Journal of Business Ethics (2010) 95:617–640
DOI 10.1007/s10551-010-0443-z
MNCs and International Accountability
Standards Through an Institutional Lens:
Evidence of Symbolic Conformity
or Decoupling
ABSTRACT. The recent proliferation of International
Accountability Standards (IAS) has attracted significant
academic interest, but the extent of their adoption and
integration by global firms remains underinvestigated.
Capitalizing on institutional theory and the typology of
strategic responses to institutional pressures proposed by
Oliver (Acad Manage Rev 16(1):145–179, 1991), this
article uses an interpretive research methodology to
analyze a sample of MNC practitioners’ views regarding
IAS, and derive some insights in relation to expected
patterns of strategic responses to these new institutional
pressures. The article also presents relevant remarks
relating to the usefulness of institutional theory in the
context of research relating to IAS. The findings suggest
patterns of engagement combining elements of both
conformity and resistance, although the answers corre-
spond most closely to a decoupling or symbolic confor-
mity strategic response. The findings are fleshed out and
their implications delineated/assessed.
KEY WORDS: Corporate Social Responsibility, Inter-
national Accountability Standards, Multinational Corpo-
rations, Institutional Theory
Introduction
Over the past decades, Corporate Social Responsi-
bility (CSR) has acquired a new resonance in the
global economy (Jamali, 2006). Although the term
itself has not been universally embraced and con-
tinues to be considered highly contested and elusive
(Matten and Moon, 2008), the need for greater
transparency and accountability have attracted uni-
versal acclaim (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005; Carriga
and Melé, 2004; Whitehouse, 2003). The debate
concerning accountability has been primarily direc-
 Springer 2010
Dima Jamali
ted at Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in light
of their greater visibility but also reports of
their illegal practices, discriminatory behaviors, and
encroachments on human rights – particularly in the
developing world (Pearson and Seyfang, 2001;
Rohitratana, 2002; Waddock, 2008). MNCs are
indeed often accused of taking advantage of weak
laws, oppressive regimes, and lax environmental
regulations in developing countries where they set
shop, evading calls for transparency and accountability
in the pursuit of profitability and short-term gains
(Kolk et al., 1999; Shamir, 2004; Waddock, 2004b).
Although the problem of regulating MNCs’
power and free space is not new, the emergence of
International Accountability Standards (hereafter,
IAS) for CSR seems to offer new prospects and hope
for greater transparency through stimulating best
practices and convergence around universally shared
values (Williams, 2004). At a minimum, IAS are
increasingly considered as a means of generating
greater consensus on the moral purpose of business,
catalyzing an effective and constructive dialogue and
highlighting the need for change (Rasche and
Behnam, 2008; Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). Some
scholars expect (and hope) these standards to evolve
into a mandatory legal framework as the best way to
guarantee companies are accountable vis-a-vis the
least advantaged in the global economy (Williams,
2004). What is certain is that these newly evolving
standards hold considerable promise, but they have
also drawn significant criticism because they are
voluntary, and thus deserve closer scrutiny and
attention.
While there has been a proliferation of academic
writings, examining IAS from the perspective of
618 Dima Jamali
their scope, purpose, and overall utility, the practical
engagement of practitioners and MNCs with these
standards has not been systematically carried out,
despite the fact that they constitute the audience for
whom these standards are most intended. The pur-
pose of this article is to examine managerial per-
ceptions of IAS, and the practical adjustments and
strategic responses MNCs are likely to evolve in
response to these new pressures. We examine stra-
tegic responses to IAS through a theoretical
grounding in institutional theory. Institutional the-
ory not only represents one of the most robust
sociological perspectives within organizational the-
ory (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Perrow, 1979)
but has also become a popular theoretical framework
for investigating the diffusion of organizational
practices (Ang and Cummings, 1997; Delmas, 2002;
Delmas and Montiel, 2008; Scott, 2008). Early
writings in institutional theory predicted isomor-
phism and conformity to prevailing institutional
norms (Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). Recent
writings emphasize, however, that conformity may
have been exaggerated and that there are important
elements of variation in terms of degree of agency,
choice, proactiveness and self-interest in responding
to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2008).
Given their recent ascendancy and largely vol-
untary orientation, we start from the assumption that
conformity to IAS cannot be assumed and find
institutional theory in its recent iterations to be a
fruitful lens in shedding light on patterns of
engagement of MNCs with these standards. By
accounting for external institutional pressures/con-
straints and internal motives/interpretations, insti-
tutional theory can help capture the complexity of
reactions and responses to IAS. We start the next
section by providing a brief overview of IAS and
then present relevant institutional theory frame-
works and insights that were used to guide the
empirical component of the research. The findings
reflect critically on the perspectives of MNC prac-
titioners compiled through our primary research
component and interviews conducted with 18
MNC officials in Europe and Asia to assess the
engagement of MNCs with IAS and draw new
insights regarding patterns of strategic responses to
these standards. The research presented here,
therefore, makes a two-fold contribution at the
theoretical and practical levels and offers a timely
critical reflection on IAS anchored in institutional
theory.
Literature overview
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a concept
that has attracted increasing resonance in the global
economy (Jamali, 2006). Heightened interest in
CSR has stemmed from the advent of globalization
and the increasing prominence of the global cor-
poration, with escalating pressures and expectations
of social responsibility involvement for large cor-
porations (Mohan, 2006). Large corporations are
indeed increasingly considered as key allies in an
expanding CSR agenda; yet, they are also frequently
blamed for much of the social and environmental
disruption in the modern world (Hamann and Acutt,
2003). This is what Marsden (2000) calls the ‘‘cor-
porate citizenship paradox’’ in the sense that large
corporations are often demonized as the rogues of
globalization yet simultaneously idealized as the
white knights disposed to save the world (Willke and
Willke, 2008). Notwithstanding this paradox, there
is little doubt that many large corporations have
started to intensify their CSR engagement under the
pressure of changing societal expectations (Jamali,
2008).
While there is ample evidence of greater aware-
ness and engagement with CSR among MNCs,
mixed characterizations of their engagement with
IAS are widely prevalent. By way of illustration,
there are approximately 70,000 MNCs with hun-
dreds of thousands of subsidiaries, but the UN
Global Compact, by far the largest IAS and most
sweeping initiative, had only some 4200 corporate
members as of mid-2008 (Waddock, 2008). More
telling, however, is that following the enforcement
of the ‘‘Communication On Progress – COP’’
policy introduced by the UN in 2005, 1034 com-
panies have been listed as non-communicating
indicating that participants had failed to develop a
COP by the relevant deadline, and 275 have been
labeled as inactive participants, suggesting a failure to
submit a COP within 3 years of joining the Global
Compact (United Nations Global Compact, 2009).
There is thus evidence that IAS have been facing
challenges in terms of diffusion and retaining busi-
ness interest and participation.
 MNCs and International Accountability Standards Through an Institutional Lens
It is important to keep in mind in this respect that
IAS are in no way unitary or uniform in the sense that
they share similarities, however, also differing on
important dimensions. These differences stem pri-
marily from the source or authority behind the
standards, the issues they address, the targeted audi-
ence, and their primary orientation. First, some of
these standards are designed by industry associations
while others represent multi-stakeholder initiatives
involving NGOs and government/industry repre-
sentatives. Second, some standards focus primarily on
social issues, others on environmental issues, and
some attempt to address triple bottom line integra-
tion (i.e., economic, social, and environmental
dimensions). Third, some standards are industry
specific while others are applicable to a range of
industries. Finally, some standards are process ori-
ented – delineating the procedures and processes that
an organization must adopt; others are performance
oriented – focusing on specific performance areas
(e.g., human rights, labor standards, environmental
protection); others are certification oriented – pro-
viding a certification for compliance with proposed
rules and guidelines and incorporating an indepen-
dent monitoring system; or alternatively, they may be
classified as foundation standards – seeking to create
the foundation for a new orientation and introducing
best practices (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004; Rasche and
Esser, 2006). Table I highlights the main character-
istics of the nine standards that are the focus of our
analysis in relation to these important dimensions.
While there is very little information on patterns
of diffusion and/or the track record of the IAS listed
in Table I, skepticism about the Global Compact
and other IAS is widely prevalent, often translating
into a flurry of criticism, objections, and concerns.
The most common criticism is in relation to the
so-called blue washing effect, or companies
using IAS for reputational gains (Waddock, 2008;
Williams, 2004). Beyond the obvious marketing
opportunity that these standards present, various
doubts have been raised about the overall ability of
IAS to temper corporate behavior, given their vol-
untary and self-regulating nature (Doane, 2005;
Levis, 2006; Monshipouri et al., 2004; Shamir, 2004;
Waddock, 2004a), the lack of an independent
monitoring provision (Whitehouse, 2003; Williams,
2004), the selectivity of issues addressed in different
standards – such that firms can select standards that
619
put them in the most favorable light (Logsdon and
Lewellyn, 2000), and the significant cost implica-
tions (Levis, 2006; Rohitratana, 2002). In these re-
spects, skeptics are profoundly alarmed about
whether these standards represent a substantive or
solely symbolic approach (Hiscox et al., 2008), and
some see these standards as another public relations
tool to ‘‘blue wash’’ damaged reputations, without
true meaning and substance (Darnall, 2003; Rasche
and Behnam, 2008; Williams, 2004).
Perhaps of the utmost concern is the lingering
uncertainty surrounding these standards, given the
lack of precision in defining performance criteria,
coupled with the reliance on the scrutiny of social
actors and moral suasion to promote compliance
(Levis, 2006; Waddock, 2008). According to Ruggie
(2002), the Global Compact has explicitly adopted a
learning approach to inducing corporate change – as
opposed to a regulatory approach – capitalizing on
the power of dialogue, transparency, and advocacy.
Most IAS are accordingly still conceived as multi-
stakeholder voluntary learning initiatives seeking to
unearth/disseminate best practices through a ‘‘net-
work’’ mode of operation, comprising companies,
international labor, transnational NGOs, and uni-
versity-based research centers (Rasche and Behnam,
2008). Notable in this respect is the emergence of
transnational networks or discourse communities
exchanging ideas about these standards in the field,
in particular, those related to the UN complex of
organizations, but also a myriad of networks of
academics, practitioners, and think tanks (Christen-
sen and Lagreid, 2003).
The bulk of the evidence in relation to IAS,
however, has been anecdotal, without systematic
linking to specific well-grounded theoretical tradi-
tions. We believe that theory in general and insti-
tutional theory in specific can be instrumental to
derive a more informed understanding of reactions
to these standards. We turn in the next section to
examine institutional theory in relation to IAS and
derive typologies and relevant insights that are used
to guide the empirical research component.
Theoretical framework: institutional theory
Early institutional writings suggested that organizations
adhere to dominant practices in their organizational

Nine accountability standards compared (adapted from Koenig-Archibugi, 2004; Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Rasche and Esser, 2006)
International Accountability
Standards (IAS)
Global Compact (GC)
Announced in 1999 in Swit-
zerland, launched in 2000
Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI)
Established in 1997 in the US,
introduced in 2000, revised in
2002 and 2006
SA8000
Released in 1997, revised in
2001 in New York
AA1000
Released in 1999 in the UK
OECD Guidelines for MNCs
Adopted by the OECD in
1976, revised in 1979, 1982,
1984, 1991 and 2000
ILO’s Fundamental Principles
Adopted in 1998 in Switzer-
land
Equator Principles
Developed in 2003, revised
in 2006
Source/authority
UN Secretary-General
Coalition for Environmentally
Responsible Economies
(CERES), Tellus Institute,
United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP)
Social Accountability Inter-
national (SAI)
Institute of Social and Ethical
Accountability (ISEA)
Governments, national stan-
dard organizations, NGOs,
and industry
Government, employer and
worker representatives
Private sector banks, the IFC,
project sponsors, project
engineers, and NGOs
TABLE I
620
Issues/content Audience Orientation
Social and environmental Multi-industry Performance and
issues foundation standard
Social-environmental- Multi-industry Performance and
economic issues process standard
Social issues (labor practices/ Multi-industry Performance, process,
employee relations) and certification
standard
Social issues (stakeholder and Multi-industry Process and foundation
consultation) standard
Social (human rights, infor- Multi-industry Performance, process,
Dima Jamali
mation disclosure, employ- and foundation
ment, and industrial relations), standards
environmental-economic is-
sues (anti-corruption, con-
sumer protection, science and
technology, competition, and
taxation)
Social issues (right to collec- Multi-industry Performance, process,
tive bargaining, child labor, and foundation
labor standards, employment, standards
and occupation)
Social (labor and working Financial industry in Performance, process,
conditions) and environmen- 2003, Multi-industry and foundation
tal issues (pollution prevention from 2006 onwards standards
and abatement) relating to
project financing activities
 MNCs and International Accountability Standards Through an Institutional Lens 621

fields, seeking legitimacy and attaining it by conform-

Performance, process,

Performance, process,
and certification stan-
ing to prevailing institutional norms for practice
(Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). In order to survive,

and certification
organizations must accommodate relevant institutional
Orientation

expectations in their field, even though these may have

standards little to do with technical performance (Delmas, 2002;

dards
Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). The focus is generally
not on one single organization, but upon a network or
population of organizations operating in a specific field
(Hoffman, 1999). The organizational field and the
templates of organizing within it tend to become in-
fused with a taken-for-granted quality, in which actors
Multi-industry

Multi-industry

unconsciously accept the prevailing template as proper

Audience

and appropriate (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Roberts

and Greenwood, 1997).
It is precisely in this sense that institutional theory
is usually used to account for the similarity (iso-
morphism) and stability of organizational arrange-
Social issues (health and safety
Environmental issues (Envi-

ments within a given population or field of

organizations (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996;
ronmental Management

Hoffman, 1999) and ensuing patterns of conformity.

management systems)

Central to these early writings were, therefore,

Systems – EMS)

assumptions of a unitary environment, imposing

Issues/content
continued

norms, and practices on networks of organizations

TABLE I

that were obliged to conform (Scott, 2008). This is

also related to the notion of tight coupling in insti-
tutionalized organizational fields referring to the
existence of mechanisms for dissemination and the
monitoring of compliance combined with a focused
certification bodies, and spe-
International Organization

National standards bodies,

and consistent set of expectations (Greenwood and

for Standardization (ISO)

Hinings, 1996). Greenwood and Hinings (1996)

cialist consultancies
Source/authority

highlight nicely how tight coupling in institution-

alized fields alleviates resistance to change and rein-
forces pressures for conformity.
The institutional approach specifically suggests
that the diffusion of organizational practices is im-
pacted by the regulative, normative, and cognitive
aspects of the institutional environment (Delmas,
2002; Scott, 1995). Regulative aspects of institutions
often take the form of regulations and influence
Created in the US since 1970
Published in 1996, revised in
International Accountability

organizational action through coercion or threat of

legal sanctions (Hoffman, 1999). However, under
conditions of uncertainty, as is the case with IAS, the
normative and cognitive elements may become
OHSAS 18001
Standards (IAS)

more salient, and impact the diffusion of organiza-

tional practice through unconscious or unquestioned
ISO14001

adherence to rules of thumb, standard operating

procedures, and popular occupational standards
2004

which are culturally supported and assumed to

622 Dima Jamali
confer legitimacy within specific organizational
fields (Delmas, 2002; Hoffman, 1999).
Full institutionalization occurs from this perspec-
tive as the density of adoption provides ideas with
increasing legitimacy, and the ideas themselves be-
come accepted and taken for granted (Greenwood
et al., 2002). Institutionalization progresses as new
ideas are compellingly presented as more appropriate
than existing institutional norms and practices, either
by nesting new ideas within prevailing normative
prescriptions or by asserting their pragmatic legiti-
macy (Greenwood et al., 2002). Once fully institu-
tionalized, ideas become deeply ingrained, widely
diffused, and tend to survive across generations. In
the unfolding of institutionalization, firms were of-
ten assumed to be passive players (DiMaggio, 1988;
Oliver, 1991; Perrow, 1985; Scott, 1995), and the
ability of organizations to respond creatively/strate-
gically to institutional influences was undermined
(Ang and Cummings, 1997).
We have witnessed, however, a significant
departure in recent institutional writings from
previously popularized assumptions. Central in this
respect is the realization that complete and uncon-
tested institutionalization is rare, and that interests
and agency play an important role in determining
how organizations adapt to their institutional envi-
ronments (Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). Rooted in
TABLE II
Strategic responses to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991)
Strategies Tactics
Acquiesce Habit
Imitate
Comply
Compromise Balance
Pacify
Bargain
Avoid Conceal
Buffer
Escape
Defy Dismiss
Challenge
Attack
Manipulate Co-pt
Influence
Control
the recognition of the complexity and subtlety
of social systems, what emerges from these writings
is a more pragmatic process-oriented perspective,
focusing attention on organizations as symbol-
processing, sense-making, and interpretation systems
(Scott, 2008) in which interests, motivations, resource
dependencies, idiosyncratic constraints, and incentives
play a focal role (Goodrick and Salancik, 1996;
Goodstein, 1994; Scott, 2008).
A prime illustration of these recent writings is the
typology of responses to institutional processes pro-
posed by Oliver (1991). Drawing on resource
dependence and institutional arguments, her con-
tribution fleshes out with great theoretical rigor how
organizational responses may indeed vary from pas-
sive conformity to active resistance in response to
institutional pressures, capturing a full repertoire of
potential strategic responses including acquiescence,
compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation
(Table II).
While acquiescence or conformity (entailing habit,
imitation, or compliance) are the responses that have
received the lion’s share of attention from institu-
tional theorists (Scott, 2008), Table II makes clear
that other responses are also viable, including com-
promise (a variety of responses that include the bal-
ancing, placating, and negotiating of institutional
demands); avoidance, entailing concealment efforts and
Examples
Following invisible, taken-for-granted norms
Mimicking institutional models
Obeying rules and accepting norms
Balancing the expectations of multiple constituents
Placating and accommodating institutional elements
Negotiating with institutional stakeholders
Disguising nonconformity
Loosening institutional attachments
Changing goals, activities, or domains
Ignoring explicit norms and values
Contesting rules and requirements
Assaulting the sources of institutional pressure
Importing influential constituents
Shaping values and criteria
Dominating institutional constituents and processes
 MNCs and International Accountability Standards Through an Institutional Lens 623

attempts to buffer some parts of the organization from
the necessity of conformity; defiance, entailing not
only dismissing institutional pressures to conform but
also defying them in a public manner; and finally
manipulation or the purposeful and opportunistic
attempt to co-opt, influence, or control the envi-
ronment (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2008). It is also possible
and indeed helpful to conceive of these strategies as
representing different degrees of conformity or
resistance along a continuum as depicted in Figure 1.
Organizational responses to institutional pressures
may, therefore, vary from passive conformity to
active resistance, depending on the nature and
context of the pressures themselves. Oliver (1991)
outlined five Cs that help in characterizing institu-
tional contexts and conditions under which organi-
zations will embrace or resist institutionalization.
These are cause, constituents, content, control, and
context (Table III).
Starting with the first C, the Cause of institutional
pressures refers to the rationale or intended objec-
tives that underlie external pressures for conformity,
with the reasons for institutional pressures generally
falling into two categories, namely, social and eco-
nomic fitness. In other words, institutional pressures
are generally exerted to make organizations more
socially fit or to increase economic efficiency. In this
respect, acquiescence is the most probable response
to institutional pressures when an organization
anticipates that conformity will enhance social or
economic fitness. Skepticism about the strategic
utility of conformity and/or disagreement with the

Corporate Corporate
Conformity Resistance

Acquiescence Compromise Avoidance Defiance Manipulation

Habit Balance Conceal Dismiss Co-opt
Imitate Pacify Buffer Challenge Influence
Comply Bargain Escape Attack Control

Figure 1. A continuum of possible responses to institutional pressures.

TABLE III
Institutional antecedents and predicted strategic responses (adapted from Oliver, 1991)

Predictive factor Acquiesce Compromise Avoid Defy Manipulate

Cause
Legitimacy H L L L L
Efficiency H L L L L
Constituents
Multiplicity L H H H H
Dependence H H M L L
Content
Consistency H M M L L
Constraint L M H H H
Control
Coercion H M M L L
Diffusion H H M L L
Context
Uncertainty H H H L L
Inter-connectedness H H M L L

L low, M moderate, H high.

624 Dima Jamali
intentions/objectives of pressuring sources will
conversely induce more resistant strategies.
The second C, institutional Constituents, refers to
the state, professions, interest groups, and the general
public who impose a variety of laws and expectations
on organizations and this is why organizations gen-
erally tend to confront multiple conflicting pressures.
Acquiescence is likely to occur when multiplicity,
defined as the degree of multiple conflicting con-
stituent expectations exerted on an organization, is
low. However, organizational responses are also a
function of degree of dependence on these external
constituents. In this case, acquiescence is a very
plausible strategic response to institutional pressures
when organizational dependence on the source of
these pressures is high. Therefore, resistance-type
strategies become more plausible as multiplicity of
pressures increases or as dependence on sources of
institutional pressures decreases.
The third C, Content, captures dimensions of the
pressures themselves, and how they influence the
adoption of alternative strategies. Consistency implies
that organizations are more likely to acquiesce to
external pressures when these pressures are consistent
with internal goals. Organizations are also likely to
acquiesce readily to institutional pressures when the
latter do not constrain substantively organizational
decision making. Compromise, avoidance, defiance,
or manipulation are expected strategic responses
when there is moderate or limited consistency be-
tween organizational goals and institutional pressures,
and/or when conformity to institutional pressures
implies high constraints and the loss of organizational
freedom/discretion.
The fourth C, Control, describes the means by
which pressures are imposed on organizations. Two
distinct processes by which pressures are exerted
include legal coercion and voluntary diffusion.
Acquiescence is most likely when legal coercion is
high or in other words when the consequences of
non-conformity are highly punitive and strictly en-
forced. Acquiescence is also likely when institutional
norms and rules are broadly diffused and become
accepted as legitimate within an organizational field
to the extent that their social validity is largely
unquestioned. Strategic responses of the compro-
mise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation variety
are expected, on the other hand, when legal coer-
cion is low, and/or when the voluntary diffusion of
norms and practices in an organizational field is
limited.
The fifth C, Context, addresses characteristics of
the environmental context within which institu-
tional pressures are exerted. Because organizational
decision makers generally have a preference for sta-
bility and predictability, it is expected that organi-
zations may choose between different responses
including acquiescence, compromise, and avoidance
when environmental uncertainty is high. Confor-
mity can thus protect organizations from environ-
mental turbulence, while other organizations may
prefer to buffer themselves from the uncertainties of
operating in an unpredictable environment. Con-
formity is also possible when the environment is
highly interconnected, but organizations may also
respond to high interconnectedness through avoid-
ance or compromise to avoid the costs of negotiation
and coordination.
In other words, and to put it more simply and
briefly, organizational responses to institutional
pressures such as IAS will depend on why these
pressures are being exerted, who is exerting them,
what these pressures are, how or by what means they
are exerted and where they occur (Oliver, 1991).
According to Oliver (1991), the five institutional
antecedents outlined in Table III – cause, constitu-
ents, content, control, and context – correspond
respectively to these five basic questions. Along these
lines, the choice of appropriate strategic response is
determined through careful tracking of variation in
the 10 dimensions of these five categories (Oliver,
1991). A complex range of responses is, therefore,
plausible and organizational perceptions, motivations
and interpretations are key in determining peculiar
patterns of choice and adaptation.
While strategic responses to IAS have not been
empirically assessed to date, some studies have
examined industry self-regulation in specific sectors.
For example King and Lenox (2000) looked at
industry self-regulation in the chemical industry
under the Responsible Care Program, and
their findings suggest that effective industry self-
regulation is difficult to maintain without explicit
sanctions, highlighting the potential for opportun-
ism to overcome the isomorphic pressures of even
powerful self-regulatory institutions. The threat of
opportunism is equivalent in this context to what
is more commonly referred to as decoupling or
 MNCs and International Accountability Standards Through an Institutional Lens
ceremonial conformity in institutional literature,
implying that ‘‘organizations under pressure to
adopt particular structures or procedures may opt to
respond in a ceremonial manner, making changes
in their formal structures to signal conformity but
then buffering internal units, allowing them to
operate independent of these pressures’’ (Scott,
2008, p. 171). Organizations decouple formal
structure from work activity to avoid the detection
of inconsistencies and the loss of legitimacy (Ogawa
and Scribner, 2002).
The most commonly mentioned antecedents of
decoupling are uncertainty, goal ambiguity, or when
the means to a certain goal are unspecified (Chris-
tensen and Lagreid, 2003; Goodrick and Salancik,
1996; Ogawa and Scribner, 2002). Decoupling is
also salient when the knowledge base for practice is
not clear cut and practices have not evolved to the
status of social fact or when institutional values
themselves are uncertain (Goodrick and Salancik,
1996). Decoupling in other words is more likely in
loosely coupled organizational fields, characterized
by ambiguity, uncertainty, multiple conflicting
expectations, high transaction costs, limited regula-
tory commitment, and the absence of mechanisms to
monitor compliance (Goodrick and Salancik, 1996;
Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Ogawa and Scrib-
ner, 2002). Under these conditions, decoupling may
help relieve the tensions created by the external
pressure for change, while maintaining legitimacy/
enhancing flexibility, being as it were primarily
oriented towards the requirements of external eval-
uators (Davis and Marquis, 2005; Westphal and
Zajac, 2001).
We attempt to gauge strategic responses to IAS in
the empirical component of this article to derive
insights into how MNCs perceive various institu-
tional antecedents and the specific strategic responses
they are likely to enact in response to the recent
proliferation and diffusion of IAS. This is to the best
of our knowledge the first application of institutional
theory in the context of research on global
accountability standards and is likely to hopefully
allow us to derive some insights regarding likely
patterns of MNC strategic responses based on per-
ceptions of various relevant institutional antecedents.
We conclude the research with insights into the
usefulness and potential limitations of institutional
theory in the context of this topical research.
625
Research methodology
The research undertaken is interpretive in nature
(Gephart, 2004), capitalizing on in-depth interviews
with managers responsible for CSR within MNCs
to explore their interpretations in relation to IAS.
Interpretive research is qualitative seeking to unearth
collective frames of reference, or construed realities
that guide the attribution of meaning and help ac-
count for how managers create, enact or interpret
the reality they inhabit (Patton, 2002). The sampling
technique utilized was purposive sampling, based on
targeting and selecting cases that are particularly
informative, i.e., MNCs that are adhering and have
experimented with one or more of the IAS.
According to Patton (2002), qualitative inquiry
typically focuses in-depth on relatively small samples,
selected purposefully. ‘‘The logic and power of pur-
poseful sampling lie in selecting information rich
cases to study in depth; Information rich cases are
those from which one can learn a great deal about
issues of central importance to the purpose of the
inquiry’’ (Patton, 2002, p. 230). After a scrupulous
online search, a total of 40 MNCs who had men-
tioned on their website their adherence to at least
one IAS were selected and contacted by email and/
or telephone. The final working sample comprised
eighteen MNCs in Europe and Asia, operating
in various sectors including financial services,
pharmaceuticals, technology, telecommunications,
transportation, beverage and gas and oil utilities
(Table IV).
The research made use of semi-structured inter-
views whereby an interview guide comprising six
sections was developed, based on the literature
review presented in the previous sections, addressing
perceptions in relation to important institutional
antecedents of IAS derived from Oliver’s (1991)
typology including (1) Causes (2) Constituents (3)
Content (4) Control and (5) Context (Table V). We
also included two open ended questions, addressing
changes in internal and external practices following
adoption of these standards. This was deemed
important to supplement managerial perceptions
with concrete examples of changes in actual practice
following adoption of IAS, thus facilitating the
tracking of potential ceremonial adoption. While
some of the questions yielded factual information
(e.g., adherence to specific standards; changes in
626 Dima Jamali

TABLE IV
Sample profile

ID No. of employees Industry Location Interviewee position

1 22,215 Financial Services Sweden CSR Coordinator

2 48,000 Industrial Transportation U.K. Director Sustainability
3 197,718 Technology Hardware and Japan Chief Specialist in CSR Imple-
Equipment mentation Office
4 60,110 Pharmaceutical and Biotech- Netherlands Corporate Sustainability Manager
nology
5 100,000 General Industrials U.K. International Social and Commu-
nity Development Manager
6 60,000 Chemicals U.S.A. Director Sustainability Develop-
ment
7 48,500 Financial Services U.K. Sustainability Officer
8 56,715 Financial Services Germany CSR Communication Officer
9 37,665 Oil and Gas Producers Spain Corporate Responsibility Manager
10 111,858 Fixed Line Telecommuni- U.K. Corporate Responsibility Perfor-
cations mance and Reporting Manager
11 13,700 Financial Services Greece Business Manager
12 35,202 Financial Services Belgium Project Officer within Sustainable
Development Direction
13 22,124 Beverages U.K. Senior CSR Manager
14 148,000 Beverages U.K. Corporate Responsibility Manager
15 90,000 Construction and Materials France Sustainability Development and
Public Affairs Manager
16 81,524 Financial Services Switzerland Corporate Responsibility Manager
17 65,741 Technology Hardware/ Sweden CSR Director
Equipment
18 78,712 Gas, Water and Multi- Italy Head of CSR
Utilities

practices), others allowed significant room for
interpretation (e.g., perceptions of cause, constitu-
ents, content, control and context). Appendix A
highlights the questions that were used to evaluate
managerial perceptions in relation to these five
institutional antecedents.
Six face-to-face interviews with MNCs located in
London were conducted and the remaining inter-
views comprised three telephone interviews and
nine electronic interviews (in this case the semi-
structured interview guide was converted into a
structured questionnaire). E-mail interviewing has
not received systematic attention in the qualitative
research literature, although it has become according
to Meho (2006) a viable tool for qualitative research
that presents distinct advantages in terms of accessing
geographically dispersed samples, increasing disclo-
sure and alleviating interviewer-interviewee effects.
Denscombe (2003) confirms that the quality of
responses gained through online research is much
the same as responses produced by more traditional
methods. According to Meho (2006, p. 1293), a
mixed mode of interviewing strategy should always
be considered but semi-structured e-mail interviews
can be a viable alternative to face-to-face and tele-
phone interviews, particularly when time, financial
constraints, or geographical boundaries are barriers
to an investigation.
Following the transcription of the interviews and
the codification of the data with regard to the basic
dimensions outlined in Table V, the analysis focused
on detecting commonalities or patterns of agree-
ment/convergence in the statements provided,
but areas of divergence were equally noted and
 MNCs and International Accountability Standards Through an Institutional Lens
TABLE V
Dimensions of research
Perceptions of cause Legitimacy and efficiency
Perceptions of Multiplicity and dependence
constituents
Perceptions of content Consistency and constraints
Perceptions of control Coercion and diffusion
Perceptions of context Uncertainty and
interconnectedness
Changes in practices Internal and external
highlighted. Content analysis allowed the detection
of a general level of conformity/consistency in the
answers provided by MNC officials despite industrial
and geographic disparities. The following sections
are, therefore, not intended to provide an exhaustive
overview of companies’ CSR practices, but rather to
reflect critically on the interviews conducted in
relation to the basic dimensions outlined in Table V.
Aggregate findings for the entire sample are thus
presented in a systematic manner in the next section
pertaining to the dimensions outlined in Table V.
In essence, the research is exploratory in nature,
capitalizing on semi-structured interviews to gauge
managerial perceptions in relation to IAS, and the
possible patterns of strategic responses that can be
inferred. Considering both the complexity of the
topic and the limited number of companies inter-
viewed, the findings presented below are not
intended to draw firm conclusions that can be
generalized to the entire population of MNCs
engaged with IAS. Nor are the findings intended to
assess companies’ successes and failures in this
domain. Rather the purpose is to generate pre-
liminary empirical insights in relation to IAS in the
context of institutional theory specifically and gain a
better understanding of potential strategic responses
to these pressures which can be used to guide further
research on the topic.
Research findings
Prevalence and adoption of standards
The participants of this research all adhered to a
combination of international standards rather than a
single standard in pursuit of their corporate respon-
627
sibility activities (Table VI). The most popular
standards across companies in the sample are the UN
Global Compact (GC) and the Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI), each having 12 (out of 18) orga-
nizations ascribed to them. Furthermore, 11 of 12
MNCs that adhere to the GC have also adopted the
GRI guidelines, which indicates that the agreement
between the GC and the GRI – according to which
the GC will encourage its members to make use of
the GRI guidelines – was voluntarily respected by
most organizations, despite the absence of any actual
explicitly stated obligation to that effect. The second
most frequently used standard which was mentioned
by five MNCs was the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, followed by Account-
ability 1000, ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, Equator Principles,
and ISO1400, each adopted by four MNCs respec-
tively. The least mentioned and popular standards
among companies in the sample were Social
Accountability 8000 and OHSAS 18001.
Perceptions of cause: legitimacy and efficiency
The participation of companies in IAS seems mostly
driven by salient legitimacy, reputation and risk
management concerns. Reputation management
was the most important incentive reiterated by 15 of
participating MNC managers. As expressed by one
of the interviewees ‘‘we are an international com-
pany, with operations around the world. Hence, the
endorsement of international CSR guidelines is one
way to boost our image.’’ Another manager char-
acterized it as an ‘‘approach to managing CSR risk.’’
TABLE VI
Prevalence of international standards in our sample
GC 12
GRI 12
OECD Guidelines for MNC’s 5
ILO’s Fundamental Principles 4
Equator Principles 4
AA1000 4
ISO14001 4
SA8000 3
OHSAS 18001 2
628
A few of the managers in the sample presented
however a broader view in the sense that conformity
to standards is perceived to promote legitimacy and
credibility in a shared global environment, and helps
build reputational capital. In the words of one of the
managers interviewed, ‘‘alignment with these stan-
dards helps us maintain a license to operate, build ties
with stakeholders and communities, and nurture
better quality environments for our operations
around the world.’’
The majority of the managers interviewed ques-
tioned on the other hand the viability of any notion
of economic gains or economic rationalizations
associated with the adoption of standards. If anything
they were perceived as imposing ‘‘serious adjustment
costs’’ according to one of the interviewees or as put
by another manager as ‘‘having serious cost impli-
cations.’’ Some managers had a long-term, more
enlightened perspective, admitting that while direct
correlations between standards and economic gains
are difficult to establish, the accumulated goodwill
and greater confidence are likely to pay off in the
long-term. As put by one of the managers, ‘‘we feel
compelled to adopt these standards as part of our
overall CSR orientation, and consider them as
investments rather than expenses which are likely to
translate into a reservoir of goodwill and confidence
and foster long-term opportunities and economic
gains.’’
Perceptions of constituents: multiplicity and dependence
Various participants dwelled on the multiplicity of
actors currently involved in the global accountability
standards hype; some of the actors listed include
national and international NGOs, labor unions,
human rights activists, investors, and governmental
organizations. The multiplicity of actors was per-
ceived as ‘‘overwhelming and stressful’’ in the words
of some managers, yet also useful for learning and
sharing best practices as pointed by others. In the
words of one manager, ‘‘this is a very dynamic field
and the multiplicity of salient stakeholders is some-
times overwhelming.’’ The consequence of this
multiplicity of constituents is often complex, frag-
mented and even conflicting requirements/
expectations as aptly noted by some participants.
The majority of the participants (14 out of 18) in-
Dima Jamali
deed commented on the multiplicity of standards
themselves, creating a patchwork of metrics and
criteria and fostering a sense of unease and confusion
among managers. The standards are thus not seen as
exerting uniform pressure and one of the managers
perceived them as imposing ‘‘competing demands
and conflicting expectations.’’
Moreover, the degree of dependence on pres-
suring organizations (in this case national and
international NGOs) was generally characterized as
moderate and linked organically in this respect to
notions of legitimacy and isomorphic adaptation.
Several managers suggested that they comply with
these standards in light of the credibility they confer
on the organization as outlined above. As high-
lighted by one of the managers, ‘‘our survival and
global competitiveness are dependent at least in part
on positive public opinion and support.’’ Several of
the managers admitted conforming to these prolif-
erating standards because they are externally vali-
dated and increasingly considered as best practices in
this field. According to one of the managers ‘‘these
standards seem to increasingly embody what is
considered as institutional best practices in the field
of CSR and hence the extent that you can define it
as dependence is related to the extent to which an
organization feels strongly about being part of this
elite circle or group.’’
Perceptions of content: consistency and constraints
Interestingly, the vast majority of managers (15 out
of 18) interviewed considered the standards to be
very much consistent with internal orientations and
a nice supplement to their on-going CSR drive.
Consistency with internal values of the organization
seems an important consideration and likely to
impact on the choice to ascribe to specific standards.
As suggested by one of the interviewees, ‘‘as a global
organization placing CSR at the heart of manage-
ment, we have adopted international accountability
standards for CSR…sustainable development is part
of our core vision and values. These various com-
mitments are merely a reflection of the group’s
strategy. They allow us to structure our approach
around Sustainable Development.’’ Another man-
ager characterized it in these terms ‘‘we perceived
the Global Compact to be compatible with our
 MNCs and International Accountability Standards Through an Institutional Lens
internal goals and to allow us to further extend our
internal CSR vision and aspirations.’’ However,
perceptions of consistency can not be easily disen-
tangled from social desirability response bias and,
therefore, have to be treated with care.
In terms of constraints, while the majority of the
interviewees concurred on the need for strength-
ening independent monitoring and verification, they
all also commended the voluntary or self-regulatory
nature of these standards. According to one of the
interviewees, ‘‘while we need de facto monitoring
and enforcement systems to ensure that companies
live up to their commitments, the choice to take part
in these standards in the first place should still rest
however voluntarily with the organization.’’ For
some managers, external verification and certifica-
tion was conceived as desirable but the majority of
the participants (14 out of 18) also insisted on
maintaining the flexible and consensual nature of
these schemes, allowing for experimentation and
creativity in defining best practice. Discretionary
space was thus appreciated in the context of IAS
with general inclinations towards resisting their
legalization.
Perceptions of control: coercion and diffusion
The majority of the participants concurred on the
limited coercive effects associated with these stan-
dards in the absence of effective monitoring and
enforcement provisions. There was indeed a good
level of consensus among the majority of the inter-
viewees (16 out of 18) on the need to strengthen the
practical content of these standards and to provide
concrete guidance to facilitate adoption and imple-
mentation. Several interviewees (14 out of 18) also
emphasized the need for verification systems to be
put in place, to ensure monitoring and comparabil-
ity. Those adhering to certification standards (e.g.,
ISO14001 and SA800) in turn justified the superi-
ority of their choice of standards in relation to the
external independent auditing involved. Neverthe-
less, the standards were perceived overall more as
normative guidelines than coercive stipulations. In
the words of one of the managers, ‘‘global
accountability standards offer general guidelines and
a useful roadmap to impel companies to think
through the impacts and implications of their actions
629
and operations.’’ As admitted by several of the
managers interviewed, the lack of punitive action or
enforcement is likely to imply ample opportunities
for evasion of compliance.
Conversely, a good number of the interviewees
were generally impressed with the proliferation of
these standards and their rate of voluntary diffusion.
As expressed by one of the managers, ‘‘in the
absence of legal mechanisms for enforcement,
the basic leverage point that seems to be working is
the voluntary global diffusion of these standards.’’
Another manager put it in these words, ‘‘at the rate
of their current diffusion, these standards are likely to
gradually evolve into taken for granted norms in the
field of CSR.’’ However, some of the managers also
admitted that to date IAS are embraced by a small
elite circle of global companies and still have a long
way to go before they become the natural way to
conduct business around the world. According to
one manager, ‘‘the limited diffusion can be ex-
plained in the sense that these IAS have not evolved
as natural and appropriate arrangements for the bulk
of MNCs.’’
Perceptions of context: uncertainty and interconnectedness
The majority of the managers attested to the
uncertainty of the current business environment, in
terms of rapid change and rapid proliferation of best
practices and new norms. In the context of this
discussion, a number of managers also attested to the
uncertainty of the notion of CSR itself, which is still
ambiguous and ill-defined. The participants ex-
pressed in this respect that IAS offer a framework for
CSR, provide guidelines and act as a roadmap, thus
promoting a minimum level of consistency in CSR
practice. As put by one of the interviewees, ‘‘I be-
lieve that these international standards start to pro-
vide a baseline of performance that companies can
use to determine what actions they need to take to
be viewed as a responsible company.’’ However,
none of the participants mentioned that these stan-
dards offer an explicit definition of CSR, suggesting
that companies are still struggling in tailoring their
own approach to CSR guided by these standards.
Still these standards were perceived as suggested by
one of the interviewees to provide ‘‘anchors that are
likely to foster consensus on expectations and best
630
practice and promote a sense of direction in a highly
uncertain environment.’’
Hence the standards were generally perceived to
fill a gap and provide some roadmap in a very
uncertain and rapidly changing environment.
Uncertainty was also posited to be exacerbated by
the multiplicity of actors, metrics and criteria, and
the interconnectedness of both actors and issues in a
global world. As put by one of the interviewees,
‘‘the multi-stakeholder character of these standards
and the involvement of various actors certainly adds
complexity to uncertainty but also allows for greater
consensus on diffused norms and the sharing of best
practices across institutional environments.’’ Thus
there was certainly a sense among the majority of the
interviewees that the high degree of inter-connect-
edness while overwhelming at times also promotes
institutional isomorphism and provides an impetus
for greater conformity. Inter-connectedness was thus
considered salient for MNCs operating across com-
plex global networks.
Perceptions of changing practices: internal and external
Two distinct sets of changes in practices were probed
in the open ended questions: internal and external.
The majority of the participants (17 out of 18)
strongly conveyed an improvement in their practices
following the adoption of IAS. More specifically, in
organizational terms, several advantages have been
highlighted. The most frequently expressed benefit
(on which 12 respondents concurred) was that the
standards enabled companies to be more transparent,
thus, offering credibility and legitimacy to their
actions. ‘‘We now have a transparent company.
Everyone knows exactly what is expected from him
or her and knows that there is zero tolerance
regarding business integrity issues.’’ Furthermore,
the ability of these standards to provide a framework
for debate around consistent CSR activities and to
act as an important and credible communication tool
has respectively been emphasized by four infor-
mants.
Various participants also shared the view that
these standards are likely to have a positive spillover
or domino effect in developing countries. According
to various managerial accounts, companies in
developing countries are now pressured to meet
Dima Jamali
such standards and, furthermore, there is a growing
interest in their content and meaning. Additionally,
through these standards the business world is more
aware of CSR issues, which implies that sensitive
issues have been raised and companies are better
informed. Additionally, three managers expressed
the view that their decision to adhere to IAS has
attracted governmental and supplier attention in
developing countries. Some respondents believe,
however, that the onus of responsibility lies with
firms to commit to make a true difference in the
developing world, irrespective of these standards.
‘‘To a level they do (make a difference) but it is not
down to the standards; it is your business principles
that are the main driving force and your leadership
orientation which is the most critical.’’
Discussion of findings
The empirical component of this article has at-
tempted to gauge managerial perceptions of IAS.
Several interesting findings have been derived,
although they need further analysis and reflection.
The first important finding is that MNCs in the
sample seem to be simultaneously adhering to mul-
tiple standards, suggesting the lack of a holistic
standard that addresses satisfactorily and compre-
hensively important issue areas from a managerial
perspective. This finding is possibly related to the
observation which has been aptly noted in the lit-
erature that MNCs selectively choose those stan-
dards that put them in the most positive light
(Logsdon and Lewellyn, 2000). Adherence to
multiple standards also raises from the outset ques-
tions about patterns of commitments, given that it is
more realistic to expect firms to commit to one
standard and make the necessary adjustments than to
simultaneously commit to multiple standards given
both cost and practical implications.
In terms of perceptions of Cause, our findings
confirm what has been reported in the literature
regarding the primary salience of legitimacy con-
cerns and a predominant preoccupation with repu-
tation management. In way of illustration, adoption
of IAS was characterized by one manager as essential
for ‘‘improving reputation and alleviating risk and
vulnerabilities.’’ Our findings conversely suggest that
perceptions of efficiency or economic gains were
 MNCs and International Accountability Standards Through an Institutional Lens 631

generally low, except amongst a few managers who
expressed an enlightened self-interest view allowing
for potential positive correlations between goodwill
and long term opportunities and economic gain. As
put by one manager ‘‘this is a costly commitment,
particularly in the short term.’’ It is thus fair to
characterize based on patterns of responses obtained
the respective perceptions of these institutional
antecedents as high in relation to legitimacy and low
in relation to efficiency as depicted in italics in
Table VII.
In relation to perceptions of Constituents, the
interviewees highlighted the multiplicity of actors
involved in this field (e.g., national and international
NGOs, labor unions, human rights activists, inves-
tors, and governmental organizations) as well as the
multiplicity of standards, metrics, criteria and
expectations. As expressed by one manager ‘‘the
proliferation of actors and standards focusing on
different dimensions of accountability has been
overwhelming.’’ The degree of dependence on
pressuring organizations was generally characterized
as moderate, linked to notions of legitimacy, repu-
tational gains and mimetic isomorphism. This is
nicely illustrated in the following quote, ‘‘we are
dependent in the sense that we care about our rep-
utation and the opinions of our stakeholders.’’ Based
on patterns of responses obtained, it is thus possible
TABLE VII
Managerial perceptions (in italics) of institutional antecedents of IAS
to characterize the respective perceptions of these
institutional antecedents as high in relation to mul-
tiplicity and moderate in relation to dependence as
illustrated in italics in Table VII.
Moving onto perceptions of Content, the
majority of the managers indicated a high level of
consistency between institutional pressures relating
to IAS and internal values, often positing conformity
to these standards as a natural extension or evolution
given their internal CSR visions and aspirations. As
characterized by one manager, ‘‘the expectations of
the global compact are compatible with our own
internal goals.’’ The findings conversely suggest that
the standards were perceived to impose constraints
on choices and actions, and that managers generally
appreciate the value of maintaining discretion and
the flexibility of tailoring their own responses. As
suggested by one manager, ‘‘compliance certainly
entails adjustments although we would like to retain
a minimum degree of autonomy in tailoring our
own response.’’ Accordingly, the respective per-
ceptions of these institutional antecedents are char-
acterized as high in relation to consistency and high
in relation to constraints as illustrated in italics in
Table VII.
In terms of perceptions of Control, the majority
of the participants concurred on the limited coercive
effects of these standards, particularly in the absence

Predictive factor Acquiesce Compromise Avoid Defy Manipulate

Cause
Legitimacy H L L L L
Efficiency H L L L L
Constituents
Multiplicity L H H H H
Dependence H H M L L
Content
Consistency H M M L L
Constraint L M H H H
Control
Coercion H M M L L
Diffusion H H M L L
Context
Uncertainty H H H L L
Inter-connectedness H H M L L

L low, M moderate, H high.

632 Dima Jamali
of effective monitoring and enforcement provisions.
The standards were generally perceived as normative
guidelines rather than coercive stipulations. As ex-
pressed by one manager, ‘‘this is a relatively nascent
field and the challenge is to improve scrutiny, vigi-
lance and enforcement.’’ While noting the rapid rate
of their voluntary diffusion, several managers also
aptly pointed out that adherence to standards is still
the purview of a small circle of global companies and
that it will take some time before they evolve into
the natural way of doing business around the world.
One manager noted that ‘‘adoption of an IAS is
purely voluntary and is still the purview of a pro-
active and progressive circle of firms.’’ Based on
patterns of responses obtained, it is thus possible to
characterize the respective perceptions of these
institutional antecedents as low in relation to coer-
cion and moderate at best in relation to diffusion as
illustrated in italics in Table VII.
Pertaining to Context, the majority of the managers
in the sample shared their perceptions of high envi-
ronmental uncertainty, in the sense that change in the
field of CSR is both dynamic and complex. This was
linked in turn to the ambiguity of the notion of CSR
itself, which managers perceived as a moving target. As
expressed by one manager ‘‘the field of sustainability is
very dynamic and has been evolving exponentially
which is really alarming but also fascinating.’’ Uncer-
tainty and interconnectedness were also perceived as
intertwined, in the sense that uncertainty in this field is
exacerbated by the multiplicity of actors, metrics and
criteria and the inter-connectedness of both actors and
issues in a global world. One manager noted that ‘‘our
sustainability actions are in the public eye particularly
given the interconnected nature of the global landscape
in which we operate.’’ Based on responses obtained, it
is possible to characterize the perceptions of these
institutional antecedents as high in relation to uncer-
tainty and interconnectedness as illustrated in italics in
Table VII.
The qualitative assessment of the five institutional
antecedents and their ten dimensions are thus
aggregated and presented in Table VII, based on the
characterizations of the majority of the sample in
relation to each dimension respectively. Admitting
that it is difficult to assign accurate values given the
qualitative (and subjective) answers derived, it was
nevertheless possible to detect ranges (e.g., rather
low or high) based on the patterns and direction of
answers obtained and the precise assessment pro-
vided for each dimension (e.g., Low, Moderate,
High; see Appendix A).
The managerial perceptions reported here are in
turn consistent with what is reported in available
literature, with legitimacy resulting from the adop-
tion of IAS generally characterized as high (Fomb-
run, 2005), and efficiency low, stemming from
serious cost implications (Levis, 2006; Rohitratana,
2002); multiplicity is consistently reported in the
literature on IAS to be high given the large number
of actors and conflicting expectations involved in
these multi-stakeholder learning networks (Rasche
and Behnam, 2008) while dependence and coercion
are generally characterized as low considering the
voluntary self-regulating character of these initiatives
(Doane, 2005; Levis, 2006; Monshipouri et al.,
2004; Shamir, 2004; Waddock, 2004a) and the
reliance on moral suasion to promote compliance
(Levis, 2006; Waddock, 2008).
In this respect, Table VII supports existing liter-
ature but also adds to it by making it clear that the
answers provided by managers lend to predictions of
strategic responses combining elements of both
conformity and resistance. Conformity can be ex-
pected particularly in light of perceptions of high
legitimacy, high consistency, and high intercon-
nectedness. As expressed by one of the managers,
‘‘we are truly concerned about IAS, because they are
congruent with our values, and general expectations
of social legitimacy in a globalized world.’’ Resis-
tance can be anticipated on the other hand in light of
perceptions of low efficiency, high multiplicity,
moderate dependence, high constraint, low coer-
cion, moderate diffusion and possibly high uncer-
tainty. These elements in combination can help
account for the salience of elements of resistance as
detected discretely in managerial accounts. As put by
one of the managers ‘‘although we believe in the
value added of IAS, they remain unevenly adopted,
have high cost implications, and their future pros-
pects are uncertain at best.’’ Conversely, the answers
correspond most closely to an avoidance (or
decoupling) strategic response, as reflected in the
density of italicized letters in the avoidance column
in the middle of Table VII.
Perhaps the greatest evidence of decoupling stems
from the answers provided to the open ended
questions in relation to changes in practices (both
 MNCs and International Accountability Standards Through an Institutional Lens
internal and external). The only meaningful changes
in practice internally related to increased transpar-
ency and the steering of dialogue around effective
CSR practices. None of the managers made refer-
ence to the recent integration of new structures and
policies that affect everyday decisions and actions.
Externally, respondents mentioned a positive spill-
over effect on developing countries and increased
governmental and supplier attention to issues
addressed in these standards. None of the accounts
provide evidence of substantive or concrete changes
in practices, and changes in internal practices spe-
cifically seem modest at best suggesting that the
MNCs in the sample are complying in a ceremonial
manner, but also buffering their internal practices,
allowing them to operate independent of these
pressures. This decoupling alleviates the detection of
inconsistencies and the loss of legitimacy as suggested
in the literature.
These findings are very useful in turn in revisiting
the main tenets of institutional theory. The central
assumption of institutional theory is that institutional
environments tend to exert a potent conforming
influence on organizations, but as suggested by Oliver
(1991) there is need for more research that helps in
identifying empirically conditions under which
institutional pressures fail in their predicted effects.
The findings indeed suggest that MNCs generally
recognize the survival value of legitimacy and hence
conformity with IAS. Yet the findings also suggest that
symbolic conformity can blend in practice with latent
facets of resistance (avoidance, defiance, manipula-
tion) under institutional conditions of low efficiency
and coercion, moderate dependence and diffusion,
and high multiplicity and constraint. These findings
are useful given limited empirical investigations of
organizational resistance in semi-institutionalized
environments, revealing that organizations are aware
of their latitude for maneuver within this voluntary
space, and are engaged in calculative responses
reflecting both choice and self-interest.
The salience of active agency under conditions of
contested or incomplete institutionalization has been
alluded to in previous literature (e.g., Goodrick and
Salancik, 1996). In this respect, the managers in the
sample have tended to characterize IAS to be in the
semi-institutionalization stage – as opposed to pre-
institutionalization and full institutionalization (see
Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). The discretion afforded
633
by incomplete institutionalization seems to create
some flexibility in responding to institutional pres-
sures without sanctioning and organizations indeed
may use this opportunity to pursue their own
interests while buffering themselves through cere-
monial adoption (Goodrick and Salancik, 1996;
Oliver, 1991). Avoidance strategies are also com-
monly encountered under conditions of institutional
uncertainty (e.g., Davis and Marquis, 2005; Good-
rick and Salancik, 1996; Ogawa and Scribner, 2002).
While Oliver’s (1991) model posits high uncertainty
as an institutional antecedent for acquiescence or
avoidance, our findings suggest that institutional
uncertainty may lead to symbolic conformity at best,
with firms seeking to restore the illusion of stability
through ceremonial acquiescence while attempting
to buffer themselves from the vulnerabilities of
operating in an unpredictable environment.
Given current institutional conditions of semi-
diffusion and contested institutionalization, IAS may,
therefore, provide perfect opportunities for easily
decoupled practices. On one hand, they can cer-
tainly help generate legitimacy-enhancing organiza-
tional outcomes by signaling that the firm conforms
to societal expectations (Goodrick and Salancik,
1996). MNCs also want to look up to date in
relation to currently fashionable organizational
practices (Weaver et al., 1999). On the other hand,
the current institutional conditions of the IAS
organizational field as reflected in managerial char-
acterizations (i.e., low efficiency and coercion,
moderate dependence and diffusion, and high mul-
tiplicity and constraint) may provide ample oppor-
tunities for avoidance or symbolic conformity, with
previous literature suggesting that decoupling can
easily become a generalized decision-making routine
that is applied to a variety of different policies over
time (Westphal and Zajac, 2001). While easily
decoupled practices may signal a concern for IAS,
managerial discretion and autonomy are maximized
through decoupling, and firms can reap the benefits
of adoption without curtailing their latitude of ac-
tion in pursuit of other strategic goals.
A related interesting finding is that when institu-
tional practices are still contested, they provide
opportunities for debating their relative merits and
also possibly opportunities for evolving a more stable
hierarchy of institutions (e.g., Goodrick and Salancik,
1996). The managers in our sample recognized that
634 Dima Jamali
adherence to IAS conferred on their firms an elite or
stewardship status by default. However, most of the
managers also recognized that membership in this
organizational field stimulated common channels of
dialogue and discussion and enticed more systematic
reflection and action. Hence, the ceremonial adoption
of standards was nevertheless conceived as an oppor-
tunity for internal and external debate, introspection,
discussions, and negotiations between organizational
actors around evolving normative prescriptions and
their implications. These debates can certainly be
useful in devising more concrete and substantive
action, evolving shared systems of meanings and
stronger norms of propriety, and for infecting other
organizations in the future through imitation and a
contagion of legitimacy (Zucker, 1987).
It is finally worth noting in closing that organi-
zational fields should be seen as evolving rather than
static, with the possibility of gradual maturity and
specification of institutional norms, roles, behaviors,
and interactions and, therefore, greater diffusion and
institutionalization (Greenwood et al., 2002). There
is certainly hope and concerted efforts by various
actors to make the IAS organizational field more
tightly coupled, through a more consistent set of
expectations as well as stronger mechanisms for
dissemination and the monitoring of compliance.
However, the institutionalization process is invari-
ably long term and protracted, and conformity
cannot be expected in the absence of a stronger
density of adoption and greater clarity regarding
institutional norms to the degree that they evolve
into the natural, legitimate, and taken-for-granted
organizational arrangements. In relation to IAS, this
remains a rather distant aspiration.
Concluding remarks
This research has attempted to supplement existing
knowledge of IAS by examining managerial per-
ceptions, practical adjustments, and strategic
responses to these new pressures. We examine stra-
tegic responses to IAS through primary interviews
with MNC managers and a theoretical grounding in
institutional theory. Institutional theory has been
successfully leveraged in accounting for isomorphism
and institutionalization, although it has recently been
criticized by Oliver (1991, p. 141) ‘‘for focusing on
conformity rather than resistance, passivity rather
than activeness, and preconscious acceptance rather
than political manipulation in response to external
pressures and expectations.’’ The findings fleshed
out in this article help to validate empirically con-
ditions under which institutional pressures may fail
in their predicted isomorphic effects, suggesting that
organizations do not blindly conform to the expec-
tations of their institutional environments and are
engaged in complex and calculative responses
involving active agency and self-interest.
The findings derived from interviews with man-
agers of a sample of MNCs in Asia and Europe who
have been experimenting with IAS in recent years
indeed suggest that based on assessment of institu-
tional antecedents relating to cause, constituents,
content, control, and context, MNCs are likely to
exhibit strategic responses that blend elements of
conformity and resistance. Conformity can be
expected in light of perceptions of high legitimacy,
consistency, and interconnectedness, while resistance
can be anticipated in light of perceptions of low
efficiency, high multiplicity, moderate dependence,
high constraints, low coercion, and moderate diffu-
sion. The findings correspond most closely to a
decoupled or avoidance strategic response or what is
commonly referred to as symbolic conformity. In
other words, the majority of organizations are
choosing to respond in a ceremonial manner, mak-
ing changes in their formal structures to signal
conformity but then buffering internal units and
operations from the necessity of conformity. Cere-
monial conformity allows organizations to reap the
social benefits of adoption without compromising
managerial freedom, autonomy, or entailing serious
or substantive adjustments.
Our findings also suggest that avoidance/symbolic
conformity can best be explained through a sys-
tematic examination of the institutional conditions
surrounding IAS. To begin with, IAS are in the
semi-institutionalization stage in the sense that they
have a relatively short history and are not broadly
diffused and stable. Their full institutionalization is
still contested because their future prospects are
considered uncertain at best. Managers perceived
institutional pressures in this field as fragmented and
imposing competing and conflicting expectations.
They were also fully cognizant of the limited dif-
fusion of these pressures, their limited dependence
 MNCs and International Accountability Standards Through an Institutional Lens
on the sources of these pressures, not to mention the
conspicuous absence of legal coercion. They were
thus keen to retain their autonomy to maneuver in
this voluntary space while reaping the benefits of
early adoption. Ceremonial conformity allowed
them to retain latitude of action while also buffering
their firms from the vulnerabilities of operating in a
very uncertain environment.
From a managerial perspective, the implementa-
tion of IAS thus clearly reflects strategic tensions and
trade-offs between legitimacy and efficiency, be-
tween dependence and independence, between
discretion and constraint. The findings allow us to
draw a picture of IAS as strategic bargaining instru-
ments that are used by organizations to promote
control and risk reduction. These findings lend
support in turn to recent institutional depictions of
organizations as symbol-processing, sense-making
and interpretation systems, in which interests,
motivations, and incentives play a focal role
(Goodrick and Salancik, 1996; Scott, 2008). Our
findings, moreover, suggest that ceremonial adop-
tion of IAS is often also an opportunity for firms
populating a specific organizational field to engage in
introspection and negotiations around evolving
normative prescriptions, thus opening up possibili-
ties for changing fieldwide practices as actors struggle
to gain status while seeking to construct a new stable
set of rules (Lounsbury, 2001).
Institutional theory, therefore, provides a potent
theoretical framework to analyze evolving processes
of institutionalization and the diffusion of institutional
practices. The recent iterations of institutional theory
specifically permit a thorough analysis of the interac-
tions of organizational actors with their contexts.
According to Greenwood and Hinings (1996,
p. 1048), ‘‘it is in the intersection of those two forces
that explanations of change and stability can be
found.’’ On the one hand, institutions are shapers of
organizational arrangements, but key actors in orga-
nizations have agency, interests, capacity, and moti-
vations that also mold their strategies and choices
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). In general, there is a
definite need for more research connecting institu-
tional pressures and variations in strategic responses as
well as empirical investigations of cases of organiza-
tional resistance and their institutional antecedents.
The research presented here also validates the use-
fulness of Oliver’s (1991) typology of strategic
635
responses to institutional pressures and constitutes an
initial attempt to examine empirically the salience of the
10 institutional dimensions of her typology in pre-
dicting organizational responses and the likelihood of
conformity or resistance to institutionalization. More
research along these lines is needed to investigate the
choice process between conformity and resistance in
the context of specific institutional constellations. For
example, Oliver’s (1991) model posits high uncertainty
as an institutional antecedent for acquiescence, com-
promise, or avoidance, but our findings suggest that the
institutional uncertainty surrounding IAS has been
mostly associated with avoidance or ceremonial
acquiescence, particularly given the prevalent condi-
tions of contested institutionalization. More research is
needed including qualitative and quantitative percep-
tual measures of the 10 proposed institutional ante-
cedents to assess their predictive validity and allow
refinement of Oliver’s (1991) typology in light of
compiled empirical evidence.
There is also the need for more research to
understand the nature of decoupled practices and
their concrete manifestations. Information asymme-
tries make it very difficult to gauge the internal
practices of an organization implying that broad and
signaling patterns are detected which need to be
supplemented with concrete details. There is also the
need for more research into the nature of the IAS
organizational field, and how these evolving
expectations and socially constructed practices can
become more widely disseminated and reproduced.
While these shared systems of meaning have gained
normative acceptance, they need to be reinforced by
regulatory processes involving state agencies and
professional bodies which can press conformity more
coercively, through better dissemination and the
monitoring of compliance, along with a focused and
consistent set of expectations. Changes in institu-
tional conditions and institutional antecedents along
these lines are, therefore, essential to make (sub-
stantive) conformity more plausible.
Appendix A
See Table VIII.
 TABLE VIII
Research roadmap 636

Institutional antecedent Dimension Please dwell on the following Please characterize this
dimension as

Cause Legitimacy Implications of adherence to IAS for your organization’s High; moderate; low
legitimacy, status, or image and prestige
Implications of adherence to IAS for reputation and risk
management in the short and longer-term
Efficiency Implications of adherence to IAS for the bottom line in the High; moderate; low
short term and long term
Implications of adherence to IAS for economic gains, eco-
nomic rationalizations, technical goals/standards, and/or
efficiency in the broadest sense
Constituents Multiplicity Implications of adherence to IAS for patterns of interactions High; moderate; low
with different national and international actors
(please provide example)
Implications of adherence to IAS in terms of patterns of
demands or expectations vis a vis your firm (i.e., clear
expectations/prescriptions, coherent norms, compatible
demands)
Dima Jamali

Dependence Implications of adherence to IAS for your dependence on High; moderate; low
various external actors/organizations (e.g., certifying bodies,
regulatory agencies, multilateral organizations)
The discretion or ability afforded to comply with or resist the
demands associated with IAS as well as the availability of
other alternative standards
Content Consistency The degree of fit between requirements/stipulations of IAS High; moderate; low
and internal company vision/goals/interests/and aspirations
The extent to which the expectations of IAS selected are
compatible with internal logic of operations, technical and
economic standards, stewardship goals/aspirations
Constraint Implications of IAS for discretion, latitude and autonomy in High; moderate; low
decision making in relation to organization–environment
relations
The extent to which your organization has retained control
in determining its decisions in key areas addressed by IAS
 TABLE VIII
continued

Institutional antecedent Dimension Please dwell on the following Please characterize this
dimension as

Control Coercion The extent to which IAS are considered to be equivalent to High; moderate; low
the force of law
The extent to which compliance with IAS is considered to
be highly punitive and strictly enforced
The extent to which compliance with IAS is scrutinized by
regulatory agencies
Diffusion The extent to which the norms and expectations of IAS are High; moderate; low
considered highly diffused, supported, and accepted
The extent to which the social validity of IAS is by now
largely unquestioned, and they have acquired a rule like
status in social thought and action
Views of the number and characteristics of other organiza-
tions that have adopted IAS, and the extent to which ‘‘the
contagion of legitimacy’’ is salient
Context Uncertainty The extent to which the organizational field of IAS is con- High; moderate; low
sidered highly uncertain, and changes in the field to be rapid
and not entirely predictable
The extent to which there is a perceived need for increased
security, stability, and predictability in relation to IAS dif-
fusion patterns and institutionalization
Inter-Connectedness The extent to which firms adhering to IAS feel inter- High; moderate; low
connected by values, norms, shared information, relational
channels, and coordination mechanisms
The extent to which adherence to IAS requires coordination
and negotiation, regular exchange, and inter-organizational
linkages
MNCs and International Accountability Standards Through an Institutional Lens
637
638 Dima Jamali
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