Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Panel 2 For Publication
Panel 2 For Publication
Day 1, 14/10/2015
Panel 2
Training for the unexpected
Moderator
Nicola
Panellist
Clark
Panel
Panel2
12
EASA Annual Safety
Conference 2015
Training in Aviation: Staying Fit for Safety
Human pilot → for the unexpected Automation → for all the rest
Pilot
Pilot Pilot
Automation Automation
Automation
Technology ↗
14 Oct. 2015 EASA Annual Safety Conference 2015 - Training for the unexpected 4
Trends in safety & the unexpected
8
Air Algérie, Flight 5017
Mali, 2014
7
Air France, Flight 447
6 Atlantic Ocean, 2010
0
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
Years
14 Oct. 2015 EASA Annual Safety Conference 2015 - Training for the unexpected 5
A new dimension for pilot training
Capacity/performance
Loss of perf.
?
Training for
R i
14 Oct. 2015 EASA Annual Safety Conference 2015 - Training for the unexpected 6
Challenges for better training
Adapt
Adapt Adapt
recruitment
competence training
and
model objectives
selection
Develop
Adapt
effective
scenario R i instructor
competence
based-training
14 Oct. 2015 EASA Annual Safety Conference 2015 - Training for the unexpected 7
Training for the unexpected
Moderator
Nicola
Panellist
Clark
Panel
Panel2
12
Flight Services Training
Pilots
Operator Organisational
Culture
Acceptance of need ?
Research
What is the problem?
Regulatory Authority
• Research completed
• Results being compiled and due for report soon
Training Options
B
e
n
FFS
e Classroom
FFS
Extended
Competency
Training Envelope
f Based Training
Training
i
t
Cost
Copyright © 2015 Boeing. All rights reserved.
Flight Services Training
Way Forward?
Moderator
Nicola
Panellist
Clark
Panel
Panel212
Harry Nelson
Panel 2 -
Training for the unexpected
Not fulfilling even one of these 4 pre-requisites may lead to a change from
an acceptable risk into an unacceptable situation
PROBABLE IMPROBABLE
100 10-1 10-2 10-3 10-4 10-5 10-6 10-7 10-8 10-9
CATEGORY
MINOR MAJOR HAZARDOUS CATASTROPHIC
OF EFFECT
Rejected T/O
TCAS RA
ENSURE THAT THE AIRCRAFT GPWS event
IS STABILISED ON A SAFE MUSTWindREACT
shear
All other
TRAJECTORY AT A SAFE Stall recognition
IMMEDIATELY
Total power loss
ENERGY LEVEL
decisions Autoland warning
and
Loss of or no visual ref
ONLY THEN on final
CORRECTLY approach
Brake failure
(Reflex
Emergencyor memory)
Descent
Hours
2. THINK
Minutes Seconds Split-second
3. Communicate 1. Fly the aircraft
Rational Naturalistic
4. Decide
decision decision Conditioned
making making reaction
5. React
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Moderator
Nicola
Panellist
Clark
Panel
Panel212
• We focus on 2 cases:
• Spatial Disorientation
• Upsets, including aerodynamic stall
Moderator
Nicola
Panellist
Clark
Panel
Panel212