dealt with an interlocutory order in an administrative
case. It cannot thus be read to apply to decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in
non-administrative or criminal cases. It is thus clear that the [Carpio-]Morales decision
never intended to disturb the well-established distinction between the appellate
remedies for orders, directives, and decisions arising from administrative cases and those
arising from non-administrative or criminal cases.
The unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770, therefore, did not necessarily

have an effect over the appellate procedure for orders and decisions arising from criminal
cases precisely because the said procedure was not prescribed by the aforementioned
section. To recall, the rule that decisions or orders of the Ombudsman finding the
existence of probable cause (or the lack thereof) should be questioned through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the Supreme Court. The rule was, therefore, not
anchored on Section 14 of R.A. 6770, but was instead a rule prescribed by the Court in the
exercise of its rule-making powers. The declaration of unconstitutionality of Section 14 of
R.A. 6770 was therefore immaterial insofar as the appellate procedure for orders and
decisions by the Ombudsman in criminal cases is concerned. Therefore, the remedy to
assail the OMB's findings of probable cause in criminal or non-administrative cases Is still
by filing a petition for certiorari with this Court, and not with the CA.
179
In the instant case, the CA, therefore, did not err in dismissing the petition for
certiorari for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners have erroneously filed their petition for
certiorari with the appellate court, when it should have been filed before this Court. It
follows then that petitioners have lost their right to assail the OMB's finding of probable
cause against them when they elevated the case before the wrong forum. It is not proper
for this Court to just assume jurisdiction and rule on the merits of the instant case given
petitioners' availment of the wrong remedy.
180
DEBUQUE V. NILSON
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 191718 | May 10, 2021
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
DOCTRINE
A petition for certiorari filed to assail the executive determination of probable
cause (and the subsequent appeal therefrom) becomes moot once an information has
been filed before the court and a warrant of arrest has been issued; more so if the trial
court has already ruled on the merits of the criminal case.
FACTS
Atty. Ignacio Debuque, who was acting on behalf of Ramon Debuque (Ramon) and
other accused, invited Matt Nilson to join them in a business venture, which the former
alleged would yield large profits. He promised Nilson shares of stock in Investa Land
Corporation (ILC), a corporation then to be formed, equivalent to the value of the
numerous personal loans extended to him by Nilson. Atty. Debuque induced Nilson to
purchase various commercial lots in partnership with him, stating that the value of the
lands will rise exponentially, and that these will be transferred in the name of ILC.
Nilson, however, thereafter claimed that the lots were not commercial lands and
were represented as such to induce him to pay a higher price. Hence, the filing of a
Complaint-Affidavit for Syndicated Estafa against Atty. Debuque, Ramon, and the other
accused. Nilson alleged that they neither gave him the promised ILC shares of stock nor
returned the funds that he contributed to the venture.
The Assistant City Prosecutor found probable cause to charge Atty. Debuque and
the other accused with Syndicated Estafa. However, this was reversed and set aside by the
DOJ Secretary. Nilson filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
before the CA assailing the Resolution of the DOJ Secretary. Then, the CA reversed the
resolution of the DOJ Secretary and reinstated the resolution of the City Prosecutor. The
ruling of the CA was appealed, while the City Prosecutor pushed through with the filing of
the case before the RTC.
The RTC ruled that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
participation and culpability of Ramon, and other accused for failure of the prosecution to
establish guilt pursuant to a demurrer to evidence. The CA affirmed the same.
ISSUE
Did the appeal with respect to the finding of probable cause become moot and
academic when the merits of the case has already been decided by the trial court
resulting to an acquittal?
181
HELD
Yes. The petition for certiorari assailing the CA decision in finding probable cause
has become moot when the RTC and CA ruled on the merits of the case.
In the case of Crespo v. Mogul and De Lima v. Reyes, the Court held that a petition
for certiorari filed to assail the executive determination of probable cause (and the
subsequent appeal therefrom) becomes moot once an information has been filed before
the court and a warrant of arrest has been issued; more so if the trial court has already
ruled on the merits of the criminal case.
In the instant case, the RTC and the CA have already ruled on the merits of the
criminal case that resulted to Ramon's acquittal. Following Crespo and De Lima, the
Petition for Certiorari filed before the CA to assail the latest Resolution of the DOJ
Secretary has become moot. It follows then that this Petition for Review on Certiorari
before Us to assail that CA Decision (on probable cause) has also become moot; hence, it
is only proper that it be dismissed.
If the court were to uphold the assailed CA Decision and sustain the finding of
probable cause against Ramon for the crime of Syndicated Estafa, the fact remains that
the RTC had already dismissed the case as against him based on a demurrer to evidence,
which effectively amounted to an acquittal. On the other hand, if We were to reverse the
CA Decision and reinstate the Resolution of the DOJ Secretary, an information for Estafa
may only be filed against Atty. Debuque to the exclusion of Ramon. And since Atty.
Debuque has already passed away, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability, a new
information then may not be filed.
182
CERVANTES V. AQUINO
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 210805 | May 11, 2021
MOOT AND ACADEMIC PETITION
DOCTRINE
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the
case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use.
FACTS
The Department of Health (DOH) executed a Build-Operate-Transfer Agreement
(BOT Agreement) with the Megawide Construction Company (Megawide) and World Citi
Medical Center (WCMC; collectively, the Consortium). The agreement proposed the
privatization or commercialization of the Philippine Orthopedic Center (POC) and the
subsequent award of the Modernization of the POC Project (MPOC Project).
MPOC Project consists of the construction of a new hospital facility within the
National Kidney and Transplant Institute Compound. The concessionaire will design, build,
finance, operate and maintain the facility for a period of 25 years and thereafter, transfer
the said facility to the DOH.
The petitioners in this case are patients and employees of the Philippine
Orthopedic Center (POC), health-allied professionals and legislators. Petitioners filed the
present petition seeking to annul and set aside the privatization of the POC including the
award to the Consortium of the MPOC Project and accordingly prohibit the building,
operation, and transfer of the POC.
While the case was pending, however, the Consortium filed a Manifestation before
this Court manifesting that in view of the supervening "Notice of Termination" of the BOT
Agreement served upon public respondent DOH, the instant petition has been rendered
moot and academic.
ISSUE
Did the service of “Notice of Termination” render the case moot and academic?
FACTS
Yes. The petition has become moot and academic by virtue of the supervening
termination of the BOT Agreement that transpired after the filing of the instant petition.
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a

case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance,
183
there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which
would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the action for certiorari and prohibition
filed by petitioners has been mooted by the termination of the BOT Agreement of private
respondents. The staleness of the claims becomes more manifest considering the reliefs
sought by petitioners, i.e., to annul and set aside the BOT Agreement for the
modernization of the POC; and to permanently enjoin respondents from implementing the
MPOC Project, are hinged on the existence of the BOT Agreement.
Corollarily, the eventual termination of the BOT Agreement rendered the

resolution of the issues relating to the prayers for certiorari and prohibition of no
practical or legal effect. Simply stated, petitioners in this case would no longer be
entitled to any actual substantial relief regardless of this Court's disposition on the merits
of the present petition.
184
METRO RAIL TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT
ADVERTISING, VENDING AND PROMOTIONS, INC.
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 204452| June 28, 2021
APPEAL AND CERTIORARI
DOCTRINE
The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative
or successive. The general rule is that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for an appeal,
for relief through a special action like certiorari may only be established when no remedy
by appeal lies.
FACTS
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
Build-Lease-and-Transfer (BLT) Agreement with Metro Rail Transit Corporation Limited
(MRT) regarding the Phase 1 of MRT-3 Light Rail System along Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue
(EDSA). In line with the said BLT Agreement, the DOTC, MRT, and MRTDC executed another
contract which granted MRTDC the right to: (a) develop commercial premises in the depot
and airspace above the EDSA MRT-3 stations; (b) lease, sublease, or assign interests in the
said depot and airspace; and (c) obtain income therefrom and exercise advertising rights.
Thereafter, MRTDC engaged the services of respondent Trackworks Rail Transit
Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) and executed a Contract for
Advertising Services for a period of five (5) years, which was renewed for another ten (10)
years. However, Trackworks defaulted in the payment of its obligation. As stated in their
agreement, the non-defaulting party may terminate the contract upon service of a notice
of termination to the defaulting party. MRTDC reiterated its demands on Trackworks but
the latter failed to fully pay its obligations under the contract. Hence, MRTDC sent a
Notice of Termination to Trackworks.
Trackworks filed a Complaint with Application for Temporary Restraining Order

(TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) against MRTDC with RTC Pasig. The
latter denied Trackworks’ application for preliminary injunction and ordered the parties
to submit to arbitration. It also ruled that pending the rendition of the arbitration award,
the proceedings before it are "stayed." However, MRTDC demanded Trackworks to comply
with its post-termination obligations. Hence, the latter filed an urgent motion for
issuance of show cause order, status quo and/or cease and desist order, and addendum.
RTC denied the injunctive relief prayed by Trackworks. Thereafter, Trackworks filed a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 before the RTC Makati. It
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. MRTDC filed a motion to dismiss.
RTC Makati issued an Omnius Order denying MRTDC’s motion to dismiss. The former
also denied the latter’s motion for reconsideration, and granted Trackworks’ application
185
for WPI. The CA granted MRTDC’s petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the
omnibus order, and ruled that RTC Makati violated the doctrine of judicial stability or
non-interference. However, on motion for reconsideration filed by Trackworks, the CA
reversed its Decision and issued its assailed Resolution dismissing MRTDC's Petition for
Certiorari on account of the earlier Decision rendered by the RTC of Makati City on June
14, 2012.
ISSUES
1. Is the Petition for Certiorari filed by MRTDC before the CA rendered moot
by reason of the June 14, 2012 decision of RTC Makati?
2. Did RTC Makati violate the doctrine of judicial stability when it took
cognizance of Trackworks’ Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus?
HELD
1. Yes, the Petition for Certiorari filed by MRTDC before the CA is rendered moot
by reason of the June 14, 2012 decision of RTC Makati as no practical relief could be
granted when a decision on the main case had already been rendered.
For certiorari to prosper, the petitioner must establish the concurrence of the
following requisites, namely:
a. The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions;
b. Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and
c. There is no appeal or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
Under the law, the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or successive. The general rule is that certiorari will not lie as a substitute
for an appeal, for relief through a special action like certiorari may only be established
when no remedy by appeal lies. The exception to this rule is conceded only "where public
welfare and the advancement of public policy so dictate, and the broader interests of
justice so require, or where the orders complained of were found to be completely null
and void, or that appeal was not considered the appropriate remedy, such as in appeals
from orders of preliminary attachment or appointments of receiver. Thus, the subsequent
promulgation of the RTC's June 14, 2012 Decision renders the Petition for Certiorari
superfluous and warrants its dismissal.
2. Yes, the RTC of Makati City obviously violated the doctrine of judicial stability
when it took cognizance of Trackworks' Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
despite the fact that the said case involved the same parties and the subject matter fell
within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig City from which the case originally emanated.
In Barroso v. Omelio, this Court explained the doctrine of judicial stability or
non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary
186
principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant
the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of
jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein
has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its
execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct
of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment. Thus, Trackworks' Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus filed before the RTC of Makati City was improper
and in glaring violation of the doctrine of judicial stability.
187
MAYNILAD WATER SERVICES INC. V. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. Nos. 202897, 206823 & 207969 | Aug. 6, 2019
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
DOCTRINE
Since the assailed order for the present case was from the DENR, an executive
office, the appropriate remedy was to file it to the Office of the President. When they
filed before the CA a petition for review, they failed to exhaust the appropriate
FACTS
The Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Environmental Management Bureau-Region III(EMB-RIII) filed a complaint before
the DENR’s Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) charging the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS) and its concessionaires, Maynilad and Manila Water, for failure
to provide, install, operate, and maintain adequate Wastewater Treatment Facilities
(WWTFs) for sewerage system resulting in the degraded quality and beneficial use of the
receiving bodies of water leading to Manila Bay, and which has directly forestalled the
DENR’s mandate to implement the operational plan for the rehabilitation and restoration
of Manila Bay and its river tributaries. As a result, the Secretary of the DENR (SENR) issued
a Notice of Violation (NOV), and in an Order dated Oct. 7, 2009, upon recommendation of
the PAB, the SENR found MWSS, Maynilad and Manila Water liable for violation of the
Clean Water Act and its implementing Rules and Regulations thus, subjecting them to
fines.
The petitioners, MWSS, Maynilad and Manila Water, sought refuge under Section 7
of the Clean Water Act which first requires the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) to prepare and effect a national program on sewerage and septage management
to guide the MWSS and/or its concessionaires in implementing the law. They likewise put
forth their respective proposals, on going projects, and accomplishments relative to the
performance of their obligations under their Concessionaire Agreements.
The PAB denied outright their motions for reconsideration for lack of merit. When
petitioners filed their separate petitions for review with the CA, these were likewise
denied. Thus, petitions for certiorari were filed with the Court.
ISSUE
Was the filing with the Court petitions for review on certiorari the appropriate
remedy for the case?
188
HELD
No, since petitioners prematurely filed the petition for review before the CA and
failed to exhaust the administrative remedies appropriate. The PAB is a separate office
under the Department proper, chaired by the Secretary of the Department, and has the
exclusive jurisdiction over the adjudication of pollution cases and all other matter related
thereto, including the imposition of administrative sanctions. Furthermore, under the
Clean Water Act and its IRR, it specifically bestows upon the Secretary of the DENR, upon
recommendation of the PAB, the power to impose fines, orders of the closure, suspension
of development or construction, or cessation of operations, or, where appropriate
disconnection of water supply. Here, the assailed orders were issued by the DENR, and not
the PAB. Thus, the appropriate remedy from the Orders of the SENR was actually an
appeal to the Office of the President.
189
EXPROPRIATION
LAND BANK PHILIPPINES V. PHILIPPINES ESCARO
OF THE
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 204526 | February 10, 2021
EXPROPRIATION ; JUST COMPENSATION
DOCTRINE
Considering that the 15-day prescriptive period under the DARAB Rules has been
struck down for being void, it would be futile for this Court to discuss the propriety or
impropriety of respondent's motion for reconsideration of the DARAB Decision, and,
ultimately, determine whether the 15-day period for filing of an action for determination
of just compensation with the RTC-SAC should be reckoned from the time respondent
received the DARAB Decision, or its order denying his motion for reconsideration.
To reiterate, the correct period to file a petition for judicial determination of just
compensation under RA 6657 before the RTC-SAC is 10 years pursuant to Article 1144 (2)
of the Civil Code.
FACTS
Expedite Q. Escaro, as represented herein by Marcelo Q. Escaro, Sr., is one of the
heirs of the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Sibao, Calabanga, Camarines
Sur, with an area consisting of 24.3990 hectares.
DAR placed 24.0467 of the 24.3990 hectares of the said parcel of land under the
Compulsory Acquisition scheme pursuant to RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law.
By virtue of its mandate under RA 6657, petitioner LBP made an initial valuation of
the property at P272,347.63 as indicated in a Notice of Valuation and Acquisition.
Respondent rejected petitioner's valuation. Thus, the matter was referred to the
PARAD of Camarines Sur who, after conducting summary administrative proceedings for
the preliminary determination of just compensation, rendered a Decision fixing the just
compensation at P1,555.084.00.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the DARAB which was reversed and set aside the
Decision of the PARAD and reinstated petitioner's valuation of P272,347.70.
Respondent moved for the reconsideration of the DARAB Decision, but the same
was denied.
190
Thereafter, respondent filed with the RTC-SAC a complaint praying that the trial
court fix the valuation of the land at P1,681,199.00 or approximately P70,000.00 per
hectare.
In its Answer, LBP interposed, among others, the following defenses: (1) that
respondent failed to file a Notice of Filing of Original Action (NFOA) with the RTC-SAC as
prescribed under the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure (DARAB Rules); and (2) that
respondent had no cause of action to file an action for determination of just
compensation with the RTC-SAC considering that the case is already barred by prior
judgment.
RTC-SAC dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata. RTC-SAC found
that respondent committed a procedural lapse when he filed before the DARAB a motion
for reconsideration to question the DARAB Decision rather than filing an original action for
determination of just compensation with the RTC-SAC within 15 days from his receipt of
the said decision on May 7, 2008 as prescribed under Section 7, Rule XIX of the DARAB
Rules.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 5, 2009 Order but
it was denied by the RTC-SAC in its January 4, 2009 Order.
CA rendered its assailed Decision granting respondent's petition for review and
setting aside the November 5, 2009 and January 4, 2010 Orders of the RTC-SAC.
ISSUE
Is DARAB automatically divested of its jurisdiction when a party to a just
compensation case files an original action with the sac even in the absence of a [notice of
filing of original action], as compulsorily required under section 7, Rule XIX of the 2003
DARAB rules, or without need of furnishing it a certified copy of the petition as filed?
HELD
No. The circumstances which brought about the instant controversy center on the
supposed procedural lapses committed by respondent, which, perforce rendered the
DARAB Decision final and conclusive, and thus served as a bar to the filing of respondent's
complaint for the determination of just compensation with the RTC-SAC.
On this matter, both petitioner and the RTC-SAC relied on Philippine Veterans Bank
where this Court essentially outlined the administrative proceedings in valuation cases,
viz.:
x x x Under R.A. No. 6657, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the
preliminary determination of the value of lands placed under land reform program and
the compensation to be paid for their taking. It initiates the acquisition of agricultural
lands by notifying the landowner of the government's intention to acquire his land and the
valuation of the same as determined by the Land Bank. Within 30 days from receipt of
notice, the landowner shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. In
191
the event the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held
by the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator, as the
case may be, depending on the value of the land, for the purpose of determining the
compensation for the land. The landowner, the Land Bank, and other interested parties
are then required to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. The DAR
adjudicator decides the case within 30 days after it is submitted for decision. x x x
We also held in Philippine Veterans Bank that "if the landowner finds the price
unsatisfactory, he may bring the matter directly to the appropriate Regional Trial Court."
The same ruling was later reiterated in Limkaichong.
Along the same lines, Section 7, Rule XIX of the DARAB Rules states the remedy
and the period to assail the preliminary determination of just compensation by the
DARAB, viz.:
SECTION 7. Filing of Original Action with the Special Agrarian Court for Final
Determination. - The party who disagrees with the decision of the Board may contest the
same by filing an original action with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) having jurisdiction
over the subject property within fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the Board's decision.
xxx
Following the foregoing doctrinal pronouncements, a party who does not agree
with the initial valuation of the adjudicator in land compensation cases has 15 days from
receipt of notice thereof to bring the matter to the RTCSAC.
Notably, considering that the determination of just compensation is a judicial

function, this Court, in Dalauta abandoned its ruling in Philippine Veterans Bank and in
Limkaichong, and definitively struck down as void the 15-day prescriptive period under
the DARAB Rules on the finding that it unduly undermined and impeded the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts to determine just compensation in
accordance with Section 57 of RA 6657. Thus, in Dalauta,48 this Court held that:
Since the determination of just compensation is a judicial function, the Court must
abandon its ruling in Veterans Bank, Martinez and Soriano that a petition for
determination of just compensation before the SAC shall be proscribed and adjudged
dismissible if not filed within the 15-day period prescribed under the DARAB Rules.
Indeed, it was emphasized in Dalauta that the jurisdiction of the RTCSAC in actions
for determination of just compensation is original and exclusive, and not merely
appellate. It is for this reason that the Court cannot recognize a procedural rule of the
DARAB that requires the court to adjudge as dismissible an action (which is otherwise by
law properly brought within its judicial cognizance) for having been filed beyond the
15-day period provided in the DARAB Rules.
To sanction such rule will effectively reduce the RTC-SAC to act merely as an
appellate review of the administrative decisions of the DAR through its adjudicators. This
192
clearly runs counter to Section 57 of RA 6657 and, therefore, should be considered as void
and ineffectual.
Considering that the 15-day prescriptive period under the DARAB Rules has been
struck down for being void, it would be futile for this Court to discuss the propriety or
impropriety of respondent's motion for reconsideration of the DARAB Decision, and,
ultimately, determine whether the 15-day period for filing of an action for determination
of just compensation with the RTC-SAC should be reckoned from the time respondent
received the DARAB Decision, or its order denying his motion for reconsideration. To
reiterate, the correct period to file a petition for judicial determination of just
of the Civil Code.
On Prescription.
As established from the records, respondent filed the complaint for determination
of just compensation with the RTC-SAC on January 5, 2009, more than 10 years after he
received or acquired knowledge of the notice of coverage from the DAR sometime
between 1994 and 1996. As such, it appears that there was sufficient ground for the
dismissal of respondent's complaint for having been filed out of time.
Thus, applying the 10-year period provided in Dalauta, respondent had until
2016/2018 to file a complaint for determination of just compensation with the RTC-SAC.
Following the Court's ruling in Dalauta, the complaint filed on January 5, 2009 before the
RTC-SAC, which was even tolled by the proceedings before the PARAD and the DARAB, was
squarely and timely filed within the 10-year prescriptive period.
Clearly, there is no statutory basis for the DARAB to promulgate rules that would
derogate the jurisdiction of the RTC-SAC or impose procedural limitations which would
effectively bar it from taking exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction. Any
attempt to do so should be struck down for being contrary to law and the Constitution.
193
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER
SPOUSES LIU V. ESPINOSA
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 238513 |July 31, 2019
UNLAWFUL DETAINER
DOCTRINE
An action for unlawful detainer will stand if the following requisites are present;
a. Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
b. Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
c. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
d. Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment
FACTS
Spouses Belinda Y. Liu (Belinda) and Hsi Pin Liu (Hsi Pin) own a parcel of land in
Agdao, Davao City which is covered by Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 146-2010008891.They
acquired the property from their predecessor-in-interest who tolerated the occupation of
the property by Marcelina Espinosa (Marcelina), Mary Ann Estrada (Mary Ann), Archie
Asumbrado (Archie), Inesita Asumbrado (Inesita),, Loreta Tutor (Loreta), Elias Penas
(Elias), Benita Abantao (Benita), Basiliza Martizano (Bazilia), Arman Paras (Arman),
Miguelito M. Antega (Miguelito), Joventino Cahulogan (Joventino), and Tito Tubac (Tito).
When the title was transferred to Belinda and Hsi Pin, they also allowed Marcelina, et al.
to occupy the property with the understanding that they will vacate the land once the
spouse’s need arises for the property.
After several demands to vacate the land remain unheeded, Belinda and Hsi Pin
sued Marcelina et. al for Unlawful Detainer before the MTCC of Davao City. When both
parties failed to arrive at a compromise, Marcelina et. al then filed an Omnibus Motion to
Amend Answer. They alleged that Belinda and Hsi Pin have no cause of action against
them since their occupation is not by the spouse’s tolerance but because they thought the
land in question was public land which they discovered soon that the land was already
titled. They claim that their occupations were made in good faith and that spouses have
no right to the title since it was declared null and void by the Court of Appeals in case no.
G.R. No. 01640-MIN.
The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of the spouses Belinda and Hsi Pin. The
municipal trial court declared them the rightful possessor of the property and ordered
194
Marcelina et al. to vacate the land and pay for the rental fee until they vacate the
property. On appeal before the RTC, Marcelina et al asserted that the MTCC had no
jurisdiction to hear the action since it failed to consider that Marcelina et al were in
possession of the land in the concept of owner and not by tolerance by the spouses which
they have occupied for more than twenty years. The RTC however sustained the decision
of the MTCC and held that all the elements of unlawful detainer were present and that
their occupation was merely by the tolerance of the spouses and their
predecessor-in-interest. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court which
ruled that spouses were unable to prove the presence of tolerance on Marcelina et al’s
occupation. This according to the CA could not sustain the action for unlawful detainer.
ISSUE
Is there a case of unlawful detainer in this particular case and was the complaint
timely filed?
HELD
Yes. In the Estate of Soledad Manantan v. Somera, the Court discussed that an
unlawful detainer is a summary action for recovery of possession of real property. It may
be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any
land of building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. The possession of the
defendant was originally legal, since this was permitted by the plaintiff either expressly
or implied but became illegal when the plaintiff demanded the defendant to vacate the
subject property due to expiration or termination of the right to possess, and that the
defendant refused to heed such demand.
An action for unlawful detainer will stand if the following requisites are present;
a. Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
b. Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant
of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
c. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
d. Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. (Suarez v. Emboy , 729 Phil. 315, 330
(2014).
Here, Belinda and Hsi are the registered owners of the subject property as
evidenced by TCT No. 146-2010008891. The Supreme Court held that Marcelina et al’s
occupation of the subject property was merely tolerated by the spouse’s
predecessor-in-interest and the spouses themselves. The tolerance was based on the
understanding that Marcelina et al will vacate the premises of the subject land when the
need to use the land by the spouses arises. Their occupation eventually became illegal
when the demand to vacate was made by Belinda and Hsi Pin with them refusing to
vacate.The last demand being made on February 12, 2013. It was therefore clear that
195
when the complaint was filed on August 6, 2013, it was within the reglementary period of
within one (1) year from the time the last formal demand to vacate was made.
Further, the offer to purchase the subject land from the spouses by Marcelina et
al. disproved that they are in possession of the property in the concept of an owner. The
possession by the spouse of the TCT under the Torrens Title is evidence of an indefeasible
title to property in favor of the person whose name appears in the title. Hence, Belinda
and Hsi Pin are entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property including
possession. (Urieta Vda. de Aguilar v. Alfaro, 637 Phil. 131, 142 (2010).)
Therefore, the complaint of unlawful detainer filed by Belinda and Hsi Pin is
sustained. Marcelina et al must vacate the subject property since their occupation is
deemed illegal and the demand to vacate was already made by the rightful owner of the
property - Spouses Belinda and Hsi Pin.
196
TINA V. STA. CLARA ESTATE
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 239979 | February 17, 2020
COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT
DOCTRINE
The sole issue in ejectment cases is physical or material possession of the subject
property, independent of any claim of ownership by the parties. Section 16, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court provides the exception to the rule in that the issue of ownership shall be
resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined
with the issue of ownership.
Consolacion V. Tiña (Tiña) and Sta. Clara Estate, Inc. both claims ownership over a
231 square meter lot along Creek I in Bacolod City. Tiña alleged that she and her husband
had been occupying said property for more than fifty-five (55) years openly, publicly,
adversely, and continuously in the concept of an owner. As proof of the length of their
occupancy, Tiña presented an indorsement of Engr. Jose F. Falcis, Jr., stating that since
1990, they have been in their area of occupancy for forty-five (45) years; and a
certification of the Office of the Barangay Mandalagan Council. Tiña had in fact filed and
was granted by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) a
Miscellaneous Sales Application.
On the other hand, Sta. Clara Estate, Inc. (Sta. Clara) alleged that the contested
property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) registered under its name. It
averred that Tiña is illegally occupying a portion of its property. Thus, it filed a complaint
for ejectment before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City.
Meanwhile, Tiña filed a complaint for cancellation of title with damages and other reliefs
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City over the contested properties. Tiña
asserted that Creek I as claimed by Sta. Clara as being the absolute and registered owner
thereof, is a property of public dominion, thus, could not be legally registered under its
name. Sta. Clara countered that it constructed Creek I, which used to be a marshland
located within its property.
In the complaint for ejectment filed by Sta. Clara, the MTCC rendered a Decision
in favor of Sta. Clara and found that it is the registered owner of Creek I having
introduced the improvement into the property, which is the man-made creek, when the
said property was being developed into the Sta. Clara Subdivision. The RTC of Bacolod
City affirmed the Decision of the MTCC. The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the judgment of
the RTC and ruled that the right to possess the disputed tract of land pertained to Sta.
Clara as the registered owner and as the party who had established prior possession. This
was also affirmed by the Supreme Court (SC). Tiña’s motion for reconsideration was also
denied with finality on 18 April 2016.
197
In the complaint for cancellation of title with damages and other reliefs, the RTC
of Bacolod City issued the Assailed 30 March 2017 Resolution dismissing the case in light of
the pronouncement of the court that Ogumod Creek or Creek I belongs to Sta. Clara.
Hence, Tiña files a direct appeal to the SC via a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. She contends that the RTC erred in prematurely terminating the
proceedings and dismissing the complaint for cancellation of title simply because of a
ruling touching on ownership in a related ejectment case. Tiña argues that teh rulign is
contrary to established law and jurisprudence that the determination of ownership in an
ejectment proceeding is merely ancillary to resolve the issue of possession.
ISSUE
Was the dismissal by the trial court proper?
HELD
No, the dismissal by the trial court was improper.
An examination of the present petition shows Tiña essentially challenging the

dismissal of the case based solely on the premise that a ruling on ownership in an
ejectment case is merely ancillary to resolve the issue of possession and should not bind
the title or ownership of the land. This is clearly a question of law which calls for an
examination and interpretation of the prevailing law and jurisprudence.
The sole issue in ejectment cases is physical or material possession of the subject
property, independent of any claim of ownership by the parties. Section 16, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court provides the exception to the rule in that the issue of ownership shall be
resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined
with the issue of ownership. In the related ejectment case, the parties were allowed to
prove how they cam into possession of the property.
In the ejectment case, the issue of ownership over Creek I was resolved in favor of
Sta. Clara. Time and again, the SC has consistently held that where the issue of ownership
is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the issue on ownership is only
provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the
property. In an ejectment case, questions as to the validity of the title cannot be resolved
definitively. A separate action to directly attack the validity of the title must be filed, as
was in fact filed by Tiña, to fully thresh out as to who possesses a valid title over the
subject property. Thus, any ruling on ownership that was passed upon in the ejectment
case is not and should not be binding in the civil case filed by Tiña.
198
PALAJOS V. ABAD
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 205832 | March 7, 2022
PRIOR PHYSICAL POSSESSION IN FORCIBLE ENTRY CASES
DOCTRINE
The issue of ownership of the property in forcible entry cases may be provisionally
determined -to determine the issue of possession and only if the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. In addition, We have likewise
consistently held that "possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but
also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts
and legal formalities established for acquiring such right."
FACTS
This petition for review on certiorari is about Respondent Jose Manolo E. Abad
(Manolo) had prior possession of the subject property than petitioner Gorgonio P. Palajos
(Palajos) in the ejection suit of forcible entry.
Manalo claimed that they are the registered owners of three adjacent and
contiguous parcels of land which they acquired from their parents in 1999. Sometime in
September or October 2001, they took actual possession of the subject property and
constructed a concrete perimeter fence around it. In January 2006, the palajos destroyed
the perimeter fence and entered the subject property and constructed their houses
thereon, depriving the plaintiffs of their possession.
Palajos claimed that he entered the subject property by virtue of a May 4, 1988
deed of absolute sale which B.C. Regalado & Co. executed in his favor. To further
substantiate his claim he showed real property taxes that he paid and proof of billing.
The Me TC ruled in favor of plaintiffs finding that they had prior physical
possession of the subject property since they constructed a concrete perimeter fence
thereon sometime in September to October 2001. The RTC reversed the Me TC ruling. The
RTC found that the plaintiffs failed to prove prior actual physical possession. The CA
granted Manolo' s petition and reversed the R TC ruling. The CA found that Manolo
sufficiently proved that he had prior physical possession over the subject property.
ISSUE
Is it necessary to provisionally determine ownership of the subject property for
purposes of determining prior possession in forcible entry cases?
HELD
Yes. It is necessary to provisionally determine ownership of the subject property.
199
As a rule, "possession" in forcible entry cases refers to prior physical possession or
possession de facto, not possession de Jure or that arising from ownership. Title is not an
issue. As an exception, Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue
of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of
possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. Thus, based on the foregoing, the
issue of ownership of the property in forcible entry cases may be provisionally determined
-to determine the issue of possession and only if the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. In addition, We have likewise
also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts
and legal formalities established for acquiring such right."
In the instant case, both the MeTC and the CA correctly found that Manolo and his
siblings were able to establish that they are the registered owners of the subject property
which they acquired from their parents in 1999. Although they did not immediately put
the same to active use but viewed in the light of the foregoing juridical acts, Manolo had
been occupying the land since 1999. On the other hand, Palajos claims that his right to
enter Lot No. 5 of the subject property was by virtue of a May 4, 1988 Deed of Absolute
Sale which B.C. Regalado & Co. executed in his favor.28 However, We find that Palajos
failed to substantially prove the same.
Hence, for the purposes of determining prior possession in forcible entry cases, it
is necessary to determine ownership of the subject property.
200
DAYRIT V. NORGUILLAS
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 201631 | DECEMBER 7, 2021
JURISDICTION OF FIRST LEVEL COURTS VIS-A-VIS JURISDICTION OF DARAB
DOCTRINE
First-level courts have jurisdiction on ejectment cases even if the land is public in
character as long as the case is not an agrarian dispute. The public character of the land
does not divest the courts of jurisdiction over ejectment cases. However, if the ejectment
case is found to be an agrarian dispute, the first-level courts will be divested of
jurisdiction in accordance with the CARL, as amended. The controlling aspect, therefore,
is the nature of the dispute (i.e., agrarian or not) and not the character of the subject
land.
Angelina Dayrit (Angelina) was the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land
located in Misamis Oriental. In 1993, the parcels of land were placed under the coverage
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Hence, Angelina’s titles to the
parcels of land were cancelled and new titles (pursuant to the Certificate of Land Award
(CLOAs) were issued in favor of respondents Jose I. Norquillas, Rogelio I. Norquillas, Romie
I. Norquillas, Herdanny I. Norquillas, Danilo M. Norquillas, Anthony Apus, Teclo P. Mugot,
Allan A. Ompoc, Joni Clarin, Candelaria Mejorada, Lilia O. Taganas, Sylvia Sabayanon,
Arsenio Catiil, Veronico Maestro, and Mario Tagaylo (collectively, respondents). Angelina,
therefore, filed a petition for the annulment of the CLOAs before the DARAB Misamis
Oriental Provincial Office.
While the appeal for the petition for annulment was pending in the DARAB Manila
Office, Angelina claimed that in 2006, respondents surreptitiously entered the property
and refused to vacate despite repeated demands. This prompted Angelina to file the
instant complaint for forcible entry.
The MCTC ruled in favor of Angelina. It held that evidence showed that Angelina
was in prior possession of the parcels of land and that respondents should have filed the
appropriate action to enforce their ownership and not taken the law into their own hands
by entering the property. The RTC affirmed the MCTC’s decision in its entirety The RTC
added that a mere allegation of an agrarian dispute does not deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction especially because the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended,
provides that the lower courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the rulings of the
MCTC and the RTC and dismissed the complaint. The CA ruled that the DARAB has
jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident involving the
implementation of the CARP. The CA therefore found that the issue of possession in this
instant case is linked to an agrarian dispute. The MCTC should have dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
201
ISSUE
Should the MCTC have dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the
complaint for forcible entry?
FACTS
Yes, MCTC has no jurisdiction over the instant action for forcible entry. According
to the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988 (CARL), the MCTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry,
while the DARAB has primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. An agrarian dispute
refers to any controversy relating to, as related to the instant case, tenancy over lands
devoted to agriculture and transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers,
tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries.
In the case of David v. Cordova (David), the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the
MCTC over a complaint for forcible entry. However, it must be stressed that David did not
lay down the rule that all ejectment cases, whether involving an agrarian dispute or not,
are cognizable by the first-level courts. David clearly states that the dispute therein is not
an agrarian matter. However, the land being public in character is completely separate
from the existence of an agrarian dispute. When a dispute involves a public land, it does
not necessarily amount to an agrarian dispute; an agrarian dispute is specifically defined
in the law.
Thus, David should not be understood that jurisdiction on ejectment cases of

whatever nature falls on first-level courts; it should be read and understood to provide
that first-level courts have jurisdiction on ejectment cases even if the land is public in
character as long as the case is not an agrarian dispute. The public character of the land
does not divest the courts of jurisdiction over ejectment cases. However, if the ejectment
case is found to be an agrarian dispute, the first-level courts will be divested of
jurisdiction in accordance with the CARL, as amended. The controlling aspect, therefore,
is the nature of the dispute (i.e., agrarian or not) and not the character of the subject
land.
On the other hand, there is the more recent case of Chailese Development
Company, Inc. v. Dizon (Chailese), which clarifies the jurisdiction of the DARAB over
agrarian disputes. It held in that case that the judge or prosecutor is obligated to
automatically refer the cases pending before it to the DAR when the following requisites
are present:
a. There is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is
agrarian in nature; and
b. One of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.
David instructs that not all ejectment cases are cognizable by the first-level courts
— those involving agrarian disputes are not cognizable by the first-level courts. In this
relation, Chailese clarifies the requisites for an agrarian dispute, and highlights the
mandate of the amendatory law of automatic referral of cases involving agrarian disputes
to the DAR.
202
This case meets the two requirements for automatic referral, as set out by RA
9700 and as summarized in Chailese. Thus, the Court finds that the case is cognizable by
the DAR through the DARAB. The first requirement is the presence of an allegation from
any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature. Here, despite the filing
of the forcible entry case, respondents have been consistent on alleging that the
controversy is agrarian in nature. As stated by RA 9700, mere allegation of the existence
of an agrarian dispute is enough. In this case, this requirement was met when respondents
made consistent allegations of the existence of an agrarian dispute pursuant to the CLOAs
issued to them.
As to the second requirement, Chailese adds that proof must be adduced as to the
person's status as farmer, farmworker, or tenant. In this case, it is undisputed that
respondents are farmers of the subject lands. Indeed, the records did not expressly show
any agreement of whatever kind that respondents were farmers of Angelina's lands.
However, the CA and the DAR Secretary here recognized the status of respondents as
farmers. This was not disputed by Angelina. Further, their status as farmers was cemented
by the subsequent award of Angelina's lands to them by virtue of CLOAs. Thus, the second
requirement is met.
In any case, even without the mandate of automatic referral at that time, the
MCTC should have dismissed the case after hearing the parties as the law is clear prior to
the amendment that the DAR, through the DARAB, has jurisdiction on agrarian disputes
involving transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries.
Here, the entry, despite being characterized by Angelina as forcible entry, is

clearly a controversy relating to and arising from the terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership to agrarian reform beneficiaries.
The Court, therefore, agrees with the CA in dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The DAR, through the DARAB, has jurisdiction over the instant case for
forcible entry for being an agrarian dispute.
203
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. V. MABALACAT
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 211563 | SEPTEMBER 29, 2021
EJECTMENT AS A CAUSE OF ACTION
DOCTRINE
Insofar as the complaint for collection of sum of money is concerned, it is not a
simple case of recovering the unpaid balance of rentals. It must be pointed out that there
are several factors to consider if and when the collection of sum of money will prosper,
i.e. the determination if indeed recovery of the alleged balance is proper, the correct
amount of rental to be paid or recovered, the intention and/or agreement of the parties
as to the terms of payment of rental in order to arrive at a correct amount, among
others.
FACTS
Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. (SVHFI) claimed that it is the registered
and absolute owner of a parcel of land situated in Mabalacat, Pampanga, more
particularly described as Lot No. 530 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
(TCT) T-195826-R, issued in its name. Mabalacat Institute, Inc. (MII), which is now known
as Don Teodoro V. Santos Institute, occupies said lot without paying rent and only through
its tolerance since the year 1983 until March 14, 2002.
Thereafter, SVHFI informed MII that it will be charged a rental fee for its use and
occupancy of the subject lot. However, MII refused to comply with SVHFI's demand. In
view of MII's refusal, SVHFI demanded the rental payment in the total amount of
P2,519,220.00 within 15 days from receipt thereof. Otherwise, it must vacate the subject
lot. However, MII still failed to comply therewith.
Consequently, SVHFI filed a Complaint for collection of a sum of money against MII.
Instead of filing an answer, MII filed a Motion to Dismiss but it was denied. During the
pendency of the collection case, SVHFI then filed an ejectment case against MII. This led
the latter to file a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum shopping.
The RTC granted MII's motion to dismiss, thereby dismissing the Collection Case.
The CA ruled that SVHFI was guilty of forum shopping when it filed two different actions,
i.e., the Collection and Ejectment Cases, in two different courts.
ISSUE
Are the amount of rental fees that are allegedly due to SVHFI under the Collection
Case correct?
204
HELD
NO, CASE MUST FIRST BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR A FULL-BLOWN
TRIAL. Insofar as the complaint for collection of sum of money is concerned, it is not a
simple case of recovering the unpaid balance of rentals. It must be pointed out that there
are several factors to consider if and when the collection of sum of money will prosper,
i.e., the determination if indeed recovery of the alleged balance is proper, the correct
amount of rental to be paid or recovered, the intention and/or agreement of the parties
as to the terms of payment of rental in order to arrive at a correct amount, among
others.
Indeed, the resolution of whether the correct rental fees were paid and if there is
a deficiency in the payment of rentals requires a full-blown trial through the submission
of documentary and testimonial evidence by the parties which cannot be passed upon in a
summary proceeding.
In the instant case, the Collection Case requires a full-blown trial for the parties to
show evidence on the propriety of paying rent and its rightful amount. These may not be
accomplished in an ejectment proceeding which is summary in nature. Collection Case
was founded on the appropriate amount of rental fees that are allegedly due and the
damages that SVHFI allegedly suffered but which have no direct relation to its loss of
material possession.
205
CONTEMPT
HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL, INC. V. LA FILIPINA UYGONGCO CORP.
HERNANDO, J.
GR Nos. 240984 & 241120| September 27, 2021
NATURE OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT
DOCTRINE
Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in nature,
that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy
for coercing a person to do the thing required. It is a remedy resorted to preserve and
enforce the rights of respondent and to compel obedience to the injunctive writ for their
benefit.
FACTS
The operator of Manila Harbour Centre (Manila Harbour), La Filipina Uygonco Corp
(La Filipina) together with its sister company Philippine Foremost Milling Corp (Phil.
Foremost) entered into a memorandum of agreement which provided, among others,
priority berthing rights to the domestic and foreign vessels of La Filipina and Phil
Foremost. The relationship turned sour when Manila Harbour demanded payment from La
Filipina and Phil Foremost. By way of response, La Filipina and Phil Foremost alleged that
Manila Harbour failed to honor the agreement and filed a complaint for breach of contract
and specific performance and, later on, a Writ for Temporary Restraining Order, which was
granted, to enjoin Manila Harbour from preventing La Filipina and Phil Foremost access to
rail lines and unloaders, and from using the port facilities of Manila Harbour, among
others. However, vessels of La Filipina and Phil Foremost were still not allowed access to
their unloaders and rail lines or were delayed in the using the berthing area fronting their
facilities. This prompted La Filipina and Phil Foremost to rent the barges which resulted
to them incurring additional expenses. Due to this, La Filipina and Phil Foremost filed a
petition for Indirect Contempt for willfully violating the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
issued to Manila Harbour.
In its answer, Manila Harbour denied the accusations and claimed that La Filipina
and Phil Foremost failed to apply for berthing for any or all of the vessels allegedly denied
priority berthing and that a charge for Indirect Contempt is criminal in nature, and thus,
the rules of evidence in contempt proceedings should be applied as far as practicable.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the Petition for Indirect Contempt explaining
that La Filipina and Phil Foremost failed to apply for the necessary documents and
procedure to hold the agreement effective.
206
Upon the denial of La Filipina and Phil Foremost’s Motion for Reconsideration, they
appealed to the Court of Appeals who set aside and reversed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court holding further that the petition of Indirect Contempt is not criminal in nature
since the objective of the petition was to compel obedience to the injunctive writ.
ISSUE
Is Indirect Contempt civil in nature?
HELD
Yes. Contempts are classified as civil or criminal. A civil contempt is the failure to
do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing
party. On the other hand, a criminal contempt is conduct directed against the authority
and dignity of a court or a judge. The real character of the proceedings is to be
determined by the relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be
regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the
purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.
Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in nature,
that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy
for coercing a person to do the thing required. So a proceeding is one for civil contempt if
the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special order
made in behalf of the other party and the disobedience may still be obeyed, and the
purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience. The rules of
procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily
are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings. In general, civil contempt proceedings
should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor; or someone who has
pecuniary interest in the right to be protected/ in criminal contempt proceedings, it is
generally held that the State is the real prosecutor.
In the case at bar, the purpose of the contempt was for the enforcement of the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. It is a remedy resorted to preserve and enforce the rights
of La Filipina and Phil Foremost and to compel obedience to the injunctive writ for their
benefit. Hence, the contempt is civil in nature. Accordingly, an appeal from the decision
dismissing the same is not barred by double jeopardy. The appellate court was therefore
correct in holding that the petition for Indirect Contempt institute herein is civil in
nature. However, Manila Harbour is not guilty of Indirect contempt due to La Filipina and
Phil Foremost’s failure to comply with the requirements mandated in the Memorandum of
Agreement which was recognized by the injunction order in the enforcement of the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction.
207
VENUE AND PROCESSES

ENDE V. ROMAN CATHOLIC PRELATE OF THE PRELATURE NULLIUS
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 191867 | December 6, 2021
PREREQUISITE BEFORE FILING AN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION TO ENFORCE OWNERSHIP RIGHTS BY
VIRTUE OF SUCCESSION
DOCTRINE
A prior determination of heirship in a special proceeding is not a prerequisite
before one can file an ordinary civil action to enforce ownership rights by virtue of
succession. The rule is unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of
the decedent's estate or for the determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate
heirs may commence an ordinary civil action to declare the nullity of a deed or
instrument, and for recovery of property, or any other action in the enforcement of their
ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, without the necessity of a prior and
separate judicial declaration of their status as such. The ruling of the trial court shall only
be in relation to the cause of action of the ordinary civil action, i.e., the nullification of a
deed or instrument, and recovery or reconveyance of property, which ruling is binding
only between and among the parties.
FACTS
Spouses Butas Ende were the registered owners of a lot located in Cotabato.
However, portions of the subject property are presently occupied by respondents Roman
Catholic, Welhilmina, Eliza and Juanito Diaz, and Jessie and Corazon Flores.
In 1995, Amado, Daniel, Felipe, and Pilar, claiming to be the surviving heirs of the
Sps. Ende, filed a complaint for quieting and recovery of possession of the subject
property. Petitioners Amalayon and Quezon, claiming to be the surviving children and
legitimate heirs of the Sps. Ende, intervened. In their answer-in-intervention, they
claimed that they are the children and legitimate heirs of the Sps. Ende and that Amado,
Daniel, Felipe, and Pilar are mere impostors.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession of
the subject property. However, the lower court granted petitioner’s Amlayon and
Quezon’s claim who, by preponderance of evidence, proved that they are the children of
the Sps. Ende and therefore, the legal heirs. On appeal, the CA affirmed the dismissal of
the complaint but reversed the RTC’s ruling in favor of Amlayon and Quezon. The CA held
that Amlayon and Quezon lack cause of action as they failed to establish that they are the
real parties-in-interest to institute an action for quieting of title or recovery of
208
possession. The CA noted that the case involved a question of who are the legitimate
heirs of the Sps. Ende, which issue should have been threshed out in a special proceeding,
and not in a complaint for quieting of title. Thus, the CA held that there was a need for a
prior declaration of heirship in a special proceeding to determine the proper party who
can institute an action.
Respondent Catholic Church agrees with the appellate court that the
determination of who are the rightful heirs of the Sps. Ende should be resolved in a
special proceeding and not in a case of quieting of title.
ISSUE
Has the RTC validly assumed jurisdiction to determine the issue of heirship in an
ordinary civil action?
HELD
Yes, as provided in the case of Treyes vs. Larlar, a prior determination of heirship
in a special proceeding is not a prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil action to
enforce ownership rights by virtue of succession. The rule is unless there is a pending
special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate or for the determination of
heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary civil action to
declare the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of property, or any other
action in the enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession,
without the necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration of their status as such.
The ruling of the trial court shall only be in relation to the cause of action of the ordinary
civil action, i.e., the nullification of a deed or instrument, and recovery or reconveyance
of property, which ruling is binding only between and among the parties.
What is abandoned in Treyes is the prior determination of heirship in a separate

special proceeding as a prerequisite for filing an ordinary civil action. Accordingly, when
two or more heirs rightfully assert ownership over another in an ordinary civil action to
recover the property of the estate against third persons, the trial court may determine
their status or right as legal heirs to protect their legitimate interests in the estate, since
successional rights is transmitted by operation of law from the moment of death of the
decedent. Thus, it is only proper to allow the legitimate heirs of Sps. Ende to institute the
present civil action or to intervene in the recovery of the property of the estate without a
prior determination of heirship in a special proceeding.
In this case, there is no doubt therefore as to the rights of Amado, Daniel, Felipe,
and Pilar; and petitioners Amlayon and Quezon who claim to be the heirs of Sps. Ende to
institute the present action to quiet and to recover its possession even without a prior
determination of heirship in a special proceeding. Consequently, the question as to who
between Amado, Daniel, Felipe, and Pilar; and petitioners Amlayon and Quezon, are the
real parties-in-interest or the rightful heirs of Butas is inevitable in the case at bar.
Hence, the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the determination of heirship
between Amado, Daniel, Felipe, and Pilar, and petitioners Amlayon and Quezon. Hence,
209
the CA erred when it reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC regarding the
determination of the legal heirs of Sps. Ende, i.e., who between Amado, Daniel, Felipe,
and Pilar, on one hand, and petitioners Amlayon and Quezon, on the other, are the real
parties-in- interest in the action for quieting and the recovery of ownership and
possession of the subject property filed against respondents Roman Catholic, Welhilmina,
Acosta, Eliza and Juanito, Kintanar, Bagasmas, and Jessie and Corazon.
210
SALES, MORTGAGES, AND OTHER ENCUMBRANCES OF PROPERTY OF
DECEDENT
RAMON JACINTO V. ATTY.BENEDICT LITONJUA
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 207675, January 20, 2021
SALES, MORTGAGES, AND OTHER ENCUMBRANCES OF PROPERTY OF DECEDENT (RULE 89)
DOCTRINE
The general rule is that an administrator has all the powers necessary for
administration of the estate and which powers he can exercise without leave of court.
However, as regards the sale, mortgage or other encumbrances on the estate, the
provisions of Rule 89 apply.
FACTS
Ramon Jacinto (Ramon) and Marilene Jacinto (Marilene) are legitimate children of
the Spouses Fernando and Bernardina Jacinto (Spouses Jacinto) who are the decedents in
separate probate proceedings pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), of
Muntinlupa City.
To recover the decedents' properties fraudulently alienated to Forward Properties,

Inc. (FPI) and subsequently mortgaged by it to EPCIB as security for a loan, Ramon filed an
action for annulment of sale and mortgage with damages and injunction against the
defendants therein, EPCIB and FPI, before the RTC Baguio docketed as Civil Case No.
5751-R.
Upon the fraudulent transfer of the subject properties to FPI by virtue of a deed of
sale purportedly executed by Fernando, and allegedly notarized on October 3, 1995,
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-60157 and 60158 in the names of the Spouses
Jacinto were cancelled. The Register of Deeds of Baguio City then issued new titles to FPI.
Significantly, on October 17, 1995, Fernando, after a lingering illness, died in the State of
Hawaii, United States of America followed by his wife, Bernardina, on November 27,
1996.
At the proceedings before the RTC Baguio, the then administratrix of the Spouses
Jacinto's estate, Marilene, was represented by herein respondents, Attorneys Litonjua and
Solis.
On October 30, 2007, the RTC Baguio ruled in favor of the Jacinto siblings
declaring void: (a) the October deed of sale between Fernando Jacinto and defendant FPI;
(b) the real estate mortgage between defendants EPCIB and FPI, and (c) the subsequent
211
sale of the subject properties on foreclosure to EPCIB. Only defendant EPCIB appealed to
the CA. Meanwhile, on February 28, 2008, respondents filed a Notice of Attorney's Lien
before the RTC Baguio claiming (contingent) attorney's fees in the amount pursuant to
their engagement contract dated May 9, 2004 with Marilene.
Respondents filed an Opposition to the Joint Motion for Approval of Compromise

Agreement attaching their Notice of Attorney's Lien. The Appellate Court approved the
Compromise Agreement but denied respondents' claim for attorney's fees. It ruled that a
charging lien requires as a condition sine qua non the execution of a judgment for money.
On motion for partial reconsideration of respondents, the appellate court rendered

the assailed Amended Decision partially granted and the Resolution modified. Upon the
denial of his motion for reconsideration, Ramon filed this appeal by certiorari.
ISSUE
Can Civil Case No. 5751-R considered as an action to recover and enforce
registered ownership over real property.
HELD
Yes. There is no dispute that the subject properties properly belonged to the
Estate of the Spouses Jacinto, which recognized that the subject properties form part of
the Estate of the Spouses Jacinto. Hence, when Marilene, as the then administratrix of
her parents' estate, intervened, the initial defect in the complaint filed by Ramon was
cured.
The general rule is that an administrator has all the powers necessary for
In this case, respondents' claim of attorney's fees over the recovered properties
and the succeeding compromise agreement cannot override Ramon's acts of
administration over the decedents' estate consisting in opting to settle CA-G.R. CV No.
92392 and the originating case, Civil Case No. 5751-R. Respondents cannot then litigate
and assert their claim of attorney's fees in CA-G.R. CV No. 92392, actually evade payment
of proper filing fees, receive relief beyond what they prayed for, and that already
adjudged with finality by the trial court. Certainly, respondents are not preferred
creditors of the estate of the Spouses Jacinto; they do not have a preferential right or
claim to a specific property thereof.
Civil Case No. 5751-R was an action to recover and enforce the ownership of the
Spouses Jacinto (decedents) and consequently their estate, over the subject properties
against that of the titles of defendant EPCIB. The RTC Baguio's ensuing judgment thereon
declared the transfers of the subject properties null the fraudulent, and ultimately
settled the valid registered ownership over these. The RTC Baguio granted Ramon's and
Marilene's prayer for damages in the total amount of P700,000.00, including P100,000.00
212
as attorney's fees. There was no other judgment award in favor of respondents' client,
Marilene, as the then administratrix of her parents' estate.
Verily, even without delving into the finality of the monetary awards to Ramon and
Marilene, respondent lawyers have no claim to the judgment amount in favor of EPCIB.
213
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
MIGUEL V. DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS
HERNANDO, J.
UDK-15368| September 15, 2021
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
DOCTRINE
It is clear that the trial court, the appellate court, and this Court exercise
concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
However, this does not mean that parties are absolutely free to choose before which court
to file their petitions, thus:
Mere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom
to choose the court with which the petition shall be filed. Petitioners should be
directed by the hierarchy of courts. After all, the hierarchy of courts serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitioners for the extraordinary
writs.'
In sum, Miguel should have filed the present petition before the RTC, absent any
showing of special and important reasons warranting a direct resort to this Court.
FACTS
This case involves a Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by
petitioner Gil Miguel (Miguel), praying for the Court to order the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons (now Director General of the Bureau of Corrections) to bring petitioner before this
Court, and after due proceedings, to restore his liberty.
On February 26, 1991, Miguel was charged with the crime of Murder before the
RTC of Quezon City. After trial, Miguel was found guilty as charged and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Pursuant to his conviction, Miguel was delivered
to the National Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on January 15, 1994. Miguel's conviction
was affirmed by this Court in a Decision dated March 7, 1996. Alleging that his continued
detention no longer holds legal basis in view of Republic Act No. (RA) 10592, otherwise
known as the Good Conduct Time Allowance Law, Miguel filed the present petition for the
issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus on August 19, 2015.
The respondent Director General of the Bureau of Corrections, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed his Comment dated January 28, 2016. In response,
Miguel filed his Reply dated May 11, 2018. In a Resolution dated September 30, 2020, this
Court required the parties to file their respective Memoranda. In compliance with the said
Resolution, respondent filed their Memorandum dated February 9, 2021. Miguel failed to
file his Memorandum.
214
ISSUE
Will the Writ of Habeas Corpus issue?
HELD
No, the Supreme Court points out that Miguel failed to observe the principle of
hierarchy of courts.
In Cruz v. Gingoyon, “A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original

jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.”
As to which court may grant the writ, Section 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section 2. Who may grant the writ. - The writ of habeas corpus may be
granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any
time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances
authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof,
or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision
on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge
thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable
only within his judicial district.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court, the appellate court, and this
Court exercise concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus. However, this does not mean that parties are absolutely free to choose before
which court to file their petitions, thus:
Mere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom

to choose the court with which the petition shall be filed. Petitioners should be
directed by the hierarchy of courts. After all, the hierarchy of courts 'serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitioners for the extraordinary
writs.'
In sum, Miguel should have filed the present petition before the RTC, absent any
showing of special and important reasons warranting a direct resort to this Court."
215
WRIT OF AMPARO
MORADA V. RIAS
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 222226 | FEBRUARY 14, 2022
WRIT OF AMPARO
DOCTRINE
The elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under Republic Act
No. 9851 are as follows:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation

of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject
of the amparo petition; and
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
FACTS
Petitioner Fe J. Morada (Morada) alleged that on October 14, 2015 at around 8:00
a.m., she received a text message from her daughter, Jennilyn J. Morada, that Johnson
was arrested and detained by the barangay tanods of Barangay 176, Caloocan City for
alleged theft of a mobile phone in the house of another barangay tanod, herein
respondent Randy Rias (Randy). On the same day, Morada went to the barangay hall. At
the barangay hall, respondent Rolly Cebu (Rolly) informed Morada that Johnson was
already released by either respondent Fernando Domingo (Fernando) or respondent Romy
Donaldo (Romy) from the custody of the barangay.
In December 2015, Morada went to the Northern Police District (NPD) to report
that her son is missing. Rumors circulated within Barangay 176 that Johnson had been
extrajudicially killed and that his body was mixed in cement in order to conceal the
incident. This prompted Morada to institute a petition for the issuance of a writ of
amparo to determine whether respondents had violated or threatened to violate Johnson's
right to life, liberty and security, and to compel respondents to determine the
whereabouts of Johnson, and the person/s responsible for his disappearance or possible
death, among others.
The RTC denied the petition. The RTC held that there was no showing of any
refusal on the part of the respondents to acknowledge or to give information on Johnson's
216
whereabouts such that there was no intention to remove him from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time. Thus, the third and fourth elements of enforced
disappearance are absent.
ISSUE
Did the RTC gravely erred in not giving due course to the petition for issuance of
writ of amparo despite substantial evidence submitted in support of the same?
HELD
No, there is no substantial evidence that exists to compel the grant of the writ
prayed for by Morada.
The elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under Republic Act

No. 9851 are as follows:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation

of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject
of the amparo petition; and
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person
from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
In this case, there is no question that the first and second elements are attendant
in this case. However, The Court agrees with the RTC that the third and fourth elements
are sorely lacking. While it is admitted that Johnson was arrested for the alleged theft
that he committed in the house of Randy, it was sufficiently established by the
respondents that he was already released from their custody on October 14, 2015, as
evidenced by the barangay blotter, signed by Johnson himself. We accord greater weight
to the documentary evidence presented by the respondents exhibiting that Johnson was
no longer in the custody of the respondents when he disappeared. Such evidence strongly
militate against Morada's claim of enforced disappearance.
Therefore, the Court agrees with the RTC that Morada failed to prove by
substantial evidence her claim of enforced disappearance.
217
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
TALABIS V. PEOPLE
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 214647; March 04, 2020
DOCTRINE
Jurisdiction
It is a general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. An exception to this is the principle of estoppel
by laches as introduced by the Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy (Sibonghanoy). However,
estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in
which the factual milieu is analogous to Sibonghanoy case, i.e., where the issue of
jurisdiction was only raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost 15 years
after the questioned ruling had been rendered by the lower court.
Complaint (Rule 110)

As a rule, a criminal action contemplated under Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules) is commenced by a complaint or information, both of
which are filed in court. Thus, if a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be
filed by those persons delineated in Sections 3 and 5 of the same rule, such as the
offended party. In the case of an information, the same must be filed by the fiscal or
prosecutor. However, a "complaint" filed with the fiscal or prosecutor from which he/she
may initiate a preliminary investigation may be filed by any person.
FACTS
Leonora Edoc (Leonora) and Rhoda E. Bay-An (Rhoda) filed a Joint
Affidavit-Complaint against petitioner before the Office of Provincial Prosecutor of La
Trinidad, Benguet. After preliminary investigation, petitioner Edwin Talabis (Talabis) was
charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of PD 705 for cutting pine trees at
Cotcot, Buguias, without any lawful permit or authority in violation of the
abovementioned law.
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Talabis guilty as
charged, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).
Talabis filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court (Court)
claiming that the case should be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because
the complaint against him was filed by private individuals and not by any forest officer as
218
prescribed in Section 8031 of PD 705. Talabis maintains that cases involving violations of
PD 705 fall within the contemplation of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which provides,
among others, for certain crimes that may not be prosecuted unless the complaint has
been filed by specific individuals.
Respondent, on its part, argued that petitioner is already estopped from assailing
the jurisdiction of the RTC by actively participating in the court proceedings.
ISSUES
1. Is the petitioner estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC on appeal?
2. Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the criminal case based on a complaint
filed by private individuals and not by a forest officer?
HELD
1. No, the petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC on
appeal.
after the questioned ruling had been rendered by the lower court. In such controversy,
laches was clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction was raised so belatedly as to
warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to
assert it.
Here, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present. Noteworthy,
Talabis, although not raised as an issue, questioned in his appellate Brief the authority of
Leonora and Rhoda to file the complaint against him. At that time, no considerable period
had yet elapsed for laches to attach. Hence, Talabis is not estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
2. Yes, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the criminal case based on a
complaint filed by a private individual.
219
The Revised Rules list the cases which must be initiated by a complaint filed by
specified individuals, non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from
trying such cases. However, these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against
chastity and not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705.
Further, the Court ruled that PD 705 should not be interpreted to vest exclusive
authority upon forest officers to conduct investigations and file criminal complaints
regarding offenses described therein. Rather, said provision should be construed as a
recognition and reinforcement of their special authority to conduct warrantless arrests,
seize and confiscate property, and proceeding therefrom, file the necessary complaints
against forestry law offenders. Thus, the RTC has correctly acquired jurisdiction over the
criminal case.
220
RADAZA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 201380; August 4, 2021
DOCTRINE
A handling prosecutor's lack of prior written authority from the head prosecutor in
the filing of an Information does not affect a trial court's acquisition of jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the person of the accused.
FACTS
Province of Cebu was designated as the venue for the 12th Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit. Beautification projects then commenced in
preparation for the event. Among such projects were the acquisition and installation of
street lighting facilities and decorative lampposts in the focal thoroughfares of Cebu,
Mandaue, and Lapu-Lapu cities. Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), Central Visayas,
Panaghugpong sa Kabus sa Dakbayan-KADAMAY, Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas, the
Panaghuisa sa Gagmay'ng Mangingisda sa Sugbo, and Alyansa sa Mamumu-o sa Sugbo wrote
the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas, alleged anomalies in pricing and called for
the investigation of the transactions entered into by the DPWH in connection to the street
lighting project. Ombudsman-Visayas found prima facie evidence of overpricing resulting
from the purported collusion between the winning bidders, the private contractors, and
the City Governments of Mandaue and Lapu-Lapu. Ombudsman-Visayas recommended the
institution of criminal charges and administrative cases against the persons and
government officials allegedly involved.
Among the respondents was Radaza , then the City Mayor of Lapu-Lapu City who
was found thereafter guilty. January 2008, Initially recommended to be indicted for
violation of Paragraph (e), Section 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as well as for administrative liability for Dishonesty/Grave
Misconduct. This was amended to add violation of paragraph (g). Radaza file for a motion
for reconsideration and motion to defer issuance of warrant of arrest, whilst this was still
pending the warrant of arrest was issued. Raised to the Sandiganbayan and pending
resolution The Sandiganbayan scheduled his arraignment. Radaza filed an Omnibus Motion
for judicial redetermination of probable cause but was denied.
Upon motion of the Ombudsman the information was withdrawn by the

Sandiganbayan, in the same vein granted the motion for reconsideration of Razada and
reordered the prosecution to reinvestigate. Prosecution merely reiterated its case and
reverted back to its original accusations. Radaza filed an omnibus motion for clarification
that the task of reinvestigation was supposed to be done by The Office of the Special
Prosecutor, by delegating it to the Ombudsman – Visayas, he was being deprived of due
process. The motion was granted but the Ombudsman – Visayas continued its investigation
221
and a subsequent turn over of the authority to investigate was given to the former. The
manifestation of Razada was denied.
Ombudsman – Visayas proceeded on its part and filed a compliance motion for
summary amendment and to set for arraignment. Razada filed a motion to quash and
pointed out that the final approving authority of the resolution was not the acting
ombudsman but then a newly appointed one. This was also denied.
ISSUE
Did the Sandiganbayan acquire jurisdiction when the amended information having
been filed pursuant to the authority of the acting Ombudsman without the approval of the
new Ombudsman?
HELD
Yes. Lack of authority of an officer to file an Information, while a ground for
quashal, is not a jurisdictional defect. Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that lack of authority to file an information may be a ground to quash
the information. However, in the case of Gomez v. People, such lack of authority does not
affect a trial court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person of
the accused. Such handling prosecutor who filed an unauthorized Information but without
bad faith or criminal intent is considered as a de facto officer coated with a color of
authority to exercise acts that remain valid and official. In this case, while it is true that
it is only the acting ombudsman who filed the amended information. Such should not be
considered as a procedural defect as it was not made in bad faith. Therefore, lack of
authority is not a procedural defect.
Even if the lack of authority may be considered as a jurisdictional defect, court

finds that Radaza has already submitted himself before the jurisdiction of the court. In
this case, Multiple pleadings, motions, and remedies had been signed, filed, and prayed
for under his name throughout the proceedings of this case. Radaza invoked the processes
of the Sandiganbayan in moving for a judicial re-determination of probable cause. He had
even applied for bail before the anti-graft court and was granted provisional liberty
thereon. Settled is the rule that an accused is deemed to have yielded himself to the
jurisdiction of the court upon seeking before it the grant of affirmative reliefs. With all of
the facts considered, Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over Radaza.
222
PEOPLE V. BERNABE EULALIO Y ALEJO
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 214882 | October 16, 2019
VARIANCE DOCTRINE; CHILD WITNESS RULE
DOCTRINE
It is important to emphasize that although Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 was
not expressly mentioned in the Information, "this omission is not fatal so as to violate his
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. Indeed, what
controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense, but the
actual facts recited in the information constituting the crime charged.
FACTS
Accused-appellant Bernabe Eulalio y Alejo (Eulalio) is appealing his conviction of
rape and acts of lasciviousness since it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In August 2004, 11-year-old AAA, was playing in the street when Eulalio called her
to his house. When AAA refused, Eulalio threatened AAA that he would kidnap one of her
siblings. Fearful, AAA went along with Eulalio. At Eulalio's house, the latter brought AAA
inside a room and started to undress her. When AAA resisted, Eulalio again threatened to
kidnap her sibling. Eulalio then proceeded to undress himself and while standing, rubbed
his genitalia against AAA's and kissed her. Eulalio then told AAA to lie down on the bed,
forcibly spread her legs apart and inserted his penis into her vagina. Eulalio covered AAA's
mouth to prevent her from shouting. After he was done, Eulalio instructed AAA to put her
clothes back on and sent her home. AAA did not reveal the incident to anyone in view of
the threats of Eulalio.
A month later, AAA was playing in the street when she was informed by CCC, her
older sister, that she was being called by Eulalio who was waiting at their (AAA's) house.
This time, AAA did as instructed. AAA went home and sat on a bench. Eulalio did not
undress her. Instead, he made AAA lie on the bed and kissed her. Eulalio and AAA were in
this compromising position when AAA's father, BBB, and mother, arrived. BBB then
inquired what happened. They then went to the barangay to report the incident. AAA
submitted herself to a medical examination wherein the attending physician found deep
healing laceration in her hymen, suggestive of a prior blunt force or penetrating trauma
to the area.
Two (2) separate Informations dated September 7, 2004 were filed charging Eulalio
with rape and acts of lasciviousness.
The RTC found Eulalio guilty of the charges of rape and acts of lasciviousness. It
gave full credence to the testimony of AAA which was corroborated by the findings of the
examining physician. It also gave weight to the testimony of the victim's father, BBB, who
223
actually saw Eulalio on top of AAA while kissing her, which constituted as acts of
lasciviousness which is necessarily included in a rape charge. The trial court noted that
Eulalio did not offer any defense despite several opportunities and in fact even waived
the presentation of his defense a year after the prosecution already rested its case. The
CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE
1. Is the charge of acts of lasciviousness although charged with rape proper?
2. Is AAA, a minor, a credible witness and her testimony be given full weight?
HELD
1. YES. Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides that- when there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged,
or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. Further, Section 5, Rule
120 states that - An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of
the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of
those constituting the latter
Here, both the RTC and the CA properly convicted Eulalio of acts of lasciviousness,
although charged with rape in the Information. Eulalio committed lewd acts upon AAA,
who was only 11 years old at the time, by kissing her using threats and intimidation.
Eulalio can only be held guilty of acts of lasciviousness although charged with rape
"following the variance doctrine enunciated under Sec 4, Rule 120, in relation to Sec 5,
Rule 120. Acts of lasciviousness, the offense proved, is included in rape, the offense
charged.
YES. It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child victims are given full
weight and credit, because when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity."
In People v. Macapagal, the court held that in cases of offended parties who are
young and immature girls, there is considerable receptivity on the part of the courts to
lend credence to their testimonies, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but
also the shame and embarrassment to which such a grueling experience as a court trial,
where they are called upon to lay bare what perhaps should be shrouded in secrecy, did
expose them to. Indeed, no woman, much less a child, would willingly submit herself to
the rigors, the humiliation and the stigma attendant upon the prosecution of rape, if she
were not motivated by an earnest desire to put the culprit behind bars.
In this case, AAA's positive and categorical testimony, together with her father's
testimony, should be given credence especially since Eulalio did not even bother to raise
224
any defense at all. In view of this, this Court emphasizes that "a young girl's revelation
that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination
and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the
details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as mere Concoction."
Consequently, Eulalio is guilty of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness due to the
weight of the testimony of AAA and her father.
225
KHO V. SUMMERVILLE GENERAL MERCHANDISING
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 213400 | August 4, 2021
PROBABLE CAUSE
DOCTRINE
Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the
suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts
and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which
he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a
conviction.
FACTS
Petitioners Elidad Kho (Elidad) and Violeta Kho (Violeta) were charged with Unfair
Competition by respondent Summerville General Merchandising & Co., Inc., (Summerville)
before the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila. The facts provide that on or about January
10, 2000 and for some time prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila,
petitioners Elidad and Violeta engaged in a business known as KEC Cosmetic Laboratory in
an unfair competition, and for the purpose of deceiving/defrauding the public in general
and the Summerville General Merchandising and Co. which is engaged, among others, in
the importation and distribution of facial cream products with the trademark known as
Chin Chun Su, herein represented by Victor Chua, its General Manager, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and jointly sell/dispose and/or cause to be sold/disposed
to the public facial cream products using tools, implements and equipments in its
production, labeling and distribution, which give and depict the general appearance of
the Chin Chun Su facial cream products and likely influence the purchasers to believe that
the same are those of the said Summerville.
On May 31, 2000, a Resolution was issued by the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila
recommending the filing of an unfair competition case against Kho. Thus, an Information
for Unfair Competition was filed against petitioners before the RTC Branch 24.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice
(DOJ). The DOJ, however, affirmed the May 31, 2000 Resolution dated August 17, 2000.
226
However, upon Motion for Reconsideration, the DOJ issued a June 18, 2001 Resolution
recalling and setting aside the August 17, 2000 Resolution but did not rule on the
propriety of the complaint. It merely stated that the case would be further reviewed.
Petitioners’ arraignment, however, pushed through on October 11, 2000 where they
refused to enter a plea so the plea of not guilty was entered for them.
On September 28, 2001, the DOJ issued a Resolution dismissing the complaint filed
against the petitioners, which respondent Summerville assailed through a Motion for
Reconsideration insisting that the case be dismissed on the ground of double Jeopardy. On
August 21, 2002, the RTC issued an Order holding that there is no necessity to order the
dismissal of the case due to its earlier Order withdrawing the information.
On September 17, 2002, the DOJ issued a Resolution granting the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondent Summerville and ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila to file the appropriate Information for Unfair Competition against
petitioners. Respondent Summerville also filed a Manifestation before the trial Court with
prayer to reinstate the case. The trial court, however, issued an Order dated April 2, 2003
holding that the revival of the case is barred by double jeopardy.
Summerville then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA but it was denied
due course and dismissed by the CA in its Decision dated May 26, 2004. When the case was
elevated to the Supreme Court, a Resolution dated August 7, 2007 ws issued giving due
course to the Petition of Summerville, annulling and setting aside the CA decision. The
Court ordered the remand of the unfair competition case to the RTC Branch 24 to
independently evaluate the merits thereof and to determine whether or not probable
cause exists to hold the petitioners for trial.
RTC: The RTC found no probable cause to hold petitioners for trial. The RTC found
that the accused never deceived the public into believing that the medical facial cream
that they sold which is contained in a pink oval-shaped container with trademark of "Chin
Chun Su", were the same as those being imported by respondent Summerville; and
petitioners acted in good faith without intent to deceive the public.
CA: The CA granted the petition for Certiorari of respondent. The appellate court
found that RTC Branch 46 committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when it found no probable cause to indict petitioners for unfair
competition.
ISSUE
Did the appellate court err when it found probable cause to indict petitioners for
Unfair Competition?
HELD
No, the Court ruled in the Negative. According to the Court, the trial court judge's
determination of probable cause is based on his or her personal evaluation of the
227
prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence. The determination of probable cause
by the trial court judge is a judicial function.
The Court explained that the term probable cause does not mean "actual or
positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the
average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the
rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense.
What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction.
In this case, the Court found that the acts complained of constituted probable
cause to charge them with Unfair Competition.
Further, the CA's directive to the RTC Branch 46 to reinstate the Information for
Unfair Competition against petitioners did not violate the latter's right against double
jeopardy.
The proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been
previously charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his
acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his consent. As a
general rule, the following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a
valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the
accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the
accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express
consent.
In this case, petitioners failed to prove that the above mentioned requisites have
been complied with. In fact, the issue of whether or not double jeopardy has set in has
already been resolved by this Court in its Resolution dated August 7, 2007 in G.R. No.
163741. This Court in G.R. No. 163741 made a clear pronouncement that reinstatement of
the Information against petitioners is not barred and that double jeopardy has not set in.
228
ARREST
ROLANDO UY Y SAYAN V. PEOPLE
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 217097 | February 23, 2022
WARRANTLESS ARREST; WHEN LAWFUL
DOCTRINE
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides for instances when a lawful
arrest may be effected with or without a warrant: a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting
officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which has
just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody
serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Checkpoints are not illegal per se. Warrantless arrest and the concomitant search
in this case is valid. However, the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 as
the Rule on Chain of Custody which is considered substantive law and not merely a
procedural technicality was not complied with. Hence, petitioner Nonoy must be
acquitted.
FACTS
An Information was filed charging petitioner Nonoy with violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165, or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs on the fact that he was
found in possession and use of marijuana. The Prosecution alleged that members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) of San Fernando, Bukidnon, upon implementation of
COMELEC gun ban check point, flagged down Nonoy’s motor vehicle and asked for the
Certificate of Registration (CR) and Official Receipt (OR) of his motorcycle but the latter
failed to do so because he left it in his house. Law enforcers became suspicious and asked
Nonoy to open the tools compartment where they found five bundles of marijuana placed
and wrapped in a cellophane. The specimen was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory
conducted by Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Madroño with a positive result. Petitioner Nonoy
denied the allegations and testified that he went to Bukidnon to deliver medicines which
he peddles to some small stores. While changing a flat tire, armed persons in civilian
attire arrived and told him that they will be inspecting then arrested him and brought him
to the police station to force him to answer queries by striking him with the butt of a
rifle.
RTC found Rolando guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. It
held that mere possession of prohibited substance is a crime per se and the burden of
proof is upon the accused to show that he has a license or permit under the law to possess
229
such prohibited drug. The case falls under the case of a lawful arrest and warrantless
search was justified. CA upheld the ruling but pointed out that Nonoy is precluded from
questioning the legality of his arrest because he never objected the irregularity before his
arraignment. His active participation in the trial amounts to voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, and he is deemed to have waived his right to question the
validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. Moreover,
CA modified the penalty imposed by the RTC since Section 36 (f) of RA 9165 as the basis of
the sentence imposed by the RTC has been struck down as unconstitutional by the Court
in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board. Thus, urine sample taken from
the petitioner, which was the only evidence against petitioner for his alleged use of
marijuana cannot be used as evidence against him.
Hence, petitioner Nonoy filed this petition for review on certiorari arguing that his
right to privacy has been violated, since a close scrutiny of the records would reveal that
the case against him does not fall under any of the circumstances mentioned under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The police officers did not have any reason to
believe that he had a gun to validate his arrest based on the implementation of the
COMELEC gun ban. Petitioner was not doing anything illegal, there was no prior positive
identification of petitioner, nor was anything in plain view for the police officers to
engender a well-founded belief that petitioner was guilty of any crime.
ISSUE
Did the CA err in finding the petitioner Nonoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drug as defined under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165?
HELD
Yes, the CA erred in finding the petitioner Nonoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drug as defined under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that search and seizures must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence
of probable cause. Moreover, Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides for
instances when a lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant.
● SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
230
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
Among the circumstances where a warrantless arrest is allowed, the arrest of the
suspect in flagrante delicto imposes a rigid, if not strict, compliance with its elements.
● An in flagrante delicto arrest requires the concurrence of two elements: (a)

the person arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he or she has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (b) the overt act was done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.
in this case is valid. However, procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 as the
Rule on Chain of Custody which is considered substantive law and not merely a procedural
technicality was not complied with. It requires apprehending officers to immediately
conduct the marking, physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs. Moreover,
the physical inventory and taking of photographs shall be conducted in the presence of:
(a) the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel; (b) a representative from the media; (c) a
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and (d) an elected public official,
after seizure and confiscation.
Such procedure laid out is considered substantive law and not merely a procedural
technicality but failure to strictly do so does not, ipso facto, render the seizure and
custody over the illegal drugs as void and invalid if: (a) there is justifiable ground for such
noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence were
preserved. In this case however, there was total lack of compliance. A review of the
pieces of evidence submitted by the parties show that an inventory report was not
accomplished by any of the police officers but in fact, an inventory report was never
mentioned in all the transmittal documents accomplished by the concerned authorities.
Absent the inventory report, the required presence of the insulating witnesses cannot be
considered to have been complied with. Therefore, petitioner's acquittal is warranted.
231
EVIDENCE
DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

PEOPLE V. AL-SAAD Y BAGKAT
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 242414 | March 15, 2021
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
DOCTRINE
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he
is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Thus, the
circumstances proven should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty
person. Moreover, it must be remembered that the probative value of direct evidence is
general neither greater than nor superior to circumstantial evidence. The Rules of Court
do not distinguish between "direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances from
which the existence of a fact may be inferred."
This is a case where the court ruled on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence
which led to the conviction of the accused as guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Arson with Homicide.
Mae Al-Saad (Mae), motivated by spite or hatred towards the occupants of the
property burned, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire to an
inhabited house and by reason of or on the occasion of the arson, death results to two
minor individuals and serious physical injury to one who are all her stepchildren with
Nabil Al-Saad and causes damage to properties in the amount of 1,500,000 pesos. RTC and
CA both ruled in favor of her conviction as being guilty beyond reasonable doubt to the
crime of Arson with Homicide.
Mae denied all the allegations against her. She claimed that the fire was caused by
faulty electrical wiring. She further claimed that the corpus delicti rule in arson was not
satisfied and that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was
insufficient to convict her of the crime charged.
Is it correct for the courts to rule on the conviction of Mae even though her guilt
had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt?
Yes, the ruling of the trial court and appellate court in convicting Mae is correct as
the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to convict her of
the crime charged.
232
● Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence:
There is more than one circumstance;
The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
● People v. Soria: For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a
conviction, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with
every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Thus, the
circumstances proven should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the
exclusion of others, as the guilty person. Moreover, it must be remembered
that the probative value of direct evidence is general neither greater than
nor superior to circumstantial evidence. The Rules of Court do not
distinguish between "direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances
from which the existence of a fact may be inferred."
The court concedes that there is no direct evidence to link Mae to the alleged
act, there being no eyewitness as to how the fire started. However, jurisprudence holds
that direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt. The lack or absence of
direct evidence does not necessarily mean that Mae's guilt cannot be proved.
Circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence and
therefore, also prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Following combination of circumstances, it thus led the court to the logical

conclusion that Mae commenced and caused the fire as to support a judgment of
conviction beyond reasonable doubt against her.
233
OBJECT/REAL EVIDENCE
PEOPLE V. HERNANDEZ
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 258077 | June 15, 2022
EXCLUSIONARY RULES; CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE
DOCTRINE
In cases involving Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA
9165, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral
certainty, considering that it is the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and hence, warrants an acquittal.
Accused-appellant Donato C. Hernandez (Donato) was charged with Illegal Sale
andd Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs in violation of Section 5 and 11, Article II of RA
9165.
According to the version of the prosecution, Senior Police Officer Lorenzo D.

Colinares (SPO2 Colinares) of the Calamba City Police Station received a phone call from a
confidential informant (CI) that Donato was engaged in selling drugs in Barangay Turbina,
Calamba City. A buy-bust team was immediately arranged and proceeded to the target
area, with media representative Zen Trinidad (Trinidad) and Barangay Chairman Rodel
Manalo (Manalo). Police Officer 1 Jhon Kevin P. Villarino (PO1 Villarino), the designated
poseur-buyer, together with Police Officer 2 Ken Fereliz Elauria (PO2 Elauria) and the CI,
went to Donato’s house while the rest of the team remained outside. The CI then
introduced the two police officers as prospective buyers of shabu. PO1 Villarino handed
the marked money to Donato, who in turn, invited them inside his house. The CI then left
and called the back-up team to proceed to Donato’s house. While inside the house,
Donato took one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet suspected to contain shabu from a
black pouch on top of the table, and gave it to PO1 Villarino, who immediately placed it
in his right pocket and thereafter, introduced themselves as police officers. They then
arrested Donato. Upon the arrival of the back-up team, they frisked Donato, w/c resulted
in PO1 Villarino recovering the buy-bust money and four more plastic sachets suspected to
contain shabu.
After the arrest, PO1 Villarino conducted the marking and and inventory of the
seized items, five in total, in the house of Donato, in the presence of Trinidad and
Manalo. Thereafter, Donato was brought to the barangay hall then the police station. At
the station Police Chief Inspector Melisa M. Malayo (PCINSP Malayo), prepared the Request
for Laboratory Examination of the contents of the plastic sachets, as well as the Request
for Drug Test. The seized items were then turned over to the Regional Crime Laboratory.
Upon examination conducted by forensic chemist, Police Chief Inspector Donna Villa P.
234
Huelgas (PCI Huelgas), the specimens tested positive for the presence of shabu. During
trial, the testimony of PCI Huelgas were dispensed with and instead, stipulated on the
qualifications of PCI Huelgas as the forensic chemist who examined the specimens and
concluded that the substance tested positive for shabu.
Despite Donato denying the charges against him, the RTC found Donato guilty as
charged, which the CA affirmed. Donato argues that the police officers did not strictly
comply with the chain of custody rule.
ISSUE
Was Donato’s guilt proved beyond reasonable doubt on the account of the police
officers not complying with the chain of custody rule?
HELD
No, since the police officers did not comply with the chain of custody rule,
Donato’s guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In cases involving Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA
9165, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral
certainty, considering that it is the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and hence, warrants an acquittal.
According to case law, to ensure the integrity of the seized drugs, the prosecution must
account for each link in the chain of custody, as follows: (1) the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
(2) the turn-over of the seized illegal drug to the investigating officer; (3) the turn-over
by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and (4) the turn-over and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic
chemist to the court
In the case at bar, the first link, seizure and marking, had been complied with as
the necessary witnesses, Manalo, an elective government official, and Trinidad, a member
of the media were present and signed the Receipt of Physical Inventory. The second link
was not broken as well since the movement of the seized items was duly recorded. The
third and fourth link were not complied with since the police officer who received the
request did not testify to ensure that the seized illegal drugs were not contaminated.
Further, the testimony of PCI Huelgas was dispensed with. In drug-related cases, it is of
paramount necessity that the forensic chemist testifies on the details pertaining to the
handling and analysis of the dangerous drug submitted for examination.
In sum, the foregoing lapses in the chain of custody of the illegal drug purportedly
seized from Donato, fatally compromised its integrity and evidentiary value. Hence,
Donato’s guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and his acquittal is warranted.
235
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
SAO PAULO ALPARGATAS S.A. V. KENTEX MANUFACTURING CORPORATION AND ONG
KING GUAN
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 202900 | February 17, 2021
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
DOCTRINE
A case or issue is considered moot when "it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is
no substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition.
Parol evidence rule further provides that "when the terms of agreement have been
reduced into writing, it is considered containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement."
FACTS
This is a case involving a violation of Intellectual Property Code which the parties
later on reached a compromise agreement and rendered the case moot and academic. Sao
Paulo Alpargatas S.A. (SPASA), the petitioner in this case, is the owner and manufacturer
of the footwear brand "Havaianas' ' who is also the registered owner of different marks,
devises, and logos of the brand "Havaianas" in the country. The respondents, Kentex
Manufacturing Corporation (Kentex) is the owner and manufacturer of the footwear with
the brand name "Havana '' and Ong King Guan (Ong), the owner and president of Kentex.
Kentex allegedly violated RA 8293 on trademark infringement and unfair

competition. The investigation team found footwear with markings "Havana" or "Havaianas
which closely resembled SPASA's "Havaianas" sandals/slippers and also bore SPASA's
Havaianas Rice Pattern Logo" and "Havaianas Greek Pattern Logo" marks at Kentex's
warehouse in Caloocan City. The investigating agent filed a search warrant which caused
the seizure of the Kentex’s products. Kentex, on the other hand, filed a Motion to Quash
Search Warrant and to Return the Seized Goods and Effects to the Owners. Along with
this, they also filed several documents establishing their ownership over the products.
Intellectual Property Office ruled that SPASA established its clear and unmistakable
right which needs to be protected. RTC later on ruled in favor of SPASA and denied the
respondents' motion to quash. The trial court found probable cause for the issuance of the
search warrants, which was based on the finding that the products manufactured by the
respondents bore a confusing similarity with SPASA's trademark registrations "Havaianas
236
Rice Pattern Logo" and "Havaianas Greek Pattern Logo." CA, on the other hand, ruled in
favor of Kentex and upheld its ownership over the properties and ordered the return of
the seized products to them. Aggrieved, SPASA elevated the case to Supreme Court but
later on reached an amicable settlement with Kentex that rendered the ruling of the CA
moot and academic.
ISSUE
Is the instant petition rendered moot and academic in view of the execution of the
Settlement Agreement between the opposing parties?
HELD
Yes, the case is considered moot and academic.
A case or issue is considered moot when "it ceases to present a justiciable

controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is
no substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or
dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve any
useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it
cannot be enforced.
In relation to this, the parol evidence rule further provides that "when the terms
of agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement."
Since the parties entered into the said Settlement Agreement, the effect is to put
the litigation between them to an end, as expressly said in the document and in view of
the parol evidence rule, the parties are bound to abide by and respect the provisions of
the duly signed Settlement Agreement regardless of its execution after the instant
petition was already filed.
Thus, the ruling of the Court of Appeals in this case will not be applied and the
instant petition is dismissed. The Settlement Agreement entered into by the parties will
govern.
237
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
PEOPLE V.GALUGA Y WAD-AS
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 221428 | February 13, 2019
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
DOCTRINE
When it comes to credibility, the assessment by the trial court deserves great
weight, and even conclusive and binding effect, unless the same is tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The trial
court has the full opportunity to observe directly the deportment and the manner of
testifying of the witnesses before it, hence, the trial court is in a better position than the
appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence. The rule finds an even more
stringent application where the Court of Appeals sustained said findings (People v.
Regaspi, 768 Phil. 593, 598 (2015)
FACTS
On April 16, 2002, Renato Wad-as (Wad-as) was charge of the crime of rape in
violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA No. 7659, and further
amended by RA No. 8353. The victim, AAA, is a twelve-year old minor, hence with an
aggravating circumstance of raping a minority.
Prosecution’s version of the events alleged that in the evening of April 1, 2002,
AAA had an altercation with her father. She left home and went to the barangay hall of
Brgy II, San Mateo, Isabela before proceeding to the park. While crying in the park, AAA
was approached by Wad-as introducing himself as ‘Jun-jun’. When she refused to go with
him to the plaza and market, Wad-as forcibly took AAA to the market place. Twelve
people were in the park but AAA did not scream for help for fear of her life. Wad-as then
brought AAA to a parlor in the market place and forcibly undressed AAA before raping her.
Due to Wad-as strength and threats of killing her if she tried to free herself, he was able
to insert his penis into her vagina. While Wad-as was pulling AAA towards the market
place, Joselito Borja (Borja) was driving his motorcycle with passenger Mitchell Garlitos
(Garlitos). Both saw Wad-as pulling AAA which prompted them to alert CCC, AAA’s father.
The three (3) of them found Wad-as seating on a bench outside N’s Restaurant. while AAA
was crying with her hair rumpled. They subsequently brough Wad-as to the police
station.AAA later disclosed in the police station that she was raped by Wad-as.
In his defense, Wad-as claimed that while he was on his way home, he saw AAA
crying in the park and asked her to come with him to N’s Restaurant. She agreed and
requested to buy bread since she was hungry. Moments later, CCC, AAA’s father together
with Borja and Garlitos arrived and boxed him for no reason. They then brought him to
the police station. Wad-as presented Realyn Acosta (Acosta), his live-in partner, and Teddy
238
Santos (Santos) as witnesses. Both testified that numerous people go to the park at night
since there are several mini-stores and eateries.
The RTC of Cauyan, Isabela convicted Wad-as for the crime of rape. The trial court
found the testimony of AAA as credible and straightforward and positively identified
Wad-as who raped her. The trial court also gave credence to AAA’s testimony as no woman
would be willing to undergo public trial to experience shame, humiliation, and dishonor of
exposing her own degradation. The trial court found that Wad-as’s testimony to be
self-serving and could not overcome AAA’s affirmative and convincing testimony. On
appeal, the appellate court sustained the decision of the trial court which found the
testimony of AAA to be credible and straightforward.
ISSUE
In deciding the case, is the testimony of AAA credible?
HELD
YES. In reviewing rape cases, the court promulgated the following guiding
principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but
more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the
nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of
the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (3) the evidence for the
prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the defense. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the complainant's
credibility becomes the single most important issue (People v. Ramos, 743 Phil.
344, 355-356 (2014)).
When it comes to credibility, the assessment by the trial court deserves great
weight, and even conclusive and binding effect, unless the same is tainted with
stringent application where the Court of Appeals sustained said findings (People v. Regaspi
, 768 Phil. 593, 598 (2015).
In this case, the Supreme Court found no compelling reason to deviate from the
rulings of the appellate and trial courts. Moreso that the appellate court had affirmed the
ruling of the trial court. As affirmed by both courts, the testimony of AAA was
straightforward, convincing, and consistent. She was able to describe vividly how Wad-as
raped her and it would be hard for a minor like AAA to directly and consistently recount in
open court such an ordeal unless she actually experienced the same. Wad-as himself even
admitted that he was found together with AAA in front of N’s Restaurant by CCC and
prosecution witnesses Borja and Garlitos.
To raise doubts on the credibility of AAA’s testimony, Wag-as pointed that (a) AAA
did not scream for help while being raped, and that (b) she failed to immediately inform
239
her parents that she was raped. The court rejected these propositions and held that there
is no standard of behaviour expected of rape victims. This depends on the circumstances
and the personal and emotional state of every victim. Here, AAA testified that she was
confused at the time of the incident and was afraid that if she shouted for help, Wag-as
would kill her. It is not rare that victims of rape hide their ordeals for fear of their lives.
Accordingly, the Court held that AAA’s testimony is credible and enough to convict
Wag-as for the crime of rape, with the aggravating circumstance of minority, beyond
reasonable doubt.
240
PEOPLE V. VILLEGAS, JR. Y LACRETE
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 218210 October 9, 2019
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES; RAPE WITH HOMICIDE
DOCTRINE
"It is well settled that questions on the credibility of witnesses should best be
addressed to the trial court because of its unique position to observe that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying
which is denied to the appellate courts”
FACTS
Accused-appellant Villegas appeals his conviction for rape with homicide. He
denies the charge and argues that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
On x x x November 12, 2003 at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, victim AAA 3
asked permission from her mother, BBB, 4 to go with x x x Villegas, Jr. to visit a friend in
Barangay x x x, Estancia[,] Iloilo. BBB did not allow AAA to go with [Villegas] but,
thereafter, she noticed that her daughter x x x was no longer in [their] house.
At 5:30 x x x, Felicidad Bornales [who] was fetching water at the jetmatic pump in
Barangay x x x, Estancia, Iloilo x x x noticed AAA [in the company of Villegas]. Felicidad
observed that AAA was wearing a black striped t-shirt and floral shorts while [Villegas]
was wearing a white t-shirt, maong pants and x x x carrying x x x a dark blue bag. While
fetching water, Felicidad [overheard Villegas inviting] AAA to go with him somewhere in
the nearby mountain but AAA declined because her mother might get angry. After
Felicidad x x x finished fetching water, she left the place [leaving Villegas] and AAA still x
x x conversing with each other.
At 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, BBB got worried when she noticed
[that] AAA was still not home. BBB went out to look for AAA x x x but to no avail. She then
asked help from one of the children of her neighbor, Jun-jun dela Cruz, and her daughter,
CCC, 5 to look for AAA. They went to the house of Eva Catalan [Catalan], the aunt of
[Villegas], but the latter [denied knowing] the whereabouts of AAA and [Villegas].
Thereafter, about [eight] 8 meters on their way out [of Catalan's house], they
noticed x x x sledge prints leading to [the] abandoned house of Antonio Lacrete which was
35 meters away. Upon reaching the abandoned house, they entered through the slightly
opened door and found a white t-shirt, a pair of black slippers with green strap[s] and a
pair of yellow slippers belonging to AAA. They also noticed x x x blood stains on the
bamboo floor. Thereafter, BBB together with [CCC] and Jun-jun went to the barangay to
report the incident.
241
Barangay Captain Editha Lamigo with her [t]anods went with BBB, CCC and Jun-jun
to the abandoned house. When they arrived, they found a dark-blue bag containing a pair
of maong pants, money worth P80.50 and torn birth certificate of [Villegas].
Thereafter, BBB[,] together with the barangay officials went to the house of Noli
Villegas, Sr., accused-appellant's father[,] to inquire on the whereabouts of his son and
AAA. However, he told the barangay officials [that] he did not know where his son [was].
So they went back to the abandoned house.
At 11 o'clock in the evening, BBB was informed by a certain Nico that AAA's body
was found dumped in a pond along the rice field. On November 14, 2003, [Villegas],
accompanied by his father, surrendered to the authorities.
ISSUE
Are the testimonies of the medico-legal and other prosecution witnesses enough
grounds to convict Villegas beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD
YES. "[j]urisprudence is replete with cases where the Court ruled that questions on
the credibility of witnesses should best be addressed to the trial court because of its
unique position to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses'
deportment on the stand while testifying which is denied to the appellate courts."
In this case, as the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses corroborated each

other on material points, these should be given great weight since the trial court found
these testimonies more convincing. Consequently, the Court sees no reason to deviate
from the factual findings of the trial court (and the CA) absent any indication that it
committed any error in its appreciation of the evidence that Villegas was guilty of the
charge.
242
PEOPLE V. SANTIAGO
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 234780 | March 17 2021
MINOR INCONSISTENCIES IN DETAIL OF TESTIMONY
DOCTRINE
Inconsistencies in minor details will not be a ground for the outright denial of the
credence of the testimony of the witness as these are mere collateral matters which do
not touch upon the fact of the commission of the crime.
FACTS
Panis, Santiago, Flores and Galingana were charged with the crime of Murder of
Brgy. Capt. Artemio Garcia with the use of illegal firearms. Panis, Santiago and Flores
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged while Galingana remains at large. Panis died
during the pendency of the case.
The witness, Johnny, corroborated the testimony of Artemio, Sr. wherein his father
was shot on his way back to his house after he had coffee with him. PCI Laggui, testified
that Panis and Santiago were lawfully arrested right after the shooting incident. However,
the Defense for Santiago raised a different account of the incident where they professed
alibi and denial. They claimed that at the time of the incident, he was asleep in his
house, together with his wife and children. Flores and Panis visited him at his farm and
tried to persuade him to participate in the killing of Artemio, Sr. He refused. Santiago’s
daughter corroborated the testimony of his father. Johnny committed minor
inconsistencies in his testimony when he positively identified the accused as one of the
assailants.
The RTC found Santiago guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder but
acquitted Flores based on reasonable doubt.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s Judgment finding Santiago guilty of the crime of
Murder. The straightforward and categorical testimony of Johnny was sufficient to support
the conviction of Santiago for the offense.
ISSUE
Are inconsistencies in minor details ground for the denial to give credence to
persuade the guilt of the accused?
HELD
No. In the case of People v. Licayan, the Court explained that discrepancies in
testimonies concerning minor details and not actually touching upon the central fact of
the crime do not impair their credibility. These inconsistencies tend to strengthen their
credibility because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed. In this case,
243
Johnny’s testimony was straightword, categorical, and sufficient to convict Santiago.
Minor inconsistencies refer merely to collateral matters which do not touch upon the fact
of the commission of the crime. The credibility of witnesses can be assessed by the trial
court since it possesses the first hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses. The trial court is in the best point to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.
Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best

undertaken by the trial court. These are important especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies.
244
PEOPLE V. XXX
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 218210 October 9, 2019
RECANTATIONS/AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
DOCTRINE
A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and
reservation. The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given
in court. The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be
secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration.
Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always a possibility that it will
later be repudiated. Only when there exist special circumstances in the case, which when
coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statements
given, can retractions be considered and upheld.
FACTS
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) and the International Justice Mission (IJM) conducted a rescue and entrapment
operation on the (redacted) in (redacted) where sex workers who were minors were
rescued and the proprietors thereof arrested. The gist of the operation, and the pertinent
facts is as follows: BBB — an Investigator of the Trafficking Market then employed by the
IJM, conducted a surveillance operation. Wearing an undercover camera, BBB, with 3
colleagues, went to the (redacted) pretending to be customers. YYY was the one who
greeted them at the bar. They feigned interest and slight apprehension at the
arrangement of the services. They were eventually introduced to XXX the bar owner, who
turned out to be a police officer. XXX allayed BBB's concerns of getting into trouble with
the law for taking out underage girls from the bar and having sex with them, specifically
AAA who was only 16 years old. Upon confirming that there was illegal activities
occurring, BBB said he will return the next day to avail of more services. They returned
the next day and conducted the rescue and entrapment operation when XXX received the
marked money. The officers were able to capture XXX and YYY.
AAA was brought to the Women and Children Complaint Division of the CIDG, Camp
Crame where she executed a Sinumpaan Salaysay (SS). AAA recounted the nature and
terms of her employment at the club such as how she was initially employed, payment of
wages and commission and hours of work. AAA listed the menu of sexual services for a fee
performed by her and other girls for customers of the bar. She confirmed that the fact of
her minority was known to the proprietors of the club, i.e. , XXX, YYY and accused
"Mommy Angel." AAA further confirmed the practice in the bar for customers, specifically
foreigners, to take out girls to bring to their hotel upon payment of the bar fine to any of
the three accused. Lastly, AAA stated that she and the other girls were given quotas on
which their daily wage rates were based. They received their wages from the bar's
owner-proprietor, XXX.
245
XXX and YYY essentially denied all the allegations against them. They claimed that
it was Momma Angel who owned the bar and that they merely worked there, all the while
being unaware of the illegal activities and that AAA and others were underage.
At a later date, AAA executed another Sinumpaang Salaysay recanting her earlier
testimony. On cross-examination, AAA claimed that XXX had no knowledge of her minority
and did not allow or tolerate illegal activities such as prostitution and human trafficking.
AAA likewise exculpated YYY from liability and pointed to Mommy Angel as the sole
culprit for the illegal activities occurring at the bar. AAA thus moved to dismiss the case
which was denied by the RTC.
ISSUE
Did the prosecution fail to present direct and positive evidence of the accused’s
actual participation in the alleged prostitution and trafficking of girls working at the bar,
in light of AAA recanting her previous testimony and eventually exculpated them from any
wrongdoing?
HELD
No. Palpably, the totality of the prosecution's evidence, i.e., testimonial, physical,
and documentary, established the guilt of accused-appellants for acts of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 (a and e) in relations to Section 6 (a, c, f) of RA
9208.
First. To begin with, the different items of evidence that taken together go to
establish an accused's guilt need not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, such doctrine
only applying to the guilt or innocence of the accused on the whole case. Every
subordinate fact need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and

reservation. The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given
in court. The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be
secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration.
Unfortunately for accused-appellants, the direct testimony of AAA attesting that

XXX and YYY recruited and hired her for purposes of sexual exploitation and prostitution is
corroborated by the testimonies of BBB and PO3 Ong as well as the physical evidence
showing XXX's receipt of P20,000 in marked money as payment for the bar fine
transaction, and the video footage of XXX and YYY confirming to BBB the sexual services
offered by ___________ through the use of the VIP rooms and the bar fin arrangement.
While there is no fixed rule by which the credibility of a witness is tested, the credibility
of AAA was impaired when she contradicted herself 66 as to her recruitment and hiring by
246
XXX and YYY. Consequently, the weight of her testimony seeking to absolve
accused-appellants is reduced.
247
PEOPLE V. CABALES
HERNANDO, J.
GR No.213831| September 25, 2019
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
DOCTRINE
There is no standard behavior expected by law from a rape victim. By whatever
manner she react, the same is immaterial because it is not an element of rape. Moreover,
while a medical certificate attesting to the victim’s physical trauma from the rape has
corroborative purposes, it is wholly unnecessary for conviction, if not a mere superfluity.
FACTS
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals decision affirming the RTC’s ruling that
found the accused-appellant Adonis Cabales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape.Cabales pleaded not guilty in the rape of his 13 year old niece.
The Prosecution had two witnesses: the victim, AAA, and her mother, and had
documentary evidence. AAA narrated that this was the second time her uncle, Cabales,
had raped her and only confessed in the crime when a certain Maguib, the husband of
AAA’s mother’s cousin, saw the second occurrence of rape and advised her to tell her
mother, BBB, who helped her report it to the police. The medical examination of Dr.
Prieto-Jabines yielded the conclusion: “disclosure of sexual abuse, medical evaluation is
suggestive of chronic penetrating injury with acute component.” AAA also confessed that
she was not able to report the first crime of rape since her uncle threatened to kill her if
she told.
Cabales denied the allegations and said that he was tending to his wife, who had
just given birth, when the alleged second rape happened. This was corroborated by
Canones, the midwife. Later, he assailed the decisions of the lower court stating that AAA
never tried to push him away or escape and that the medical findings did not present nor
state that AAA suffered any physical injury resulting from alleged use of force.
The RTC accorded full faith and credence to AAA’s testimony and held Cabales
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed against him. This was affirmed by
the CA.
ISSUE
Was the alleged reflex of AAA in response to the rape and lack of finding of
physical injury merit the dismissal of the case?
HELD
No, for absent any other adequate proof that the victim clearly assented to the
sexual act perpetuated by the accused, a victim shall not be condemned solely on the
248
basis of her reactions against the same. There is no standard behavior expected by law
from a rape victim. By whatever manner she react, the same is immaterial because it is
not an element of rape. Moreover, while a medical certificate attesting to the victim’s
physical trauma from the rape has corroborative purposes, it is wholly unnecessary for
conviction, if not a mere superfluity. Here, AAA’s testimony meets the test of credibility
when she pointed to Cabales as the perpetrator of her rape and laid out her accusation
with overt clarity. Thus, the Court affirmed the findings of the lower courts against
Cabales.
249
ARRIOLA V. PEOPLE
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 199975 | February 24, 2020
HEARSAY AND EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE; DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT
STATEMENTS
DOCTRINE
Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part,
on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is
sought to produce it. A person who introduces a hearsay statement is not obliged to enter
into any particular stipulation, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to
reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and
that he/she entrenches himself/herself in the simple assertion that he/she was told so,
and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author. For this reason, the rule
against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. The hearsay rule, however, does not apply to independently
relevant statements.
People v. Umapas is instructive on the matter: “[W]hile the testimony of a witness

regarding a statement made by another person given for the purpose of establishing the
truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if
the purpose of placing the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that
the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or
falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such statement has been
made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of
fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the
existence of such a fact. This is the doctrine of independently relevant statements.”
FACTS
Luis T. Arriola (Arriola) was charged with estafa under Section 315 paragraph 2(a)
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. It
was alleged that Arriola willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defraud Ingeborg De Venecia
Del Rosario (Del Rosario), when by means of false manifestation and fraudulent
representations he made to the latter to the effect that he was the real estate broker of
Pasencia G. Candelaria (Candelaria). It was also alleged that Arriola represented that he
had the authority to sell and receive payments in selling a parcel of land located in
Tagaytay City owned by Candelaria and could facilitate the issuance of a new Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of Del Rosario. Lastly, by means of other deceit of
similar import, Arriola induced and succeeded in inducing Del Rosario to gove and deliver
and in fact the latter gave and delivered to Arriola the total amount of P437,000
representing full payment for the land.
250
The RTC of Makati City convicted Arriola of estafa. It found that the prosecution
sufficiently discharged its burden of proving Arriola’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Arriola filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA). He claimed that the RTC
convicted him solely on the basis of hearsay evidence. However, the CA denied Arriola’s
appeal. It found that the elements of estafa by means of deceit were all present. It also
declared that the prosecution’s evidence anent the phone call to Candelaria was not pure
hearsay, since it did not consider Del Rosario’s testimony in isolation but in consonance
with other proof, which consisted of telephone records, Brisbane White Pages, and the
Statutory Declaration of one Cecilia Elicanal Villanueva about the Brisbane White Pages.
The CA likewise denied Arriola’s motion for reconsideration. Thus, this present Petition
for Review on Certiorari.
Aiming to be exonerated, Arriola asserts that the sole evidence presented by the
prosecution showing his alleged deceit was only the phone conversation that transpired
between Del Rosario and Candelaria, and thus, rested on mere hearsay evidence which
should not have been admitted by the trial court.
ISSUE
Did the Court of Appeals err in giving credence to the hearsay evidence of the
prosecution?
HELD
NO, the CA did not err in giving credence to the hearsay evidence of the
prosecution. The totality of circumstantial evidence sufficiently established Arriola’s guilt
for estafa by means of deceit.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court does declare hearsay as generally
inadmissible testimonial evidence:
Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay

excluded.—A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception x x x
Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part,
on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is
sought to produce it. A person who introduces a hearsay statement is not obliged to enter
into any particular stipulation, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to
reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and
that he/she entrenches himself/herself in the simple assertion that he/she was told so,
and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author. For this reason, the rule
against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. The hearsay rule, however, does not apply to independently
relevant statements.
251
Del Rosario’s testimony can and will be admitted as evidence only for the purpose
of proving that such statements regarding Arriola’s lack of authority to sell the subject
property were, in fact, made and uttered by Candelaria. This is circumstantially relevant
to the instant case and within the competence of Del Rosario to confirm. Also, her
perception on the conversation in question was adequately tested when she took the
witness stand and was cross-examined by Arriola’s counsel in open court. Hence, Del
Rosario’s account as to the fact of her conversation with Candelaria and the latter’s stand
against Arriola’s authority to sell, irrespective of its veracity, is considered as an
independently relevant statement that may properly be received as evidence against
Arriola.
252
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
CIR V. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
HERNANDO, J.
G.R. No. 180740 & 180910 | November 11, 2019
PROOF OF AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATION
DOCTRINE
"It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove its affirmative
allegation." In CIR v. Traders Royal Bank, the court held that the burden fell upon TRB to
produce the Trust Indenture Agreements, not only because the said Agreements were in
its possession, but more importantly, because its protest against the DST assessments was
entirely grounded on the allegation that said Agreements were trusts. TRB was the
petitioner before the CTA in C.T.A. Case No. 6392 and it was among its affirmative
allegations that the said Trust Indenture Agreements were trusts, thus, TRB had the
obligation of proving this fact. It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove its
affirmative allegation.
FACTS
In 1997, R.A. 8240 took effect adopting a specific tax system instead of the ad
valorem tax system imposed on, among others, fermented liquor. As a result, fermented
liquors were specifically subjected to excise taxes in accordance to the schedule in
Section 140 of RA 8240 (renumbered to Section 143 under RA 8424).
In 1999, the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the CIR, issued RR No.
17-99 to implement 12% increase on excise tax, among others, fermented liquors by
January 1, 2000.
In 2003, SMC filed a claim for tax refund or credit of excise tax it paid on its Red
Horse Beer product from January 11, 2001 to December 31, 2000 in the amount of PhP
94,494,801.96 which was equivalent to the difference before the effectivity of RA 8240
and the new rate imposed under Section 145 of RA 8424. Without waiting for the CIR to
act on its administrative claim for tax refund or credit, SMC filed a Petition for Review
before the CTA.
The CTA 1st Division approved SMC’s claim for tax refund or credit for its excess
excise tax payment from March 1, 2001 to December 31, 2002 in the amount of
88,090,531.56 The difference from the PhP 94.49M+ excluded the prescribed claim from
January to February 2001.
SMC filed a motion for reconsideration for the prescribed claim for January to
February 2001 arguing that under the Advance Payment or Deposit scheme authorized by
253
RR No. 2-97, the filing of the returns and supporting documents may be submitted even a
week after the actual removals.
The CTA 1st Division denied the motion. Though due date of tax payment is not
always the reckoning point for purposes of prescription, SMC failed to present its excise
tax returns for January 1, 2001 to February 28, 2001 to prove the dates they were
actually filed.
CIR and SMC filed a Petition for Review with the CTA En Banc.
The CTA en Banc denied the petition since SMC claim is barred by prescription
based on Section 229 and 130 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997. SMC failed to present the
proof of the exact amount it paid for the period February 1 to 23, 2001.
CIR filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
with the CTA En Banc.
ISSUE
Is SMC correct in claiming that the apportionment on the excise tax due can be
deduced from the evidence submitted?
HELD
NO. "It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove its affirmative
allegation." In CIR v. Traders Royal Bank, the court held that the burden fell upon TRB to
produce the Trust Indenture Agreements, not only because the said Agreements were in
its possession, but more importantly, because its protest against the DST assessments was
entirely grounded on the allegation that said Agreements were trusts. TRB was the
petitioner before the CTA in C.T.A. Case No. 6392 and it was among its affirmative
allegations that the said Trust Indenture Agreements were trusts, thus, TRB had the
obligation of proving this fact. It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove its
affirmative allegation.
Here, The burden rests upon SMC to present evidence that its prescribed returns
for the excise taxes on its Red Horse beer product for February 2001 were actually filed
after the removal of the said products from the place of production or later than February
24, 2001. SMC insists that the needed information could be deduced from the evidence it
submitted before the CTA.However, as the CTA First Division observed; [S]ince the
removal reports presented by [SMC] were on a monthly and not on a daily basis, this Court
cannot ascertain which portion of the entire claim for the month of February 200[1] in the
amount of [Ph]3,889,761.48 corresponds to the payment made by [SMC] on February 24,
2001 and falls within the two-year prescriptive period.
Interestingly, even in its Petition before this Court, SMC failed to present a
definitive computation of the excise taxes on its Red Horse beer product which it had paid
from February 24 to 28, 2001 and which would still have been within the two (2)-year
prescriptive period; and to cite the corresponding evidence on record in support thereof.
254
Instead, it unduly placed the burden of apportionment of its February 2001 claim upon
the CTA by simply and conveniently asserting that the tax court "could have determined,
based on the evidence presented, the portion which had [already] prescribed." Hence, the
petition of SMC fails and the decision of the CTA En banc is affirmed.
255
PRIETO V. CAJIMAT
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 214898 | June 8, 2020
BURDEN OF PROOF
DOCTRINE
The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Section 1, Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is the duty of a party to prove the
truth of his/her claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence required
by law.
FACTS
Petitioner Rondal, Jr. was driving a red Yamaha tricycle with plate number BT 9799
along the southbound lane of the national highway of Barangay 2 Garreta, Badoc, Ilocos
Norte. Thereafter, petitioner Rondal, Jr. overtook two tricycles in front of him and
occupied the northbound lane which resulted in a head-on collision with a black Yamaha
“chop-chop” motorcycle which was driven by Narciso Cajimat III (Cajimat III). As a result,
Cajimat III suffered a fractured skull which caused his instantaneous death. A criminal
case for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide was filed against petitioner Rondal, Jr.
before the MCTC of Badoc-Pinili, Badoc, Ilocos Norte docketed as Criminal Case No.
2730-B. Meanwhile, the mother of deceased Cajimat III, respondent Erlinda, filed a
separate civil action for damages before the RTC against petitioners Rondal, Jr. and
Prieto, the registered owner of the red Yamaha tricycle. Respondent Erlinda posited that
at the time of the incident, petitioner Rondal, Jr. did not have a driver’s license and was
intoxicated. She pointed out that the direct, immediate, and proximate cause of the
collision was petitioner Rondal, Jr.’s gross negligence in managing, driving, and operating
the red Yamaha tricycle. Thus, respondent Erlinda prayed for the payment of the burial
and miscellaneous expenses she incurred in the total amount of P200,000.00, attorney’s
fees, moral damages, and exemplary damages. After pretrial, trial on the merits ensued.
Respondent Erlinda presented the testimony of Senior Police Officer 1 Proceso Villa (SPO1
Villa), the responding officer who investigated the vehicular collision. On the other hand,
Prieto et. al. presented their testimonies as evidence.
MCTC: Rendered a Decision finding petitioner Rondal, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide, which fact was admitted by both
parties.
RTC: Applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur, rendered a Decision finding
petitioners Rondal, Jr. and Prieto negligent and are therefore civilly liable. In addition,
the RTC reasoned that deceased Cajimat III cannot be considered contributorily negligent
in the vehicular mishap as there was no evidentiary proof that his motorcycle did not have
a headlight at the time of the collision.
256
CA: The CA rendered its Decision9 affirming in toto the RTC’s Decision dated
February 18, 2011.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners which was subsequently

denied by the CA in its Resolution dated September 23, 2014.
Hence, petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Were the petitioners able to prove the truth of their claim/defense?
HELD
No. The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is the
duty of a party to prove the truth of his/her claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the
amount of evidence required by law.
In this case, the burden of proof rests upon the petitioners, who are required to
establish their case by a preponderance of evidence. However, aside from petitioners’
allegations, no other evidence was presented to prove that indeed the deceased was
negligent in driving his motorcycle.
257
GERODIAS V. RIVERAL
HERNANDO, J.
A.C. No. 12719 | February 17, 2021
BURDEN OF PROOF
DOCTRINE
Settled is the rule that for a charge to justify a disciplinary action against a
lawyer, the complainant must present convincing proof to substantiate the charge.
Otherwise, the lawyer is presumed innocent.
FACTS
On February 21, 2017, Sanny L. Gerodias (Gerodias) filed a disbarment complaint
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Attorneys Tomas A. Riveral
(Riveral), Annabel G. Pulvera-Page (Pulvera-Page) and Lorena M. Supatan (Supatan).
Gerodias was a former employee of Oriental Port and Allied Services Corporation
(OPASCOR). During his employment, he underwent several disciplinary investigations for
various reasons such as heated altercations with co-employees, damage to company
property and abandonment of work. The last disciplinary investigation which lead to his
voluntary retirement from OPASCOR was the incident of him stealing a box of perfumes
owned by OPASCOR's clients.
Gerodias demanded to avail of the early retirement option. Despite the fact that
he was short of two years to avail of the company's early retirement program, Gerodias'
request was approved by Riveral, the President and General Manager of OPASCOR.
However, a month after Gerodias received his retirement pay, he filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against OPASCOR. Thereafter, a disbarment case was filed by Gerodias
against Riveral as the President and General Manager of OPASCOR; Pulvera-Page, as the
Corporate Secretary of OPASCOR and one of the lawyers in the firm of Riveral, Pulvera &
Associates; and Supatan, as: a lawyer in Riveral, Pulvera & Associates who received
Gerodias' Position Paper during the proceedings of the labor case.
Gerodias claimed that Supatan's act of receiving a copy of his Position Paper during
the proceedings of the labor case indicates her connivance with Riveral and Pulvera-Page.
Supatan argued that her participation in the labor case by receiving a copy of Gerodias'
Position Paper in behalf of Riveral, Pulvera-Page & Associates does not justify the
allegations of conspiracy against her.
The IBP issued its Report and Recommendation recommending the dismissal of the
administrative case against Riveral, Pulvera- Page and Supatan for lack of factual and
legal basis.
ISSUE
258
Was the act of Supatan in receiving a copy of the Position Paper justify the
allegations of conspiracy against her?
HELD
No, the act of Supatan in receiving a copy of the Position Paper did not justify the
allegations of conspiracy against her. The Court adopted the findings of fact of the IBP
and approved the recommendation to dismiss the complaint against respondents Riveral,
Pulvera-Page and Supatan. Settled is the rule that for a charge to justify a disciplinary
action against a lawyer, the complainant must present convincing proof to substantiate
the charge. Otherwise, the lawyer is presumed innocent.
As per the records, Supatan is an associate of the firm of Riveral, Pulvera-Page &
Associates which represents OPASCAR in the labor case filed by Gerodias. Hence, Supatan,
as an associate of the firm, is duty bound to assist and represent its client OPASCAR in the
said labor case including the receipt of any pleadings filed. To reiterate, her act of
receiving a copy of Gerodias' Position Paper is a lawful act and does not in any way violate
the CPR nor the Lawyer's Oath.
Mere allegation of conspiracy is not evidence and not equivalent to proof. The
burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the case must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. Evidently, complainant Gerodias utterly failed to
discharge such burden. If anything, what is apparent in the records is complainant's
penchant for filing baseless disbarment cases for the flimsiest of reasons. It should not
surprise him if respondents would justifiably counter with legal actions of their own
against him to vindicate their rights.
259
WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORP. V. UY
HERNANDO, J.
GR No. 219317 | June 14, 2021
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
DOCTRINE
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish its cause of
action by a preponderance of evidence, or that "evidence which is of greater weight or is
more convincing than that which is in opposition to it." Preponderance of evidence "does
not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more
believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on one side
than on the other."
FACTS
On July 15, 2008, [Cathay] filed a Complaint against Uy for Sum of Money and
Damages alleging, that: on February 16, 1996, Cathay hired Uy as section supervisor and
(sic) at its Novaliches plant; on July 1, 1999, Uy was assigned as the material handling
officer tasked with checking, accepting, and releasing steel products that go through the
Novaliches plant premises, and the sale of special assorted (below standard length) steel
bars known as retazos, authorized to accept cash payments directly from customers to be
remitted immediately to Cathay's treasury department; sometime in March 2008, Cathay's
management conducted a special audit of sales of retazos for the period covering the first
quarter of 2008; as a result of the special audit, Cathay discovered that cash proceeds
from the sale of retazos for the month of February 2008 covered by several delivery
receipts amounting to P409,280.00 were not remitted to its treasury department; Uy's
signature was on the delivery receipts; on May 29, 2008, Cathay sent a demand letter for
payment of the amount covered by the questionable transactions within five days from
receipt, but Uy failed to pay or settle with Cathay; and, the unlawful refusal of Uy to
settle his obligation to Cathay caused it to file a collection suit and engage the services of
counsel. Cathay prayed that a decision be rendered ordering Uy to pay P409,280.00 as
principal obligation, legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
attorney's fees of P50,000.00; and costs of suit.
In its August 10, 2012 Decision, the RTC, relying on the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented by Cathay, found that the latter was able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that Uy had the duty to accept cash payment for the sale of
the retazos, and that he failed to observe such duty by not remitting the amount of
P409,280.00 to Cathay's treasury department. Thus, the trial court held Uy liable for such
amount. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's August 10, 2012 Decision
after finding that Cathay failed to prove the existence of the unremitted payments.
260
ISSUE
Did the CA err in ruling that Cathay failed to prove by preponderance of evidence
its cause of action against Uy?
HELD
Yes, Cathay was able to establish by preponderance of evidence Uy's liability for
the unremitted payments. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish its cause of action by a preponderance of evidence, or that "evidence which is of
greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it."
Preponderance of evidence "does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the
testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that the
probability of truth is on one side than on the other."
Thus, the determination of preponderance of evidence depends greatly on the

credibility of the witnesses. Hence, in the evaluation of their testimonies, We must be
guided by the well-settled doctrine that "[w]hen it comes to [the witnesses'] credibility,
the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding,
unless the same is tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence."
Here, after a careful review of the records, the court found that Cathay was able
to establish by a preponderance of evidence Uy's liability. It was able to prove that in
February 2008, Uy authorized on four occasions the release of the retazos sold on a cash
transaction basis, for which he had the duty to accept cash payment, but failed to remit
the payments to Cathay's treasury department.
261
MAULANA V. NOEL, JR.
HERNANDO, J.
A.M. No. RTJ-21-006 | March 15, 2021
REQUIRED EVIDENCE FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
DOCTRINE
Certifications issued by the FEO Records Section are sufficient proof of the fact of
possession or non-possession of a valid license to own or possess firearms or explosives in
the offense of Illegal Possession of Firearms.
FACTS
This case is about a trial court judge who refused to release subject firearms
despite the presentation of FEO-issued certifications.
Several firearms were seized from the house of Maulana, but the Office of the
Prosecutor ordered that such items were not in violation of RA 10591. However, when the
counsel of Maulana filed a Motion to Release Seized Items, Judge Noel allegedly directed
Maulana to shoulder the amount of 300,000.00 pesos representing the Judge's travel
expenses to Camp Crame to personally verify the licenses for the subject firearms. Judge
Noel, on the other hand, argued that it was Maulana who moved for him and his court
personnel to have the licenses personally verified, and offered to shoulder their travel
expenses. He further questioned the presentation of mere photocopy of Certification from
the FEO and when the original was presented, there were some inconsistencies in the
signatures therein.
ISSUE
Are the FEO-issued certifications sufficient evidence in determining the presence
or absence of a valid license or permit to own or possess firearms?
HELD
Yes, FEO-issued certifications are sufficient evidence, and thus, should be
accepted by the courts in determining the presence or absence of a valid license or
permit to own or possess firearms.
OCA Circular No. 11-2011, citing Del Rosario v. People, provides that certifications
issued by the FEO Records Section are sufficient proof of the fact of possession or
non-possession of a valid license to own or possess firearms or explosives in the offense of
Illegal Possession of Firearms. OCA Circular No. 11-2011 further states that personal
appearances of FEO records personnel is not required in order to establish the
authenticity of FEO-issued certifications.
262
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
doctrines
REMEDIAL Law
REMEDIAL Law
PALAFOX VS MENDIOLA
G.R. NO. 209551|FEBRUARY 15, 2021
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

This case stemmed from the Complaint for Damages filed by Sen. Angara against
Palafox, Jr., wherein Sen. Angara alleged that Palafox, Jr. authored an unsigned letter
containing defamatory statements against him. In the Complaint, Sen. Angara indicated
that he was holding office in Pasay City.
DOCTRINE: Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court
is improper because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so
in order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to
devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing
the overcrowding of its docket.
OLIVIA D. LEONES V. HON. CARLITO CORPUZ, ET AL.

GR NO. 204106 | NOVEMBER 17, 2021
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Leones was appointed municipal treasurer of the Municipality of Bacnotan, La
Union. During Leones' stint in the Provincial Treasurer's Office, she was not paid her
Representation and Transportation Allowances (RATA). In G.R. No. 169726, CA ordered
DBM Secretary Boncodin and Mayor Minda Fontanilla to pay Leones' RATA. However, Leones
RATA remained unpaid. In SCA No. 007-11, the case ended in a compromise agreement
between Leones and Mayor Rufino Fontanilla. Proceedings ensued in the lower courts and
from the RTC, Leones skipped the appellate tribunal and proceeded straight to this Court
for recourse. This is an open disregard of the hierarchy of courts.
DOCTRINE:
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts; Certiorari
Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA in petitions
for certiorari, a direct resort is allowed only when there are special or compelling
reasons that justify the same, to wit:
1) When dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public policy;
2) When demanded by the broader interest of justice;
3) When the challenged orders were patent nullities; or
4) When analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified
the immediate and direct handling of the case.
The following are qualifying conditions for certiorari:
264
1) One must show that the respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
2) There is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
Res Judicata
For res judicata to bar a subsequent action, the following elements must be
present:
1) The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
2) The decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties;
3) The disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
4) There must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action.
Dispute Resolution; Compromise Agreement and Compromise Judgments

Judgments, once final and executory, are incontestable and unappealable. The
winning litigant receives the right to the favorable awards contained in such executory
judgment, and the losing party has to comply with the order of the court that is
enforceable by a writ of execution.
Rights, however, may be waived or modified through a compromise agreement

even after a final judgment has been rendered and already settled the rights of the
contracting parties. Compromise agreements are known important tools in dispute
resolution. To be binding, the compromise must be shown to have been voluntarily, freely
and intelligently executed by the parties, who had full knowledge of the judgment. As
with the law on contracts, the compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs and public policy.
A compromise agreement must contain the same elements of a valid contract:

1) Consent of the parties;
2) Object certain that is the subject matter of the compromise; and
3) Cause of the obligation established.
Consent is the heart of all contracts: it bears reiterating that it should be given
intelligently, freely, and spontaneously, otherwise, the contract is voidable.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: In Candelaria v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, City of San
Fernando, This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is
shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking
any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
265
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary
to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Court's docket.
VILLAFUERTE V. SEC
GR NO. 208379 | MARCH 29, 2022
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

The petition to the Supreme Court alleges that public respondents, through their
assailed regulations, and with the help of private respondent Bankers Association of the
Philippines (BAP), enabled the PDS Group to establish and maintain a monopoly and
impose unlawful restraint of trade and unfair competition in the market for fixed-income
securities and the over-the-counter (OTC) market for government securities.
DOCTRINE:Hierarchy of courts is the mechanism that ordains a sequence of

recourse to courts vested with concurrent jurisdiction. The invocation of the Court's
original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs may be allowed on the ground of special
and important reasons or transcendental importance. The Court clarified that direct
recourse is allowed only when the issues presented are purely legal.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: When a question before the Court involves determination of

a factual issue indispensable to the resolution of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to
resolve the question regardless of the allegation or invocation of compelling reasons, such
as the transcendental or paramount importance of the case. Such question must first be
brought before the proper trial courts or the CA, both of which are specially equipped to
try and resolve factual questions.
PROVINCE OF BATAAN V. CASIMIRO

GR NOS. 197510-11 & 201347 | APRIL 18, 2022
RAPE; GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN REVIEWING RAPE CASES
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Province of Bataan placed a tender for the purchase of fishing boats. The Field
Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Supplemental Complaint
recommending the filing of criminal and administrative cases against the involved public
266
officials and individuals for violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). The FIO alleged that the purchase of the patrol boat is tainted with
anomalies as the documents related to its procurement were altered, the process
occurred without public bidding, and because it gave undue advantage to Asistin.
DOCTRINE:
It is settled that as a “quasi-judicial agency, decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may only be appealed to the Court of
Appeals through a Rule 43 petition” in order to respect the hierarchy of courts. Withal, it
is only proper that the administrative aspect of the cases be resolved by the CA, in proper
observance of the hierarchy of courts, and in accordance with prevailing rules and
jurisprudence. When an Ombudsman, in an administrative case, renders a decision and
imposes a penalty, it is performing a quasi-judicial function. Its decision has the same
effect as a court judgment.
PHILAM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. V. DE LUNA G.R. NO.

209437 | 17 MARCH 2021
JURISDICTION - JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Philam Homeowners Association, Inc. (PHAI) is a non-stock, non profit organization
of homeowners at Philam Homes, Quezon City; Caguiat was its President and Chief
Executive Officer at the time of the termination of employment of respondents De Luna
and Bundoc. De Luna is PHAI’s Office Supervisor and Bundoc was the Cashier. Several
irregularities were discovered during audit of PHAI’s books of accounts. The Committee
disclosed that De Luna and Bundoc were involved in the disbursement of PHAI’s funds.
DOCTRINE: The CA is empowered to examine the records and evaluate the pieces
of evidence in order to confirm materiality and significance when it is necessary to
prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice; and when necessary to arrive at a
just decision of the case.
ZALDIVAR-PEREZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 204739 | NOVEMBER 13, 2019
JURISDICTION - JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Tamboong filed a complaint against Perez for unlawful appointment in appointing
Fortaleza as Provincial Legal Officer though lacking the five year practice of law. An
information was filed before the Sandiganbayan since there was probable cause in
267
violation of Art. 244 of the RPC. Perez moved to reconsider since there was a pendency of
the MR within the office of the Ombudsman.
DOCTRINE: As ruled in the case Garcia vs Sandiganbayan, “from the filing of

information, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on
the sound discretion of the court, which becomes the sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. Pursuant to said authority, the court takes full authority over the case,
including the manner of the conduct of litigation and resort to processes that will ensure
the preservation of its jurisdiction. Thus, it may issue warrants of arrest, HDOs and other
JORGENTICS SWINE IMPROVEMENT CORPORATION V. THICK & THIN

AGRI-PRODUCTS INC.
G.R. NOS. 201044 & 222691 | MAY 5, 2021
JURISDICTION - ASPECTS OF JURISDICTION - JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Thick & Thin Agri-Products, Inc. (TTAI) entered into an agreement with Jorgenetics
Swine Improvement Corporation (Jorgenetics) where TTAI would supply feeds and other
supplies necessary for Jorgenetics' hog raising business. While TTAI delivered feeds and
supplies pursuant to the agreement, Jorgenetics failed to pay for the same despite
demand.
TTAI filed a complaint for replevin with damages against Jorgenetics, seeking
possession of 4,765 heads of hogs that were the subject of a chattel mortgage between
the parties. Jorgenetics moved to dismiss the complaint for replevin on the ground of
invalid service of summons, since service was made on its farm in Rizal instead of its
place of business in Quezon City, and in view of the lack of justification from the sheriff
for availing of substituted service of summons.
DOCTRINE: A defendant is deemed to have voluntarily submitted themselves to

the jurisdiction of the court if they seek affirmative relief from the court.

GR NO. 213888 | APRIL 25, 2022
JURISDICTION - JURISDICTION V. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

The respondents as Heirs of Eustaquio claimed ownership which was contested by
petitioners. Respondents filed an appeal before the CA questioning the jurisdiction of the
RTC in declaring TCT null and void. CA granted such and ruled that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of TCT in an action for quieting of title. It held that
268
while a TCT should not have been issued to Eustaquio in an action for reconstitution, the
declaration of its nullity can only be had either in an action for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court before the CA, or in an action for reconveyance before
the RTC.
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As

distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a
cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person
and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an
exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
Section 12, in relation to Section 15, of Republic Act No. 26, the governing law for
judicial reconstitution, instructs when reconstitution of a title should be allowed.
NGO V. GABELO
G.R. NO. 207707 | AUGUST 24, 2020
JURISDICTION - JURISDICTION OVER CASES COVERED BY BARANGAY CONCILIATION
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Ngo alleged that he is the owner of the property by virtue of the Deed of Absolute
Sale between him and Phil Realty Corp. Despite demands, Gabelo refused to vacate the
property and claimed that Ngo has no legal personality to sue since the court did not
declare him as the absolute owner of the property and further alleged that Ngo failed to
bring the matter first to barangay conciliation, a condition precedent for filing the action.
DOCTRINE: All disputes between parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality are subject to barangay conciliation. A prior recourse thereto is a
pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any government office. Non-compliance
with the said condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of
action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of
action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction
from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants
failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction.
PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN FIFTH DIVISION

G.R. NO. 239878 | FEBRUARY 28, 2022
CIVIL PROCEDURE - GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING IF THERE IS A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

This case arose from a complaint filed by Task Force Abono, Field Investigation
Office (Task Force) of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) against respondents local
269
government officials of Surigao City. Monteros filed a motion to quash information/dismiss
the case and a motion (A) to quash/hold in abeyance the release of the warrant of arrest;
and (B) to defer arraignment and other proceedings. Monteros claimed that her right to
speedy disposition of cases was violated because of the length of time that had passed
from the COA investigation in 2006 to the filing of the Information before the
Sandiganbayan in 2017.
DOCTRINE: In Cagang vs Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that: First, the right to
speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale
for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal
prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may
be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is
that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy
disposition of cases to be invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a
conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the
Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard
to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken
against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing
of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of whether there has
been inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the
right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court
resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of
the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably
invoked.
If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the
prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay. If the defense has the burden of
proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only
politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the
defense did not contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove
first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation
and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the
volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered
by the accused as a result of the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must

consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to
the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.
270
An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the
case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or
when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may
be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious
prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be
dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay.
Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy
disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused
acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be invoked. In all cases of
dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and
discussed by the relevant court.
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be
timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the
lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived
their right to speedy disposition of cases.
EDDA V. HENSON V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. NO. 230185 | JULY 7, 2020
CIVIL PROCEDURE - GENERAL PROVISIONS
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Intramuros Administration, under Henson, held a public bidding for the
construction of Plaza San Luis Cultural Commercial Complex. AAE, the lowest bidder
negotiated to lower the bid price but in return, IA will supply the materials and
architectural details be downgraded. Upon completion of the project, COA found the
discrepancy and issued the Notice of Disallowance to Henson.
DOCTRINE: It bears stressing that "in the absence of a proper and adequate notice
to the court of a change of address, the service of the order or resolution of a court upon
the parties must be made at the last address of their counsel of record.”
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V. PTT PHILIPPINES TRADING CORP.

G.R. NOS. 203138-40 | FEBRUARY 15, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - FORUM SHOPPING
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Commissioner Napoleon Morales (Commissioner Morales) of the BoC sent a demand
letter to PTTPTC to settle its P4,236,530,193.00 outstanding obligation within seven (7)
days from notice. PTTPTC, through counsel, sent a letter to Commissioner Morales, asking
271
for reconsideration or reinvestigation of the Audit Team's conclusion and
recommendation.
The Commissioner of Customs attributed that PTTPTC is guilty of forum shopping

in filing four petitions for review questioning the same November 7, 2007 demand letter.
DOCTRINE: Forum shopping exists when a party repeatedly avails himself of several
judicial remedies in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, all of which
are substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
ASIS V. HEIRS OF CALIGNAWAN

G.R. NO. 242127 | SEPTEMBER 15, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - FORUM SHOPPING; SPLITTING CAUSES OF ACTION
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Petition involves an action for Declaration of Nullity and Recovery of Ownership on
a partition of property owned by the decedent Calignawan. As a result, a motion to
dismiss was filed on the ground of forum shopping.
DOCTRINE: While the observation of petitioners as to Rosello's commission of

forum-shopping is correct, raising said issue on appeal is already too late in the day.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements as to the elements of forum-shopping.
First, there must be identity of parties. Second, there must be similarity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, where the relief is anchored on the same facts. It is a hornbook
doctrine that the cause of action is determined by the allegations of the complaint and
not the caption or designation by the parties, considering that the latter is not even
indispensable to the complaint. Third, the judgment rendered in any of the actions would
amount to res judicata as to the other.
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. V. MABALACAT

INSTITUTE, INC.
G.R. NO. 211563 | SEPTEMBER 29, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - FORUM SHOPPING
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

SVHFI is the alleged owner of a parcel of land in Mabalacat. By tolerance,
Mabalacat Institute occupies the lot without paying rent from 1983 until 2002. SVHFI
informed Mabalacat Institute (MII) that it will charge a rental fee but the latter refused to
comply. For its failure to pay the rental, SVHFI sued Mabalacat Institute for collection of
272
sum of money. MII moved to dismiss the case for forum shopping. The RTC granted the
motion to dismiss. The CA sustained the ruling.
DOCTRINE: Forum Shopping is the practice of resorting to multiple reliefs to

or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.
PNB-REPUBLIC BANK V. SIAN-LIMSIACO

G.R. NO. 196323 | FEBRUARY 08, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Maybank filed a Motion for Substitution in favor of PNB (petitioner) by virtue of the
Deed of Assignment but it was denied by the RTC. Maybank argued that the CA erred
when it affirmed the RTC’s judgment despite Remedios being not the real
parties-in-interest, hence having no cause of action against the petitioner.
DOCTRINE: An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed
principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract
involves things belonging to the principal.
The Rules allow agents to bring actions for the principals in their own name
without joining their principals, provided that the contract does not involve things
TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

(TESDA) V. ERNESTO ABRAGAR
G.R. NO. 201022 |17 MARCH 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Respondent Abragar filed a complaint before the Regional Arbitration Branch of
the NLRC in San Fernando City, Pampanga for underpayment and non-payment of
salaries/wages, service incentive leave, and 13th month pay against Marble Production
Training Center (Center) and his supervisor, Philip Bronio (Bronio). The NLRC gave due
course to TESDA's appeal in intervention and emphasized that nothing on record shows
273
that the Center is a juridical person authorized to be made a party to any case as it is not
clothed with legal personality to be sued.
DOCTRINE: The joinder of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for
the exercise of judicial power. While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not
per se a ground for the dismissal of an action, considering that said party may still be
added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of
the action and/or such times as are just, it remains essential — as it is jurisdictional —
that any indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings before the court renders
judgment.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: There are two consequences of a finding on appeal that
indispensable parties have not been joined, 1. all subsequent actions of the lower courts
are null and void for lack of jurisdiction; and 2. The case should be remanded to the trial
court for the inclusion of indispensable parties.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandate that only natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action and every
action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real parties-in-interest.
ALPHA PLUS INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES CORP. V. PHILIPPINE

CHARTER INSURANCE CORP.
G.R. NO. 203756| FEBRUARY 10, 2021
RAPE; GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN REVIEWING RAPE CASES.CIVIL PROCEDURE - AMENDED PLEADING;
PRESCRIPTION
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Alpha Plus obtained two fire insurance policies from PCIC. Alpha Plus’s warehouse
was gutted by a fire destroying its equipment and pieces. The claim was denied by PCIC.
Alpha Plus filed a complaint before the RTC for specific performance and collection of
sums of money.
DOCTRINE: Case law teaches that the prescriptive period for the insured's action
for indemnity should be reckoned from the "final rejection" of the claim. The "final
rejection" simply means denial by the insurer of the claims of the insured and not the
rejection or denial by the insurer of the insured's motion or request for reconsideration.
The rejection referred to should be construed as the rejection in the first instance.
274
filed.
BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. CIR

GR NO. 205466 | JANUARY 11, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - DOCKET FEES AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

This case involves the question of whether the BCDA is exempt from payment of
docket fees before the CTA. The BCDA claims exemption for being a government
instrumentality pursuant to Section 22, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The
CIR, on the other hand, disputes BCDA's status as a government instrumentality, and
therefore posits that it is not exempt from payment.
DOCTRINE: The BCDA is a government instrumentality and therefore exempt from

payment of docket fees as provided under Section 22, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.
Section 2 (10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987
provides for the definition of a government "instrumentality" and a "GOCC," to wit:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. — x x x

(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction
by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. x x x
The grant of these corporate powers is likewise stated in Section 3 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7227, also known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which
provides for BCDA's manner of creation, to wit:
Sec. 3. Creation of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority. — There is

hereby created a body corporate to be known as the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority, which shall have the attribute of perpetual succession and shall be vested with
the powers of a corporation.
It is clear that government instrumentality may be endowed with corporate powers

and at the same time retain its classification as a government "instrumentality" for all
other purposes.
A notice of hearing is required in BCDA's Motion for Reconsideration as provided

under Section 5, Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the CTA expressly requires a
275
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

GR NO. 236075 & 236076 | APRIL 18, 2022
CIVIL PROCEDURE - EFFICIENT PAPER RULE
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Marilyn Go Ramos-Yeo, Laurence Go and Montgomery Go (the Gos), petitioners,
filed a petition for motion for reconsideration. In their Consolidated Motion for
Reconsideration, Spouses Chua, respondents, ascribed the following errors on the part of
this Court in granting petitioners' petition. Among these is that Spouses Chua question the
promulgation of the Court's Decision and Resolution on the same date. In the Resolution,
the Court noted the Comment filed by the Gos, and granted the motion for substitution of
party filed by ECI Trading Corporation.
DOCTRINE: The Court has already received and considered the Comments that are
required to be submitted by the parties within the prescribed period of filing the same.
The directive to subsequently file soft copies of the Comments to the Petitions is only for
the parties to comply with A.M. Nos. 10-3-7-SC (Rules on E-Filing), and 11-9-4-SC
(Efficient Use of Paper Rule), the hard copies thereof we have already received, examined
and assessed. It, therefore, does not preclude this Court from resolving the instant case
since the Comments to the Consolidated Petitions have already been deemed filed one
month before we rendered judgment. Considering that all the pleadings and the records
of the case had already been submitted before the Court, it, therefore, can now fully
resolve the issues presented by parties in the case pursuant to our constitutional mandate
to promptly dispense justice.
In terms of the proper service of summons, in an assailed Decision, it was

discussed that Sheriff Liboro did not exert serious efford to personally serve the summons
to the Gos before resorting to substituted service. Clearly, the substituted service of
summons on the persons of the Gos is improper, hence the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over their persons.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action
is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the
parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject
matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of
the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has
none over the cause of action. (Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of
Alberto Cruz)
276
SABADO V. SABADO
G.R. NO. 214270 | MAY 12, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - SERVICE OF SUMMONS; NOTICE TO COUNSEL
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

The court order was served to Atty. Palmero, Jay’s counsel in a separate criminal
case, not his counsel of record in this particular case.
DOCTRINE: The purpose of summons is two-fold: (1) to notify the defendant that
an action has been brought against him; and (2) to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant.
The notice to counsel is equivalent to notice to client, however, it must be one

sent to the counsel of record in order to bind the client.
The voluntary appearance of Jay, in effect, cured the improper service of

summons when he sought the lifting of the TPO and the denial of the issuance of PPO in
his opposition, without raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. By such
conduct, he can no longer subsequently object to the court's jurisdiction.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: Since personal service could not be effected due to overseas
employment, summons should be served through substituted service, extraterritorial
service, or by publication in accordance with Section 7, 15, 16 and Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.
GEMINA V. SPOUSES ESPEJO

G.R. NO. 232682 | SEPTEMBER 13, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - APPEARANCE OF PARTIES; EFFECTS OF FAILURE TO APPEAR
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

This Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Patricio G. Gemina
(Gemina) assails the February 22, 2017 Decision and the June 30, 2017 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101629, which affirmed with modification the
September 3, 2013 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 80 of Quezon City,
in favor of respondents Heirs of Gerardo V. Espejo, Jr. (heirs of Espejo) and Nenafe V.
Espejo (Nenafe), in a case for Recovery of Possession of Property.
DOCTRINE: When the party-defendant is present, the absence of his counsel

during pre-trial shall not ipso facto result in the plaintiff's ex parte presentation of
evidence.
277
ADDITIONAL NOTES: The rigid application of procedural rules should not result in
straight-jacketing the administration of justice.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT V. PAMPILO, JR.

G.R. NOS. 188760, 189060 & 189333 |JUNE 30, 2020
CIVIL PROCEDURE - INTERVENTION; LEGAL INTEREST
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

SJS filed a petition for declaratory relief against Pilipinas Shell, Caltex, and Petron
due to unjustified oil price increase constituting monopoly and restraint in trade. The Big
3 moved to dismiss the case on lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. During the
pendency of the case, Pasang Masda filed a Motion for Intervention.
DOCTRINE: Section 1, 92 Rule 19 of the Rules of Court requires that: (1) the
movant must have a legal interest in the matter being litigated; (2) the intervention must
not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties; and (3) the
claim of the intervenor must not be capable of being properly decided in a separate
proceeding. The right to intervene, however, is not an absolute right as the granting of a
motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and may only be
allowed if the movant is able to satisfy all the requirements.
ALJEM’S CREDIT INVESTOR CO. V. SPOUSES BAUTISTA

G.R. NO. 215175 | APRIL 25, 2022
CIVIL PROCEDURE - SUMMARY JUDGEMENT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Bautistas failed to pay the loan; thus, the petitioner foreclosed the mortgage.
As the spouses Bautista did not redeem the property within the reglementary period, title
to the property was consolidated in petitioner's name. Thus, petitioner sent demand
letters to Catalina to vacate the property. The last demand letter to vacate was sent on
January 18, 2006. All demands were to no avail, resulting to petitioner's filing of the
complaint. Petitioner filed its Reply. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment, alleging that there is no genuine issue of fact because: (a) the spouses Bautista
admitted that the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the property is in petitioner's
name; (b) there were no specific denials of the material allegations of the complaint; (c)
the defense of the spouses Bautista are legal issues, not factual; and, (d) there is no
genuine issue of fact.
278
DOCTRINE: An issue of fact is genuine if it requires presentation of evidence to be
resolved.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: Summary judgment is a procedural device that allows parties

to avoid long litigation and delays, where the pleadings show that there are no genuine
issues of fact to be tried. A genuine issue of fact is "such issue of fact which requires the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived, or false
claim." As such, an issue of fact is genuine if it requires presentation of evidence to be
resolved.
LETICIA RAMIREZ V. FELOMINO ELOMINA

G.R. NO. 202661 | MARCH 17, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - PERIOD TO EXTEND THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Ramirez admits having committed the procedural infraction of filing a Motion for
Reconsideration belatedly but asks for the relaxation of the rules. She explains that the
inadvertent late filing of the said motion with the appellate court was due to
forgetfulness in view of her old age and frail condition.
DOCTRINE: The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal
must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so leads to the loss of the
right to appeal. Settled is the rule that anyone seeking exemption from the application of
the reglementary period for filing an appeal has the burden of proving the existence of
exceptionally meritorious instances warranting such deviation.
MARIA AROMIN V. HEIRS OF SOMIS

G.R. NO. 204447 | APRIL 26, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - EXTRINSIC FRAUD
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Maria alleged that she and her deceased husband Rufino owned three parcels of
land (lots A,B, and C). According to her, she instructed her son, Briccio, to pay the realty
tax for the said lots. Briccio then discovered that Lots A and C were sold to the Spouses
Somis, through a Deed of Sale with the Right to Repurchase, allegedly signed by Maria and
Rufino. Maria filed a Complaint for Annulment of Documents with damages, alleging that
she did not sign the Deed of Sale, hence it is void.
DOCTRINE: Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in
litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is
279
prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on
him by his opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a false
promise of a compromise, or where the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit,
being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or
without authority connives at his defeat. These instances show that there was never a
real contest in the trial or hearing of the case so that the judgment should be annulled
and the case set for a new and fair hearing.
A lawyer's neglect in keeping track of the case and his failure to apprise his client
of the developments of the case do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Fraud is not extrinsic if
the alleged fraudulent act was committed by petitioner's own counsel. The fraud must
emanate from the act of the adverse party and must be of such nature as to deprive
petitioner of its day in court.
PARAYDAY V. SHOGUN SHIPPING CO., INC.

GR NO. 204555 | JULY 6, 2020
CIVIL PROCEDURE - APPEALS
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

This case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal and regularization,
underpayment of wages, overtime pay, rest day pay, holiday pay, holiday premium,
service incentive leave (SIL), thirteenth (13th) month pay, and night shift differential pay,
and claims for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees filed by Parayday and
Reboso against respondent Shogun Shipping Co., Inc. (Shogun Ships), and Vicente R.
Cordero (Cordero) and Antonio “Nonie” C. Raymundo (Raymundo), President and Vice
President, respectively, of Shogun Ships.
DOCTRINE: It is a well-established rule in labor proceedings that the Labor Arbiter

(LA), or the Supreme Court (SC) for that matter, cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent until he/she is validly served with summons, or that he/she
voluntarily appears in court.
Parties who do not appeal from a judgment can no longer seek modification or
reversal of the same Rule 8, Section 11, of the Rules of Court, which supplements the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Rules of Procedure, provides that allegations
which are not specifically denied are deemed admitted.
280
BRUAL V. CONTRERAS
G.R. NO. 205451 | MARCH, 7, 2022
CIVIL PROCEDURE - NATURE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

This case involves an appeal wherein the respondents, collectively as Bruals, filed
an appeal on the decision of the RTC dismissing their motion for intervention in a special
proceeding concerning the last will and testament of their aunt. The RTC dismissed the
case on the ground that while they filed their notice to appeal, they failed to file the
record on appeal pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The
Supreme Court, in affirming the dismissal, held that while it is not necessary that a notice
of appeal and a record on appeal be filed simultaneously, the rule is unequivocal that the
notice of appeal and record on appeal shall be filed within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order.
DOCTRINE: Appeal is neither a natural nor a constitutional right, but merely

statutory, and the implication of its statutory character is that the party who intends to
appeal must always comply with the procedures and rules governing appeals, or else the
right of appeal may be lost or squandered.
MEGA FISHING CORP V. ESTATE OF GONZALES

GR NO. 214781| MARCH 9, 2022
CIVIL PROCEDURE - NATURE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

The Deceased Francisco Gonzales (deceased Francisco, respondent) owned a 1,667
sqm property (subject property) located in Navotas covered by TCT No. 280406 issued on
April 20, 1994. By virtue of a deed of sale, TCT No 280406 was canceled and TCT No 21297
was issued on April 30 1999, TCT 21297 was canceled, and at the exact time, a new TCT
21299 was issued in the name of Esperanza Consigna. On November 5, 1999, Mega Fishing
Corporation (MFC, petitioner) purchased the subject property from Esperanza. The estate
of Francisco through Teresita, filed a case against Esperanza, Mercedita, MFC, Vicente
Garcia (Garcia), and Sarah Principe, seeking to annul and cancel TCT 21297, 21299, and
21296, and the reinstatement of TCT No. 280406. RTC ruled in favor of Francisco. The
MGC filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision but it was denied. MFC then
filed a notice of appeal.
DOCTRINE: The rules of procedure must be strictly followed because the “right to
appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. A party
who seeks to avail of the right must, therefore, comply with the requirements of the
rules, failing which the right to appeal is invariably lost.
281
However, this court previously allowed the relaxation of the rigid rules of
procedure in order to serve substantial justice in considering (1) matters of life, liberty,
honor or property; (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (3) the merits
of the case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; or (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. TICO INSURANCE

GR NO. 204226 | APRIL 18, 2022
CIVIL PROCEDURE - NATURE OF APPEAL
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) sent TICO several final assessment notices for
its tax deficiencies. TICO failed to pay its tax liabilities, prompting the BIR to issue a
warrant of distraint and/or levy over the two aforementioned condominium units of TICO
annotated on the Certificate of Title of the two units.
DOCTRINE: It is settled that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. This means that the
failure to interpose a timely appeal deprives the appellate body of any jurisdiction to
alter the final judgment, more so to entertain the appeal.
A successful litigant who has secured a final judgment in its favor cannot later be
impleaded by its defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove its
claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack
upon the judgment. In other words, an action for interpleader may not be utilized to
circumvent the immutability of a final and executory judgment. It is settled that when a
decision has attained finality, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: In order to resolve the conflict of who has preference of

credit over TICO’s two condominium units, a complaint for interpleader was filed by TICO.
PEOPLE V. MALLARI
G.R. NO. 197164 | DECEMBER 04, 2019
CIVIL PROCEDURE - DOCTRINE OF FINALITY/IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGEMENTS
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the May 23, 2011 Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc which dismissed
282
the petition for review filed by petitioner, the People, questioning the dismissal of C.T.A.
Criminal Case No. O-151 by the CTA First Division in its December 14, 2009 Resolution for
failure to obey lawful orders of the court and the subsequent dismissal of its motion for
reconsideration in the CTA Special First Division March 17, 2010 Resolution for being filed
out of time.
DOCTRINE: Judgments or orders become final and executory by operation of law

and not by judicial declaration. The finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse
of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or no motion for
reconsideration or new trial is filed. The court need not even pronounce the finality of
the order as the same becomes final by operation of law.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: Resolution of the CTA First Division has already attained
finality, it now "becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of
the land." Although there are recognized exceptions to this rule, petitioner failed to prove
that the case falls under any of the instances. By virtue of the doctrine of immutability,
the said Resolution can no longer be reviewed nor modified event is meant to correct an
erroneous conclusion of law and facts of the said tax court.
TANINGCO V. HERNANDEZ
G.R. NO. 215615 | DECEMBER 9, 2020
CIVIL PROCEDURE - DOCTRINE OF FINALITY/IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGEMENTS
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Taningco received the decision of the CA for them to vacate the ancestral land. He
immediately filed with the CA to set aside the decision since they did not receive a copy
for the previous decision of the CA since the decision was only received by Taningco’s
counsel.
DOCTRINE: A decision or order that has attained finality can no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
and law and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of
the land.
283
EAST WEST BANKING CORP. V. CRUZ
G.R. NO. 221641, JULY 12, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
SUMMARY & DOPCTRINE

Petitioner East West Banking Corporation (East West) filed a Complaint before the
RTC for a Sum of Money with an Application for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment against respondents Ian Y. Cruz (Ian) and Paul Andrew Chua Hua (Paul) and
also impleaded respondents Francisco T. Cruz (Francisco), Ian's father, and Alvin Y. Cruz
(Alvin), Ian's brother, as unwilling co-plaintiffs, which case was dismissed, and East West
appealed the case to the CA by filing a Notice of Appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court. However, Ian contended that the complaint does not state a cause of action, and
whether or not a litigant is a real party-in-interest are questions of law, as these do not
involve an evaluation of facts.
DOCTRINE: Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal from
the RTC to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed; and that
an appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall be dismissed outright.
The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: Under the Rules of Court, there are three modes to appeal a
decision or final judgment of the RTC, 1. The ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court, is brought to the CA from the RTC, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law; 2. The petition for
review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from the RTC, acting in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law. 3. The appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
is brought to the Supreme Court and resolves only questions of law.
HORCA V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 224316 |NOVEMBER 10, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - APPEALS FROM THE RTC
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Horca was charged with the crime of theft from money she received from the
Sisters of Providence for the purchase of 19 Swiss Air plane tickets. In the motion for
reconsideration, Horca insisted that the crime charged is not supported by evidence on
record and that her liability is merely civil in nature.
284
DOCTRINE: It is axiomatic that issues raised for the first time on appeal should not
be entertained because to do so would be anathema to the rudiments of fairness and due
process.
In S.C. Megaworld vs. Parada, the court ruled that: it is well-settled that no
question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below.
Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a
reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic
considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first
time on appeal is barred by estoppel.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: It is a cardinal principle that, in all criminal prosecutions, it

is the prosecution that bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, it is essential that the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense. This burden of proof placed upon the prosecution is anchored on
the presumption of innocence granted in favor of the accused, which no less than our
Constitution has guaranteed.
Further, acquittal in the criminal case does not amount to absolution in the civil
liability. In Dayap v. Sendiong, this Court held that:
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against
him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with
it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of
the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is
not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action
based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in
the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
GABUTINA V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. NO. 205572 | OCTOBER 07, 2020
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Moreno filed a complaint against Gabutina, chief of staff of Cong. Moreno. Accused
Baldovino allegedly demanded Php 500,000 as an SOP for the award of the Farm to Market
project to Moreno. The Ombudsman found Gabutina guilty and denied his motion for
reconsideration.
285
DOCTRINE: The Court cannot anymore relax the rules for Gabutina, as his delay in
filing a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the CA spanned
more than six years, when, in the first place, he only had 15 days under the law to do so.
The Court has consistently held that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the
provisions of law. His six-year delay was not justified by any compelling reason; thus, his
Petition for Review must fail.
PRC V. ALO
G.R. NO. 214435 | FEBRUARY 14, 2022
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Alo was charged before the Board for Professional Teachers, which operates under
the Professional Regulation Commission, for using fraud or deceit in obtaining a certificate
of registration and professional license. The Board rendered a decision against Alo, who
then files a motion for reconsideration which the Board denied. Without elevating the
case to the PRC, Alo directly filed a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.
DOCTRINE: There is no law granting the PRC exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
cases decided by the Board, nor is there any law excluding such cases from being taken
cognizance by the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as
will be discussed further below.
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court grants the CA exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of RTCs and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions.
It is clear from the above provisions that a Rule 43 petition to the CA includes all
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Scope. —

This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals
and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies
are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and
Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No.
6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Agricultural Invention Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
286
Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and
voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
Section 2. Cases not covered. — This Rule shall not apply to judgments or final
orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines.
MONTERDE V. JACINTO
GR NO. 214102 | FEBRUARY 14, 2022
RAPE; GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN REVIEWING RAPE CASES
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

The case stemmed from the administrative complaint filed by Evelyn A. Conag
(Conag), respondent, in 2011 against the vice mayor and the members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Esperanza, Masbate (local government officials), for Gross Negligence, and
violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
The petitioners, filed two separate motions for reconsideration, arguing in common that
the assailed Decision has no basis in fact and law, and that the suspension was too harsh a
penalty. The Ombudsman partially granted the motions in its May 1, 2013 Order, and
reduced the penalty to a fine equivalent to three-months' salary.
DOCTRINE: The filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review

before the Office of the Ombudsman does not operate to stay the immediate
implementation of the foregoing Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions.
Only a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, duly

issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, stays the immediate implementation of the
said Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure

provides that a decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be
executed as a matter of course.
GRANA V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 202111 | NOVEMBER 25, 2019
CIVIL PROCEDURE - APPEALS BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Bolbes filed a case of malicious mischief against Grana et al. The accused intruded
his house by destroying the fence and destroyed the cement foundation of the house.
Grana answered that the diggings were made since they are the owners of the property
and the purpose of the diggings is to protect both parties.
287
DOCTRINE: A petition for review on certiorari must be limited to the issues on
legal questions only.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. QUILIT

GR NO. 194167 | FEBRUARY 10, 2021
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Respondents Mauricio Laoyan, now deceased, and Magdalena Quilit filed with the
RARAD a petition for annulment of sale of an agricultural land and redemption. The case
involves two parcels of land located at La Trinidad, Benguet containing areas of 219 sqm.
and 3,042 sqm, including improvements thereon, which were formerly owned by the
Spouses Pedro and Erenita Tolding.
DOCTRINE: Well-settled is the rule that "this Court is not a trier of facts, and it is
not its function to examine, review, or evaluate the evidence all over again." Along the
same lines, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers
only questions of law. Thus, in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Court
is generally limited to reviewing only errors of law and not of facts.
when: "(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact
evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10)
the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties."
LOPEZ V. SALUDO, JR.

G.R. NO. 233775 | SEPTEMBER 15, 2021
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

This Petition for Review on Certiorari challenges the February 9, 2017 Decision and
August 30, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals which denied petitioner Doris Marie
Lopez’s (Lopez) appeal. Respondent Aniceto G. Saludo (Saludo) alleged that sometime in
April or May 1997, Lopez told him that she knew of two parcels of land that were being
offered for sale at a reasonable price. After the execution of the sale, Saludo noticed that
288
Lopez started evading him and did not give any update as to the registration of the sale in
his name. When Saludo inquired on the status of the properties, he found out that the
properties were already registered in the name of Lopez issued by the Register of Deeds
of Pasig City.
DOCTRINE: Questions of fact, which would require a re-evaluation of the

evidence, are inappropriate under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The jurisdiction of the
Court under Rule 45, Section 1 is limited only to errors of law as the Court is not a trier of
facts. While Rule 45, Section 1 is not absolute, none of the recognized exceptions, which
allow the Court to review factual issues, is present in the instant case.
BELARSO V. QUALITY HOUSE, INC.

G.R. NO. 209983 | NOVEMBER 10, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - APPEALS BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT; EXCEPTIONS TO RULE 45
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Belarso, a supervisor of Quality House, Inc. was validly dismissed for loss of trust
and confidence when on a routinary outgoing inspection of body frisking of employees, a
belt buckle was found inside her bag. Conflicting findings of the LA and the NLRC gave
rise to the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
DOCTRINE: The Court may review the factual findings of the LA and the NLRC
when they are conflicting. While the Court's jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to
the review of questions of law, this rule admits of exceptions, one of which is when the
factual findings of the LA and the NLRC are conflicting.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: The Court’s jurisdiction in cases brought before it from the
CA via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. The
Court is not the proper venue to consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts. This
rule, however, is not ironclad and a departure therefrom may be warranted where the
findings of fact of the CA are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the NLRC and LA,
as in this case. In this regard, there is therefore a need to review the records to
determine which of them should be preferred as more conformable to evidentiary facts.
(INC Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Moradas, G.R. No. 178564, 15 January 2014).
289
TELETECH CUSTOMER CARE MANAGEMENT
PHILIPPINES, INC. V. GERONA, JR.
G.R. NO. 219166 | NOVEMBER 10, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - APPEALS BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT; PETITION FOR REVIEW
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Due to the decrease in volume of calls for the Accenture (American customers)
account, Teletech offered to transfer several representatives to the Telstra (Australian
customers) account one of which was Gerona, a regular employee who refused to transfer
and go through training and examination. Due to such refusal, Teletech dismissed him on
the ground of redundancy. Gerona then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal that resulted
to conflicting factual findings of the LA and NLRC on the one hand, and the CA, on the
other.
DOCTRINE: It must be stressed that a petition for review under Rule 45 is limited
only to questions of law as factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by
certiorari. The Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not its function to evaluate the
However, as the findings of the LA and NLRC on the one hand, and the CA, on the
other, are conflicting, the present case falls under jurisprudential exemptions. Thus, in
the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, this Court is compelled to re-evaluate the factual
issues and re-examine the questioned findings.
REPUBLIC V. KIKUCHI
GR NO. 209837 | JUNE 22, 2022
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

This petition for review on certiorari is about the judicial recognition of the
divorce between Respondent Jocelyn Asusano Kikuchi (Jocelyn), Filipino, and Fumio U.
Kikuchi (Fumio), Japanese. She alleged that she was married to Fumio in 1993, and in
2007, they jointly filed for divorce before the City Hall of Sakado City, Saitama
Prefecture.7 As the divorce was accepted, Jocelyn sought the recognition thereof here in
the Philippines.The Republic argued that Jocelyn failed to comply with the requirements
of authentication and proof of documents concerning the Acceptance Certificate, and the
Authentication by the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. The trial court held that
Jocelyn indeed was able to establish the fact of divorce and the national law of Japan.
The CA held that Jocelyn was able to present documents proving the fact of divorce and
the law of Japan.
290
DOCTRINE: Exceptions to rule 45 of the Rules of Court:(1) the conclusion is
grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; ( 4) the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts; ( 5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no
citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of
absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings
of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
EQUITABLE PCI BANK V. MANILA ADJUSTERS AND

SURVEYORS, INC.
G.R. NO. 166726 | NOVEMBER 25, 2019
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Phil-Am Insurance Co. Inc which was represented by respondent Manila Adjusters
and Surveyors Inc. (MSI) executed a deed of sale for the salvaged fertilizers stored in a
warehouse located in San Fernando, La Union. It was agreed that Phil-Am Insurance would
pay for the total amount of 5,159,725 pesos and that they would be accountable for the
storage and warehousing charges. Phil-Am Insurance was also required to open an
irrevocably confirmed without recourse letter of credit amounting to P1,000,000.00 in
favor of Manila Adjusters and Surveyors Inc. in case of non-compliance with the terms and
conditions by the former. MSI demanded from Phil-Am insurance but the latter failed to
settle the obligation.
DOCTRINE: A petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 of the Rules of Court
is only limited to questions of law. A re- examination of factual findings cannot be done
through a petition for review on certiorari because this court is not a trier of facts. there
is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
set of facts; a question of facts arises when there is doubt or difference as to the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: The jurisprudential doctrine that findings of the Court of

Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when these coincide
with the factual findings of the trial court, must remain undisturbed, unless factual
findings are not supported by the evidence on record.
291
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM V. SENO JR.
G.R. NO. 183478 | FEBRUARY 10, 2020
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside the
March 11, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals which granted the Amended Petition for
Certiorari filed by Manuel F. Seno, Jr., Fernando S. Gorrospe, and Gemma S. Seno and
which annulled and set aside Orders of the Regional Trial Court.
DOCTRINE: It is a settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a

petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts. Hence, it will not entertain questions of facts as it is bound by the
findings of fact made by the CA when supported by substantial evidence.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: There are exceptions to the rule wherein the Court may pass
upon and review the findings of fact by the CA. These instances are:
conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
REPUBLIC V. CASTILLO
G.R. NO. 190453 | FEBRUARY 26, 2020
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

In an expropriation proceeding initiated by petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(RP), both the RTC and CA ruled that the just compensation shall be determined based on
the value of the subject property on the date of the filing of the Amended Complaint for
expropriation and not on the date of taking in 1947 the fact of which had not been
292
proven. Hence, the RP filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and
raised a question of fact claiming that it had actual possession of the subject property
since 1947.
DOCTRINE: Rule 45 of the Rules provides that the petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is
doubt as to what the law is on a certain set of facts, while a question of fact arises when
there is doubt as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of
law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the litigants. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of facts and circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of
the evidence presented, the question is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question
is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising
the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue without
examining or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it
is a question of fact.
KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES V. TIONGCO

G.R. NO. 212136| OCTOBER 4, 2021
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

The issues raised by Dr. Tiongco are factual in nature which are not subject to
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
DOCTRINE: Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Court is not a trier of facts. Hence, it
is not the court’s function to re-evaluate the probative value of the evidence of both
parties which were already considered in the proceedings.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, jurisdiction is generally

limited to the review of errors of law committed by the appellate court. The Supreme
Court is not obliged to review over again the evidence which the parties adduced in the
court a quo. However, the rule is not without exception. In Medina v. Asistio, Jr.,the
findings of fact of the CA may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court in the following
instances:

conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting: (6) When the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions
293
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
PACIFIC ROYAL BASIC FOODS, INC. V. NOCHE

G.R. NO. 202392 | OCTOBER 4, 2021
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. They imputed grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC for entertaining PRBFI's appeal, the requisite
bond of which was posted only almost a month after the appeal period had lapsed.
DOCTRINE: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed before the Supreme Court covers pure questions of law - questions on the
application of the law on a certain set and state of established facts. Questions of fact, or
those seeking to verify the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, will not be entertained.
Essentially, a petition for review on certiorari excludes a reassessment of the disputed
facts of the case.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: In assailing the CA's actions on the respective procedural

obedience of herein parties and its favorable appreciation of the arguments raised by
respondents, PRBFI necessarily prays for the reopening of the factual records of the case.
PRBFI cannot do so in a Rule 45 proceeding.
Note, however, that this is not an inflexible rule. A factual probe into the case
may be conducted in a Rule 45 petition if it falls under the exceptional circumstances laid
out by jurisprudence: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
294
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the finding of
fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record. The case at hand does not fall under any of these
exceptions.
CALUBAD V. ACERON
G.R. NO. 188029 | SEPTEMBER 02, 2020
CIVIL PROCEDURE - ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

TCT N-2533731 was issued in the name of Oliver. He informed Aceron of the
rescission of the Conditional Sale and demanded he vacate the premises of the subject
property. Aceron moved that the ownership of the property be transferred to him. The
RTC granted the motion.
DOCTRINE: Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed

only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. In
addition, it may be invoked only on two grounds, namely, extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.
ANCHETA V. CAMBAY
G.R. NO. 204272 | JANUARY 18, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGEMENT
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Vivian obtained a loan from Cambay. As security, she executed a REM in favor of
Cambay. She then obtained another loan from Cambay. Ancheta filed with the RTC a
Petition for Relief from Judgment arguing among others, that: (1) Ancheta came to know
of the case docketed as SPL Civil Action No. 64 only sometime in February 2006; (2) no
summons was personally served on her and/or Dionila; and (3) the June 10, 2003 SPA
purportedly executed by Ancheta and Dionila empowering Vivian to utilize the land as
security for her loan with Cambay was falsified, and thus, null and void.
DOCTRINE: Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could
have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. This means that the
remedy of annulment of judgment, albeit a "last remedy," is not an alternative remedy to
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or a petition for relief. It must show or allege
that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. But this requirement to
aver is not imposed when the ground for the petition is lack of jurisdiction (whether
295
GAOIRAN V. CA
GR NO. 215925 | MARCH 07, 2022
CIVIL PROCEDURE - ANNULMENT OF JUDGEMENT
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

The property subject of the instant petition is a 275-square meter parcel of land
situated in Barangay Poblacion San Miguel & San Pedro, City of Laoag. The petitioner
claimed that on September 22, 2009, her acquaintances introduced her to a man named
Timoteo H. Pablo, Jr., who reportedly wanted to sell a piece of property that was
registered in his wife Perlita S. Pablo's name. To the petitioner and her husband, Timoteo
made the offer to sell the concerned property. By claiming that his wife Perlita had given
him permission to sell the property, Timoteo was able to persuade the petitioner to buy
it.
DOCTRINE: Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the only grounds for
annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. In this case, petitioner
alleges that the CA erred in failing to annul the Decision of the RTC on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: The property subject of the instant petition is a 275-square

meter parcel of land situated in Barangay Poblacion San Miguel & San Pedro, City of
Laoag, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) T-34540 issued under the name
of respondent Perlita S. Pablo (Perlita), married to Timoteo Pablo (Timoteo). The
petitioner claimed that on September 22, 2009, her acquaintances introduced her to a
man named Timoteo H. Pablo, Jr., who reportedly wanted to sell a piece of property that
was registered in his wife Perlita S. Pablo's name. To the petitioner and her husband,
Timoteo made the offer to sell the concerned property. By claiming that his wife Perlita
had given him permission to sell the property, Timoteo was able to persuade the
petitioner to buy it. On the same day, petitioner delivered the purchase price to Timoteo
296
in the amount of P500,000.00 and in exchange, Timoteo surrendered the first owner's
duplicate copy of TCT T-34540 to petitioner and undertook to deliver a deed of absolute
sale signed by his wife on or before October 22, 2009. Timoteo, however, did not make
good his promise.
In exchange for Timoteo turning over the initial owner's duplicate copy of TCT
T-34540 to the petitioner and promising to submit a deed of absolute sale signed by his
wife on or before October 22, 2009, the petitioner paid Timoteo the purchase price of
P500,000.00 on the same day. But Timoteo didn't follow through on his pledge.
ANGONO MEDICS HOSPITAL V. AGABIN

G.R. NO. 202542 | DECEMBER 9, 2020
CIVIL PROCEDURE - IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENTS; RES JUDICATA
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Agabin was hired by Angono Medic Hospital as staff midwife. She was illegally
dismissed when she returned from study leave. She filed two separate petitions for
certiorari.
DOCTRINE: CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGEMENT— Any right, fact or matter in issue

directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by
the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies,
whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the
same.
RES JUDICATA — 'a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment.' It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or
decree rendered on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
VILLAROMAN V. ESTATE OF ARCIAGA

G.R. 210822 | JUNE 28, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - RES JUDICATA; FORUM SHOPPING
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

This case involves Civil Case No. 11993 and Civil Case No. 00-113, wherein the
heirs of Agrifina De Villaroman argue that there is no res judicata and forum shopping.
297
DOCTRINE: Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; or a thing or matter settled by judgment." Under this rule, final
judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction "is conclusive as to
the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits, and on all points and matters
determined in the former suit.
"[a] cause of action may give rise to several reliefs, but only one action can be
filed. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided into
two or more different actions. The rule prohibiting the splitting of a single cause of action
is clear.”
PNB V. DARADAR
G.R. NO. 180203 | JUNE 28, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - EFFECT OF JUDGEMENTS
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

This is the case where the trial court issued two orders; one provisionally
dismissing the case and the other dismissing the case for failure to prosecute.
DOCTRINE: There is nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which

provides for a provisional dismissal of a civil case. Moreover, a judgment must be
definitive; the decision itself must purport to decide finally the rights of the parties upon
the issue submitted by specifically denying or granting the remedy sought by the action. It
is significant to note that in Cu Unjieng E. Hijos v. Mabalacat Sugar Company the Court
held that when a definitive judgment cannot be rendered since the judgment is subject to
a contingency, the judgment contains no disposition at all and is null and void. Guided by
the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the First Order which provisionally dismissed
Civil Case No. 21375 is void and without legal effect for lack of basis.
A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect for any purpose. In
contemplation of law, it is non-existent and may be resisted in any action or proceeding
whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a
void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored. All acts performed pursuant to it
and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. In this sense, a void order can
never attain finality. Being void, the issuance of the First Order never became final nor
operated to divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the complaint.
causes of action.
298
PINEDA V. MIRANDA
G.R. NO. 204997 | AUGUST 4, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - REVIVAL OF JUDGEMENTS
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Respondents Abelardo Miranda, Elias Miranda and Miranda (respondents) filed a
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against petitioners who are residents of Barangay
Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, before the MTC.
DOCTRINE: The revival action is a new action altogether; it is different and

distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. It is a new and
independent action, wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits
of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. The Court
agrees with the CA in citing Saligumba v. Palanog, especially when it ruled that revival of
judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be revived, either by motion
or by independent action, is already final and executory.
LINDEN SUITES V. MERIDIEN FAR EAST.

G.R. NO. 211969 | OCTOBER 4, 2021
CIVIL PROCEDURE - EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECT OF JUDGEMENT
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

The Linden Suites, Inc.(Linden Suites) filed a complaint for damages against
respondent Meridien Far East Properties, Inc.(MFEPI) before the RTC of Pasig City. RTCc
held MFEPI liable, and such decision attained finality. Since the Writ of Execution was
unserved, Linden Suites filed an Urgent Motion to Examine Judgment Obligor before RTC
of Pasig City, the same trial court which rendered the final judgment.
DOCTRINE: Section 5 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court provides that every court
has the inherent power to "amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
the said law or rules. The court may stay or suspend the execution of its judgment if
warranted by the higher interest of justice. It has the authority to cause a modification of
the decision when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: It is settled that the court which rendered the judgment has
supervisory control over the execution of its judgment. It does not, however, give the
court the power to alter or amend a final and executory decision in the absence of the
299
recognized exceptions, namely: (a) if there is a need to correct clerical errors which
cause no prejudice to any party, (b) void judgments, and (c) if circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable.
HEIRS OF AURIO T. CASIÑO, SR. V. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE

G.R. NOS. 204052-53 | MARCH 11, 2020
CIVIL PROCEDURE - RES JUDICATA ; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Petitioners Heirs of Aurio Casino assailed, in a complaint for quieting of title
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC Br. 10) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, the validity of the
real estate mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure sale in favor of the respondent DBP
which was already adjudged by the Supreme Court in Civil Case No. 1465, and has become
final and executory. However, the RTC Br. 10 ruled in favor of the petitioners and granted
the petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal primarily based on the advanced age
of Aurio's spouse. The CA reversed the decision of RTC Br. 10 and ruled that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion for Execution pending appeal.
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of res judicata actually embraces two different concepts:
(1) bar by former judgment; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.The concept of
conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former
suit and was judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and
persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future
action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the
judgment remains unreversed by proper authority.
execution.
300
CHUA V. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 202004 | NOVEMBER 04, 2020
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES - PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Interbrand Logistics & Distribution, Inc., (Interbrand) represented by its duly
authorized officer, Almer L. Caras (Caras), applied with China Bank for the issuance of
Domestic Letters of Credit (L/C) for the purchase of goods from Nestle Philippines. Due to
advances made by China Bank, the parties jointly executed two Surety Agreements
whereby in the first Agreement, Interbrand and its officers, Chua, Carlos Francisco
Mijares (Mijares), and Caras served as sureties but they all failed to pay.
DOCTRINE: A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon

the order of the court where an action is pending. Through the writ, the property or
properties of the defendant may be levied upon and held thereafter by the sheriff as
security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment might be secured by the attaching
creditor against the defendant. The provisional remedy of attachment is available in
order that the defendant may not dispose of the property attached, and thus prevent the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be secured by the plaintiff from the former.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: Under Sections 12 and 13, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court,
there are two ways to secure the discharge of an attachment, as mentioned by the CA.
First, the party whose property has been attached or a person appearing on his/her behalf
may post a security. Second, said party may show that the order of attachment was
improperly or irregularly issued. In this case, Chua successfully had the attachment
against him initially discharged on the second ground.
301
DUMARAN V. LLAMEDO
G.R. NO. 201380 | AUGUST 4, 2021
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES - PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

This Petition for Review on Certiorari with Application for Writs of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order seeks the reversal of the August 13, 2014
Decision and February 11, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
04133-MIN entitled Teresa Llamedo, Sharon Magallanes and Ginalyn Cubeta v. Hon.
Panambulan M. Mimbisa, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, General Santos
City, and Ignacio S. Dumaran . The CA Decision set aside the Orders of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 37 of General Santos City in Civil Case No. 7938, an action for Sum of
Money, Damages and Attorney's Fees with Ex- Parte Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment/Garnishment.
DOCTRINE: Non-payment of a debt does not automatically equate to a fraudulent

act. The fraud alleged must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been
the reason which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have
otherwise given.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: Under Sections 12 and 13, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court,
there are two ways to secure the discharge of an attachment, as mentioned by the CA.
First, the party whose property has been attached or a person appearing on his/her behalf
may post a security. Second, said party may show that the order of attachment was
improperly or irregularly issued. In this case, Chua successfully had the attachment
against him initially discharged on the second ground.
METROPLEX BERTHAD V. SINOPHIL CORP.

G.R. 208281 | JUNE 28, 2021
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES - INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Sinophil entered into a Share Swap Agreement with Metroplex and Paxell.
Thereafter Sinophil approved the reduction of the shares of their authorized capital stock,
wherein Maxell filed their petitons in opposition.
DOCTRINE: Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a TRO may be
granted only when:
perpetually;
302
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SPOUSES DE JESUS

G.R. NO. 221133 | JUNE 28, 2021
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES - REDEMPTION; NATURE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

The mortgagor failed to redeem and sought to prevent the mortgagee bank, who
was also the highest bidder, from consolidating title despite the lapse of the redemption
period.
DOCTRINE: If the redemption period expires without the mortgagor or his

successor-in-interest redeeming the foreclosed property within one year from the
registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds, the title over the property
consolidates in the purchaser. The consolidation confirms the purchaser as the owner
entitled to the possession of the property without any need for him to file the bond. The
issuance of a writ of possession to the purchaser becomes a matter of right upon the
consolidation of title in his name, while the mortgagor, by failing to redeem, loses all
interest in the property.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or

proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or
a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. Its essential role is preservative of the
rights of the parties in order to protect the ability of the court to render a meaningful
decision, or in order to guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper or
prevent the granting of the proper relief after the trial on the merits.
Another essential role is preventive of the threats to cause irreparable harm or

injury to a party before the litigation could be resolved. It is resorted to only when there
is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences that cannot be redressed under any
standard of compensation. The application for the writ rests upon an alleged existence of
an emergency or of a special reason for such an order to issue before the case can be
regularly heard, and the essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief
are that the complaint alleges facts that appear to be sufficient to constitute a cause of
action for injunction and that on the entire showing from both sides, it appears, in view
of all the circumstances, that the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal
rights of plaintiff pending the litigation.
303
An application for preliminary injunction may be denied even without the conduct
of a hearing separate from that of the summary hearing of an application for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NOS. 192809, 193588, 193590-91 & 201650|
APRIL 26, 2021
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES - WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Reta is the owner and operator of Aquarius Container Yard (ACY) which the
operation as a container yard outside the customs territory has been approved by the
BOC. On Jan. 9, 2009, Reta entered into a MOA with the BOC for the free use of his
container yard as the designated examination area for the container vans in the Port of
Davao for a period of 25 years. The agreement also provided that the parties may revoke
it for cause at any time.
Reta closed the container yard and barred customs examiners from entering the
premises. On the same date, Atty. Castigador informed Reta, through a letter, of his
intention to conduct the examination of the container vans and to reexamine the MOA as
its purpose no longer exists. This prompted Reta to file a Complaint with Application for
Preliminary injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against
petitioners.
DOCTRINE: The requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are
as follows: (a) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected,
that is a right in esse; (b) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (c)
there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and,
(d) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of
irreparable injury.

or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, an injunction is not
proper. While it is not required that the right claimed by the applicant, as basis for
seeking injunctive relief, be conclusively established, it is still necessary to show, at least
contradiction.
304
PEOPLE V. SERGIO
G.R. NO. 240053| OCTOBER 09, 2019
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - WRIT OF CERTIORARI, GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius L. Lacanilao (Julius) were friends and
neighbors in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Due to dire situations, they forced Mary Jane to
accept a domestic helper job in Malaysia. Upon arrival in Malaysia, the intended job was
unavailable. Cristina then sent Mary Jane to Indonesia only to be arrested for drug
trafficking. Cristina and Julius were arrested for human trafficking and illegal
recruitment. Prosecution requested leave of court to take deposition from Mary Jane. This
was opposed by Cristina and Julius. The RTC granted the prosecution's motion. The CA
reversed the decision hence, the present petition for writ of certiorari.
DOCTRINE: A writ of certiorari — being a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in

character, whose purpose is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction,
or to prevent an inferior court from committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts (i.e., acts that
courts have no power or authority in law to perform) — is not a general utility tool in the
legal workshop, and cannot be issued to correct every error committed by a lower court.
The power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances
or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of
certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Under Section 1, Rule 65, the petitioner must
show that, (1) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, (2) there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or
nullifying the proceeding.
2. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "capricious or whimsical exercise of

305
INTER-ISLAND INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC., REPRESENTED BY JESSIE
TAN TING V. COURT OF APPEALS, 11TH DIVISION (FORMER 10TH
DIVISION) AND CHAM Q. IBAY
GR NO. 187323| JUNE 23, 2021
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - DISTINCTION OF RULE 45 AND RULE 65 CERTIORARI
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Challenged in this petition are the resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
dismissed petitioner Inter-Island Information Systems, Inc. (Inter-Island) petition for
certiorari for failing to comply with the CA’s Resolution directing it to furnish the
appellate court the present and complete address of both respondent Cham Q. Ibay (Ibay)
and his counsel for the purpose of sending court notices and processes.
DOCTRINE: Section 1 of Rule 45 provides that when a party desires to appeal by

certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the CA, he or she may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari which shall raise only questions
of law.
DORMIDO V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. NO. 198241 | FEBRUARY 24, 2020
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Dormido filed for a Petition for Certiorari against the Ombudsman for its decision
denying her earlier complaint against Adobo (LMB OIC Director of Lands and De la Peña
(DENR Undersecretary for Legal Affairs) for their issuance of a Deed of Conveyance over a
lot in favor of the Spouses Manahan. The Ombudsman contends that the main issue of the
case was of ownership, and thus, it had no jurisdiction over the case.
DOCTRINE: Higher tribunals may disturb the findings of a fact-finding body and its
ensuing conclusions upon a determination of grave abuse of discretion through the writ of
certiorari. For certiorari to issue against the public officer, court, or tribunal complained
of, the standard is: Grave abuse of discretion is such “capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or an exercise of power in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law. The
very basic prerequisite of a petition for certiorari is to allege the acts constituting grave
abuse purportedly committed by the public officer, tribunal, or court.
306
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL BANK V. BANK OF COMMERCE
G.R. NO. 195236| FEBRUARY 08, 2021
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

PCIB filed a complaint for collection of sums of money against Laguna Navigation.
It alleged that Sps. Lim, executed a REM over a parcel of land in favor of PCIB to secure
the letters of credit. Eventually, PCIB foreclosed the mortgage on failure of the Lims to
satisfy their obligation. Sps. Lim claims that PCIB has no cause of action since the
obligation to pay has not accrued. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of PCIB’s interest.
The CA sustained the decision of the RTC.
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to
resolve questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari, subject to exceptions laid
down in case law. There is a question of fact when the issue at hand invites a review of
the evidence presented. The test, therefore, of whether a question is one of law or of
fact is "whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
of fact."
DY BUNCIO V. RAMOS
G.R. NO. 206120 | MARCH 23, 2022
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - APPEALS BYCERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT (RULE 45), PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI (RULE 65)
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Raquel G. Dy Buncio (Buncio) filed a complaint for accion reinvindicatoria and
damages against the respondents Leontina Ramos (Leontina) and Fernando Ramos
(collectively, the Ramoses), claiming that she is the registered co-owner of a parcel of
land located in Nueva Ecija. The instant petition for review on certiorari filed assails the
resolution of the CA, which denied the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Buncio on
the ground that she availed of the improper remedy because a portion of the subject lot
was devoted to palay production and traversed by a cemented city road of Cabanatuan
City, which should be determined by the DARAB.
DOCTRINE:
Rule 45: A factual review of the case, is an issue beyond the purview of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which covers only questions
of law.
Rule 65: A resort to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
at the stage where the petitioner was not without any plain, speedy, or adequate remedy
307
as her cause could very well be adequately advanced before the DAR is very much
premature.
PURISIMA JR. V. PURISIMA

G.R. NO. 20048|NOVEMBER 18, 2020
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Macaria and Sps. Medrano filed a complaint for reconveyance, cancellation and
quieting of title against the heirs of their late brother, Pascual, Leonardo, Eufrata, and
Estelita. Relying on mutual trust, the sale was not recorded by the parties. They have
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the apportioned properties since the
1960’s and prior to Purisima Sr’s death in 1971.
As heirs of Pascual Sr., Pascual Jr. Leonardo, Eufrata, and Estelita executed the
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Pascual Sr. This included the sale of the
properties apportioned to Macaria et. al. For failure to settle this issue in barangay
conciliation, Macaria et al sued to remove the cloud on their title to the apportioned
properties.
DOCTRINE: Petition for Review on Certiorari is a remedy under the law which is
confined to settling questions of law and not questions of facts. However, this Court may
take exceptions when:
(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
based;
(7) the findings of absence of fact are contradicted by the presence of evidence on
record;
(8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;
(9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and
(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
The doctrine that the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, being
conclusive in nature, are binding on this Court, applies even if the Court of Appeals was in
disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of evidence with a consequent
reversal of its findings of fact, so long as the findings of the Court of Appeals are borne
out by the record or based on substantial evidence.
308
PHILHEALTH. V. USSH (URDANETA SACRED HEART HOSPITAL)
G.R. NO. 214485 | JANUARY 11,2021
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF JUDICIAL REMEDIES
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

USHH filed a Complaint against Philhealth on the basis of unpaid claims. Philhealth
claimed that RTC has no jurisdiction on the basis that USHH did not follow the proper
procedure of filing a claim which should have been with the Philhealth Regional Office
and then if denied, its own Protest and Appeals Review Department. USSH argued that
such a case warranted an exception to the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of
DOCTRINE: DOCTRINE ON EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; EXCEPTIONS

— When strong public interest is involved. Technicalities should not be allowed to defeat
the right of the health care provider to be reimbursed, since it will result in a deprivation
of legal rights.
REPUBLIC V. HEIRS OF BORJA

GR NO. 207647 | JANUARY 11, 2021
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - LATE FILING OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

The Heirs of Mauro Borja filed a petition for Issuance of OCT. They claim to be the
lawful owner of the lot in Agusan Del Norte. The RTC granted the petition due to the
failure of the Provincial Prosecutor to comment within 15 days from receipt of the formal
offer of exhibits.
DOCTRINE: It has been settled that the 60-day period within which a petition for
certiorari should be filed is non-extendible, except in meritorious cases in Adtel v. Valdez.
In Laguna Metts Corporation, this Court ruled that the 60-day period was
non-extendible and the CA no longer had the authority to grant the motion for extension
in view of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC which amended Section 4 of Rule 65.
309
PATDU JR. V. CARPIO-MORALES

GR NO. 230171|SEPTEMBER 27, 2021
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

The DBM allotted a budget for the purchase of communications equipment for
Region VI. It was alleged that Ng, the supplier of Nokia 1100 units, received payments
without delivering them. The Ombudsman found probable cause to charge Patdu Jr. et al.
for violation of R.A. 3910 and Malversation through Falsification. Patdu et al filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA but the latter dismissed the petition outright since it
alleged that the remedy to assail the decision of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable
cause is filing an original action for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
DOCTRINE: Decisions or orders of the Ombudsman finding the existence of

probable cause (or the lack thereof) should be questioned through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 filed with the Supreme Court. The rule was not anchored on Section 14 of
R.A. 6770, but was instead a rule prescribed by the Court in the exercise of its
rule-making powers. The declaration of unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 was
immaterial insofar as the appellate procedure for orders and decisions by the Ombudsman
in criminal cases is concerned. The remedy to assail the OMB's findings of probable cause
in criminal or non-administrative cases Is still by filing a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court, and not with the Court of Appeals.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: the second paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770,93 states that

"No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings
of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law."
310
DEBUQUE V. NILSON
G.R. NO. 191718|MAY 10, 2021
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

The Department of Health (DOH) executed a Build-Operate-Transfer Agreement
(BOT Agreement) with the Megawide Construction Company (Megawide) and World Citi
Medical Center (WCMC; collectively, the Consortium). The agreement proposed the
privatization or commercialization of the Philippine Orthopedic Center (POC)and the
subsequent award of the Modernization of the POC Project (MPOC Project).
The petitioners in this case are patients and employees of the Philippine
Orthopedic Center (POC), health-allied professionals and legislators. Petitioners filed the
present petition seeking to annul and set aside the privatization of the POC including the
award to the Consortium of the MPOC Project and accordingly prohibit the building,
operation, and transfer of the POC.
DOCTRINE: A petition for certiorari filed to assail the executive determination of

probable cause (and the subsequent appeal therefrom) becomes moot once an
information has been filed before the court and a warrant of arrest has been issued; more
so if the trial court has already ruled on the merits of the criminal case.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal

information, does not require absolute certainty or guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A
well-founded belief that a crime was committed and that the individual charged is
probably guilty of committing the crime suffices. The merits of the parties' respective
accusations and defenses and admissibility of testimonies and defenses are better
ventilated in the trial proper before the courts than during the preliminary investigation
level.
The task of determining probable cause is lodged with the public prosecutor and
ultimately, the Secretary of Justice. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, courts
have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government. Thus, we have generally adopted a
policy of non-interference with the executive determination of probable cause. Where,
however, there is a clear case of grave abuse of discretion, courts are allowed to reverse
the Secretary of Justice's findings and conclusions on matters of probable cause.
311
CERVANTES V. AQUINO
GR NO. 210805|MAY 11, 2021
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - MOOT AND ACADEMIC PETITION
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

A petition was filed seeking to annul and set aside the agreement for the
privatization of the Philippine Orthopedic Center. However, one of the parties filed a
“Notice of Termination” of the agreement, which rendered the petition moot and
academic.
DOCTRINE: A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to

present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication
of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use.
METRO RAIL TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. TRACKWORKS

RAIL TRANSIT ADVERTISING, VENDING AND PROMOTIONS, INC.
GR NO. 204452| JUNE 28, 202
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - APPEAL AND CERTIORARI
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Challenged in this Petition are the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Metro Rail Transit
Development Corporation (MRTDC) assailing the validity of the Omnibus Order and Order
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65 of Makati City.
DOCTRINE: The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive. The general rule is that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for
an appeal, for relief through a special action like certiorari may only be established when
no remedy by appeal lies.
312
MAYNILAD WATER SERVICES INC. V. SECRETARY OF
G.R. NOS. 202897, 206823 & 207969 | AUG. 6, 2019
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Special Civil Actions - Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Petitioners, Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and its
concessionaires, Maynilad and Manila Water, were fined for their violation of the Clean
Water Act in regards to their failure to provide, install, operate, and maintain adequate
Wastewater Treatment Facilities (WWTFs) for sewerage system resulting in the degraded
quality and beneficial use of the receiving bodies of water leading to Manila Bay. The
Secretary of the DENR, upon recommendation of the PAB, thus Ordered them to be fined,
which they assailed via petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
DOCTRINE: Since the assailed order for the present case was from the DENR, an
executive office, the appropriate remedy was to file it to the Office of the President.
When they filed before the CA a petition for review, they failed to exhaust the
appropriate administrative remedies.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ESCARO

G.R. NO. 204526|FEBRUARY 10, 2021
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - EXPROPRIATION ; JUST COMPENSATION
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Expedite Q. Escaro, as represented herein by Marcelo Q. Escaro, Sr., is one of the
heirs of the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Sibao, Calabanga, Camarines
Sur, with an area consisting of 24.3990 hectares. DAR placed 24.0467 of the 24.3990
hectares of the said parcel of land under the Compulsory Acquisition scheme pursuant to
RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
DOCTRINE: Considering that the 15-day prescriptive period under the DARAB Rules
has been struck down for being void, it would be futile for this Court to discuss the
propriety or impropriety of respondent's motion for reconsideration of the DARAB
Decision, and, ultimately, determine whether the 15-day period for filing of an action for
determination of just compensation with the RTC-SAC should be reckoned from the time
respondent received the DARAB Decision, or its order denying his motion for
reconsideration.
To reiterate, the correct period to file a petition for judicial determination of just
of the Civil Code.
313
SPOUSES LIU V. ESPINOSA
G.R. NO. 238513 |JULY 31, 2019
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - UNLAWFUL DETAINER
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Spouses Belinda and Hsi Pin Liu acquired the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
146-2010008891 from their predecessor-in-interest who allowed Marcelina et al to occupy
the land until the need arises for the land to be used by the former. Belinda and Hsi Pin
eventually demanded the group of Marcelina to vacate the land but the latter refused to
vacate. Spouses then file an action for unlawful detainer.
DOCTRINE: An action for unlawful detainer will stand if the following requisites
are present:
a) Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
b) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of
the termination of the latter's right of possession;
c) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
d) Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. (Suarez v. Emboy , 729 Phil. 315,
330 (2014)
TINA V. STA. CLARA ESTATE

G.R. NO. 239979 | FEBRUARY 17, 2020
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Tiña and Sta. Clara Estate both filed complaints over a lot along Creek I in Bacolod
City, the former a complaint for cancellation of title with damages and other reliefs,
while the latter, a complaint for ejectment. The RTC earlier resolved the complaint for
ejectment in favor of Sta. Clara which resulted to the subsequent dismissal of Tiña’s
complaint, hence Tiña in this present petition contends that the RTC erred in prematurely
terminating the proceedings and dismissing her complaint.
DOCTRINE: The sole issue in ejectment cases is physical or material possession of

the subject property, independent of any claim of ownership by the parties. Section 16,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides the exception to the rule in that the issue of
ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of
possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership.
314
PALAJOS V. ABAD
GR NO. 205832 | MARCH 7, 2022
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - PRIOR PHYSICAL POSSESSION IN FORCIBLE ENTRY CASES
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Jose Manolo E. Abad (Manolo) had prior possession of the subject property than
Gorgonio P. Palajos (Palajos). Palajos destroyed the perimeter fence of the property and
constructed their houses by virtue of a deed of absolute sale which B.C. Regalado
executed in his favor. The MeTC held that Manolo had prior possession of the subject
property. The RTC reversed the decision and ruled that Manolo failed to prove prior actual
physical possession of the property. The CA granted Manolo’s petition and reversed the
RTC ruling.
DOCTRINE: As a rule, "possession" in forcible entry cases refers to prior physical

possession or possession de facto, not possession de Jure or that arising from ownership.
Title is not an issue. As an exception, Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides
that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the
question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership.
The issue of ownership of the property in forcible entry cases may be provisionally
determined -to determine the issue of possession and only if the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. In addition, We have likewise
also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and
legal formalities established for acquiring such right."
DAYRIT V. NORQUILLAS
G.R. NO. 201631|DECEMBER 7, 2021
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - JURISDICTION OF FIRST LEVEL COURTS VIS-A-VIS JURISDICTION OF DARAB
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Angelina Dayrit was the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land which were
placed under the coverage of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and was
occupied by the respondents in this case. Hence, she filed a complaint for forcible entry
against respondents.
DOCTRINE: First-level courts have jurisdiction on ejectment cases even if the land
is public in character as long as the case is not an agrarian dispute. The public character
of the land does not divest the courts of jurisdiction over ejectment cases. However, if
the ejectment case is found to be an agrarian dispute, the first-level courts will be
divested of jurisdiction in accordance with the CARL, as amended. The controlling aspect,
315
therefore, is the nature of the dispute (i.e., agrarian or not) and not the character of the
subject land.
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. V.

MABALACAT INSTITUTE, INC.
G.R. NO. 211563 | SEPTEMBER 29, 2021
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - CAUSE OF ACTION
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

SVHFI is the alleged owner of a parcel of land in Mabalacat. By tolerance,
Mabalacat Institute occupies the lot without paying rent since 1983 until 2002. SVHFI
informed Mabalacat Institute (MII) that it will charge a rental fee but the latter refused to
comply. For its failure to pay the rental, SVHFI sued Mabalacat Institute for collection of
sum of money. MII moved to dismiss the case for forum shopping. The RTC granted the
motion to dismiss. The CA sustained the ruling.
DOCTRINE: Insofar as the complaint for collection of sum of money is concerned,

it is not a simple case of recovering the unpaid balance of rentals. It must be pointed out
that there are several factors to consider if and when the collection of sum of money will
prosper, i.e. the determination if indeed recovery of the alleged balance is proper, the
correct amount of rental to be paid or recovered, the intention and/or agreement of the
parties as to the terms of payment of rental in order to arrive at a correct amount, among
others.
HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL, INC V.

LA FILIPINA UYGONGCO CORP.
G.R. NOS. 240984 & 241120| SEPTEMBER 27, 2021
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - NATURE OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Manila Harbour entered into a MOA with La Filipina Uygonco which provided
priority berthing rights to domestic and foreign vessels of La Pilipina. The relationship
went bad when MH demanded payment for La Pilipina. In response the La Pilipna alleged
MH to have failed to honor the agreement, and filed a complaint for breach of contract.
DOCTRINE: Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil
in nature, that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially
a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. It is a remedy resorted to
preserve and enforce the rights of respondent and to compel obedience to the injunctive
writ for their benefit.
316
ENDE V. ROMAN CATHOLIC PRELATE OF THE PRELATURE NULLIUS OF
COTABATO, INC.
G.R. NO. 191867 | DECEMBER 6, 2021
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIAL WRITS - PREREQUISITE BEFORE FILING AN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION
TO ENFORCE OWNERSHIP RIGHTS BY VIRTUE OF SUCCESSION
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Spouses Ende were the registered owners of a lot located in Cotabato. Spouses
passed away, and the surviving heirs filed a complaint for quieting and recovery of
possession of the subject property. Petition was opposed by persons claiming to be the
real children of the spouses on the ground that the petitioners were imposters.
DOCTRINE: A prior determination of heirship in a special proceeding is not a

prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil action to enforce ownership rights by
virtue of succession. The rule is unless there is a pending special proceeding for the
settlement of the decedent's estate or for the determination of heirship, the compulsory
or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary civil action to declare the nullity of a deed
or instrument, and for recovery of property, or any other action in the enforcement of
their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, without the necessity of a prior
and separate judicial declaration of their status as such. The ruling of the trial court shall
only be in relation to the cause of action of the ordinary civil action, i.e., the nullification
of a deed or instrument, and recovery or reconveyance of property, which ruling is binding
only between and among the parties.
JACINTO V. LITONJUA
G.R. NO. 207675 | JANUARY 20, 2021
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIAL WRITS - SALES, MORTGAGES, AND OTHER ENCUMBRANCES OF
PROPERTY OF DECEDENT (RULE 89)
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

To recover the decedents' properties fraudulently alienated to Forward Properties,
Inc. (FPI) and subsequently mortgaged by it to EPCIB as security for a loan, Ramon filed an
action for annulment of sale and mortgage with damages and injunction against the
defendants therein, EPCIB and FPI, before the RTC Baguio docketed as Civil Case No.
5751-R.
DOCTRINE: In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable.The general rule is that an administrator has all the powers necessary for
317
ADDITIONAL NOTES: ARTICLE 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy
the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability
laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
MIGUEL V. DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS

UDK-15368 | SEPTEMBER 15, 2021
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIAL WRITS - WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

This case involves a Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by
petitioner Gil Miguel (Miguel), praying for the Court to order the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons (now Director General of the Bureau of Corrections) to bring petitioner before this
Court, and after due proceedings, to restore his liberty. Alleging that his continued
detention no longer holds legal basis in view of Republic Act No. (RA) 10592, otherwise
known as the Good Conduct Time Allowance Law, Miguel filed the present petition for the
issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus on August 19, 2015.
DOCTRINE: It is clear that the trial court, the appellate court, and this Court
exercise concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus. However, this does not mean that parties are absolutely free to choose before
which court to file their petitions, thus:
Mere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom to
choose the court with which the petition shall be filed. Petitioners should be directed by
the hierarchy of courts. After all, the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant
of the appropriate forum for petitioners for the extraordinary writs.
318
MORADA V. RIAS
GR NO. 222226 | FEBRUARY 14, 2022
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIAL WRITS - WRIT OF AMPARO
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Petitioner Fe Morada’s son, Johnson was arrested and detained by the barangay
tanods. She discovered that Johnson was released but was still missing. She, then
instituted a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo to determine whether
respondents had violated or threatened to violate Johnson's right to life, liberty and
security, and to compel respondents to determine the whereabouts of Johnson, and the
person/s responsible for his disappearance or possible death, among others
DOCTRINE: The elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under

Republic Act No. 9851 are as follows:
a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of;
c) the State or a political organization;
d) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge
or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the
amparo petition; and
e) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
TALABIS V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 214647 | MARCH 04, 2020
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

After preliminary investigation, following a complaint filed by Leonora Edoc
(Leonora) and Rhoda E. Bay-An (Rhoda) before the Office of Provincial Prosecutor of La
Trinidad, Benguet, petitioner Edwin Talabis (Talabis) was charged and subsequently held
guilty for the crime of violation of Section 68 of PD 705 for cutting pine trees at Cotcot,
Buguias, without any lawful permit or authority. Talabis filed a petition for review before
the Supreme Court and assailed the jurisdiction of RTC arguing that the complaint against
him was filed by private individuals and not by any forest officer as prescribed in Section
8031 of PD 705, and in violation of Rule 110 of Rules of Court.
DOCTRINE:
Jurisdiction
319
after the questioned ruling had been rendered by the lower court.
Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)

ARTURO RADAZA V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 201380 | AUGUST 4, 2021
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Radaza's Petition for Certiorari first assailed the Amended Information for lack of
the written authority or approval of the incumbent Ombudsman at the time the it was
filed before the Sandiganbayan. Radaza claims that while the Amended Information was
approved to be filed by the then Ombudsman, there was no such approval from the
incumbent Ombudsman at the time the Joint Resolution was issued. Such posits this fact
prevented the Sandiganbayan from acquiring jurisdiction over the offense charged under
the Amended Information and over his person as the accused thereunder.
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
DOCTRINE: A handling prosecutor's lack of prior written authority from the head
prosecutor in the filing of an Information does not affect a trial court's acquisition of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person of the accused.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: A counter-bond is not necessary for the discharge of a writ of

preliminary attachment that was found to be irregularly issued.
320
PEOPLE V. BERNABE EULALIO Y ALEJO
G.R. NO. 214882 | OCTOBER 16, 2019
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VARIANCE DOCTRINE; CHILD WITNESS RULE
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

On appeal is the April 15, 2014 Decision 1 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 05924 affirming the ruling 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malabon City, Branch 169 in Criminal Case Nos. 31438-MN and 31439-MN convicting
accused-appellant Bernabe Eulalio y Alejo (Eulalio) of rape and acts of lasciviousness.
DOCTRINE: It is important to emphasize that although Section 5 (b), Article III of

RA 7610 was not expressly mentioned in the Information, "this omission is not fatal so as
to violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
Indeed, what controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense,
but the actual facts recited in the information constituting the crime charged.
KHO V. SUMMERVILLE GENERAL MERCHANDISING & CO., INC.

G.R. NO. 213400 | AUGUST 4, 2021
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - PROBABLE CAUSE
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Petitioners Elidad Kho (Elidad) and Violeta Kho (Violeta) were charged with Unfair
Competition by respondent Summerville General Merchandising & Co., Inc., (Summerville)
before the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila.
DOCTRINE: Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the
average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the
rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense.
What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction.
321
ROLANDO UY Y SAYYAN V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR NO. 217097 | FEBRUARY 23, 2022
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - WARRANTLESS ARREST; WHEN LAWFUL
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

An Information was filed charging petitioner Nonoy with violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165, or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs on the fact that he was
found in possession and use of marijuana. The Prosecution alleged that members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) of San Fernando, Bukidnon, upon implementation of
COMELEC gun ban check point, flagged down Nonoy’s motor vehicle and asked for the
Certificate of Registration (CR) and Official Receipt (OR) of his motorcycle but the latter
failed to do so because he left it in his house. Law enforcers became suspicious and asked
Nonoy to open the tools compartment where they found five bundles of marijuana placed
and wrapped in a cellophane.
DOCTRINE: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides for instances when a
lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant: a) arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime
which has just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from
custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
in this case is valid. However, the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 as
the Rule on Chain of Custody which is considered substantive law and not merely a
procedural technicality was not complied with. Hence, petitioner Nonoy must be
acquitted.
PEOPLE V. AL-SAAD Y BAGKAT

G.R. NO. 242414 | MARCH 15, 2021
EVIDENCE - CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Mae Al-Saad (Mae), motivated by spite or hatred towards the occupants of the
property burned, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire to an
inhabited house and by reason of or on the occasion of the arson, death results to two
minor individuals and serious physical injury to one who are all her stepchildren with
Nabil Al-Saad and causes damage to properties in the amount of 1, 500, 000 pesos. RTC
and CA both ruled in favor of her conviction as being guilty beyond reasonable doubt to
the crime of Arson with Homicide.
322
DOCTRINE: For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of
guilt. Thus, the circumstances proven should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of others,
as the guilty person. Moreover, it must be remembered that the probative value of direct
evidence is general neither greater than nor superior to circumstantial evidence. The
Rules of Court do not distinguish between "direct evidence of fact and evidence of
circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred."
PEOPLE V. HERNANDEZ
GR NO. 258077 | JUNE 15, 2022
EVIDENCE - CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Respondent Donato Hernandez was held guilty as charged by the RTC for violating
Section 5 and 11 of Article II of RA 9615. However, when the case was brought to the
Supreme Court, respondent Hernandez was acquitted as there was a failure in complying
with the chain of custody rule, by not including the testimony of the police officer who
received the request to test the seized drug and that of the forensic chemist who
received, tested, and verified the specimen.
DOCTRINE: In cases involving Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous

Drugs under RA 9165, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established
with moral certainty, considering that it is the corpus delicti of the crime. In drug-related
cases, it is of paramount necessity that the forensic chemist testifies on the details
pertaining to the handling and analysis of the dangerous drug submitted for examination,
i.e., when and from whom the dangerous drug was received; what identifying labels or
other things accompanied it; description of the specimen; and the container it was kept.
Further, the forensic chemist must also identify the name and method of analysis used in
determining the chemical composition of the subject specimen.
SAO PAULO ALPARGATAS S.A. V. KENTEX MANUFACTURING

G.R. NO. 202900 | FEBRUARY 17, 2021
EVIDENCE - PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

SPASA, the petitioner in this case, is the owner and manufacturer of the footwear
brand "Havaianas' ' who is also the registered owner of different marks, devises, and logos
323
of the brand "Havaianas" in the country. TKentex Manufacturing Corporation (Kentex) is
the owner and manufacturer of the footwear with the brand name "Havana '' and Ong King
Guan (Ong). Kentex allegedly violated RA 8293 on trademark infringement and unfair
competition.
DOCTRINE: A case or issue is considered moot when "it ceases to present a

case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance,
there is no substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition.
Parol evidence rule further provides that "when the terms of agreement have been
reduced into writing, it is considered containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement."
PEOPLE V. GALUGA Y WAD-AS

G.R. NO. 221428 | FEBRUARY 13, 2019
EVIDENCE - CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Accused appellant Wag-As is charged with the crime of rape. The victim, AAA, is a
twelve year old girl who left home at night after having an altercation with her father,
CCC. The accused saw AAA in the park and forcibly took her to the market place and
raped her. In his defense, Wag-as denied the charges and claimed that he just help the
victim to buy some food since she was hungry. The trial and appellate courts gave
credence to the consistency and straightforward testimony of AAA though she was a minor
and has to under such shame and humiliation when she testified in open court.
DOCTRINE: When it comes to credibility, the assessment by the trial court deserves
great weight, and even conclusive and binding effect, unless the same is tainted with
stringent application where the Court of Appeals sustained said findings (People v. Regaspi
, 768 Phil. 593, 598 (2015)
324
PEOPLE V. NOLI VILLEGAS, JR. Y LACRETE GR NO.
218210 | OCTOBER 9, 2019
SUMMAY & DOCTRINE

Accused-appellant Villegas appeals his conviction for rape with homicide. He
denies the charge and argues that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
DOCTRINE: It is well settled that questions on the credibility of witnesses should

best be addressed to the trial court because of its unique position to observe that elusive
and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying
which is denied to the appellate courts.
PEOPLE V. SANTIAGO
G.R. NO. 234780 | MARCH 17, 2021
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Panis, Santiago, Flores and Galingana were charged with the crime of Murder of
Brgy. Capt. Artemio Garcia with the use of illegal firearms. Panis, Santiago and Flores
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged while Galingana remains at large. Panis died
during the pendency of the case
The witness, Johnny, corroborated the testimony of Artemio, Sr. wherein his father
was shot on his way back to his house after he had coffee with him. PCI Laggui, testified
that Panis and Santiago were lawfully arrested right after the shooting incident. However,
the Defense for Santiago raised a different account of the incident where they professed
alibi and denial
DOCTRINE: Inconsistencies in minor details will not be a ground for the outright
denial of the credence of the testimony of the witness as these are mere collateral
matters which do not touch upon the fact of the commission of the crime.
325
PEOPLE V. XXX
GR NO. 225288 | JUNE 28, 2021
EVIDENCE - RECANTATIONS/AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

The victim-witness recants her previous sworn statement and exculpates the
accused in her new one.
DOCTRINE: A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion

and reservation. The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously
given in court. The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be
secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration.
PEOPLE V. CABALES
G.R. NO. 213831 | SEPTEMBER 25, 2019
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

The accused-appellant Cabales was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape of his 13 year old niece. Although he pleaded not guilty, he later stated that
AAA never pushed him away during the imputed act and that there were no findings in the
medical examination of physical abuse AAA claimed.
DOCTRINE: There is no standard behavior expected by law from a rape victim. By

whatever manner she react, the same is immaterial because it is not an element of rape.
Moreover, while a medical certificate attesting to the victim’s physical trauma from the
rape has corroborative purposes, it is wholly unnecessary for conviction, if not a mere
superfluity.
326
ARRIOLA V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 199975 | FEBRUARY 24, 2020
EVIDENCE - DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT STATEMENTS
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Arriola, convicted of the crime of estafa, asserts in this present Petition for Review
on Certiorari that the sole evidence presented by the prosecution showing his alleged
deceit was only the phone conversation that transpired between Del Rosario and
Candelaria, and thus, rested on mere hearsay evidence which should not have been
admitted by the trial court.
DOCTRINE: Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole
or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by
whom it is sought to produce it. A person who introduces a hearsay statement is not
obliged to enter into any particular stipulation, to answer any question, to solve any
difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any
ambiguities; and that he/she entrenches himself/herself in the simple assertion that
he/she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author. For
this reason, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was
no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The hearsay rule, however, does not apply
to independently relevant statements.

CIR V. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION

G.R. NOS. 180740 & 180910 | NOVEMBER 11, 2019
EVIDENCE - PROOF OF AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATION
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

SOF upon recommendation of CIR, issued RR No. 17-99 to implement the 12%
increase on excise tax. SMC filed a claim for the tax refund it paid on Red Horse. CTA
approved SMC’s claim but the latter moved for reconsideration since under the Advance
327
Payment Scheme, the filing of the returns where the tax is based may be submitted even
a week after the actual removals. Motion was denied.
DOCTRINE: "It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove its
affirmative allegation." In CIR v. Traders Royal Bank, the court held that the burden fell
upon TRB to produce the Trust Indenture Agreements, not only because the said
Agreements were in its possession, but more importantly, because its protest against the
DST assessments was entirely grounded on the allegation that said Agreements were
trusts. TRB was the petitioner before the CTA in C.T.A. Case No. 6392 and it was among its
affirmative allegations that the said Trust Indenture Agreements were trusts, thus, TRB
had the obligation of proving this fact. It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must
prove its affirmative allegation.
PRIETO V. CAJIMAT
GR NO. 214898 | JUNE 8, 2020
EVIDENCE - BURDEN OF PROOF
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Rondal Jr was riding a motorcycle when it overtook two other motorcycles and
caused him to occupy the northbound lane. This resulted in a head-on collision against a
chop-chop motorcycle driven by Cajimat. The latter died. Rondal alleged that the
collision was due to the negligence of Cajimat.
DOCTRINE: The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Section 1,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is the duty of a party to
prove the truth of his/her claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of
evidence required by law.
GERODIAS V. RIVERAL
A.C. NO. 12719 | FEBRUARY 17, 2021
EVIDENCE - BURDEN OF PROOF
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Gerodas filed a disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) against Attorneys Tomas A. Riveral (Riveral), Annabel G. Pulvera-Page (Pulvera-Page)
and Lorena M. Supatan (Supatan). He underwent several disciplinary investigations for
various reasons such as heated altercations with co-employees, damage to company
property and abandonment of work.
A month after Gerodias received his retirement pay, he filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against OPASCOR. Thereafter, a disbarment case was filed by Gerodias against
Riveral as the President and General Manager of OPASCOR; Pulvera-Page, as the Corporate
328
Secretary of OPASCOR and one of the lawyers in the firm of Riveral, Pulvera & Associates;
and Supatan, as: a lawyer in Riveral, Pulvera & Associates who received Gerodias' Position
Paper during the proceedings of the labor case.
DOCTRINE: Settled is the rule that for a charge to justify a disciplinary action
against a lawyer, the complainant must present convincing proof to substantiate the
charge. Otherwise, the lawyer is presumed innocent.
CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL GROUP V. SPOUSES UY

G.R. 219317 | JUNE 14, 2021
EVIDENCE - PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Uy, who was the section supervisor of Cathay Pacific Steel Corp., made
questionable transactions which was discovered by Cathay’s special audit.
DOCTRINE: In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish its
cause of action by a preponderance of evidence, or that "evidence which is of greater
weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it." Preponderance of
evidence "does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is
more believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on one
side than on the other."
MAULANA V. NOEL JR.

A.M. NO. RTJ-21-006 | MARCH 15, 2021
EVIDENCE - REQUIRED EVIDENCE FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
SUMMARY & DOCTRINE

Several firearms were seized from the house of Maulana, but the Office of the
Prosecutor ordered that such items were not in violation of RA 10591. However, when the
counsel of Maulana filed a Motion to Release Seized Items, Judge Noel allegedly directed
Maulana to shoulder the amount of 300, 000. 00 pesos representing the Judge's travel
expenses to Camp Crame to personally verify the licenses for the subject firearms.
DOCTRINE: Certifications issued by the FEO Records Section are sufficient proof of
the fact of possession or non-possession of a valid license to own or possess firearms or
explosives in the offense of Illegal Possession of Firearms.
329

REMEDIAL LAW Hernando CDD 2023

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

REMEDIAL LAW Hernando CDD 2023

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SBCA

Publication, reproduction, dissemination, and distribution, or

Material includes both cases penned by Justice Hernando and recent

Jurisdiction of Various Philippine Courts and Tribunals

Jurisdiction v. Exercise of Jurisdiction 17

Jurisdiction over Cases Covered by Barangay Conciliation

Parties to Civil Actions

Filing and Service

Judgment and Final Orders

Execution, Satisfaction, and Effect of Judgment

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

Requisites, When and Where to File

Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIAL WRITS

Writ of Habeas Corpus

Object (Real) Evidence

Hearsay and Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule

Burden of Proof and Presumptions

Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

Jurisdiction of Various Philippine Courts and Tribunals

Jurisdiction v. Exercise of Jurisdiction 268

Jurisdiction over Cases Covered by Barangay Conciliation

Parties to Civil Actions

Filing and Service

Judgment and Final Orders

HORCA v. PEOPLE 284

Execution, Satisfaction, and Effect of Judgment

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

Requisites, When and Where to File

Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIAL WRITS

Writ of Habeas Corpus

Object (Real) Evidence

Hearsay and Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule

Burden of Proof and Presumptions

Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

Leones also ignored the qualifying conditions for certiorari , viz.:

A compromise agreement must contain the same elements of a valid contract:

4. [Leones], upon fulfillment of the above conditions, shall obligate

Incidentally, estoppel has no application here. There is no more issue on

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED.

This led to the establishment of the Fixed-Income Exchange (FIE), a marketplace

The FIE, according to petitioners, failed as a financial venture. Such losses

Some of the issues here are not purely legal.

x x x when the factual findings complained of are not supported by the

In her counter-affidavit, Perez argued that the appointment of Fortaleza is

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of

Thus, a defendant is deemed to have voluntarily submitted themselves to the

Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must

An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the

Subsequently, the Commission on Audit (COA) post-audited the transaction. It was

Then on September 22, 2017, respondent Monteros filed a motion to quash

RULING of Regional Director: The Director of National Government Audit Office

RULING of respondent COA-CP: It partially granted the appeal insofar as Alcantara

Thereafter, then Commissioner Napoleon Morales (Commissioner Morales) of the

On November 7, 2007, a Demand Letter was sent to PTTPTC to settle its

Forum shopping can be committed in three ways, to wit:

Hence, to constitute forum shopping, the following elements must be present:

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that Compulsory joinder of

Respondents filed Motions to Dismiss on grounds of lack of cause of action and

Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Affirmative

To determine the prescription of the subject insurance claim, Article 63 of the

An amended complaint supersedes an original one. As a consequence, the original