I.

- DECISION-MAKING TRAPS
1.
Anchoring:
The United States government faces in the first frames of the film a harsh and
difficult decision, Soviet nuclear missiles have been detected in Cuban territory
aiming directly at the US (not yet operational). - In this approach to the conflict we
find ourselves with a hasty bias towards maintaining the first of the ideas, namely
war.
2.
Status Quo:
Throughout the film there are multiple appearances of the status quo bias, such as
at the beginning, when the expert advisory committee decides that attacking first
is the best option since this is what has always been done at the wartime (based
only on World War II despite the post-war circumstantial and technological
changes Kennedy considers). Or as when the president is asked to keep his
agenda, without considering the update of this event that could trigger a new
global war. This bias is also present when the second letter from the Russian
leader is received, which, despite being confirmed that he did not write it, was
immediately taken as a refusal to negotiate, only later was the information
updated to consider that the Russian Communist Party could have been
manipulating the situation to carry out a coup d'état.
3.
Sunk Costs:
A clear example of sunk cost (and de-authorization) is when the high chiefs of the
military chain resolve to maintain an air offensive program that in the context
could be politically interpreted as an obvious provocation, justified in a framework
of sustained hostility (when the president's framework was more to wait and
negotiate) and in the logistic investment of the military equipment already
deployed.
4.
Confirming Evidence:
The military commanders, still biased by the excessive weight of the idea of going
to war, only presented evidence that confirmed Soviet hostility and that the only
safe and viable option for national security was to face up to military interventions
in Cuba. This confirmation bias also occurs when, after receiving the second letter
from the Soviet leader, the first thing the high military commands stick to is
mistrust and the need to respond with immediate pure hostility, instead of
carrying out more detailed studies.
5.
Framing:
The framework greatly affected the top U.S. decorations, since it moved (and
presented a strong resistance to change) along hostility, tension, a sense of
preponderance, revenge and conflict, when in reality the presidential leader was
seeking a middle ground, negotiable and above all without a war movement.
6.
Estimating & Forecasting:
Again (and in fact you see it throughout the film) the military officials by not
changing their frame continued to think until the end that the appropriate
response was hostile, and they did not update the information on their board,
since the political spectrum was anything but rigid and the political position had to
be updated quite often.
II.- ADVOCACY AND INQUIRY
With respect to the
investigation
, this was key. For example, when the signal from the
Soviet ship was deepened and decrypted to determine that their ships would not present an
offensive and would in fact begin the withdrawal (when they had already prepared the torpedoes
to nestle the submarine. Also when the reliability of the Russian source that wanted to negotiate
on behalf of the highest Russian authority was investigated, that investigation was key to the
development of the conflict and to "kick" the option of entering the war. Another stage where the
investigation was key was when the second alleged letter from the Soviet leader was received,
which updated the political spectrum in an important way. With regard to
defence
, it is worth
noting all the times that, influenced by different biases, the high military officials tried to take the
country to a third global state of war
III.- COMMUNICATION PRACTICES OF GOOD DECISION
MAKING
1.
Multiple alternatives:
At each meeting of the expert committee, the intention (on the part of the
presidential team) was to explain the opportunities, however absurd they might
seem. For example, even when a military command backed off the characteristic
robustness and offered "missiles for missiles" as an option.
2.
Assumption testing
A strong assumption is made that the blockade response would be seen as
"weakness" among the enemy, which was obviously the opposite.
3.
Well-defined criteria
President Kennedy stated his defined intention as a restriction (criterion) from the
moment 0. Since his option was always to avoid armed conflict at all costs and to
try to reach a solution that would not put the country or the world in jacketed.
4.
Dissent & debate
The decisive debate comes at the end, at the moment of deciding the final
strategy: to ignore the "false" card or war.
always be so.