Gabriel Barrios Cabrera: The Anti-Agrarian Friend of the Campesino

Author(s): Keith Brewster

Source: Bulletin of Latin American Research , Sep., 1998, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Sep., 1998), pp.
263-283
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS)

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3339572

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 Bull Latin Am. Res., Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 263-283, 1998
? 1998 Society for Latin American Studies. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd
Pergamon All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain
0261-3050/98 $19.00 + 0.00

PII: S0261-3050(97)00067-3

Gabriel Barrios Cabrera: The anti-agrarian friend of the

Campesino1
KEITH BREWSTER
Centre of Latin American Studies, University of Cambridge, Cambridge,

Abstract ? This article considers the cacicazgo of Gabriel Barrios Cabrera in the Sierr
Puebla, Mexico during the 1920s. It analyses the ways in which he introduced social
economic development, and clarifies the apparent contradiction in his hostile respon
agrarismo yet benevolence towards the region's campesinos. A picture emerges of a regi
leader whose own philosophy and actions were fashioned by distinctly local views on lan
autonomy and patronage. As such, his style of leadership defies neat categorisation
suggests that rural leaders could not help but reflect the characteristics and interests of
region in which they operated. ? 1998 Society for Latin American Studies. Published
Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved

Key words ? Mexico, Caciquismo, Barrios, education, agrarismo, communications

The village of Cuacuila enjoys panoramic views in all directions of woode

slopes. Only infrequently is this scene interrupted by the rising smoke of fires
existence of other small settlements lost within the Sierra de Puebla. These are connected to
Cuacuila, and Cuacuila with yet more villages beyond, by the same tracks that serranos
have used for centuries to make journeys to the markets of Tetela de Ocampo and Zacatlan.
Telephone lines now cross the rugged terrain, connecting Cuacuila to the outside world.
Just below the small clearing that serves as the village's public square, no less than three
schools provide board and education for hundreds of children from surrounding communi?
ties. A recently forged road makes it possible for robust vehicles to reach Cuacuila in good
weather. Frequent heavy rainfall, however, causes landslides which wrest Cuacuila, and
many other Sierra villages, back to a former way of life.
Below, in the valleys that dissect this mountainous region, man has partially succeeded in
moderating the vagaries of the Sierra climate. Frequent nortes cloak the valleys in mist and
low cloud, blocking out the sun yet providing insufficient moisture to relieve the long
months between seasons of rain. Conversely, the deep gorges that cut into the valley floor
bear witness to the destructive potential ofthe summer downpours which, in the past, have
washed away the soils of the upper slopes. However, when breaks in the cloud permit,
a narrow strand of silver can be seen to follow the contours ofthe precipitous gorge wall; an
irrigation channel that has helped to regulate the erratic rainfall and ensure decent land for
cultivation. Within the rural landscape, the presence of houses is revealed, not only by the
cacophony of noise made by farm animals foraging for food, but by the orchards that
surround almost every dwelling in the region and that provide a supplement to the serrano's
income and diet. Transport links allow local crops to reach a wider market than in the past.
From the valley-head town of Tetela de Ocampo, a paved road leads to Chignahuapan,

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264 Keith Brewster

Zacatlan and beyond, enabling bo

hours' journey to regional and nat
It is somewhat strange that th
rural landscape was Gabriel Barrio
of Cuacuila: a person whom off
ofthe campesino and a brutal caciq
commander of the Federal Army'
that eventually incorporated a th
stretches of the north coast of V
managed to portray himself as a loy
with every action, strengthening hi
Sierra.
From the increasing number of stu
ary period, two main themes emerg
factor in determining a leader's abil
ways in which land was used to gain
with which to categorise regional
been portrayed as 'traditional' cau
supporters to cement their power b
to have reflected a more modern de
tion of an emerging post-revolution
(Ankerson, 1980: 140). In turn such
what has been portrayed as the disp
power-brokers to harness local di
charged with undervaluing the tr
within their locality (Joseph and Nu
The case of Gabriel Barrios provide
article argues that while land ten
composition of Sierra communities
could use such issues to attract
that the battle for land and auto
communities not only responded in
but varied among themselves in t
many parts ofthe Sierra, subjugatio
of land and more on control of la
a long history of negotiation and
forces over those issues that affe
such negotiations were facilitated
explains how Barrios's intimate k
successfully to assume this traditi
from which he was seen by both
a legitimate regional leader.
As with other provincial leaders du
government lay in his military pote
in a crucial region of the Republic.
support for the federal government
reform. His dual role as military

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 Gabriel Barrios Cabrera 265

a considerable degree of goodwill and freedom t

relationship with federal authorities was essent
Sierra.
Although the flow of federal patronage was
regional power depended equally upon his sensib
considers how Barrios's appreciation of the
land, autonomy, and patronage contributed t
While the struggle for land had affected differ
of the Revolution it had ceased to become a
Nonetheless, in boasting an armed force of s
found alternative methods of recruitment. If c
buy favour, Barrios adopted another major in
nomic and social reconstruction, to attract a
Barrios's central role in organising major comm
ment, and promoting rural education sugge
re-appraisal. Yet more importantly, by analysin
reforms and dispense the benefits that the
opportunist who merged revolutionary refor
tradition. The resulting picture seems to sugges
ary and contradictory; that he was fiercely
patron of the campesino. It will be argued,
a single unbroken thread ran through all his act
to bind Barrios to his fellow serranos. That thr
of the responsibilities of a legitimate leader.
In conclusion, it will be suggested that local hi
way in which Barrios was able to become a regio
manner in which he used his influence once he
the ways in which he modified the implem
conditions, the case of Barrios adds weight to
popular opinion. Crucially, the reactions of serr
own history and socio-economic circumstance
attempts to describe the nature of regional p
needs to be more sensitive to the diversity of lo

REGIONAL SECURITY AND AGRARIAN UNREST IN THE SIERRA

DURING THE 1920s

In many respects, Barrios's background places him neatly within the framework of
leaders identified by Schryer and others (Schryer, 1980; Jacobs, 1980). The Revolut
the Barrios Cabrera family an unprecedented opportunity for social advancem
the family's activities in horse breeding had already afforded relative wealth, t
background prevented the Barrios brothers from attaining any significant influenc
the economic and political life of the non-Indian cabeceras of Tetela de Ocam
Zacatlan.3 Conversely, it was his ethnic links, more than his undeniable
prowess, that allowed Gabriel Barrios to assume command of the Brigada Serra
upon the death of the old Indian patriarch, Juan Francisco Lucas.4 Loyal
service to both Carrancista and Sonorense administrations guaranteed Barrios's

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 266 Keith Brewster

senior military commander in the S

allowed him access to a degree of in
denied.5
Much of Barrios's success in assuming the mantle of Juan Francisco Lucas lay in his
awareness of the region's recent history. I have argued elsewhere that Barrios was able to
rise to power in the Sierra primarily because he represented continuity with the past
(Brewster, 1996). In 1917 the federal government needed the services ofa cultural intermedi-
ary to ensure the continued supply of loyal troops. Sierra communities sought a leader who
might afford a degree of protection from the revolutionary violence that continued after
Lucas's death. Much of Lucas's legitimacy had derived from his ability to prolong the
period during which serranos, whether on communal or privately owned land, could
determine their own destiny. During the Revolution, such protection assumed a military
character, and it was in this guise that Barrios continued the task of his predecessor. In his
methods of troop mobilisation and deployment, and his affinity to, and respect for, Indian
cultural values, Barrios displayed a sensitive awareness of the role that Lucas had per?
formed throughout the previous fifty years. Arguably, only someone whose background
and lifestyle reflected the Nahua traditions of the communities from which the Brigada
Serrana9s soldiers came, could step into the huaraches of the old patriarch.
The image of Barrios as a brutal cacique lacking any legitimacy, was first disseminated in
the late 1920s and coincided with a broader federal government assault upon military
caciquismo. It reached a crescendo in 1930 when newspapers explained the federal govern?
ment's decision to remove Barrios's 46th. Battalion from the Sierra. An article in El
Nacional Revolucionario was typical: 'With the removal of General Barrios's forces, the
campesinos have been released from the slavery under which they have suffered for so many
years, and are finally able to become a part of the "Revolutionary family".' It is interesting
to note that the selective use of evidence by contemporary commentators to create
a negative image of Barrios's cacicazgo, has never subsequently been questioned. Whether
through inadequate analysis or the desire to portray caciquismo in a certain light, official
history and the 1970s progressive literature on rural caciques concentrate upon his liberal
use of force to maintain control (Hernandez Enriquez, 1986; Cordero y Torres, 1966: 92;
Cordero y Torres, 1972; INEHRM, 1992; Pare, 1977).6
The truth is that the type of cacique that Barrios was depended much upon time and
space. It is certainly true that during the more turbulent years of the Revolution, Barrios
invariably met violence with violence. Yet, as a measure of stability returned to the Sierra,
he increasingly replaced coercion with persuasion. Furthermore, while he always enjoyed
a large measure of popular support and respect within the districts of Tetela de Ocampo
and Zacatlan, it was impossible to sustain such personal ties further afield. As the cacicazgo
expanded beyond its natural constituency in the western Sierra, so Barrios relied upon
a broad network of representatives to ensure local stability and loyalty. In most Sierra
cabeceras, Barrios established a garrison of regular troops from his 46th Battalion. Of
greater numerical and strategic importance, however, were the many groups of armed men
(cuerpos voluntarios) stationed in almost every Sierra community of significance. Led by
jefes de armas, these groups represented a vast military reserve that Barrios could call upon
if the need arose. In more peaceful times, they were responsible for maintaining law and
order and informing Barrios of developments likely to cause a threat to his control. In
addition, many municipal presidents, secretaries and other functionaries owed their jobs to
Barrios's patronage. This both extended the network of clients and provided independent

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 Gabriel Barrios Cabrera 267

sources of intelligence that deterred anyone fr

to create their own power base.
The two basic elements of Barrios's cacicazg
applied in varying mixes, depending upon loc
on agrarian colonies, the basis of Barrios's po
were scattered throughout the Sierra within a v
did not share common daily concerns and th
some lived in isolated Indian communities, othe
him, others gave their support grudgingly. Bar
the true nature of his cacicazgo is hard to defin
to prove or disprove whatever verdict one ap
leadership stress the nature of a leader's rela
understand how Barrios tackled the diversity
supporters could be found.
At first glance it would appear that Barrios ha
inter-ethnic and class relations in the district o
that Barrios's local allies conducted a vigour
prevent campesinos from the village of Atz
hacienda (Pare, 1977). Such actions persuaded
elite who sought to continue its exploitation of
difficult to find more examples of similar incide
Barrios clashed with several agrarian groups
Throughout the 1920s Barrios fought with
a rural settlement some twenty kilometres nor
been reported between the local hacendado a
became more formalised when petitions for
commission.7 Two months later, foilowing c
armed attack against labourers on a nearby f
agrarian leaders of Palos Caidos. In his offic
culprits were in possession of land, they ref
manufacture of pulque to provide them with
was the source of their trouble making.8 For th
east: in future years, they periodically accus
evicting their members and replacing them
report of such an incident was sent to the presi
three years after Barrios's forces had been tran
On the other side ofthe Sierra in the municipa
Ramon Arellano, a local trader and leader of an
Regimiento\ first received broader attention in
one of the many jefes de armas that operated in
As such, Arellano enjoyed a significant degr
agrarian committee accused Arellano of havin
peace-keeping force during a local fiesta. The co
example of the violence to which Arellano ha
1927 the agrarian committee had placed its
suppressing rebel activity, it was claimed th
intimidating local agraristas. Demetrio Barrio

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 268 Keith Brewster

superiors by stating that the acc

February 1928 agraristas in Tepey
the Secretaria de Gobernacion. Thi
was personally responsible for a cam
region.12 Only after Arellano's m
subside. Not until Barrios's troops w
investigate the wide range of accu
against Barrios were not proved, wh
and legally unrepresented, Arellano.
Further serious allegations again
he had rented on the hacienda El Paredon in the western Sierra district of Alatriste.
Sections of the hacienda had already been granted to agraristas, and Tobler suggests that
the tenancy was an example of a broader phenomenon of hacendados attempting to limit
agrarian reform by renting land to soldiers (Tobler, 1988). In October 1925 local agrarian
leaders claimed that campesinos were victims of abuses committed by the hacendado and
troops belonging to Barrios. In a clear demonstration of the support that Barrios then
enjoyed from his regional military commanding officer, General Juan A. Almazan re-
sponded to the complaints by ordering a detachment of Barrios's own forces to police the
situation.14
Further land grants in the area were made in 1928, and an uneasy truce appears to
have lasted until Barrios's removal from the Sierra in May 1930. Two years later, the
Puebla City daily, La Opinion, reported the killing of a campesino on El Paredon. The
murder was alleged to have been committed by Barrios's cousin, Dario Barrios, who, far
from accompanying the battalion to Mexico City, was reported to have occupied the
ranch together with a group of armed men.15 Subsequent investigations appear to have
been ineffective, and during the following year agrarian representatives accused Barrios's
troops of similar atrocities. The tension culminated in November 1933 when, according
to La Opinion, an armed gang belonging to Barrios carried out a massacre of innocent
campesinos in the nearby settlement of Corral Blanco.16 Barrios informed his superiors
that the allegations were false and that the accused officers and men had 'always been
garrisoned at their headquarters in San Joaquin, Mexico City'. It must have been embar-
rassing for Gabriel Barrios when, in February 1934, military investigators encountered
Lieutenant Dario Barrios and two sergeants still in possession of the hacienda. Dario
Barrios insisted that he and his men had been acting under orders from the Ministry of War
and that only recently had these orders been superseded by others recalling them to
barracks.17
It is important to distinguish the situation in El Paredon from that which occurred on the
other side of the Sierra in Tepeyahualco. In the former, military officers under Barrios's
direct control were occupying haciendas. As such, it conforms to Tobler's picture in which
officer-tenants were rented land by hacendados in the hope that military presence would
deter attempts by agraristas to dismantle their estates. The case of Arellano, however, was
different in that he was one of those armed representatives who comprised a more informal
network of coercion. More often than not jefes de armas were chosen for their ability to
control an area. Overall subjugation to Barrios was the price he demanded in order for
them to retain such a position. This was not the same as having total control over each and
every jefe. As such, Arellano's actions reflected long-standing tensions between the local
hacendado and campesinos in which he had often acted as a pistolero for the hacendado. The

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 Gabriel Barrios Cabrera 269

outcome may have been the same, but the c

taken before making too many assumption
officer-tenancy was a direct response to agrar
had never been in the federal army and we
intimidation that preceeded the Revolution.
Despite the differences, these cases do make
the agrarian cause. Barrios's anti-agrariani
measure taken by a regional cacique seekin
eldest son, Jose Maria, admits as much, su
agrarian committees as a threat; agents of fed
of land grants.18 In this light, aggression a
protect the peripheries of Barrios's empire fr
forces of political centralisation.
Yet, the plight of campesinos in Atzalan d
towards agraristas was not limited to com
applied within his main constituency. This
towards land tenure that drove Barrios to
enemies within the Sierra. Contrast Barrios's a
Aguilar, whose counter-revolutionary instin
popular support in Orizaba. As a result, Agu
communities beyond his region of control
non-compromising stance against agrari
campesinos in the Sierra accused his troops of
abuses during the 1920s. Had agrarian unre
representatives did against the campesinos o
were at work. A possible explanation is pro
who in 1919 commented:

In this municipality [Tetela] and, perhaps, throughout the Sierra Norte de Puebla, the
agrarian problem which has served as a revolutionary banner for the people of other
regions, does not exist. Here, there are no large estates, there are no enemies of the small
holder, this is because in the past, whenever possible, the land has been divided and
granted to serranos in small plots. Here in the Sierra, virtually all heads of families own
their own plot of land which, if they tend it carefully, will provide sufficient for the needs
of themselves and their families. If they are poor it is because they produce no more than
is strictly necessary to survive.19

Miguel Lucas was, infact, reflecting the consequences of a generation of liberalism that
had swept much of the western Sierra under the auspices of his father and the mestizo
governor, Juan N. Mendez. Through desamortizacion, inheritance and defaults on debts, the
Lucas family had acquired many small plots of land which they then rented to campesino
families. It was the eventual sale of these lands before and during 1919, and previous sales of
land owned by the Mendez estate, that created a second generation of private landowners.
Among the many recipients were members ofthe Barrios family.20 It is clear from Lucas's
words that the son of the Tatriarch of the Sierra' strongly believed in a campesino's
personal responsibility for the welfare of himself and his family. This same principle had
a fundamental influence upon Barrios's actions during the 1920s; a philosophy that led him
to view agraristas in Palos Caidos and elsewhere, as lazy and unwilling to invest in their

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270 Keith Brewster

own future. If this were so, it wou

on the one hand, show little regard
serranos to provide, in Miguel Lucas
their families'.
Florencia Mallon's study of peasant p
century liberalism in the western dis
preneurial character. She contrasts th
that developed in central Sierra com
(Mallon, 1995; 32). While Juan Franc
son's words suggest that one of the
not always have acknowledged such a
Although by no means universal, we
campesinos were willing to abandon
enterprise. Future security then lay i
land that they owned. Some, such as t
while others failed and reverted to be
agricultural conditions in the Sierra s
a small land-holder brought up in a
Miguel Lucas was wrong, however
viewed land tenure in the same way. T
ties. In much of the region, communi
climate, soils and infrastructure comb
Where conditions were more favourab
nineteenth century had indeed produc
assumed that the Revolution had aro
class willing to fight for agrarian ref
unrest was based more upon political
ship of land (Brewster, 1996; Thoms
more common method of campesino e
of campesino labour through the cu
nant and submissive sectors of serran
from that exisiting in areas of agrari
tensions that allowed him to gain le
Thomson believes that in some dist
were crucial to ethno-political develop
are underlined by Mallon's analysis of
points in the Sierra's recent history,
compromise as local and state interp
contested. The outcome often produce
to local perceptions and values (Mal
Liberal menu, Sierra communities oft
those dishes that suited their palate
Both Thomson and Mallon concent
developments. Yet, when emphasising
nities were 'constant and ongoing', M
and political reform, the post-revolut
state-community dialogue (Mallon,

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 Gabriel Barrios Cabrera 271

of Barrios's part in this process as it pertained

him to have played no significant role, or t
reaction. Yet the degree of popular support t
the 1920s demanded that he take an active part
state and local communities. Indeed, he was the
these exchanges flowed.
However, there is no evidence to suggest tha
receiving land, were ever used by Barrios to
Indian troops either possessed their own land
immediate threat to communal ownership. Th
Mallon suggests had happened in the past, s
Barrios's army as a means of legitimating th
informal agreement in which military servic
recognition of traditional land rights. Yet th
a widespread phenomenon. Correspondence be
display the heightened awareness of patriotic
ations between Lucas and local units of the N
1989,1990; 1991a, 1993). The more common im
throughout the Sierra, communities were pre
had changed since Lucas's day was that the possi
the promise of loyal support to the federal gov
throughout the Revolution, and increasingly
degree of autonomy that serrano communitie
offered a compromise. In a changing world,
a return to the spectre of an Indian patriarch f
a way that made change more palitable to loca
the menu, but Barrios was able to provide a m
that serranos could understand.

POST-REVOLUTIONARY PATRONAGE

Although the geographical extent of Barrios's cacicazgo far exceeded t

Francisco Lucas, throughout the 1920s Barrios's civilian and military act
reflected Lucas's influence. Barrios never strayed from Lucas's death-bed a
his actions as future commander ofthe Brigada Serrana, Barrios should remain
federal government. In the same way, Barrios shared Miguel Lucas's philos
a campesino's responsibility to support himself through his own labours.
raised under the shadow of Juan Francisco Lucas, a leader whose commerc
demonstrated a belief in the sacrosanct nature of private property. Yet
cacicazgo expanded, he needed to appeal to a broader constituency: Indian
serranos who, like Barrios, sought advancement for themselves and their fami
individual endeavour; non-Indian elites who fought to retain political and econ
of their districts, often to the cost of rival factions; serrano Indian communi
whom jealously guarded their traditions and rights, and others who des
integration within the broader social and economic environment. Had B
achieve a satisfactory balance, popular support would have dissolved and l

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 272 Keith Brewster

position of his contemporaries acr

Apango, whose political survival wa
Falcon, 1989).
Where Barrios showed himself to be a pragmatic and shrewd judge of broader political
trends, however, was in his decision to bring revolutionary reform to the Sierra. His interest
in regional development coincided with a period in which the federal government was
drastically cutting military expenditure and diverting funds towards economic reconstruc?
tion. If Barrios had learned one lesson more than any other from the past, it was the
foolhardiness of placing all his eggs into one military basket. During the late Porfiriato,
Lucas's diminishing regional influence reflected the redundancy of his role as a recruiting
officer in more peaceful times. If Barrios were to retain influence, he would need to extend
his usefulness beyond a point in the future when his services as a soldier might become
superfluous. Support for current federal initiatives helped to enhance his image as a loyal
federal servant.
Adoption of such initiatives brought a variety of favourable consequences. As with the
case of Saturnino Cedillo, help in obtaining grants of seeds, animals and farming imple?
ments were constant reminders ofthe benefits that could accrue as the result of being one of
Barrios's men (Ankerson, 1984:99). Unlike Cedillo, however, Barrios never found himself in
a position of financial strength. Whereas Cedillo had access to funds from the state treasury
and the federal government's Ministry of Agriculture, Barrios relied almost entirely upon
federal cash from the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Communications and Public
Works to support his network of patronage. It was no coincidence that the considerable
amount of federal funding that major road and telecommunication construction projects
attracted was all controlled by Barrios or his designated civilian representatives. Simult-
neously, under the guise of promoting such projects, Barrios found a very efficient method
of expanding and fortifying his cacicazgo.
The almost universal desire for post-revolutionary social stability, both within and
beyond the Sierra, created support for Barrios's argument that rapid deployment of troops
was essential for the restoration and maintenance of law and order. Yet, the topography of
the Sierra had always resisted the advance of modern communications (Vargas, 1874;
Arriaga, 1873).23 While there were no technical difficulties in running rail and road routes
across the plains, once they reached the foothills of the Sierra, the flow of communications
suffered stenosis. On the edges of the Sierra, at Honey, Beristain, Zaragoza and Chi-
gnahuapan, rail-tracks reached the end of the line. Similarly, federal roads connecting
Mexico City and Puebla City to Chignahuapan petered out as the routes began to penetrate
the Sierra. Mules replaced trucks and railway wagons as the means of transport and
throughout the Revolution, using the narrow mountain tracks often exposed travellers to
banditry. During the 1920s, however, the Sierra de Puebla experienced one of the most
ambitious programmes of rural communications development to be witnessed in post-
revolutionary Mexico. By 1930, a comprehensive network of roads wove through the
valleys and meandered the region's mountain slopes; telephone lines linked every village to
Barrios's headquarters in Cuacuila, and from there to the outside world.
His many critics attacked Barrios for coercing local communities to pledge their 'volunt-
ary' labour towards public works. Opponents argued that such projects were being used by
Barrios to strengthen his influence within the region. It is certainly true that Barrios used
armed men to 'protect' faeneros, stating that the workers constantly risked attacks by
bandits and 'enemies of progress'. As road construction projects crossed state borders, so

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 Gabriel Barrios Cabrera 273

too Barrios's armed presence extended beyond

maintained roads, paths and telephone links, pr
network and the means to deploy troops rapidly
a facility, of course, was as useful in putting do
as it was in quelling periodic rebellions agains
Barrios was always aware of his need to retain
way that he adopted policies that, while str
provide for the greater good. Some Indian co
only benefit the non-Indian traders in cabecera
an external threat to their very existence. Yet t
provided was fundamental to the eradicatio
commercial activities of all serranos alike. Furth
ary groups had already ridden roughshod ove
Barrios's promise of regional stability struck a
negotiate municipal autonomy. As under Lucas,
patriarch than risk all to hostile external forces
protection was repeated.
Driven by his strong convictions on the merit
ties into organising local projects to alleviate som
approach was simple: road construction acti
progressive sectors of a community. Barrios use
public works, such as irrigation, canalisation of
pipes. Local neighbourhood committees were
for government support, and to ensure succ
became personally involved in these schemes, fe
as material support.
Negotiations on local participation in suc
that developed between Barrios, Sierra comm
a range of compromises that reflected th
state relationships. Interestingly, although some
retain traditional values through isolation, t
faenas for nearby road construction. One may a
of the price communities were willing to pay
provided they displayed overall obedience to
them alone. In other communities, serranos w
such demands. By exposing these difference
pre-existing factional tensions. It was his manip
him to gain the upper hand. Those factions
supremacy; their opponents were either for
against a powerful enemy.
It is in this light that Barrios's alliance with
seen. In Zacapoaxtla, for example, it is too sim
arrangement with the creole elite that led t
campesino. Infact, Barrios used existing division
ofthe competing factions. Meanwhile, the oppos
of Indian community labour, was forced to
ernors.24 Dependent upon Barrios's continue

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 274 Keith Brewster

pro-Barrios faction was unable to pre

inter-communal relationships. Barrios
labour and thereby extended the num
their patron. Barrios's genius was i
existing structures in order to ens
traditional methods of decision-mak
that such leaders, either directly o
authority to whom overall obedienc
Reflecting the reciprocal nature of
strategy for attracting popular sup
policies likely to offer communities a
ties were to determine the essen
Barrios's thorough knowledge ofthe S
of the serranos, qualified him to a
flourishing military career, Barrios r
a lifetime of experience in the rear
challenges presented by the Sierra's c
federal desires to promote a self-relia
local significance: his conviction t
improving the life of the Sierra cam
patriarch by ensuring local stabili
serranos to maximise the potential of
communally owned.
Not surprisingly perhaps, the mo
took place in the valleys below B
a blue-print for irrigation and the pr
military commander, Barrios organ
from Barranca Fria to Tetela de Ocam
feat of civil engineering, Barrios's
precipitous canyon where, suspend
a water channel into the rock face. Fa
their lives before the task was com
formed the agricultural potential o
suffered erosion, were transforme
controlled irrigation could be susta
plea to President Obregon, Barrios
Obregon stated that he sent the ploug
nation, perhaps, but no recipient of a
obtained the gift and it was Barrio
benefit.
Other initiatives followed. In August 1925, Ubalde Barrios, a cousin and serving
officer of the 46th. Battalion, joined forces with the jefe de armas of Villa Juarez in
organising a community project to convert a derelict ranch into a self-sufficient
rural community. A junta agricola was formed and faenas were used to bring the project
to a successful conclusion.27 With the cooperation of the Direccion General de Agricultura
y Ganaderia, Barrios promoted initiatives to improve farming techniques within the
Sierra and used his network ofjefes de armas to establish forestry brigades throughout

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 Gabriel Barrios Cabrera 275

the region. In Libres, the local Union de Ob

of Barrios's proposal that faenas should be u
farm land.28
Barrios's initiative to encourage the planting
indication of local implementation of federal po
Barrios impressed upon his fellow campesino
excess produce could be sold or bartered at
addition to a family's income. Ayuntamiento
were issued that all households should, witho
within a period often days.29 For his part, Barr
ing the abundant agricultural potential of th
City delivered numerous boxes of locally pro
president, senior officers and politicians.
As late as 1930, just weeks before the batt
Barrios attended local committee meetin
agricultural projects that would raise funds
of improved farming techniques.30 The inter
to foster education in the community of Co
region's campesinos were to maximise their
equipped to make the best use ofthe available
motives for supporting such initiatives wer
nineteenth century, so Barrios responded to req
who sought to educate their children. At th
demonstrated, once again, his willingness to a
policy.

RURAL EDUCATION IN THE SIERRA

In June 1923, the celebrated Chilean poet, Gabriela Mistral, addressed a sel
the public library in Zacapoaxtla. As she extolled the virtues of such estab
their potential to enrich community life, she would not have been aware ofthe
responsible for fulfilling these ambitions for serranos.31 This was not the stat
which, at the time that Mistral encouraged increased literacy, was struggling t
meagre attendance at badly under-funded schools. In contrast, within a month
speech, the tiny mountain village of Cuacuila took delivery of materials for est
own library, together with a supply of scholastic pro visions sufficient to satisfy
the 1000 school children that lived in Cuacuila and neighbouring villages
educators struggled with unrealistic objectives, Barrios, capitalising upon the re
Tetela of Secretary of Education, Jose Vasconcelos, was again converting fi
action.33
The personal archive amassed by the Barrios family during the 1
many aspects of the cacicazgo. Among the wealth of documents relating t
public security matters, the presence of numerous school reports appears some
gruous. Barrios kept minute details of school life; the attendance and per
children, the quality, training, recruitment and payment of teachers and schoo
and the organisation of community contributions to make up for budget sh

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 276 Keith Brewster

documents give an indication of th

education.
Puebla's post-revolutionary educational authorities certainly faced a formidable task.
The Revolution had resulted in the closure of many schools and those that remained open
were poorly attended. During Carranza's presidency, Governor Alfonso Cabrera attempted
to harness Barrios's intimate knowledge of the Tetela region to encourage communities
to become more receptive to local educational initiatives.34 Across the Sierra in Cuetzalan,
the municipal president was forced to approach wealthy coffee merchants and Demetrio
Barrios, then local military commander, for loans of 100 pesos to pay the wages of
school directors.35 By the time the state government's inspector of schools, Professor
Carlos Barrios (unrelated), made a tour of inspection through the Sierra in September 1920,
practical evidence of Barrios's help was beginning to emerge. From Cuetzalan, the
hard-pressed Zacapoaxtla authorities were informed that a new boys' school had been
opened on the Rancheria de Reyes-Ogpan as a result of Barrios's efforts. Closer to home,
in Aquixtla, Barrios had become personally involved in a stock-taking exercise of
educational material in the municipality's schools; while in Huehuetla, he had arranged for
the state government to supply local schools with books and equipment.36 Meanwhile, the
state government's lack of commitment to education was barely concealed. In 1922,
Zacatlan authorities were informed that the government had decided to cancel an earlier
decision to grant local authorities a monthly amount of 200 pesos towards the costs of
education.37
Despite these examples of Barrios's involvement in education, it would be fair to say that
educational reform was a low priority in the early years of his cacicazgo. While he made
great strides towards providing a basic education for his soldiers and in equipping
Cuacuila's schools to the highest standards, education in other areas of the Sierra was
generally left to the mixed fortunes of federal and state provision. It was only in 1927,
foilowing a tour of inspection by Prof. Moises Saenz, the federal undersecretary of Educa?
tion, that Barrios displayed increasing enthusiasm for the development of education on
a broader scale. An interesting aspect of Saenz's report is his comment on life in Sierra
Indian communities. He suggested that despite the best efforts of teachers, the educational
policies followed bore little relevance to the everyday needs of serrano communities. Three
or four years of basic instruction in reading and writing were inadequate, Saenz suggested,
to escape the miserable cycle of subsistence farming. He called upon federal departments to
devise educational policies that would provide campesinos with relevant, practical skills.
Only in this way, he argued, would Indian communities more fully embrace education and
benefit from the civilising influence that it could deliver.
Saenz's philosophy must have struck a chord with Barrios, who accompanied him
on much of his tour of the Sierra. The sentiments in Saenz's subsequent report were
almost identical to the practical approach that Barrios had striven to adopt in other
initiatives. Barrios began to assume the kind of responsibility for regional education taken
on by his predecessor, Juan Francisco Lucas. Together with military reports, Barrios
received details of local education provision. As Barrios's interest in education reached
a wider audience, so too, the requests for his help in acquiring teaching aids began to
increase.
The rural school-teacher at Jicolapa (Zacatlan), asked Barrios to help ensure the
delivery of essential teaching materials for almost 100 children which had previously
been promised by state authorities.38 There is evidence that the federal school in Cuacuila

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 Gabriel Barrios Cabrera 277

was receiving funds from Barrios in order

Barrios used one of the family's representa
to obtain maps of Puebla for distribution to is
the Barrios brothers encouraged the est
to supervise the cultivation of crops, the s
In Zitlala (Zacatlan), the success of this sche
extend small loans at 3% per month intere
agricultural resources.41
Evidence of more fundamental education p
period. An unsigned report written in 192
tenimiento y vigilancia de Escuelas Rudimen
bears the address of Barrios's ranch in Zac
educational objectives in line with federal a
finances, channels and levels of authority; reg
duties of teachers and inspectors; the establ
Zacatlan to monitor the quality of personne
practical proposals for putting such plans into
regular teacher training courses be held in Zac
school inspectorate. The report was sent to bo
attract their support.42
Although there is no evidence of governmen
courses did take place.43 The courses appea
teachers to deliver papers on the peculiar pr
such as the Sierra. One paper addressed the dif
communities. The paper encouraged all teacher
in the knowledge that by spreading the nat
cause. The teacher in Cuacuila spoke of how th
could be used by teachers who, by means of
'educative witches' in the minds of children
teaching methods, the responsibility of the
encouraging the role of the mother as a teac
The scope of the topics covered by these c
education. Rural teachers were not only am
also charged with representing the Revoluti
tuals saw education as the civilising influence
weakness; a weakness highlighted by the wides
sessions allowed local intellectuals to muse
application in the field. Although sponsorin
shared all the views of local educationalists.
and personal contact with presidents ofthe Re
ence for the rural life of his Nahua origins an
Nonetheless, the vital point was that in graspi
the direction and extent ofthe educational poli
parts of the Sierra.
Barrios accepted broader federal initiative
in as much as they encouraged personal dev
campaign against alcoholism, Barrios issued

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 278 Keith Brewster

quantities of alcohol sold in variou

mentally weakened the resolve of t
municipalities in the Sierra had ado
order to create, 'the improvement of
which will serve as an example for
Barrios instructed his network ofjef
and Chignahuapan in their efforts
Barrios outlined his views on the anti-alcohol issue in a letter to a hostile state
government concerned about a likely reduction in its revenues derived from taxes
alcohol sales. He explained that the municipalities had decided to restrict sales on Sun
and holidays:

[...] To avoid scandals and consequential lawlessness, so that the humble classes
workers might abandon the habit of heavy drinking in order that, as soon as poss
future generations might develop into a healthy, strong, moral society, with the capa
to adapt itself to its duties and various activities efficiently.46

It is strange to reflect that, although little love was lost between Barrios and Manuel Lu
there is no difference between these views and the underlying sentiments expressed by Lu
regarding land tenure in 1919. The need for all serranos to maximise their own potentia
order to guarantee their well-being, shone like a beacon guiding Barrios's policies throug
out the 1920s.

CONCLUSION

Barrios's uncanny knack of anticipating federal government policies sugge

actions were swayed more by opportunism than any structured, global appr
revolutionary reform. Nonetheless, patterns do emerge from his actions that r
about the man and his ability to retain favour. Each of his initiatives was a
which the revolutionary government had placed considerable importance. B
reacting to stated federal government objectives, at others pre-empting th
revealed his astute political judgement Whether in road building, education
development or, most crucially, military loyalty, Barrios reaffirmed the impre
could supply whatever the national government demanded. Even his conflicts w
tas were conducted during a period when there was less than whole-hear
government support for comprehensive land reform.
Yet many of the projects over which Barrios presided, bore a marked res
elements of the agrarian policy espoused by the federal government. The forma
cooperatives, communal efforts to encourage profitable agriculture, the employ
methods of cultivation and diversification away from traditional crops, were al
with broader agrarian aspirations. The vital difference in the Sierra, howev
Barrios was the lynch-pin for the successful implementation of such schem
communities needed ploughs, building materials, technical assistance, or even sc
and maps, Indians and non-Indians alike knew that patronage was disp
Cuacuila, the tiny mountain village in the District of Tetela.
How can one summarise Barrios's attitude towards the campesino? His actio
have been contradictory, yet a constant thread exists to help clarify his stance. If

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 Gabriel Barrios Cabrera 279

Jose Maria Barrios's assessment that his father

honest toil could the prize be appreciated, th
Faenas represented the means by which impro
techniques could benefit the earnest campesin
little desire to co-operate, it was essential that B
directed faenas and ensured local compliance.
that he occupied such a position.
Agraristas were placed in another category.
Revolution was all about a struggle for a land
experience. Barrios was raised in an environm
private property and self-sufficiency. Noneth
lenges facing the campesino and the measure
while it would be untrue to suggest that all B
a shared sense of a basic liberal philosophy, few
this Indian patriarch promised was far more
enable them to realise the potential of the lan
As the political tide turned against Barrios,
planted: a brutal cacique who sought to prevent
tional rights. This image discounts the positive e
living standards of his fellow serranos, efforts
federal government's developmentalist policies. S
his removal from the Sierra; others survive
aspects of the cacicazgo. Campesinos in many
during the 1920s; their children benefit from t
extends across the Sierra.
The case of Gabriel Barrios produces very real indications of popular participation. Such
a phenomenon will not, of course, be prominent if the focus of attention is placed upon the
relationships between regional leaders and the federal government: local communities had
negligible direct influence in such matters. Yet sufficient evidence exists to suggest that
Barrios's character and actions were more frequently influenced by local rather than
national factors. Most studies stress a regional leader's need for a source of independent
popular support: support which was best achieved by addressing issues of local concern. In
this respect, Barrios had to strike a balance between representing federal authority and
adopting policies likely to strengthen his role as a patriarch. Juan Francisco Lucas had
provided a working model in the nineteenth century; Barrios adjusted the prototype to
reflect the changed political environment and his need to appeal to a much larger constitu-
ency. In doing so, Barrios became a crucial element in the negotiations between state and
Sierra communities during the post-revolutionary period.
Finally, I believe that the case of Gabriel Barrios Cabrera offers an alternative perspective
for interpretation of the Revolution at the regional level. In times of great change and
turmoil, things were rarely clear-cut. Not all zapatistas were heroic fighters, and not all
federalistas were undisciplined scoundrels. Although Barrios's underlying role was as
a representative ofthe federal government, he was far from subservient to its every wish: his
value to the government lay in his ability to attract popular support, and this frequently
forced him to address issues of local concern. Although he may not have sought social
revolution within the Sierra, he should not be east as the unqualified supporter of the elite
and the ruthless exploiter of the poorer classes. Although Barrios was frequently portrayed

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 280 Keith Brewster

as the enemy of the agrarista, th

campesino.
It is of lesser importance that Barrios's actions during the 1920s were driven more by
pragmatism and personal ambitions than by ideology. Many revolutionaries with firmer
ideological stances ended up as dead heroes: in times of great flux, pragmatism often meant
survival. What is of fundamental importance is that in interpreting federal policies, Barrios
paid due regard to the reactions of the Sierra communities that formed the centre of his
popular support. These reactions, like his own, were inextricably hnked to the past. In
judging the degree to which a regional leader's relationship with his popular constituency
was manipulative or responsive, each case should be judged on its merits. But when making
general conclusions on regional leadership, the strength of local popular influence should
not be underestimated. Gabriel Barrios Cabrera, I would argue, was only one of many
leaders who could not help but reflect the characteristics and interests of the region in which
he was raised and which he came to lead.

NOTES

A greater analysis of the many aspects of Barrios's influence is the subject of my doctoral thesis, Brew
(1995) Caciquismo in Post-revolutionary Mexico: The Case of Gabriel Barrios Cabrera in the Sierra
Puebla. Ph.D. thesis, University of Warwick.
2. Rather than provide a list of individual studies, I refer the reader to a collection of essays that prov
summary of the characteristics of regional leadership in the revolutionary and post-revolutionar
Brading, D. A. (ed.) (1980).
3. Gabriel Barrios had three brothers, Amado, Bardomiano and Demetrio. Amado was kille
during the Revolution in 1916, and Bardomiano died in 1923 in a clash with the Delahuertista
General Cavazos. Demetrio survived to become an important figure within the Barrios cacicazgo d
1920s.
4. Thomson's work on nineteenth century Sierra inter-ethnic and politic relationships provides man
Lucas's regional importance. See: Thomson, G.P.C. (1989; 1990; 1991a; 1993).
5. For details of Barrios's acquisition and retention of power, see: Brewster, K. (1996).
6. El Nacional Revolucionario, 7 June 1930,2nd section, p. 3; La Opinion, 28 May 1930, p. 1; Archivo
la Nacion (Hereafter AGN), INEHRM, c. 13, exp. 20.
7. AGN. Ramo Obregon-Calles, (hereafter AGN, O-Q, 816-P-45. p. 4. Periodico Oficial del Estado
1924. Item no. 19 refers to documentation dated 21 October 1924 notifying the hacienda owner that a
had been received by the local agrarian commission.
8. BibUoteca Luis Cabrera, Zacatlan, RHAM archive, (hereafter BLCRHAM), Caja 1924. Teleg
sent/received December 1924. Telegramme sent on 25 December 1924, by Barrios to General Cruz
Operaciones Militares, Puebla.
9. Archivo de la Defensa Nacional (hereafter ADN), C, 2-1145, f. 398. See letter dated 18 October 192
Comision Nacional Agraria to Ministry of War. Archivo Municipal de Zacatlan (hereafter AMTn),
10,16,1502. In a letter dated 30 June 1932 from Governor Almazan to the municipal president of
appears that one source of friction in the area was based upon land disputes between the ejid
Caidos and neighbouring agraristas in Penuela. ADN, C, 2-1145, f. 544. See letter dated 13 Septem
from the vecinos of Pueblo Nuevo y Penuela to the President.
10. For further details of this network of armed forces see: Brewster (1996).
11. BLCRHAM. Caja 1927. Correspondence for November 1927. Letter dated 3 November 1927
Jefatura, Puebla to Barrios. Letter dated 23 November 1927 from Demetrio Barrios to the Jefatu
12. BLCRHAM. Caja 1928. Documents for March 1928. Letter dated 22 March 1928 from Goberna
Jefatura, Puebla; BLCRHAM. Caja 1927. Documents sent/received July 1927. See letter dated 14 J
sent to the Ministry of War from the local agrarian committee of Tepeyahualco, and letter dated 27 J
sent to Barrios from Alvarez Contreras, commander of the garrison in Libres; Archivo Municipa
(hereafter AML), Justicia, exp. 18, April 1928.

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 Gabriel Barrios Cabrera 281

13. ADN, C, 2-1145, ff. 433-43, 692-94. AU cases were in

14. BLCRHAM. Caja 1925. Letters for October 1925. S
Barrios. Almazan argued that Barrios's forces were th
personally vouch for their high reputation.
15. La Opinion, 11 July 1930, no. 2257, p. 4; La Opinion,
16. ADN, C, 2-1145, ff. 682-91, 941-42; La Opinion, 10 N
17. ADN, Q 2-1145, ff. 579-89.
18. Interview with Jose Maria Barrios, 6 November 199
19. Archivo Municipal de Tetela de Ocampo (hereafter A
24 September 1919 from Miguel Lucas to Carlos B. Zet
20. Archivo de Notarias del Estado de Puebla, Tetela, Caj
transactions relating to the Lucas estate are to be inc
Francisco Lucas by Guy Thomson.
21. The main area of agrarian conflict was the municipalit
cultivation of coffee. In the late nineteenth century, non
conflict ensued as Indian communities fought to reta
uncommon in the harsher climates of the upper Sierra.
Valderrama Rouy, P. and Ramirez Suarez, C. (1993).
22. Throughout the colonial period, the creole elite in Si
community-based voluntary labour (faenas) to harness t
common benefit, faenas were often directed towards pro
local creoles.
23. Throughout the nineteenth century ambitious projects to build canals, roads and railways within the Sierra
had been frustrated by inadequate funding and the technical difficulties associated with the mountainous
terrain. See: Vargas, M. M. (1874); Arriaga, F. J. (1873) gives details of a proposal to build a national highway
linking Zacapoaxtla with Tecolutla in the tierra caliente.
24. Even those who eventually supported Barrios feared the loss of control of faenas. In 1921, Moises Macip
wrote to the governor that faenas could only be obtained through 'moderation, good sense and exquisite tact'.
He implied that Barrios had none of these qualities and that community cooperation was best obtained by
those with relevant experience in handling such delicate matters. See: Archivo Municipal de Zacapoaxtla
(hereafter AMZ'x), Fomento 1921, no. 1380.
25. AMT de O, Caja 86, exp. 1, SCOP. See letter dated 28 September 1943. Interview with Alejandro L. Huerta
Mora (Presidente de aguas, in charge of the Solidaridad committee maintaining the canal), 8 November 1993,
Tonalapa, Tetela. This canal was renovated in 1943, with Barrios and his son, Jose Maria, as the project's
central organising figures.
26. AGN, O-C, 605-T-6. See letter from Obregon dated 21 March 1922.
27. BLCRHAM. Caja 1925. Letters for August 1925. Copy of a declaration of intent signed by the junta on 21
March 1922.

28. AML, Fomento, (1928), exps. 19, 21, 23, 27; AML, Beneficencia (1928), exp. 5; AML. Gobernacion (1928),
exp. 33.
29. AML, Fomento, Circular IV, dated 13 February 1928.
30. BLCRHAM. Caja 1930. Minutes of a meeting held at the presidencia, Concepcion, Atlequizayan, on 5 May 1930.
31. AMZ'x, Instruccion Publica, exp. 18, 1923.
32. BLCRHAM. 1923. Telegrammes received/sent July 1923. Telegramme dated 26 July 1923 from Jose Galvez
to Barrios.
33. AMT de O, Caja 46, Gobernacion, no. 322. See documents dated 20 March 1923.
34. AMT de O, Caja 26, exp. 54, Seguridad Publica. See letter from Barrios to the municipal president of Tetela
informing him of the governor's request for Barrios's cooperation.
35. Archivo Municipal de Cuetzalan (hereafter AMC). Caja 146, Hacienda. See letter from the municipal
president dated 1 March 1920.
36. AMZ'x, Instruccion Publica, exp. 22, 49, (January 1920). BLCRHAM. Caja 1921. Correspondence for
January 1921. See memo. dated 14 January 1921 from the municipal president of Aquixtla to Barrios. AMZ'n,
Instruccion Publica, Caja 16, 26, 169, dated 19 October 1921.
37. ACP. Seccion de leyes, p. 246, dated 8 April 1922. Presumably, the grant became a casualty of
the mounting political pressure that culminated with the removal of the Delahuertista governor,
Manjarrez.

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 282 Keith Brewster

38. BLGRHAM. 1928. Letters for March 1928

Demetrio Barrios.

39. BLGRHAM. Caja 1927. Expediente on schools for (1927-1929). See letter dated 3 May 1928 from the
Director of Federal Schools in Puebla City to Cuacuila's teacher, Baudeho Cananedo.
40. BLCRHAM. Caja 1928. Letters for September 1928. See letter dated 16 September 1928 from Demetrio
Barrios to Salustio Cabrera.
41. BLCRHAM. Caja 1929. See letter dated June 1929 from M. Becerra to Demetrio Barrios.
41 BLCRHAM. Caja 1928. Report dated 17 July 1928.
43. BLCRHAM. Caja 1928. Instruccion. Demetrio Barrios invited all teachers who had assisted in
'Education Orientation Courses and Examinations' to attend a lunch to be held in Zacatlan on 29
December 1928.

44. BLCRHAM. Caja 1929. See paper dated 30 July 1929 entitled La Castellanizacion del indios. See paper dated
13 September 1929 entitled La Brujeria. See various leaflets in the Seccion Pedagogica.
45. AML, Gobernacion, exp. 28,1928.
46. BLCRHAM. Caja 1928. Correspondence January-December 1928. See letter dated 22 October 1928 from
Barrios to the Secretary-general of the state government.

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Distrito de Tlatlauqui promovido ante de la H. Asamblea d
Vargas, y llevado al Hon. Congreso de la Union. Puebla.

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