Coalitions, Commercialization and Corruption: João Havelange and The Transformation of FIFA

Running head: Coalitions, Commercialization and Corruption 1
Coalitions, Commercialization and Corruption:
João Havelange and the Transformation of FIFA
Stephen C. Crawford, M.A. Candidate
Southeastern Louisiana University
Term paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Comm 627. Ethical Issues in
Organizational Communication. Southeastern Louisiana University, Hammond, La. 26
November 2020. The student named as the author certifies that this is an original piece of
literature entirely written by the student that conforms to all class requirements and is free of
plagiarism.
Coalitions, Commercialization and Corruption 2
Abstract
FIFA is the worldwide governing body of organized football, also known as soccer. The latter
term is more common in North America, but both are often used interchangeably worldwide.
Following World War II, FIFA swelled with new member associations from developing
countries, primarily located within Africa and Asia. Brazilian Joáo Havelange, aspiring to
become the first non-European president of FIFA, was elected to the position in 1974 largely
aided by voting blocs composed of the new associations that had been marginalized due to their
own outsider origins. To fulfill campaign obligations, such as assurances that the World Cup
tournament would be expanded to include participants from the previously underrepresented
continents, Havelange would partner with sports marketing pioneer to trade valuable broadcast
and licensing rights in exchange for kickbacks that would fund the progress he had promised.
Havelange would become a soccer revolutionary, as his presidency would substantially increase
the visibility of the game and facilitate access for millions, but his legacy is characterized by
systematic corruption and unethical self-enrichment practices that have continued under
subsequent leadership. With no mechanisms for enforcing accountability there appears to be
little to dissuade FIFA’s leaders from taking part, so it is crucial that future leaders come forward
to promote a new approach to governance if the world’s game is to regain purity lost due to
FIFA’s corrupt culture.
Keywords: FIFA, football, soccer, World Cup, Joáo Havelange, Pelé, Horst Dassler,
Adidas, ISL, sports marketing, corruption.
COALITIONS, COMMERCIALIZATION AND CORRUPTION:
JOÁO HAVELANGE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FIFA
Background
Federacion Internationale de Football Association, commonly known as FIFA, was formed in
1906 to establish standards for the game of soccer that would be enforced across boundaries and
has since grown to a size of more than 200 member associations from across the globe. FIFA
operates in four-year cycles that coincide with the World Cup, which is largely responsible for
generating revenue of around $5 billion in the most recent cycle. Bruce W. Bean (2016) of
Michigan State University’s College of Law, author of multiple works regarding FIFA,
emphasizes the remarkable fact that FIFA has virtually no responsibility to outside authority,
thus promoting a culture where officials regularly manipulate the game to serve their own
agendas. That FIFA is headquartered in Switzerland is no coincidence. Bean (2017) notes that
the Swiss government has long ignored scandals tied to FIFA, and its secretive banking laws
provide advantages to those with unethical motives (Bean, 2017). In her analysis of scandals in
the World Cup bidding process, Allison Cottle (2019) of the John Marshall Law School
identifies FIFA as marked by corruption. If the claim is true, FIFA’s Code of Ethics, which fills
more than 50 pages, is a curious piece of literature. The Code of Ethics (2019) preamble states
that the code exists “to protect the image of football, and especially that of FIFA, from jeopardy
or harm as a result of illegal, immoral or unethical methods and practices.” This appears to be a
statement from a proud organization determined to prevent corruption and unethical acts in the
name of fair play and respect, but FIFA is practically as famous for corruption as it is for
governing soccer.
Figure 1
FIFA Budget, Revenue and Investments. 2015–2018
Standardizing the Game
Leaders from the French, Belgian, Danish, Dutch, Spanish, Swedish and Swiss football
associations signed the agreement to establish governance over associations that until then hadn’t
been required to abide by rules set forth by one another, including those to regulate laws of the
game, restrict players from simultaneously competing in different associations, and enforce
disciplinary across boundaries (FIFA, 2007). FIFA grew modestly for nearly a half century and
entered the postwar era governing 60 national associations, but that number would more than
double in just two decades (Gill et al., 2019). FIFA’s restructure was completed in 1966 with the
addition of its sixth confederation in Oceania, which joined confederations in Europe, the
Americas, Africa, and Asia. Still, it continued to operate in unremarkable form, conducting
business from out of home and with a small staff assisting leaders whose decisions were
becoming increasingly consequential (Gill et. al, 2019). Growth of the game would bring
substantial change, and FIFA would soon be transformed into a monolith with unchecked power
to sway outcomes and unilaterally punish non-compliance.
João Havelange’s Rise in Brazil

Pelé, the Brazilian star often hailed as the game’s greatest player, described football as “the
beautiful game” in his 1977 autobiography. His influence was strong enough for the phrase to
soon be universally adopted. Pelé led Brazil to consecutive FIFA World Cup wins in 1958 and
1962, and again in 1970, elevating his status to that of a godlike figure, and his global appeal
would lead Sports Illustrated to proclaim him to be the world’s most famous athlete (Axthelm,
1966, p. 77). Pelé’s dominance throughout the 1960s would make his name synonymous with
the game of football, and his worldwide popularity would one day be converted into power for
João Havelange, president of Brazil’s sports confederation, to use in his pursuit of the FIFA
presidency as he would attempt to become its first non-European president.
Jean-Marie Faustin Goedefroid “João” Havelange may well have considered leading
Brazilian sports his destiny. Havelange competed twice for Brazil in the Olympic Games, first as
a swimmer in 1936 and later in 1952 in water polo. Transitioning from athlete to administrator,
Havelange began his career began with a pair of administrative stints for Sao Paulo based clubs,
first as treasurer for Botafogo, and later as director at Esperia. Success would propel him to the
presidency of Sao Paulo’s Swimming Association, where he would hone the skill of striking
questionable deals (Vonnard & Sbetti, 2018). Havelange used his growing influence to boost his
crony Silvio Pacheco into the Brazilian Sports Confederation, and the favor would be returned
when Pacheco promoted Havelange to become Brazil’s national director of water sports in 1954
(Vonnard & Sbetti, 2018). In just two more years he would be the confederation’s president after
a landslide election in which he won nearly 90 percent of the 177 votes that were cast (Vonnard
& Sbetti, 2018).
An Imperative for Success

Havelange progressively reformed the national associations in a style that would reappear
years later in his global management of FIFA. He didn’t shy away from making deals to improve
the organization’s image, particularly those which offered funds that could be repaid on a
deferred basis. His presidency also benefitted from what could be described as the single-biggest
event in Brazil’s sporting history, as his tenure coincided with the rise of the dominant Pelé. The
1960s would be turbulent in Brazil after a coup d'état replaced the government with military rule,
but Havelange and his national team would benefit from a leader in need of high-profile victories
to increase support for his administration. Emílio Garrastazu Médici, Brazil’s fifth president
since the coup, led the country into the 1970s with a rapidly growing economy despite the
increasing authoritarianism under the military government. State University of New York at
Stony Brook professor of history Robert Levine (1979) noted Medici’s association with the
squad would grow increasingly closer. Any love of the game from Medici aside, it was almost
certainly an act of reputation management as Levine (1979) suggests the government had used
team’s popularity to its advantage since its first World Cup win in 1958. Aided by Medici’s
resources, Brazil won its third World Cup in 1970, arguably the most memorable of the team’s
five in the competition. Havelange was rewarded with additional capital to continue pursuing of
Brazilian greatness on the pitch, and essentially had free reign to make decisions for the benefit
of Brazil’s national team as well as his own. (Chaim, 2016).
FIFA’s Postwar Expansion
Decolonization following World War II created several nation-states that would remain
largely unaffiliated with the era’s major political influences, resulting in their being classified
into what would become known as the Third World. Christine Eisenberg of Berlin’s Humboldt
University (2005) noted that by participating in international competitions, these new countries
would receive recognition of their existence and their independent status would be strengthened
as a result. The rapid increase in membership robbed Europeans control of the organization and
cleared a path for new leadership to emerge with the aid of coalitions made of the new members
(Eisenberg, 2005). Paul Darby of Ulster University in Northern Ireland (2003) believes FIFA
leadership quickly became uneasy with Havelange’s presence. President Sir Stanley Rous
refused to enforce the “one nation, one vote" principle that would likely shift a substantial
amount of power to new members from Africa and Asia. Seeing this, Havelange began to ponder
what it would take to establish himself as a viable candidate for the FIFA presidency in 1974.
Fellow South American leaders from Argentina and Uruguay lauding his work as the architect of
Brazil’s World Cup victories, kickstarting his candidacy and an effort to coopt support from
associations that Rous had marginalized (Darby, 2003).
Leveraging a Superstar
Pelé’s international retirement following Brazil’s 1970 victory did little to stifle the
excitement that surrounded him. Anibal Chaim (2016) of the University of Sao Paulo noted that
his worldwide presence didn’t diminish, and he remained the biggest name in world football.
Pelé became essential to Havelange’s strategy for winning the FIFA presidency. His association
with Pelé during this time is representative of his willingness to gain, or coerce, support from
those who could deliver it. Chaim (2016) argues that Havelange was quick to exploit Pelé s
financial need following a series of bad investments he made. With debt rapidly growing, Pelé
made a deal that would essentially make him a valuable PR tool for the campaign to utilize as it
accumulated the number of delegates necessary to form a winning coalition (Chaim, 2016)
Havelange wouldn’t accomplish this with money of his own. Instead, funds from the Brazilian
sports federation would be directed to cover Havelange’s obligation to Pelé.

According to Chaim (2016), more than 40 of the delegates with voting rights would request
time with the star, and Havelange frequently arranged for Pelé to travel with his professional
club, Santos F.C., to create excitement among the delegates he needed to secure (Chaim, 2016).
Merely suggesting Pelé’s presence was powerful would be an understatement. A tale marked
with uncertainty, but corroborated by Santos (2019) nonetheless, claims that an exhibition
featuring Pelé that took place amidst Nigeria’s civil war led to a temporary cease fire to allow the
match to safely be played. Even if the legend could be disproved, the fact that it hasn’t
disappeared entirely over half a century later suggests Pelé’s ability to strengthen Havelange’s
bid.
In a strategy designed to gain support of the newer, smaller delegates, Havelange sought to
strengthen perceptions of his ability by hosting a World Cup-style tournament in Brazil as part of
a nationwide celebration (Chaim, 2016). While the tournament wasn’t sanctioned by FIFA,
Havelange strategically invited Rous to inspect his plans and offer advice, but as the competition
neared Havelange would receive a shock when many of soccer’s world powers withdrew from
the competition, reportedly due to technical problems (Chaim, 2016). The withdrawals were a
product of growing resentment of Havelange among Rous’s supporters, and Havelange offered
an indirect acknowledgement of the issue, simply stating that he understood his candidacy was
becoming troubling to many (Chaim, 2016). Their absences would be costly, however, as
Havelange’s tournament became what Chaim (2016) suggests was a de facto convention of
associations favoring Havelange. He spared no expense hosting the competition, primarily using
funds from the Brazilian sports federation. Havelange covered the cost of travel and lodging and
would provide countless artifacts, such as commemorative pins and posters, to mark the occasion
(Chaim, 2016). Even as the excesses became known, Havelange remained above censure,
evidenced by the proclamation of an official that stated questionable acts that strengthened his
bid for the presidency were pardonable (Chaim, 2016). Havelange would soon be given an
opportunity to apply the same questionable methods on a bigger scale.
The 1974 Election
Following a lengthy campaign full of global travel to solidify relationships and secure votes,
Havelange defeated Rous at FIFA’s 1974 congress by a count of 68 – 52 and handed FIFA’s old
guard a stunning defeat. Darby (2003) argues that Rous and his supporters underestimated
the Brazilian’s campaign and the effect of his strategy to court the less influential associations.
Havelange's assurances to voters of a World Cup with an increased number of participants from
their confederations were effective, but the potential for the current divide to widen even further
was likely an equally powerful force (Darby, 2003). Perhaps Rous was sunk by his colonialist
bent that was rapidly growing unfashionable, specifically by only lightly punishing the South
African Football Association despite its systematic discrimination. Chris Bolsmann (2009) of
Aston University in England argues the “absurdity of apartheid football” was on display when
SAFA requested permission to field a non-white side in the 1966 World Cup qualifying stages
along with an additional request of the same for an all-white squad in 1970. Bolsmann (2009)
notes that the South Africans would later suffer a lengthy expulsion but the slow run up
reinforced beliefs among African associations regarding Rous’s priorities. Additionally, it would
be unwise to entirely discount anonymous claims that Havelange secured votes by placing
“small, brown envelopes into big, black hands (Phillips, 2011).” Regardless of why, it was clear
that the control of FIFA was slipping away from the formerly chosen few. The old guard would
be left to witness the transformation of world football.
A Culture Rich in Corruption

Bean (2017) concedes that organizational corruption isn’t endemic to FIFA. Governing
bodies of all kinds are regularly entangled in scandals, and those without geographical
limitations are particularly susceptible (Bean, 2017). The International Olympic Committee
(IOC), for example, is rarely far from unethical practices concerning the financial and sporting
aspects of competitions it presumably regulates (Bean, 2017). Like FIFA, the IOC is
headquartered in Switzerland and operates with few worries of in the way of accountability.
Interestingly, Havelange was also a longtime IOC member and his decisions as its representative
would later be scrutinized as well (Reider-Gordon, 2014). Scandal is so prevalent that it often
passes with little notice, evident in Bean’s (2017) compilation of recent events that involve
politicians, international bankers, and automobile industry executive, to name a few. In most
cases, organizations and their offending members are presumably held at least somewhat
accountable for violations of ethics and trust. Because of that, Bean (2017) suggests a
structure that allows major offenses to pass with little worry is simply baffling.
Havelange wouldn’t waste time to developing strategies for accumulate the resources
necessary for fulfilling promises, the biggest being assurances that the World Cup would expand
to 24 teams from the 16-team format used since its inception (Gill et al., 2019). Even before
Havelange made soccer more visible than ever, the sport had long been the world’s most popular
(Giulaianotti & Robertson, 2004). However, it was presented far differently than the modern
product based on the inseparability of sports and marketing. Today’s broadcasts are saturated
with sponsorships and advertisements that have contributed to the sports industry’s global value
growing into the hundreds of millions (Manoli, 2018). At the outset of Havelange’s presidency,
however, sports commercialization was in its infancy. Havelange recognized the potential value
that could result a more intense relationship between FIFA, global sponsors and the fledgling
sports marketing firms that would soon develop countless opportunities for FIFA to profit by
licensing of its properties (Gill et al., 2019). Along with Sepp Blatter, FIFA’s newly appointed
technical director, Havelange began building partnerships with some of the world’s most
recognizable brands, many of which remain in existence. A relationship with Adidas would be
among the most consequential, as the German shoe company’s leader was on the way to
becoming a sports marketing revolutionary. The alliance rapidly changed the marketing and
commercialization practices in the sporting industry, and FIFA would soon have a new look.
Horst Dassler and the Adidas Influence
Horst Dassler, without question, was a sports marketing pioneer. The son of Adidas founder
Adi Dassler, Horst’s influence transformed the popular shoe company into much more, as sports
equipment and apparel would account for half of Adidas’s sales by 1970 (Jones et al., 2016). In a
Harvard Business School case study, Jones et al. (2016) note that Adi Dassler initially resisted
the idea of an expansion beyond sneakers, but Horst’s vision was the driving force that cemented
the company’s place as an industry leader. The rising profile attracted new interests as German
clubs would begin turning to Adidas for uniforms, equipment and other training gear, and it
produced uniforms that would be worn by 80 percent of athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games.
British investigative reporter Andrew Jennings (2011) claims Dassler’s clout provided the means
to help “useful men” gain powerful positions from which they would reciprocate by presenting
countless opportunities for Horst to further elevate Adidas’s status (Jennings, 2011). With their
similar philosophies it’s not surprising a partnership would develop upon between the two, but
the underlying relationship between Havelange and Dassler that would be a powerful influence
on FIFA’s corrupt culture that presently still survives. The emerging alliance would indeed
elevate football to new heights, and the disregard for ethical choices would drive the duo to use
their growing influence for personal gain.
Horst Dassler was supporter of Stanley Rous during his presidency. However, a meeting with
Havelange and a keen understanding of his strategy was apparently enough to convert Dassler, as
he was spotted applauding the as the election results were announced (Jones, et al., 2016).
Maybe Havelange attracted Dassler, or perhaps vice versa, but the budding partnership would
quickly provide the duo with substantial control over the governance and finances of world
football (Jones et al., 2016). Dassler recognized Havelange’s need of resources for fulfilling his
campaign promises, primarily to expand the World Cup and increase representation from the
African and Asian confederations (Jones et al., 2016). In what Jones et al. suggest was an
informal arrangement, Havelange agreed to apply his influence and the world soccer stage to
promote Adidas in exchange for the financial backing necessary for the realization of his World
Cup vision. Dassler agreed, but he understood that Adidas alone couldn’t supply the necessary
resources. Dassler began to look outside his own company, soon to make the acquaintance of
Patrick Nally, a partner in a small public relations firm that had begun to focus on sports
marketing.
West Nally, SMPI and ISL
Sponsorships had not been entirely nonexistent, but Garry Whannel (2009) of the University
of Bedfordshire argues that the 1970s ushered in the era of capitalist rationalization and
intensified the relationship between commercialization and sports. Growing television audiences
inspired a parade of new ideas, including strategies to develop effective marketing and
sponsorship opportunities (Philips & Whannel, 2013). Patrick Nally’s firm, West and Nally,
successfully convinced cigarette brand Benson & Hedges to sponsor an English cricket event,
and the deal would lead to a longstanding presence of the brand at sporting events around the
country. The success inspired Dassler to eagerly join with Nally to create a new firm to focus
exclusively on sports marketing (Jones et al., 2016). Favorable tax laws led the duo to base the
firm in Monte Carlo, the basis for its name of Société Monégasque de Promotion Internationale
(SMPI).
Havelange, already a partner of West Nally, continued with SMPI to develop strategies for
elevating the World Cup, already among the most popular global events. FIFA’s first
monumental campaign was a partnership with Coca-Cola. The soft drink giant’s distinctive
brand would be prominent in FIFA’s global football development program, and Coca-Cola
would provide access that allowed FIFA to utilize its well-developed marketing infrastructure to
streamline the distribution process (Gill et al., 2019). Coca-Cola would expand its role by
becoming the venue sponsor for the 1977 World Youth Championship, at which its red and white
logo consumed the fences that surrounded playing fields. However, Jones et. al (2016) points to
the 1978 World Cup as the ultimate target. By the time the 1978 arrived, SMPI was an
experienced buyer and seller of FIFA sponsorship and broadcasting rights, proven by another
escalation of its partnership with Coca-Cola that produced an $8 million sponsorship agreement
(Jones et al., 2016). The successful partnership with Coca-Cola reinforced Nally’s belief that
SMPI was a growing force in the young industry, as Jones et al. (2016) quotes his claim that
“anyone convincing Coke to do something is on their way, because anything Coca-Cola does has
to be a success.”
The partnership was a “big bang” that created a new world of inseparable partners and began
marketing practices so common in modern sports. On-screen graphics, sideline and scoreboard
advertisements and even uniforms of teams from around the world are marked with the logos of
corporate sponsors that are so common they are often easy to overlook. These strategies are
offshoots of approaches pioneered by SMPI more than a generation ago. Selling the rights for
brands to become “official FIFA partners” for virtually any product would prove to be lucrative,
as Jones et al. (2016) notes that the 1982 World Cup was flooded with sponsorships from food
and drink brands, tobacco companies and countless other products marketed “FIFA preferred”
products. Havelange and Dassler were not only reaching their goal of increasing the
commercialization of the game and increasing its popularity, but the pair were enjoying personal
benefits as well.
Havelange and Dassler were also developing greater capacities to influence those who might
obstruct their plans. As the 1978 World Cup concluded, the era of 16 teams was also scheduled
to end. Havelange focused his attention on the next edition scheduled for 1982 in Spain, but the
host country became uneasy with the prospect of paying the costs associated with eight
additional squads and their entourages (Jones et al., 2016). To resolve the issue that jeopardized
his plan for expansion and imperiled his ability to fulfill campaign promises made a decade
earlier, Havelange turned to Dassler and SMPI for financial aid. A $23 million payment to defray
the added costs was made to Spanish officials, though the payment wouldn’t suffice on its own
and Havelange would again seek out a partner for an exchange of influence, finding it in Juan
Antonio Samaranch, a Spanish sporting official with whom he was familiar with as an IOC
member (Jones et al., 2016). Samaranch successfully sold the Spanish government on the plan
and Havelange reciprocated by quietly working to create a voting bloc that would supply the
votes necessary for Samaranch to win the IOC presidency in its impending election (Schudel,
2016).
The Havelange and SMPI partnership continued to pay dividends, but Nally became
increasingly uneasy with what his role become and how far he had strayed from his original
goals. Nally contended it was FIFA and Dassler that were the real winners, but his growing
concern was the firm’s disregard of its supposed responsibilities, leaving him questioning
whether his duty was to SMPI’s clients or to the interests of Dassler (Jones et al., 2016). The
conflict would lead to his departure from SMPI, which was absorbed into Dassler’s newest
venture, International Sports and Leisure Marketing (ISL), for continuing pursuits in sports
marketing. In the years following their uncertain beginning, Havelange and Dassler had
transformed nearly every aspect of world football aside from the game itself, and Havelange
didn’t shy away from praising Dassler for his efforts that were crucial to FIFA’s wild success.
Jones et al. (2016) share accounts of Dassler being referred to as the “boss of sport” by one
commentator and a “puppet master” by another. His influence had been so impactful to FIFA
that Havelange would make claims to suggest it was Coca-Cola and not FIFA that was the
greatest beneficiary from their partnership, in contrast to FIFA’s having once piggybacked onto
Coke’s global network to expand its own reach. (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998). Havelange’s
strategic partnerships that repeatedly flouted ethical practices had produced growth likely in
excess of what he had envisioned, but Bean (2019) argues the progress didn't come cheap, as
Havelange had essentially been “bought and paid for” by Dassler, a claim that would suggest
puppet master to be an appropriate moniker.
Trouble with Pelé
Havelange would continue his relentless efforts to further grow FIFA, and he would rarely
encounter resistance. In what would be a crowning achievement of his presidency, Havelange’s
influence directed the 1994 World Cup to be rewarded to the United States, arguably the most
valuable markets. The event would be a breakthrough for soccer in the United States, with record
attendance from full venues across the country (U.S. Soccer, n.d.). The record-breaking World
Cup would also be the impetus for the establishment of the U.S. based professional league,
Major League Soccer (MLS), which has flourished in the decades since (Miller, 2019). The
event wouldn’t be without issue, however, as Havelange would be scrutinized for publicly
banning Pelé, once a powerful ally, from participating in events associated with the tournament
(Goldstein, 2016).
The banning was in response to Pelé’s allegations that the president of Brazil’s sports
federation and Havelange’s son in law, Ricardo Teixeira, refused to grant broadcast rights for the
Brazilian championships to a group that included Pelé after it refused to pay a $1 million bribe
(Pendleton, 2005). The winning bid was for an amount of $1 million less than what was offered
by Pelé’s group, and the Havelange reportedly offered support for the winning bid (Pendleton,
2005). Perhaps for decades Pele harbored resentment toward Havelange for the exhaustive use of
his star power, and Havelange may have never recovered from Pelé’s refusal to unretire and
rejoin his national team. Regardless, the relationship that was once so productive had decayed,
and Havelange would not hide his paternalistic contempt, painting Pelé as an ungrateful recipient
of the opportunities he had been given, and he would make intention to guard the interests of
those closest to him at any cost (Pendleton, 2005) Removing Pelé from World Cup events robbed
the United States of what may have been the only recognizable soccer player to most Americans,
as the game had never been among the nation’s most popular sports. Banning Pelé was of little
consequence, as the record-breaking numbers imply, but the decision to block the superstar from
participating in an event of such importance suggests Havelange was making his decisions in the
absence of fear. Instead of remorse for years of control over the star, Havelange was apparently
comfortable reinforcing his grip.
The feud wouldn’t end with the 1994 World Cup. Pelé would become Brazil’s minister of
sports, and he would prioritize ending the corruption he feared would destroy the beloved game
(Pendleton, 2005). He introduced a bill designed to loosen restrictions and increase opportunities
for player free agency. Additionally, it would mandate that disputes be independently reviewed
and establish independent oversight of officials, both of which would decrease the sports
federation’s control over football in the Brazil (Associated Press, 1997). Havelange asserted
FIFA’s supremacy by stating that referees and tribunals are subordinate to national associations
(“Brazil Face World Cup Axe”, 1997). Havelange’s powerful influence on Brazilian sports, and
the persistent conflict between Pelé and Teixeira,
implies the decision was personal. Pelé’s pursuit of regulations continued, however, as the star
would refer to Havelange as “arrogant dictator” intent on controlling the game in Brazil
(Associated Press, 1997). Havelange responded with by threatening the unthinkable, warning of
the possibility of Brazil’s expulsion from the upcoming World Cup if the association continued
in defiance of FIFA (“Brazil Face World Cup Axe”, 1997). The pursuit of independent oversight
continued despite the warnings, and what had become known as the Pelé Law would ultimately
pass, but only after changes had substantially weakened its effect (Pendleton, 2005). The changes
were almost certainly influenced by Havelange, leading Pelé to request his name be removed
from legislation that barely resembled its original design (Pendleton, 2005).
Passing the Torch
After serving as president for more than two decades, João Havelange stated that 1998 would
be his final year leading FIFA. Joseph “Sepp” Blatter of Switzerland, FIFA’s secretary general
since 1981, was elected as his successor amidst controversy befitting a close associate of
Havelange. The losing candidate, Sweden’s Lennart Johannsson, claimed that small brown
envelopes were handed out as FIFA officials convened for the election, similarly to those
reportedly present with Havelange in 1974 (O’Connor, 2011). There is still little reason to
quickly dismiss claims that Blatter’s election was tainted by corruption. His presidency would be
characterized by a disregard for ethics, perhaps unsurprisingly considering his relationship with
Havelange, who remained a force as an honorary president. Blatter’s tenure would see corruption
escalate within FIFA, as the threat of exclusion from international competition would silence
association leaders who might otherwise be compelled to speak out against corruption. And
while Blatter’s decisions may have been his own, the ease in which he operated unethically was
a product of his predecessor’s work.
International Law expert Basil Ugochukwu (2016) of the Centre for International
Governance Innovation argues that FIFA’s uncompromising enforcement of its non-interference
policy allowed its corruption to spread “like a virus” across the globe. Late in Havelange’s
presidency, FIFA began actively pursuing associations violating the non-interference principle,
which demands that member associations operate without outside interference, including that
which might be imposed by their governments (Hylton, 2017). Presumably the intent is to protect
associations from meddling governments and officials with questionable motives of their own to
ensure the game remains pure. Blatter, however, would instead tie compliance with the policy to
the financial implications and prestige that accompany a national association’s participation in
the World Cup and other major tournaments controlled by FIFA.
According to J. Gordon Hylton (2017), professor of law and history at the University of
Virginia, the potential punishment for defiance is too powerful to ignore. Hylton (2017) notes
that yearly distributions from FIFA are essentially the primary revenue source for some smaller
associations and the loss would be difficult to overcome. Suspension would also disqualify an
association from all international competition sanctioned by FIFA, including the World Cup,
which would be universally devastating. Along with the prospect of financial losses resulting
from a suspension, the impact to fans who robbed of the opportunity to see their nation
represented in FIFA competitions would be pronounced. Governments apparently recognize the
potential fallout, as Hylton (2017) suggests that for some nations this presents too much risk. It is
possible, according to Hylton (2017) for non-interference to be the force that silences a
government or the officials who preside over national sports from exposing corruption by FIFA
officials, thus allowing the practices to continue with ease. The policy may have once served to
prevent corruption from within an association, but Blatter’s coercive application made the non-
interference policy a tool to diminish or eliminate the possibility of corruption being exposed.
ISL’s Collapse
By the late 1990s, ISL was no longer the lone dominant force in sports marketing. Arguably,
ISL was a victim of its own success, as the pioneering firm was likely a source of inspiration for
many who were competing for their own share of what had become a massive industry (Staun,
2006). More than a decade after Horst Dassler’s 1987 death, ISL wasn’t yet in decline, but
having recently lost marketing rights for the Olympic Games, an aggressive strategy was needed
to keep pace with competitors. ISL was indeed aggressive as it claimed the rights to the
Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) in a deal worth more than $1 billion over 10 years
(Staun, 2006). The company would spiral downward as it became apparent it would fall far short
of expectations, leaving it incapable of meeting its obligations. ISL attempted to negotiate a
buyout offer, but it wouldn’t materialize as it became apparent that the company lacked
resources for that as well. A bailout wouldn’t materialize after records were presented to
potential investors who quickly walked away, forcing ISL into bankruptcy in May 2001 (Staun,
2006). “Amidst this wreckage,” said BBC sports editor David Bond (2013), is where
investigators would find evidence suggesting FIFA officials had been paid hefty sums for
favorable treatment in the awarding of rights to the World Cup.
Fallout
More than a decade would pass before any substantial information from the investigation that
followed the ISL collapse was made public. Despite efforts to suppress its release, the Swiss
Supreme Court ordered the publication of the dossier containing its findings. Havelange, along
with Teixeira, negotiated to end criminal investigation of their relationships with ISL (Blitz,
2012). The Swiss report, released in July 2012, harshly judged FIFA’s culture by declaring it was
defined by acts of corruption and categorizing its practices as “deficient,” even prior to the ISL
collapse. It asserted that there was no question that FIFA, particularly Sepp Blatter, had direct
knowledge of bribery payments that were distributed throughout the organization (Blitz, 2012).
Nearly $22 million in total was reportedly transferred into accounts linked to Havelange and
Teixeira, and the report contained testimony from a witness claiming a $1 million payment
intended for Havelange was once mistakenly deposited into a FIFA account, suggesting
corruption was so commonplace that the need for discretion had lost urgency (Dunbar, 2012).
FIFA, Havelange and Teixeira would repay a combined $6.1 million, with $500,000 coming
from Havelange. The payments were made with the condition of anonymity, and the $2.5 million
from FIFA was provided with assurances that legal proceedings against Havelange would be
dropped (Dunbar, 2012). The legal action against Havelange would end but his identity and role
in the scandal would be leaked, leaving an indelible mark on his legacy. Havelange would soon
resign as honorary president of FIFA, and nearly 40 years following the election that started a
revolution in the organization and in how the world’s game was marketed, Havelange’s
relationship with FIFA would end unceremoniously.
Analysis
More than 30 years would pass between João Havelange’s election as FIFA president of the
organization’s establishment of its own ethics committee. Policies put forth in the FIFA ethics
code forbid virtually every tactic Havelange used to win the presidency and to maintain the
position in the following decades. Havelange was a master at exploiting gray area to establish an
advantage, a practice supposedly regulated by the code. It is intriguing, then, that FIFA would
be involved with the attempt to suppress the dossier’s release. This only reinforces opinions
based on a belief that the ethics committee is at least partially inspired by PR. It would be nearly
a year later before FIFA released its own ISL report, gently assessing the scandal in a way that
Bond (2013) argues is little more than an attempt to appear transparent. Hans-Joachim Eckert
(2013), chairman of the committee’s adjudicatory chamber, penned an opinion supporting
virtually every claim from in the Swiss dossier, and he expressed contempt for acts he called
“morally and ethically reproachable.” Curious, however, was the apparent lack of intrigue that
closed off the possibility of exploring additional paths that might have appeared through further
analysis of the ISL case.
Eckert concluded the investigation of the case primarily on the basis that ethical guidelines
for FIFA officials simply did not exist at the time of the violations. The report did not deny the
corruption, but Eckert (2013) concluded that corrupt acts that occur outside of a mandate for
ethical standards are beyond the committee’s reach (Eckert, 2013). Eckert’s (2013) “ethical
standards” could potentially uncover countless violations that stemmed from ISL and continued
after policies were set. Without knowledge of the committee’s decision-making process, the
conclusion that offers little more than an affirmation of the parameters for actionable violations
is baffling. Bond (2013) argues that an independent investigation would likely reveal much
more, which would indeed support the claim that Eckert’s report was little more than “window
dressing.”
An ethics committee created to implement and enforce guidelines is unquestionably a good
idea. In the case of João Havelange, however, a code and a committee not assuredly objective
may have been of little consequence had they been in place during his tenure. Disregarding
ethical principles by exploiting undefined gray area, particularly from a leader in such an
influential position, suggests the possibility of a predisposition to engage in such antisocial
behaviors. Solutions to practices that were standard for Havelange are more likely to be found
through the difficult process of changing an ingrained culture, and through mechanisms that
allow some authority to break through the existing barriers to enforce compliance.
Incongruent Cultures
Only the most jaded individuals would immediately refuse to believe that positive group
behavior and a common goal to eliminate corruption could be at least somewhat effective. Even
if so, its effectiveness would most likely be inversely proportional to its size, making success
highly improbable for an organization with FIFA’s level of membership. Still, size isn’t the
biggest obstacle in this approach, since a common goal can only be reached after one has been
identified and agreed upon. FIFA consists of members from countless cultures that follow
uneven standards. Jake E. Streubing (2019), assessing international corruption in organizations
for the New Criminal Law Review, argues that legal and normative definitions for corruption are
often vastly different. As a result, creating a standard for ethical behavior is its own problem for
multinational organizations with markedly different members. Streubing (2018) notes that an
inability to formally classify corrupt acts as illegal and the lack of a unified system to prosecute
are among the primary factors that make the problem so unwieldy. Entirely abandoning self-
regulation could be counterproductive, since it essentially acknowledges incompetence, but
organizations with no oversight likely continue to attract and harbor individuals inclined to act
with disregard for ethical principles.
If solutions that rely on individual accountability are ineffective at preventing unethical
behavior in organizations, it still should not be accepted that most members are self-serving and
without moral compasses. A closer look at an organization’s makeup may be useful.
Organizations consisting of members from countless different countries and cultures as FIFA is
risk fracturing, or never uniting, if a central force to do so isn’t present. This could lead
individuals or smaller groups to lose focus on the organization as a whole and instead look to
meet their own needs. Conversely, a charismatic leader might emerge under the guise of unity,
only to abuse their power through graft and deceit. Perhaps elements for a winning strategy can
be found in additional measures of accountability instead of that which focuses on the individual.
Mechanisms of Accountability
Roger Pielke, Jr. (2012) of the University of Colorado researched strategies to address
corruption in FIFA for Sport Management Review and concluded that there isn’t an easy fix,
especially when accounting for its lack of accountability. Pielke (2012) references a series of
mechanisms for accountability identified by political scientists Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane
(2005, p. 35). Grant and Keohane (2005) define accountability as the right to hold others to a set
of standards and the right to issue penalties if standards aren’t met. The hierarchal, supervisory,
fiscal, legal, market and peer accountabilities Grant and Keohane (2005) use to evaluate global
are valuable in a study of FIFA as well, considering its global influence likely exceeds that of
many of its member associations. Three of these accountability mechanisms stand out for their
potential value.
Total fiscal accountability would likely solve the bulk of FIFA’s problems rooted in
corruption. A substantial portion of FIFA’s budget is distributed for the vague purpose of
development, and Transparency International (2015) study found a remarkable percentage of
financial distributions from FIFA goes unreported by the associations to whom they are issued.
Consider the possibilities if there had been a requirement for fiscal accountability in FIFA over
the last 50 years. As president, João Havelange absolutely added value to the world of soccer by
acting to develop youth programs and to create a Women’s World Cup, for example.
But the beautiful game presumably belongs to the world and not Havelange, so it’s reasonable
that the world would prefer the leader of the sport to be held to a certain standard. Growth may
not have occurred as rapidly and the outcomes might be a bit different, but the world’s most
popular sport would certainly grow organically. Fiscal accountability would provide the respect
and purity FIFA will likely never reach regardless of what measures its leaders take.
The Havelange era made commercialization and soccer an inseparable pair. The emergent
sports marketing industry drove FIFA’s expansion of the World Cup and other major
tournaments. This is no doubt a positive for fans as more nations compete in matches that can be
viewed from almost anywhere. The privilege comes at a cost, however. The power once held by
Havelange and ISL once is another factor that drains the game of the purity that presumably lies
at the heart of fair competition. Organizations that allow leaders to exchange money for
influence invite suspicion. While Havelange apparently wasn’t involved in match-fixing, it does
exist, and it is financially motivated (Kordas, 2016). To maintain trust, sponsors should be
accountable as well by opting not to advertise if it appears leaders aren’t acting in the sport’s best
interest. Just as the game’s growth might be slowed by mechanisms for accountability, ethical
choices may lessen financial gains for sponsors that opt out. Sponsors that choose to not
participate when corruption is present have the potential to change the way an organization
operates, and just one needs to act with courage and take the first step.
Legal accountability would presumably fill any void left by mechanisms for fiscal and
market accountability, and the specter of legal action would likely diminish levels of corruption
in FIFA. It is no coincidence that FIFA, and countless other organizations from around the
world, has long been headquartered in Switzerland. Famous for banking laws that have
traditionally provided full cover, Switzerland has been a regular venue for tax evasion, money
laundering and other financial crimes. The country recently implemented its first measures
designed to end practices it had long facilitated to conform to Federal Tax Administration
standards (Shields, 2018). This may shed light on FIFA’s finances, which could lead to less
corruption, but this is only the product of one nation’s policies. Legal accountability would
prevent questionable circumstances such as those that surround the 2022 World Cup to be hosted
by Qatar. The Qatari event reeks of “business as usual,” considering the tournament will take
place in country of considerable wealth but little history with the sport. Additionally, Qatar’s
climate will force the event to be moved to November and December, disrupting countless
professional football clubs. More damaging, however, is repeated ignoring of calls for the
tournament to be moved from Qatar, as the country’s preparation has resulted in forced labor and
an abnormally high death rate among migrant workers (DiCenso, 2017). Refusing to end self-
serving agreements might violate ethical principles but permitting the World Cup to be held
where such practices are permitted is morally bankrupt.

References
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individuals associated with the organization.
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understanding Havelange’s campaign strategy that intensely focused on building
coalitions among less influential associations. PROF: Scholarly journal.
DiCenso, M. B. (2017). A Long-Awaited Reboot: The FIFA Scandal and its Repercussions for
Football's Governing Body. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review.
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgiarticle=1782&context=iclr. The
author discusses FIFA’s questionable decision to permit the 2022 World Cup to take
place in Qatar. DiCenso identifies unsafe conditions for workers constructing venues,
along with social and climate concerns, as factors that could diminish the tournament’s
quality. PROF: Legal journal.
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6XY1-JBKJ-D03W-00000-00&context=1516831. Dunbar reported for the Associated
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documents that showed his apparent awareness of acts of bribery that had taken place in
the organization.
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image/upload/c9vtsfldsdtemkcnt7jb.pdf. FIFA’s report on the ISL scandal was harshly
criticized, as it failed to offer any solutions to prevent corruption in the future. The report
did not argue the claims, but instead submitted there was little action it could take since
the parties in question were not under obligation to FIFA’s code of ethics, which did not
yet exist at the time of the offenses.
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professional club, Santos F.C., shares its own version of a legend that alleges Nigeria’s
civil war came to a temporary halt when the star arrived in the country to play in an
exhibition match. This is a clear example of Pele’s worldwide stature and what made the
star invaluable to Havelange.
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447. This page from FIFA’s website provides a brief history of the organization and the
reasons it was created.
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the Challenge of Global Governance. European Journal of International Law.
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materials&id=urn:contentItem:5Y4B-4F41-JW5H-X2HJ-00000-00&context=1516831. -
The authors analyze several published works focused on corruption within FIFA before
presenting potential solutions. The authors argue that despite FIFA’s evident conflicts, its
association with the popular sport has insulated it from treatment similar organizations
would receive. PROF: Legal journal.
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Hand, Dies at 100. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/17/
sports/soccer/joao-havelange-dead.html. Goldstein’s New York Times profile, published
following Havelange’s death, contains a wealth of information on his accomplishments as
well as the scandals that would come to define the former FIFA president. The lengthy
article is indicative of the substantial amount of influence Havelange once possessed.
Grant, R., & Keohane, R. O. (2005). Accountability and abuses of power in world politics.
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Political scientists Grant and Keohane identify a series of mechanisms for accountability
with the potential to rein in the power that is often abused without oversight. PROF:
Political science review.
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glocalization of the 'serious life'. The British Journal of Sociology. https://doi.org/
10.1111/j.1468-4446.2004.00037.x. The authors analyze cultural and commercial factors

that have facilitated the globalization of football after supplying statistics to ensure the
game’s worldwide impact is clear. PROF: Academic journal.
Hylton, J. G. (2017). How FIFA Used the Principle of Autonomy of Sport to Shield Corruption in
the Sepp Blatter Era. Maryland Journal of International Law. https://digitalcommons
.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1659&context=mjil. Hylton examines
the autocratic power available to leaders in autonomous organizations like FIFA. With
threats of withholding distributions and suspending associations from international play,
FIFA has a record of coercing compliance and silencing would-be reporters of
corruption. PROF: Legal journal.
Jennings, A. (2011). Investigating corruption in corporate sport: The IOC and FIFA.
International Review for the Sociology of Sport. https://doi.org/10.1177%
2F1012690211408845. Investigative reporter Jennings uses firsthand experience to
explain the complexity of studying organizations like FIFA to advocate for the
development of an academic approach that is more productive. PROF: Academic journal.
Jones, G., Norris, M., & Kim, S. (2016). Horst Dassler, Adidas, and the Commercialization of
Sport. Harvard Business School. https://hbsp.harvard.edu/product/316007-PDF-ENG.
The authors provide a comprehensive study of Horst Dassler, an early leader in the sports
marketing industry. Key information related to the formation of ISL and the relationship
between Dassler and Joao Havelange can be found in this article. PROF: Academic
study.
Kordas, K. (2016). Dropping the Ball: How FIFA Can Address the Match-Fixing Problem
Facing Professional Football. Sports Lawyers Journal. https://advance-lexis-
com.ezproxy. selu.edu/api/document?collection=analytical-
materials&id=urn:contentItem:5JC5-R1S0-02C9-D0FG-00000-00&context=1516831.
Kordas uses this article to address the dreaded practice of match-fixing. While not
widespread, fixed outcomes will remain a perpetual concern surrounding FIFA
considering its history of corruption. PROF: Legal journal.
Levine, R. M. (1979). BRAZIL'S DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY. Current History (Pre-
1986), 76(000444), 70. http://ezproxy.selu.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-
com.ezproxy.selu.edu/docview/202925803?accountid=13772. Levine, an expert on Latin
American studies, published findings from his study of Brazil’s government during the
time of military rule. Levine links Havelange with government leaders who permitted
corruption if it meant results, which may be a source of the entitlement he would have as
president of FIFA. PROF: Academic study.
Manoli, A. E. (2018). Sport marketing's past, present and future; an introduction to the special
issue on contemporary issues in sports marketing. Journal of Strategic Marketing.
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revisits the early days of sports marketing and analyzes the industry’s role in driving the
value of global sports into the hundreds of billions. PROF: Professional journal.
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Lincoln. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/honorstheses/143/. Miller examines the
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host/1994-fifa-world-cup. U.S. Soccer provides this information on attendance and the
overall impact of the 1994 World Cup, which remains among the most successful
tournaments in FIFA’s history
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Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-fifa-johansson/envelopes-handed-
over-in-1998-blatter-election-johansson-idUKTRE7507IK20110601. This article,
published by Reuters years after the alleged occurrence, contains suggestions that Sepp
Blatter had distributed cash for votes much like Havelange had in 1974.
Pendleton, K. (2005, December 9). Havelange and Pele: Is it good to be soccer's king? US
Soccer Players. https://ussoccerplayers.com/history/the-world/is-it-good-to-be-the-king.
Pendleton’s article shares information surrounding Havelange’s banishment of Pele from
the 1994 World Cup draw and other events related to the tournament.
Pielke, R. (2012, December 11). How can FIFA be held accountable? Sport Management
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mechanisms of accountability to the problem of ending FIFA’s corrupt practices. PROF:
Professional journal.
Philips, D., & Whannel, G. (2013). The Trojan Horse: The Growth of Commercial Sponsorship.
Bloomsbury Academic. http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781472545145.0005. Philips and
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https://www.espn.com/story/_/id/6861161/corruption-murder-beautiful-game.
Sportswriter Brian Phillips examines the corruption that has long defined FIFA’s
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Reider-Gordon examines the nation’s history of corruption in sports in this analysis of
corruption that engulfed the 2014 World Cup in Brazil. PROF: Legal journal.
Schudel, M. (2016, August 16). João Havelange, FIFA president and world power broker in
soccer, dies at 100. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/joao-
havelange-fifa-president-and-world-power-broker-in-soccer-dies-at-100/2016/08/16/
5b75e2a4-63b6-11e6-8b27-bb8ba39497a2_story.html. Schudel’s profile, published
following Havelange’s death, is another repository for good and bad milestones from the
Brazilian’s eventful life.
Shields, M. (2018, October 5). Era of bank secrecy ends as Swiss start sharing account data.
Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-secrecy/era-of-bank-secrecy-ends-as-
swiss-start-sharing-account-data-idUSKCN1MF13O. The author reported on changes in
Swiss banking laws made to enforce conformity to the country’s tax authorities.
Removing anonymity from Swiss banking may be a strong influence on the behavior of
FIFA officials in the future.
Staun, J. (2006, June 2). The fall of ISL. Play the Game. https://www.playthegame.org/news/
news-articles/2006/the-fall-of-isl/. Staun chronicles the collapse of ISL, the pioneering
sports marketing company founded by Adidas’s Horst Dassler.
Struebing, J. E. (2018). Federal Criminal Law and International Corruption: An Appraisal of the
FIFA Prosecution. New Criminal Law Review. https://doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2018.
21.1.1. Struebing identifies difficulty effectively communicating with individuals from
diverse cultures, all driven by different demands, as an obstacle that prevents
multinational groups from establishing and achieving goals.
Sugden, J., & Tomlinson, A. (1998). Power and Resistance in the Governance of World
Football: Theorizing FIFA's Transnational Impact. Journal of Sport and Social Issues.
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F019372398022003005. The article identifies positive aspects
from FIFA’s growth while recognizing the potential issues from organizations offering
influence and requiring little accountability. PROF: Professional journal.
Ugochukwu, B. (2016). Global Governance in All Its Discrete Forms: The Game, FIFA, And the
Third World. Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice. https://doi.org/10.22329/
wyaj.v33i3.4897. Ugochukwu’s article describes the process in which FIFA’s non-
interference policy was strictly enforced. Under the threat of potential financial and
sporting penalties from seeking guidance outside of FIFA, many associations were
effectively silenced, allowing corruption to continue. PROF: Legal journal.
Vonnard, P., & Sbetti, N. (2018). Global Sport Leaders: A Biographical Analysis of
International Sport Management. Palgrave MacMillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-
319-76753-6 . The authors provide background on Havelange’s early life as an athlete in
Brazil before examining the career that produced an explosion of growth and revenue for
FIFA. PROF: International journal.
Whannel, G. (2009, September). Television and the Transformation of Sport. The Annals of The
American Academy of Political and Social Science https://doi.org/10.1177%2F00027
16209339144. Whannel’s study of television’s effect on sports points to the early 1970s
as the beginning of the era that would eventually see capitalist rationalization dominate
virtually all aspects of the industry. PROF: Scientific journal.
Appendix A
Stephen Crawford, Comm 627

3rd Summary, 27 November 2020
Reference: OxfordUnion. (2013, October 30). The Qatar World Cup: Sepp Blatter
[Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iwgW7zxWfw8
Overview: This YouTube video features an interview of FIFA’s then-president Sepp
Blatter by the Oxford Union Society of the University of Oxford in England. Blatter succeeded
Joao Havelange as president of FIFA, and his tenure would build on the corrupt culture
normalized by his predecessor. From the moment it was announced in 2010, the Qatar World
Cup has been the subject of harsh criticism for several reasons, most notably the conditions that
have led to a high number of deaths in construction projects readying the country to host the
event. When asked if FIFA bears any responsibility, Blatter first asserts that FIFA isn't
responsible for the world, then awkwardly references another controversy out of his control, but
instead of worker deaths it is about a questionable goal in the German Bundesliga and appears
insensitive as a result. A leader in such an influential position would seemingly be more tactful,
but Blatter continues by callously defending the number of deaths by comparing it with the
number of workers who haven’t died and suggests not every death has occurred specifically
during the construction of the stadiums that will be used in the tournament. Like a politician,
Blatter states that there are conditions to hosting a World Cup, but he equivocates with the claim
that FIFA can’t interfere with a country’s principles.
Concept: FIFA’s leaders have long been suspected of being corrupt, and while the World
Cup is awarded through a voting process, the host country is typically the subject of heavy
scrutiny. Qatar being awarded the tournament is questionable, as several issues that would
presumably best be avoided have been present since it was announced.
Portrayal: The interviewer is clear with his question regarding the controversial matter
that wasn’t a new revelation at the time, which makes Blatter’s uncomfortable reaction stand out.
Discussion: An understanding of FIFA’s history is necessary for the gravity of this video
to be fully felt. Notorious for exchanging money for favors and influence, corruption in FIFA has
never been tied to something as dire as the conditions for workers in Qatar. Unwilling or unable
to answer clearly, Blatter repulses with uncomfortable attempts at levity in a manner that
suggests his reality is likely much different from what most of the world experiences. The casual
discussion of the dire situation is not characteristic of a leader focused on solving the matter.
Blatter’s disregard for the wellbeing of workers constructing his event is apparent in his attempts
to avoid the subject, and by his barely breaking the surface with a series of vague answers.
Although this interview took place in 2013, the same questions still exist. The world can only
hope that the Qatar event is just an anomaly and not one that establishes a precedent.
Appendix B
Stephen Crawford
Comm 627 – 3rd Case Study
26 November 2020
CASE STUDY 8.3

TO LOAN OR NOT TO LOAN?
1. Should Harry Edwards recommend that the bank loan another $150,000 to Highway Market?
Why or why not? Edwards may be inclined to recommend an additional loan to his longtime
customers who, until now, have consistently met their obligation to the bank. In this case,
however, recommending the Smiths for the loan is the wrong decision. By optimistically
assuming the Highway Market will recover from its current downturn would be disregarding
several warning signs, most notably the Walmart store set to open just down the road. The
market might be the only store in town, but it simply won’t be able to compete with the
superstore’s prices, which would be nearly impossible even without the debt the Smiths will owe
when the remodel is complete. Perhaps more concerning is the Smiths’ inability to see the
problem for themselves, as they are instead prepared to add a substantial amount of debt to what
they currently owe. It is likely that the Smiths do believe in their ability to recover and thrive,
since operating the business has been so prominent in their lives, but this is the primary reason
Edwards should courageously make the ethical decision and recommend against the loan. Both
Edwards and the Smiths are faced with the dilemma of escalating commitment in this case, as it
would seem logical for Edwards to base his decision on his history with the Smiths instead of
looking at directly at the problem and accepting the facts as they are. Recommending against the
loan is the most ethical decision Edwards can make for himself, the bank and the Smiths.

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Running head: Coalitions, Commercialization and Corruption 1

Coalitions, Commercialization and Corruption:

João Havelange and the Transformation of FIFA

Stephen C. Crawford, M.A. Candidate

Southeastern Louisiana University

tournament would be expanded to include participants from the previously underrepresented

subsequent leadership. With no mechanisms for enforcing accountability there appears to be

FIFA’s corrupt culture.

COALITIONS, COMMERCIALIZATION AND CORRUPTION:

JOÁO HAVELANGE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FIFA

Federacion Internationale de Football Association, commonly known as FIFA, was formed in

FIFA Budget, Revenue and Investments. 2015–2018

Standardizing the Game

to sway outcomes and unilaterally punish non-compliance.

João Havelange’s Rise in Brazil

presidency as he would attempt to become its first non-European president.

& Sbetti, 2018).

An Imperative for Success

of Brazil’s national team as well as his own. (Chaim, 2016).

FIFA’s Postwar Expansion

associations that Rous had marginalized (Darby, 2003).

sports federation would be directed to cover Havelange’s obligation to Pelé.

opportunity to apply the same questionable methods on a bigger scale.

The 1974 Election

be left to witness the transformation of world football.

A Culture Rich in Corruption

Horst Dassler and the Adidas Influence

their growing influence for personal gain.

West Nally, SMPI and ISL

puppet master to be an appropriate moniker.

Trouble with Pelé

encounter resistance. In what would be a crowning achievement of his presidency, Havelange’s

comfortable reinforcing his grip.

the persistent conflict between Pelé and Teixeira,

Passing the Torch

a product of his predecessor’s work.

Governance Innovation argues that FIFA’s uncompromising enforcement of its non-interference

the World Cup and other major tournaments controlled by FIFA.

represented in FIFA competitions would be pronounced. Governments apparently recognize the

of expectations, leaving it incapable of meeting its obligations. ISL attempted to negotiate a

favorable treatment in the awarding of rights to the World Cup.

relationship with FIFA would end unceremoniously.

(2013), chairman of the committee’s adjudicatory chamber, penned an opinion supporting

analysis of the ISL case.

An ethics committee created to implement and enforce guidelines is unquestionably a good

influential position, suggests the possibility of a predisposition to engage in such antisocial

uneven standards. Jake E. Streubing (2019), assessing international corruption in organizations

regulation could be counterproductive, since it essentially acknowledges incompetence, but

with disregard for ethical principles.

If solutions that rely on individual accountability are ineffective at preventing unethical

without moral compasses. A closer look at an organization’s makeup may be useful.

development, and Transparency International (2015) study found a remarkable percentage of

where such practices are permitted is morally bankrupt.

10.1111/j.1468-4446.2004.00037.x. The authors analyze cultural and commercial factors

Stephen Crawford, Comm 627

CASE STUDY 8.3

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