Linköpings universitet | Institutionen för kultur och samhälle

Kandidatuppsats i praktisk filosofi, 15 hp | Ämneslärarprogrammet

Vårterminen 2022

Cannibalism Is Not Inherently

Immoral
– A Philosophical Study of Morality and Cannibalism

Rebecca Blomberg

Handledare: Jami Weinstein

Examinator: András Szigeti

Linköpings universitet
SE-581 83 Linköping
013-28 10 00, www.liu.se
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Abstract
This essay argues that cannibalism is not inherently immoral. To demonstrate this, I have
analyzed the ethics of cannibalism through the perspective of consent, rights, autonomy, and
consumption of flesh. I have defined the concepts of cannibalism and morality. The case of
the German Cannibal Armin Meiwes is used throughout the essay as it gives factual examples
of a case where cannibalism is in accordance to consent. I have analyzed cannibalism as a
taboo, in the ways this taboo has formed and how we differentiate cannibalism in humans and
nonhumans. Following this I have demonstrated how the relations surrounding human rights,
the law’s interpretation of consent and autonomy can alter its morality. With discussing
consumption of flesh, whether it be from an animal or a human being, followed by how our
view on treating nonanimals as a means to an end, I illustrate a comparison to cannibalism in
human beings. By exploring the relationship of cannibalism with morality through these
theories I conclude that cannibalism in fact cannot be inherently immoral.
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Table of Contents
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 3
1. The Case of The German Cannibal................................................................................... 4
2. What is Cannibalism? ....................................................................................................... 6
3. Morality ............................................................................................................................ 7
4. Taboo ................................................................................................................................ 8
5. Rights, Consent and Autonomy ...................................................................................... 12
6. Morality of Consuming Flesh ......................................................................................... 16
7. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 21
8. References ....................................................................................................................... 23
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Introduction
My interest in the ethics of cannibalism started after reading about the now famous case of
Armin Meiwes, the so-called German Cannibal. The Meiwes case is one of the first modern
cases of cannibalism where consent is well documented and crucial to the act. Therefore, my
discussion will continuously include references to this case, in order to help make my point.
The goal of my arguments is demonstrate that cannibalism cannot be inherently immoral. I
have previously not come across any studies that analyses the morality of cannibalism in
relation to consent and autonomy as well as the consumption of meat. To demonstrate my
thesis statement I will examine morality, consent, personal autonomy, the nature of human
and non-human cannibalism as well as the ethics behind eating meat.
This essay is divided into six sections. The first section presents a summary of
the case of the German Cannibal, Armin Meiwes. The second provides a summary and
definition of cannibalism. The third is a discussion of morality as it is defined in philosophy.
The fourth section explains of the origins and validity of the taboo against cannibalism. The
fifth section discusses morality, rights, consent and personal autonomy in relation to
cannibalism, and the final section analyzes and compares the morality of consuming non-
human versus human meat. From this, I hope to conclude that, contrary to mainstream
understandings of the issue, cannibalism is not inherently immoral.
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1. The Case of The German Cannibal

Armin Meiwes was born into his family, not by love, but rather because of an attempt by his
mother, Waltraud, to salvage her marriage to Meiwes’ father, Dieter (Johnson, 2018). The
marriage was very unhealthy, with Waltraud being the possessive and abusive spouse
(Johnson, 2018). After several years of abuse when Meiwes was just seven years old, Dieter
left his wife, son and Meiwes’ two older half-brothers who were Waltraud’s children with
previous husbands (Reid, 2014, p.429). This is, followed by his brothers’ departures out into
the world, what seems to have started Meiwes’ feelings of loneliness. Meiwes and his mother
moved to Wüstefeld, neighboring Rotenburg, which are the woods made famous by the
Brothers Grimm (Reid, 2014, p.432). The stories of the Brothers Grimm were popular, as they
still are, but the “happily ever after” and the sense of morality that the children’s books have
as their focus is not what intrigued young Meiwes. He was especially intrigued by the story of
the Witch who captured and fed Hansel and Gretel only to later cannibalize them. Meiwes
labeled himself as bisexual, but as Reid describes it, he idolized women and thought them to
be much too valuable to eat. On the other hand consuming a man would relieve him of his
loneliness, since the man consensually consumed would become one with him unable to
abandon him (Reid, 2014, p.444). This abandonment links back to the way he felt about his
father and brothers leaving when he was younger. While he tried to have relationships with a
few women during his early adulthood, they were either not good enough for his mother or
not sufficient to alleviate his feelings of loneliness. When Meiwes was an adult and left on his
own, after the death his mother, he had more time and opportunity to find himself. He started
reading about cannibalism and found there to be a sense of belonging in realizing that he was
not the only one with cannibalistic desires. Over time Meiwes’ interests in cannibalism and
real-life cannibals grew. Jones explains that, he read the book Alive, about the Uruguayan
rugby team who engaged in survival cannibalism, as well as tales of cannibalistic tribes and
cultures (2005, p.33). He eventually found there to be a large cannibalistic community online,
which led to him cutting off nearly all human contact and immersing himself into the
internet’s endless possibilities (Reid, 2014, p.453).
Meiwes and Brandes first contact started on February fifth of 2001. The two
talked about their fantasies and shared pictures of themselves. Meiwes believed that he would
finally be able fill the void of loneliness and take on Brandes qualities and spirit when
consuming him. Since Brandes wanted to have his genitals removed while still alive and
conscious they agreed to, after his castration, either let Brandes loose his consciousness and
bleed to death or have Meiwes stab him in the throat when unconscious in order for the death
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to be as humane as possible. Meiwes seems to have been apprehensive about biting Brandes’
penis off, since he did not want to inflict any pain to his willing participant, but agreed to best
accommodate Brandes’ desires (Jones, 2005, p.52-91). To prepare for his castration and death
Brandes erased everything on his computer that could tie him to Meiwes, wrote a will which
he had signed by a notary and paid for his travels with cash to avoid a paper trail (Jones, 2005,
p.52-91). Brandes also sold his car, took time off work, and tried to leave as little
inconvenience as possible for the people he left behind (Reid, 2014, p.462). Factors
motivating Brandes to surrender his body to Meiwes included fulfilling his own
sadomasochistic desires and to have control over his own demise. He did not want to become
an old shell of himself that later was left to rot in the ground. They also agreed that this
planned act would lead to Brandes experiencing a nice death. To make the ordeal as
comfortable as possible, the two men decided to purchase sleeping tablets and a large bottle of
Schnapps, so that the pain of the castration would not be overwhelming (Jones, 2005, p.67).
When asked, Brandes told Meiwes that he wanted to go through with the castration and
cannibalism because he hated and wanted to destroy himself (Jones, 2005, p. 67, 73). Meiwes
felt as if he could give Brandes a purpose, becoming one with each other and the most
valuable part of each other’s life. Both Jones and Reid agree that consent was Meiwes’ main
concern. Not only did he continually ask for consent throughout the process, but also he kept
to the agreement of castration and Brandes’ wish to become unconscious before dying even
though Brandes was completely vulnerable due to the use of alcohol and tablets. The consent
and agreement of all actions is documented both in writing and in the home-video Meiwes
recorded of the event. The two men went through with the castration of Brandes and they both
tried to eat it. Not being used to cooking such an organ, they managed to both burn it and
leave it undercooked which led to it being almost impossible to consume. After the castration
Brandes did not become unconscious for over nine hours (Jones, 2005, p.116). Meiwes did his
best to keep Brandes as comfortable as possible, giving him water, a bath, moving him to a
bed, talking to him and asking what to do, to make sure Brandes was as comfortable as
possible. Brandes wanted Meiwes to stab him when he fell unconscious which Meiwes agreed
to do. When Brandes finally fell unconscious Meiwes, when reciting a prayer, took his life. It
took Brandes only three minutes to bleed out from the stabbing. However, while the two men
thought that it would be painless, Reid describes that later reviews of the videotape shows that
Brandes must have experienced a great amount of pain (2014, p.466).
While Meiwes understood that eating a man was seen as wrong socially, he felt
that he was closer than ever to Brandes’ soul after he ate pieces of him. He also compared his
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act to that of Christians when engaging in the, whilst metaphorical, consumption of Christ
(Jones, 2005, p.117). After eating more than two thirds of Brandes flesh, he decided to ones
again search the internet for another willing participant (Jones, 2005, p.146-154). Even
though he met with a few other men, Meiwes was still not interested in hurting or doing any
harm to anyone who did not fully consent. When Meiwes had posted pictures of Brandes flesh
online, one man understood it to be real and was the one who contacted law enforcements.
This is what led to Amin Meiwes’ arrest and capture. Meiwes’ lawyer told him that
cannibalism was not technically illegal in Germany, and they decided to push for a “killing on
demand” charge, since consent was well documented (Jones, 2005, p.175). The charge of
“killing on demand” was mostly applied to euthanasia cases and would only lead to maximum
five years in prison. Meiwes was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to eight years and
six months, which meant he could get out on parole in just four years. After more than three
years in prison, in May 2006, a retrial convicted Meiwes of murder and sentenced him to life
imprisonment.

2. What is Cannibalism?
Jeremy Wisnewski defines Cannibalism as “the consumption of the flesh of members of one’s
own species” (2014, p.1), while Bill Schutt raises the uncertain grey area of cannibalism with
examples of breastfeeding, eating one’s own mucus, fingernails, or placenta (2018, p.78).
Greg Pollock takes it one step further while trying to understand the definition of cannibalism
as historically entwined with the Euro-American imperialism (2010, p.9), which I will discuss
in the form of a western view. For the sake of my argument I will confine the definition of
cannibalism to the consumption of flesh belonging to one’s own species.
According to Wisnewski there are three main kinds of cannibalism, emergency
cannibalism, ritualistic cannibalism, and fetish cannibalism (2014, p.1). Emergency
cannibalism is used solely as a means to prevent starvation. The second kind is ritualistic
cannibalism which, while it can have several different motives, stems from a cultural or
religious ritual. Examples of motives can be respecting one’s ancestors, consuming the
attributes of the person or desires for revenge. The third kind of cannibalism is fetish
cannibalism, which is most relevant to Armin Meiwes’ case, where cannibalism is a means to
fulfill a desire. One could argue that fetish cannibalism, at least, in the case of Armin Meiwes
and Bernd Brandes would fall under the category of ritualistic cannibalism. Since even though
it was performed to fulfill a desire, this desire seems to check the boxes both of respect and
the one of consuming the attributes of the consumed person which would make it a ritualistic
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form of cannibalism. Following this one could also argue that ritualistic cannibalism may not
be fully distinct from fetish cannibalism, as the aim of ritualistic cannibalism also seems to
fulfill a desire, though it can differ in what kind of desire. The main difference between them
seems to be that ritualistic cannibalism often involves respect while fetish cannibalism need
not which I would argue, at the very least, alters the morality of the act.
Lu and Center provide an additional definition of cannibalism in their distinction
between active and passive cannibalism which, they argue, depends on the killing of the
person who is eaten. Their focus is mainly on passive cannibalism, which involves eating
human flesh without the killing of the person. Passive cannibalism is easiest explained with
cases of survival cannibalism when the victim already is dead before the consummation of
their flesh begins. This means that their focus lie solely on the action of cannibalism without
worrying about the morality of killing; this will be discussed further in the following sections.
One element that could make the morality, of even passive cannibalism, ambivalent is the
circumstances in which the so-called “victim” dies. Would Lu and Center still define the
cannibalism as passive if the person dies without anyone actively trying to keep them alive, or
is it just passive when a person dies after multiple attempts of saving them?

3. Morality
Morality is different for all humans, since everyone have their individual personal cultures,
norms and backgrounds that can alter the moral judgements we hold (Gert and Gert, 2020,
Introduction). This view on morality as fluid will be a continuously relevant idea throughout
the morality discussion of, among others, survival cannibalism, as well as in line with the
theory of Jeremy Wisnewski (2014). Gert and Gert (2020, Introduction) also tries to define
the difference between morality and law but comes to the conclusion that the law most often
is both altered and based on moral grounds. We can see this based on different cultures,
religion and norms where, as Gert and Gert explain it, a society might accept immoral acts
when in line with traditions or laws (2020, Chapter 2). I will return to the definition of
morality in law below.
Jeffery Edwards explains morality from a consequentialist ethical perspective
where an act is morally permissible if it has the best consequences with reference to the
greater good (2017). He also states that it therefore should not only be morally permissible but
also morally obligatory to perform the act, if that act lead to the best consequences (Edwards,
2017). By this definition, I would argue that cannibalism in several instances could be
considered a moral obligation. To use the Uruguayan rugby team crashlanding in the Alps and
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resorting to survival cannibalism as an example, the best possible outcome is that as many
people as possible survive. This means that the engagement in survival cannibalism is needed
to make the result as optimal as possible. Therefore I would argue that the cannibalism
performed by the survivors would be morally obligatory, and that those who refused,
performed an immoral act in doing so. With this argument, cannibalism can be understood as
both morally permissible and obligatory in certain instances.
With the example of Armin Meiwes, we could ask ourselves if Meiwes’ desire
to only consume a willing and consenting partner would be morally permissible, since the
consequences of fetish cannibalism in all but few other forms would involve the killing and
consumption of an unwilling victim. In the late 90’s Meiwes was talking to other like-minded
people on online cannibal-forums where he started his quest to find a consenting victim to
fulfill his cannibalistic desires. Jones explains that Meiwes placed ads under the pseudonym
Franky, his childhood imaginary friend, where he searched for a man between the ages of 18
and 30 in good physical condition, who would offer their body to him (2005, p.42). Over
some time, Meiwes had talked to over 400 potential willing participants, which he narrowed
down to 30 men who were suitable for an interview. On several occasions, Meiwes met with a
person he thought was a willing participant only to find out that their fantasy did not involve
actual cannibalism but only the idea of it. Even in the instances where he had a potential
participant tied in his so-called slaughter room and the opportunity to fulfill his desires he did
not act upon his urges if the participant did not fully consent. He would ask them several
times if everything was to their liking to ensure he had consent. Meiwes wanted to become
one with the man he consumed and, therefore, the willingness and consent of the victim was
very important to him (Jones 2005, Reid 2018). He also had no actual desire to kill anyone but
saw it as a necessary evil which he would perform with the utmost respect and the least
possible amount of pain (Jones, 2005, p.114). Therefore, I would argue that the consequences
of the consuming of a willing participant should be able to be understood as a morally
acceptable act in reference to a greater good.

4. Taboo
Around the world there are societal taboos. Usually, the violation of taboos even in harm-free
situations leads to great disapproval of the action (Gutierrez 2007, p.854).
The law differentiate acts with and without consent such as the act of sexual
intercourse being defined as sex with consent and it being defined as rape without consent. In
accordance with this, I would argue that you should also have the right to consume human
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flesh if both parties are willing participants. We could even argue that consumption of human
flesh ought not be considered cannibalism in a legal sense, just as consensual sex differs from
rape and giving someone your belongings differs from theft. Even if this is the case, many, if
not all, of the previously mentioned taboos or actions that violates the societal norms are often
seen as harmful. There is a presumption of harm that follows the violation of a norm, even in
cases where no one is harmed like consensual incest between a brother and a sister, using
contraception and not telling anyone (Gutierrez, 2007, p.584) and, perhaps, even to
consensual cannibalism, as we have seen in the case of Armin Meiwes and Bernd Brandes. To
illustrate this presumption, Gutierrez produced an experiment in three parts testing the
emotions anger and disgust in relation to taboo violations with different descriptions of harm
(2007, p.587). Included in these examples of taboo violations were actions involving
necrophilia, consensual incest, and nonharmful cannibalism. The nonharmful examples of
cannibalism are not in this case consenting cannibalism, but rather cannibalism in the form of
consuming a piece of human flesh grown from a cell culture. In these findings he discusses,
among other things, hostile reactions towards homosexuals which as he states: “are mostly
based on symbolic values and morality and not on actual harm to other people” (Gutierrez
2007, p.866), which he also found to be the case in his own study. This is also what I have
found to be the case towards most forms of cannibalism. Society associates the act of
cannibalism with evil and projects this feeling of disapproval to involve all cases of
cannibalism with the specific act they have decided is wrong. I will present further examples
of this below.
The idea of immorality and taboo connected to cannibalism can be explained by
an array of different examples. But it is important to mention that cannibalism is only seen as
immoral and unnatural when associated with humans. Insects, marine life and even other
mammals have been recorded to engage in cannibalism, most often, but not always, as a result
of overcrowding or lack of other food (Schutt 2018, p.63). But why do we not classify eating
a member of the same species as cannibalism when it occurs in non-humans? Most often the
answer is located in the issue of taboos. When talking about human cannibalism it is not
always easy, even for professionals, to distinguish between possible cases of historical
cannibalism and that of funerary rites since some Australian aboriginal had funerary practices
which included the removal of flesh (Schutt, 2018, p.92). In these cases, we cannot
differentiate whether a human body has been cannibalized upon or if the removal of flesh is
due to a funerary practice. The most efficient way to distinguish the difference, between
funerary rites and cannibalism is to see whether the human bones have been discarded in the
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same way as animal bones (Schutt, 2018, p.93). This is due to the respect given to the remains
of humans differing to that of animal remains. Most accounts of cannibalism among
indigenous cultures of the Caribbean come from Spanish and other European explorers who
themselves never witnessed any cannibalism. But the rumors that the islanders engaged in
cannibalistic acts were sufficient enough, even without evidence, to justify the raiding and
enslaving of the islanders (Schutt 2018, p.108). In this case, among others, the idea of
cannibalism was used as a way to dehumanize people and therefore justifying their
punishment which benefited many European colonialists. Pollock takes this point further,
claiming that actual cannibalism in humans never existed and that the sources of these
instances of cannibalism are instead projections of the western gaze, with the exception of
individuals such as Jeffrey Dahmer or Armin Meiwes (2010, p.9). Tales of cannibalism as an
act of revenge or horrible act of monsters, written over the span of over 2000 years, is what
firstly depicted the cannibalism we currently see as taboo (Schutt, 2018, p.183). This makes
me wonder whether the Western view of cannibalism as immoral and taboo could be negated
if Europeans had not used the idea of cannibalism as a tool to justify the colonization of the
land belonging to indigenous cultures.
To relay another real-life example of cannibalism, there is the case of the
famous Donner Party in 1847. Although new evidence continues to bring light to the
situation, Schutt explains what most likely went down (2018). Ultimately the Donner Party is
thought to have forcibly engaged in cannibalizing each other as a means to stay alive (Schutt,
2018, p.133-173). The people engaging in cannibalism in this case have later been given, as
Schutt calls it, a free pass for their cannibalistic actions (2018, p.173), since it was necessary
for the Donner Party members’ survival. What is it about this case of cannibalism that we
define as unethical? I believe the assessment of this case as immoral originates from the idea
we hold of cannibalism as taboo and morally wrong. If we were to see past this taboo, could it
rather be, as previously stated, that their act of cannibalism is actually a moral obligation,
since the consequences of refusing to engage in cannibalism would lead to a greater amount
of death?
Yet another case of where there are theories about cannibalistic engagement is
that of the people of Leningrad in the 1940’s. After Hitler had ordered no food to be shipped
to Leningrad, the people were left to eat the zoo-animals followed by their own pets and, then,
as theorized, children who were snagged of the streets (Schutt, 2018, p.145). Schutt explains
that approximately 2000 people were arrested for cannibalism during this siege (2018, p.149).
But whether this is true or not is not the important part. It is rather the fact that theories of
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cannibalism, in almost all cases, are associated with such horrible circumstances and
traumatic events that the idea of cannibalism as inherently bad and, therefore, taboo persists.
This can further be corroborated by the example of the previously mentioned case of the
stranded Uruguayan rugby team. Even though through the survivors’ explanation of the
inspiration from the last supper managed to win over the skeptics and absolve them from any
sins (Schutt, 2018, p.132), their engagement in cannibalism is still associated with the
traumatic crash and therefore also horror, which in the same way as most cannibalism
discussed above further strengthens the idea of cannibalism as bad and taboo. But if the
survivors of these cases had not engaged in these cannibalistic acts they would most likely be
dead. The act of cannibalism is what kept them alive, and simultaneously, I would argue, the
traumatic circumstances surrounding them is what keeps the taboo of cannibalism alive.
To go further in explaining the Western cannibalism taboo, Schutt discusses the
difference between the taboo in the West with that of the views on cannibalism in China
(2018, p.197). Firstly, China have had a widely different view on what animals qualifies as
food, compared to that of the West. The Chinese have consumed animals like scorpions, rats,
chicken testicles and snakes, which fall outside the view of consumable animals people
outside of China have as a norm. With a broader view on which types of flesh count as
consumable and are not considered taboo, it is not surprising that the view on cannibalism in
China is far less of a taboo. Human body parts and organs in medical treatment have been
used in China over the span of 400 years as yet another reason for Chinese ethics to differ
from that of the Western countries. But should this be a reason to view the morality of
cannibalism so differently? Contrary to popular belief, Europeans routinely engaged in the
consumption of human body parts for hundreds of years as medical treatments (Schutt, 2018,
p.210-211). So the assumption of cannibalism as taboo and unethical must have originated
later in history in the West, which shifts cannibalistic actions, or rather the use of human body
parts as a means to an end, from normal to horrible. This could have happened perhaps as a
result of, as previously mentioned, the dehumanization and use of indigenous people as a
means for European profit. This further demonstrates my argument that the reasons behind the
cannibalism taboo are not objectively valid statements, since the Western taboo originates
from factually false claims and is defined by its surrounding circumstances, which is what
makes cannibalism seem unethical. Having understood these cases of cannibalism, be they
true or not, it remains unclear what exactly confirms cannibalism as inherently immoral or
unethical.
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5. Rights, Consent and Autonomy

Another important topic to address if that of rights and consent. As stated by Vera Bergelson
the voluntary and rational consent of a victim makes them a co-author of their own injuries
and therefore should, at the very least, alter the perpetrators responsibility (2006, Abstract).
She comes to this conclusion by trying to answer the question of why consent in some
instances negates criminal harm but in others is does not. The argument that consent negates
criminal harm is used all over the world in a variety of circumstances. In most countries, body
piercings are allowed even though it is a harm to the body and, in some rare instances, could
lead to serious harm, while it in some countries is illegal. Gender conforming surgeries are
also on the increase all over the globe, being legal and considered an ethical surgery, despite it
not being physically necessary and potentially dangerous. (Bergelson, 2006, p.22)
Assisted suicide or euthanasia, while in the same realm of topics, is still only
legal in a few places worldwide. Bernhard Weicht and Benhard Forchtner discuss the
increasing demand, especially in Western countries, for one’s individual right to decide over
one’s own death (2021, p.1). With autonomy as one of the most important parts of democracy
and individual freedom, Lucas Swaine takes this further by arguing that autonomy might be a
basic human right (2020). While arguing for the morality of individual autonomy, Swaine
does bring up the fact that some autonomous people may also perform immoral acts (2020).
Just because an act is autonomous does not mean that it automatically translates into being a
morally justified act. In accordance with this, I would argue that individual autonomy does
not implicate morality on its own, but that it is able to alter the morality when all parties
involved give rational consent as autonomous individuals. As stated by Weicht and Forchtner:
“If humans are autonomous, then they should be allowed to autonomously decide about their
completed life and its end.” (Weicht and Forchtner, 2021, s.7). This does not mean that an act
would be considered morally if an autonomous individual makes a decision about another
autonomous individuals’ life except in the cases where all parties involved are able to give
rational consent regarding the consequences of their decisions. Since Bernd Brandes gave
Armin Meiwes rational consent, and as he was an autonomous individual, I would argue that
the act of cannibalism in this case does not infringe with any rights or morality, which could
compare to the elderly who, according to Weicht and Forchtner, have earned the right to
decide over their own death (2021, p.8).
In the way that most people do not want to end up depending on care in an
institution and wither away, but rather experience a nice death when ready, Bernd Brandes
had a fear of growing old and weak. He, as previously stated, did not want to become an old
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shell of himself that later was left to rot in the ground. Brandes and Meiwes both agreed that
their plan would successfully lead to a nice death, which could be argued as analogous to the
elderly’s right to decide about their own death when discussing euthanasia. Even though the
background of Bernd Brandes is not as widely researched as Armin Meiwes’, Brandes’ father
was not emotionally available after the death of his wife, Brandes mother, who committed
suicide when Brandes was five years old (Reid, 2014, p.459). Despite this, Brandes was very
successful, both academically and professionally, but never found his life or relationships
satisfying, having had both female and male partners. Brandes’ urge for self-destruction,
which, primarily in his sexual life, became an irrepressible desire for pain and Brandes
experimented with sadomasochism and hired prostitutes who he asked to preform gradually
more and more violent acts on him (Reid, 2014, p.460). Brandes started demanding the
prostitutes to bite his penis off, but the prostitutes refused which left him feeling unsatisfied
(Jones, 2005, p.59). Like Meiwes, Brandes started to look for his urges to be accommodated
online. If we are to solely base the cannibalism of Brandes on the right to decide over one’s
own death and the consent included, I would argue that the case is not inherently immoral.
What could however invalidate my claim is that both men’s backgrounds could be seen as the
motivating factor for the cannibalistic act, which I will discuss in further detail shortly.
Weicht and Forchtner discusses the elderlies desire to end their lives and having
a “nice death” as a consequences of the surrounding circumstances (2021, p.14). They argue
that it is the environment of care institutions, where the elderly lack crucial care and support,
that forms the context in which they want to end their lives (Weicht and Forchtner, 2021,
p.14). This means that the elderly in this instance would maybe not desire a “nice death” if
institutional care provided adequate support. The same argument could be made in the case of
Armin Meiwes and Bernd Brandes. If Bernd Brandes would have had a more secure
childhood, and with at least one parental figure who was emotionally available, he might not
have felt desire for self-destruction and castration. The is also true for Armin Meiwes who, as
previously mentioned, felt abandoned by his father, and had no support from his mother.
Another factor motivating Meiwes, I would argue, stems from when he lived in Wüstefeld
with his mother and encountered real life witchcraft. A neighbor by the name of Ulla von
Bernus, who was the most famous witch in all of Germany, moved in next door and quickly
became a close family friend (Reid, 2014, p.437). Since Meiwes’ only parental figure was
neglectful, he very easily became attached to Ulla. Reid explains how Ulla encouraged
Meiwes to explore his dark fantasies (2014, p.438). Ulla inspired Meiwes and he started to act
out his fantasies of cannibalism with dolls, ketchup, and marzipan where he dismembered,
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took pictures, of and ate the dolls (Jones, 2005, p.18). If they would have had different
childhoods, perhaps they would not have had these desires for destruction and companionship
that led them to engage in this cannibalistic act. But even if they had good support systems
and secure childhoods, it does not alter the fact that still could have developed these desires,
as people of all backgrounds develop all forms of desires. Additionally, the courts and
psychiatrists considered both parties, Armin Meiwes and Bernd Brandes, of sound minds and
capable of giving rational consent. Therefore, their backgrounds as motivating factors should
not be considered reason enough to define their act as immoral, which subsequently can help
strengthen my argument that cannibalism itself is not inherently immoral.
The subject of consent seems to be a crucial part of the criminal system and,
therefore, a factor to be used in the quest for possible morality in cannibalism. As stated in
“The Right to Be Hurt, Testing the Boundaries of Consent”: “Consensual sex is not rape,
consensual possession of other people’s belongings is not theft, and consensual presence on
other people’s premises is not trespass.” (Bergelson, 2006, s.6). Does this then mean that all
actions are morally justifiable when consent is involved? According to Bergelson both
consensual injury and consensual death can be regretted even when justified, morally or
legally, and in turn she proposes that the action must not violate the victim’s dignity nor
interests, in order to be considered justifiable (2006, p.58). In theory, this would apply to
cases of cannibalism, but unfortunately for my argument the law does not follow the theory of
justification by consent. In the United States, consent to personal harm only applies to three
specific sets of circumstances: first, when the injury is not serious, second, when the injury or
its risk are reasonably foreseeable hazards of participation in a lawful athletic contest or
competitive sport or other concerted activity not forbidden by law and, third, when consent
establishes a justification for the conduct of defense to bodily injury (Bergelson, 2006, p.12).
What defines serious harm is a: “bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or
which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ” (MPC § 210.0(3), and many US states have adopted
an identical or similar definition (see e.g., N.J. Stat. § 2C:11-1(b) (2005); Tex. Penal Code §
1.07 (2005)). This could explain why some states criminalize the splitting of one’s tongue, but
it fails to explain why many other plastic surgeries are legal under the same law, especially
when there are thousands of confirmed cases of misconduct and substantial risk of permanent
debilitating injury as consequences of plastic surgery while tongue splitting has, in
comparison, almost no recorded cases of such risk or misconduct. With the very open and
interpretative definition of serious harm in the U.S. legal system, it is not surprising that the
 15

courts use these as a means to further their goal of condemning unwanted behavior, while not
penalizing actions that do not, in their opinion, affect society negatively. In cases involving
consensual sadomasochistic sexual activities with no permanent or debilitating harm or injury,
Bergelson explains how courts have been able to find “serious harm” and therefore penalize
them it in order to discourage unwanted and “immoral” activities (2006, p.18). Following this
law-oriented basis, it is important to note several other legally acceptable ways that consent
can justify harm. Bergelson mentions: preventive mastectomy, gender affirming surgeries,
and patients seeking to become amputees, as such examples (2006, p.22). If a physician or
other medical professional causes harm in their practice with the patient’s consent and
knowledge of risks, most forms of harm are justifiable. This includes harm used as a form of
treatment to promote the health of the patient with the patient’s consent. While mentioning
preventive mastectomy, Bergelson explains that even though the surgery does not lower the
chances of breast cancer, and therefore is considered controversial, it is not prohibited by law
since it relieves the anxiety and improves mental health of the patient (2006, p.22). Likewise,
another surgery that is not physically necessary for survival is gender confirming surgeries.
This form of surgery is performed to alleviate body dysmorphia and improve the patient’s
mental health. Despite the fact that the surgery is considered more neutral, in a sense of
morality, it is still illegal in many places all over the world. While these previously discussed
forms of justifiable “debilitating” surgeries are often seen as morally acceptable surgeries in
the West, there are similar surgeries that are not. One example is voluntary amputation for
patients struggling with BIID, or Body Integrity Identity Disorder. Even if the patient’s life
and mental health would greatly improve as a consequence of becoming an amputee, it is not
legal to perform an amputation of this sort and the patient’s consent is invalidated by the law
(Bergelson, 2006, p.22). This is because the law has decided that some forms of consent are
invalid by nature while others are valid. In this essay, I am opting not to agree or disagree
with any of the previous cases, since it is not relevant to my argument, but I present them in
order to demonstrate the ambiguity of morality around the issue of consent in the legal
system. It is important to note that consent can be invalidated is if the person is underage,
under the influence of drugs or alcohol or mentally ill (Bergelson 2006, p.24). To this I would
add that consent should not be considered a valid justification if the person is not fully aware
of the consequences of what their consent will entail, which is raised by Swaine (2020) when
discussing the capabilities and options, in the form of consequences, following self-ruling. In
the case of Armin Meiwes and Bernd Brandes, neither of the participants were under the
influence during the time of signing the consent-contract nor attested to be clinically insane,
 16

but were still found to have participated in an immoral and illegal act, which further
demonstrates the ambiguity of the definition of moral actions and fails to give any factual
reasoning to why cannibalism should be defined as immoral.
Following the discussion of the right to decide one’s own death as well as the
shifting understanding of consent in relation to harm, I would argue that the act of consuming
another human beings flesh, at the very least when no killing is involved, negates any moral
stance provided by the stated sources. I would also raise the question whether the killing of
Brandes in fact might be considered a mercy killing, since the only other option would lead to
him bleeding out during a longer period and would still lead to his death. The ethical or moral
right to not be cannibalized after death is, almost entirely due to the idea of being
disrespected. If the person in question would consent to the consumption of their flesh after
death, I do not believe that other people should have the right to decide that the cannibalism is
unethical. The people who do not respect the person’s wishes to be cannibalized after death
are, according to consequential ethics, those who are in fact disrespecting the dead, rather than
those who consume their flesh. This discussion of consent as negating any fault in morality by
using a dead body as a means to an end can also be further demonstrated by donation of
organs. Dalal explains that organs donations are most often dependent upon the explicit
consent of the person whose organs are to be donated (2015). In some cultures, the handling
of one’s body after death is seen as disrespectful, and in these cases it would be ethically
wrong to do so. But many people see this handling and donation of organs as morally
acceptable. To donate a working organ, could even be seen as morally obligatory according to
consequentialist ethical theory. In the same way that consent is the main factor for
determining whether the handling of a dead body is ethical or not, I would argue that consent
should also hold similar weight in relation to cannibalism.

6. Morality of Consuming Flesh

In the discussion of the morality of eating meat from animals, we cannot rely on contracts or
consent since they are unable to provide it. Therefore, I would argue that consuming animal
flesh without the animal’s consent must be morally worse than the consumption of human
flesh when the individual in question has consented. To arrive at this conclusion, I will
however still have to account for the right and value surrounding life in non-humans.
In different parts of the world, there are a variety of customs around meat-
eating. While people in the West who own pets like dogs, cats, and guineapigs see these
animals as companions rather than food, that is not the case in other countries. Tom Regan
 17

explains that this means that those animals are protected by sentimental interests and, argues
that the duty to not cause harm to the animals protected by sentimental value lie in the duty of
respect to the people who care about them (1983, p.181). Respecting a human being would
then be higher on a morality-scale than that of respecting an animal. If we are to follow this
idea, one could argue that not eating a non-consenting human being is morally worse than
eating a non-consenting animal, but how then should we consider the consenting human
being? If we are to respect the person’s wish to be consumed after death, would that not be
valued morally higher than consuming an animal who was killed for their flesh, which is the
norm? We cannot deny that there is a big difference between humans and animals. But should
these differences be what define our value? According to Regan inherent value lays in a
conscious individual’s experience of life, feelings, pleasure, pain and wants (1983, p.184).
Which undoubtably transfers to the experience of animals, and therefore shows that they have
inherent value. As with all theories, there is a range of people who disagree with this idea of
animals possessing inherent value. The most common counterargument is that human beings
have a greater intellect. The way Regan argues for the lack of logic in such speciesism is by
the fact that there are some animals whose intellect exceeds that of a number of humans, such
as a mentally incapacitated person (1983, p.187).
The same argument is used by Peter Singer, who discusses the similarities
between experiments performed on nonhumans as opposed to those performed on infant
humans or mentally incapacitated adults, the former of which, he argues, would cause less
suffering because the animal does not have the capability to fear or comprehend being
kidnapped and experimented upon (2019, p.48). Singer further explains this with the example
of severely brain-damaged infants who can never exceed or even reach the same intelligence
level as a dog (2019, p.48). This definition of speciesism, that is used by both Regan (1983)
and Singer (2019), shows that our distinction between animals and humans are often without
valid reasoning. It can even be compared to the racism and sexism which were, and in places
still are, used to differentiate these “categories” of humans into those with less and more
inherent value (Singer, 2019, p.136). While these explanations of equal human and non-
human value without speciesism can seem to resemble the Marxist view on equality, this is
not exactly what it means. Singer explains that choices solely based on the membership of our
own species does not hold up morally, and that we instead should use criteria concerning
characteristics such as self-awareness, and the ability to have meaningful relations with others
and plan for the future (2019, p.52). With the characteristics as criteria, rather than
membership of species, we can still conclude that it would be more morally wrong to kill an
 18

adult human rather than a mouse. This does not mean that it would be a moral act without
reason, but in the event of a choice between killing an adult human and a mouse, it can serve
as a criterion for moral reasoning. This criterion also means that, the right to life must be seen
as greater in an animal who possesses more of these characteristics than a human (Singer,
2019, p.53). For example a chimpanzee’s life would be of greater value than a brain-damaged
infant or senile adult.
Why is the value of animals relevant for my argument? Well, if we are to agree,
to the existence of inherent value in animals, another question arises: of human and non-
human alike share an inherent value, how, and maybe more importantly, why, do we
differentiate which meat is considered morally acceptable to consume? Armin Meiwes never
understood the reason behind their being difference in morality between slaughtering and
consuming an animal and doing the same to a human being (Jones, 2005, p.8). I would argue
that the morality of consuming flesh in itself should not differ depending on which meat is
consumed. Singer gives an example when the U.S. air force, in 1973, were planning on using
200 puppies to test for poisonous gas, which led to them receiving a massive amount of mail
protests (2019, p.63). The societal concern for the puppies was greater than with any previous
experiments. Since, as stated previously, animals like dogs are protected in a sentimental way,
it caused people to find the experiment repulsing, and as a result of the backlash the
experiment was stopped. Experiments, on, to state a few, rats and mice, by both the
government and scientists are continuously performed without these kinds of protests. This
seems to be purely as a result of sentimental value as described by Regan (1983, p.184), but in
the light of Singers conclusion of animals’ inherent value, it is in line with morality for us to
categorize animals into the ones with valuable life and the ones who we can experiment on
(2019, p.65). It is known for certain that rats are extremely intelligent animals (Singer 2019,
p.65), but they are still seen as dirty and without value, which in turn means that they are
excellent to experiment on. Because of the lack of sentimental value, the experiments on rats
does not come even close to the amount of protests as the puppies, even though I would argue
for the rats greater intelligence levels. While protesting the norm of experiments, it can be
helpful to protect the rights and values of animals but, it is, according to Singer, the
institutionalized mentality of speciesism, and conditioned ethical blindness that follows,
which make these experiments possible (2019, p.81). The speciesism is further shown in the
experimenters arguments for the lack of immorality of these experiments. They often use the
hypothetical question, as stated by Singer: Would we be prepared to let thousands of humans
die if they could be saved by a single experiment on a single animal? (2019, p.134). Singer
 19

quickly proves this argument to be speciesism with the counterargument: Would the
experimenters be prepared to carry out their experiment on a human orphan under six months
old if that were the only way to save thousands of lives? (2019, p.134). It is seen as immoral
to do so, even when the life of the human infant surely is lesser than that of an intelligent
animal. It even makes itself clear when we look at the Nazis who conducted experiments on
darker skinned people and Jews because of the same reasons. Pollock also makes this
connection when discussing how animals and humans both have been exploited in similar
ways during history (2010, p.12). This can be explained by both women and non-whites who
historically have been excluded from the human definition, with no, or less, self-right, ability
to be involved in political action and personal autonomy. Pollock further demonstrates this
through the idea of “humanized humans” and “animalized animals” as isomorphism appearing
in the relations between humans and animals without being limited to human class (2010,
p.12).
We, as humans, are ignorant of what we eat, not only by not caring about the
animals lives before slaughter but also in how we choose to describe the meat; with words
like beef and pork instead of cow and pig, and how by doing that, we refuse to acknowledge
the animal in question (Singer, 2019, p.153). It is even made clear in Pollocks’ explanation of
a cannibal as an animalized human (2010, p.12). Not only are the animals we consume bred
and slaughtered for the sole purpose of consumption, as a means to an end, but the short life
they do experience is filled with torture which we would never even imagine being done to
humans, at least whilst calling it ethical. The pig, or what we call it when eaten – pork, is an
extremely intelligent animal who, like dogs and humans, dislike boredom and monotony
(Singer 2019, p.190). Singer explains how they are born in a farrowing pen where the mother
have so little room that she can barely move, when able to survive without the mother they are
moved to a growing-feeding unit where they stay until the age of five or six months when
they are fat enough to be slaughtered (2019, p.190). Why the pigs are not allowed to move or
live freely comes down to one single factor, money. It is cheaper to pay for less land and stack
the animals close together, and the fact is that we are paying for meat by the pound and not by
the animal’s quality of life makes this an economical issue, rather than a morality issue.
Singer does bring up the question of eating an animal which have lived a longer
and fulfilled life but argues that the animal flesh would be both a luxury for the rich and still
only used as a means to our end (2019, p.296). This is where I start disagreeing with Singer’s
(2019) view on morality. My interpretation of Singer’s arguments is that he believes there to
be mainly two sides of a coin, right and wrong. I believe that morality is a much broader
 20

subject, and I disagree with the idea of the consumption of animal flesh as wrong when done
with respect of the animal when compared with an animal which has been tortured. This can
also be translated to humans, killing, and eating a human being for sports, or, breeding,
torturing and using them solely as a means to an end, that being consumption, is morally
worse than consuming human flesh of a person who have lived a long life, is dying or even
consented.
Wisnewski argues against any inherent disrespect or immorality in cannibalism
since there are cases, such as emergency cannibalism, that can be seen as both moral and
respectful (2014, p.7). Examples of these cases has been discussed in previous sections. Lu
and Center have been shown to disagree with Wisnewski’s assumptions of morality in
cannibalism and believe him to have failed to take virtue ethics into consideration (2013,
p.437). Wisnewski’s reasoning stems from the dead’s lack of autonomy and dignity which
therefore means that it does not violate any virtue to consume a corpse; a dead thing. Lu and
Center on the other hand claims that a corpse does possess a value that, even if not as strong
as in the living, requires respect (2013, p.447). This is further explained by an example, of
using a dead body as means of protection, which shows that respecting the life of the living
weighs heavier than that of respecting the dead, and therefore the use of a dead body can be
morally acceptable in accordance to the greater good (Lu & Center 2013, p.447). While
believing that there is a greater good to be valued highest, the violation of virtue can still
regrettable and wrong, just less wrong in the order of goods (Lu and Center, 2013, p.447).
Wisnewski does agree with cannibalism being able to be disrespectful but argues that is not
inherently so in all cases, instead he believes that it is the circumstances surrounding the act
which decides whether the person has been disrespected or not (2014, p.1). When discussing
humans rights, Wisnewski claims that cannibalism, as opposed to murder, does not violate
any rights; since the dead possess no rights (2014, p.7). The rights and values we give to the
dead is often due to the individuals wishes when alive, and it is with this reasoning that
Wisnewski raises the alternative that respecting the dead is an indirect respect of the living
(2014, p.7). Furthermore Wisnewski explains the lack of inherent disrespect in cannibalism
with examples of ritualized cannibalism that is used to honor the dead (2014, p.3). One
example of this is the Wari who considered it to be both degrading and disrespectful to leave a
loved one’s body to rot in the dirt (Schutt, 2018, p.196). In this case it would be more
respectful to consume the loved one’s body rather than leaving it to rot or scattered for
animals to prey on.
 21

Wisnewski claims that if there are instances were cannibalism is not

disrespecting anyone, then cannibalism is not universally wrong (2014, p.7). Even while
agreeing to many of Wisnewski’s arguments, I believe Lu and Centers idea of a human corpse
possessing inherent value to be true. With believing in the value of a human corpse I would
still argue it to be insufficient to prove that the act of cannibalism is inherently immoral. If the
person, while alive, has requested to be consumed, I would be able to use Lu and Centers own
arguments against them, demonstrating that the morally right thing to do actually is to engage
in the cannibalistic act, rather than it being disrespectful to the dead person, which seem to be
their biggest argument against cannibalism.

7. Conclusion
In this paper I have analyzed and discussed different views on morality regarding the
consumption of flesh. To better specify I have decided to confine the definition of
cannibalism to that of consumption of the flesh of one’s own species, rather than that of
mucus, the placenta or breastfeeding which are proposed as a grey area in cannibalism
(Schutt, 2018). I have also discussed the various forms of cannibalism, as explained by
Wisnewski (2014) as well as Lu and Center (2013). I have compared these forms of
cannibalism to the morality of personal autonomy, consent, the law, and cannibalism as an
idea. And discussed cannibalism in human beings and in non-humans, which have brought up
the problematized idea of taboo through a Western gaze originating in false claims.
With the case of the German Cannibal, also known as Armin Meiwes, I have
addressed the form of cannibalism called fetish cannibalism in relation to my presented
arguments. I have found there to be circumstantial evidence for the desire of cannibalism, and
being cannibalized upon, as possible counterarguments, especially in the case of Armin
Meiwes and Bernd Brandes regarding their problematic backgrounds. With comparing these
to the same circumstantial evidence found when examining euthanasia and elderly care, I do
not find these circumstantial factors subsequent for defining cannibalism as an inherently
immoral act. I have also thoroughly discussed the importance of consent in this case, as a
main argument for the failure of the cannibalistic act being defined as immoral. This have also
been discussed in relation to debilitating surgeries as well as compared to the consent of organ
donations, which does not hold the same taboo regarding its inherent morality, or lack thereof.
Following this I have given several arguments regarding both survival
cannibalism and ritualistic cannibalism which have all lead to supporting my argument,
respect being the main factor in deciding its morality. The arguments presented are not only
 22

through the described taboo, which have been a great factor in defining the cannibalistic act as
inhumane through the Western gaze, but also through the analysis of several accounts where
the act of cannibalism have been defined as morally acceptable, and according to the
definition of morality through a consequentialist ethical theory to even be morally obligatory
in certain instances. With having analyzed a variety of ethics theories in relation to that of
consuming human flesh, I have also compared these theories to the consumption of non-
human flesh. With examining the morality of the killing and consumption of animals, I cannot
find any valid reasoning to why cannibalism would be defined as immoral whilst the
consumption of non-human flesh does not. I have discussed the different worldviews of
animals which we consume with those that we define as companions from the perspective of
speciesism and found it to be inadequate in defining value of life.
I have tried to state any possible faults and holes in my arguments with the
problematization of the presented ideas of morality in cannibalism. I have done this on several
occasions, in particular, the lack of consent as an accepted justification in the eye of the,
followed by my counterarguments against the ambivalence of the morality in law, especially
that of deciding to define morality according to what better helps support the courts view on
various matters. I have also proposed the idea of a redefinition of cannibalism. Maybe we
should differentiate consensual consumption of human flesh from cannibalism in the same
legal sense as we have redefined nonconsensual sex from sex to rape. This further
demonstrates my argument that cannibalism is not inherently immoral, while still
acknowledging that an act not being immoral does not immediately make it a morally
acceptable one. Instead, this depends on the surrounding circumstances in relation to valid
consent as a part of personal autonomy. Based on the proposed arguments I expect to have
addressed the lack of adequate reasoning behind the supposed inherent immorality of
cannibalism. Therefore, I would argue that cannibalism is not inherently immoral.
 23

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MPC § 210.0(3)