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Summary
 MAHARASHTRA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY MUMBAI

SUMMARY OF THE JUDGEMENT & REVERSE JUDGMENT TOWARDS

FULFILMENT OF THE ASSESSMENT

IN THE SUBJECT OF Civil Procedural Code

TITLE OF THE PROJECT:

"DEVA RAM AND ANOTHER VS ISHWAR CHAND"

SUBMITTED BY SANKALP MIRANI

ENROLLMENT NO. 2021085

SUBMITTED TO PROF. DR. Anil G. Variath & Ms.Mahvish Kazmi

SUBMITTED ON 14-03-23

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 DEVA RAM AND ANOTHER VS ISHWAR CHAND

2
The judgement of the Preliminary Court was maintained by the took in Extra Region Judge,
Shimla in an allure recorded by the offended party which was excused with the discoveries that
the land being referred to was at no stage offered by the offended parties respondents to the
current appellants and thus the offended parties were not qualified for recuperate Rs.6,300/ -
from the appellants as deal cost as the report being referred to was just an understanding
available to be purchased and not a deal deed. The lower appellante court likewise explicitly
1
turned around the finding of the Preliminary Court on Issue No.5 and held that the respondents
had neglected to demonstrate how them can be occupants of the contested land under the
offended party. Those official procedures ended at that stage.
1
The offended party, be that as it may, started new procedures by recording Suit No. 91/1/1982
for ownership against the current appellants based on the title, arguing entomb alia that they
were the proprietors of the land being referred to and the litigants, in particular, the current
appellants who had proactively been held in the prior suit that they were not the occupants of
the land in suit, were not qualified for hold ownership.
1
This suit was opposed by the appellants on the ground that the Buit was banned by Request II
Rule 2 of the Code of Common Strategy and that it was banished by time as they were under
1
lock and key over the land being referred to since samvat 2005 and had become proprietors of
the land in suit by antagonistic belonging.
The Preliminary Court, specifically, Senior Sub-Judge, Kinnaur at Kalpa, excused the suit by
judgment and request Dated April 21, 1984 with the observing that the suit was banished by
the standards of Request II Rule 2 and was past time. In claim, chose by the Distt. Judge,
Shimla, on Walk 31, 1986, the discoveries recorded by the Preliminary Court were switched
and the suit was announced with the discoveries that it was not banned by Request 2 Rule 2 of
the Common Strategy Code nor was it past time.The appellants then, at that point, documented
1
a second allure in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh which by its judgment dated July 8,
1994 excused the allure and that is the way the matter is before us now.
Learned counsel for the appellants has fought that the discoveries recorded by the Locale Judge
that the suit of the respondents was not banned by Request 2 Rule 2 of the Common Strategy
Code was mistaken and the appellants having proactively been held to be occupants under the
respondents by the Preliminary Court in the prior suit, the suit for ownership was not viable
and should have been excused by the Area Judge as additionally by the High Court as was
finished by the Preliminary Court, it was likewise battled that the discoveries recorded by the
Preliminary Court on the situation with the appellants in the past suit that they were occupants
1
of the land in suit ought to in any case be blessed to receive hold the field despite its inversion
by the lower re-appraising court as the lower redrafting court, had eventually concluded the
allure in support of themselves with the outcome that they being the effective party had no
event to document the allure and challenge the discoveries. In this present circumstance, it is
fought, the discoveries of the preliminary court can't be blessed to receive have been switched.
The Civil Procedure Code's Order 2 Rule 2 will be our first topic. It provides the following:

2
"R.2. suit to cover the entire claim. 1) The entire claim that the plaintiff is entitled to make
regarding the cause of action must be included in every suit; However, in order to bring the
case before a court, a plaintiff can give up any part of his claim.
abandonment of a portion of the claim.
(2) A plaintiff may not later sue for the portion of his claim that he omitted to sue for or that he
intentionally relinquishes to avoid paying a claim.
failure to file a lawsuit for one of several reliefs.
(3) A person entitled to more than one relief for the same cause of action may sue for all or any
of them; however, if he fails to sue for all of them without the permission of the Court, he
cannot sue for them later.
A cursory review of the aforementioned provisions would reveal that if a plaintiff is entitled to
multiple reliefs against the defendant for the same cause of action, he cannot separate the claim
so that he can sue for both parts of the claim. Order 2 Rule 2 is founded on the fundamental
principle that the defendant should not be troubled twice for the same cause, so if the cause of
action is the same, the plaintiff must bring all of his claims before the court in one suit.
Therefore, all claims in a single suit that are based on the same cause of action must be united
under the rule. It does not consider the interconnectedness of distinct and distinct causes of
action. Therefore, the rule will not prevent a subsequent suit from being brought on the basis
of a different cause of action. Check out Arun Lal Gupta & Co. Mriganka Mohan Sur and
Others v. A.I.R.1975 S.C.207; State of Maharashtra v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others:
A.I.R. 1977 S.C.1466; Mt. Kewal Singh v. : Lajwanti A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 161].
Sidramappa v. Rajashetty and Others: According to A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1059, the subsequent suit
will not be barred by the rule in Order II Rule 2, CPC if the cause of action on which the
previous suit was brought does not form the foundation of the subsequent suit and the plaintiff
in the previous suit could not have claimed the relief he sought in the subsequent suit. It was
noted in Gurbux Singh v. Bhura Lal (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1810):
"So that a plea of a bar under 0.2 R.2(3) may be entered. The defendant who raises the plea
must demonstrate, in order for the Civil Procedure Code to prevail, that the second suit was
based on the same cause of action as the first; (ii) 2) that the plaintiff was entitled to multiple
reliefs in relation to that cause of action; 3) The plaintiff failed to sue for the relief for which
the second suit had been filed because he was entitled to multiple reliefs. This was done without
permission from the court. Because there is no identity between the cause of action on which
the earlier suit was filed and that on which the claim in the later suit is based, there would be
no scope for the application of the bar, it would be seen from this analysis that the defendant
would have to first and foremost establish the precise cause of action upon which the previous
suit was filed." In light of the foregoing, the question in this case is whether the cause of action
on which the previous suit was filed is the same as the one on which the subsequent suit that is
the basis for the current appeal was filed. Because the appellants are the defendants in both of
the suits, they cannot be vaxed twice by two separate suits in respect of the same cause of
action. If the identity of the causes of action is established, the rule would immediately become
applicable, and it would have to be held that since the relief claimed in the subsequent suit was

3
omitted to be claimed in the earlier suit, the subsequent suit for possession is liable to be
dismissed without the leave of the court in which the previous suit was originally filed.
We have already noted in the preceding section of the judgment that the prior suit was filed to
recover Rs. 6300 as the sale price of the land. However, the suit was dismissed on the grounds
that the document on which it was filed was not a sale deed but rather a simple agreement for
sale, and as a result, the amount in question could not be recovered as the sale price. As a result,
the suit was based on that document.
The respondents then filed a lawsuit to get back possession of the land, claiming that because
they owned the land in question, they had the right to get it back. As a result, the subsequent
lawsuit had a completely different cause of action. The respondents could not have claimed the
relief of possession on the basis of title because they had pleaded that title had been transferred
to the defendants (appellants) in the previous suit, which was for the recovery of sale price.
The identity of the causes of action in the previous suit and the subsequent suit, which is a
necessary condition for the applicability of Order 2 Rule 2, was not established. As a result, the
appellants' argument regarding Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code was correctly
rejected by both the District Judge and the High Court.
The next argument made by learned counsel for the appellants was that the finding made by
the Trial Court in the previous suit on Issue No.5 that the appellants were tenants of the land in
the suit under the respondents since Samvat 2005 should be treated as still available to them,
and that because of this, they can legally argue that the respondents' suit for possession of the
land in the suit was liable to be dismissed. It is argued that the lower appellate court reversed
the finding on Issue No. 5 in an appeal that was ultimately decided in their favour. As a result,
they were unable to challenge the lower appellate court's findings in any higher forum for the
simple reason that an appeal under Section 96 or, more specifically, Section 100 of the Civil
Procedure Code only concerns a decree and not a finding. It is argued that the appellate
judgement regarding the finding on Issue No. 5 may be ignored in this circumstance. It is
emphasised that if this is done, the Trial Court's initial findings regarding the appellants' status
as tenants of the land under the respondents would come back into play and serve as a res
judicata against the respondents, who are unable to obtain possession.We may begin by noting
that the appellants, in their capacity as defendants, did not invoke the res judicata principle in
the subsequent suit. In fact, they did not even mention the Trial Court's findings from the
previous suit in their written statement, nor did they claim to be tenants of the land in the suit
under the respondents. Their main argument was that they had adverse possession of the land
in question since Samvat 2005, when the suit was filed. In addition, they argued that the suit
was time-barred and, in any case, unmanageable in light of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil
Procedure Code. As a result, the appellants presented a brand-new defense and did not claim
to be tenants of the respondents. As a result, there was no question of whether the appellants
were tenants of the land in dispute, so there was no need to refer to the findings from the
previous suit.
Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, which benefits from all of its explanations, specifically
Explanations I to VIII, contains the rule of res judicata. The following is a quote from Section
11:
"11. This is the case. "No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and
substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a previous suit between the

4
same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim to be litigating under
the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue
has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and ultimately decided by such Court," the
rule states.
The full maxim, "Res judicata Pro Veritate Accipitur," has been reduced to "Res Judicata" over
time.The rule of conclusiveness of the judgment is found in Section 11, and it is partly based
on the maxim "Nemo debet bis vexari pro una at eadem causa," which states that "Interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium" (it concerns the State that there be an end to law suits). If the
matter in the suit was directly and substantially in issue (and ultimately decided) in the previous
suit between the same parties litigating under the same title in a court competent to try the
subsequent suit in which such issue has been raised, the section does not affect the Court's
jurisdiction but acts as a bar to the trial of the suit or issue.

The appellant, who were the defendants in the subsequent suits, did not plead that they were
the tenants under the respondents, so Issue No. 5 was not raised in the previous suit, which was
initiated by the respondents. However, in the subsequent suit, this issue was not raised because
the appellant, who were the defendants in the subsequent suits, did not plead that they were the
tenants under the respondents. They pleaded that they had adverse possession of the title since
Samvat 2005, when they had been in possession for a long time. As a result, the issue that was
raised and tried in the previous suit was not raised, framed, or tried in the subsequent suits. As
a result, no finding was recorded regarding whether the defendants were tenants of the land in
the suit. It is true that the parties involved in the current case, which is the sequel to the one
that came before it, are still litigating, and it is also true that the disputed land, which was the
subject of the previous case, remains the same, despite the fact that the issues and grounds for
action were different. The learned counsel for the appellants cannot invoke the rule of res
judicata on the grounds that the trial court found that the appellants were tenants of the land in
dispute under the respondents in the previous suit because the basic requirement for the rule of
res judicata's applicability is lacking. As a result, there are no pleadings, issues, or findings.
Let us now consider the argument regarding the impact of a negative finding made by the court
against a party who ultimately wins the suit or appeal.
According to Section 96 of the C.P.C., an appeal from any decree issued by a court with original
jurisdiction must be filed with the court designated to hear appeals from such a court's decision.
Additionally, Section 100 stipulates that any appeal-related decree must be appealed to the
High Court. As a result, the "decree" is required by both provisions, and an appeal would not
be allowed under either Section 96 or Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code unless the decree
is approved. Similarly, where the "orders" against which an appeal would lie have been
enumerated, an appeal is filed against an "order" under Section 104 and Order 43 Rule 1 of the
Civil Procedure Code. An appeal would not lie unless there is an "order" as defined in Section
2(14) and if that "order" is included on the list of "orders" in Order 43.
As a result, an appeal cannot be filed against merely recorded "findings" unless the findings
constitute a "decree" or "order." The defendant against whom an adverse finding might have
been recorded on some issue has no right of appeal when a suit is dismissed, and he cannot

5
challenge those findings in front of the appellate court.) Observe Ganga Bai v. Vinay Kumar
et al.: 1974) 3 S.C.R.882).
Naresh Narayan Roy v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. Ltd. [A.I.R. 1922 P.C.241]. The following
was observed:
"Their Lordships do not believe that this will be found to be an actual plea of res judicata
because the defendants, who succeeded on the other plea, did not have the opportunity to go
further regarding the finding against them: But it is the finding of a court that was dealing with
facts that were closer to their knowledge than the facts that the Board is currently dealing with,
and it certainly creates a paramount duty on the appellant to displace the finding, which they
have been able to do."
An earlier decision in Run Bahadur Singh v. Luchokoer [1885 ILR 11 CAL.301 (P.C.)]
expressed a similar viewpoint.

Pateshwar Din & Anr.'s Oudh Chief Court. In Mahant Sarjudas v. A.I.R. 1938 Oudh 18, it was
ruled that a person has no right of appeal if a decree from a previous suit is entirely in his favour
and grants him all of the reliefs he sought. This meant that the person could not contest any
negative findings made against him in that suit. As a result, this negative finding cannot be
used against him in a subsequent lawsuit as res judicata.
REVERSAL
In the case of Bansi Lal Ratwa v. Laxminarayan & Anr., the High Court of Andhra Pradesh In
Arjun Singh & Anr., the Full Bench of the High Court of Patna and Andhra Weekly Reporter]
versus Tara Das Ghosh & Co. According to A.I.R. 1974 Patna 1], an appeal would not be filed
against an adverse finding unless such a finding would result in res judicata in subsequent
proceedings. We are not, however, concerned with this aspect of the matter in the present case,
nor are we concerned with the previous aspect, as the appellant cannot be permitted to raise the
res judicata defence here because it was not raised in the written statement. The issues before
us are decided in favour of the appellants based on what we have said above.

REVERSAL
But we can't ignore the fact that the appellants have owned the land in question for a very long
time and that the respondents themselves had once argued (in a previous suit they had filed)
that the land had already been sold to the appellants and that the appellants were responsible
for paying Rs. They received $6,300. It is odd that, despite the trial court's findings that the
appellants were tenants of the land in the suit filed by the respondents, they did not make that
claim in the subsequent suit filed by the respondents for possession recovery. Perhaps because
the appellate court reversed the finding. We cannot inquire into why this was not carried out.
We can only say that the suit's land is 34.9 bighas in size, and the interest of justice would be
served if only a compact area of 10 bighas was left for the appellants and the decree for
possession was made executable only for the remaining 24.9 bighas. Ten bighas of land will
be assigned to the appellants as Protected Tenants. The land will be divided between the parties
by the concerned Tehsildar in accordance with our instructions. Within a month of the

6
Tehsildar's order, the appellants must hand over the area that does not belong to the
respondents. The Tehsildar's decision is final. The judgments of the lower courts, including the
High Court, will not be altered in any way.
The appeal is partially granted to the extent mentioned above, but there is no cost order.

Res judicata-the maxim being res judicata pro veritate accipitur - is a fact to be pleaded and
proved. The appellant in his written statement has specifically pleaded it. The only evidence
adduced by him to prove it is Ext B1 photocopy of the plaint in the previous suit. But Ext A5
copy of the judgement in the previous suit produced by the first respondent is available. In Kali
Krishna Tagore vs Secretary of State for India in Council (ILR 16 Calcutta 173) the Privy
Council pointed out that the plea of res judicata cannot be determined without ascertaining
what were the matters in issues in the previous suit and what was heard and decided. A
constitution bench of the Supreme Court in Gurbux Singh vs Booralal (AIR 1964 SC 1810)
has had occasion to examine the question. It held that the plea of res judicata cannot be
established in the absence of the record of the judgement and decree which is pleaded as
estoppel. The following observation of the constitution bench is very relevant: "Without
placing before the court" the relevant records "the defendant cannot invite the court to speculate
or to infer by process or deduction what those facts might be with reference to the reliefs which
were then claimed". In Syed Mohd Salie Labbai (dead) by L.Rs and others vs Mohd. Hanifa
(dead) by L.Rs and others (1976) 4 SCC 780) the Supreme Court held:

"The best method to decide the question of res judicata is first to determine the case of the
parties as put forward in their respective pleadings of their previous suits, and then to find out
as to what had been decided by the judgments which operate as res judicata. Unfortunately
however in this case the pleadings of the suits instituted by the parties have not at all been filed
and we have to rely upon the facts as mentioned in the judgments themselves. It is well settled
that pleadings cannot be proved merely by recitals of the allegations mentioned in the
judgement."
Later, in V.Rajeshwari vs T.C.Saravanabava (2004) 1 SCC 551) the question again came up
for consideration before the Supreme Court. It held that it is risky to speculate about pleadings
merely by a summary of recitals of the allegations made in the pleadings mentioned in the
judgement. The necessity to prove the pleadings and the issues in the former suit has been
pointed out by the Supreme Court in Dalip Singh vs Mehar Singh Rathee and Others (2004) 7
SCC 650), Swamy Atmananda and Others vs Sri.Ramakrishna Tapovanam and Others (AIR
2005 SC 2392) and Alka Gupta vs Narendar Kumar Gupta (AIR 2011 SC 9) also.

Thus, Ext A5 copy of judgement produced by the first respondent will not help the appellant
prove that the present suit of the former is hit by section 11 C.P.C. The plea of res judicata
raised by the appellant cannot even be taken notice of since he has not produced a copy of the
written statement filed by him and the decree passed by the trial court in the previous suit.

7
Order II Rule 2 CPC reads as follows:

(1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in
respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order
to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court.
(2) Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his
claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished.
(3) A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for
all or any of such reliefs, but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such
reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted.
Explanation - For the purposes of this rule an obligation and a collateral security for its
performance and successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed
respectively to constitute but one cause of action.
Sub rule 1 of Rule 2 in Order II CPC contains the mandate that the suit shall contain the whole
claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action alleged in the
plaint and sub rule 2 contains the prohibition that the plaintiff shall not later sue for any portion
of the claim which was so omitted or relinquished. Sub rule 3 bars the plaintiff from suing for
a relief which was not prayed for in a previous suit though he was entitled to sue for that relief
also, the cause of action alleged in both suits being the same. The principle behind Order II
Rule 2 CPC is that the defendant should not be twice vexed for one and the same cause (Naba
Kumar Hazra and another vs Radhashyam Mahish and another AIR 1931 P.C. 229). The object
is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and not to vex the parties over and again in a litigative
process (State Bank of India vs Gracure Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (AIR 2014 SC 731). The rule is
directed against the evils of splitting of claims and splitting of remedies (Mohammed Khali
Khan and others vs. Mahbub Ali Mian and others AIR 1949 P.C.78 and Shri Inacio Martins vs
Narayan Hari Naik AIR 1993 S.C. 1756)

The requirements that the parties are same and the cause of action is same in the previous suit
and the subsequent suit are common to these provisions. But the provisions apply to different
situations.

The interpretation of the above provisions turns on the meaning of the words 'claim' and 'relief'.

In Black's Law Dictionary the meaning of 'claim' is given as follows:

i) The aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court.

ii) The assertion of an existing right.

8
iii) A demand for money, property or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right.

And the meaning of 'relief' is given as follows:

i) Aid or assistance given to those in need

ii) The redress or benefit that a party asks of a court. It may appear that the words 'claim' and
'relief' mean the same thing. But obviously, it is not so because if they are taken to mean the
same thing, the provisions contained in sub rules 1 and 2 on the one hand, and sub rule 3 on
the other become insensible.

12. In Mohammedunny Azeez vs M/s. Gopal Company (1987(1) KLT 703) while interpreting
section 64 C.P.C this court examined the meaning of the word claim. 'Claim' means demand
for something supposed due or to demand as a right is the definition accepted by the division
bench.

Sub rule 3 is attracted only when several reliefs flow from a single cause of action. Inclusion
in Sub rule 3 of cases in which several reliefs arise from a single cause of action is exclusion
of such cases from Sub rules 1 and 2. Sub rules 1 and 2 can have application only when one
relief arises from a single cause of action. To put it differently, sub rules 1 and 2 are attracted
only when the plaintiff is entitled to one relief on the basis of one cause of action. In cases in
which sub rule 3 has application the court may in the first suit grant leave to the plaintiff to file
another suit for any other relief the plaintiff could have prayed for in the first suit on the basis
of the same cause of action. But in cases to which sub rules 1 and 2 apply though the plaintiff
in such cases can relinquish a portion of his claim, no leave can be granted to file another suit
for the relinquished portion of the claim. These are the differences between the two provisions.

A plaintiff may be entitled to one right or several rights in relation to a single relief. Out of the
bundle of rights which form the cause of action for the relief prayed for, a part may give rise
to one right and another to another right. When a debtor fails to pay the money he borrowed,
the only cause of action for the creditor to sue for the money is breach of promise. This breach
gives him a right to sue for return of the money lent as well as the interest on it. These two
rights together form the relief of recovery of money. Thus, though there is only one relief, he
has two rights in relation to it. In such cases if he intentionally relinquishes or omits to pray for
any of the rights, he will not be entitled to sue for it in a subsequent suit. In cases where the
plaintiff has only one right in relation to a relief he should pray for the entire right. Thus, if a
plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs.1,00,000/- from the defendant in respect of a single cause of
action, he should pray for the entire amount in the same suit. Where a plaintiff who is entitled

9
to several reliefs, sues for all of them, but intentionally relinquishes or omits to sue for a portion
of any of the rights in relation to each of the reliefs, he will not be entitled to claim for the
relinquished or omitted portion in a subsequent suit.

15. The definitions of 'claim' and 'relief' given in the Black's Law Dictionary also fortifies the
view that 'claim' indicates rights while 'relief' indicates assistance of the court. For the purposes
of Order II Rule 2 'claim' means the aggregate of all the rights the plaintiff is entitled to in
relation to the relief prayed for on the basis of the action alleged in his pleadings. If he fails to
sue for any of those rights or any portion of any of those rights, he cannot subsequently sue for
the right or the portion of the right so omitted or relinquished.

16. To prove that the present suit is barred by the provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC the
appellant produced an Ext B1 photocopy of the plaint in the previous suit. This is sufficient
because the plaint reveals the cause of action alleged, the relief prayed for and the claim made
by the plaintiff.

17. In Mohammad Khalil Khan and others vs Mahbub Ali Mian and others (AIR 1949 P.C 78)
the Privy Council has summarised the principles governing Order II Rule 2 thus:

"(1) The correct test in cases falling under O.2, R.2 is "whether the claim in the new suit is in
fact founded upon a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation for the former
suit." Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem vs Shumsunnissa Begum (1867-11 MIA 551: 2 Sar 259
P.C.)(supra) (2) The cause of action means every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff
to prove if traversed in order to support his right to the judgement. Read vs Brown (1889-22
QBD 128:58 LJQB 120)(supra) (3) If the evidence to support the two claims is different, then
the causes of action are also different. Brundsden v.Humphrey (1884-14 QBD 141:53 LJQB
476)(supra) (4) The causes of action in the two suits may be considered to be the same if in
substance they are identical. Brundsden v.Humphrey (1884-14 QBD 141:53 LJQB 476)(supra)
(5) The causes of action has no relation whatever to the defence that may be set up by the
defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers
to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.
Muss.Chandkour v. Partab Singh (15 IA 156 : 16 Cal 98 PC)(supra). This observation was
made by Lord Watson in a case under S.43 of the Act of 1882 (corresponding to O.II, R.2),
where plaintiff made various claims in the same suit.")"
The constitution bench of the Supreme Court in Gurubux Singh's case (supra) relied on the
above Privy Council decision and explained the scope of the provision in Order II Rule 2 CPC.
One of the latest decisions of the apex court is Rathnavathi and another vs Kavita Ganashamdas
(2015) 5 SCC 223), in which the court has observed:

10
"Since the plea of Order II Rule 2 CPC, if upheld, results in depriving the plaintiff to file the
second suit, it is necessary for the court to carefully examine the entire factual matrix of both
the suits, the cause of action on which the suits are founded, the reliefs claimed in both the suits
and lastly, the legal provisions applicable for grant of reliefs in both the suits."
In the light of the principles laid down by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court it may be
6
examined whether the present suit of the plaintiff is barred by the provisions in Order II Rule
2 C.P.C.

The court's reasoning in this case is flawed, and the judgment must be reversed due to several
errors in its analysis. The principle of res judicata applies not only to the issues that were raised
in the previous suit but also to those that could have been raised. This means that the fact that
the appellants did not raise the defense of being tenants of the land in the subsequent suit does
not prevent the application of res judicata if this issue was directly and substantially in issue in
the previous suit. This is supported by the case of K. Narayanan v. K. Sreedharan, where it was
4
held that the principle of res judicata applies not only to the matters directly and substantially
in issue in the earlier suit but also to any other matter which could have been pleaded as a
ground of attack or defence in the earlier suit.

Furthermore, the court's analysis of Section 96 and 100 of the CPC is also flawed. It is not
3
correct that an appeal does not lie against mere "findings" recorded by a court unless the
findings amount to a "decree" or "order." The CPC provides for appeals not only from decrees
and orders but also from judgments, as stated in Section 96 of the CPC. This is supported by
the case of Harnam Singh v. Bhagwan Singh, where it was held that an appeal lies not only
from a decree or an order but also from a judgement.

In addition, the fact that the appellants did not appeal against the previous judgement does not
prevent the application of res judicata. As stated in Section 11 of the CPC, a judgement in a
5
previous suit between the same parties or their representatives, directly and substantially in
issue in a subsequent suit, will operate as res judicata. The fact that the appellants did not appeal
against the previous judgement does not affect the application of res judicata to the issue of
whether they were tenants of the land.

Therefore, the court's judgement must be reversed, and the principle of res judicata must be
applied as the issue of whether the appellants were tenants of the land was directly and
substantially in issue in the previous suit, and the finding that the appellants were tenants of the
land in dispute was not challenged by the appellants in any subsequent proceedings. This is in

11
line with the principles established by the case law on res judicata and the appeals process
under the CPC.

12
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