970581

research-article2020
JAS0010.1177/0021909620970581Journal of Asian and African StudiesRezvi

Article
JAAS
Journal of Asian and African Studies

Exploring Politics of Social Safety

1­–16
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0021909620970581
https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909620970581
Settlement: The Case of Rajakhali journals.sagepub.com/home/jas

Union in Cox’s Bazar District

Minhazur Rahman Rezvi

University of Dhaka, Bangladesh

Abstract
The purpose of the study is to explore the politics of beneficiaries’ selection and resource distribution
of social safety net (SSN) programs and how local elites and political groups establish political settlement
by using it as a tool. In developing countries, formal systems are not strong enough and elites’ groups
use their power to create informal institutions for securing their interests. As other studies have shown,
informal politics influence the processes of selection and distribution of SSN programs in Bangladesh. The
study is qualitative in nature and the selected research area is Rajakhali Union in Cox’s Bazar District. The
study found that informal systems (e.g. clientelist politics, political affiliation, personal conflicts, and kinship)
determine the selection and distribution of SSN programs. The Union Parishad (UP) members distribute
the SSN programs to their ineligible clients (supporters, local elites, and political groups) by bypassing the
formal systems for strengthening clientelist relations, increasing their legitimacy, stabling their power, and
increasing their vote banks. They (UP members, political elites, and local elites) have allowed introducing
more informal structures that better serve their interests. They have used the SSN programs as a tool for
establishing the political settlement (distribution of power between UP members and local elites).

Keywords
Social safety net, clientelist politics, political groups, local elites, Union Parishad members, political
settlement, Bangladesh

Introduction
Bangladesh’s government has placed the elimination of poverty and inequity at the forefront of its
development strategy. The plan stands to bring down the poverty rate from 40 percent in 2005 to
12.30 percent by 2023–2024 (Ministry of Finance, 2019). The poverty rate has been brought down
to 21.8 percent in 2018. Infrastructural investment, creation of employment opportunities during
slack seasons, and increased coverage of social safety net (SSN) programs will drive to improving
the poverty conditions. SSN programs are performing more effectively in Bangladesh for lessening
poverty and fostering development. The government continues expanding the budget allocation for

Corresponding author:
Minhazur Rahman Rezvi, Department of Development Studies, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, 1000, Bangladesh.
Email: minhazurrahmanrezvi@gmail.com
2 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

the SSN programs every year to improve the condition of the impoverished. By now, nearly a
quarter of the households in the country have been covered under the SSN programs. In the finan-
cial year (FY) 2019–2020, the government has allocated Tk 74,367 crore in the sector, which is
14.21 percent of the total budget and 2.58 percent of gross domestic product. In the revised budget
of FY 2018–2019, the allocation was Tk 64,404 crore (Ministry of Finance, 2019). The priority is
given for ensuring the selection of genuine beneficiaries to enhance the effectiveness of SSN
programs.
The government has formulated the National Social Security Strategy (NSSS) 2015 for expand-
ing coverage, strengthening delivery systems, and also improving the efficiency of the existing
SSN programs (Bangladesh Planning Commission, 2015). The Action Plan 2016–2021 for its
implementation has been approved. The main aim of the NSSS is to reform the national social
security system by ensuring more efficient and effective use of resources, strengthened delivery
systems, and progress towards a more inclusive form of social security that effectively tackles
lifecycle risks, prioritizing the poorest and most vulnerable members of the society (Bangladesh
Planning Commission, 2015). Its objective is to bring significant improvement in the processes of
the beneficiaries’ selection and resource distribution of SSN programs. Has it (the NSSS, 2015)
performed efficiently in improving the processes of the beneficiaries’ selection and distribution
resources of SSN programs? The purpose of the study is to analyze how much it has improved after
the NSSS, 2015, and also why?
In developing countries, social protection is used as a means of gaining political supports
rather than as a way of promoting a new social contract between the state and its citizens
(Hickey, 2009; Lavers and Hickey, 2016). Power politics of elites and distribution of power
between elites and political groups are a stabilized political settlement (Hossain, 2007; Khan,
2010, 2017; Lavers and Hickey, 2016). Elite groups move from formal systems to informal
systems, which are beneficial for their power stability (Khan, 2018). Social protection has been
used as a tool for setting political settlement in Latin America and also in African countries
(Lavers and Hickey, 2016; Willmore, 2006); it is strengthening the political capital of local
elites and permitting patronage distribution to shore up vote banks at the local level (Hassan,
2013). Similarly, in Bangladesh, non-eligible people enjoy social protection facilities by using
local patronage politics (Ahmed, 2004; Hossain and Matin, 2007). Are the SSN programs used
as a tool for establishing political settlement in Bangladesh? The main research objective is to
explore the politics of the SSN through the lens of the political settlement in Bangladesh’s
perspective.
The study also attempts to answer the question as to how local (elected) government (Union
Parishad (UP) chairman or UP members) distributes the resources among beneficiaries. I want to
explore the politics of beneficiaries’ selection and distribution of SSN programs. I select only three
SSN programs rather than selecting all SSN programs; those are Vulnerable Group Development
(VGD), Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF), and Old-Age Allowance (OAA).

Research objectives
The main objectives of the research are:

1. To examine the politics of beneficiaries’ selection and resources distribution of the SSN
programs (before and after the NSSS, 2015) in the study area.
2. To explore and explain the changes observed in SSN programs through the lens of political
settlement.
Rezvi 3

Research questions
The main research question of the study is ‘Has the process through which SSN services are pro-
vided improved overtime? If yes, why?
Sub-questions of the research are:

1. What was the process of beneficiary selection for SSN (before and after the NSSS, 2015)?
2. What was the process of resources distribution among beneficiaries of SSN (before and
after the NSSS, 2015)?
3. What are the changes that we can observe now? Why have these changes taken place?

Methodology
This research has followed a qualitative approach. The research objectives were best suited to the
qualitative approach. The study did not make an effort to determine the impact but it tried to get an
insight into the development of the process. From this perspective, the study adopted a process-
tracing approach for which qualitative tools were the most appropriate ones. It used both primary
and secondary data sources to explore the research objectives. Open-ended questionnaires were
used as a technique for collecting primary data which allowed the respondents to express their
opinions. Primary data were collected through qualitative tools such as focus group discussion
(FGD), key informant interview (KII), and in-depth interviews.
To carry out the study, it only focused on three specific SSN programs: VGD; VGF; and OAA.
The selected research area was Rajakhali Union Parishad, Pekua Upazila in Cox’s Bazar District.
The study chose FGD, a qualitative research tool; it is useful for providing insight into different
opinions among different parties involved in the process. In total, four FGDs were conducted in
which three were FGDs from the beneficiaries of VGF (2 FGDs) and OAA (1 FGD), and another
from the non-beneficiaries of OAA. Mainly, KIIs were conducted from the official secretary (local
bureaucrat) of UP, information and communications technology officer of UP, UP Ward members
(3), UP female member (one), UP chairman, and also from his (UP chairman) personal secretary;
in total 8 KIIs were taken for understanding the processes of the SSN programs and the politics
underlying these processes. Moreover, three in-depth interviews were taken from the beneficiaries
of OAA (1) and VGF (2), and also three more in-depth interviews conducted from the non-benefi-
ciaries of VGD (2) and OAA (1).
For an extensive literature review, I focused on published journals, reports, edited books, policy
papers, and other forms of research publications.

Literature review
Political settlement defined as ‘the distribution of organizational power’ is essential for under-
standing the economic and political effects of institutions and policies (Khan, 2000, 2010, 2017).
It argues about how the common understanding or agreements amongst elites, and how resources
will be distributed and power will be exercised (Di John and Putzel, 2009). It also defines the
distribution of power and resources among political, economic, and social elites or the power rela-
tions between elites and non-elite groups or the formal and informal institutions (Hickey et al.,
2018; Kelsall, 2018) that provide ‘an acceptable distribution of benefits’ (Khan, 2018). It has
referred to the balance of power between social groups and social classes (Di John and Putzel,
2009; Khan, 1995, 2000).
4 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

The political settlement as an interactive social order describes the distributions of power
amongst dominant social groups or political elites, between formal and informal institutions that
deliver a secure acceptable distribution of benefits (Kelsall, 2018; Khan, 2018) and ensure political
and economic sustainability in society (Khan, 2018). Political elites or local elite groups build
coalitions when they are unable to protect their benefits. They mobilize their power from formal
systems to informal systems to achieve more profits (Khan, 2018). The natures of the political set-
tlements are different between countries (i.e., developed countries and developing countries)
(Khan, 2011, 2017).
In developing countries, the nature of the political settlement is characterized as ‘clientelist
political settlement’ (Khan, 2010, 2011) where there is a significant level of informality in politics
and there is the pressure and modification of formal institutions through informal institutions
(Khan, 2011). Political bargaining amongst political elites and non-elite groups leads to establish-
ing political settlement (Khan 2011, 2017). Clientelist relation plays important roles in power rela-
tions and power distribution within society (Huber and Stephens, 2001, 2012; Khan 2017; Lavers
and Hickey, 2016). Informal settings are deteriorating formal institutions of developing countries
and also formal rules are not well-enforced (Khan, 2018). Powerful elites groups do not support the
implementation of formal rules and instead, they move to create informal institutions for achieving
more privileges (Khan, 2011, 2018).
Bangladesh is a developing country and, therefore, its characteristics of political settlement can
be classified as ‘clientelist political settlement’ (Khan, 2011) in which its informal agencies (e.g.,
patron–client relationship and clientelist politics) have a major influence on state (formal) agencies
(Khan, 2011). Hassan (2013) also categorized Bangladesh as an ‘overarching elite political settle-
ment’ that has dominant coalitions of elites. Elite groups bargain with non-elite groups formally
and often informally to distribute resources in a way that serves all groups (Hassan, 2013).
Clientelist politics shape the design and target social protection programs during the planning and
implementation phases (Hickey, 2007). Pro-poor development strategies are used to allocate
resources for elite clients as well as for increasing the political capital in local areas that help to
establish an elite political settlement (Hassan, 2013).
In developing countries, there has been a growing interest in social protection policies as a
means of reducing poverty and promoting development in recent years (Barrientos and Hulme,
2008; International Labour Office, 2014). In low-income countries political commitment to the
expansion of social protection is used as a medium of securing the interests, assuring political sta-
bility (Lavers and Hickey, 2016), and a critical factor for the regime’s political survival (Feng and
Gizelis, 2002). Social development allocations are connected with multiple political benefits for
the political elites, for example, the enrichment of the electoral legitimacy of the regime, and nur-
turing of vote banks (Hassan, 2013). Social protection is used as a means (contracts) for buying
political support rather than as a way of promoting a new social contract between the state and its
citizens (Hickey, 2009; Lavers and Hickey, 2016). Political incentives are critical operators of
social development strategies and have an interconnection with the interests of political elites and
prioritizing to increase coverage of social protection (Hassan, 2013). In Lesotho, the introduction
of a universal pension (social protection) served the government to win the next two elections
(Regional Hunger Vulnerability Programme 2017). The distribution of power between elite groups
within a given political settlement influences the selection and implementation process of social
protection (Lavers and Hickey, 2016). Political groups and local elites use it (SSN programs) as a
tool for increasing and strengthening the political capital of local political elites, enabling patron-
age distribution to shore up vote banks at the local level (Hassan, 2013).
Similarly, social protection was used as a political tool in Latin America and also in African
countries. The universality of social protection policies (e.g., universal pensions schemes) means
Rezvi 5

that politicians and local elites often use social protection policies to win elections (Kidd et al.,
2014; Willmore, 2006) or for retaining electoral support (Hickey et al., 2018). In Kenya, Daniel
arap Moi distributed food aid selectively to secure his regime in power while denying it to provide
some of the most vulnerable groups and areas (De Waal, 1997). Local patronage politics serve as
an informal mechanism for protecting the benefits of elites (Hossain and Martin, 2007). In
Bangladesh, non-eligible participants enjoy social protection programs’ facilities by using patron-
age politics, as 47 percent of beneficiaries of the Primary Education Stipend programs were non-
poor included illegally in the program (Ahmed, 2004). The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2010)
reported that 33 percent of beneficiaries of the OAA was too young or under the age of eligibility.
The distribution of SSN became a matter of competition that shapes the survival strategies of
political elites (Hickey et al., 2018). Political elites use social protection to secure their political
legitimacy and sustain their power (Hickey et al., 2018). A study noted that a UP chairman of
Faridpur District in Bangladesh and some of the UP members took bribes ranging from Tk 500 to
Tk 1000 from each woman in exchange for VGD cards. The chairman also used the SSN cards to
get votes in the UP election (Ahmed et al., 2009). In Bangladesh and Ethiopia, political connec-
tions and patronage played a vital role in selections of households for social protection programs
(Zenebe, 2010). The politics of beneficiaries’ selection and distribution started while allocating
VGD cards to households at the UP level (Hossain, 2007).
In general, selection processes are not transparent and depend on the relationship with the UP
members (Hashemi, 2001). Even poor eligible people had to keep lobbying or a minimum level of
relations with the UP members for receiving the privileges. In most cases, UP members selected
their clients who supported them (Hashemi, 2001). A study stated that a UP chairman of Faridpur
District influenced the decision of the beneficiaries list and enjoyed benefits out of it. The UP
chairman snatched away the VGD cards from a UP female member and gave the cards to one of his
clients for distribution (Ahmed et al., 2009). Political influences, social, and personal preferences
were causes of the inclusion of ineligible beneficiaries (Choudhury and Räder, 2014), and also the
support of political parties had significant influence in beneficiaries’ selection for SSN programs
(Rahman and Choudhury, 2012). The power of distributing VGD cards and other SSN programs
became an important factor in local politics (Hossain, 2007).
Rahman and Choudhury (2012) said that inclusion error has increased due to the influence of
clientelist politics in the selection process of SSN and the inclusion error based on the age criteria
is 16.9 percent in the OAA. Even with use of the proxy indicator of landownership below 10 deci-
mals, the error remains above 20 percent. In the case of VGD, the inclusion error is 6.3 percent by
following the eligibility criterion of landownership below 15 decimals. The Bangladesh Bureau of
Statistics (2017) reported that in Bangladesh, the ratio of inclusion error and exclusion error has
been raised in SSN programs because of rising informal institutions where the estimated exclusion
error is around 70 percent and inclusion error is around 30 percent. Political elites prefer more to
create informal institutions rather than formal institutions; this (informal institutions) better serves
their interests (Khan, 2018). Distribution of power between elites and political groups is defined as
the political settlement (Khan, 2017; Lavers and Hickey, 2016).

Theoretical framework
According to Figure 1, power is distributed between UP members (local-elected government) and
informal groups (local elites and political groups) and they belong to the elite groups. Khan (2017)
defines political settlement as the distribution of power between formal and informal groups (polit-
ical and local elites). They can move to develop more informal systems for protecting their inter-
ests (Khan, 2018). As Figure 1 shows explains, local elites and the UP members cannot satisfy their
6 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

Political Settlement

(Distributed power relations between groups

formally & informally)

Elites

Up Local elites
chairman/UP and political
members (Local groups

High Influence Formal Low interference

bodies (UP
duty officers)

High Influence

High Influence
Social safety net (Used as a tool of PS)

(VGD, VGF, and Old Allowance)

Selection /Distribution
process

Low/medium level
High Clientelist
Clientelist relationship
relationship

Non-eligible Eligible Benefiaries

Beneficiaries

Conflict of interest Conflict of interest

Eligible but non-
beneficiaries

Figure 1.  Theoretical framework.

interests in the formal systems; therefore, they can move to develop informal institutions for secur-
ing their benefits. Local-level bureaucrats (UP government officials) have limited control over the
selection and distribution processes of SSN programs; they work in favor of elites’ interests. Figure
1 states that the UP members and elites’ groups have a strong influence on the selection and distri-
bution processes of SSN programs (e.g., VGD, VGF, and OAA). Mannan (2010) described that UP
members and local elites made the key decisions of the beneficiary lists. Even poor eligible people
had to keep lobbying or a minimum level of relations with UP members and local elites for getting
the SSNs facilities because UP members selected clients who supported them (Hashemi, 2001).
Figure 1 shows that eligible and non-eligible people enjoy VGD, VGF, and OAA facilities. Non-
eligible beneficiaries maintain strong clientelist relationships with the local-elected government
and political elites. As a result, eligible beneficiaries are compelled to keep a minimum level of
Rezvi 7

clientelist relationship with the elites’ groups. This also shows that if the eligible people do not
have good relations or have a personal conflict with the local-elected government, they are auto-
matically excluded from the beneficiaries’ lists.
The UP chairman has used the SSN programs to get votes in the UP election (Ahmed et al.,
2009). Political groups and local elites also use it (the SSN) as a tool for increasing and strengthen-
ing their political capital at the local level (Hassan, 2013). Figure 1 shows the politics of beneficiar-
ies’ selection and distribution of SSN programs, and how UP members and elites use it (the SSN)
as a means of power distribution (political settlement). The elites introduce more informal systems
because formal systems do not serve their interests.

Assumption-1: As a limited access order country, in Bangladesh, if the government creates

more formalized arrangements, elites will move to introduce more informal systems in the
country as formalization will not serve their purposes. In other words, whereas the formal struc-
ture would allow the local government representatives and the elites to practice limited control
on the beneficiary selection process, the relatively informal structure would allow these actors
to exercise higher control over the whole process.
Assumption-2: As the systems become more informal in nature, this will focus more on
strengthening the existing clientelist relationship.
Assumption-3: The selection and distribution processes of SSN programs in Bangladesh will
thus acknowledge the clientelist relations.

Results analysis
In the study area, local-elected government (UP members), political leaders, and other dominant
groups belonged to the elite class. The study found that formal institutions had weakened due to the
increase of informal institutions. UP members played a significant role in the beneficiaries’ selec-
tion and distribution of VGD, VGF, and OAA programs. The local bureaucrats were inactive in the
beneficiaries’ selection and distribution process of SSN programs. UP-official secretary (local
bureaucrat) also depended on the decisions of informal groups.

Are the processes (selection and distribution) formal or informal?

Bangladesh’s government has formulated the NSSS for ensuring the effectiveness of beneficiaries’
selection and resource distribution of the SSN programs. In the study area, the local-elected gov-
ernment (UP members) hardly followed the NSSS and formal arrangements of beneficiaries’ selec-
tion and resource distribution. The study found that the UP members provided the SSN programs
(VGD or VGF or OAA) benefits to ineligible beneficiaries without following the formal qualifica-
tions of the beneficiaries’ selection of the programs. They only maintained the age and male/female
requirements and neglected other conditions of the beneficiaries’ selection in most of the cases. A
UP female member stated that:

At present, we see that the Union Parishad committee meetings do not hold regularly. Personal
secretary of UP chairman, Ali plays a significant role in the process of beneficiaries lists and
distribution of SSN programs. The decisions are determined by informally; UP chairman gives priority
to his (Ali) words. As a consequence, personal interests and power conflicts with UP Ward-members
influence the processes of beneficiaries’ selection and distribution of VGD, VGF, and OAA cards.
(Mohsena, UP Female member)
8 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

There had been Ward-committees and a UP committee of UP official employees (local bureau-
crats) for selecting eligible beneficiaries for the SSN programs; UP Ward members and UP female-
members of the Ward(s) were the members of the Ward-committee with other government
employees (bureaucrats). The UP Ward-members selected the beneficiaries for the SSN programs
(VGD, VGF, and OAA) by neglecting the formal arrangements. If they followed the formal regu-
larities in the beneficiaries’ selection, they could not provide SSN program privileges to their cli-
ents. As a local bureaucrat stated:

Though there has been a Ward committee in every ward for the beneficiaries’ selection, UP ward-members
make the beneficiaries lists of SSN programs neglecting the formal procedures; besides, political group
interests, elite interests, and clientelist relations also influence it. (UP Official secretary)

A UP Ward-member, Mannan told that some of the UP Ward-members bypassed the formal regu-
larities in the case of beneficiaries’ selection and distributions of SSN programs. He stated that:

Chokidar (local police) and UP Ward-members (Ward-5, Monjur, and Ward-6, Ismail) select beneficiaries
for the SSN programs neglecting the formal regulations. They select beneficiaries based on their preference,
and exchange money for VGD/VGF cards. (Mannan, Member of Ward-7)

The study found that the influences of power politics became more visible in beneficiaries’ selec-
tion and distribution of SSN programs (VGD and VGF). The local-elected government played a
significant role as key decision-makers in the selection and distribution processes of VGD cards.
Further, the UP chairman exercised dictatorial power in the entire process of the SSN programs. A
UP Ward-Member, Ismail stated that the UP Members neglected formal conditions in the case of
beneficiaries’ selection and distribution. Ismail stated that:

Irregularities have taken place while the UP chairman distributes VGD cards. He gives more extra cards
to his favorite UP Ward-members than others. Moreover, most of the UP Ward-members (Ward-2, Ward-4,
and Ward-5) distribute the SSN facilities informally among their supporters, kin, or exchanging money
with it. (Ismail, UP Ward Member, Ward-6)

The study found that there was more ambiguity in the beneficiaries’ selection and distribution of
the VGF program. The UP chairman controlled the distribution processes of VGF by exercising his
absolute authority. As Mohsena stated:

VGF allocate twice a year in UP. Last year, UP received an allocation of almost 2400 VGF cards. Among
the cards, the UP chairman has distributed around 1300 VGF cards to UP Ward members and UP female
representatives for distribution in their Wards. The UP chairman kept around 900 VGF cards illegally in
his quota. He allocates all the cards to his (ineligible) clients (chamchas); he allocates 20–30 VGF cards
per person. (UP Female member, Mohsena)

The UP chairman took the largest share of VGD and VGF cards from total allocations. As a result,
the numbers of per-Ward VGD or VGF cards distributed automatically reduced. In many cases, the
UP chairman gave the cards to his ineligible clients (chamchas) by neglecting formal regularities.
As the local bureaucrat (UP official secretary) stated:

The UP chairman keeps large amounts of cards for his clients in the time of allocations. Furthermore, the
UP Ward-members (Wards-2, 4, 5, 6, and 8) and UP female-members distribute the cards of VGD or VGF
or OAA among their clients and relatives or exchange money for the cards. (UP Official secretary)
Rezvi 9

Also, Mohsena argued that:

UP received 197 VGD cards for allocations last year. The UP chairman distributed 107 VGD cards among
UP members for distributions in their area (per UP Ward-member eight cards and per UP Female-member
nine cards). He also kept around 90 VGD cards for his quota and he distributed the cards to his (ineligible)
clients by neglecting the formal requirements.

Personal secretary of the UP chairman, Ali, stated that they tried to distribute all VGD cards to
eligible people; and, he also conceded that patron–client relationships played an influential role in
the time of distribution. Ali argued that:

We try to provide VGD and VGF cards facilities to eligible beneficiaries. Sometimes, VGD and VGF cards
are distributed to ineligible people who are clients of the UP chairman and local elites. Such as the UP
chairman gives some extra VGD cards (5–6) to the UP Ward-member (Ward-6) because of the clientelist
relationship with him. (Ali, Personal secretary of UP Chairman).

The study found that when UP members selected the beneficiaries for the OAA program, they
gave priority to the elites’ class, kinship, and clientelist relationship. Without age-requirement, the
UP members rarely followed other requirements (e.g., annual income is less than Tk 10,000) for
the beneficiaries’ selection of the OAA program. Ali stated that:

The UP Ward-members give priority to the clientelist relationship and kinship while selecting people
rather than following formal requirements (Ali, Personal secretary of UP chairman)

Also, an ineligible beneficiary of OAA argued that:

I told off my relative, Mohsena (UP female member) for giving me the OAA facilities. In that year, she
provided the OAA card to me though also she took Tk 500 for the card. (An FGD participant)

The UP chairman maintained strong informal networks in the area; in most cases, informal politics
controlled the distribution of the OAA program. As a consequence, many eligible people were
excluded from getting the SSN programs (OAA) facilities. Mohsena argued that:

The UP chairman has allocated only 55 OAA cards (out of 90 cards) to the UP members for distribution
in their area. Other cards, he distributes among his clients and local elites, neglecting formal requirements.
(UP Female member, Mohsena)

The UP members provided social protection facilities to political elites for gaining their support.
The study found that the politicization of SSN programs had become a more common feature. In
Pekua Upazila (study area), the beneficiaries’ selection and distribution processes for SSN pro-
grams were highly influenced by political parties (government’s political party) and political elites.
The leaders of the Awami League (current government’s political party) enjoyed the benefits of the
SSN programs by using political power. The UP official secretary (local-bureaucrat) argued that:

In the Pekua union, Upazila political leaders (Awami League leaders) determine the distributions of SSN
programs. In the case of Mognama Union Parishad, local elites influence along with political groups in
the beneficiaries’ selection and distribution processes of the SSN programs. Like other Union Parishad, in
Rajakhali Union we have political influences in the beneficiaries’ selection and distribution for SSN
programs. Besides, the UP chairman distributes around 10 VGD, VGF cards (every-times) to UP Ward-
president and secretary of Awami League serving their interests (Official secretary of Rajakhali Union)
10 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

The study found that informal politics (systems) became more powerful and influence the benefi-
ciaries’ selection and distribution of SSN programs. The UP members did not give priority to the
suggestions of the UP Wards-committee in the beneficiaries’ selection and neglected formal proce-
dures. The UP members distributed the cards of SSN programs to their clients by neglecting the
eligibility qualifications (formal systems) of the beneficiaries’ selection. UP officials (local-
bureaucrats) acted as a puppet and depended on the decisions of the UP chairman (members) in
case of beneficiaries’ selection and distribution. Moreover, clientelist relations, political party lead-
ers (Awami League), and political elites influenced the process of beneficiaries’ selection and dis-
tribution. As a consequence, the poor eligible people were excluded from getting the SSN programs
(VGD, VGF, and OAA) facilities.

Why do the elites move to informal systems?

The study found that the local-elected government (UP members) built more informal systems to
ensure more benefits, and serve the interests of their clients (supporters and local elites). They used
the SSN programs to establish clientelist relationships for securing benefits and stabling their
power. Political elites were also influential actors in the informal system. While local elites referred
lists of their supporters for selection, the UP members gave priority to the lists (ineligible people)
as beneficiaries of SSN programs (VGD and VGF) for getting the favor of the elites. Ismail argued
that:

UP Ward-members provide VGD and VGF cards facilities to their supporters and local elites. I also try to
provide the SSN cards facilities to the people who are referred by the local elites in my Ward. (Ismail, UP
Ward-member)

The local-elected government (UP members) informally distributed the VGD and VGF cards to
their supporters of the (prior) election, elites’ groups, and relatives. If they followed the formal
systems in the distribution of SSN programs, they could not serve their (ineligible) clients. They
used SSN programs (e.g., VGD, VGF, and OAA) for strengthening informal networks with their
clients, thereby increasing vote banks for the next elections. Mohsena stated that:

The UP Chairman has chamchas (clients) in each Ward. He distributes per-client around 10–12 cards of
VGD, VGF, and OAA and also builds strong clientelist relationships, neglecting the formal systems. They
(clients) enjoy the SSN (VGD and VGF cards) facilities and distribute the cards to their relatives or
exchange money for the cards. (Mohsena, UP Female member)

Similarly, Monjur argued that the UP chairman used the SSN programs as a means of strengthening
informal systems. He stated that:

The UP chairman keeps extra allocations of the SSN (VGD and VGF) programs for the clients using his
arbitrary power. While we provide the lists of eligible beneficiaries (25–30 people) for VGD and VGF
programs, he excludes 5–6 people’s names from our lists to provide VGD and VGF cards facilities to his
clients (chamchas). He has established strong informal networks using SSN programs. (Monjur, UP
Ward-member)

One of the UP Ward-members told that he got extra allocations of cards for the SSN programs
(VGD, VGF, OAA) compared to other UP Ward-members because of having a good relationship
with the UP chairman. Ismail argued that:
Rezvi 11

My Ward is nearby the UP chairman’s home and I have good relations with the UP chairman. For that, he
gives me extra allocations of SSN programs than other UP Ward-members. (Ismail, UP Ward-member)

The UP members moved to informal systems for maintaining good relations with their clients (sup-
porters) and local elites. As a respondent stated:

Last year, I went to UP Ward-member, Ismail (Ward-6) applying for the facilities of the OAA. But he
demanded Tk 5000 for OAA cards facilities. I could not give the money because I did not have that amount
of money. Besides, I am not a relative of the UP member. Mainly, the UP member gives OAA card facilities
to his supporters and his relatives though they are not eligible. (An FGD participant)

The study found that clientelist politics became stronger than party politics, and determined the
distributions of the SSN programs for enhancing the web of clients and extending its ranges in the
UP. The UP chairman used the SSN programs (VGD, VGF, and OAA) for strengthening the clien-
telist politics and took the advantages of clientelist politics for sustaining his position and stabling
his power. An FGD participant stated that:

Last time, the UP chairman gives me (an ineligible beneficiary) 15 VGD cards. I distribute all the cards to
the people of my surroundings. (An FGD participant)

Local elites and political groups took benefits of clientelist relationships with UP members. The
UP members provided SSN program facilities to elites’ group (local elites and political elites) for
building rapport with them to ensure power stability. Political leaders (Awami League) had strongly
influenced decision-making processes of the beneficiaries’ selection and distribution of SSN pro-
grams. Some of the UP members stated that local political leaders (Awami League party) were
influential in the distribution processes of SSN programs. The UP Ward-president and secretary of
the Awami League enjoyed a special quota facility (informal) in the distribution of SSN programs.
A UP Ward-member stated that:

Every Ward of UP has a local party office of the Awami League. The UP chairman distributes the SSN
programs to the political party workers (Awami League) because he is also president of the political party
in UP level. He creates a quota system for them for strengthening bonding with the political party workers.
Following that, they (UP Ward-president and secretary of Awami League) get the allocations (around
5–10 cards) of the SSN programs (VGD, VGF, and OAA) and distribute the cards among the political
party workers, avoiding the eligibility conditions of beneficiaries’ selection. (Monjur, UP Ward-member)

The UP members provided SSN programs’ benefits to the political elites for getting political sup-
ports. The Upazila and Union Awami party leaders had established strong informal networks and
controlled the distribution of SSN programs. And, local bureaucrats also worked in favor of politi-
cal leaders. Mannan told that:

Party politics influence the beneficiaries’ selection of the VGD and VGF programs. While I do not give
VGD or VGF cards to the local Awami League workers (ineligible), the senior officers or the political
leaders call me to provide the facilities. Also, local elites give lists of people’s names for giving VGD or
VGF cards to the people. We are compelled to distribute the VGD or VGF cards to the ineligible people
for gaining their supports (local elites and political groups). (Mannan, UP Ward-member)

Personal conflicts of the local-elected government influenced the selection and distribution pro-
cesses of SSN programs. If he/she (eligible participant) has no good relations or has personal
12 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

conflicts with the UP members or UP chairman, he/she will be excluded from the beneficiaries’
lists. The study found that two UP Ward-members (Ward-1 and Ward-4) did not get the allocations
of SSN programs for their Ward-people because of having personal conflicts with the UP chair-
man. As a result, many eligible people (Ward-1 and Ward-4) were excluded from getting the VGD
or VGF cards facilities. As Mohsena stated:

Last Eid, the UP chairman did not provide VGD card facilities to two UP Ward-member, Azamgir (Ward-
4), and Osman (Ward-1) due to having personal conflicts with the UP Ward-members, although they were
eligible people for getting the VGD cards. (UP Female-member, Mohsena)

As an FGD participant argued:

When a beneficiary complains against UP members or UP female members about taking money in
exchange for the SSN programs’ cards or their irregularities, her/his name is excluded from eligible
beneficiaries lists of VGD, VGF, OAA, and other SSN programs. They give the SSN facilities to other
people who can give them money or support them. (An FGD participant)

The study found that the UP members used SSN programs for increasing their legitimacy and
strengthening their power, and also used these programs for increasing their vote banks for the
future election. Ali argued that:

Moreover, the UP Chairman will be re-elected for the next period. (Ali, the personal secretary of UP
Chairman)

In the election period, UP members assured the voters of providing SSN programs (VGD, VGF,
and OAA) facilities, if they would win in elections. After winning in the election, they distributed
the SSN programs to their supporters, avoiding the formal systems. Ismail stated that:

When I got the first allocations of SSN programs for distribution in my Ward, I distributed some of VGD
and VGF cards to them (who supported me in the election), skipping the eligibility requirements of
beneficiaries. (Ismail, UP Ward-member)

In the study area, the distribution of power between local-elected government (UP members) and
informal groups (local elites and political groups) established political settlement. The UP mem-
bers distributed the SSN programs to their (ineligible) clients, neglecting the formal systems. They
(UP members, political elites, and local elites) allowed introducing more informal structures as the
formal structures do not serve their interests. They used it (the SSN programs) for strengthening
clientelist relations; also, they used it for increasing their votes bank and stabling their power. They
used the SSN programs as a tool for distributing power between them (UP members, political
elites, and local elites), and as a means of establishing the political settlement.

Discussion
The SSN programs of Bangladesh have many leakages (Ahmed et al., 2009), but the existing lit-
erature does not explain two points. First, the SSN programs are overwhelmed by high rates of
inclusion error and exclusion error (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2017; Choudhury and Räder,
2014), elites priority (interests) (Ahmed et al., 2009; Mannan, 2010), political influences (Ahmed
et al., 2009; Rahman and Choudhury, 2012), and social and personal relations (Rahman and
Rezvi 13

Choudhury, 2012). But the literature has not discussed why the government officials (bureaucrats)
and UP members do not utilize the strong formal system (the NSSS).
Second, the current literature also does not explain how the politics of SSN programs work for
sustaining the existing political dynamics. The findings of the current study have explored the two
points through the lens of political settlement in Bangladesh’s perspective. The political settlement
determines the design of institutional frameworks of a country, how much it will allow formal
structures or informal structures, and also how this depends on the interests of elites of the country.
Elites will follow formal systems when this reduces uncertainty and serves their purposes (Khan,
2018). Similarly, they (UP members and elite groups) will follow the systematic (formal systems)
distribution processes of the SSN programs when this minimizes uncertainty and ensures their
interests (Hickey et al., 2018; Khan, 2018).
In Bangladesh, UP members and local elites bypassed formal systems in the selection and dis-
tribution processes of SSN programs and introduced more informal structures (Mannan, 2010;
Rahman and Choudhury, 2012) to ensure their expected benefits. The study also found that they
(UP members and local elites) have established strong informal systems (clientelist relations) to
protect their interests. The key findings of the study are:

1. Clientelist relations, political affiliation, power conflicts (personal or political), and kinship
influenced the selection and distribution processes of SSN programs. The UP members
have distributed the SSN programs to their (ineligible) clients, neglecting the formal
systems.
2. The UP members distributed the SSN cards to their (ineligible) clients or supporters for
strengthening the clientelist politics (relations).
3. The UP chairman distributed SSN programs to the political party workers (Awami League)
for maintaining strong bonding with them.
4. The UP members have used SSN programs for increasing their legitimacy and strengthen-
ing their power by building informal networks (clientelist relations).
5. They (UP members) followed informal systems to serve the interests of local elites and
political groups for getting their supports and increasing their vote banks.
6. The UP members provided SSN programs’ facilities to them (those who supported them in
the election) by bypassing the eligibility requirements of beneficiaries as gratitude for their
supports.
7. They (UP members, political elites, and local elites) have allowed introducing more infor-
mal structures as the formal structures do not serve their interests.

Local elites and political groups have moved to informal systems for using social protection to
maintain their political legitimacy and holding their power (Hickey et al., 2018; Khan, 2018). They
(political groups and local elites) use it (the SSN) as a means of power stability in society (Hassan,
2013). Similarly, the study found that the UP members, political groups, and local elites have
moved to create more informal systems using the SSN programs for ensuring their benefits and
balancing the power. Even though, the NSSS is an efficient and effective strategy for ensuring
efficiency and effectiveness in the selection and distribution of SSN programs (Bangladesh
Planning Commission, 2015), the study found that the UP members have distributed the SSN pro-
grams to their (ineligible) clients, neglecting the formal systems. They (UP members, political
elites, and local elites) moved to introduce more informal structures as it serves their interests.
They have used the SSN programs as a means of establishing the political settlement (distribution
of power among UP members, political elites, and local elites).
14 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

Conclusion
Elites and political groups can use their power to introduce informal institutions to reduce uncer-
tainty and ensures their benefits (Khan, 2018). The distribution of power among elites or the power
relations between elites and non-elite groups or between formal and informal institutions is the
determined political settlement of a country that provides ‘an acceptable distribution of benefits’
(Hickey et al., 2018; Kelsall, 2018). Similarly, they (elites and political groups) allow more infor-
mal systems in the selection and distribution of SSN programs while formal systems of SSN pro-
grams do not serve their interests. SSN programs have performed more effectively in Bangladesh
for reducing poverty and promoting development. It (SSN programs) is overwhelmed by many
leakages such as high rates of inclusion error and exclusion error, elites’ priority (interests), politi-
cal influences, social and personal relations (biases), and corruption (Ahmed et al., 2009;
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2017; Mannan, 2010; Rahman and Choudhury, 2012). The study
found that informal structures (e.g., clientelist politics, political affiliation, personal conflicts, and
kinship) determined the selection and distribution processes of SSN programs. The UP members
have distributed the SSN programs to their (ineligible) clients neglecting the formal systems. They
provided SSN programs’ facilities to the local elites and political groups through informal struc-
tures for strengthening clientelist relations and increasing their legitimacy and strengthening their
power. They (UP members, political elites, and local elites) have allowed introducing more infor-
mal structures that better serve their interests. They used it (the SSN programs) for increasing their
vote banks for the future election and stabling their power. They have used the SSN programs as a
tool for establishing the political settlement (distribution of power between UP members and local
elites). The UP members and local elites would move to introduce more informal systems in a
country such as Bangladesh if the formalization processes did not serve their purposes.

Acknowledgements
All my gratitude and thanks to the Almighty Allah, who is the supreme Creator, and given me His Kind bless-
ings to complete this piece of study. I express my heartfelt gratitude and appreciation to my research supervi-
sor, Dr Asif M Shahan, (Associate Professor, Department of Development Studies, Dhaka University) for his
thorough, intensive and enthusiastic supervision from the inception of this research. I am highly indebted to
him for his valuable advice and intellectual guidance throughout my research writing. I thank my uncle’s
Omar Imran, Omar Azam and Abbas Uddin who helped me to collect primary data from the study area, and
the Union Parishad members (Monjur, Ismail and Mannan) for their assistance in communicating with the
beneficiaries of the social safety net programs. I am also grateful to all key informant interview and focus
group discussion respondents for sharing their opinions. I give a special thank you to my parents and my fam-
ily for their love, inspirations, sacrifices, blessings and supports. Finally, I am grateful to all the persons who
gave me supports and inspirations to complete the research directly and indirectly.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD
Minhazur Rahman Rezvi https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3046-6664

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Author biography
Minhazur Rahman Rezvi is currently doing MSS at Department of Development Studies, University of Dhaka,
Bangladesh. He has also completed Bachelor of Social Sciences (BSS) from same department. He is a veteran
in the spectrum of development research and has already published numerous research works in various
national and international peer-reviewed journals. His area of research widens through political science, pub-
lic policy, public health to gender development etc.