Shatterbelts and Conflict Behaviour: The Effect of Globalisation On High Risk' States

SHATTERBELTS AND CONFLICT BEHAVIOR:
The Effect of Globalization on “High Risk” States
DAVID REILLY
University of Colorado, Boulder
Campus Box 333, Boulder CO 80309
e-mail: David.Reilly@Colorado.EDU
Biographical Information
David Reilly is a doctoral candidate at the University of Colorado, Boulder. His research
emphasizes geopolitical conflict and democratization. He is an active participant in the
Globalization and Democratization research project at Colorado, which produced ‘The Diffusion
of Democracy, 1815-1994’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 88 (1998).
Recent publications include ‘Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the
Postcommunist World’, World Politics (2000), co-authored with Jeffrey Kopstein.
SHATTERBELTS AND CONFLICT BEHAVIOR:
The Effect of Globalization on “High Risk” States
This paper ties together seemingly disparate literatures—those of globalization and “shatterbelt
states”—as a means of investigating the changing conflict behavior of high risk states. The
objective of this research is to ascertain empirically whether the circumstances that generate
aggression by high risk states are the same as those for others. In addition, by examining how
conflict behavior has changed over time, and in conjunction with trade openness, these tests speak
to the importance of economic interdependence as a mitigating counter-force to aggressive
tendencies. The results indicate that domestic instability and fragmentation are more directly tied
to high risk state behavior than are systemic influences. In contrast, the probability that low risk
states originate or participate in conflicts, and resort to violence, is tied to international factors.
Surprisingly, increased repression seems to result from the opposite circumstances. For high risk
states, changes in repressive behavior are tied to the external environment while low risk states
seem prone to change levels of repression in conjunction with their internal conditions. Finally,
and most importantly, trade openness has an important pacifying effect on high risk states but
appears to be irrelevant to the conflict behavior of all others. Globalization, it appears, mitigates
the violence that is often initiated by high risk states. These results offer important preliminary
evidence for understanding high risk states and the strategies that may reduce their aggressiveness.
As improvements in communication and transportation technologies lead to increases in flows of
information and resources, researchers have begun to examine the effects of globalization and
integration on a variety of state behaviors. From these studies, a fundamental disagreement has
emerged: Globalization is argued by some to lead inevitably to a consensus on social and
political order that will signify the “End of History,” 1 while others contend that increased
interaction between cultures and nationalist groups will result in conflict and a “Clash of
Civilizations.”2 The two sides of this dispute have been characterized as Jihad vs. McWorld and
the Lexus and the Olive Tree, a tug-of-war between the assimilationist nature of capitalism and
the fundamentalist tendencies of religious and tribal groups.3 In either case, there is general
agreement that these changes will have implications for global peace and security: whether
international order or terrorism and violence is the likely result of globalization – and whether
policies can be enacted to mitigate this process – will have a profound effect on international
relations in coming years.
One issue of contention within the broad debate of globalization involves the relationship
between economic interdependence and peace. The liberal view proposes that expanding
economic ties will result in a reduction of violent conflict as the costs of military solutions
become prohibitive. Realist and Marxist critics counter that economic globalization, and the
increased interaction associated with it, will have a negligible or even amplifying effect on
violence between and within states. A recent review of the research on globalization and peace
indicates that findings are mixed: Although much empirical evidence supports the claims of
liberal economists, formal analysis anticipates little or no pacification as a result of economic
interdependence.4
A second issue of debate within the globalization literature involves the importance of
location within a globalized world. Liberals such as Friedman suggest that the importance of
1
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).
2
Samuel J. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1996.).
3
See Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World (New York:
Ballantine Books, 1995); Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999).
4
Katherine Barbieri and Gerald Schneider, ‘Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of
Trade and Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research 36 (1999), pp. 387-404.
local context will be diminished as international ties are extended: “In the Cold War system, the
most likely threat… was from your neighbor coming over… That threat has not been eliminated
today, but, for the moment, it has been diminished in many parts of the world.” 5 A recent study
assessing the process of transition for Postcommunist states, however, indicates just the opposite:
Location is the most important determinant of political and economic change. 6 Such findings
have fueled speculation that regional dynamics and neighbor-effects will continue to provide the
clearest indicators of interstate conflict.
This article addresses these two facets of the globalization debate by evaluating the
aggressive behavior of “shatterbelts.” These are backward and fragmented regions; the states
that comprise them suffer from depressed political and economic systems. Because these states
are inwardly divisive and exploited from the outside, they are characterized as hostile and
violent. It is suggested that their temperament leaves these countries displaced from their
neighbors, their regions, and the system at large. 7 In addition, there is assumed to be a regional
dynamic whereby the aggressiveness of individual states is contagious, leading to violence that
spills over borders. The probability of conflict within shatterbelts, for all of these reasons, is
assumed to be significantly greater than in non-shatterbelt areas. Accordingly, shatterbelts are
informative for examining propositions about conflict behavior, interdependence, and the
diffusion of conflict.
This study offers an alternative conception for the grouping of states at high risk of
conflict. It employs the same underlying causal mechanisms identified within the shatterbelt
literature – the category of “high risk states” is defined by their political instability, economic
backwardness, cultural fragmentation, external military intervention, and isolation from the
surrounding region and the international system at large – but employs individual countries as
the unit of analysis rather than regions. This allows for the identification of countries that “buck
the trend” of their high risk neighbors and facilitates a comparison of “shatterbelt” and “high
risk” designations.
The following research is intended to ascertain empirically whether the circumstances
that generate aggression by high risk states are the same as for other countries. By distinguishing
between systemic factors and domestic influences, this study attempts to clarify the dynamics
that generate crises, disputes, repression, and violence. In addition, by examining how conflict
behavior has changed over time, and in conjunction with trade openness, these tests speak to (1)
the importance of economic interdependence as a mitigating counter-force to aggressive
tendencies, and (2) the relative importance of location and domestic circumstances for explaining
conflict.
Globalization and Peace

Globalization places greater demands upon governments. As satellites, aircraft,
computers, radio, and other communications and transportation technologies develop, people and
information become increasingly mobile. Ideas spread over borders more rapidly and
individuals can travel to previously inaccessible locations. The result is populations that are
more aware of the quality of life of their counterparts and more desirous of the comforts
available in other parts of the world. These populations demand the best of what they observe
abroad from their leaders; moreover they demand that the government provide it faster, cheaper,
and in greater quantities. The effect of globalization, accordingly, is new governmental
pressures.
The aforementioned debate on globalization and peace suggests that government leaders
have at least two potential solutions for responding to these new pressures. They may attempt
trade arrangements, opening markets, or cultural or informational exchanges as a means of
accommodating their public. They can, in other words, cooperate with other states experiencing
similar circumstances.8 As early as 1795 it was argued by Kant that certain states will recognize
and act for mutual benefits gained through cooperation and openness. 9 These perspectives have
been revived in studies of the democratic peace, 10 economic interdependence,11 security
communities,12 and epistemic communities.13 It has also been argued that the costs of traditional
military solutions are increasingly prohibitive as the economic well-being of states becomes
intertwined.14 As a result, leaders have incentives to seek out new solutions to age-old problems
and to identify peaceful means of conflict resolution.
Alternatively, a state can become conflictual: it can take an imperialist approach to ensure
access to necessary resources, or it can employ violence against its own people or against
neighboring states as a means of relieving pressures on the government. 15 Because differences
between cultures are seen by some as irreconcilable, the increased interaction that accompanies
globalization is, according to this view, likely to result in an increase in violent conflict. 16 This
position suggests that the particularity of cultures will be likely to function as a barrier to the
diffusion of global ideas and values, and even as a flash-point for conflict in coming years. 17
Fragmentation and instability at the domestic level will also become more prevalent as
governments attempt to suppress new public demands.18
Regardless of which side is correct, there is general agreement on the fact that a select
number of states will play a critical role in determining whether globalization is a pacifying or
conflict-generating process. Those countries that serve as the fault-lines between civilizations, 19
or that serve as ethnic borders 20 will be instrumental in determining the outcome of globalizing
processes. Whether they facilitate the flow of information from one realm to another or resist the
spread of ideas will affect the likelihood of cooperation and conflict.
Shatterbelts and Ethnic Fault-Lines

Beyond its economic implications, globalization can be conceptualized as a geopolitical
phenomenon. Because historical and cultural heritage are important for understanding how
states respond to increased interaction and openness, and given that these traditions tend to be
linked to geography, researchers have focused on regional adaptation to globalization. As
Inglehart demonstrates, “Religious and historical traditions have left an astonishingly durable
legacy that continues to differentiate a wide range of basic values concerning not only religion,
but also political, economic, social norms across cultural zones.” 21 Although change is taking
place, the inclination of states to embrace or resist globalizing forces is in large part dependent
upon its geopolitical history.
Geographic environments have been found to have a direct influence on the behavior and
adaptability of states. Krugman, for example, finds that the characteristics of the geographic
landscape – in the form of resource endowments – has a profound effect on a state’s trade
behavior.22 Sachs finds that access to waterways is a determinant of economic reform. 23 Most
and Starr’s research suggests that conflict in neighboring countries increases the probability of
conflict for a given state.24
This last proposition is particularly troubling. Independent of their actions and efforts,
individuals who live in particular states are more likely to experience war and terror than people
in other locales. Because of the important implications of this, studies have attempted to identify
these “high risk” locations and to determine if conflict does in fact occur more frequently.
Although studies of “risky states” have distinguished between individual, state, dyad,
region, and system units of analysis,25 there are two predominant approaches to identifying
locales at risk. The first focuses on the internal conditions of the state as determinants of conflict
proneness. Characteristics such as standard of living, trade openness, political orientation and
stability, and cultural homogeneity are used to identify countries at a high risk of crisis and
violence.26 In other words, there is an attempt to identify conflict-enhancing domestic conditions
and attributes.
A second subset of this research focuses on regional characteristics and geopolitical
influences. These studies that have examined the spatial component of violence refer to conflict
prone regions as shatterbelts: clusters of states that are politically, culturally, and economically
underdeveloped.27 As a result of their cultural and social fragmentation, political instability,
economic woes, and distinctiveness from neighboring states, they are prone to violence. Hostile
internal and external challengers constantly threaten their governments. This leads to aggressive
policies on the domestic and international fronts. Scapegoating, preemptive strikes, purges,
repression, and a general reluctance to bargain or seek non-violent resolution to disputes are
listed as characteristics of these states.
Exacerbating these aggressive tendencies is the fact that major states are able and willing
to exploit their vulnerability. Because shatterbelts are “caught between the conflicting interests
of the Great Powers,”28 they are frequent targets of intrusive foreign intervention. Because of the
divisiveness of their domestic environments, their lack of harmony with neighboring states, and
their attractiveness as susceptible targets of dominating regional or global powers, shatterbelts
resort to – and are the target of – violence.
The unique characteristics of shatterbelts and weak states make them useful subjects of
analysis. Given their propensity for conflict, these states are potentially instrumental for
clarifying the effect of globalization in relation to the spatial context of violence. As described
above, a debate rages about the prospects of cooperation and conflict in a globalizing world.
Hensel and Diehl suggest that “shatterbelts… offer a way of understanding how geography can
provide the bases for conflict as well as condition state behavior in that conflict.” 29 If
globalization does, in fact, represent a fundamental transformation of the manner in which states
respond to adversity,30 “high risk” states such as those found within shatterbelts should magnify
these changes. In other words, they serve as the most likely cases for conflict and least likely
cases for cooperation. As such, they are useful states for examining the implications of
globalizing trends.31
Despite the importance of conflict processes to research in the social sciences, studies of
shatterbelts in particular, and geopolitical conflict in general, tend to be imprecise at best and
tautological at worst. Hensel and Diehl are particularly critical of this field of research: “the
shatterbelt literature has suffered from a lack of conceptual precision and rigorous empirical
testing, and has generated a debate over the meaning and implications of shatterbelts.” 32
Although the conflict propensity of these locations may provide valuable insight into the causes
of interstate aggression, few studies have been able to combine the theoretical logic and
empirical evidence of shatterbelts in a meaningful way.
In what may be the only rigorous, systematic investigation of shatterbelts to date, Hensel
and Diehl describe a number of important characteristics of these “at risk” states. Their study
provides empirical support for the proposition that shatterbelts generate a disproportionate
number of militarized disputes, and it reveals that internal conflicts are more common in
shatterbelt regions. In fact, shatterbelts are twice as likely as other regions to experience
militarized disputes. The intensity and duration of conflicts in these areas are also significantly
greater than in non-shatterbelt regions.
Hensel and Diehl raise a series of questions about the causes of shatterbelt conflict and
suggest an agenda for this research area. In their opinion, “there is sufficient empirical evidence
to suggest that shatterbelts are worth further rigorous study… We do not yet have the answers to
all of these questions, but their empirical importance makes them worth asking.”33 As their study
acknowledges, we do not understand why conflict is more likely in shatterbelts. The behavior of
shatterbelt states may provide insight into a central question of international relations: Do
conflicts stem primarily from superpower rivalry, or are they derived from domestic, neighbor-
level and regional factors? Furthermore, it is unclear how to mitigate tensions within these
regions. Not all shatterbelt states are conflict-prone; an examination of the factors that promote
and inhibit violence within these regions could offer insight into the most effective strategies of
conflict management and resolution.
This study attempts to correct for a number of the shortcomings of earlier analyses of
shatterbelt states, and to address the lacunae in our understanding of these conflict prone states.
Furthermore, this research is intended to speak to the debate on globalization by examining the
spatial and temporal components of conflict in states “at risk.” In terms of policy implications, it
is expected that through the identification of conflict catalysts and enhancers, disputes can be
anticipated and resolved before they escalate to crises. Conflict reducing factors may also be
pinpointed and promoted to generate stability within these areas.
There are a number of propositions tested within this research. First, I seek to clarify
whether the aggressiveness of shatterbelt states is a predominantly regional phenomenon –
dependent upon regional factors – or whether the effect is particular to states that share domestic
fragmentation and instability. The expectation of this research is that although there may be a
regional component to the crisis behavior of shatterbelt states, aggression is more likely to be a
function of their internal conditions. In other words, we are less likely to know the conflict
propensity of a state by identifying its location than by examining its domestic circumstances.
Furthermore, it is expected that the importance of a state’s location has decreased over time as
interdependence has increased.
A second issue to be addressed is the importance of trade openness – one indicator of
economic interdependence – for conflict propensity. Some suggest that fragmentation and
instability will be exacerbated by increased interdependence, leading to a rise in conflict and
hostility. Others argue that cooperation is more likely to result from the changes associated with
economic interdependence. Shatterbelt states are a particularly interesting set of cases with
which to test these propositions, because the conditions described as prototypical for these
countries indicate that they are detached from their neighbors and from the larger world system.
The expectation of this research is that integration, in particular with bordering countries and
regional organizations, will promote cooperation. Following the logic of Keohane and Nye in
Power and Interdependence, the costs of military action will become prohibitive as the benefits
of cooperation and interaction are realized. 34 Especially in high risk states, the development of
trade relations should be a critical determinant of crisis behavior. Given the uncertainty of
political, cultural, and economic circumstances within these countries, a strong trade network
should be embraced and fostered. Globalization, therefore, is hypothesized to reduce the
probability of conflict and violence.35
Beyond addressing the question of globalization and peace, this research will examine the
factors that determine the timing of crisis by high risk states. Within the literature there are two
sets of propositions: that the dynamics of the international system and the behavior of major
powers condition the crisis behavior of shatterbelt states; and that the inherent instability,
fragmentation, and dislocation of these states generate aggressive behavior. By testing models of
crisis behavior that include both systemic- and domestic-level factors, I intend to determine the
primary causes of shatterbelt state aggression. It is the contention of this study that domestic
factors are the predominant source of hostility for high risk states because they force the leaders
of these countries to externalize their disputes, as well as to identify scapegoats and diversions
from internal strife. Furthermore, scarcity within borders pressures leaders to seek short-term
solutions—often in the form of conflict. These concepts are developed within the internal-
external conflict nexus literature36 and although the results of studies in this area are
inconclusive,37 the logic of these concepts is suitable for the conditions that exist within high risk
states. Low risk states, in contrast, are likely to respond to the circumstances of the larger
international environment. Because leaders within these countries have consolidated their
authority and established their legitimacy, the threats that generate aggressive behavior are more
likely to stem from systemic-level factors.
Finally, this study evaluates different types of conflict behavior. Research by Hensel and
Diehl suggests that in addition to external crises, shatterbelts are more prone to internal conflict
as well.38 This research design will test whether dispute origination, participation in crises, the
resort to violence, and increased repression are all generated from similar or distinct causes for
high risk states. In other words, by disaggregating conflict behavior into particular types, it is
possible to learn about the distinct strategies that leaders of high risk states employ in response to
varying internal and external conditions.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The term shatterbelt has been used alternately to describe zones of competition between
major powers,39 clusters of states in political flux, 40 and “regions of interrelated regional and
strategic conflict.”41 As Hensel and Diehl observe, in spite of the imprecise definitional criteria
used to identify shatterbelt states, there are fundamental themes in the literature. These states are
typically (1) ‘weak’ and economically backwards, (2) politically and culturally fragmented, (3)
the targets of foreign intervention, and (4) outside the exclusive sphere of influence of major
power states. Because “[e]ach of these conceptual components deals with elements that are
thought to be linked theoretically with increased conflict within the shatterbelt,” they serve as
useful definitional criteria for selection.42
Rather than evaluating shatterbelts as regions, I choose to examine the behavior of
individual “high risk” states. There are a number of reasons for this. First, not all states within
shatterbelt regions are conflict prone. In order to investigate the conditions that increase the
likelihood of conflict across these states, characteristics of individual states should be considered.
Second, distinguishing regions as the unit of analysis may result in an unnecessary loss of detail.
The abstraction of regions may preclude researchers from identifying causal processes that are
observable at the state level. Third, states that appear to behave as shatterbelts may not be
categorized as such when the research design emphasizes regions. An example of this can be
seen in Hensel and Diehl’s study, where India and Pakistan are designated non-shatterbelt status
in spite of their culturally fragmented, politically unstable, and economically underdeveloped
conditions.
It is important to note that the geographical component of the shatterbelt literature is
compromised by this decision. The genesis of the shatterbelt concept is predicated on the
observation that regions appear to behave differently. By examining states independently, there
may be a cross-national diffusion dynamic or regional predisposition that is ignored in this
alternative operationalization. In other words, observations of individual states may not be
independent. Accordingly I test two different models of shatterbelts (described below) in order
to evaluate my conception against others.
The aforementioned propositions are tested for all nation-years in the global system for
the period 1950-1992.43 These years were selected because of data limitations and, following
Hensel and Diehl, this period offers the most substantively meaningful grounds for comparison.
The global projection of power by states was rare prior to this period, and the majority of areas
outside of Europe lacked many of the qualities associated with the modern nation-state. In
addition, many of the weak states of the world did not shed their colonial status until after World
War II.
Two models intended to capture conflict-prone states are evaluated. The first model
replicates Hensel and Diehl’s operationalization of shatterbelt regions. In their study, eleven
regions were identified based on the following parameters: countries located on the same
continent or geographic space, that identify with regional international organizations, and that
share common histories and cultures.44 Shatterbelt regions were then determined on the basis of
the aforementioned four criteria. 45 Their study revealed five shatterbelt regions during the period
1950-1976; in extending the data to 1992 there are a total of 2621 nation-years (30.8 percent of
nation-years) designated as belonging to shatterbelt regions out of a possible 8507 (see Table
One and Map One).46 This first measure of shatterbelts provides a geographic component
missing from the subsequent model. The interaction between neighbors and proximate states is
captured by defining regions – rather than some smaller unit of analysis such as states – as
conflict-prone.
The second model operationalizes high risk states over the 1950-1992 period of time
without regard for regional considerations or temporal consistency. High risk states are
determined according to their scores on six measures: the size of their largest ethnic group, 47 the
size of their largest religious group,48 the variance of their political scores,49 their per capita
Gross National Product,50 whether they were the target of overt military intervention in the prior
ten year period,51 and a trade openness score (exports + imports / real pcGNP).52 The median
score of each measure was taken for the full set of nation-years, and states that fell below the
median were scored “one.” States falling above the median received a “zero” score. Regarding
real per capita GNP, the median was taken for each year and states were scored based on the
annual median. For variance, states falling above the median received a “one” score, whereas
states below the median received a “zero.” These scores were then tallied, and nation-years
receiving a total score equal or greater to four were labeled high risk and states receiving a score
below four were labeled low risk. Map Two offers a visual representation of high risk states.
Darker shading is indicative of countries that qualify as high risk for all or nearly all of the forty-
two years under examination. Lighter shades represent countries that are designated as high risk
for a shorter period of time, and states without shading are considered low risk for the entire
period under investigation.
This scoring scheme is intended to reflect the theoretical basis of the shatterbelt literature.
As explained earlier, the components most common to the literature are ethnic and political
fragmentation, economic underdevelopment, political instability, isolation from their neighbors
and their region, and frequent external intervention. Each of these factors is hypothesized to
contribute to their conflict proneness and their additive effect is expected to compound the
aggressiveness of these states. Because the median represents the middle state’s score, a “one”
in each category is intended to reflect the extent to which that state is “at risk.” States at risk in
more than half of the categories are defined as high risk. From this selection rule, 989 nation-
years (13 percent) are defined as “high risk states.”
These two models enable me to evaluate alternative conceptions of conflict propensity:
the first that conflict is primarily geographically-bound and spatially proximate. It is based on the
assumption that states within shatterbelts share some common feature that is either directly tied
to their region, or that their region serves as a proxy for some more complicated factor. The
second assumes that the domestic features of high risk states predispose them to conflict, and that
these features are variable over space and time. Regardless of where high risk states are located,
it is assumed that their domestic conditions increase their potential for aggression and violent
behavior.
The following tests are intended to evaluate these models. Upon identifying the most
useful model for predicting conflict behavior, this model will be applied to a number of empirical
analyses to determine whether a set of propositions about high risk states is accurate. First, I
investigate the probability that high risk states will originate disputes, 53 participate in disputes,54
and escalate crises to violence,55 given a set of domestic- and system-level factors. Then I
examine the probability that high risk states will increase their level of repression 56 for a
particular year given the same set of domestic- and system-level factors. Next, I investigate how
high risk state behavior has changed over time, and whether there are any indications that
interdependence have influenced conflict behavior. This involves graphing the hostility level of
high risk state disputes over time as well as the severity level of conflicts involving high risk
states. Finally, I examine how the level of trade openness has changed among high risk states
between 1950-1992, and how this change correlates with changes in conflict behavior.
Empirical Results
In order to evaluate the two models that conceptualize high risk states, I consider the
“goodness-of-fit” scores for each model against nine dependent variables. These variables
represent crisis and dispute behavior: whether and how often states initiate disputes, escalate
levels of hostility, use violence, participate in wars, and repress their citizens. Given that the
intent of the shatterbelt literature is to identify states “at risk,” the appropriate model should have
a strong fit with aggressive behavior. The results of these tests are listed below (see Table Two)
in the form of R2 scores for each regression.
As the results of these tests indicate, the model that conceptualizes high risk states
according to their internal characteristics scores higher in every category of aggressiveness. It
appears from these tests that the most effective manner for assessing risks – even within high
conflict regions – is by focusing on the domestic conditions of the states rather than the
circumstances of some larger spatial unit such as regions. Furthermore, the conflict propensity
of these states varies over time, and accordingly our measures should be dynamic in order to
accommodate these changes. In short, a model that employs nation-years as the unit of analysis
and accounts for variability in high risk status appears to be most effective.
One test of the effect of interdependence on conflict behavior is whether location has
become increasingly irrelevant to conflict propensity. In other words, if interaction is more
global in nature in the modern world, one would expect that domestic conditions would grow in
importance while regional factors would become less useful as an explanation for state conflict.
This does not appear to be the case when evaluating the goodness of fit for each model by decade
(see Table Three). Using the “originating of disputes” as an example, the predictive power of the
high risk state model actually declines from decade to decade. The shatterbelt model is more
consistent across the decades but scores consistently lower than the high risk state model.
Although this result appears to refute the expectation that location is losing importance for
conflict propensity, conclusions should be tempered by the fact that one criterion for high risk
designation is low trade openness – an indicator of isolation from the global system. Before
speculating on the determinants of conflict and the levels of violence within and among these
states, further examination is necessary.
Internal and External Determinants of Conflict
In order to evaluate the effect of domestic and systemic factors on the timing of conflict
by high risk states, I model the probability of aggressive behavior for a shatterbelt given a set of
specified conditions. These include systemic level conditions of polarity, 57 alliance capability,58
and whether or not a state is a member of the United Nations. 59 I also include a set of domestic-
level factors: real per capita GDP, the size of the largest religious group in the country, the size
of the largest ethnic group in the country, a country’s level of democracy, the variance of change
in the country’s political score over the prior 10-year period, and whether or not that country was
the target of overt military intervention within the prior ten year period.
I then gauge the probability that a high risk state will originate disputes,60 engage in
disputes,61 and escalate crises to violence62 given these domestic- and system-level factors. The
expectation of this research, as described earlier, is that the timing of aggression by high risk
states is dictated by internal conditions, while systemic factors are the predominant catalysts for
established states. The results are listed below; they provide general – although inconsistent –
support for this proposition.
In Table Four, the results of two separate probit analyses involving low risk and high risk
states are listed side by side.63 As designated by asterisks, the likelihood of low risk states
originating disputes is significantly influenced by the three system-level variables – in the
positive direction by polarity and whether or not the state was the target of overt military
intervention in the prior ten-year period, and negatively so by membership in the UN. In other
words, disputes are more likely to be originated by low risk states when the polarity of the
international system is loose (unipolar or polycentric) and when they have been the target of
intervention in the recent past. These states are less likely to originate disputes when they are
members of the United Nations. None of the domestic-level factors are significantly associated
with the low risk states. High risk states, on the other hand, are also influenced by overt military
intervention (although the effect is less certain than on low risk states), and are only moderately
more likely to originate disputes when their ethnic makeup is relatively homogeneous.
Regarding participation in disputes, the results are listed below (see Table Five). The
model is slightly different from the last in that it groups originators and targets of aggression into
one category: dispute participation. This is important because the aggressor in disputes is not
always clear. In addition, it is useful to understand the dynamics of states that are frequently
involved in crises whether or not they are the initiator. One additional independent variable in
this model is alliance capability as a system-level factor. 64 This variable measures the type of
alliance pattern that existed for the crisis actor at the time of crisis, and includes non-alignment,
informal alliances with major powers, and formal alliances with major powers. The results
indicate that low risk states are positively influenced, to a small degree, by ethnic homogeneity
and real per capita GDP. High risk states are also more likely to engage in disputes when they
are ethnically homogeneous. However, the probability of participating in a militarized interstate
dispute decreases when high risk states experience high levels of political variance. This is a
surprising finding, given recent studies that have associated rocky transitions with increased
conflict.65
The measures of dispute involvement and origination, described above, are important for
gauging the aggressiveness of states. They do not offer a clear indication of extent to which a
state is willing to use violence, however. The following table (Table Six) provides results of a
model measuring the probability of violent conflict given high risk status. Crises are
dichotomized according to whether they involve violence; minor clashes, serious clashes, and
war are distinguished from events that fall short of military engagement. 66 As the results reveal,
in the case of low risk states polarity is negatively associated with the use of violence while
military intervention strongly increases the probability of violent action by the state. Recall that
polarity is positively associated with the origination of disputes. These results suggest that
disputes are likely to be originated when the polarity of the international system is loose
(unipolar or polycentric), but only become violent when there is tight bipolarity. The probability
of violence is also moderately more likely for low risk states when there is ethnic homogeneity.
In terms of high risk states, religious fragmentation is associated with violence, as is political
variance. It is interesting to note that political variance reduces the likelihood of engaging in a
dispute, but makes violence more likely if a dispute does occur.
Moving to repression, we find that the apparent trends in interstate disputes and crises are
reversed. Where it appears that the crisis behavior of low risk states is most strongly influenced
by system level factors, increased repression in these states is associated with domestic level
issues. Thus, international behavior can be attributed to international factors and domestic
practices to domestic conditions. As Table Seven shows, high levels of democracy, real per
capita GDP, and ethnic homogeneity reduce the probability of repression in low risk states. The
larger the religious majority, however, the more likely repression is to increase. Note that none
of the system-level factors are significantly associated with repression in these states. In high
risk states, however, the opposite effect is observed. Whereas high risk states seem most
responsive to domestic-level factors when dealing with interstate disputes, their repressive
behavior seems to function in accordance with systemic influences. Polarity and military
intervention increase the probability of repression in high risk states. Like low risk states, there
is a positive correlation between the size of the largest religious group and repressive behavior,
and economic level is negatively associated with human rights levels.
Economic Interdependence and Conflict

We now turn to the issue of economic interdependence and how it affects high risk states.
In order to represent the level of interdependence for states, openness scores – measures of
exports plus imports divided by real per capita GDP – are employed. A graph of the level of
openness for high risk states and low risk states is displayed below (see Graph One). It is
evident that the trend for both categories of states is towards increased openness. Accordingly, if
trade patterns are a fair representation of economic interdependence – and it is the contention of
this article that they are – then globalization is on the rise for both high risk and low risk states.
How does this trend affect conflict over time? As a starting point, the mean level of
hostility67 for both categories of states is graphed over time. This measure is selected because it
indicates the extent to which states are willing to escalate disputes. One theory of the
relationship between interdependence and conflict is that globalization promotes peaceful
solutions given that the costs of military action are increasingly prohibitive. 68 Accordingly
disputes may not decline in numbers but the resort to violence, or the level of hostility, should. It
appears from Graph Two that this is the case. The mean level of hostility has declined over time
for both high risk and low risk states.
Although these graphs are suggestive of a relationship, the significance of openness to
conflict behavior is not clear. In order to test this effect, I re-run the models displayed in Tables
Four through Seven in order to determine how openness influences the probability that a high
risk state will originate disputes, engage in disputes, escalate crises to violence, and increase
levels of repression within.69 The results of these tests are provided in Appendix A. Of
particular interest from these tests is the fact that high risk states are strongly influenced by their
level of openness across all of these dependent variables. In other words, increased openness
reduces the willingness of high risk states to participate in conflicts, to escalate disputes, to use
violence, and to repress their own citizens. Equally noteworthy is the fact that this same measure
has no significant effect on low risk states. Established states appear to determine their crisis
behavior without regard for trade constraints or concerns.
The extent to which economic interdependence affects high risk state conflict is
noteworthy. Table eight distinguishes between high risk states that are above the mean for trade
openness (in other words, their designation as high risk is a result of domestic circumstances
other than trade behavior) and those that are high risk in part because of their limited trading
behavior. Within each category, the percentage of high risk states that employ violence or
engage in conflict is listed. High risk states that engage in limited or no trade originate disputes
more frequently, resort to violent conflict more often, employ higher levels of violence (nearly
twice as high), and are participants in disputes more often (more than two times as likely) than
high risk states that are integrated into the international trading system. During the entire period
under investigation, there are no instances of war involving high risk states who are above the
mean for trade openness.
CONCLUSION
Assessing the risk of states around the world is an important and useful exercise. By
identifying “high risk” states and regions, it is possible to better predict the likelihood of
repression, conflict, and violence. By pinpointing the “accelerators,” “de-accelerators,” and
“triggers” of aggression,70 steps can be taken to mitigate escalating crises and reduce the
likelihood that cumulating circumstances and events result in conflict. Research on shatterbelts
has addressed these issues by suggesting that particular states behave uniquely and deserve
special attention. This study attempts to build on the shatterbelt literature by suggesting a new
model of high risk states and by testing a number of propositions regarding crisis behavior.
The results indicate that an emphasis on states as the unit of analysis is the most fruitful
means of understanding conflict propensity. In comparing categories of factors that are
theoretically tied to the timing and nature of conflict, it appears that domestic circumstances are
more directly tied to high risk state behavior than are systemic influences. This is one facet of
high risk states that differentiates them from more established and stable states. In contrast, the
probability that low risk states originate or participate in conflicts, and resort to violence, is tied
to international factors.
Interestingly, increased repression seems to result from the opposite circumstances. For
high risk states, changes in repressive behavior are tied to the external environment while low
risk states seem prone to change levels of repression in conjunction with their internal
conditions. This is an unexpected result, but there are plausible explanations for such a finding.
High risk states are, by definition, in a constant state of domestic turmoil. It is reasonable to
assume – and possible to empirically validate – that levels of internal strife and dissent are
generally higher within high risk states than in low risk states. Accordingly, the fluctuations of
the domestic environment are unlikely to generate shocks that require a harsh governmental
response – no more so, at any rate, than is the normal course of events. Changes from the
outside, however, may result in political uncertainty for leaders and provide the impetus for
greater repression. Especially when intervention from abroad is threatened or undertaken, a
domestic uprising would not be tolerated.
The reverse can be imagined for established states. Given that the prevalent conditions
for these states are (relative) homogeneity, stability, and prosperity, there is little need for an
ongoing display of state power. The public is more satisfied, and therefore less likely to
mobilize against the government under normal circumstances. When international conditions
change, the recognized legitimacy of the government leaders affords them some leeway in
responding to these circumstances. Furthermore, severe shocks from the outside during
prosperous times may only serve to create a “rally ‘round the flag” effect, giving the state little
reason to crack down or oppress the public. In contrast, changing domestic conditions such as
economic recession, political turmoil, or the growth of some minority interest could generate
dissatisfaction with the political leadership. Citizens may feel a relative deprivation given their
recent downturn71 and hold the government accountable for their declining circumstances. As a
result, the state may be compelled to restrict liberties or to crack down on particularly violent
protesters.
Perhaps the most important finding of this study is the effect that trade openness has on
high risk state behavior. In contrast with low risk states, which display no significant change in
crisis behavior given their level of interdependence, high risk states are strongly influenced
through trade. Greater trade openness reduces the likelihood that high risk states will originate
or participate in conflicts, resort to violence, or increase levels of repression. It is an
encouraging sign that openness is increasing over time for these states, and not surprising that
hostility levels are decreasing in conjunction.
This finding does suggest that researchers would be ill advised to disregard the
geopolitical context of high risk states when evaluating conflict behavior. The importance of
trade for high risk states – whether it serves as a proxy for interaction or is directly responsible
for mitigating aggression – indicates that these states are responsive to their surrounding
circumstances. Not only does this empirical result suggest strategies for reducing conflict in
these areas, it indicates that more research is needed on the topic of high risk state interaction.
One strong possibility, and an area that this research design fails to address, is that high
risk states react to changes that occur in their proximate external environment. Whereas
established states are concerned about the system at large because they have the ability to
influence it and the system has a direct bearing on their well-being, the weakness of high risk
states leaves them with little control over international factors. Although threats for these states
may stem from a variety of sources, their attention and efforts are best directed at those closest to
home. Aggression, in other words, would be directed at neighbors and nearby states that
increase uncertainty through their own economic, political, cultural, and military fluctuations.
Such a process would help to explain the regional dynamic of conflict observed in the
shatterbelt literature. Studies of the internal-external conflict nexus, regional security
dilemmas,72 and colonial legacies73 hint at similar processes, but do not focus on the spatial
context of weak states in particular. The shatterbelt literature is mute on the subject of where
these states direct their aggression. To identify the likely targets of conflict will provide insight
into why the conflict occurs in the first place, as well as where it is likely to spread.74
There are a number of other important issues to be resolved regarding high risk states.
First, it is clear from these findings that external military intervention is significantly associated
with conflict. This study does not address other forms of intervention, however. Whether
military aid, economic aid, or economic sanctions have a similar effect on crisis behavior
remains to be seen. Second, if there is a regional effect to aggression, how do low risk states
behave within shatterbelt regions? It may be that these states are more prone to conflict given
their proximity to high risk states, or that they are somewhat insulated from aggression on
account of their stable domestic environments. Research on this topic would help to clarify the
apparent spatial clustering of aggression and violence.
A final point evident in these findings is that conflict studies will benefit from research
that takes into account the distinctive behavior of domestically weak states. Whether the
emphasis is on shatterbelts or “high risk” countries, there is sufficient empirical evidence to
suggest that not all states are alike. Generalizing theories of conflict behavior may offer
parsimony, but they will fail to explain the unique circumstances and motivations of weak states.
Although dichotomizing states according to strength or stability may appear to be a simplistic
endeavor, initial results indicate that there is much to be learned from the examination of high
risk states.
Table One: Shatterbelt Regions, 1945-1992
Shatterbelt Regions Years (1945-1976)* Years (1977-1992)

Eastern Europe 1945-55 ----------
East Asia 1945-76 1977-92
Middle East 1955-76 1977-92
Southeast Asia 1960-76 ----------
South Asia ---------- 1978-88
Sub-Saharan Africa 1961-76 1962-85
Central America/Caribbean ---------- 1979-88
*Coded by Hensel and Diehl 1994, 39-43.
Table Two: Goodness-of-Fit Scores* for High Risk States and Shatterbelt Regions
R2 R2
High Risk States Shatterbelt Regions
Originating Disputes .096 .024
Participating in Disputes .126 .042
Use of Violence (MID) .078 .048
Use of Violence (ICB) .095 .025
Severity of Violence (ICB) .061 .031
Hostility Level .112 .034
Number of Disputes/Year .083 .033
War .036 .035
Increased Repression .192 .180
*Note that the models evaluate the goodness-of-fit by including variables that indicate whether or not a country-year is identified as high risk
in the first column, and located in a shatterbelt region in the second. These models also control for a variety of other factors: system polarity,
membership in the United Nations, whether or no the state was a target of overt military intervention in the prior ten year period, real per
capita GDP, political stability, political level, religious homogeneity, and ethnic homogeneity. 75
75
The logic for including each of these variables in an examination of shatterbelts as well as the operationalization of each is
detailed in subsequent footnotes. Even without these additional variables, the shatterbelt state model consistently outperforms
the shatterbelt region model.
Table Three: Goodness-of-Fit Scores by Decade for Dispute Origination
R2 R2
High Risk States Shatterbelt Regions
1950-1959 .096 .022
1960-1969 .068 .010
1970-1979 .026 .017
1980-1992 .021 .020
Table Four: Probit Analysis of Dispute Origination by High Risk and Low Risk States
Low Risk States (n=2627) High Risk States (n=702)

Originate Disputes Std. Std.
Coef. Error z P>|z| Coef. Error z P>|z|
System Polarity .061 .028 2.178 .029** .012 .049 .242 .809
UN Membership -3.599 1.110 -3.241 .001*** -.476 .687 -.693 .489
Target of Mil. Int. .457 .103 4.428 .000*** .465 .156 2.985 .003***
Per Capita GDP .000 .000 1.035 .301 -.000 .000 -.031 .976
Relig. Homogeneity .005 .004 1.088 .276 .008 .005 1.418 .156
Ethnic Homogeneity .003 .003 .801 .423 .009 .005 1.791 .073*
Democracy Level .002 .009 .265 .791 -.007 .012 -.575 .565
Political Stability .001 .003 .230 .818 -.003 .004 -.618 .536
Constant 1.833 1.199 1.528 .127 -1.422 1.021 -1.393 .164
* p>.1, ** p>.05, *** p>.01
Table Five: Probit Analysis of Dispute Involvement by High Risk and Low Risk States76

Involved in Disputes Std. Std.
System Polarity .170 .154 1.098 .272 .100 .510 .195 .845
UN Membership -5.130 2684.04 -.002 .998 -.939 9.407 -.100 .921
Target of Mil. Int. .252 .259 .972 .331 .669 .611 1.094 .274
Alliance Capacity -.052 .079 -.657 .511 .268 .445 .602 .547
Per Capita GDP .000 .000 1.912 .056* .001 .001 1.082 .279
76
The low number of cases in Tables Five and Six is a function of missing data in the ICB data set.
5
Friedman (note 4), pp. 29. On the same page he goes on to say that, “The biggest threat today… is likely to come from… all
the anonymous, transnational, homogenizing, standardizing market forces and technologies that make up today’s globalizing
economic system… But there are other things about this system that empower even the smallest, weakest political community
to actually use the new technologies and markets to preserve their olive trees, their culture and identity.”
6
Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly, ‘Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World’, World
Politics 53 (2000), pp. 1-37.
7
See Saul B. Cohen, ‘The Geopolitics of the Evolving World System: From Conflict to Accommodation’, in Paul F. Diehl
(ed.) A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999);
Saul B. Cohen ‘Global Geopolitical Change in the Post-Cold War Era’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 81
(1991), pp.551-80; Saul B. Cohen, ‘The Emerging World Map of Peace’, in N. Kliot and S. Waterman (eds.) The Political
Geography of Conflict and Peace (London: Belhaven Press, 1991); . Saul B. Cohen, ‘A New Map of Global Geopolitical
Equilibrium’, Political Geography Quarterly 1 (1982), pp.223-42; Paul R. Hensel and Paul F. Diehl, ‘Testing Empirical
Propositions about Shatterbelts, 1945-76’, Political Geography 13 (1994), pp.33-51; Philip L. Kelly, ‘Escalation of Regional
Conflict: Testing the Shatterbelt Concept’, Political Geography Quarterly 5 (1986) pp.161-80; Philip L. Kelly,
Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: The Geopolitics of South America (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997).
8
See, for example, Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1997).
9
Kant’s position is most clearly explained in Perpetual Peace (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Co, 1957).
10
The study of the democratic peace phenomenon has generated a vast literature. Examples of the primary normative and
structural explanations include Rudolph J. Rummel, ‘Libertarianism and International Violence’, Journal of Conflict
Resolution 27 (1983) pp.27-71; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993);
James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995).
11
See Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950); Stephen Van Evera,
‘Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War’ International Security 15 (1991) pp.7-57.
12
See Karl Deutsch and S.A. Burrell, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1957); Richard H. Ullmann, Securing Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
13
See, for example, Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds.), Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York :
Columbia University Press, 1991).
14
This position is most clearly developed in Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd edition
(Glenview, Ill: Scott, Foresman/Little Brown College Division, 1989).
15
The Lateral Pressure theory represents this view. See Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, ‘Lateral Pressure Theory and
Intenational Conflict’, in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
16
Huntington (note 2).
17
See Errol A. Henderson, ‘Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, The Similarity of States, and the Onset of War, 1820-1989’,
Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1997) pp.649-68; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (eds.), The International Spread of
Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); and Cohen (note 4).
18
See Mohammed Ayoob, ‘State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure’ in Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, (eds.), Managing
Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1996); Ted Robert
Gurr, ‘Minorities, Nationalists, and Ethnopolitical Conflict’ in Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, (eds.), Managing Global Chaos:
Sources of and Responses to International Conflict (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1996); and Timur Kuran, ‘Ethnic
Dissimilation and Its International Diffusion’ in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (eds.), The International Spread of
Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
Ethnic Homogeneity .015 .008 1.769 .077* .023 .012 2.019 .044**
Relig. Homogeneity -.013 .012 -1.115 .256 -.011 .020 -.549 .583
Democracy Level -.006 .018 -.321 .748 .046 .056 .816 .415
Political Stability .012 .015 .766 .443 -.038 .015 -2.484 .013**
Constant 5.324 2684.04 .002 .998 .608 9.768 .062 .950
* p>.1, ** p>.05, *** p>.01
19
Huntington (note 2), p.205.
20
Barber (note 3); and Iriye (note 8).
21
Ronald Inglehart, ‘The Clash of Civilizations? Empirical Evidence from 61 Societies’ (Annual Meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 1998).
22
Paul R. Krugman, Geography and Trade (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).
23
Jeffrey Sachs, ‘Geography and Economic Reform’ (Unpublished Manuscript, 1998).
24
Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, ‘Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War’, American Political
Science Review 74 (1980) pp.932-46; Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, ‘Theoretical and Logical Issues in the Study of
International Diffusion’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 2 (1990) pp.391-412. See also Kristian S. Gleditsch and Michael D.
Ward, ‘War and Peace in Space and Time: The Role of Democratization’, International Studies Quarterly 44 (2000).
25
Gerald Schneider and Patricia A. Weitsman, ‘Eliciting Collaboration from Risky States’ in Schneider and Weitsman (eds.),
Enforcing Cooperation: Risky States and Intergovernmental Management of Conflict (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).
26
See, for example, Daniel C. Esty, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc Levy, Geoffrey D. Dabelko,
Pamela T. Surko, and Alan N. Unger, ‘State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings’ (Unpublished Manuscript, 1998);
Ted Robert Gurr and B. Harff, ‘Conceptual, Research, and Policy Issues in Early Warning Research: An Overview’ Journal of
Ethno-Development 4 (1994) pp.3-14.
27
Cohen (note 7), Kelly (note 7), and Hensel and Diehl (note 7).
28
Saul B. Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World Divided, 2nd Edn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973) pp.85.
29
Hensel and Diehl (note 7) p.34.
30
Keohane and Nye (note 14).
31
An alternative view, taken by Cohen in his latest discussion of shatterbelts (note 4), would argue that globalization has
contributed to the breakdown of the Cold War system that generated shatterbelts. As a result, shatterbelts may not exist per se
in a unipolar world, or are disappearing with the evolution of new geopolitical regions. This view, however, emphasizes major
power competition for access to shatterbelt resources as the primary cause of the conflict behavior of shatterbelt states. This
paper, in contrast, argues that shatterbelt states can exist in any system in which external challengers threaten their
governments. The more crucial conditions for the formation of shatterbelt states, as argued in Vladimir Kolossov and John
O’Loughlin, ‘Pseudo-States as Harbingers of a New Geopolitics: The Example of the Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic
(TMR)’, Geopolitics (1999) pp.151-76), note 18, are cultural fragmentation and political instability.
32
33
34
35
It is important to note that the effects of globalization are not entirely tied to trade. Some have hypothesized that the
processes of globalization will serve to further marginalize third world countries and lead to greater exploitation by the first
world. See, for example, William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Nonetheless, trade is a central feature of globalization and it is on this aspect of
interdependence that I focus.
36
For overviews see Birger Heldt, ‘The Dependent Variable of the Domestic-External Conflict Relationship: Anecdotes,
Theories and Systematic Studies’, Journal of Peace Research 34 (1997) pp.101-6; Harvey Starr, ‘Revolution and War:
Rethinking the Linkage Between Internal and External Conflict’, Political Research Quarterly 47 (1994) pp.481-507; Jack
Levy, ‘The Diversionary Theory of War’, in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook of War Studies (Boston : Unwin Hyman,
1989); Jack Levy, ‘Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War’, World Politics 40 (1987); Michael D. Ward and
Ulrich Widmaier, ‘The Domestic-International Conflict Nexus: New Evidence and Old Hypotheses’, International Interactions
9 (1982) pp.75-101; Michael Stohl, ‘The Nexus of Civil and International Conflict’, in T.R. Gurr (ed.), Handbook of Political
Conflict: Theory and Research (New York: Free Press, 1980).
Table Six: Probit Analysis of Use of Violence by High Risk and Low Risk States

Use of Violence Std. Std.
System Polarity -.267 .081 -3.293 .001*** -.135 .164 -.826 .409
UN Membership .228 .908 .251 .802 -3.126 4.906 -.637 .524
Alliance Capacity -.039 .059 -.667 .505 -.253 .163 -1.553 .120
Target of Mil. Int. .817 .192 4.244 .000*** .374 .428 .874 .382
37
(Levy 1989; Zinnes, Dinna. 1976. Contemporary Research in International Relations. New York: Free Press.
38
Hensel and Diehl (note 7).
39
See Kelly (note 7) and Cohen (note 7).
40
See Hartshorne, ‘The United States and the “Shatter Zone” of Europe’, in H. Weigert and V. Steffanson (eds), Compass of
the World (New York: MacMillan, 1944).
41
See Kelly 1997 (note 7) p.33.
42
Hensel and Diehl (note 7) p.39. They offer a slightly different set of criteria. First, “[t]he presence of multiple major
powers” (p.39) in the region suggests that shatterbelts are a zone of contention and therefore is included in their definitional
criteria. Because I focus on states rather than regions, this is not a useful criteria for the subsequent analysis. Second, they do
not include an economic determinant, although Hartshorne (note 37) describes late economic development as a characteristic of
“shatter zones.”
43
The dependent variables are not all available for this entire period. Data on levels of repression is observed from 1976-
1996, militarized disputes between 1950-1994, and crisis behavior 1950-1992. As a result, there is some variation in the
number of nation-years observed across tests.
44
45
For a more detailed description of their operationalization, consult Hensel and Diehl (note 7) p.39-43.
46
The extension of shatterbelt region data follows Hensel and Diehl’s criteria.
47
Data taken from Ellingsen’s ‘Ethnic Witches’ Brew Data Set: Linguistic, Religious and Ethnic Fragmentation: 1945-94.
From ‘Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches’ Brew? Type of Political Regime and Armed Conflict During and After the
Cold War’, Annual Convention of the International Studies Association: San Diego, CA, 1996). Largest groups are used as the
measure to represent fragmentation because it is assumed that the larger the group, the more homogeneity in the society and
therefore the greater the cohesiveness. Data is based on three sources: the Handbook of the Nations, Britannica Book of the
Year, and Demographic Yearbook.
48
Data taken from Ellingsen’s ‘Ethnic Witches’ Brew Data Set (note 47).
49
Data from Gleditsch and Ward (note 24). This measure is intended to indicate the rockiness of transitions, which has been
theoretically linked to violent conflict. See Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, ‘Democratization and the Danger of War’,
International Security 20 (1995) pp.5-38; and Michael D. Ward and Kristian S. Gleditsch, ‘Democratizing for Peace’,
American Political Science Review 92 (1998) pp.51-61.
50
Data from the Penn World Tables, ver. 5.6.
51
This measure is coded using data from Tillema’s Overt Military Intervention Data Set.
52
Data from the Penn World Tables, ver. 5.6.
53
Data from the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data Set (ver. 210B); includes all nation-years for the years 1950-1992.
Although a state can originate more than one dispute in a given year, this measure is recoded as (0) no disputes, and (1) one or
more disputes originated during the given year.
54
Data from the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data Set (ver. 210B); participation in a dispute is coded as (0) no dispute
during a given year, and (1) participation in a dispute.
55
Data from two sources: the actor-level portion of the International Crisis Behavior Project (ICPSR # 9286) includes all
nation-years for the years 1950-1994. Violence associated with the crisis actor is scaled as (1) no violence, (2) minor clashes,
(3) serious clashes, and (4) full-scale war. For the purposes of this analysis, these options are collapsed into (0) no violence
and (1) violence. From the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data Set, Hostility Levels of disputes are coded as (1) no militarized
action, (2) threat to use force, (3) display of force, (4) use of force, and (5) war. These are collapsed into (0) no violence and
(1) violence.
56
Data from the US State Department, as gathered by Steven Poe and C. Neal Tate, ‘Repression of Personal Integrity in the
1980’s: A Global Analysis’ American Political Science Review 88 (1994) pp.853-72. These measures are scored 1-5, with 1
Per Capita GDP .000 .000 .752 .452 -.000 .000 -.066 .947
Relig. Homogeneity -.007 .010 -.661 .509 -.012 .009 -1.724 .085*
Ethnic Homogeneity .014 .007 1.874 .061* .003 .008 .329 .742
Democracy Level -.013 .013 -1.000 .317 .020 .019 1.058 .290
Political Stability -.007 .008 -.876 .381 .016 .009 1.707 .088*
Constant .306 1.385 .221 .825 5.146 4.877 1.055 .291
* p>.1, ** p>.05, *** p>.01
being the least repressive. Changes in these scores are generated by created a lagged variable of the original and then
subtracting the lag from the score.
57
Data based on codings from the actor-level portion of the International Crisis Behavior Project. System polarity is
measured as (1) Tight Bipolar, 1948-56, (2) Loose Bipolar, 1957-62, (3) Polycentric, 1963-1987, and (4) Unipolar, 1988-1992.
58
Data from the International Crisis Behavior Project. This variable measures the type of alliance pattern that existed for the
crisis actor at the time of crisis, and includes non-alignment, informal alliances with major powers, and formal alliances with
major powers.
59
Years and members taken from the United Nations website: http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html.
60
See note 54.
61
See note 55.
62
See note 56.
63
Analysis performed using Intercooled Stata ver. 6.0 for Windows 98 with the xtprobit function. This function enables a
population-averaged probit model for cross-sectional time-series data. Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance employed
which produces valid standard errors even if the correlations within group are not as hypothesized by the specified correlation
structure. As a result, standard errors are labeled “semi-robust.” Assumptions about independence are also relaxed in the
model by clustering observations by country.
64
See note 55. The inclusion of alliance capacity reduces the number of cases evaluated; the ICB data does not include
alliance capacity figures for all states, only those participating in a crisis.
65
Ward and Gleditsch (note 46).
66
For a more detailed discussion of these events, see the ICB codebook.
67
Data from the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data Set (ver. 210B). Hostility levels are coded as follows: (1) No militarized
action, (2) Threat to use force, (3) Display of force, (4) Use of force, (5) War.
68
69
Openness was not included in the original models because the measure does not fit decisively into a domestic or systemic-
level category. Recall that the intent of these tests was to determine the extent to which shatterbelt states are influenced by
internal versus external conditions.
70
Esty et al. (note 26) p.16.
71
See Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); and J. Davies, ‘Communications: The
J-Curve Theory’, American Political Science Review 72 (1978) pp.1357-58.
72
Barry Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival 35 (1993) pp.27-47.
73
See Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states : Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (New York : Cambridge
University Press, 1990); and K.J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1996).
74
The diffusion of conflict is an important issue that has received considerable attention in the recent past. See, for example,
David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (eds.), The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); and John Vasquez, ‘Factors Related to the Contagion and Diffusion of
International Violence’, in The Internationalization of Communal Strife (ed.), Manus Midlarsky (New York: Routledge, 1992).
Table Seven: Probit Analysis of Increased Repression by High Risk and Low Risk States

Increase in Std. Std.
Repression Coef. Error z P>|z| Coef. Error z P>|z|
System Polarity .147 .098 1.499 .134 .374 .189 1.976 .048**
Target of Mil. Int. .089 .156 .571 .568 .758 .196 3.872 .000***
Per Capita GDP -.000 .000 -5.814 .000*** -.000 .000 -1.779 .075*
Relig. Homogeneity .009 .004 1.901 .057* .019 .006 2.893 .004**
Ethnic Homogeneity -.009 .003 -2.600 .009** .007 .006 1.324 .185
Democracy Level -.038 .009 -4.261 .000*** -.016 .017 -.940 .347
Political Stability .006 .005 1.341 .180 .003 .004 .678 .498
Constant -.585 .555 -1.054 .292 -3.259 .928 -3.511 .000***
* p>.1, ** p>.05, *** p>.01
Table Eight: The Effect of Trade Openness on the Conflict Behavior of High Risk States
Restricted Trade (n=829) Open Trade (n=160)

Originating Disputes 42% 29%
Participating in Disputes 50% 41%
Use of Violence (MID) 39% 26%
Use of Violence (ICB) 26% 16%
Severity of Violence (ICB) .24 (mean level) .14 (mean level)
Hostility Level 1.6 (mean level) .88 (mean level)
Number of Disputes/Year .83 (average number) .41 (average number)
War 9% 0
Increased Repression 49% 42%
GRAPH 1: Level of Openness by Year for High Risk States
GRAPH 2: Mean Hostility Level by Year for High Risk States

GRAPH 1A: Level of Openness by Year for Low Risk States
GRAPH 2A: Mean Hostility Level by Year for Low Risk States
APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL RESULTS INCLUDING LEVEL OF OPENNESS
PROBIT ANALYSIS OF DISPUTE ORIGINATION

HIGH RISK STATE=1
GEE population-averaged model Number of obs = 702
Group variable: cnum Number of groups = 59
Link: probit Obs per group: min = 1
Family: binomial avg = 11.9
Correlation: exchangeable max = 41
Wald chi2(9) = 29.57
Scale parameter: 1 Prob > chi2 = 0.0005
(standard errors adjusted for clustering on cnum)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Semi-robust
originat | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
polar | .0058666 .051376 0.114 0.909 -.0948285 .1065616
globmemb | -.3231468 .6637967 -0.487 0.626 -1.624164 .9778708
omilag | .5229693 .1516927 3.448 0.001 .2256572 .8202815
rgdpc | .0000186 .0000596 0.312 0.755 -.0000983 .0001355
lareth | .0082524 .0050298 1.641 0.101 -.0016058 .0181106
larrel | .0068311 .0052636 1.298 0.194 -.0034855 .0171476
dma | -.00336 .0122969 -0.273 0.785 -.0274616 .0207415
variance | -.0027833 .0040657 -0.685 0.494 -.0107519 .0051852
openness | -.0068824 .0035049 -1.964 0.050 -.013752 -.0000129
_cons | -1.19078 .986167 -1.207 0.227 -3.123631 .7420722
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HIGH RISK STATE=0

Wald chi2(9) = 43.94

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Semi-robust
originat | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
polar | .0595549 .027823 2.140 0.032 .0050227 .114087
globmemb | -3.519021 1.055685 -3.333 0.001 -5.588126 -1.449915
omilag | .476099 .1049585 4.536 0.000 .2703841 .6818138
rgdpc | .0000204 .0000157 1.298 0.194 -.0000104 .0000512
lareth | .0025412 .0032255 0.788 0.431 -.0037807 .0088632
larrel | .0042874 .0049479 0.867 0.386 -.0054103 .0139851
dma | .001971 .0091996 0.214 0.830 -.0160599 .0200019
variance | .0008101 .0031403 0.258 0.796 -.0053449 .0069651
openness | -.0019159 .0014573 -1.315 0.189 -.0047722 .0009404
_cons | 1.939625 1.173735 1.653 0.098 -.3608524 4.240103
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PROBIT ANALYSIS OF DISPUTE INVOLVEMENT
HIGH RISK STATE=1
Wald chi2(10) = 9.61
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
mid | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
polarity | .0776908 .5096464 0.152 0.879 -.9211978 1.076579
globmemb | 0 5.129975 0.000 1.000 -10.05457 10.05457
allycap | .2218915 .4706052 0.472 0.637 -.7004777 1.144261
omilag | .8604025 .6938382 1.240 0.215 -.4994954 2.2203
rgdpc | .0013068 .0009768 1.338 0.181 -.0006078 .0032214
lareth | .0221383 .0121772 1.818 0.069 -.0017286 .0460052
larrel | -.0198057 .0216625 -0.914 0.361 -.0622634 .0226519
dma | .0233024 .0607977 0.383 0.702 -.0958588 .1424637
variance | -.0440075 .0183531 -2.398 0.016 -.0799788 -.0080361
openness | -.0135996 .0111449 -1.220 0.222 -.0354433 .008244
_cons | .3755128 5.706255 0.066 0.948 -10.80854 11.55957
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HIGH RISK STATE=0

Wald chi2(10) = 19.18
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
mid | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
polarity | .3051178 .1728268 1.765 0.077 -.0336165 .643852
globmemb | -4.076736 357.7693 -0.011 0.991 -705.2916 697.1381
allycap | -.0956321 .0827556 -1.156 0.248 -.25783 .0665658
omilag | .4168235 .2746376 1.518 0.129 -.1214563 .9551033
rgdpc | .000102 .0000466 2.186 0.029 .0000105 .0001934
lareth | .01793 .0082415 2.176 0.030 .001777 .0340831
larrel | -.0172997 .0123192 -1.404 0.160 -.041445 .0068455
dma | -.0086562 .0174188 -0.497 0.619 -.0427964 .0254841
variance | .0042415 .0161606 0.262 0.793 -.0274328 .0359157
openness | -.0126876 .0045549 -2.786 0.005 -.021615 -.0037603
_cons | 4.843882 357.7718 0.014 0.989 -696.3759 706.0637
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PROBIT ANALYSIS OF USE OF VIOLENCE
HIGH RISK STATE=1
Wald chi2(10) = 21.45

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Semi-robust
vdummy | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
polarity | -.1304686 .1539332 -0.848 0.397 -.432172 .1712349
globmemb | -2.949025 .9983719 -2.954 0.003 -4.905798 -.9922515
allycap | -.2336625 .1849497 -1.263 0.206 -.5961572 .1288322
omilag | .3728279 .4317124 0.864 0.388 -.4733129 1.218969
rgdpc | -.0000704 .0001188 -0.592 0.554 -.0003033 .0001625
lareth | .0031528 .0071672 0.440 0.660 -.0108947 .0172002
larrel | -.0099152 .0067813 -1.462 0.144 -.0232062 .0033759
dma | .0238886 .0227223 1.051 0.293 -.0206463 .0684236
variance | .0236692 .013411 1.765 0.078 -.0026159 .0499542
openness | -.0119479 .0050597 -2.361 0.018 -.0218648 -.002031
_cons | 5.224867 1.430286 3.653 0.000 2.421559 8.028175
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HIGH RISK STATE=0

Wald chi2(10) = 44.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Semi-robust
vdummy | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
polarity | -.2679695 .0838408 -3.196 0.001 -.4322944 -.1036446
globmemb | .0936351 .8796047 0.106 0.915 -1.630358 1.817629
allycap | .0235904 .056863 0.415 0.678 -.087859 .1350398
omilag | .7143421 .2012811 3.549 0.000 .3198384 1.108846
rgdpc | .0000209 .000024 0.871 0.384 -.0000262 .0000681
lareth | .0140285 .0073072 1.920 0.055 -.0002933 .0283502
larrel | -.0075219 .0089491 -0.841 0.401 -.0250618 .010018
dma | -.0099212 .0132448 -0.749 0.454 -.0358804 .0160381
variance | -.003596 .0088217 -0.408 0.684 -.0208863 .0136942
openness | .0075226 .0037743 1.993 0.046 .0001252 .01492
_cons | -.003342 1.274726 -0.003 0.998 -2.501759 2.495075
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PROBIT ANALYSIS OF INCREASED REPRESSION
HIGH RISK STATE=1

Wald chi2(8) = 38.03

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Semi-robust
sdincr | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
polarity | .4791238 .2053183 2.334 0.020 .0767073 .8815403
omilag | .8030629 .1957507 4.102 0.000 .4193985 1.186727
rgdpc | -.0001056 .000076 -1.389 0.165 -.0002547 .0000434
lareth | .0050039 .0052301 0.957 0.339 -.0052469 .0152546
larrel | .0140228 .0059867 2.342 0.019 .002289 .0257566
dma | -.0144895 .0149834 -0.967 0.334 -.0438564 .0148773
variance | .0003873 .0037672 0.103 0.918 -.0069962 .0077708
openness | -.0118022 .0041598 -2.837 0.005 -.0199552 -.0036491
_cons | -2.646189 .8738949 -3.028 0.002 -4.358992 -.9333866
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HIGH RISK STATE=0

Wald chi2(8) = 123.95

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Semi-robust
sdincr | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
polarity | .1456327 .0981054 1.484 0.138 -.0466502 .3379157
omilag | .1083028 .1545165 0.701 0.483 -.1945439 .4111495
rgdpc | -.0000933 .0000171 -5.470 0.000 -.0001268 -.0000599
lareth | -.0085194 .0033126 -2.572 0.010 -.015012 -.0020268
larrel | .0072767 .0044519 1.635 0.102 -.0014488 .0160022
dma | -.038297 .0087709 -4.366 0.000 -.0554877 -.0211063
variance | .0060211 .0047225 1.275 0.202 -.0032348 .0152769
openness | -.0015774 .0027254 -0.579 0.563 -.006919 .0037642
_cons | -.4121312 .5722857 -0.720 0.471 -1.533791 .7095281
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
77
77

Shatterbelts and Conflict Behaviour: The Effect of Globalisation On High Risk' States

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Shatterbelts and Conflict Behaviour: The Effect of Globalisation On High Risk' States

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SHATTERBELTS AND CONFLICT BEHAVIOR:

The Effect of Globalization on “High Risk” States

Globalization and Peace

Shatterbelts and Ethnic Fault-Lines

Economic Interdependence and Conflict

Shatterbelt Regions Years (1945-1976)* Years (1977-1992)

Low Risk States (n=2627) High Risk States (n=702)

Low Risk States (n=230) High Risk States (n=92)

Low Risk States (n=220) High Risk States (n=84)

Low Risk States (n=893) High Risk States (n=249)

Restricted Trade (n=829) Open Trade (n=160)

GRAPH 2: Mean Hostility Level by Year for High Risk States

PROBIT ANALYSIS OF DISPUTE ORIGINATION

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on cnum)

HIGH RISK STATE=0

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on cnum)

HIGH RISK STATE=0

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on cnum)

HIGH RISK STATE=0

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on cnum)

HIGH RISK STATE=1

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on cnum)

HIGH RISK STATE=0

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on cnum)

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