The "Environmental Justice" Frame: A Conceptual Discussion and an Application

Author(s): Stella M. Čapek

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Social Problems, Vol. 40, No. 1, Special Issue on Environmental Justice (Feb., 1993), pp.
5-24
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Society for the Study of Social Problems
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 The "EnvironmentalJustice"Frame: A
Conceptual Discussionand an
Application*
STELLA M. CAPEK, Hendrix
College

Drawing ona socialconstructionist this

perspective, paper: some
(1) identifies ofthemostsalient
dimen-
sionsofthe"environmental "frame
justice as ithasemerged fromlocalcommunity over
struggles toxiccontami-
nationintheUnited and(2)provides
States; anempiricalillustration
oftheemergence ofthis
andapplication
conceptina particular
contaminatedcommunity, theCarverTerrace
neighborhood Texas.Carver
ofTexarkana,
Terrace,anAfrican-Americancommunity mostly
consisting ofhomeowners,recently towina federal
organized
buyoutandrelocation
afterbeingdeclared
a Superfundsite
in 1984. case
Using study the
evidence, paper argues
thattheresidents'ability
tomobilize
forsocial
change linked
wasintimately totheir ofan "environmen-
adoption
Theintent
taljustice"frame. oftheconceptualdiscussion
ofenvironmental andthecasestudy
justice istoclarify
themeaning ofa term usedwith increasing andsome
frequency ambiguityinboth popularandacademic
discourses.Thispaperdocuments theprocessbywhich theenvironmental frame
justice isconstructedinan
interplaybetweenthelocalcommunityandnational oftheantitoxics
levels movement.

Whenlocalgrass-roots environmental groupshaveparticipated in nationalnetworks mo-

bilizedaroundtoxiccontamination issuesin the1980sand 1990s,theyhave alterednotonly
thepoliticaleconomyoftheU.S.environmental movement, butalsoitsstrategies
and concep-
tual language.Representing moreeconomically marginalactorsthando traditional "main-
stream"environmental organizations, thesegrass-rootsgroupsare morelikelyto frametheir
demandsin termsof socialjusticeand to challengestratification based on race,class,gen-
der,and thedistribution ofpower.Accordingly, theconceptof"environmental justice"has
emergedas a prominent partof the nationaldialogueovercitizenempowerment and the
environment. Although national organizationssuch as Citizen'sClearinghouse forHazardous
Wastes(CCHW)-whichadoptedtheslogan"PeopleUnitedforEnvironmental Justice"-have
helpedto popularizetheterm,itssourceis in a nationwide pattern oflocalresponses toper-
ceivedsocialinjustices.In theprototypical situation,socialgroupsin a community (including
thevictimsthemselves) are polarizedoverquestionsrelating to chemicalcontamination and
itsconsequences,and "expert"agenciesare unableto resolveambiguity. Whilesurrounding
circumstances mayvary,thecall forenvironmental theanalogousexper-
justicecrystallizes
iencesofmanycommunities intoa termwithsignificance and mobilizing powerat boththe
local and nationallevels(Bullard1990;Cableand Walsh1991;Clarke1991;Edelstein1988;
Freudenberg 1984;Gibbs1982;Krauss1989;Levine1982;Masterson-Allen and Brown1990;
Pardo1990).
"Environmental justice"can be understood as a conceptualconstruction, or interpretive
"frame"(Snowet al. 1986),fashionedsimultaneously fromthebottomup (localgrass-roots
groupsdiscovering a patternto theirgrievances) and fromthetopdown(nationalorganiza-
tionsconveying thetermtolocalgroups).A socialconstructionist perspective(Gusfield 1981;
Snowand Benford1988;Snowet al. 1986;Spectorand Kitsuse1987)is particularly usefulfor
understanding theemergence ofan environmental justiceframeand itsmobilizing powerin

* Thisarticleis partially
based on a paperpresented of the AmericanSociological
at the annual meetings
Associationin Cincinnati,August1991. I wish to thankanonymousreviewersfor theirhelpfulsuggestions.
Correspondenceto: Capek,Department HendrixCollege,Conway,AR 72032.
ofSociology,

SOCIALPROBLEMS,Vol.40, No. 1, February1993 5

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6 CAPEK

the environmentalmovement. While resourcemobilizationtheory(McCarthyand Zald 1973,

1977) has made significantand lastingcontributionsto the understandingof organizational
resource-building, the emergingconstructionist traditionpays closer attentionto symbolic
processes,nonmaterialresources,and the micromobilizationprocessesthroughwhich organi-
zation and symbolicframecome together(Ferreeand Miller 1985; Gamson 1988). Since sym-
bols themselvesbecome resourcesto movements,the intersectionbetween resourcemobiliza-
tion and social constructionisttheoryis particularlypromisingforgeneratinginsightsintothe
process of frame constructionand modification.In addition, attentivenessto stratification
yields insightsinto grass-rootsstrategieslinked to hierarchicalrelationshipswith othersocial
groups(Feagin and Capek 1991).'
The two-wayprocessby which interpretiveframesare constructedand validated in an
interplaybetween local and nationalgroupsin the environmentalmovementis an important
and relativelyundeveloped fieldof sociologicalinquiry. Constructionists point out that the
viable symbolicpresentationof a social problem(both to participantsthemselvesand to the
generalpublic) is an essentialtask forany successfulsocial movement(Snow et al. 1986; Tur-
ner 1983). Much of the literatureon technologicalhazards emphasizes the inherentambigu-
ityof chemical contaminationand the consequentneed forcognitiveframingproceduresby
social groups (Erikson 1991; Kroll-Smithand Couch 1991). Spectorand Kitsuse (1987) note
thatthe appearance of a new terminologysignalsa transformation in public understandings
of a social problem. The significanceof "naming"has also been underlinedby a hostof other
scholars (Collins 1990; Donati 1992; Melucci 1985; Smith 1990). Finally,Gamson and Modi-
gliani (1989) pointto the crucialroleof social "sponsors"in media constructionand dissemina-
tion of competing frames or "packages" surroundingpolicy issues (see also Gitlin 1980;
Hansen 1991; Mazur 1991). These theoreticalinsightsfroma constructionist perspectiveare
particularlyfruitful foranalyzing the emergenceof an environmentaljustice frame.
The specificgoals in thispaper are twofold. First,the contentof the environmentaljus-
ticeframeitselfneeds conceptualclarification.The term"environmentaljustice"is oftenused
loosely and with a broad range of connotations. Increasingly,it is applied in a global and
cross-cultural context,and some groupsuse it in a broaderor narrowersense than thispaper
reflects.2Given its emergingprominencein both popular and academic discourses,it is im-
portantto clarifyitsmeaning. Drawingon a rangeofliteratureconcerninggrass-roots mobili-
zation against toxic contamination(Brown and Mikkelsen 1990, Bullard 1990; Cable and
Walsh 1991; Capek 1987, 1991, 1992; CCHW 1986; Clarke 1991; Couch and Kroll-Smith1991;
Edelstein 1988; Gibbs 1982; Krauss 1989; Masterson-Allenand Brown 1990; Pardo 1990; Zeff
et al. 1989), I will firstpropose a number of dimensionsthat constitutean environmental
justice frame.3Second, I will relatethese dimensionsto my case studyof the CarverTerrace
neighborhoodin Texarkana,Texas, where an extraordinary mobilizationby itsAfrican-Amer-
ican residentsresultedin a highlyunusual federaldecision in 1990 to buy out and relocate
residents,over the objectionsof the EnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA).
CarverTerraceresidents'abilityto mobilize effectively forsocial change was intimately
linkedto theirgradualadoptionof an "environmentaljustice" frame. I examine thisprocess,

1. I am awareofthedebatesbetween"strict" and "contextual" (Best1987;Rafter1992;Troyer

constructionists
1992)andin thispaperI assumethelatter standpoint.AsI willdemonstrate,theenvironmentaljusticeframeis socially
constructed, butgrounded in an objectively setofsocialpatterns.
verifiable
2. Foran example,see the"Principles ofEnvironmental Justice" by theFirstNationalPeopleofColor
drafted
Environmental Leadership Summit, sponsoredbytheUnitedChurch ofChrist's
Commission forRacialJustice inOctober
1991.Theprinciples incorporate, amongotherthings, a consciousness
oftheinterdependenceofall species;therightto
be freefromecological destruction; therighttopolitical,
economic, and environmental
cultural, self-determinationfor
all peoples;ethicaland responsible landuse;and appropriate choices.
lifestyle
3. Thisdistillationis thegradualresultofreadingabout,directly in,andobserving
participating antitox-
grass-roots
ics mobilizations;it buildson suggestions madein an earlierpaper(Capek1992).I do notoffer myinterpretation as
definitive,butas a necessary first
stepin clarifying
an ambiguous concept.

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 Justice
The Environmental Frame 7

as well as the reasons why this particularframe was powerfuland "culturallyresonant"

(Gamson and Modigliani 1989) for Carver Terrace residentsand for certain audiences. Fi-
nally,I examine the significanceof the "environmentalracism"claim as an increasinglyvisi-
ble componentof environmentaljustice debates.

The EnvironmentalJusticeFrame and Its Dimensions

If the environmentaljustice frameis to be analyzed as a claims-makingactivity(Best
1987), then it is importantto lay out its major assumptions. As Spectorand Kitsuseobserve,
"Claims-makingis always a formof interaction:a demand made by one partyto anotherthat
somethingbe done about some putativecondition"(1987:78).
There is much in the sociologicalliteratureon environmentalmovementsto suggestthat
residentsof contaminatedcommunitiesface a range of structuralobstacles to full participa-
tionin decisionsthataffecttheirlives. Disproportionately likelyto be of lower socioeconomic
status(Masterson-Allenand Brown 1990), they also have a high probabilityof being racial
minorities(Bullard 1990; Bullard and Wright1990). At the social-psychological level, studies
of contaminatedcommunitiesreveal the devastatingimpact of real or suspectedcontamina-
tionon residents(Edelstein1988; Kroll-Smithand Couch 1990, 1991; Vyner1988),which adds
to power inequalitiesstronglyrelatedto class and race, and is reflectedin residentialpatterns
and access to the politicalprocess(Mohai 1990).
Environmentally-related social movementsand countermovements sharplyreflectthese
stratificationdimensions (Albrecht 1973; Gale 1986). Grass-rootsgroups mobilized against
toxic contaminationgenerallyhave less access to political,legal, and scientificresourcesthan
do theiropponents. Influenceexercisedby privateindustryon public agencies is well docu-
mented (Buttel 1985; Freudenberg1984; Levine 1982; Szasz 1990; Yeager 1987), and occurs
both directlythroughpolitical appointmentsand indirectlythroughthe economic, bureau-
cratic,and legal resourcesaccumulatedby "repeatplayers"in the public policy arena (Capek
1992; Galanter 1974). In additionto class-basedand bureaucraticobstacles,racial and ethnic
barriersare also significant;the gulfbetween neighborhoodresidentsand cityhall is typically
greaterforracial minorities(Mohai 1990). Grass-rootsactivistswho contact city officialsto
exercisetheirdemocraticrightsoftenfindthemselvesstigmatizedforraisingissues thatmay
give theircity or town an unattractiveimage (Cable 1992; Krauss 1989). Their opponents,
usually organizedaround groupssuch as the chamberof commerce,fearthatdamage may be
done to "a good business climate" conducive to growth. Such groupsaccuse antitoxicsactiv-
istsof selfishNIMBY (Not In My Backyard)sentiments.Moreover,residentsof contaminated
neighborhoodsare often characterizedas hystericaland irrational(Edelstein 1988) or as
greedypublicity-seekers.Accordingto theirown accounts (Capek 1987; Gibbs 1982; Krauss
1989),antitoxicsactivistsgraduallydiscoverthatthereis no "polite"way to gettheirproblems
addressed. Feeling violated at one level by the contaminationitself,theirsense of social jus-
tice is violated at a second level by the social reaction to theirproblems (Kroll-Smithand
Couch 1991; Vyner 1988).
Defininga situationas unjust is more than an act of categorization;it implies a strategy
foraction. Residentsin contaminatedcommunitiesare generallypushed by theirexperiences
towarda particularset of mobilizingstrategies.A typical(althoughnot inevitable)path is to
opt fordirectaction tacticsupheld by an "environmentaljustice" frame. This choice implies
rejectionof otherpossible frames. For example, it has been amply documentedthat many
activistsbegin with assumptionsof fairnessabout the politicaland regulatoryprocessin the
UnitedStates,as well as a naive faithin science as unbiased and "above" politics(Gibbs 1982;
Levine 1982). As a resultof theirexperiences,thisframe'svalidityis shattered.In construct-
ing theirclaims and seekingredress,therefore, antitoxicsactivistsare farless likely
grass-roots

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8 CAPEK

than traditionalestablishedenvironmentalgroups(such as the Sierra Club) to appeal to the

supposedlyneutralarbitrationof scientificstudies conductedby privateor public sectorex-
perts. Instead,environmentaljustice is premisedon the notion that the rightsof toxic con-
taminationvictimshave been systematically usurpedby morepowerfulsocial actors,and that
"justice"residesin the returnof these rights.
The environmentaljusticeframeis builtaround a conceptofrightsconstructedin partby
the actions and rhetoricof previous social justice movements. Most notable among these is
the civil rightsmovement. Snow and Benford(1992; also see Tarrow 1983) suggestthatthe
civil rightsmovementprovided a "masterframe"which validates the struggleforrightsby
other disenfranchisedgroups. While the civil rightsmovement was itselfshaped by prior
social movementsand traditions,its rhetoricof dignityand fullcitizenshiphas been preemi-
nent in a rangeof "rights"movementsin the twentiethcentury.The movementforenviron-
mentaljustice is no exception;perceivingthemselvesas stigmatized"second-class"citizensto
whom othersocial groupsdo not feelaccountable(Scottand Lyman 1968),antitoxicsactivists
claim fullrightsin the community,fromrespectfulpublic treatmentto legal protectionand
compensation.
The environmentaljustice framealso containsspecificclaims relatedto the distinctchar-
acter of environmentalgrievances. These claims include the rightto: (1) accurate informa-
tion about the situation;(2) a prompt,respectful,and unbiased hearingwhen contamination
claims are made; (3) democraticparticipationin decidingthe futureof the contaminatedcom-
munity;and (4) compensationfrompartieswho have inflictedinjurieson the victims. A fifth
component,not statedin the language ofrightsbut oftenfunctioningas an informalexpecta-
tion,is the commitmentto solidaritywith victimsof toxiccontaminationin othercommuni-
ties (Capek 1992). Finally, a call to abolish "environmentalracism" (Alston 1990) is an
increasinglysignificantelement of the environmentaljustice frame.
The dimensionsof environmentaljustice are unifiedby a strongemphasis on citizenship
rights,democraticprocess,and respectfor"grass-roots" knowledge(i.e., the experientialreal-
ityof those mostdirectlyaffectedby problems). They are firmlygroundedin existingbeliefs
about fairnessin the United States. For example, just compensationis an importantmoral
dimension of environmentaljustice. Unlike natural disasters,chemicals are manufactured
and distributedby human beingswho (theoretically) can be identifiedand whose responsibil-
ity can be established(Erikson 1991). In constructingtheirclaims,therefore,some antitoxics
activistshave drawn an analogy betweenthe crimeofpoisoninga person'scattlein the nine-
teenthcentury,forwhich a well-establishedpunishmentexisted, and poisoningby chemical
companies in the twentiethcentury.This extendsthe domain of beliefsabout justice to fita
new situation, a type of "frame alignment" (Snow et al. 1986) crucial to many social
movements.
The theme of solidarity,althoughnot presentin all contaminatedcommunities(Kroll-
Smith and Couch 1990, 1991), implies a nationwide movement"community"transcending
racial, geographic,and economic barriersand restingon the claim thatno community'ssolu-
tion should become anothercommunity'sproblem. The national dimensionof the antitoxics
movementcalls attentionto the "sponsor"role of various organizationsin the dissemination
of frames(Gamson and Modigliani 1989), as well as the two-wayprocessof frameconstruc-
tionat the local and national levels. National organizationssuch as CCHW, the NationalTox-
ics Campaign (NTC), Greenpeace, and others have facilitatedthe creation of national
networks,even as theirpresenceas "big players"in local communitieshas sometimesstimu-
lated infighting among victimgroups. Organizationslike the SouthwestOrganizingProject
(SWOP) and The United Church of Christ'sCommissionforRacial Justice,which sponsored
the FirstNational People of Color EnvironmentalLeadershipSummitin 1991 (see footnote2),
have fosteredsolidarityagainstenvironmentalracismforpeople of color. Indeed, in minor-
itycommunities,environmentaljustice is oftenstronglylinked to civil rightsissues (Bullard

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 The Environmental
Justice
Frame 9

1990; Mohai 1990), and the growingvisibilityof national organizationsthat challenge envi-
ronmentalracism is once again changingthe face of the U.S. environmentalmovement.
Finally,framingdemands around environmentaljustice is not in any way automaticor
inevitable. Studentsof social movementshave shown how problematica unified,enabling
collectiveinterpretationof a stressfulsituationmay be (Fantasia 1988; Gaventa 1980). Con-
taminatedcommunitiesfrequentlyinclude homeownerswho feel theyhave a vestedinterest
in the statusquo. In situationsof alleged contamination,recentand/oreconomicallymargi-
nal homeowners may feel torn about acknowledginga problem,since denying it enables
them to clingto theirtenuousbut hard-wonstatus. The individualisminherentin the "Amer-
ican dream" of homeownershipmay also undermine collectiveaction. Traditionalgender
roles can be a furtherobstacle; men may feel compelled to deny that they have failed as
breadwinnersor have exposed their wives and children to dangers (Blocker and Eckberg
1989). In addition,theymay work forthe privateindustriesor agencies against which their
wives are protesting.Protestorsalso generallyknow thatcorporationscan respondby taking
away the jobs of people in theirsocial network(Cable and Walsh 1991). These subtle and
overt social pressuresand stigmasmay decisivelydefusepotentialprotest.
On the otherhand, a perceptionof "second-classcitizenship"frequentlyacts as a power-
fulmotivatorforsocial change action(Capek and Gilderbloom1992). Betrayalof thedream of
homeownership,given itsculturalplace as a markerof successin the UnitedStates,makes it a
double blow to dignityand aspirations,and violates"folk"understandingsofjustice. In effect,
residentsin contaminatedcommunitiesexperience a shockinginversion of the American
dream,where all thatis assumed to representsafetyand economic and existentialsecurity-
and, one mightadd, creativityand self-realization-isturnedintoitsopposite(Edelstein1988).
Indeed, many accounts of contaminatedcommunitiesuse the evocative imageryof transfor-
mation from"dream" to "nightmare."While the environmentaljustice framedoes not reject
the American dream,its mobilizingpower stemsfromthisdeep sense of betrayal. It is thus
both "resonant"with mainstreamU.S. cultureand radicallychallengingin its recognitionof
"second-class"citizenship.

Case Study Data

The data for my qualitative case study are primarilyfrom in-depthinterviewswith

CarverTerraceresidentsas well as with membersof otherlocal and national organizationsor
agencies involved with CarverTerrace. CarverTerracecontains78 homes, and representsan
economic spectrumthat includes middle-as well as working-classresidents,most of whom
are homeowners (Capek 1991). I conducted interviewsthere in 1991 and 1992, although I
began collectingbackgroundmaterialsin 1989.4 The sample includes 21 open-endedinter-
views of CarverTerraceresidents,6 interviewsof nonresidents,and numerousfollow-upin-
terviews. The goal was to reach people active in the movementforchange ratherthan the
entire community. The sample was constructedusing a rosterof Carver Terrace residents
compiled by FriendsUnitedfora Safe Environment(FUSE), a groupaffiliated with the Carver
Terrace CommunityAction Group (CTCAG). I also used a snowball sample to reach other
elementsof the community(forexample, nonparticipants, and mem-
opponents,cityofficials,
bers of national environmentalgroups). In addition to interviews,I collected background
informationfrom newspapers, EPA documents, press releases, personal correspondence,

4. My firstvisitto the communitytookplace in 1989 duringa three-dayGrass-roots Conferenceon Environmental

Justicethatbroughtlocal and national environmentalgroupstogetherin CarverTerrace. In 1991,I was invitedinto the
community-along with my husband, Hans Baer, an anthropologist-bya memberof FUSE and subsequentlyby the
presidentof CTCAG to sociologicallydocumentthe case. Interviewswere tape-recordedby permission,and vary from
one to fourhours in length. All attributedquotes appearing in thispaper are by verbal permission.

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10 CAPEK

scrapbooksof movementparticipants,transcripts of meetings,photographs,videotapes,and

coverage in national environmentalpublications. I also relied on fieldnotes and attendance
as a participantobserverat a number of communitymeetingsinvolvingCTCAG,FUSE, the
EPA, the U.S. ArmyCorps of Engineers(the relocationagency) and an environmentalrally.
Althoughthis is presentlyan ongoing project,my data collection has been shaped by the
imminentscatteringof the community.

CarverTerrace,Texarkana

Texarkana, splitby the Arkansasand Texas stateline, has threeSuperfundsites on the

Texas side (the Superfundis a federalprogramestablishedin 1980 to clean up the most con-
taminatedsitesin the UnitedStates),a controversiallandfillon the Arkansasside,and various
other environmentalproblems stemmingfrom the nearby paper companies. The Texas
Carver Terrace residentialsubdivision,consistsof approximately33 acres and includes 78
homes. It was declared a Superfundsite in 1984, and was unusual in that people lived di-
rectlyon top of the site ratherthan near it. As in many othercommunities,the contamina-
tion problemwas many decades in the making,and involved both corporateactorsand the
local government.Productionat the Carver Terrace site dates back to 1910, when the Na-
tional Lumberand CreosoteCompany began to operate (Preston1991). By 1940, the site be-
came part of the Koppers Company, headquarteredin Pittsburgh,Pennsylvania. Koppers
produced treatedwood productsand used the site forboth productionand disposal of toxic
chemicals. The company stoppedproductiontherein 1961 and the buildingswere removed.
The propertywas subsequentlysold forresidentialand industrialdevelopment.5The Koppers
Corporationwas boughtby Beazer East, Inc., a multinationalcorporationheadquarteredin
New York City,in 1988.
Cityzoning permitteda Shreveport-based developer to build houses on part of the site,
and the firstlots were sold in 1967. In a time when most neighborhoodsin Texarkana still
had racially-baseddeed restrictions, Carver Terrace offereda place where middle-class,up-
wardly mobile African-Americans could buy homes with amenities such as paved streets,
playgrounds,fireinsurance,and otherdesirablefeaturesat an affordableprice. As homeown-
ers moved in, theyviewed theircommunitywith pride and saw it as an excellentplace to
settleand raise children. Althoughsome of the residentsknew thatcreosotehad been manu-
facturedthere,theywere unaware of its toxicityand the extentof its presence at the site.
The EPA firstbecame aware of the problemin 1979, afterCongressasked the 50 largest
chemical companies to reporthazardous waste sites(Preston1991). Koppersreportedfinding
pentachlorophenol(PCP), arsenic,and creosoteon its formerplant site. In 1980, the Texas
Departmentof Water Resourcesrecommendedthat the land be included on the EPA's na-
tional Superfundlist foremergencycleanup. In 1984, the EPA declared the Koppers Texar-
kana site a Superfundsite and placed it on the National PriorityList (NPL). The EPA and
Koppers conducteda remedial investigationand feasibilitystudyin 1985, and as an interim
measure Koppers engaged in some soil removal and sod replacementat various residencesto
create a barrieragainst contamination.6In 1987, some residentswho had long experienced
health problemsjoined togetherto sue the Koppers company. This was the firstpublic "jus-
tice" claim, and it took a legal form. Although the claimants were unsuccessful,Koppers
reached some out-of-court settlementswith individualresidents.In September1988,the EPA
in itsRecordof Decision (ROD) proposeda techniquecalled soil washing/filtering to clean up

5. Twenty-eightacres on the southernhalf of the originalsite adjacent to the futureCarver Terrace residential
communitywere sold to the Bruce Kennedy Sand and Gravel Company,which was in operationfrom1970 to 1984.
6. Many residentsprivatelyquestioned the integrityof this process,includingthe degree to which old contami-
nated soil was removedand good quality soddingwas installed.

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 The Environmental
Justice
Frame 11

CarverTerrace,a processwhich did not requirerelocatingresidents.This was consistentwith

the EPA's claim-then and now-that levels of contaminationwere not sufficiently high to
warranta relocation.
This briefhistoryreveals the importantrole of outside groupsand agencies in determin-
ing the fateof CarverTerrace. Many residentswere unaware of the seriousnessof the con-
taminationuntil they read about it in the newspaper or were informedby a local environ-
mental organization,Friends United for a Safe Environment. Residentssoon encountered
conflictinginterpretations fromvarious agencies. While the EPA insistedthatthe contamina-
tion posed no serious danger to residents,a 1988 Texas Fish and WildlifeService surveyre-
portnoted thatCarverTerracealso faced the problemof toxinsmigratingfromcontaminated
gravel pits adjacent to theirneighborhood.In thatsame year,portionsof CarverTerracebe-
gan to floodbadly,carryingchemicallycontaminatedwaterinto some residences. This was a
probable resultof the EPA's instructionsto cityofficialsto refrainfromdiggingon the site
(another interagencyconflict). Moreover, a health assessment carried out by the federal
AgencyforToxic Substancesand Disease Registry(ATSDR) and publishedin 1989 underlined
the site's dangers. A 1991 studyfundedby the ATSDR but carriedout by the Texas Depart-
ment of Health found thatCarverTerraceresidentsreportedskin rashes,chronicbronchitis,
liver disease, prematurebirths,and low birthweightsmore oftenthan residentsin a nearby
comparisongroup (Busby 1992).
Feeling trapped in a dangerous situation,and unable to trustconflictingreportsby
outside agencies, residentsgraduallybecame more actively involved in protestingand de-
mandingrelocation,and with the help oflocal and national environmentalgroups,mobilized
themselvessufficiently to prompta Congressionaloverridein 1990 of the EPA's recommenda-
tions. A federalbuyout and relocationwas in progressin 1992. The 1988 formationof the
CarverTerraceCommunityAction Group,in coalitionwith FUSE ofTexarkana,had a major
impact on this decision. A successfulrepertoireof directaction strategiessupportedby an
environmentaljustice framewere indispensableforaccomplishingthis task.

The Emergenceof an EnvironmentalJusticeFrame

An "environmentaljustice" frameappeared with increasingfrequencyboth in the resi-
dents' interpretations and public presentationsof theirsituation. Initially,factorstypicalof
contaminatedcommunitiesposed obstaclesto such an interpretation (Edelstein 1988; Levine
1982). Residents knew at some level about bad-smelling air, mysteriousillness or deaths
among people with no priorhistoryof medical problems,plantsthatwould not growor grew
strangely,animals becoming ill or born deformed,and a varietyof other experiences that
lacked explanation. The amorphousand invisiblenatureof chemical exposure,however,and
the difficulty of diagnosingits consequences eitherat a popular or professionallevel worked
against the integrationof thisknowledge(Brownand Mikkelsen 1990; Vyner1988). Second,
residentswere reassuredby the authorityof the citygovernment,which had zoned the Kop-
pers site residential. The developer of the housing tractlikewise played down any dangers.
Third, the pride of homeownershipsometimesencouraged residentsto deny dangers,and
traditionalgenderroles sometimesreinforcedthis denial.7 CarverTerracewas an attractive
and well-keptcommunity,and its very desirabilityforupwardlymobile African-Americans
may have helped residentsto discountor overlookthe dangers. Fourth,many people did not
initiallytalk to theirneighborsabout theirexperiences,a significant factwhich can be linked
to the individualisticinterpretation of the "dreams" of homeownership,as well as to busy
schedules. As one residentobserved:

7. For example, men landscapingand diggingin theiryardswere much more likelyto run across odd substances,
but tended to minimize theirsignificanceand did not always share this informationwith women.

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12 CAPEK

I thinkwe werejustso busywiththeartofliving,andmakinga livingandraisingkids-youknow,

mychildrenwereinvolvedin everything. And we wereso busywiththat,and theydidn'tget
ill,so we didn'ttalkto theotherone aboutthings,
seriously we just thoughtit was partof kids
growingup . .. we justdidn'thave timeto lookat otherthings,unlessit happenedto be a big
problem,and it wasn't,as faras we knew(interview
19 July1991,Texarkana,Texas).8
Thus many factorssystemicallyworkedagainstattributing problemsto chemicals,and exper-
iences remained at the level of relativelyinsignificantpersonal puzzles or at most "private
griefs."
Over time,a radicallydifferent definitionof the situationcast a new lighton residents'
experiencesand linked them to a sense of social injustice. The environmentaljustice frame
not only facilitatedthe attributionofblame, but also laid out a remedyin theformof"claims"
forrights.

The Rightto Information

An importantclaim within the environmentaljustice frameis the rightto get informa-
tion about one's situation. As individual residentsof CarverTerracebecame concernedand
asked questionsabout the potentialpresenceof chemicals,theywere oftenmisled about the
dangers. Withoutthe social or financialresourcesto employexpertsof theirown, and not yet
experiencedin organizingthemselves,communityresidentsinitiallyhad to relyon informa-
tion supplied to themon an individual basis by expertsin the employ of privatebusiness or
cityand federalofficials.This gave them littleopportunityto interactor react as a commu-
nity. The CarverTerraceCommunityActionGrouplaterconsciouslystroveto counteractthis
problem.9
Many instancescould be cited of false assurances given to residents. For example, one
resident-who had grownup in the area and had been warned as a child by his grandmother
not to walk throughthe creosoteplant grounds--consultedthe buildingcontractorabout the
possiblepresenceof dangerouschemicalsbeforebuildinga house. "He assured me about the
stateand the city,theyhad given him the O.K. to do it,therewas no toxicelementsout here,
and so I took his word forit" (interview20 July1991). Afterdiggingup strangeblack sub-
stances in the process of landscaping his backyard,the same individual told him, "Well,
you're gonna dig up some black stuff, but all of thatstuffhas been treated." Otherresidents
had experiencesthatsuggestedthat somethingwas wrong. As one remarked:
Oneguytriedtoraisea gardenoutthere, justdidn'tgrow.AndI hadfruit
andstuff treesplantedout
thereand theydidn'tgrow.I guessthey'dstaymaybea coupleofyearsand thenthey'djustdie.
And theworstoffaboutme was I plantedtheyardand I alwayswonderedwhymymouthand
handswouldswellup,mylipswouldswellup double,justlikesomebody wouldhitme,butthey
weren'tbruised,they'djustswellup (interview
19 July1991).
This woman's doctorwas at a loss to explain the cause, but toldher she was "probablygetting
intosomething"thatshe shouldn't. The antibioticshe prescribedseemed to ease herproblem,
and itwas notuntillaterthatthisincidentmade sense in a broadercontext. In retrospect, it is
evident thatalthoughdisturbingindividual events were takingplace, theydid not generate
social alarm.

8. All interviewscited in this paper were conducted in the Carver Terrace neighborhoodof Texarkana, Texas
between 10 July 1991 and 11 July 1992. AlthoughI received verbal permissionfordirectquotes, in most cases I cite
interviewswith the followingindividualsby date only: Camille Brown,Talmadge Cheatham,BettyeDavis, J.E."Sonny"
Fields, Clida James,Linda James,Patsy Oliver, Raymond Parker,James Shavers, Mary Frances Shears, Billy Shears,
PatriciaSmith,and JeterSteger.
9. On a well-remembered occasion,J.E. "Sonny" Fields,presidentof the CTCAG,refusedto allow the group to be
brokenup to conferseparatelywith expertsat an EPA workshop;suspectinga "divide and conquer" strategy,he asked
the groupto remaintogether.Theydid so, symbolicallyaffirming theirunityand theirdesireto be addressedas a group.

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 The Environmental
Justice
Frame 13

Significantchanges took place in 1984, when CarverTerrace was declared a Superfund

site by the EPA. Despite the fact that studies of theirarea had been carriedout foryears,
homeownerswere not aware of them. As one residentremarked,the earlierstudies"lay and
got dust on them in the offices"(interview13 July1991). However, FUSE of Texarkana-a
local citywideenvironmentalgroup already enlistedin a numberof battleswith polluters-
was "pluggedinto" a range of local and national informationnetworks. FUSE membersDon
Prestonand JamesPresleylearnedof the dangersin CarverTerraceand called a meetingwith
CarverTerraceresidentsto share informationwith them. FUSE eventuallyparticipatedin an
extremelyeffectiveinterracialcoalitionwith the CTCAG.
The public attentiondrawn to theirsituationinitiateda processof cognitive"reframing."
Shocked by the implicationsof chemical contaminationin their"dream" homes, residents
pondered the factorsthat had produced theirsituation. In the process,they experienced a
range of emotionscommon to contaminatedcommunities(Edelstein 1988; Vyner 1988), in-
cluding anger and feelingsof betrayal. At the same time,a sense of injusticeemergedout of
their interactionswith the EPA as the agency began to bring in speakers and to organize
workshopsand public hearings. In a 1991 interview,the presidentof the CTCAG observed:
"About the second or thirdmeeting,nobodyhad no trustin the EPA. As a matterof fact,the
ATSDR, we didn't trustany of them,because we foundtoo many discrepanciesin what they
were sayingand doing" (interview13 July 1991). Numerousresidentsprovided parallel ac-
counts,notingthat information"wasn't ringingtrue" or was "full of holes." As one home-
owner put it,"the more we would questionit,the less answerswe were getting"(interview10
July1991). Anotherremarkedthat"theyalways send us different faceseach time"(interview
19 July1991). Since the cast of expertschanged constantly,it was difficult forthe citizensto
establishcontinuityand to perceive accountability.Moreover,the EPA's bureaucraticrheto-
ric and reliance on statisticalinformationcreateda sense of alienation.
In responseto dissatisfactionwith the agency'sresponse,the CarverTerraceCommunity
Action Group was formed in March 1988 by three residents-Jeter Steger, Talmadge
Cheatham, and J.E. "Sonny" Fields. Formed as an affiliateof FUSE, it benefitedfromthe
existingorganizationalresourcesand experienceof thatgroup,but also had an independent
board ofdirectorsconsistingof CarverTerraceresidents.The CTCAG made use of the existing
social networksof churchesand various professionalorganizations,as well as informalcon-
tactsin the CarverTerraceneighborhood.It relied,like mostsocial movementorganizations,
on a core groupof activists,but graduallydeveloped the power to mobilize almost the entire
communityforparticularevents such as public hearings. Unlike many contaminatedcom-
munitiesin which leadershiproles belong predominantlyto women, the CTCAG mobilized
both men and women and in some cases, entirefamilies. Althoughsome strongtensionsexist
to thisday between male and femaleleadershipstylesand networks,the organizationusually
presentedan effectiveunitedfrontto thoseoutsidethe community.The CTCAG thusbecame
a formidableopponent of any agencies or individuals who treatedresidentsas second-class
citizens.
With the formationof the CTCAG,the communityassertedits rightto information.For
example, accordingto federalregulations,a health studyof CarverTerracecompletedby the
ATSDR on 10 April 1989 was supposed to be made available to the communityimmediately.
Instead, residentsdid not discover its existence until almost a year later. This generateda
strongsense of betrayal:
Theywithheld a studythattheymade,theykeptthedocuments fromus forovera year.... It was
hid,and theyweresupposedto have it on recordat thepubliclibrary[and]... overhereat the
church..,.butnobodyhada copyofit .... So thatreallymadepeoplelosea biggertrustin theEPA
(interview13 July1991).
The CTCAG learned to respondto such instanceswith public "attentioncalling" tactics(Marx
1979) such as pressconferencesand otherjoint actions. In thisparticularcase, CTCAG/FUSE

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14 CAPEK

soliciteda statementfromcivil rightsleader the ReverendJesseJacksonthat linked Carver

Terrace'splightwith racismand with a national struggleforenvironmentaljustice. The re-
sultingpublicitysuccessfullypressuredagencies to become more responsive.

The Rightto a Hearing

A relatedaspect of environmentaljustice is the rightto a serioushearingwhen contami-
nationclaims are raised. This means not only gettinginformation, but presentingclaims in a
climateofrespectforpersonalknowledgeofa situation.In CarverTerrace,a varietyofmeans
forgettinga hearingwere used. The initiallegal strategywas indicativeof trustin thejustice
system. In 1987, 58 familiescame togetherto sue the Koppers Company fordamages. The
firsttestcase was thatof JeterSteger,head deacon of the Mt. Zion MissionaryBaptistChurch
in CarverTerraceand a retiredschool administrator.Mr. Stegerwas in extremelypoor health
and his case was taken firstbecause it appeared strongestin termsof health problemsrelated
directlyto the site and the willingnessof medical expertsto supporthis claims. However,
pursuinga strategyused elsewhere by corporationsagainst minorityplaintiffs, the Koppers
corporation'slawyersbroughtin a doctorfromAtlantato testifythatSteger'sproblemswere
typicalof "hereditary"health problemsamong blacks and thereforenot caused by chemicals.
Class dynamics also surfacedin the case; a white male working-classmember of the jury
stated afterthe case was over that he simply didn't believe Steger"deserved that kind of
money"(interview13 July1991). The impacton CarverTerracewas to raise awareness about
corporatemanipulationof technical,scientificdata in the regulatoryand legal systems.Disil-
lusionmentabout gettinga fairhearingthroughthe legal system-and over time,throughthe
EPA-laid the groundworkforacceptance of directaction strategies.
In interactionswith the EPA, citizensnoticedfirsthandthe discrepancybetween thefor-
mal opportunityto participatepresentedby the EPA, and the discounting Else-
oftheirtestimony.
where I have discussed the political-economicand bureaucraticdynamics that fosterthis
process,as well as the highlyambiguousnatureof scientificdata regardingchemical contami-
nation(Capek 1992). A chronicallyunderfundedagencysuch as the EPA has a stakein "fram-
ing" the dangersof contaminationas minimal; EPA spokespersonswere carefulto assertthat
CarverTerracewas "no Love Canal." Moreover,rulesabout the practiceof science frequently
do not permitthe kind of "yes" or "no" answers thatresidentsin contaminatedcommunities
need to hear. In interviewsand in transcripts frompublic hearings,CarverTerraceresidents
clearly reacted negatively to a communication process theyperceived as not credibleor re-
spectful.Theirown evidence about theirillnessesand firsthandexperienceswere treatedas
while the EPA's positionwas up-
"anecdotal" (Gillman 1991) or "statisticallyinsignificant,"
held by highlytechnicaldata which residentswere not in a positionto dispute. As one resi-
dent noted:
Theycomein hereand useall thesebignumbers, and all ofthat,and likeI gotup
partspermillion,
at themeeting and I saidshowmea groupofpeoplethathaveanyidea as to whatyouaretalking
about,I say,I wanta showofhandsin thisgrouptonight thatknowexactlywhathe's [theEPA
talkingabout. Hey,nobodycan holdtheirhandup,'causetheydon'tknow(interview
official] 19
July 1991).

Throughthe efforts of FUSE and CTCAG,some residentseducated themselveson a "lay" basis

to interpretsuch numbersand to debunk the agency'sarguments. However, theygenerally
felttheywere being talked down to by people who had many statisticsbut no answers and
littlecommon sense.
In particular,CarverTerraceresidentscould not cognitivelyreconciletheir"Superfund"
statuswith the factthatthe EPA did not see fitto move them. Althoughthe agency implied
that the area around theirhouses could be cleaned up while residentswere still in them,
residentslogicallywonderedabout what was under theirhouses,particularlysince a portion

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 Frame
Justice
The Environmental 15

of the neighborhoodbegan to floodwith chemicallycontaminatedwater (interview10 July

1991; see also EPA Public Hearingon Koppers Texarkana site,20 July1988). They also won-
dered about the dust raised duringsoil removal. "Soil washing" did not seem a verybeliev-
able option; as one woman recalled statingto the EPA:
I askedthemhowlongithadbeenouthere,howlonghadthispoisonbeenhere.I said,"Thatmany
gonnawashitaway"(interview
years.IftheyLorddidn'twashitaway,youtellme howyou're 19
July 1991).
Anotherfactthatmade no cognitivesense was thatalthoughthe EPA maintained that con-
taminationlevels were low enough forfamiliesto continueto live there,residentsknew that
samplingwas being done by contractorsin "moon suits." One residentrecountedthatwhen
the EPA came in to do a house-to-housesurvey
Boy,that'swhensomeofthesepeoplegrabbedthemand said,"Wouldyouwantyourwifeand kids
andmother andfather toliveouthere?"Theyhadtosayno. Wellthen,whyareyousayingthatit's
alrightforus to stayouthere?(interview
20 July1991)

Feeling that they were being "managed" ratherthan gettinga true hearing, residentsre-
sponded by tryingto cut throughthe technicalrhetoric;theyattemptedto radicallysimplify
and "humanize" the discourseby asking "yes" or "no" questions. Would the officialswho
declared theirneighborhoodsafebe willingto live there? Would theyaccept a glass of water
to drink? Would CarverTerraceland be as safeas any otherland in the city? Officialsrefused
are fullof theirefforts
to ventureonto thislinguisticterrain,and public hearingtranscripts to
returnthe questionsto a more quantitative,abstractplane. In turn,this discursivestrategy
was perceived as evasive and disrespectful,and sent a deeply negative message to Carver
Terraceresidents.
Residentswere even more disturbedwhen theydiscoveredthatan all white community
in Conroe,Texas was to receive a federalbuyout.
They[EPA]kepttellingus,theystoodflat-footed Butat
and toldus "We don'tdo anyrelocations."
thesametimetheyhadoneat ConroeTexas. O.K.,Conroehad thesameproblemthatwe had here,
and I relatedittothemthattheonlydifference betweenthetwoproblems was,one,thatitwas an
all whiteneighborhood,
and thiswas an all blackneighborhood.Andtheotherfactor was thatthe
man foundthecreosotein hisfrontyard,and I foundit in mybackyard(interview 13 July1991).
While CarverTerraceresidentsare farfromunanimouslyagreedon the extentto which racial
discriminationexplains theirsituation,many feel stronglythat it has had a major impact.
Ironically,the climateforpublic hearingswas inflamedwhen the EPA appointedan African-
Americanwoman to be sitesupervisorforCarverTerrace. Since she was the main communi-
cation link with the community,many residentsfeltthiswas a ploy to controlthemby "one
of our own." The situationconstituteda double offensesince the woman was perceived as
having verylittleindependentpower or significantinformation.Instead of convincingpeo-
ple that theywere "gettinga hearing,"it had the reverseeffect.
As a consequence of theirexperiences,residentslost faithin the processof communica-
tion with agencies such as the EPA. As the CTCAG organizedand pressedforenvironmental
justice, it adopted press conferences,marches, direct encounterswith public officials,and
letter-writing campaignsas strategies.Each encounterwas a lesson in empowermentas well
as in structuralresistance. In one incident,forexample, CTCAG memberstook a bus tripto
Dallas in order to conferwith RobertLayton,an officialat EPA's Region VI headquarters.
Althoughtheyannounced theirintentionsin advance, EPA officialswere apparentlythreat-
ened not only by CarverTerraceresidents,but by the presenceof Greenpeace. As one partici-
pant recalled:
Atthetimethatwe weresupposedto havebeentherewe wentup in thebuildingand triedtogo
totheEPAoffice.Andeverytimesomeonewouldgo through
upstairs thedoortheywouldlockit.

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16 CAPEK

Andwe gotup toaboutthesixteenth floor,theyshuttheelevatordown,theylockedall thedoors,

theyhad peoplelockthemupstairs,theyhad peoplelockthemdownstairs . .. and nobodywas
radical-I meanitwasjusta peacefuldemonstration.
All we wantedtodo was tojustgetin tosee
thepeople,to tryto findsomeanswers(interview13July1991).

Althoughrespondentsoftenlaughed about thisepisode, itsmessage was serious. Participants

realized in yet another way that officialsappointed to serve them would not be available
withouta fight.The media, on the otherhand, recognizinga "good story"(Gitlin1980), be-
came an increasinglyvaluable resourceas theyreportedon the situation,makingit possible
forCarverTerraceresidentsto publicize theirenvironmentaljustice claims and to derive a
strongersense of collectiveidentityas a community.

Democratic and SocialSolidarity

Participation
Althoughdemocraticparticipationin decidingthe futureof a communitymay be a sepa-
rate issue fromsocial solidarity,most grass-rootsgroupsfightingtoxicsfindthat the two are
integrallyrelated. Aftertheirexpectationsof "gettingjustice"fromtraditionalsourcessuch as
the citycouncil or the EnvironmentalProtectionAgencyfail,residentsin contaminatedcom-
munitiessuch as CarverTerraceare oftenforcedto rebuildtheirnetworksin orderto reclaim
the rightto take part democraticallyin public decisions about their lives (Edelstein 1988;
Gibbs 1982). This processmightinclude developing"lay networks"to gatherinformationto
counterbalancewhat theybelieve to be biased science (Brown 1991, 1992; Brown and Mikkel-
sen 1990) or exchangingproteststrategiesand experienceswith othergroups facingsimilar
issues. As a numberoftheoristshave pointedout,protestis a learnedactivitythatdepends,in
part,on mobilizingor constructing social networksand "culturesofsolidarity"(Fantasia 1988;
McAdam 1988; Morris 1984; Snow, Zurcher,Ekland-Olson1980). This is particularlyimpor-
tant given the high degree of social conflictthat oftenarises in and around contaminated
communities;new formsof solidaritymay be necessaryto counterbalancethe loss ofold ones.
In CarverTerrace,social networkshad to be constructedboth withinthe communityand
between communitiesthatshared similarproblems. Stimulatedby informationfromFUSE,
the CarverTerraceCommunityActionGroup immediatelyafterits formationbegan to push
fora federalbuyout and relocation. In the process,CTCAG/FUSEmade contactwith other
groups with similar environmentalproblems. As a result,in February 1989, a "National
Grass-rootsConferenceon EnvironmentalJustice"took place in CarverTerrace. This was a
key episode in constructingan "environmentaljustice" frame, since the term itselfwas
broughtin by national organizers. While it would be a mistaketo assume thatthe national
movement"constructed"the local movement,it offeredsignificantexpertiseand resources
and mostimportantly, perhaps,"named" the problemin a way thatmade sense to both resi-
dentsand the nationalenvironmentalnetwork. Indeed, accordingto participants,the confer-
ence was a success because the accountsofferedby national activists-unlike those fromthe
EPA-were consistentwithlocal experiencesand efforts by CarverTerraceresidentsto under-
stand theirsituation.
The conferencebroughtin prominentactivistsincludingLois Gibbs of Love Canal, New
York; CathyGarula of Centralia,Pennsylvania;Pat Bryantof the GulfCoast TenantsAssocia-
tion in Louisiana; membersof the HighlanderCenterin Tennessee; Greenpeace; and others
(Presley1989). Held in the Mt. Zion MissionaryBaptistChurchadjacent to the CarverTerrace
neighborhood(constructedin 1985, the church was a chemical "hot spot" with symbolic
value as a meetingplace), the meetingprovedto be a major catalystforcollectiveaction. The
presenceof national activistswho had struggledwith similarproblemsserved to validate the
firsthandexperiencesof CarverTerraceresidents.Validationis oftenone of the most impor-
tant resourcesprovided by national social movementorganizationswhen they bring their
expertiseto local settings(Masterson-Allen contaminationvictims
and Brown 1990). In effect,

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 The Environmental Frame
Justice 17

finally"gota hearing"fromotherswho respectedtheirexperiences. CarverTerraceresidents

were also moved by the willingnessof othersto supporttheircause; theylearned at the same
time that they were part of a larger pattern and faced typical obstacles to democratic
participation.
At the conference,Lois Gibbs shared "stateof the art" knowledgeabout protestused by
groupsall over the country. She observed thatof threeapproaches to social change--scien-
tific,legal, and political-the last proved most effective,
particularlywhen allied with direct
action tactics (Presley 1989). Since the "experts"associated with the firsttwo approaches
could be boughtoff,or in any case tended to move veryslowly,collectiveaction guaranteed
betterresults. Other seasoned activistspresentedthe same conclusions. The consensus-ar-
rived at througha varietyof local encounters-was that reassertingdemocraticcontroland
achieving "environmentaljustice" could only be accomplishedby adoptinga politicallycon-
scious,directaction strategy.This was not a new thoughtfororganizersof the CTCAG;as one
of them recalled about the group's founding:"We knew we had to get ourselves an action
group. You gottabe noticed.... We knew we were gonna have to do some marching. We
knew that we would have to adapt probably some of the civil rightsmovement'stactics"
(interview20 July1991). However,priorto the conferenceno directaction tacticshad been
used.
The conferenceresultedin the firstcollectiveprotestaction in CarverTerrace. As a cul-
mination of the gathering,a number of Carver Terrace residents,as well as representatives
fromFUSE and statewideand national groups,marchedthroughthe neighborhoodin the rain
carryingsigns. This action gained broad media coverage. It was an easier action forsome to
take than forothers,and a numberof residentsremainedat home, peeringout frombehind
the curtains.'0 As one participantrecalled:
Well,we justdidn'tgo outand march.We had otherpeoplefromotherstatesmarching withus.
And it was quiteuncomfortablebecauseI'd neverdoneanything likethat. . . butifyougetsent
someonethat'swillingtocomein hereandspendhistimeandmoneytotryandhelpyou,and then
he comesup withan idea like that,you'regonnahave to acceptit. We said-well, we kindof
smiled,butwe said, yessir,
we'regonnado it (interview
20 July1991)!
For those who participated,the march was a powerfulpersonal experiencewhich generated
solidarityforfutureaction.
As a symbolic action, the march dramatized the environmentaljustice theme, and
presentedthe national media audience with a morallydisquietingimage of a groupof people
trapped in a poisoned settingthroughno faultof theirown. This image was powerfulfor
many reasons. It called up strongassociationsof the civil rightsmovement,which, despite
some recent"backlash,"has provideda certainbaseline formoral expectations. The march-
ers,too, perceivedtheirstruggleas a civil rightsissue, a theme highlightedby the grass-roots
conference(Presley1989) and evidentin theirunusuallyhighdegreeof social unitycompared
to othercontaminatedcommunities. The "story"presentedby CarverTerraceresidentswas
fullof injustices,includingthe poisoningof the land, the neglectfulbehavior of cityand fed-
eral authorities,the illnessesand deaths,and the yearsof hard work lost when propertyval-
ues dropped. In short,it representedthe betrayalof a post-civilrightsmovementdream of
buildinga good community.Moreover,the grouplooked deserving,respectable,nonviolent,
and drivento protestas a last resort,moved by theirown grief.As Turner(1969) pointedout,
these kinds of qualities are likelyto help bystandersconstructradical actionsas "justprotest"
thatdeservessympathy.The environmentaljustice framespoke both to thosewho feltguilty

10. Some residentsviewed directaction as not polite,respectable,or likelyto accomplishanything;some working-

class activistsin particularaccused "people with degrees"of having thisattitude. Some residentshad taken payments
fromthe Koppers Corporationand were afraidto get involved. Many of these individualsjoined later,but a few only
began to attendCTCAG meetingsonce the buyout was assured.

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18 CAPEK

thata civil rightsaction was stilltakingplace in 1989 and those who were preoccupiedwith
extendingminorityrightsonly to the "deserving."
Local reactions were not all sympathetic. Texarkana's "city fathers"condemned the
marchersforspreadingnegativepublicityharmfulto the entirecity. Residentsfound these
criticismshypocritical,since the cityitselfhad zoned CarverTerraceresidential. The protes-
tors' belief that they were rightto challenge their treatmentas second-classcitizens was
strengthened.As the presidentof CTCAG remarked,"we've had mud thrownback in our
faces,and we being tax payingcitizens,it'snot askingfortoo much,onlythethingsthat'sright"
(interview13 July1991). The CTCAG subsequentlyorganizeda second march,this time on
cityhall, with even greaterparticipationthan the firstmarch. As the CTCAG's directaction
repertoireexpanded,it includedjoint actionswithsuch groupsas Texans United,Greenpeace,
and the EnvironmentalCongressof Arkansas.
Several otherfactorslinked CarverTerraceto the national environmentalmovement. In
1990,a HighlanderCenterStop Toxic Pollution(STP) school was held in Texarkana. The High-
lander Center'sapproach over the course of its involvementin the labor, civil rights,and
environmentalmovements has been to link activistsdirectly(Morris 1984). At the STP
school, a number of Carver Terrace residentslearned to be more outspoken as they heard
firsthandabout citizenactions in otherstates,including,forexample, Lauri Maddy chaining
herselfto the Kansas governor'schairuntilhe gave her a hearing. Aftersharingsome ofthese
stories,one residentsaid of her protestinvolvement: "No, I had never did it beforebut if it
took thatI was willingto. Sometimesyou have to do those things"(interview10 July1991).
Prominentindividualslike JesseJacksonalso forgeda link to the the broaderenvironmental
movement. His statementofsupportforthe CTCAG'sprotestover the withheldATSDR health
studyjointlycritiqueddiscriminationbased on race and class.
CarverTerraceis an African-American
community at risk.... It is timethatcommunities
suchas
CarverTerracestoppedpayingforpollutionthattheydidnotcreate,timethateveryone, regardless
oftheirraceor class,be guaranteed
therighttobreathefree(NationalRainbowCoalition1990).

Insistingon first-classcitizenshipforresidentsof contaminatedcommunities,Jackson'sstate-

mentembodied the nationalmovement'semergingenvironmentaljusticerhetoricand helped
place CarverTerraceon its agenda.
I noted at the outsetof this paper that social constructionof an environmentaljustice
frame was a two-wayprocess. Throughan environmentalistnetwork,the storyof Carver
Terracewas carriedto the national and even internationallevel, where it became a dramatic
symbolof the struggleforenvironmentaljustice. At one level, thisprocessspread a success
story which inspired local grass-rootsactivism elsewhere. At another level-well docu-
mented by resourcemobilizationtheorists-it fulfilledthe goals of particularorganizations
(such as Greenpeace, NTC, and others)to generatepowerfulimages helpful in mobilizing
fundsand sustainingsocial activism. Justas Rosa Parks was judiciouslyselectedas the sym-
bol of a budding civil rightsmovement,CarverTerracehas receivedselectiveattentionfrom
national organizationsdue to the level of moral indignationthatit generates. At yetanother
level, local activistshave also been recruitedinto national and internationalorganizational
networks. For example, residentPatsy Oliver became vice presidentof the National Toxics
Campaign Fund and travelledto Brazil forthe EarthSummitin 1992. She has not,however,
been "appropriated";as an outspokenactivist,she and otherslike her have helped to "con-
struct"the nationalmovementthroughtheirparticipation.Thus,resourcesand symbolshave
flowedin both directions,sustainingenvironmentalactivismbut at the same timegenerating
new frictions.
As CarverTerracebecame highlyvisibledue to regionaland nationalpublicity,local and
federalpoliticalofficialsbecame markedlymore responsive. EPA documentsreflectthegrow-
ing volume of correspondencearrivingfromprominentpolitical figuresconcerningCarver
Terrace (EPA AdministrativeRecord Index). The Texarkana, Texas city council eventually

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 TheEnvironmental
Justice
Frame 19

passed a resolutionsupportinga federalbuyout for Carver Terrace. A major coup for the
residentsoccurredwhen Texas CongressmanJimChapman publiclyespoused theircause af-
ter a massive letter-writing campaign. Among other things,residentsconvinced Chapman
thata buyoutwould be less expensive and more effectivethan the cleanup remedyproposed
by the EPA. Chapman spearheaded the successfuleffortto win a Congressionaloverrideof
the EPA's decision not to relocate residents. In November 1990, PresidentBush signed the
appropriationsbill, allocating five million dollars for the buyout. Since the EPA numbers,
criteria,and scientificdata had not changed,thisaction can only be attributedto the citizens'
abilityto organizearound the "environmentaljustice" framein a pragmaticand morallycon-
vincing way.

TheRightto Compensation
A final environmentaljustice claim is the rightto compensationfromthose who have
polluteda particularneighborhood.In many contaminatedcommunities,gettingsatisfactory
compensationis the mostdifficult struggleofall. The major social actorsinvolvedin compen-
sation are the pollutingcorporationsthemselvesand the federalgovernment.Corporations
generallydo not acknowledge fault,and if pressed,preferto engage in out-of-court settle-
ments. As a chronicallyunderfundedagency,the EPA under PresidentsReagan and Bush
was unable to back up its authorityto conduct Superfundsite cleanups and to effectively
regulateindustry.Indeed, in the past severalyearsthe U.S. governmenthas played down the
severityof contaminationin places like Love Canal, New York and Times Beach, Missouri,
statingthat the buyoutstherewere the resultof an "overreaction."
In this climate of structuralresistanceto compensation,winning a federalbuyout and
relocationwas a major victory.Clearly,the social and moral pressuregeneratedby CTCAG/
FUSE and the national movementforenvironmentaljustice produced a dramaticreversalin
CarverTerraceresidents'fate. At the same time,the EPA, mandatedto work throughthe U.S.
ArmyCorpsof Engineers,has been a reluctantpartyto the relocation,as has Beazer East, the
corporationwhich bought out Koppers in 1988 (EnvironmentalProtectionAgency 1992).
Althoughfunds were designatedin November 1990, the process has moved slowly. In the
meantime,the psychologicalcost of stayingin Carver Terrace-as is common in contami-
nated communities(Edelstein1988)-was veryhigh. The wait was aggravatedby yetanother
floodin March 1992. The firsthandfulof residentsmoved out of CarverTerrace in the early
summerof 1992. By the end of 1992, approximately25 familiesremained.
The buyouthas been ambiguousin otherways as well. Residentslostsome ofthe solidar-
ity built up in the communitywhen they had to negotiatetheirbuyoutsindividuallywith
limitedinformation.By law, theywere entitledto informationabout particularhouses and
neighborhoodsused as a basis forestablishingtheirappraisals (although they were not al-
lowed to see the actual appraisals),theirpropertywas to be evaluated withouttakingcontami-
nation into account, room for negotiationwas required, and the process was not to be
threateningor coercive. However, dismay at the low prices offeredwas matched by a
stronglynegativereactionto perceivedcoercion(communicatedboth in writingand in inter-
personal negotiations)and to breaches of some of the law's otherrequirements.
The dissatisfactionin thecommunityled to a partialsplitin the CTCAG. The presidentof
the organization,J.E. "Sonny" Fields, led the way in acceptingthe buyout process. He was
joined by otherswho feltthatunder the circumstancesthe monetaryofferswere the best they
would get. Some also feltthatoutsideorganizationswere exploitingthe situationto promote
theirown agendas. However,residentand CTCAG memberPatsyOliver-affiliatedwith the
NTCF and with a varietyoforganizationsformedaround the issue of environmentalracism-
publiclychallengedthe buyoutprocessand helped arrangea communityforum,mediatedby
the SouthwestNetworkforEnvironmentaland Economic Justice,in Dallas on 26 June 1992.

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20 CAPEK

The forumbroughttogetherthe U.S. ArmyCorpsof Engineers,the EPA, CarverTerrace

residents,representativesof the United Church of Christ'sCommission for Racial Justice
(whose studyin 1987 was the firstto document"environmentalracism"in the United States
[Lee 1987]), the NAACP, the Panos Institute,and the Texas Network. These organizations'
contributionto monitoringthe federalbuyoutof a minoritycommunityrevealed the growing
visibilityof the movementagainstenvironmentalracism. The forumbelied the EPA's claim
that since 70 people had signed buyout agreements,they were satisfied. Residentsoffered
detailed testimonyabout perceived intimidation,an inabilityto receive information,and a
sense of loss aggravatedby the low bids for theirhomes which made them fearfulabout
findingcomparable housing. The public recordreflectsthis testimonyas well as claims that
due to racial discriminationthe buyoutwas conducteddifferently than it would have been in
a white community.The forumslightlyraised residents'economic bargainingpower, and a
numberof the groupsinvolved are monitoringthe "paper trail"markingthe expenditureof
the fivemillion dollars appropriatedforthe relocation.
While the CarverTerracebuyoutallowed residentsto graduallyescape their"toxictrap,"
it also broughtthe dishearteningloss of an actual communityof neighborsand social net-
worksrootedin a particularlocationand built up over decades. Althougha small numberof
Carver Terrace residentshoped to relocate together,the obstacles (includingavailabilityof
land, cost,and agreementon location)have proved insurmountable.In the end, thereis no
adequate compensationforthe loss of a functioningcommunity.Even as residentsapproved
the EPA's decision to raze the houses of Carver Terraceand to close it foreverto residential
usage, theyalso assentedto the literalrazingof theirhistory.While at one level environmen-
tal justice is achieved, at anotherlevel communityis destroyed.

Conclusions
This paper's purpose was to conceptuallyclarifythe emergentenvironmentaljustice
frameas a claims-makingactivity,and to explorethe connectionbetween thisframeand the
process of mobilizingfor change in a particularcommunitysituatedwithin the field of a
broader social movement. Drawing on theoreticaltools offeredby a social constructionist
perspective,supplementedby insightsfromresourcemobilizationtheoryand an awareness of
power and conflictdynamics,I have tracedlinks between local and national groupsin con-
structingand diffusingthe environmentaljustice frame. I have also explored this frame's
groundingin the everydayexperiencesof residentsin contaminatedcommunitiesas well as
in a broader,legitimizing"civil rights"culture. The evidence supportsthe conclusionthatthe
outcome in CarverTerracewas determinednot by objective scientificevidence (which is at
best ambiguous), but by a social movement repertoirethat rested on effectivesymbolic
framing.
The value of thiscase residesboth in its typicalityand itsuniqueness. Many of the social
circumstancessurroundingCarverTerraceare representativeof othercontaminatedcommu-
nities: thejoint culpabilityofcorporationsand local governmentsin producingcontaminated
sites;the experienceofresidentsin contaminatedneighborhoodsofbeing ignoredand stigma-
tized untiltheyformsocial movements;and residents'need to convince not only themselves,
but also crucial outsidersof the injusticeof theirsituationsin orderto achieve remedies. An
in-depthlook at this case, therefore,provides insightsinto a more general social process of
frameconstructionin the antitoxicsmovement.
CarverTerrace is also exceptional,not only in gettingits claims addressedthrougheco-
nomic compensationand relocation,but in doing so as a minoritycommunity. As Bullard
and Wright(1986) point out,black "Love Canals" have tendedto be overlooked,not the least
by the mainstreamenvironmentalmovement. It is preciselyforthisreason thatmany such

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 TheEnvironmental
Justice
Frame 21

communities-a large proportionof which are in the South-are takingpart in an emerging

movement forenvironmentaljustice that stronglyaccentuates the "environmentalracism"
claim. This new strandof grass-roots activismis alteringthe terrainof environmentalmove-
ments in the United Statesand globally. Indeed, it is possible that in mobilizinggrass-roots
supportaround the claim of environmentalracism,an independentframewill be generated
thatnot only elaborateson, but challengesthe existingenvironmentaljustice frame. Situated
in thisnew terrain,CarverTerraceis significantnot only as a federalbuyoutand relocationof
a minoritycommunity,but also as a markerof the emergenceof environmentalracism as a
major new componentof environmentalsocial movementsin the United States.

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