Inadvertent Escalation Outline

I. Title - Inadvertent Escalation Outline

II. Subtitle - Conventional War and Nuclear Risks
III. Year published - 1991
IV. Author – Barry Posen
V. Before Reading -
I’m guessing that the IV is unintentional nuclear escalation and the DV is conventional war or
some specific characteristic of it.

VI. Reading the book/article Dependent Variable(s): Identify the DV, How could it vary? If the
topic is on war what dimensions is the DV (war onset, duration, intensity, aims, level of
violence, outcome).

VII. Variables:
- DV: Use of nuclear weapons [in response to a conventional operation]
- IV: Large-scale conventional operations that produce patterns of damage or threat to the
major elements of the state’s nuclear forces
- Intervening variables:
o Second strike survivability – if low, then the threat of a conventional on nuclear
attack is greater
o Dependency on launch-on-warning / launch under attack system – if high, then
perceived attacks on EWS à more likely escalatory response
o “receiving” state’s deterrence doctrine
§ Counter value deterrence doctrine à could ignore, since counter-value
retaliation requires less second-strike capability than counter-force
• “If each superpower had dedicated its 1980s level of strategic
nuclear resources to the simple task of assured retaliation, it
would have been very difficult to do damage with conventional
operations to produce a nuclear response.”
§ Bargaining / damage limitation “doctrine” à stronger reaction but not
absolute
§ Counterforce deterrence doctrine à strongest reaction
• “The greater the counterforce capabilities in Soviet and American
nuclear strategic force and the greater their commitment to
counterforce strategies for nuclear warfighting, the greater the
likelihood that the factors discussed in this book will lead to
nuclear escalation.”
IIX. Scope conditions:
The phenomena of interest is conventional-to-nuclear escalation between two nuclear armed
states (state level of analysis), caused not by one side being unwilling to accept definitive defeat
in a high-stakes conflict, but rather misperceiving the other side’s large-scale conventional
attacks impact on its nuclear forces as being deliberate.
Such attacks may include:
 - Conventional attacks that self-consciously threaten nuclear forces as a means to achieve a
conventional mission
- Large-scale conventional operations conducted in a sensitive area that create the potential
for multiple accidental encounters between conventional and nuclear forces.
- Attacks on general-purpose forces that protect strategic nuclear forces.
Such attacks do NOT include:
- Occasional accidental conventional attacks on nuclear weapons
- Sustained and deliberate conventional attacks on nukes

IX. Theory:

Posen’s theory takes place under the condition of the security dilemma / spiral model, with the
model adapted for war rather than the oft-used context of peace (e.g., arms buildups, crisis
mobilizations). Here, instead of weapons procurement being the threatening behavior, actual
attacks are the ambiguous threatening behavior, because “cooperation” in this scenario is just
continuing to fight conventionally, and non-cooperation is going nuclear.1 The basic (condensed)
ingredients are as follows:
1. Country A and B value their nuclear forces very highly.
2. A conducts conventional operations may pose a threat to nuclear forces and does not see
the effects of those operations as as much of a threat to their opponent’s military forces as
B does.2
3. As a result, when B retaliates “harshly” for these nuclear-threatening conventional
operations, A sees this retaliation as a signal of A’s “malign” intent and takes things up a
notch.
4. Spiral of action and reaction increases the likelihood that of the sides uses nuclear
weapons.
Two characteristics of military organizations exacerbate this spiral is:
1. Preference for offensive doctrines in pre-conflict planning
2. Autonomy seeking nature (like any other organization); don’t want outside [civilian]
influences to complicate their operations, including nuclear force operations
These factors lead to militaries striking out on offensive actions unbeknownst to their civilian
superiors (numerous historical instances.) 3
The fog of war further catalyzes this spiral.
X Arrow Diagram:

State A: Large-scale conventional operations inadvertently come into direct contact with nuclear
forces à State B: fear of losing second strike, launch on warning, launch under attack, etc. (use
‘em or lose ‘em logic) à State B: heightened preparations for nuclear operations à Escalation
to nuclear war

1
Posen seems to argue that when nuclear powers engage in – and maintain – conventional war, this signals to their
opponent that they do not want the war to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons, but that they are willing to risk that
happening. Reminds me of Carson’s work on limited wars and secrecy.
2
This builds on the classical SD notion that sometimes states have no choice but to improve their military
capabilities, and very often they do not understand how threatening their behavior, though defensively motivated,
may seem to others. In this context, rather than mil buildup, we see offensive (but conventional) behavior.
3
Even when the intensity of a crisis increases civilan efforts ot intervene in the details of military policy, soldiers
often interpret policymakers’ injunctions in ways that allow them maximum operational discretion.
XI. Case studies
Outline of Posen's Case Studies:
1. Large-scale air war analysis between NATO and Warsaw Pact.
• NATO's conventional attacks on air defenses and command-and-control systems in
Eastern Europe would have increased the vulnerability of the strategic command-and-
control systems in the Soviet Union.
2. Assessment of the ground forces campaign.
• NATO armored forces could have defended the central front, avoiding deliberate
escalation to nuclear war.
3. Potential for escalation if NATO naval forces attacked Soviet ballistic missile submarines
and naval bases in a conventional war.
• Examining the U.S. maritime strategy, Posen argues that such attacks could have led to
escalation and increased the danger of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.
4. Comparison of offensive and defensive strategies for NATO protection of sea lanes in the
Atlantic.
• Posen argues that defensive operations could have been successful in protecting sea
lanes, putting pressure on Moscow to either initiate the use of nuclear weapons or
delegate control of such weapons to lower-level military officers, thereby increasing the
danger of accidental or unauthorized use.

XII. Contingency Planning (what is missing)

- I would be interested in reading studies about and/or researching the impact of regime
type, civil-military relations, bureaucracy / intel relations with central govt as potential
intervening variables.

XIII. Strengths and Weaknesses of book – didn’t have a lot to add here, because I’m pretty
new to this topic.
- Strengths:
o Clearly articulated framework that could be tested on other cases
- “Weaknesses”
o Posen could have talked more about the parts of his argument that don’t travel to
minor nuclear powers (e.g., different vulnerabilities and capabilities; different
types of civil-military relations), but this wasn’t the task of the book.

XIII. Other Questions

1. This is a bit out of the scope of Barry’s theory, and maybe more in the Schelling territory,
but I found myself thinking a lot about the “generic” stakes-based escalation rationale,
the idea that a nuclear power that is losing a conventional war in which the stakes are
sufficiently high will, out of necessity, turn to nukes before folding.
o We see this in the ch1 account of how the US planned its own behavior in a
hypothetical hot war with the USSR. In particular, we see an evolution in the
US’s beliefs about its ability to limit the use of nukes in a conventional hot war in
Europe and increased optimism about the prospects of avoiding a nuclear war
based on increased US conventional capabilities.
 § (Ex: In 1984, Gen Bernard Rogers (supreme allied commander in Europe)
requested that due to lack of US/ NATO ability to sustain a conventional
fight, nukes be released within days of the war’s outbreak. In 1987, Caspar
Weinberger declared that the US would be able to contain fighting
conventionally without nukes.)
o But shouldn’t it be assumed that if the US is winning conventionally without
nukes in a hot war, then the USSR/Russia will turn to nukes just like the US
planned on doing? I get that this is why we avoid direct conflict with Russia
today, but I guess my question is, if the stakes are sufficiently high enough for
both sides, why even bother engaging in a conventional fight with your adversary
if you’re going to win and then they are going to turn to nukes and then so will
you?
2. Related, and more in line with the key argument of this book. I wondered about the
implications of threat asymmetries and conventional-nuclear force mixing today. The
geographical factors are pretty immutable, but did we (pre-Ukraine) significantly draw
down the forces stationed close to Russia? Does the US/NATO still have more blended
conventional and nuclear forces? If so, what are the implications for the Ukraine war?
For a war in a NATO country (e.g., the Baltics)?
a. “The competition between the two alliances in Europe has created two major
military asymmetries that substantially affect the relative security position of
these two superpowers. US Decisionmakers often seem to forget these
asymmetries. The Soviet Union faces the possibility of very intense conventional
military conflict close to its national boundaries; the US does not. The Soviet
Union faces an impressive array of nuclear forces based on its periphery and
capable of penetrating deep into the Soviet Union. The US faces a much smaller
array of such forces, usually less than a half-dozen forward-deployed Soviet
SSBNs. Most importantly, NATO’s conventional and nuclear forces are all mixed
together. They produce a special conventional war problem for the Soviet Union.
Conventional war can become a cloak behind which a nuclear attack against the
Soviet Union can be prepared and launched.” - 15
3. I found the second vs third-image “debate” overview at the end to be interesting.
a. I still don’t know a ton of polisci literature, so I was wondering if the more
experienced readers found the characterizations to be correct.
i. Second image: Nondemocratic leaders more likely to use nukes &
therefore enjoy more strategic benefit of having them.
1. Setting values completely aside, I could imagine there being more
dictators / oligarchs than democratic heads of state with secret
underground palace bunkers, and if it comes down to getting
assassinated for losing a war or living underground for the rest of
one’s life, then I guess living underground isn’t so bad? Though
you’d think that someone who was chosen to serve the dictator in
his bunker would be vengeful enough assassinate him there… I
digress.
ii. Third image: The consequences of war are so dire that no one would use
them out of greed; if used, it will be out of fear regardless of domestic
politics.
Notes on Middle Chapters
I. Chapter 3
a. Main idea: large scale conventional aerial warfare over Central Europe could have
damaged Warsaw Pact & Soviet air defense à create confusion for Soviet air
defense commanders à opportunity
b. Components:
i. Vulnerability of key Soviet C3I (command control, communication s and
intelligence assets) to short-warning peripheral attacks by forward-based,
nuclear armed tactical aircraft and cruise missiles.
ii. Impact of a conventional air combat in Central Europe on Soviet air
defense and early warning capabilities
1. Specific focus: NATO’s planned effort to suppress the air defenses
of the Warsaw pact