Saint Catherines Press

Introduction: Instruments in the History of Science

Author(s): Albert van Helden and Thomas L. Hankins
Source: Osiris, Vol. 9, Instruments (1994), pp. 1-6
Published by: University of Chicago Press on behalf of History of Science Society
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 Introduction:
in theHistoryof Science
Instruments
ByAlbertVanHeldenand ThomasL. Hankins

IN THE 1943 VOLUME of Isis there appeared a two-page article entitled

"Traduttore-Traditore: A Propos de Copernicet de Galilee," writtenby Alexan-
dre Koyre. Besides the normalproblemof accuracyin translatingscientifictexts
fromanotherera, Koyrearguedthatthereis theadditionaldangerof "involuntarily
substituting our conceptionsand our habitsof thoughtforthose,entirelydifferent,
of theauthor."Amongtheexampleshe citedwas a passage at thebeginningof the
thirdday of Galileo's Dialogues concerningTwoNew Sciences,translatedby Henry
Crew and Alfonsode Salvio, in whichGalileo's comperiowas renderedin English
as "I havediscoveredby experiment." Koyrearguedthattheword"experiment"was
simplyadded by thetranslator who, "obviouslycommittedto empiricistepistemol-
ogy,could notimaginethatone could demonstrate or discoversomethingotherthan
byexperiment." It was no wonder,accordingto Koyre,thatthelegendof Galileo the
empiricistand experimenter was so firmlyestablishedin America,foreven thebest
Americanhistorianscitedthetranslation by Crew and de Salvio.'
Koyre set out to change all that.In his Etudes galileennes of 1939 he drew a
differentportraitof Galileo, a Platonist,who foundthingsin his head and used
instruments only by way of illustration.In the same yearthathis littlearticleap-
peared in Isis, thereappearedin The PhilosophicalReviewhis article"Galileo and
theScientificRevolutionof theSeventeenthCentury," in whichhe made thefollow-
ing statement:

Good physicsis madea priori.Theoryprecedesfact.Experienceis uselessbecause

beforeanyexperiencewe are alreadyin possessionoftheknowledge we are seeking
for.Fundamentallawsofmotion(andofrest),lawsthatdetermine thespatio-temporal
behaviourofmaterial
bodies,arelawsofa mathematical nature.
Ofthesamenatureas
thosewhichgovernrelations and lawsof figures
and numbers.We findanddiscover
themnotinNature, butin ourselves,
inourmind,inourmemory, as Platolongago has
taughtus.2

For Koyre a scientificinstrument servedonly to illustratea conclusionreached

firstby logical reasoning.He assertedthattheexperiments withinclinedplanes that

' AlexandreKoyr6,"Traduttore-Traditore:
A Propos de Copernicet de Galil6e,"Isis, 1943,
34:209-210.
2
AlexandreKoyr6,"GalileoandtheScientific
Revolution
oftheSeventeenth
Century," ThePhilo-
sophicalReview,1943,52:333-348;repr.in Koyr6,Metaphysics
andMeasurement: EssaysinScien-
tificRevolution,
ed. M. A. Hoskin(London:Chapman& Hall; Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniv.
Press,1968),pp. 1-15,quotingfromp. 13.

?
1994byThe Historyof ScienceSociety.All rights
reserved.
0369-7827/94/0008-0001$01.00

OSIRIS 1994,9: 1-6 1

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2 ALBERT VAN HELDEN AND THOMAS L. HANKINS

Galileo describedin his Discourses were merelyrhetoricaldevices. In an article

and experi-
publishedin 1953,KoyrequotedGalileo's descriptionof his instruments
mentalprocedureand thencommented:

A bronzeball rollingin a "smoothand polished"woodengroove!A vesselof water

witha smallholethrough whichitrunsoutandwhichonecollectsin a smallglassin
orderto weighitafterwards andthusmeasurethetimesofdescent(theRomanwater-
clock,thatofCtesibus, hadbeenalreadya muchbetter whatan accumula-
instrument):
tionofsourcesoferrorandinexactitude.
arecompletely
Itis obviousthattheGalileanexperiments theveryperfec-
worthless:
proofoftheirincorrection.3
tionoftheirresultsis a rigorous

For theempiricistepistemologyof Crew and de Salvio, Koyresubstituted an ex-

tremeidealistepistemologythatbecame veryinfluential in the historyof science.
In 1965 NorwoodRussell Hanson wrotein an important articlein Science: "Centu-
ries of scholarshipto thecontrarynotwithstanding, Galileo was not a greatexperi-
mentalscientist.He was no experimentalscientistat all, not as we would know
one."4In thisapproach,thehistoryof science was thehistoryof theory.Experiment
and measurementtook place afterthe factand were not of primeinterest;instru-
mentswere consideredat best "reifiedtheories,"in Bachelard'sterm.5The debate
was in largepartideologicaland focusedmoreon acceptablemethodthanon histori-
cal accuracy.WhetherGalileo actuallybuilthis instruments or onlyimaginedthem
was to be determinedfromhis philosophicalgoals. Because he obviouslydid build
telescopesand proportional compasses,one would thinkthathe mightequally well
have builtinclinedplanes,butbecause, fromKoyre'spointof view,theyservedno
purpose,it seemed clear to KoyrethatGalileo neverbuiltthem.6
Such an extremeidealistpositioninvitedcounterargument. In 1961 Thomas B.
Settle,thena graduatestudentat Cornell University, publishedthe resultsof his
attemptto repeat as faithfully as possible the Galilean experimentcriticizedby
Koyre.Settleshowedthat with the tools available to him Galileo could easily have
achievedtheaccuracy he claimed in his Discourses on Two New Sciences. Settle's
dissertation,finishedin 1966, gave a more exhaustive account of Galileo's experi-
mentsand, though neverpublished, became thelocus classicus of thestudyof Gali-
leo's experiments.7
Over thepast severaldecades, Settle'spioneeringstudyhas been followedup by
several scholars,includingStillmanDrake and Ronald Naylor,and we may now

I AlexandreKoyr6,'An Experiment inMeasurement," Proceedings oftheAmerican Philosophical

Society,1953,97: 222-237;repr.inKoyr6,Metaphysics andMeasurement, pp.89-117,quotingfrom
p. 94.
4Norwood RussellHanson,"Galileo'sDiscoveriesin Dynamics," Science,1965,147:471.
5Gaston Bachelard, Les intuitions
atomistiques (Paris:Boivin,1933),p. 140.See also Bachelard,
L'activiterationalistede la physiquecontemporaine (Paris:PressesUniversitairesde France,1951).
6 In From theClosedWorldtotheInfinite Universe
(Baltimore: JohnsHopkinsPress,1957),Koyr6
devotespartof a chapterto Galileo'sdiscoverieswiththetelescope,buthe sayslittleaboutthe
instrument besidescallingit"thefirst instrument"
scientific according
(p. 90). Further, to Koyr6,the
instrument had littlebearingon thequestion.In TheAstronomical Revolution:Copernicus, Kepler,
Borelli,trans.R. E. W. Maddison(Ithaca,N.Y: CornellUniv.Press,1973),Koyr6ementions thein-
strument onlyin passingin connection withGiovanniBorelli'sworkon Jupiter's satellites
(p. 468).
7Thomas B. Settle,'An Experiment in theHistoryof Science,"Science,1961,133:19-23; and
Settle,"GalileanScience:EssaysintheMechanicsandDynamicsoftheDiscorsi"(Ph.D. diss.,Cor-
nellUniv.,1966).

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 INSTRUMENTS IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE 3

safelyconcludethatGalileo'sinstruments werenotabstractions butactualapparatus

thatbothsuggested andtestedtheory.8 If Galileo'sargument in hisDiscourseswas
mathematical, thatwas becausemathematical arguments couldclaima certainty
thatpurelyqualitative arguments could not; it was not because mathematics made
instruments unnecessary.
EvenwithSettle'scorrection ofKoyre'sidealism, mosthistorians ofsciencecon-
tinuedtoregardinstruments as unproblematic. They assumed thatinstruments were
employed thenas theyarenow,andthattheirinterest forthehistorian was largely
antiquarian. Keytothisassumption was thenotionthatscientific principlesresided
in theory andperhapsin experimental method, butnotin instruments. Instruments
helpedto quantify concepts,butdid notcontainor initiatethem.More recently,
however, historianshaverecognizedthattheroleof instruments in experimental
sciencehasbeenmuchmorecomplex.Intheseventeenth century itwasunclearhow
instruments likethetelescope,microscope, andairpumpshouldbe usedto obtain
natural knowledge. Less problematical, butstillunusual,was apparatus likethein-
clinedplaneandthependulum. In eithercase,theinstruments werenewandthere
was no established convention forusingthemorforvalidating theirresults.9
AlbertVan Heldenhas arguedelsewherethatthemodemscientific instrument
wasbornduring theperiodbetween1550and1700.10Earlierdevicesthatwe would
recognizeas scientific instruments weredesignedformeasurement (if we except
musicalinstruments, surgicalinstruments, andthelike),whilethenewinstruments
oftheScientific Revolution seldommeasured anything, atleastnotatfirst. Alsothe
newinstruments camefromthetradition ofnatural magic,wheretheemphasiswas
ondeception andentertainment, notoncareful anddispassionate observation. Giam-
battistadellaPortagetsclosetotheideasofthebarometer andthetelescopein his
Magia naturalis, butthenuses airpressure to producea "vesselwherewith as you
drink,theliquorshallbe sprinkled aboutyourface"andlensesandmirrors toper-
form"othermerrysports."'It is notsurprising, then,thatinstruments werenot
alwaysacceptedenthusiastically andthattheirvalueandtheirtrustworthiness hadto
be demonstrated. Instruments likethetelescope, whichwe acceptas quintessentially
"scientific,'
weresuspectwhentheyfirst appeared.
DeborahWarner, one ofthecontributors to thisvolume,has warnedus recently
thatit is dangerousevento talkabout"scientific instruments" in theseventeenth
century, becausethattermdidnotbecomecommonuntilthenineteenth. In England
after1650 suchinstruments werecalled "philosophical" in contrast to theolder

8
See e.g.,StillmanDrake,"RenaissanceMusicandExperimentalScience,"Journalfor
theHistory
ofIdeas, 1970,31:483-500; Drake,"The Role ofMusicinGalileo'sExperiments,"
Scientific
Ameri-
can, June 1975, 232:98-104; Drake, Galileo at Work:His ScientificBiography(Chicago: Univ. Chi-
cago Press,1978); R. H. Naylor,"Galileo and theProblemof Free Fall,"BritishJournal
for the
HistoryofScience,1974,7:105-134;andNaylor,"Galileo:Real Experiment andDidacticDemon-
stration,"
Isis, 1976,67:398-419. See also JamesMacLachlan,"ATestofan 'Imaginary'
Experiment
ofGalileo,"Isis, 1973,64:374-379.
9The mostnotableexploration intothestatusofinstrumentsin theseventeenth
century
is Steven
Shapin and Simon Schaffer,Leviathan and theAir-Pump:Hobbes, Boyle, and theExperimentalLife
(Princeton:PrincetonUniv.Press,1985).
10AlbertVan Helden,"The Birthof theModernScientific Instrument, 1550-1700,"in The Uses
ofSciencein theAge ofNewton,ed. JohnG. Burke(Berkeley/Los Angeles:Univ.California Press,
1983),pp. 49-84.
I Giambattistadella Porta,NaturalMagick(trans.of 2nd ed., 1589), ed. DerekJ. Price(New
York:Basic Books,1957),pp. 357, 393.

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4 ALBERT VAN HELDEN AND THOMAS L. HANKINS

measuring instruments, whichwerecalled"mathematical." Nehemiah Grew's1681

catalogueofinstruments belonging totheRoyalSocietydistinguished between"in-
struments relating tonatural philosophy" and"things relatingtothe Mathematicks,"
andthedistinction was pickedup bytheinstrument makersin theeighteenth cen-
Thustheprocessofdetermining
tury.'2 what was acceptable practice in natural phi-
losophyalso requireda decisionaboutwhat were acceptable instruments. If we
agreethatanimportant partoftheScientific Revolution wasthecreation of an exper-
imental method, thenthecreation ofconventions fortheproper useofinstruments-
thatis,decidingwhatkindsof instruments should be admitted intonatural philoso-
phyand whatconstituted their proper use-was crucial to the entire scientific
enterprise. The roleofinstruments has changed,ofcourse,as sciencehas changed
sincetheseventeenth century, both in itsmethods andinitssocialorganization. By
studying instruments we can better understand how the changes have taken place.
In raisinginstruments fromthesubordinate positionwhereKoyreplacedthemto
a moreelevated status,we assume that they are notmerelytoolsfortesting theory
orexploring ideas. Because instruments determine what can be done, they also de-
termine to some extent what can be thought. Often the instrument provides a possi-
bility;itis an initiatorofinvestigation. The scientist asksnotonly:"I havean idea.
How can I buildan instrument thatwillconfirm it?"butalso: "I havea newinstru-
ment.Whatwillitallowmetodo?WhatquestioncanI nowaskthatitwaspointless
toaskbefore?"
Thereis, ofcourse,an ambiguity in thewordinstrument.FrancisBacon,in his
secondaphorism wrote:"Neither thenakedhandnortheunderstanding lefttoitself
can effect much.It is byinstruments andhelpsthattheworkis done,whichareas
muchwantedfortheunderstanding as forthehand.Andas theinstruments ofthe
handeithergivemotionor guideit,so theinstruments of themindsupplyeither
suggestions fortheunderstanding or cautions."13 Baconconsidered theinstrument
tobe botha method anda tool.Thewordhasalwayshada broadmeaning, andifit
hadanyspecialmeaning inclassicalLatinitwasinlaw,notinnatural philosophy.'4
Thewordalso hasmultiple meanings withinnatural philosophy Scientific instru-
mentscan be themeansforproducing naturalwonders fortheedification ofman,
as in naturalmagic;theycan be modelsor analogiesto nature, as in thecase of
orreries orethermodels;theycanbe extensions ofthesenses,suchas thetelescope
andmicroscope; theycanbe measuring devices,as inthecase ofmeters, microme-
ters,or gauges;theycan be themeansforcreating extreme conditions thatdo not
occurnaturally ontheearth, as inthecase oftheairpumpandtheparticle accelera-
tor;theycan be apparatus forcontrolling andanalyzing phenomena, as in thecase
of thependulumor chemicalapparatus;and theycan be themeansof visualor
graphicdisplay, as inthecase ofrecording devices.Undoubtedly manymorekinds
12
DeborahJeanWarner, "WhatIs a Scientific
Instrument, WhenDid It BecomeOne,andWhy?"
Brit.J.Hist.Sci., 1990,23:83-93. Warner,whois curator ofscientific instrumentsattheSmithsonian
claimsnottoknowwhata scientific
Institution, instrument is. It is a practicalproblem.Whatshould
shecollect?
13 FrancisBacon,Novum Organum, aphorism II, in FrancisBacon: A SelectionofHis Works, ed.
SidneyWarhaft (Toronto:Macmillan,1965),p. 331.
14OxfordLatinDictionary, ed. P G.W. Glare(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1968-1982),s.v.instru-
mentum. As we wouldexpect,theOxford EnglishDictionary givesspecialmeanings forinstruments
oflaw andmusic.

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 INSTRUMENTS IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE 5

ofscientific instruments couldbe addedtothislist,butanyattempt tobe exhaustive

wouldnotdo justiceto theinventiveness of thosewhohaveused instruments to
investigatenature. Sometimes ambiguityis a virtue,
anduntilwehavea better under-
standing of theroleof instruments in naturalscience,we arebetteroffleavingto
theterm"scientific instrument"itstraditionalvagueness.Perhapsit is bestto say
thatinstruments are thetechnology of science,a technology thathas expanded
greatly sincetheseventeenth century.
In addition tothevariety inthekindsofscientific instrumentsthereis also variety
in theiruse. Instruments servedifferentpurposes,and in thisvolumewe explore
fourdifferent waysin whichtheyareused.
Inthefirst place,instruments conferauthority.Thiswouldbe obviousiftheinstru-
mentprovideda clear-cut wayof determining whois rightin a scientific
dispute,
butfrequently a scientistwillclaimmoreauthority thantheinstrument reasonably
provides. Albert VanHeldendescribes theauthority claimedbycompeting telescope
makersintheseventeenth century,andJanGolinskishowshowtheEnglishchemists
resistedLavoisier's claimtoauthoritybasedonhissuperior instruments.BruceHunt
describesthepressurecomingfromengineers, notscientists,
foran authoritative
standard bywhichto measureresistance, leadingto theunitsofelectricity thatwe
use today.Whileithasbeencustomary tosaythatthemodemscientific community
is a republicwhereideascirculate freelywithout resorttoauthority,
thetruth appears
tobe otherwise.
Second, instruments
are createdfor audiences. These audiencesconsistnotonly
of thescientistswhouse theinstruments, butalso thepatronswhopayforthem.
BruceHevlyshowshowpatronage (or "grantsupport"in modemparlance)shapes
thedesignand intended use of instruments.RobertSmithandJosephTartarewicz
showhowan extremely complexinstrument liketheHubbleSpace Telescopere-
flectsan equallycomplexnetwork ofconflictinginterests
andambitions
amongits
buildersandsupporters.
DeborahWarner, on theotherhand,usesthecase ofmag-
neticinstrumentstoshowhowtwotraditionally different
audiences-natural
philos-
ophersandmathematical practitioners-in factused similarinstruments
forsimi-
larpurposes.
Third,instruments
can act as bridgesbetweennaturalscience and popular cul-
ture.Instrumentsprovidemetaphors forwritersandpoets,theyhavean important
pedagogicalroleinillustrating
andconfirmingtheory,andtheydefineforthepublic
whatis acceptablescience.ThomasHankinsstudiesthepositionoftheocularharp-
sichordon themargin betweenscienceandartandshowshowdifferent approaches
to naturesuggestdifferentinstruments.
SimonSchaffer showshowa pedagogical
instrument likeAtwood'smachinewas notused as intended or as we wouldhave
expected.Insteaditservedthesocialandpoliticalpurposes
oftheCambridge scien-
tificestablishment.
AndThatcher Deane arguesthattheastronomical instruments
of Mingdynasty Chinaweremoreusefulas symbolsof theemperor's heavenly
mandatethanas toolsforobservation.
Andfourth, evenin theirtraditional
site,thelaboratory,
theroleofinstruments
changes whentheyare used to studylivingorganisms.RobertFrankshows thatin
neurophysiology
thereis a veryclose connection
betweentheinstrument
and the
organismunderinvestigation
suchthattheinstrument
almostbecomesan extension
of theorganism.
AndTimothy Lenoirshowshowin carrying outresearchon the

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6 ALBERT VAN HELDEN AND THOMAS L. HANKINS

perceptionofcolorandtone,Hermann Helmholtz borrowed fromthetelegraph in-

dustry,notonlyitsdetectors andrecording instruments,butalsothegeneralproper-
tiesofa systemofcommunication.
Withtheexception ofThatcher Deane'schapter on Mingdynasty astronomy, all
of thechaptersin thisbook are on Western sciencesince 1600,whichalertsus
to thelikelihoodthattheinstruments we studyare highlyculturebound.Koyre's
denigrationofinstruments andtheempiricists' praiseofthemarereflections ofthe
constantandsometimes hostileconfrontationbetweentheory andexperiment char-
acteristic
of Western scientificculture.Lookingat instruments in a non-Western
societyteachesus thattheiruse andintended purposeis notobvious,andwarnsus,
thattheroleofinstruments
byreflection, inWestern scienceis suretobe evenmore
complexthanitwas in China.The important questionto ask is notwhether Koyre
wasrightorwrongabouttheimportance ofinstruments. Subsequent historiansand
philosophershaveprovedhimwrong.Whatwe needto ask is, rather, howinstru-
mentshaveworkedtodetermine and,perhaps, eventodefinethemethods andcon-
tentofscience.
The philosophical debateoverwhether theory drivesexperiment or experiment
drivestheoryhas tendedtoobscuretheindependent roleofinstruments in science.
Instrumentscomeandgo,butnotnecessarily inphasewiththevicissitudes ofexper-
imentandtheory. Thetraditional mixofexperiment andtheory needsa newingredi-
ent-instruments. It is notjusta matterofgetting thequantities right;we needan
entirelynewrecipe.'5The following essaysareintended as a stepin thatdirection.
15
PeterGalison,"History, and the CentralMetaphor,"
Philosophy, Science in Context, 1988,
2:197-212.

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