50 Landmark Judgments in
Family Law
Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs
ShahBano Begum And Ors
1985
A h m e d a b a d Wo m e n
Action Group (AWAG) v.
Union ofIndia (AIR (1997)
Danial Latifi and another
v.Union of India (2001)
Shamim Ara v. State of U.P.,
2002
Into Legal World Notes
In this case, Supreme Court granted the
maintenance to a divorced muslim woman
irrespective of what the Muslim personal law says.
Supreme Court held that Section 125 of CrPc is also
applicable on Muslims. Supreme Court concluded
that Cr.P.C. is a secular law and “there is no conflict
between the provisions of section 125 and those of
the Muslim Personal Law on the question of the
M u s l i m h u s b a n d ’s o b l i g a t i o n t o p ro v i d e
maintenance for a divorced wife who is unable to
maintain herself.” A
muslim woman is entittled for the maintainance
even after the period of iddat.
The court was of the opinion that India and Indians
have been governed by personal laws, regardless of
the time period. It was of the opinion that an
interference by the court would lead to several
undesirable outcomes, as the adjudication of
personal laws was
beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. The petition
was therefore dismissed.
The court held that the Muslim Women (Protection of
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which provided that
under section 3(1)(a), a divorced woman is entitled
to reasonable and fair provisions, and maintenance
within the ‘iddat’ period is not in violation of
Article
14 and 21 of the Indian constitution.
In this case the Supreme Court was of the view that
the mere plea of a Talaq, would not validate the
same. There Quranic procedures of obtaining a
Talaq need to be fulfilled, i.e., Talaq has to be
pronounced
in the Quranic injunction.

 Shayara Bano v. Union Supreme Court in 2017 in a historic and landmark

ofIndia and others, 2017 judgment declared “Triple Talaq” unconstitutional.
The Apex Court said, “Given the fact triple talaq is
instant and irrevocable, it has no scope of
arbitration which is essential for saving marriage
ties. Hence, it is clear that this form of Talaq is
manifestly arbitrary in the sense that the marital tie
can be broken capriciously and whimsically by a
Muslim man without any attempt at reconciliation so
as to save it. The court invalidated Section 2 of
Shariat
Application Act, 1937 to the extent it enforces “triple
talaq”.

Chand Patel v.
BismillahBegum, 1
(2008)
Sarla Mudgal vs. Union of
India, 1995
Yousuf v. Sowramina, 1970
Lily Thomas vs.
Unionof India, 1995
Chanmuniya v. Virendra
Kumar Singh Kushwaha, 2011
Ganeshji vs. Hastuben, 1967
Laxmi vs. Babulal, 1972
The Supreme Court that a Muslim’s marriage to his
wife’s sister may be , while the earlier marriage
still subsists, will be irregular but the second wife
and children are entitled to maintenance. The
Muslim personal law prohibits “unlawful
conjunction”- a man cannot marry his wife’s sister in
her lifetime or till the
dissolution of their marriage but that doesn’t affect her
entitlement to maintenance.
The Court held that if a Hindu converts to Muslim
and then have a second marriage, he can not do so,
irrespective of the fact that polygamy is allowed in
Islamic Law.
It was held that at times, the determination of the
question whether in fact a marriage has broken
down or not is left to the courts. At other times, the
legislature lays down the criterion of breakdown of
a marriage and if that is established, the courts
have no option but to dissolve the marriage.
When a non-Muslim man, married according to the
religious rites stipulating monogamy, renounces his
religion, converts to Islam and solemnizes a second
marriage according rites without divorcing his first
wife. Supreme Court held that husband is guilty
of bigamy.
Considering Sec 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
the marriage performed in absence of customary
rites and ceremonies of either parties to marriage is
not valid. And Mere intention of the parties to live
together as husband and wife is not enough. Further,
there is no scope to include a woman not lawfully
married within the expression of ‘wife’ in Section
125 of the Code should be interpreted to mean only
a legally wedded wife.
Where the wife on an account of structural
malformation of vagina was not capable to have
normal sexual intercourse. But she underwent surgical
operation as a result of which she became capable of
having sexual intercourse. It was held that she was
not impotent.
Wife had no vagina, but by a surgical operation an
artificial vagina was constructed. The Court held
that the act did not remove wife‘s impotency. In
Ganeshji Case there was vagina but in this case
there was no



 vagina from the very beginning.
Jagdish vs. Seela, 2002 Where immediately after marriage the husband lived
for three nights and days in the same room with
his wife and failed to consummate the marriage, it was
a fair inference that non consummation was due to
husband‘ knowing refusal arising out of
incapacity , nervousness or hysteria.
Prajapati vs. Hastubai Barrenness and Sterlity- Marriage is valid.
Shewanti vs. Bhaura, 1970 Barrenness and Sterlity- Marriage is valid.
Corbett vs. Corbett Marriage between same sexes is void ab initio.
Sexual constitution of an individual is fixed by birth
and can‘t be changed either by the natural
development
of organs of opposite sex or medical or surgical means.
Mahendra vs. Sushila, 1964 Wife‘s admission of pre-marriage pregnancy when
it is established that the petitioner had no access
prior to marriage, is sufficient in itself to establish
the fact against her.
Bhaurao Shankar Essential ceremonies of Hindu Marriage are;
Lokhande vs. State (1) Invocation before the sacred fire and (2) Saptapadi
of
Maharashtra, 1965
Dr. N.A.Mukerji A physician was prosecuted for bigamy. It was alleged
vs.State that three ceremonies of marriage were performed.
The Court held that performance of such mock
ceremonies of marriage does not constitute valid
ceremonies, and therefore the prosecution for
bigamy failed. There mere intention of parties
however serious, will not make them husband and
wife and the
accused will escape prosecution even if he
deliberately performed a defective ceremony.
P.V.Venkataraman The Court held that any marriage between minors
avs. State aged 13 and 9 is perfectly valid. Reason- (1)Section
4
(2) Factum Valet (A fact can notaltered by a
hundredstexts)

 Seema v. Ashwani Kumar, 2006
T.Sareetha vs. T.V.Subbaih.
The Supreme Court in this case directed the State
Governments and the Central Government that
marriages of all persons who are citizens of India
belonging to various religious denominations should
be made compulsorily registerable in their
respective
States where such marriages are solemnized.
Section 9 of HMA is unconstitutional. Reason-It is
violation of right to privacy and right to life
enshrined
in Article 21 of Constitution of India.

 Harvinder Kaur vs.
HarmanderSingh Choudhry,
1983
Saroj Rani v Sudarshan
Kumar, 1984
Sushil Kumari Dang v.
PremKumar, 1976
Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash,
1(1991)
Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah
v. Prabhavati, AIR 1957
Oxford vs. Oxford
Subbaramma vs. Saraswathi,
1996
Rajesh Kumar Singh vs.
RekhaSingh
Section 9 of HMA is Constitutional.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
Section 9 by saying that it serves a social purpose as
anaid to the prevention of break-up of the marriage.
Here, a petition for restitution of conjugal right is filed
by the husband and the husband accuses his wife for
adulterous conduct. Following which he filed another
petition for judicial separation which shows the
extent of his sincerity and interest in keeping the wife
with him. So, the Delhi High Court set aside the
decree of
restitution granted by the lower court.
The SC settled the controversy by ruling that at the
time of second motion under Section 13(B) HMA,
one of the parties of the marriage withdraws the
consent given to the petition, and then decree
for
divorce on mutual consent cannot be passed.
The SC held that for the offence of desertion, so far as
the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential
conditions must be there, namely (1) the factum of
separation, and (2) the intention to bring
cohabitation permanently to an end (animus
deserendi).
Similarly two elements are essential so far as the
deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of
consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving
reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the
matrimonial home to form the necessary intention
aforesaid.
A wife who allows her to be artificially inseminated
with semen provided by a person other than her
husband is not guilty of adultery.
After midnight in her bedroom in actual
physicaljuxtaposition- adultery
Rape cannot be ground of divorce. Sexual
intercourse
has to be consensual for it to be a ground of divorce.

 Russel v Russel Conduct of such a character as to have caused

danger to life, limb, or health, bodily or mental , or
as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of
such
danger.
Naveen Kohli vs. The Supreme Court observed that the conduct
NeeluKohli complained of should be grave and weighty.It
should




Itwari v. Asghari, AIR 1960
Romesh Chander vs. Savitri,
1995
N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane,
AIR1975
Dharmendra Kumar v.
UshaKumar, AIR 1977
Nachhattar Singh v.
HarcharanKaur AIR 1996
be such that no reasonable person should tolerate it .
It
should not be ordinary wear and tear of marriage.
The court held that even in the absence of
satisfactory proof of the husband’s cruelty, the
Court will not pass a decree for restitution in
favour of the husband if, on the evidence, it feels
that the
circumstances are such that it will be unjust and
inequitable to compel her to live with him.
Considering the facts and circumstances of this
case we, in exercise of power under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, direct that the marriage between
appellant and the respondent shall stand dissolved. 25
years had elapsed since the appellant-husband a
sanitary inspector and respondent a school
teacher had enjoyed the company of each other.
Five tests were laid down in determining whether a
given conduct amounts to legal cruelty. They are the
following:
1. The alleged acts constituting cruelty should be
proved according to the law of evidence;
2. There should be an apprehension in the
petitioner’s mind of real injury or harm from
such conduct;
3. The apprehension should be reasonable having
regard to the socio-economic and psycho-
physical condition of the parties;
4. The petitioner should not have taken
advantageof his position;
5. The petitioner should not by his or her conduct
have condoned the acts of cruelty.
Mere non-compliance with a decree for restitution
does not constitute wrong within the meaning of
section 23(1)(a).
If both the parties had voluntarily consented to file
the petition for dissolving the marriage by mutual
consent and all the other conditions mentioned in
sub-sec. (1) of S. 13B of the Act are fulfilled, it will
not be
open to a party to withdraw the consent.

 Asha Qureshi v. Afaq The Court held that a person is entitled to a decree
Qureshi,AIR 2002 MP 263 ofnullity under Section 25(iii) of the Hindu
Marriage Act on grounds of fraud as described in
Section 17
of the Indian Contracts Act.



 Amardeep Singh v.
HarveenKaur
Suman Singh v. Sanjay Singh
V. Bhagat vs D. Bhagat
Balveer Singh v. Harjeet Kaur
Mrs. Christine Lazarus
Menezes v. Mr. Lazarus Peter
Menezes (Bombay High
Court)
Amar Kanta Sen v. Sovana
Sen,AIR 1960
Shanti Devi v. Govind Singh
The Supreme Court held that the period mentioned in
Section 13B(2) is not mandatory but directory.
The court held that few isolated incidents of long
past and that too found to have been condoned due
to compromising behavior of the parties cannot
constitute an act of cruelty within the meaning of
Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
In cruelty, mens rea is not important
Mental cruelty was defined.
While deciding this issue, the High Court referred to
theimpugned provisions and made the following key
observations in the case:
1. That on a simple reading of Section 9 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, it has altogether a
different purpose. The purpose of Section 9 of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is to meet a
contingency.
2. Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and
Section 13-A of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 are
framed to meet a separate set of contingencies.
3. If Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
is either decreed or dismissed, it will not take
away a right of a party to file Section 13-A of
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for dissolution of
marriage at any subsequent stage.
The Court noted that if the Criminal Complaint filed
by the appellant wife against her husband was false
and was filed only to bring back her husband and
consequent to which he was arrested and was in
jail
for about 7 days, it would constitute a clear case of
cruelty by the wife against her husband.
Supreme Court in this case held that when a wife
deliberately persist on not getting a job even she easily
can, is an undue advantage. The court only
allowed
starving allowance in this case.
The Court held that for constituting ‘desertion’ two
essential conditions must be fulfilled namely (i) the
factum of separation; and (ii) the intention to
bring
cohabitation permanently to an end.

 Meghanatha Nayyar v. The Madras High Court had observed that Section 14
Smt.Susheela provides restrictions presumably designed to
prevent party from taking recourse to
legal
proceedings before the parties have made real
effort




Neeraja Saraph v
JayantSaraph (1994)
Lata Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, 2006
Velusamy v. D.
Patchaiammal,(2010)
Masroor Ahmed v. Delhi
(NCT)2008
Ankush Narayan v. Janabai
to save their marriage from disaster.
The Supreme Court gave some important
obiterobservations in this case:
1. No marriage between a NRI and an Indian
woman which has taken place in India may
be annulled by a foreign court.
2. Provision may be made for adequate alimony
to the wife in the property of the husband
both inIndia and abroad.
3. The decree granted by Indian courts may be
made executable in foreign courts both on
principle of comity and by entering into
reciprocal agreements like Section 44-A of the
Civil Procedure Code which makes a foreign
decree executable as it would have been a
decree passed by that court.
Noting that there was no bar to inter-caste marriage
under the Hindu Marriage Act, a Division Bench of
theSupreme Court comprising of Justice Ashok Bhan
and Justice Markandey Katju observed that since
there wasno dispute about the petitioner being a
major, “she wasfree to marry anyone she likes or
live with anyone
she likes“.
The Supreme Court, in this case, held that Live-in
relationships will also come under Domestic
Violence Act 2005 . It is held that ‘not all live in
relationships will amount to a relationship in the the
nature of marriage to get the benefit of the Act of
2005.
The Delhi HC in this case elucidated the various
modes of dissolution of marriage under Muslim Law.
The Hon’ble Court elaborated Section 2 of the
Muslim
Personal Law (Shariat Application), 1937.
Court held that on adoption by a widow, the adopted
son becomes the son of the deceased adoptive
father and the position under the old Hindu law as
regards ties
in the adoptive family is not changed.

 Guradas v. Rasaranjan Adoption is made when the actual giving and

taking had taken place and not when the religious
ceremony is performed like Datta Homam. For a
valid adoption, it would be necessary to bring on
records that there has been an actual giving and
taking
ceremony.
Jijabai v. Pathan Khan Where the father and mother had fallen out and the




Sitabai v. Ramchandra
R.Virupakshaiah v.
Sarvamma& Anr
Vineeta Sharma v.
RakeshSharma & Ors.
Dipo v. Wassan Singh & Others
Vaddeboyina Tulasamma
v. Vaddeboyina Shesha
Reddi,1977
mother was living separately for over 20 years and
was managing the affairs of her minor daughter the
apex Court observed though the father was alive but
he was not taking any interest in the affairs of the
minor and should be treated as if non-existent, and,
hence, the mother is the natural guardian of the
minor’s person as well as property.
So there may be relationship by implication in the
other cases also. The Supreme Court has also held that
a son adopted by the widow of the deceased
coparcener
will also be a coparcener with the surviving
coparceners of the deceased husband.
Property inherited by a Hindu from his father,
father’s father or father’s fathers’ father,
isancestral property.
The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act ,2005 did
not provide for its retrospective effect. It was held
that a daughter is entitled to equal property rights
under Hindu Succession Amendment Act 2005 with
retrospective effect. And it is immaterial whether she
was born or her father was alive or not at the time of
amendment in 2005 to Hindu Succession Act,
which
gave women equal right of inheritance.
A person who has to inherit property from his
immediate paternal ancestors up to 3 lines, holds
it in coparcenary and to other relations he holds it
and is entitled to hold it, as his absolute property.
Hence,
the property inherited by a person from any other
relation becomes his separate property.
The Supreme Court in this case highlighted the Hindu
female’s right to maintenance as a tangible right
against property which flows from the spiritual
relationship between the husband and wife. The
Bench comprising of Justice P.N. Bhagwati,
Justice
A.C. Gupta and Justice S.M. Fazal Ali held that
Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 must
be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to
advance the object of the Act. This section makes
female Hindu a full owner of a property, instead of
a
limited owner of the property.

 Mrs. Mary Roy Etc. v. State The Supreme Court in this case held that Christian
OfKerala & Ors, 1986 women are entitled to have an equal share in
theirfather’s property. Till then,
Christian women in



 Kerala were governed by the provisions under the

1916
Travancore-Kochi Christian Succession Act.
Roxann Sharma v. The Supreme Court in this case held that in a in a
ArunSharma battle between estranged parents, for the custody of
minor child, who has not completed five years of age,
shall be allowed to remain with the mother. The Bench
comprising of Justice Vikramajit Sen and Justice C.
Nagappan held that in such cases child should not
treated as a “chattel”.
Githa Hariharan v. It is pertinent to note that sub-section (c) of Section 4
ReserveBank of India provides that a natural guardian means a guardian
(1999) mentioned in Section 6. This definition section,
however obviously in accordance with the rule of
interpretation of statute, ought to be read subject to
Section 6 being one of the basic provisions of the Act
and it is this Section 6 which records that natural
guardian of a Hindu minor, in the case of a boy
or
an unmarried girl, is the father and after him the
mother.
Dhanwanti Joshi v The Supreme Court had the occasion to decide the
MadhavUnde (1998) custody of the child when he was more than 12
years old and decided that even though the father
may have obtained custody from the US court, the
best interests of the child demanded that the child
be allowed to continue to stay with the mother in
India
who had brought up the child single handedly in India,
subject to visitation rights of the father.
Shatri vs. Muldas1966 Meaning of Hindu -Justice Gajendragadkar,
Dr. Surajmani Stella Kujur In this case, the Supreme Court described who is a
v. Durga Charan Hansdah, “Hindu” for the purposes of the applicability of the
AIR2001 Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Act, is, therefore,
applicable to: “(1)All Hindus including a Virashaiva,
a
Lingayat, a Brahmo, Prarthana Samajist and an Arya
Samajist (2) Budhists (3) Jains (4) Sikhs”

 Swaraj Garg v. K.M. It is true that under the Hindu law, it is the duty of
Garg,AIR 1978 thehusband to maintain his wife, but the wife is not
under a corresponding duty to maintain her
husband. This also is due to the fact that normally the
husband is the wage earner. If, however, the wife also
has her own income it will be taken into account and
if her income is sufficient to maintain herself the
husband will not be required to pay her any
maintenance at all.



Padmja Sharma v. Ratan
LalSharma, AIR 2000
Gohar Begum v Suggi, (1960)
Mambandi v. Mutsaddi, (1918)
Vandana Shiva v.
JayantaBandhopadhaya
There is no warrant in Hindu law to regard the
Hinduwife as having no say in choosing the place
of
matrimonial home.
The obligation of a person to maintain his or her
aged or infirm parents or daughter who is
unmarried extends insofar as the parent or the
unmarried daughter, as the case may be, is unable
to
maintain himself or herself out of his or her own
earnings or other property.
The court held that in Muslim law, the mother is not
a
natural guardian even of her minor illegitimate
children, but she is entitled to their custody.
The court held that a father’s right of guardianship
exists even when the mother, or any other female, is
entitled to the custody of the minor. The father has
the right to control the education and religion of minor
children, and their upbringing and their movement.
So
long as the father is alive, he is the sole and supreme
guardian of his minor children.
The Supreme Court has held that under certain
circumstances, even when the father is alive mother
can act as a natural guardian. The term ‘after’
used in
Section 6(a) has been interpreted as ‘in absence of’
instead ‘after the life-time’.