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Plantinga On God, Freedom, and Evil - Frederick W. Kroon
Plantinga On God, Freedom, and Evil - Frederick W. Kroon
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FREDERICK W. KROON
University of Auckland
Introduction
Is (God) willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing?
then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil? (Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion, Pt. X)
Hume's intention, evidently, was not to charge the theist with maintaining
belief in a God whose ways are fundamentally mysterious, but to drive
home the charge that God's existence appears logically incompatible with
the manifest existence of evil; that the statements:
(1) There is an all powerful, all knowing, wholly perfect being, God
and
this approach is found in his recent God, Freedom, and Evil I (hereafter
called 'GFE'), but there are other formulations in God and Other Minds 2
and in The Nature o f Necessity. 3 These formulations are not identical, but
neither are they essentially different in underlying strategy. In both GFE
and The Nature o f Necessity, there is a much more explicit emphasis on the
role of counterfactuals and greater stress is placed on the fact (if it is a fact)
that the logic of counterfactuals requires that there are possible worlds that
God cannot actualize, thus indicating a clear contrast between a position
like Plantinga's and a Leibnizian theodicy. But while Plantinga's argument
does not seem to have undergone essential changes since it first appeared, I
do not think that GFE presents the most subtle version of the argument. In
fact, the argument in GFE raises a number of serious questions, some of
which are peculiar to the GFE formulation of the argument. This, at least,
is what I claim in the present paper.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 is devoted to a
summary of Plantinga's consistency proof in God, Freedom, and Evil. In
section 2, I point to a rather counterintuitive (but, for Plantinga, extremely
crucial) modal assumption that Plantinga makes - an assumption accord-
ing to which 'it is logically possible for P to ~ ' has a different meaning
from 'there is a logically possible world in which P ~ ' s ' - and I defend an
account of the ascriptions of powers and abilities that makes sense of this
assumption. Having shown that Plantinga's consistency proof clears this
important hurdle, I argue in section 3 that Plantinga's proof in God,
Freedom, and Evil nonetheless fails to demonstrate that perhaps it was not
possible for God to actualize worlds without evil, although (as I argue in
section 4) a superficially similar consistency proof in The Nature o f Neces-
sity is more successful. Section 5 argues the more general thesis that, even
so, all of Plantinga's attempts to show God's existence compatible with
that of evil, including the account in The Nature o f Necessity, suffer from
a certain lack of generality. It is argued in this section that there are a
number of powerful reasons for being dissatisfied with consistency proofs
that (like Plantinga's) categorically rule out the possibility that God could
have brought about any possible state of affairs he wished. In the con-
cluding section (6), I briefly consider the question of the feasibility of
alternative approaches to the problem of evil that do not rule out this
possibility.
existence of evil the theist is required only to prove (1) and (2) above con-
sistent; he is required only to provide a consistency proof. A full theodicy,
one that posits reasons a Supreme Being might have for permitting evil to
exist, does much more, and, in particular, does much more than is needed
to solve the Problem of Evil. Plantinga's consistency proof, which he calls
the Free Will Defense, applies most directly to the case of moral evil. He
believes that his strategy for dealing with the problem of moral evil can be
modified to apply to other arguments from evil (for example, ones which
record the existence of natural evil, or the existence of all the evil the world
actually contains). Since he spends most of his time on the problem of
moral evil, however, we shall do the same.
Here, then, is Plantinga's solution to the logical problem of evil.
Leibniz, so Plantinga thinks, was guilty of an important mistake when he
made the claim that God could have actualized any possible world at all.
Once Leibniz made this mistake, he was naturally led to assert that ours
must be the best of all possible worlds. Since the claim that God could have
actualized any possible world at all is false - Plantinga calls it 'Leibniz's
Lapse' - we are free to reject the highly embarrassing conclusion that this
highly imperfect world is nevertheless the best of all possible worlds. We are
also free to entertain the possibility that perhaps God could not have
actualized worlds containing only moral good and no evil and imperfec-
tion.
This, in fact, is the central lemma on which Plantinga bases his consis-
tency proof. He claims, that is, that it is at least possibly the case that
(3) God could not have actualized a world containing moral good and
no moral evil.
(c) If S were the case, P would go wrong with respect to A. (Or, using
Lewis 's symbolism: S D--- P goes wrong with respect to A.)
Call (4) the principle of Transworld Depravity. Now (4) is a possibly true
statement that, once amended to read that all possible persons suffer from
transworld depravity (including persons that God might have created),
entails (3), which therefore is also possibly true. The argument goes as
follows. Free creatures are necessary to moral value. Now suppose that all
possible creatures are transworld depraved. [This is at least possible, by
(4)]. Let W be a world in which allthe creatures in W always freely do what
is morally right, and let P be any such creature. Since P is transworid de-
praved, there is an action A with respect to which P is free in W and which
is morally significant for P in W, and there is a maximal world segment S
included in W, but containing nothing about the outcome of P's free
choice regarding A, such that the following counterfactual is true:
(c) S []--" P goes wrong with respect to A.
Now God can actualize W only by actualizing S and leaving P free with
respect to A. But in that case [as counterfactual (c) tells us] P will go wrong
with respect to A, and hence the resultant state of affairs will not be W
after all. Hence God cannot actualize such morally perfect worlds W.
If Plantinga is right, then the following three statements are mutually
consistent:
and
Thus (1) and (6) [which is a version of the unadorned (2): there is evil] are
79
Has Plantinga proved his case in GFE? Well, consider the following
response. On the standard view,
means
and
means
(9) I f God actualizes a world W in which S is the case and P freely goes
right with respect to A, then (c) is not true in that world, and hence
W is not (~).
But from (9) it cannot be inferred that it was not in God's power to
actualize such a world, but at most (if at all" see section 3 below) that it was
not in God's power to actualize a world in which S is the case, in which P
freely goes right with respect to A, and in which (c) is true.
As a matter of fact, however, there is a defense available to Plantinga,
one which requires him to reject the analysis of (7) in terms of (8). I shall
attempt here to reconstruct this defense, hopefully in a more perspicuous
way than has been done by Plantinga himself. Consider locutions like 'it is
possible for me to play tennis tomorrow', 'it is in my power to get you a
good teaching position', 'I am able to join you for lunch tomorrow, should
you want me to join you'. For want of a better term, call these 'personal-
modal ascriptions', or 'p-modal ascriptions'. P-modal ascriptions form an
interesting class of modal ascriptions, not least because they seem to resist
easy translation into the usual possible world parlance. To say that
is not to say that there are logically possible worlds in which I play tennis
tomorrow, or technologically possible worlds in which I play tennis to-
morrow. It is, instead, to say that the exercise tomorrow of my ability at
tennis is compossible with all the constraints the world actually imposes on
the exercise of this ability tomorrow, constraints such as physical laws,
limitations of time and space, previous arrangements, and so on. A certain
amount of flexibility in the identification of these actual constraints is
inevitable and of some significance. One is often able to challenge the truth
of a statement such as
that if you are easily persuaded it is in my power after all to get you to vote
in a certain way: in my indirect power, not my direct power.
This suggests a two-level account of what is in P's power, with both steps
involving an appeal to 'actual constraints'. We have already seen how a
person's direct powers are generally a function of constraints imposed by
the actual world. The second level, which requires the application of a
certain kind of counterfactual ('if P were to do A, then B would result'),
similarly regards the actual world as a system which determines what can,
or cannot, result contingently from the performance of certain actions
which are within a person's direct control. The existence of this second
level makes disputes about what agents can directly undertake (intendings,
basic actions, etc.) seem less important, for it seems intuitively likely that
there will be basic agreement at least about what agents have it in their
power, direct or indirect, to bring about.
An 'actual constraints' analysis can now be applied to God in much the
same way as we have applied it to humans. According to Plantinga, there
are certain states of affairs even God cannot directly bring about, so that
his power to bring these about, if he indeed has that power, can only be an
indirect power, one whose scope is determined to a certain extent by the
way the world actually is. Just as I have no direct control over whether the
universe will end with a bang or a whimper, unlike God, so God has no
direct control over whether or not I freely keep a certain promise, unlike
me. And if there is nothing God can do that would result in my freely
keeping a promise I should keep, then he doesn't even have indirect control
over whether or not I freely keep this promise. In that case, it is simply not
in God's power to actualize a world in which I freely keep all my promises.
The only relevant difference between God and his creatures is that, being
all powerful, God is constrained by few of the contingencies that constrain
his creatures.
According to the 'actual constraints' analysis, then we have something
like this:
I still have some qualms about this formulation. In particular, the counter-
factual 'P does T Fq--- A' was chosen to symbolize 'were P to do T, A
would result', but the latter locution looks a causal locution, unlike the
bare 'P does T [~--" A'. (The difference can be vividly brought out by
83
noting that, on the standard semantic analysis, 'P does T [ ] ~ A' is true
whenever P does T and A is the case.) Maybe, therefore, account (AC)
should be amended to yield a tighter connection between possible actions
on P's part and those possible states of affairs whose actualization results
from P's actions. ~ In any case, the 'only if' part of (AC) will be part of any
truly comprehensive 'actual constraints' thesis about what agents can bring
about; and, as we shall see later, it is the only part of (AC) that can be
considered to play a necessary role in Plantinga's consistency proof.
What about the locution 'it is logically possible for P to do X?' It is
usually thought that if it is logically possible for God to do X then it is also
in God's power to do X; which perhaps casts doubt on account (AC) as
applied to God. But we can give a similar 'actual constraints' analysis of 'it
is logically possible for P to do X'. Sentences of this latter form can, in
fact, be understood in at least two different ways, only one of which makes
it a p-modal ascription. On the standard reading, the following is true:
(Q) it is logically possible for P to bring about A iff there is some action
X which is in P's direct control, assuming no non-logical limitations
on what is in P's direct control, such that P does X [ ~ A is the
case.
The two analyses differ. Suppose that God exists in the actual world, and
suppose that in the actual world there is nothing God's creatures can
possibly do that will let their breaking his moral laws remain unpunished.
(I am assuming that God's creatures are necessarily under God's control.)
Then (i) it is not logically possible (in the actual world) for a person P to
break God's moral code with impunity, even though (ii) there are possible
worlds in which P breaks God's moral code with impunity (worlds in which
God is more merciful, for example). In this example, (i) is based on the
'actual constraints' analysis (Q), while (ii) is based on the standard analysis
(L). The example quite clearly brings out the curiously indexical nature of
84
The statement
that
(d) God brings it about that S U]--, P goes wrong with respect to A.
But (d) does not follow from (c). S, being a maximal world segment, may
contain states of affairs that God cannot directly bring about (states of
affairs such as Curley's freely refraining from accepting a certain bribe),
and hence, if God is able to actualize S at all under these circumstances, he
can only do it indirectly. By the 'actual constraints' analysis (AC), it is in
God's power to bring about S indirectly if there is some state of affairs T
which God can directly bring about such that
To derive (d) from (c) and (e) is impossible, however, without committing
the fallacy of transitivity,' the fallacy of using the invalid inferential
scheme:
p [3--} q,
q [~--} r,
therefore p []--} r.
At this point, Plantinga may respond that we have lost sight of the nature
of the S's that feature in the relevant counterfactuals (c) and (e). They are
supposed to be maximal world-segments, possible worlds with single holes
in them, and hence a maximal world-segment S that leaves the result of one
of Curley's free choices undetermined contains either (i) God's doing T or
(ii) the complement of this state of affairs. In either case, (c) and (e)
logically entail (d). The non-trivial case is that where S contains God's
doing T, and in this case the inference is essentially of the form
p [~ q,
[] (q D P),
q I~-~ r,
.'. p E]-" r,
87
(c') Even if God had brought it about that P was reared in a socially and
materially enriched environment, P would still have told lies,
broken promises, and so on.
Should we agree, then, that Plantinga has effectively answered those who,
like Hume, see the existence of evil as a logical problem for the theist? I do
89
(c**) God does T ~ --" P goes wrong with respect to A (or: had God
done T, P might have gone wrong with respect to A).
and
the actual constraints limiting God's indirect power. The resultant account
does admit that there is an important difference between the case of God
and the case of humans: God's direct powers are so much greater than
ours, after all. But the account does not admit any 'in principle' difference
between the case of God and the case of humans. God, like his creatures,
acts against the background of the actual world. More of the actual world
is directly attributable to him than to us, of course, but nonetheless the dif-
ference looks, in an important sense, quantitative only. This startingly
anthropomorphic conclusion is the price we pay for idealizing the 'actual
constraints' analysis for ordinary p-modal ascriptions to yield an 'actual
constraints' analysis of statements about God's power.
We can see how suspicious we should be of Plantinga's claim that he has
conclusively refuted Leibniz's Lapse. Leibniz certainly would not have
been able to make sense of God's actualizing the actual world against the
background of the actual world itself; or of God's power being to some
degree a function of the way the world actually is. Leibniz like Plantinga,
agrees that God is in no way responsible for what humans do, but for
Leibniz this means something entirely different from what it means for
Plantinga. It means that before God ever actualized anything humans and
other substances subsisted sub rationepossibilitatis, i.e., as conceptualized
possibilities whose existence as possibilia God could not have prevented.
This clearly does not mean that certain contingent counterfactuals about
humans perhaps constitute the actual constraints against which God
actualizes a possible world. For Leibniz, there just cannot be states of
affairs that constitute actual constraints against which God actualizes a
possible world, for the possibility of any state of affairs can only be the
result of God's free decision to actualize some substance that, until actual-
ized, only subsists sub ratione possibilitatis. ,2
Why, then, does Plantinga continue to think that he has conclusively re-
futed Leibniz's Lapse? It is, no doubt, because he thinks that it is at least
logically possible that humans are free in a very strong, incompatibilist
sense that rules out causal pre-determination, so that Leibniz too has to
face the fact that there are certain possible states of affairs God cannot
strongly actualize, cannot directly bring about. But Leibniz would certainly
not grant Plantinga the starting premise that humans are at least possibly
free in the strong sense Plantinga favours. To leave a person free in that
sense would be, for Leibniz, to bring about the existence of a being whose
individual concept is radically incomplete, and this is impossible on
Leibniz's understanding of possible substances and possible worlds.
Persons are, for Leibniz, rather like characters from a novel. They are
certainly free, but not in a transcendent sense of freedom that excludes all
causal pre-determination of their actions. Characters from novels certainly
do not lead lives that are, in such a transcendent sense, independent of their
92
versions of the logical problem o f evil whose premise about evil is a reason-
able statement o f the nature and scope o f the evil in the world; and Plantin-
ga's approach is, to that extent, limited in application. Plantinga argues (in
GFE and elsewhere) that his strategy can be adapted to deal with versions
o f the logical problem o f evil that specify in some detail what kind o f evil
there is (e.g., natural evil as well as human sin), and how much there is. But
consider the following statement about evil:
( 2 " ) There is natural and moral evil which an all powerful being could
have prevented, and whose prevention would have resulted in a
better world.
It is not necessary for the critic to explore whether evil spirits, mischievous fairies, clumsy
Homeric gods, or the like, can be shown possiblyto be the cause of certain kinds of evil. This
is to rest the theist's case on a purely sceptical, unreal doubt. I'
6. Conclusion
This inference is, I think, fallacious. Rather than rest a consistency proof
on the denial of the antecedent in (P2) (Leibniz and Plantinga both do this),
we would do well to consider the possibility of consistency proofs that
simply deny (P2) itself. One way of breaking the logical link between (PI)
and (P2) was assayed by Robert Merrihew Adams in his "Must God Create
the Best?" is In his article, Adams argues that on the Christian conception
of the moral ideal there is no reason for believing that a wholly good God
would have actualized the best possible world (supposing that there is a
best world). An alternative way of breaking the link is to accept a principle
like:
(who similarly holds that the negative utility of suffering is off-set by the
positive utility of a sufficient amount of good). But philosophies like
classical utilitarianism aside, the intuition seems a powerful one, and
presents a continuing obstacle to the articulation of hoped-for alternative
approaches to the problem of evil.
NOTES
17. Plantinga, in GFE and elsewhere, criticizes a number of different principles about omni-
benevolence. One he does not criticize is the principle that a wholly good, all-knowing,
and all-powerful being eliminates all evil it can properly eliminate (i.e., can eliminate
without causing more evil or getting rid of an outweighing good). Through his Free Will
Defense, Plantinga instead attempts to show that it is possible that there is much evil
that God cannot properly eliminate.