Kant on Intuition

Author(s): Kirk Dallas Wilson

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) , Jul., 1975, Vol. 25, No. 100 (Jul., 1975), pp.
247-265
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association
and the University of St. Andrews

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2217756

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 247

KANT ON INTUITION
BY KIRR DALLAS WILSON

Kant's Logic1 begins by dividing objective representations into int

and concepts:
All cognitions, that is, all [re]presentations consciously referred to
object, are either intuitions or concepts. Intuition is a singular
presentation (repraesentatio singularis), the concept is a general (re
sentatio per notas communes) or reflective [re]presentation (reprae
tio discursiva) (op. cit., ? 1).
But, as Frege has noted, this definition of 'intuition' contains no m
of a connection with sensibility,2 a connection that dominates the treatm
of intuition in the Transcendental Aesthetic.3 What is more, in contrast
with the Logic definition of intuition in terms of singularity, the opening
sentence of the Transcendental Aesthetic reads,
In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge
may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate
relation to them. . . . (A19=B34).
Later in the Critique, however, 'intuition' is defined by both singularity and
immediacy: intuition, Kant says, "relates immediately to the object and is
[singular (einzeln)]" (A320=B377).
Two problems with Kant's notion of intuition emerge:
(1) How are the singularity and immediacy criteria for defining in-
tuitive representations related?
(2) How is the connection between intuition and sensibility to be
established?
In the Prolegomena4 and in the Transcendental Expositions in B, Kan
treats the connection of intuition to sensibility as a consequence of a certain
theory of mathematical construction (see sec. V below); however, the relation
between singularity and immediacy as defining criteria of intuition is never,
as far as I know, made explicit by Kant.
In some recent articles Jaakko Hintikka has argued that the immediacy
criterion is just another formulation of the singularity criterion.5 Charle
Parsons has countered that the two criteria are different and, moreover, that
lImmanuel Kant: Logic, trans. Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz, Library
of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis, 1974). Hereinafter, Logic; references to this work will
appear in the text.
2The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin (New York, 1960), p. 19.
30f the Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp-Smith (London, 1963). Here-
inafter, Critique; references will appear in the text.
4Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. Lewis White Beck, Library of Liberal
Arts (Indianapolis, 1950). Hereinafter, Prolegomena; references will appear in the text
5Most notably in "On Kant's Notion of Intuition (Anschauung)", in The First
Critique: Reflections on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, ed. T. Penelhum and J. J.
Macintosh (Belmont, 1969), esp. p. 42. See also Hintikka's reply to Parsons, "Kantian
Intuitions", Inquiry, 15 (1972), pp. 341-5, esp. p. 342.

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 248 KIRK DALLAS WILSON

the singularity criterion is broader than

representations as intuitive.6 I shall a
intensionally different but extensional
each criterion identifies a different as
representation that satisfies the one a
tikka, therefore, I shall argue that imme
ity, and against Parsons I shall argue t
the other. The root difficulty in both
in their interpretation of Kantian intu
terms of the Predicate Calculus. Again
a reconstruction of Kant's singularity
primitives and of the immediacy crite
isomorphism.
I

Though much is said of the ambiguity between act and content in Kant's
notion of representation, Kant rarely used 'representation' to mean the act
of representing. While such acts are necessarily tied to our representations,
representations themselves are objects of consciousness (mental entities).
Our representations are the content of our acts of apprehending; they are
the what of what is apprehended. Accordingly, in this paper I shall use
'representation' in the content-sense.
Let us begin by noting a prima facie case for the intensional difference
but extensional identity of the singularity and immediacy criteria. Though
prima facie, this case prohibits one kind of reconstruction of Kant's notion
of intuition.

Concepts are said to be general representations because they represent

many objects by marks or characteristics that these objects have in common.
By implication, then, intuitions do not represent their objects by marks or
characteristics. But because Kant holds the transcendental thesis that
intuitions are connected with sensibility, which therefore places the
of singular representations outside the scope of general logic and insi
of aesthetic (A52=B76), Kant does not explain in the logic how intu
represent in virtue of their singularity. In formal logic Kant mentio
singularity of intuitive representations as a contrast with the genera
conceptual representations. Nevertheless, we shall find that it is p
through the contrast with the generality of concepts to reconstru
singularity of representations with logical mechanisms (sec. III below
we obtain one of Kant's criteria for distinguishing kinds of represen
-singularity versus generality-as a distinction regarding the logical
ture of a representation.
On the other hand, while singularity is mentioned at least seven
as the defining feature of intuitions in the logic lectures during the
6"Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic", in Philosophy, Science, and Method, ed.
Morgenbesser, et al. (New York, 1969), p. 570.

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 KANT ON INTUITION 249

period, the immediacy criterion is a

quite understandable, since logic, a
mode in which a representation rela
versus mediacy, as modes of represe
between ways in which a representa
critical character of this distinction
Marcus Herz of February 1772 in whic
Although he later formulated the
thetic a priori character of judgme
grounds of the relation of that in u
object".8 Kant immediately added th
[i.e. intuitions] have an understanda
are the immediate effects on the m
the mature critical philosophy ther
identify the object represented by int
it is easy to see in this argument th
and critically unproblematic, relatio
on the other hand, concerns "intelle
upon the "inner activity of the min
mediate relation to their objects.10
problem is reflected in the Critique by
cates of possible judgments (A69=
representation in order to relate to
concepts contain other representati
elements in their relation to objects (A
7In Kants Vorlesungen: Vorlesungen iber
von der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, vol. 24 (Berlin, 1966).
References to intuition as singular representation occur in Logik Philippi, p. 451; Logik
Politz, pp. 565, 566; Logik Busolt, p. 653; Logik Dohna-Wundlacken, p. 754; and Wiener
Logik, pp. 904, 905. Intuition as immediate representation is assumed but not directly
stated in Logik Politz, p. 569, during a discussion of the impossibility of infimae species
(or lowest species). Immediacy is explicitly associated with intuition in Logik Dohna-
Wundlacken, p. 754; but by 1792 one might expect that aspects of the critical philosophy
would be creeping into the logic lectures. Further references to these notes will appear
in the text; the translations are mine.
8In Kant: Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99, trans. and ed. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago,
1967), p. 71.
9See Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (New
York, 1962), p. 80.
'0Kant: Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99, p. 72.
"1By repudiating the traditional doctrine of infimae species (see Logic, ? 11, Note;
and Logik Politz, p. 569), Kant proves that it is part of the logical theory of concepts
that all concepts contain other concepts under themselves, for this repudiation guaran-
tees at least in principle that any concept can be a genus. What is critical about this
doctrine is that concepts are used as predicates in judgments when they are used to
provide a conceptualization of objects. However, Manley Thompson is mistaken when
he argues that the repudiation of the doctrine of infimae species entails that Kant would
have used the first-order scheme 'Fx' as the form of predication rather than the form
of classical logic 'S is P' ("Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology",
The Review of Metaphysics, XXVI (1972), pp. 325-326). The repudiation of the doctrine
of infimae species is only a necessary condition for Kant's critical use of concepts as
mediate representations in the critical philosophy.

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 250 KIRK DALLAS WILSON

for classifying representations, the

representation, the other its critical re
The intensional difference between si
lies in the distinction between defining
of a representation. Nevertheless, sin
are associated with mediate represen
natural to assume that singular repre
to their object. Hence we have the ex
Moreover, it follows that intuitions
valent to conceptual singularity. Intu
in immediate (and unproblematic) re
are intuitions, but in mediate (and p
objects insofar as they are conceptua
larity-immediacy and generality-med
position where intuitions were treat
sertation of 1770, the concepts of tim
intuitions.l2 This ambiguity occurs, f
The concept of space contains in i
intuition (Diss., ? 15 C).
This position should be compared wi
clusion of the Metaphysical Expositi
original representation of space is a
(A25=B40).
Kant's rejection of conceptual singularity as a conception of intuition is
clearly indicated in the logic lecture notes. In the pre-critical Logik Blomberg
(1771), Kant divides concepts into singular and common (general) (? 260,
p. 257). The former take up the role of intuition by representing an object
immediately. However, after the critical question is raised, conceptual
representation is restricted to generality and the immediacy criterion, as we
have noted, is reduced in importance in the logic. In the Logik Philippi
(May, 1772), Kant draws the logical distinction between concepts and in-
tuitions as it functions in the critical philosophy:
A concept is a general representation; representations which are not
general are not concepts. ... A singular representation is intuition
(p. 451).
II

While logic abstracts from the mode of representing an object, it never-

theless deals with objective representations, representations which purport
to represent an object, and excludes subjective representations such as
sensations and feelings. Compliance with the singularity criterion requires
that a representation purports to represent a single object. We might thus
120n the form and principles of the sensible and intelligible world, trans. G. B. Kerferd,
in Kant: Selected Pre-Critical Writings and Correspondence with Beck, trans. Kerferd
and D. E. Walford (New York, 1968); see esp. ?? 14 (subsections 2 and 3), and 15 (sub-
sections B and C). Hereinafter, Diss.; references will appear in the text.

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 KANT ON INTUITION 251

be tempted to agree with Hintikka th

Kant's notion of intuition is not v
singular term. An intuition is
would perhaps rather say a symb
object or which is used as if it wo
But problems confront such a recons
out that definite descriptions are sing
of conceptual representations.l4 Cert
against any identification of intuitio
identification would amount to conc
ceptual singularity.
Parsons takes the existence of defi
Hintikka's reduction of immediacy t
immediate singular representations, a
terion is broader in picking out intu
mediacy criterion. Parsons maintains
. . Kant never remarks, so far a
the possibility of non-immediate sin
cept of intuition.15
But certainly such implications are
intuition is defined in terms of imm
would, again, be a case of intuitions
this curious position because he retains
correspond to singular terms of mode
be singular representations (i.e., sing
sentations as parts.
But neither demonstratives nor pr
counterparts of Kantian intuitions for
tions cannot-namely, their conceptua
lent discussion of this problem, notes t
representations of concepts'".16 Dem
here' are construed in Kantian logic
judgments in order to enable one to
single object of that kind.17 Kant him
an example of a singular judgment.18
ploys demonstratives only in singula
1""On Kant's Notion of Intuition", p. 43.
as if it would refer to one", is meant to refe
14"Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic", p. 5
15Ibid.
16"Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology", p. 329. I owe much
more than can be footnoted to Professor Thompson's acute article.
17See Logic, ? 1, Note 2: "It is mere tautology to speak of general or common con-
cepts, a mistake based on a wrong division of concepts into general, particular, and
singular. Not the concepts themselves, only their use can be divided in this way."
18Kants Handschriftlicher Nachlass, Kants Gesammelte Schriften, hrsg. von der
K8niglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 16 (Berlin, 1924), N 3173.

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 252 KIRK DALLAS WILSON

that concepts which are given a singul

lously converted into an intuition of a
Similarly, proper names cannot repr
names are eliminable in the Predicate
(representations of concepts) and vari
intuitions as proper names would reduce
representations. That such a reductio
the fact that one cannot make a judgm
the proper name 'Wilson'. An intuition
the use of proper names shares commo
features that distinguish proper name
representations, it makes sense to talk
and misapplication of names. But sinc
objects are given (A50=B74), they are n
cannot be reapplied or misapplied.19
Thus, no singular term of the Predic
of 'intuition'. In particular then, no s
singularity criterion.

III
The form of singular and general representations determines dif
ways in which intuitions and concepts express part-whole relationsh
divisibility-today we might say that these representations express diffe
relations of membership. I shall consider concepts first. The form
cepts possesses two distinctive features: Allgemeinheit (= generality
versality), and the fact that this form must be generated by the mind
(Logic, ? 2, & ? 4, Note). In Logic, ?? 5-6, Kant argues that a represe
is made general by subordinating other representations to it through "l
acts" (analytic judgments) of comparison, reflection, and abstractio
subordination produces a hierarchical ordering of concepts according to
the subordinated concept, from which the higher concept is abstra
contained under the higher concept. Those representations that ar
tained under a concept constitute the Umfang of that concept. Mor
the higher concept is said to be contained in the subordinated con
(Logic, ?? 7 & 9). In this way we generate a species-genus ordering o
cepts (Logic, ? 10): the concept Philosopher is subordinated under the con
Human which in turn is subordinated under Animal; conversely, the con
Human is contained in the concept Philosopher, which differs fro
concept Human by some specific differentia, and Animal is contai
Human, which also contains the differentia Rational.
Because the concepts subordinated under a higher concept may be

"9The argument beginning with "Indeed, the use of proper names . . ." is M
Thompson's argument against construing Kantian intuitions as proper nam
"Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology", pp. 327-8.

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 KANT ON INTUITION 253

the members of the division of that c

kind of part-whole relation results from
to this theory the parts of a whole are su
whole is contained within the parts. Th
that the whole can be contained within t
that in dividing a concept one divides
cept. In discussing the nature of logica
To dissect a concept and to divide it
In dissecting the concept I see wh
analysis); in dividing it I consider w
I divide the sphere [Umfang] of the
The division, far from dissecting the
its members, for they contain more
cept (Logic, ? 110, Note 1).
The members of a logical division are o
a concept. Thus, in the sense that a log
in its species, all of which are A's, the wh
the division. The logical division of con
for the process of finding specific differ
tinues indefinitely in principle (Logic, ? 1
over, this regression is merely a regul
B696); it is only a methodological proce
It is noteworthy that the subordinat
by the classical class-membership re
theoretic character of the conceptual part
he often defined the extension of a conce
The sphere [Sphaera] is the extensi
concerns the set of things [Menge d
under the concept (Wiener Logik, p
Logik, p. 755).
We have the following definition of the s
A is a subordinated part of B =df
Further formalization of Kant's theory
this paper. In particular, one cannot
contains antinomies. However, it is lik
restricting the scope of his theory to spe
thereby excluding antinomic concepts.
In contrast with concepts, intuitive re
forms. While time, Kant contends, is t
will be convenient in this section and the next to confine our attention to
space, which is the form of intuitions representing things "outside"
Now since the form of concepts defines these representations as genera
must assume that space defines intuitions as singular representation
20For further discussion of the preceding two features of the logical division of c
cepts, see Jules Vuillemin, "Reflexionen fiber Kants Logik", Kant-Studien Band 5
Heft 3 (1960-1), p. 316.

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 254 KIRK DALLAS WLSON

this case, the theory of singularity wi

is the converse of that which results fro
the parts are subordinated to the who
the parts, it follows that the parts of
whole and that the whole is greater t
forward this view in the third argumen
of Space when he says,
. . if we speak of diverse spaces, we
and the same unique space (A25=B
Thus, in general, we may say that an
parts are contained within its whole.
The part-whole relation associated wi
different theory of division from that
of concepts occurs by limiting a concept
in the Metaphysical Exposition of Spa
Space is essentially one; the man
[the introduction of] limitations [
insert is Kemp Smith's).
These limitations are boundaries pla
division of an intuition does not take
between one part of space and other, b
one and the same space. Vuillemin ha
division (compare these with the corr
conceptual representations): first, the
and secondly, this division represents
representations.21
Since the conceptual part-whole relatio
notion of membership, it is natural to su
determines the structure of a repres
conception of the part-whole relation. A
mereology22 is the study of the form
concrete whole, or of an individual, s
saw that events possess a mereological
another, "larger", event, or two event
physical objects stand in a mereologic
object of which they are the parts, as
house. While a concrete whole may be
parts, it is obvious that this concept o

21"Reflexionen iiber Kants Logik", pp. 315

22Mereology was first developed by S. L
Goodman and H. S. Leonard in "The Calculus of Individuals and its Uses", The Journal
of Symbolic Logic, 5 (1940), pp. 45-55; see also Nelson Goodman, The Structure of Appear-
ance (Indianapolis, 1966), ch. II, ? 4. A formalization of mereology by Alfred Tarski
appears in J. H. Woodger, Axiomatic Method in Biology (Cambridge, 1937), Appendix V.
For a brief discussion of mereology, see Guido Kiing, Ontology and the Logical Analysis
of Language (Dordrecht, 1967), ch. 8, esp. pp. 102-7.

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 KANT ON INTUITION 255

set theory. There is no need to cons

logical relations as ranging over dif
no antinomies in mereology.
It is easy to obtain from a mereolo
the part-whole relation that charact
use variables to range over regions o
x is a part of y=df. (z) (z overlap
and, then,
x is a proper part of y=df. (x is
The proper-part relation is the forma
parts of a space and the whole space
properties of the division of space; f
character of the division is represente
(x) (3y) (y is a proper part of x).
Since this axiom asserts the existen
also represented as a constitutive fe
over, unlike the classical class-mem
Kant's relation of subordination, th
is, moreover, asymmetrical and irrefl
We obtain discreteness, x is discrete
having no parts in common in all s
Ultimately, the plausibility of Kan
upon originating definitions of on the
in front of. Undoubtedly, the fact
for Kant, by mereological primitiv
the Prolegomena of identical but n
that
. . .the difference between simil
congruent . . . cannot be made in
by the relation to the right and lef
to intuition (Proleg., ? 13).
The difference between right and left
parts of a representation; hence, it
intuitive representation rather than t
Kantian intuitions, therefore, are
terms but with patterns whose inte
the mereological relations in which
another. Kant brings out the relatio
ing section of the Transcendental A
. . it is especially relevant to obs
ledge that belongs to intuition .
tions; namely, of locations in an
location (motion), and of laws
determined (moving forces) (B66
23See Goodman, The Structure of Appear

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 256 KIRK DALLAS WILSON

Moreover, besides being the forms

obviously themselves intuitions, for the
mereological structure as do the represen
Kant calls space and time pure intu
Kant's doctrine of the dual character
of intuitions and themselves intuitio
Finally, let us note that a consequen
the divisibility of intuitive representa
in itself a manifold (A99). This thesis,
be synthesized in order to enter into
and of its contrast with the generalit
long footnote in the Transcendental De
Space and time, and all their parts, ar
with the manifold which they cont
the Transcendental Aesthetic). Con
cepts through which one and the s
contained in a number of represent
them many representations are fou
sentation, and in the consciousness
are thus composite. The unity of t
synthetic and yet is also original. T
is found to have important consequ

IV

In its most sophisticated form, synthesis is the process whereby a mani-

fold is given a conceptual expression as part of a scientific theory. In the
Transcendental Deduction Kant argues that the categories are the forms
in which this synthesis must be articulated in order to generate scientific
knowledge. Clearly, Kant associates synthesis with the generation of a
unified conceptual scheme when he states
By synthesis, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting
different representations together, and of grasping [begreifen, which
here should be more accurately and less metaphorically translated as
'conceiving'] what is manifold in them in one . . . knowledge (A77=
B103).
In both formulations of the Transcendental Deduction, synthesis appears as
the conceptual expression of a given manifold. In A Kant argues that
knowledge is possible only through the recognition of a manifold in a concept,
and in B he maintains that combination of a manifold by understanding is
the foundation of synthesis (B, ? 15). And Kant defines understanding as
the faculty for making judgments by bringing concepts into conformity
with the objective unity of apperception (B141). The function of the Trans-
cendental Deductions is to ascertain what are the conditions of objective
unity with which the generation of a scientific conceptual scheme must
comply: these Kant maintains to be the categories.
To be sure, Kant defines synthesis as the generation of experience. But

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 KANT ON INTUITION 257

here Kant is not using 'experience' to

desk as a spatio-temporal object cha
ception is merely intuition accompa
perience is empirical knowledge (A1
ence with "the sum of all knowledg
(A237=B296). "Knowledge", says Ka
tions stand compared and connected"
There is one single experience in wh
as in thoroughgoing and orderly
The unity of experience arises from the
and is possible only by ascribing rep
? 16; vide A113).
It is not surprising, therefore, to fin
ental Deductions that the categories are
unity by which intuitions are concep
nection (see, e.g., A119). This argum
Kant argues in ? 20 that "All sensible
gories" and then shows in ? 26 that
scription of laws to nature for the com
In this way the categories make poss
experiments in the generation of sc
Transcendental Deduction in B with the observation:
Categories are concepts which prescribe laws a priori to appearance
and therefore to nature, the sum of all appearances (B163).
In A Kant expresses this same point by arguing that the categories are
laws of the synthetic unity of all appearances*" (A128). The constructio
scientific theory, therefore, does not rest upon the formation of a Humean
type habit, but involves the conceptual expression in accordance with c
gories of what is presented in intuition.
According to Kant, furthermore, scientific theory is generated thro
the synthesis of the manifold of pure, a priori intuitions (B160). The
manifolds contain only mereological relations reducible to those holding
regions of space and time (A41=B58). Since the pure intuitions of spac
and time are the media in which mathematical construction takes pla
(see sec. V), Kant maintains in the "Axioms of Intuition" that appearan
are related to experience through the same synthesis whereby space and tim
are determined in the first place (B203). The synthesis of pure intuition
given by pure mathematics (A165-6=B206). Pure mathematics, therefo
is constitutive of scientific knowledge (A237=B295-6). In other words, o
intuitions must be conceptually articulated in terms of the structure
pure mathematics. Certainly, the rise of modern physics has provided am
verification of this Kantian thesis.
It is possible now to consider Kant's famous dictum, "Thoughts withou
24The asterisk (*) here and elsewhere indicates words italicized by me, not by Kant

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 258 KIRK DALLAS WILSON

content are empty, intuitions wit

That concepts must be given intuitio
apply their concepts to spatio-tempor
ture is presented by an intuition. Bu
intuitions can be "blind" without con
representations. An intuition is objec
logical structure of an appearance, bu
thesis relating it to other appearance
that "appearances can certainly be
functions of the understanding" (
"would be for us as good as nothing
and temporally prior to all experienc
tions of objects (A26=B42), but with
unconnected with any knowledge, and

V
Sensible intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical
intuition of that which is immediately represented, through sensation,
as actual in space and time (B147).
To this classification of intuitions, as we shall see, we must add images
(Bilder). In this section I want to consider the types of intuitions in terms
of the proposed interpretation of the singularity criterion.
Empirical intuitions, says Kant, are those that are "in relation to the
object through sensation" (A20=B34). Any identification of empirical intu-
ition with sensation is misguided. Sensations are mere subjective representa-
tions pertaining to the "subjective constitution of our manner of sensibility",
and, therefore, are not intuitions (A28=B44). Kant holds, rather, that
sensations enter into intuitions insofar as they admit of being ordered in
a spatio-temporal system of relations (A20=B34). Thus sensations are
merely the medium through which the mereological structure of an object
of empirical consciousness is represented. Kant aptly chose the word An-
schauung, which comes from the verb anschauen, meaning 'to view' or 'to
show forth', for intuition. Intuitive representations "show forth" their
object by representing its mereological structure and, in the case of empirical
intuitions, its empirical properties (B69, fn.). Kemp Smith is probably
correct in observing that "Anschanung etymologically applies only to visual
sensation", and that "Kant extends it to cover sensations of all the senses".25
However, Kemp Smith fails to grasp the interesting philosophical problem
of identifying what sensations can be ordered under which forms of intuition.
Berkeley evidently thought that tactile sensations were capable of revealing
a spatial world ("outness"), that is, of falling within space.26 However,

25A Commentary To Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, p. 79.

26An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision, ?? 45-6; in Works on Vision: George
Berkeley, ed. C. M. Turbayne (Indianapolis, 1963).

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 RANT ON INTUITION 259

aural sensations, it seems, are not iso

with sensations of taste and smell, th
relations. They cannot represent an o
Kant maintains that only space is th
time is just the form of inner sense.
mind (insofar as it is a representatio
mereological structure of space is not
space as an entity or as a "container"
which is in space renders Kant's view
is removed when we realize that 'spac
exists in the mind possesses a kind o
mereologically.28 These representations
in them is said to be apart, or discre
Kant's mereological conception of sp
Leibniz's view that space is "the orde
however, like the early Kant, had failed
concepts and intuitions and had treat
On the other hand, time, whose sing
logically representable and is therefo
for the representation of motion and
sents the manner in which represent
existence) are taken up into conscious
All our representations are ordered in t
not for this reason yield a mereological
in the way that outer intuition yields a
(A23=B37).
We turn now to consider the pure intuitions, not in relation to empirical
intuitions, but in themselves. For Kant, the pure intuitions of space and
time are the media in which the construction of mathematical objects takes
place (Proleg. ? 10). It has been said that the interpretation of Kant's
notion of intuition "stands or falls on the interpretation of the role of intu-
itions in mathematics".29 This contention is unfortunate, because, as I shall
now argue, Kant himself was unclear about this role.
Much misunderstanding has resulted from identifying the construction
of a concept with a mental image.30 When speaking carefully, Kant main-
tains that mathematics has recourse to "the universal procedure of imagina-
27See P. F. Strawson, Individuals (London, 1959), ch. II, "Sounds". Also, and
especially, J. W. Swanson, "On a Problem of Nicod and Strawson", Philosophy &
Phenomenological Research, XXVIII (1967), pp. 222-9.
28For a discussion of the 17th-18th century background of this concept of space, see
Ivor Leclerc, "The Meaning of 'Space' in Kant", Proceedings of the Third International
Kant Congress (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 393-400.
29By Parsons, op. cit., p. 571.
30Hintikka maintains that such an identification, or at least the need for mental
images, is entailed by Kant's critical association of intuition with the form of sensibility
through transcendental exposition ("On Kant's Notion of Intuition", p. 51.) This
contention is groundless (see discussion in the following paragraphs).

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260 KIRE DALLAS WILSON

tion for providing an image* for a co

this universal procedure a schema, and
(A665=B693). Pure schemata, rather th
of mathematical construction (A140
schema is a model obtained by interpr
mereological system. Tarski has shown
the logical foundations for a geometr
only bodily figures.31 It is my contentio
formal system that underlies Kant's t
turn, this system itself is grounded in h
bility through the transcendental expo
To construct a concept in intuition,
mathematical concept, is, then, a form
modelled in a mereological system suffici
posits "certain universal conditions of
object of a mathematical concept (A714
mined by the structure of space, but unt
we have no clear conception of how th
conditions are nothing other than the
part-of relation is transitive) and the spe
of solids. Moreover, we can be assured
dimensional Euclidean geometry does
solids32-in Kantian language, that geo
with schemata in the pure intuition of sp
Unfortunately, there is ample evide
preciate the wholly formal procedure for
concepts in the pure intuition of space
mathematical knowledge considers "the
in the single instance" (A714=B742). Si
patterns (see sec. III above), Kant descri
the representation of a configuration b
geometer may obtain a pure intuition.
that a geometer requires a concrete mo
a model of the mathematical concep
schemata are the means by which imag
a mathematical concept, and Kant back
mathematical knowledge as considering
the geometer "pays attention" only to
conditions of the construction" in the
In fact, Kant must back-track from a con
are always inadequate to express the uni

31"Foundations of the Geometry of Solids",

(Oxford, 1956), Essay II, pp. 24-9.
32Tarski, op. cit., p. 29.

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 KANT ON INTUITION 261

=B180). Here Kant is struggling wit

can be obtained in human cognition
literally to have a pure intuition, a co
the admixture of anything empiric
provided by imagination. But this p
pure intuition. What Kant fails to se
of a pure intuition by a formal pro
concept in a mereological system.
Secondly, further evidence that K
character of the theory underlying th
of the construction of a line. Kant wr
I cannot represent to myself a lin
it in thought, that is, generating
another (A162-3=B203).
(As we have seen, one can also represen
line in the geometry of solids.) But
In the geometry of solids, points, line
of figures. (For a definition of 'poi
above.) One cannot picture a point w
is not a point in the pure intuition of
infinitum character of intuition im
constituted by regions of space, con
which is a characteristic axiom of
struction of a point by recourse to
matter of imagining a point. If my
solids underlies mathematical concep
schematism for a point, line, or su
imagination.
In spite of these difficulties in Kant's philosophy of mathematics, the
argument of the Transcendental Expositions may still be salvaged. This
argument proceeds roughly as follows:
(1) Sensibility is the only possible way for human beings to acquire
intuitions. (Man does not possess an intuitive intellect, a peculiar
fact about human nature.)
(2) Pure intuitions contain the form of intuition (see sec. III above).
(3) Therefore, pure intuitions are possible only if the form they con-
tain is the form of human sensibility (Proleg. ? 9; also B41).
It would be incumbent upon Kant's opponent to produce another explana-
tion of how pure intuition is grounded in human cognition. Now since
mathematics and mechanics are the a priori disciplines in which man investi-
gates the structure of pure intuition, space and time are the a priori forms
of sensibility (Proleg. ? 10, cf. B48-9). This account of pure intuition is
transcendental (A56=B80-1) and, therefore, in no way affects the actual
doing of mathematics. With transcendental exposition we establish some-

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262 KIRK DALLAS WILSON

thing about the ontological status of

(since sensibility pertains to what is i
no concern to the mathematician who p
less of whether space is "in the mind
is that the formal representation of th
the form under which the human mi
is, the form under which something m
B74-5).
I shall consider, finally, the intuitive character of images (Bilder). In
the historical tradition underlying Kant's use of 'intuition'33 as well as in
Kant himself, an association is made between image (Bild) and intuition.
We have already seen Kant's use of imagination as a means, although in-
adequate, of obtaining pure intuitions. Moreover, Kant makes this associa-
tion explicitly when he says that
. . .not every intuitive representation of outer things involves the
existence of these things, for their representation can very well be a
product of the imagination [Einbildungskraft] (as in dreams and
delusions) (B278).
This association is natural on the proposed interpretation of the singularity
criterion, for mental images contain mereological relations in the same way
as empirical intuitions upon which imagination must draw in order to pro-
duce an image.
Moreover, from this interpretation of singularity, a neat interpretation
of the immediacy criterion follows.
VI

Hintikka argues that immediacy can be reduced to singularity. The

prima facie case against this reduction is that critical distinctions, such as
immediacy versus mediacy, cannot be reduced merely to logical distinctions
between types of representations. Hintikka's argument proceeds:34
(1) The alternative to immediacy is reference to objects by marks or
characteristics which may be shared by several objects.
(2) Reference to objects by such marks or characteristics is generality.
(3) Therefore, immediacy is reference to objects by particular (i.e.,
singular) representations.
(2) is true by definition, but the argument requires at least the assumption
that if a representation is not general, then it is singular.
Textual evidence, however, is insufficient to justify (1) and the additional
assumption. Hintikka offers as proof of (1) the Stufenleiter passage, a portion
of which was quoted at the beginning of this paper. Kant says, concerning
intuitions and concepts,
33See, for instance, the following passage from J. Chr. Adelung's Auszug aus dem
grammatisch-kritischen W6rterbuch: "... versteht man durch die anschauende Erkennt-
niss, eine jede Erkenntniss, die wir durch die Empfindung erlangen, oder da wir uns die
Sache selbst oder doch ihr Bild vorstellen . . ."; quoted by Hintikka, "On Kant's
Notion of Intuition", pp. 41-2.
34"0n Kant's Notion of Intuition", p. 42.

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 KANT ON INTUITION 263

The former relates immediately

singular], the latter refers to it
which several things may have in
But this passage is merely a summa
lary and should not be taken as suppl
the relationships between the criteri
immediate representation is mediate
tikka maintains in (1), and which, Ka
concepts in the same way that imm
intuitions. (See sec. I for the prima
VIII below.) But these relationships a
of representations. The opposite of i
objects by marks or characteristics) onl
to be mediate representation (that is
judgments). Clearly, however, the ide
is not true simply by definition. Hen
we establish first the correlation of
establish the correlation of immedia
correlation is a corollary of the oth
question-begging; it is true only if
representation.
Similarly, the extra assumption tha
it is singular can be accepted only if
otherwise it could be false if a repres
and thus fulfilling the antecedent) an
when the representation is mediate).
Furthermore, premiss (1) is equiva
representation does not refer to obj
premiss, thus, does not provide any
mediate representation. Parsons sug
evidently means that the object of a
present to the mind, as in percept
The phrase 'in some way' doesn't help
analogy. Hintikka is undoubtedly cor
that, interpreted literally, this defin
'intuition' in the Prolegomena.36 Kan
we use intuitions prior to the percept
intuition is such a representation as
presence of the object" (Proleg. ? 8).
VII
In this section I shall define immediacy by examining the nature
empirical intuitions. These intuitions present several important featu
35"Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic", p. 569.
36"Kantian Intuitions", p. 343.

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264 KIRK DALLAS WILSON

First, by taking empirical intuitions as

immediacy as the consciousness of th
would be a mistake. Such a definitio
Kant says about images (see the final
over, render the point of the Second
reads, "That which is bound up with
that is, with sensation, is actual" (
involve by definition the consciousne
dignify this definition into a synthet
not define immediacy as epistemolog
for Kant defines empirical intuitions
mediate relation to their object through
Our interpretation of singularity natu
sentation is in immediate relation to
morphic with that of its object. But
extensional isomorphism to explain the
object. For extensional isomorphism,
compare the ultimate factors in the ext
ever, to try to establish such a relat
object would be to incur the ancient
decries in a different, but related, cont
Now I can, however, compare the
cognizing it. My cognition thus sh
from sufficient for truth. For sin
cognition in me, I can judge only wh
agrees with my cognition of the o
was called by the ancients diallelu
for which the logicians were alway
noted that with this explanation it
fied in court and appealed to a wit
wants to gain credibility by maint
as a witness is an honest man. The
but the solution of the task in que
anyone (Logic, "Introduction", Ch
Similarly, we could determine wheth
morphic with its object only by hav
we could determine only that our intui
In this, we are again reminded that t
critical and, therefore, lies outside th
Since this distinction is critical, we
of immediacy from the doctrines of
that of transcendental idealism, the
empirical intuitions, are just represe
A490-1=B518-9, A492=B520). Now o
37For a complete explanation of extension
Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, Ch

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 KANT ON INTUITION 265

sciousness of an object its appearance fr

within my perception (intuition) of
desk. The implication of transcenden
the appearance qua object of intuition
can define immediacy as isomorphic
object. Kant himself indicates this ident
. . . what we call outer objects are
of our sensibility, the form of wh
(certainly, the "representations of ou
intuitions), and implies it when he state
If. . . we . . do not proceed, as we
intuition as itself mere appearance
a thing in itself can be found, our t
appearances and things in themse
The object of intuition, then, is mer
What distinctions one does make rega
the object and what pertains only to
are only empirical distinctions and d
side" the intuition (A45=B62; also A29-30=B45). (And what belongs
objectively to the intuitions is its mereological structure-A28==B44.)
VIII
I have said that because an intuition possesses a mereological stru
Kant can say that an intuition is isomorphic with its object. It ma
objected that this argument only vindicates Hintikka's position th
mediacy is only "a corollary" of singularity.39 However, by reducin
mediacy to singularity, Hintikka wants to argue that immediacy
other meaning than that of singularity. In this he is mistaken. M
cedure in the preceding section shows how Kant can base critical distinc
upon given logical distinctions while yet maintaining a separate mea
the critical distinction (cf. Proleg. ? 9, fn. 4).
Only the relatively simple task remains of showing that the sing
and immediacy criteria are extensionally identical. This identity foll
cause (i) if a representation is singular in the defined sense, it is isom
with an empirical object, and (ii) if a representation is isomorphically id
with an empirical object, it must be singular in Kant's mereological s
singularity.
Georgia State University
38The same point is made by Henry E. Allison, in "Kant's Concept of the Trans-
cendental Object", Kant-Studien, Band 59, Heft 2 (1968), when he says, ". . . when we
distinguish between representations and their objects, we are not distinguishing between
two kinds of entities, one in the mind, and the other "out there", but between two ways
in which we can regard our representations . . ." (p. 179). Allison arrives at this inter-
pretation not through transcendental idealism but through its opposite side, namely,
through an analysis of the transcendental object, the object which is represented by
appearances qua representations.
39Hintikka uses this formulation of his reduction of immediacy to singularity in his
Inquiry response to Parsons, "Kantian Intuitions".

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