UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA PORTUGUESA

Centro Regional das Beiras - Pólo de Viseu

Faculdade de Letras

MESTRADO EM LINGUÍSTICA E ENSINO DE LÍNGUAS

meaning, sense and sensibility

Some notes on implicitness and inference

Trabalho apresentado no contexto do seminário de Pragmática Linguística

Docente: Dr. Ludwina Van Son
Aluno: Jorge M. C. Damasceno
Abril 2002
 Contents

1. Introduction ................................................................................ 2
2. The Crisis of Meaning ................................................................ 2
3. Austin's "Unhappiness": True... but False ...................................... 4
3.1. Pressupositions ................................................................. 4
3.2. Illocutionary force ............................................................. 5
3.2.1. Implicit (primary) performatives ............................. 5
3.2.2 Explicit performatives ............................................. 5
3.3. Implicatures ...................................................................... 5
3.4. Indirect speech acts ........................................................... 6
3.4.1. Secondary literal illocution ..................................... 7
3.4.2. Primary non literal illocution .................................. 7
4. Conclusion .................................................................................. 8
Bibliography ............................................................................... 9

1
 "Imagination is more important than knowledge"
Albert Einstein

1. Introduction

1.1. The field of Pragmatics is fairly huge, since it is the result of a long quest for the issue of
semantics; because this is an attractive sphere of study, a lot of investigation has been
undertaken, basically as an attempt to explain the relationship between meaning and use of
language. Not only as a critical professional involved in EFL teaching, but also as a citizen
who has been carefully observing and trying to understand the importance of language in
society, I am particularly interested in all those less explicit (yet very attractive and
interactive) aspects of discourse, because "Le sens d'un énoncé n'est pas un donné statique,
immuablement figé dans son enveloppe signifiante. C'est un objet que construisent et
négocient ensemble, de manière plus ou moins coopérative, les différents partenaires de
l'interaction." (Orecchioni, ::::::: : 349).
1.2. This proposal of trip from meaning to "sensibility" implies a double objective of this
paper:
1.2.1. Rather than focusing on scientific detail, the overall goal is to track, relate and
identify several aspects of language related to inference that have gradually emerged and
converged to implicit meaning, which underlyies every study in the field of Critical
Discourse Analysis, based upon what can be regarded as a "sensible" interpretation of what is
actually hidden inside and beyond discourse".
1.2.2. Since the semantic evolution of meaning versus sense has been closely related
to the above aspects, it will receive due attention so as to articulate with them and thus
constitute a logical unit.
1.3. By means of critical selection, reading and analysis of the wide information that has been
produced by major theorists in this field over the past decades, I shall present throughout this
paper an overall systematic view of the way Saussure's limited concept of discourse has
evolved: From Austin and Searle's philosophical development of Speech Acts, tracking
further studies on language in use, to eventually meet the notion of implicit meaning, I shall
establish an ultimate link between Pragmatics and Critical Discourse Analysis, a
transdisciplinary, "sensible" approach to discourse.

2
2. The Crisis of Meaning

In order to clearly perceive the divergent approaches to the study of discourse in a diachronic
perspective, it is essential to compare two radically different opinions on the subject,
produced in different stages of linguistic theory:

a) "En séparant la langue de la parole, on sépare du même coup: 1º ce qui est

social de ce qui est individuel 2º ce qui est essentiel de ce qui est accessoire et
plus ou moins accidentel. La langue n'est pas une fonction du sujet parlant, elle
est le produit que l'individu enregistre passivement; elle ne suppose jamais la
préméditation (...). La parole est au contraire un acte individuel de volonté et
d'intelligence (...)" (Saussure, 1995: 30).

b) "Même lorsque la communication s'effectue au moyen d'un code, c'est

seulement l'intention manifeste du communicateur de rendre manifestes certaines
hypothèses qui peut réussir à les rendre, de fait, manifestes au destinataire.
Même si un communicateur s'est engagé avec la plus grande détermination à
respecter les règles ou les conventions d'un code, cela ne suffit jamais à garantir
que les signaux qu'il emploie répresentent à coup ce qu'il a l'intention de
communiquer." (Sperber & Wilson, 1986:255-256)

The above contrasting views are separated by decades of evolving linguistic research. They
feature the opposite view of each author around aspects like the role of speakers, the concept
of verbal communication, the relationship between the linguistic code and ocurrent
utterances, as well as the difference between internal linguistic linguistics and an external
explanation for the functioning of language, be it verbal or non-verbal. One of the most
striking issues discussed above is the one of passivity versus intentionality of the speaker. Is
discourse nothing but an individual or accidental occurrence as is preconized by Saussure? Is
it just a personal, mental achievement... or rather the result of unaccidental choices based on
psychological and social criteria, the intention of communication? What is the very role of
both speaker and addressee? What is there to see, almost hidden, sometimes peeping out
beyond language and context?
Much of the answer to such questions has come from the field of Pragmatics, a branch
of the philosophical science, that saw some of its leading figures concern themselves with the
question of language use. A clear distinction between:

3
 a) the traditionally inherent and context-exclusive semantic concept of meaning
and,

b) the pragmatic notion of sense as the interface between meaning and

context, the latter being a deeper (or external) understanding of the
former,

is presented by Oswald Ducrot (1984:15) distinguishing these aspects and at the same time
arguing that both aspects are linked. Ducrot departs from the point of view that an ehxaustive
sentence-by-sentence semantic description is far from fruitful if one wants to find the
regularities underlying deeper levels of sense: "Un prémier composant, c'ést à dire un premier
ensemble de connaissances, (...composant linguistique) assignerait à chaque énoncé,
indépendamment de tout contexte, une certaine signification, et, par example, à A, la
signification A'. Et un deuxième composant (le composant rhétorique) aurait pour tâche, étant
donné la signification A' attachée à A, et les circonstances X dans lesquelles A est prononcé,
de prévoir la signification effective de A dans la situation X."; In view of this Ducrot
furthermore clarifies the notion of sense stating that "les faits devant lesquels le linguiste
adoptera l'attitude d'observateur, ce seront les actes d'énonciation, et les interprétations que les
sujets parlants sont censés leur attribuer. (...) quant à l'hypothèse d'une valeur sémantique
attachée à l'énoncé en tant que tel, nous en faisons une hypothèse interne (...) par les avantages
qu'elle comporte lorqu'on explique les effets de sens produits par cet'énoncé" (ibid:61), being
an utterance regarded as "Ce que le linguiste peut prendre pour observable, (...) considéré
comme la manifestation particulière, comme l'ocurrence hic et nunc d'une phrase" (ibidem:
174); such a clear distinction between sentences and utterances, reflects the different levels of
"langue" and "parole". Yet the latter is now regarded by Ducrot within the very pragmatic
scope: what is actually performed by using the language, whereas the "langue" still makes up
the grammar by means of analysis and interpretation of the sentence that conventionally
underlies the utterance. (cf. ibid:177), considering a sentence merely "un objet théorique,
entendant par là qu'il n'appartient pas, pour le linguiste, au domaine de l'observable, mais
constitue une invention de cette science particulière qu'est la grammaire" (ibidem:174), i.e., an
abstract formal object of study as far as the very inside of the sentence is concerned.

4
3. Austin's "Unhappiness": True... but False

As a reaction to the traditional approach to language, John Austin's collected lectures

constitute a commited approach to language as used to perform actions; "How to Do Things
with Words" (Austin, 1962) sets a critical moment for the attachment of action to the
sentence. By building, dismantling and rebuilding anew, the author struggles to assemble a
speech act taxonomy, gradually inviting the reader into a world of new philosophical
problems, from the simple notion of "performative" vs. "constative" to the theoretical analysis
around inference dependent issues like pressupposition, illocutionary act, illocutionary force,
as well as implicit and explicit performatives. According to Austin (cf. op. cit.: 22) speech
acts fail whenever the conditions of "happiness" are not achieved in practice; thus constative
utterances may be true or false, whereas performative utterances may be "felicitous" or
"unfelicitous".
Austin is said to have discovered the speech acts was followed by

3.1. Pressupositions
"Il semble en effet raisonnable de faire du présupposé, attaché à l'énoncé lui-même, et lié aux
phenomènes syntaxiques les plus généraux, un produit du composant linguistique. Le sous-
entendu, au contraire, qui résulte d'une réflection du destinataire sur les circonstances
d'énontiation du message (...) tient compte à la fois du sens de l'énoncé et de ces conditions
d'occurence, et de leur applique des lois logiques et psychologiques générales." (Ducrot,
1984:25)
Having stated above several studies that effectively got at significant progress in the
field of implicit meaning, as far as primary performatives (Austin), indirect speech acts
(Searle), implicatures (Grice), pressupposition and sous-entendu (Ducrot) are concerned, it is
now time for the drawing up of a framework that may clarify the genesis of implit meaning

3.2. Illocutionary force

3.2.1. Implicit (primary) performatives

3.2.2 Explicit performatives

3.3. Implicatures

5
In the quest for the status of implicitness an important step beyond was done by Paul Grice.
He preconizes special attention to the conditions that rule conversation; in identifying them he
distinguishes what is said (truth condition of the utterance) from what is implicated (aspects of
meaning that go beyond truth / false assessment). This is what gives rise to Grice's
Conversational Maxims and Cooperative Principle. They seem rather awkward at first sight:
I. Maxims of Quantity:
Make your contribution as informative as is required.
Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

II. Maxims of Quality:

Try to make your contribution one that is true.
Do not say what you believe to be false.
Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence

III. Maxim of Relation:

Be relevant.

IV. Maxims of Manner:

Be perspicuous.
Avoid obscurity /of expression.
Avoid ambiguity.
Be brief.
Be orderly.
(Grice, 1975: 158 - 159 )

In fact it is somewhat odd! In fact, the CP isn't but the presentation of general
scientific principles of conversation; however the practice of verbal communication shows
that strictly following the CP is not a sucessful strategy of discourse since the use of language
involves "deux types de processus de communication: l'un qui est basé sur le codage et le
décodage, l'autre sur l'ostension et l'inférence" (Sperber & Wilson, (1986: 262); this latter
ostensible process of information which leads the addressee to infer forms the basis of Sperber
& Wilson's concept of "relevance", and clarifies how the speaker, despite being competent,
violates one (or various maxims), the natural automatic response of the hearer is to search for
unstated meaning within the utterance. A better understanding of the above can also be
achieved through Searle's postulate of intentionality: "To say that a speaker S meant
something by X is to say that S intended the utterance of X to produce some effect in a hearer
H by means of the recognition of this intention. (...) When I say "Hello", I intend to produce
in a hearer the knowledge that he is being greeted. If he recognizes it as my intention (...) then
he thereby acquires that knowledge." (Searle, 1978: 43); Grice thus distinguishes what is said
from what is implicated. What is said is a technical term used to refer to the truth condition of

6
the utterance, whereas what is implicated is used to talk about aspects of meaning which go
beyond the truth condition: "inferences arise to preserve the assumption of cooperation; it is
only by making the assumption contrary to superficial indications that the inferences arise in
the first place. (...) Grice's point is not that we always adhere to these maxims on a superficial
level but rather that, wherever possible, people will interpret what we say as conforming to the
maxims on at least some level." Levinson, 1983: 103)

3.4. Indirect speech acts

"Une phrase qui contient des marqueurs de force illocutoire propres (...) peut être énoncée
pour accomplir en sus un autre type d'acte illocutoire." (Searle, 1979:71)

"Dans les actes de language indirects, le locuteur communique davantage qu'il ne dit
effectivement en prenant apui sur l'information d'arrière-plan, a la fois linguistique et non
linguistique, qu'ils ont en commun, ainsi que sur les capacités générales de rationalité et
d'inférence de l'auditeur." (Searle, 1979:73)

3.4.1. Secondary literal illocution

4. Conclusion

Taking into account that "sensibility" is a sort of humour, one could answer the above
questions by saying that there is a great deal of difference beween the meaning of "humour"
and sense of humour.

Bibliography

Austin, J. (1962). How to do Things with Words.

Ducrot, O. (1984). Le Dire et le Dit. Paris: Éditions de Minuit

7
Grice, P. (1975). Logic and Conversation. In P. Cole and J. Morgan (Eds.), Speech Acts
(Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3). New York: Academic Press, 41 - 58.
Kerbrat-Orecchioni, C. (1986). L'Implicite. Colin. Paris
Levinson, S.C. (1983) Pragmatics. Cambridge University Press
Saussure, F. (1916, 1995). Cours de Linguistique Générale. Payot. Paris
Searle, J.R. (1978). Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge
University Press.
Searle, J.R. (1979). Sens et Expression. Paris: Minuit
Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (1986). La Pertinence. Minuit. Paris