Arthur Keaveney - Lucullus, A Life-Gorgias Press (2013)

Lucullus, A Life
Arthur Peter Keaveney

Lucullus, A Life
Gorgias Studies in Classical and Late Antiquity
12
Gorgias Studies in Classical and Late Antiquity contains monographs

and edited volumes on the Greco-Roman world and its transition
into Late Antiquity, encompassing political and social structures,
knowledge and educational ideals, art, architecture and literature.
Lucullus, A Life
Second Edition with a New Postscript
Arthur Peter Keaveney
9
34 2013
Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA
www.gorgiaspress.com
Copyright © 2013 by Gorgias Press LLC
All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright

Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the
prior written permission of Gorgias Press LLC.
2013 ‫ܚ‬
9
ISBN 978-1-60724-078-5
Second Printing
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication

Data
A Cataloging-In-Publication Record is Available

from the Library of Congress
Printed in the United States of America
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents.....................................................................................v
Preface......................................................................................................vii
Preface to the Second Edition...............................................................ix
1 Lucius Licinius Lucullus and the Luculli .....................................1
2 Master and Pupil............................................................................21
3 The Politic Man .............................................................................43
4 The Consulship..............................................................................67
5 Confronting the king: the war with Mithridates......................99
6 Confronting the king: the war with Tigranes.........................135
7 The Life of a Sponge?.................................................................175
8 ‘… retired Leisure that in trim gardens takes his pleasure’...195
9 Lucius Licinius Lucullus and his age ........................................225
Appendix 1 ............................................................................................245
Asia 81–79 ....................................................................................245
Appendix 2 ............................................................................................255
When did the Third Mithridatic War begin?...........................255
Postscript ...............................................................................................287
Bibliography ..........................................................................................311
Index.......................................................................................................325
v
PREFACE
Some years ago when writing a biography of Sulla I became in-

trigued by the figure of Lucullus, a man with whom he formed an
unusual but enduring friendship. There and then I conceived the
notion of writing Lucullus’ life when I had done with other tasks. I
have found him to be a figure of great interest in himself, but he is
also of considerable importance as one of those who carried the
Sullan republican ideal into the next generation. As we study him
we study, too, the last days of the Roman republic. Through his
eyes and by his side we watch an ideal perish. His failure is the fail-
ure of a whole class.
I was encouraged to undertake the present work by the ab-
sence of anything comparable in English. Other languages are bet-
ter served. In French we have long had the work of the learned Fr.
van Ooteghem, while German speakers can consult the austere but
penetrating RE article by Gelzer. Even as I wrote, Antonelli gave
the Italian world his entertaining but somewhat unscholarly treat-
ment. I am aware, of course, that some, who do not themselves
practise the art of ancient biography, believe that a task such as this
were better left unattempted. Personally, I have never been able to
understand why, when so much about the ancient world is dark,
the inadequacies of the evidence in this particular department
should be singled out for a special mention. Nor can I see what is
wrong with being curious about the leading figures of antiquity and
labouring in consequence to achieve a fuller understanding of
them. Moreover, it is not perhaps altogether fanciful to suggest that
if we do acquire a better understanding of a man like Lucullus then
perhaps we may acquire a better understanding of his age as well.
For help in the making of this book I have but one institution
to thank: my own university, Kent, which allowed me a term’s
study leave in Michaelmas 1990. As regards individuals I would like
to thank Mr D. R. Nightingale, Dr G. Anderson, Professor E. Bad-
vii
viii LUCULLUS, A LIFE
ian and Dr J. Madden who answered queries while the work was in
progress and Mr R. Seager who kindly read through the whole
manuscript when it was completed. A version of part of Chapter 8
was read to the 1991 AGM of the Classical Association at Warwick
University and benefited, I believe, by some comments then.
I owe an especial debt to Dr Tracey Rihll for preparing the
maps and my wife Jenny and Dr Anderson for help with the
proofs. Finally, I should like to mention Rebecca Edwards and
Hilary Joce of Darwin College Secretariat who braved my hand-
writing to produce the typescript.
For the rest, suffice to say that this book is the sole responsi-
bility of the undersigned.
Arthur Keaveney
Darwin College
University of Kent
at Canterbury
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
In this second edition the text of the first has been reproduced
without alteration. I have however added a postscript which re-
examines certain problems and issues and tries to take account of
recent scholarship on Lucullus. For help in making this possible I
have four people to thank. Angela Faunch of the Inter-Library
Loan Department of the Templeman Library obtained much mate-
rial for me. Charles Young advised on IT matters. Kirsty Corrigan,
combining swiftness and accuracy, produced the final version. Ver-
ity Irvine gave invaluable aid with proof reading and indexing.
Rath Dé orthu go léir.
Arthur Keaveney
University of Kent
November 2008
ix
1 LUCIUS LICINIUS LUCULLUS AND THE
LUCULLI
In every land and under every clime nobles have shown the great-
est pride in their ancestry. The Romans are no exception to this
rule. The Julii Caesares, for instance, unblushingly declared that
they were descended from the goddess Venus herself. The Luculli,
with more modesty, but no more truth, spoke of a certain Lucullus
who as a king of Illyria led his people into Italy in the distant past
where they eventually became the nation of the Paeligni, inhabi-
tants of the centre of that country. So far as we are concerned,
however, the first historical L. Licinius Lucullus is a man who was
curule aedile in 202. Learned opinion in ancient Rome and in our
own day holds that his name ‘Lucullus’ is a diminutive of ‘Lucius’.
This latter signifies ‘born at dawn’.
The Licinian gens to which the Luculli belonged was plebeian.
Other members included the Calvi, the Murenae, the Nervae and
the Crassi. The word Licinius is believed to derive from the Etrus-
can lecne (‘curving’ or ‘slant’) which first came into Latin as the ad-
jective licinius. We hear for instance of licini boves or oxen with horns
which slanted upwards. During the fifth and part of the fourth cen-
tury the Licinii played a fairly prominent part in Roman public life.
Towards the middle of the fourth century, however, they suffered
an eclipse that lasted for some hundred years. The revival of their
fortunes towards the last quarter of the third century was largely
due to the Crassi and the Luculli.
Aside from the curule aedile we have noted, the Luculli gave
the world two tribunes of the plebs, one in 196 and another in 110.
An M. Lucullus was praetor peregrinus in 186, the troubled year of the
Bacchic conspiracy. Scholars are undecided as to how exactly our
Lucullus is to be fitted into the family tree. One school believes
that his grandfather L. Licinius Lucullus (cos. 151) was the son of
that Lucius who was curule aedile in 202. Others take the view that
1
2 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
the consul of 151 was the son or grandson of C. Lucullus, tribune

of the plebs in 196.
But, whatever problems there may be in tracing his exact line
of descent, we are, nevertheless, reasonably well informed about
our Lucullus’ grandfather. Since he was the first of the family to
reach the consulship it was he who, in accordance with Roman
custom and practice, conferred upon it the status of noble. Our
Lucullus thus inherited his status and probably also his wealth from
this man who, it may be said, he in some respects resembled. Both
were to tangle with tribunes. The grandfather and his colleague
were, during the year of their consulship, thrown into prison by the
tribunes because of the way in which they conducted the levy for
war in Spain. According to one version, it was their excessive se-
verity that led the tribunes to take this action. According to an-
other, it was the favouritism they showed in granting exemptions
from serving in what was a dangerous and unpopular war. In other
ways, however, the subject of our study differed radically from his
ancestor. While our Lucullus gained an exemplary reputation for
his provincial government his grandfather garnered exactly the op-
posite. Once he got to Spain he soon earned for himself a well-
deserved name for cruelty, treachery and rapacity. Finding that his
predecessor had made peace with the Celtiberi in Hither Spain and
thus deprived him of the booty and glory he craved, he at once
determined to seek them elsewhere. So he turned on the neigh-
bouring Vaccaei who were completely inoffensive. After their prin-
cipal city Cauca (Coca) had surrendered to him on terms Lucullus
massacred all the male inhabitants and looted the place. His next
move was against Intercatia (Villalpardo). He offered the inhabi-
tants a treaty but they prudently refused. Eventually, with both
sides suffering the rigours of a siege, an agreement was patched up.
The townsfolk, however, insisted that Scipio Aemilianus who was
in Lucullus’ army and had a reputation for uprightness should act
as its guarantor. Lucullus’ next target was a third city Pallantia
(Palencia) but operations had to be called off because of the onset
of winter. In the next year Lucullus joined Ser. Sulpicius Galba,
governor of Further Spain, in an attack on Lusitania. To celebrate
his successes in Spain Lucullus erected in the Velabrium a temple
to Felicitas. It was adorned with statues which Mummius the con-
queror of Greece lent Lucullus. Some time later, when Mummius
LUCIUS LICINIUS LUCULLUS AND THE LUCULLI 3
asked for these back he was told by Lucullus that this was impossi-
ble as they were now dedicated to the goddess.1
This man’s son, the father of our Lucullus, and himself a
Lucius was born about the year 144. He married—and again we
can only give an approximate date—in or around 119. His bride
was a Caecilia Metella who, as her name suggests, was sprung from
the Metelli, then one of the most powerful families in Rome. Of
the political advantages this woman conferred on her husband we
shall speak in a moment. Of the lady herself all we know is that she
was said to be a bad woman, and we may anticipate our story a lit-
tle by observing that she was not to be the last such to cleave to the
house of the Luculli. Both this generation and the next seem to
have had an infinite capacity for contracting unhappy marriages.2
1 Van Ooteghem (1959) pp. 5–11; Drumann/Groebe (1964) p. 62; de

Sanctis (1969) pp. 461–6; RE ‘Licinius’ and ‘Licinii Luculli’. The definition
of nobility here followed is that of Gelzer (1969). Brunt’s questioning of it
(1982) is ably answered by Shackleton Bailey (1986)—see also the severe
remarks of Burckhardt (1990) pp. 77–82. The notion that Lucullus in later
life assumed the agnomen ‘Ponticus’ is baseless, cf. Thomas (1977). The
words of a minor Elizabethan, Sir William Herbert, illustrate perfectly a
man’s pride in his birth: ‘[I see] little cause to think myself blemished by
my blood being the heir male of that Earl that hath this day living nine
earls and barons descended out of his body.’ In his case the boast seems
to be true, cf. Keaveney and Madden (1992).
The Lucullus in Front. Strat. 3.10.7 is something of a puzzle. The in-
cident has been assigned either to 114 when a war with the Scordisci was
in progress or to the Dacian wars of Frontinus’ own day (RE ‘Licinii Lu-
culli’ and ‘Scordisci’). I would suggest that P. Lucullus (trib. pleb. 110) is
in question. After the trouble in his year of office (Sall. Jug. 37.1–2) he
might well decide to leave Rome for a while, and the war with the
Scordisci was still in progress (MRR 1.543).
2 The birth-date of Lucullus’ father is an inference from the probabil-
ity that, thanks to his connections (see further below), his praetorship in
104 (MRR 1.559) was probably suo anno or very near it. Likewise the date
of marriage is inferred from the birth-date of his sons (see next note).
For Metella see Plut. Luc. 1. I see no need to detect in this tale a dou-
blet of Lucullus’ own unhappy marriages, for which see ch. 3. Of Metella
Antonelli (1989) p. 8 says, ‘possiamo desumere che fosse bellissima anche,
perché, in generale, solo le donne belle e affascinanti sono sottoposte
continuamente alle prove della tentazione e quindi solo a loro, più facil-
4 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
Two sons were born of the match: Lucius, our subject, whose date
of birth may, in spite of that uncertainty which has plagued us in
tracing the family tree, most likely be assigned to 118, although
some would favour 117; and Marcus who we know for certain was
born in 116.3
Lucullus père was elected to the praetorship in 104. As I
hinted a little earlier, he may have owed something of his success to
his wife’s family. Metella was the daughter of one consul, Metellus
Calvus (142) and the sister of two others, Metellus Delmaticus
(119) and Metellus Numidicus (109). With members of a family like
that commending a man to the voters his path to office would
surely be broadened and smoothed.4 Lucullus was either praetor
urbanus or peregrinus and as such would normally be expected to
carry out his duties in the city. An emergency, however, led to his
being despatched to the south where a slave rebellion had broken
out in what can only be described as romantic circumstances. A
young eques from Capua called Vettius had fallen in love with a
slave-girl. Being impoverished, he could not immediately pay the
mente che alle altre, capita di non superarle’—a comment which is very
Italian, very imaginative and very flawed in its psychology.
3 Marcus held the aedileship suo anno in 79 (Plut. Luc. 1 with
MRR2.83) and so we know he was born in 116. Lucius is more problem-

atical and what follows is a refinement of the discussion of Sumner (1973)
pp. 113–14. Plutarch says that Lucius held the aedileship with his brother.
Although he was older, he chose to delay assuming the office until the
latter should come of age and they could hold it together. Since a volun-
tary act of renunciation is in question it follows that Lucius could con-
ceivably have held office in either 81 or 80. For obvious reasons any ab-
stention prior to November 82 could not be described as ‘voluntary’. So
we can postulate 118 or 117 for Lucius’ birth-date. One circumstance
favours the former. According to Cicero (Acad. 2.1) Lucullus factus aedilis,
continuo praetor [i.e. in 78] (licebat enim celerius legis praemio). This makes it clear
that Lucullus had been allowed to ignore the biennium between aedileship
and praetorship. No reason is given for this concession but it seems rea-
sonable to suppose it was to allow him to claw back the time he had lost
and assume the praetorship suo anno (for further remarks on this conces-
sion see ch. 3). Self-evidently this squares with a birth-date in 118 but not
one in 117.
4 MRR 1.559 and van Ooteghem (1959) pp. 11–12. For some further
observations on Roman elections see ch. 3.

price asked for her freedom. He was, however, able to obtain her
on credit and promised to pay by a certain day. When that arrived
he was still unable to meet his obligations but continued to receive
an extension of the period of grace. But when that too ran out Vet-
tius’ position was no better and the only solution he could come up
with was to have recourse to arms. Kitting himself out with a dia-
dem and a purple robe and surrounding himself with lictors, he
first led his slaves against his creditors and then spread the rebel-
lion further afield.
Eventually he built a fort on a hill near Capua and by welcom-
ing fugitive slaves he increased his force to 700. The Romans took
this matter very seriously. They had not forgotten the horrors of
the First Slave War in Sicily, although it had ended some thirty
years before, and moreover they had witnessed recently rebellion
like that of Vettius at Nuceria and Capua. So Lucullus was despat-
ched to put things to rights. At first the strong insurgent position
baffled him but then he was able to induce Vettius’ principal ally to
desert and was, in consequence, able to make short work of those
who remained.5
In truth this war was little more than a scuffle in a cornfield
but now Lucullus received a commission that would test his talents
a little more. What has since become known as the Second Sicilian
Slave War had just broken out and, like the first, was on a grand
scale. So Lucullus was sent out with augmented forces, in order to
put it down. The rebel leader, a man called Salvius, had assumed
the name ‘Tryphon’ together with the pretensions of a king. His
court was established at a town called Triocala (Caltabellotta?) and
it was for this place that Lucullus headed. Battle was joined some
distance away. For a time the issue was doubtful, but at last the
slave army turned and fled. The survivors took refuge in Triocala.
Lucullus, at first, made an attempt to take the town but to no avail.
5 Diod. Sic. 36.2. Walton ad loc. makes what seems to me to be the

sensible observation that the natural inference from the text is that Vet-
tius’ revolt took place near Capua, although Vogt (1974) p. 59 does not
commit himself and Bradley (1989) pp. 72–3 merely says ‘probably’. I can
see no reason for following van Ooteghem (1959) p. 13 in his acceptance
of Münzer’s suggestion (RE ‘Licinius’ no. 103) that the revolt began in
Lucania. On the background see further Bradley (1989) pp. 46–72.
6 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
After that he seems to have done nothing. Some claimed he was

simply being indolent, while others suggested he was being his fa-
ther’s son and consuming his energies in extorting money from the
provincials.
Whatever the truth of this last allegation, it was to return soon
to haunt Lucullus. For the moment, however, he reacted with an-
ger to the news that a certain C. Servilius was being sent out (102)
to replace him. He vented his spleen by disbanding his troops and
firing his camp and siege works. He hoped, it is said, that the con-
sequent difficulties for his successor would show he had not been
deliberately prolonging the war.6
The ploy did not, however, work. So far as can be made out,
Servilius complained to Rome about what had happened and a
cousin, known as Servilius the Augur, took up the cudgels on his
behalf. Since C. Servilius had two brothers who did not bestir
themselves on this occasion we may suspect that this display of
familial loyalty had more than a trace of self-interest in it and was
primarily designed to further the Augur’s political career. At any
rate he brought a charge of res repetundae (extortion) against Lucul-
lus. The latter naturally turned to his powerful in-laws for help,
only to meet with a rebuff. Metellus Numidicus refused to speak
on his behalf. Various theories have been put forward to account
for this behaviour. Some invoke the widespread Metellan family
tree with its intertwining branches. One of Metellus’ sisters might
be married to Lucullus but he was not likely to forget that the Ser-
vilii brothers also had a Metella for a mother and under these cir-
cumstances he may have judged it best to steer clear of the whole
affair. Others think that Lucullus’ guilt was so patent, or, at least,
that his conviction was so certain, that Metellus could see no point
in intervening on his behalf. While such speculation seems plausi-
ble enough at first sight, I am not sure that it is strictly necessary.
6 Diod. Sic. 36.8–9; Flor. 2.7.10–11 with Freeman (1892) pp. 327–9;
Dumont (1987) pp. 248–52; Vogt (1974) pp. 56–9; Bradley (1989) pp. 66–
79. There is probably no need to assume with e.g. Münzer RE ‘Lucullus’
no. 103 that Florus has mistakenly reversed the order of the governors.
He seems to be offering a summary which is not necessarily chronologi-
cal. Nor, despite Scardigli (1989) p. 326 n. 3, does he accuse Lucullus of
indolence.
One ancient text does preserve what appears to be Metellus’ own

publicly declared reason for refusing aid to Lucullus. Unfortunately,
ambiguity, excessive terseness and possible corruption make it en-
igmatic to say the least. Nevertheless, one fact does emerge with
tolerable clarity: Metellus had been offended by some kind of ir-
regularity in Lucullus’ conduct of his praetorship (not necessarily in
Sicily) and for that reason he would not have anything to do with
him. And from what we know of Metellus such an obsessive pre-
occupation with legal niceties and such a display of high-minded
probity is not at all surprising. In other words, Metellus rejected
Lucullus’ request from what appeared to himself at any rate as the
highest of motives; and when the matter went to court Lucullus
was condemned and forced into exile.7
So far as the Luculli were concerned, this was tantamount to a
declaration of war. A feud had begun between the two families.8
There is dispute, however, as to its next manifestation. When Ser-
vilius returned from Sicily he too faced a charge similar to that of
Lucullus and like him he succumbed. The plausible suggestion that
the friends of the Luculli engineered this has not won universal
acceptance.9 What is beyond doubt though is that hostilities tempo-
rarily ceased during the exile of Metellus Numidicus which had
been engineered by his great foe, Marius, and lasted from 100 to
98. Then the Luculli seem to have had no difficulty in co-operating
with the Servilii and others in working for his return.10
It may very well be that they bore Metellus no ill-will or per-
haps they at least considered it politic to dissemble. The recall of
7 The enigmatic text is De Vir. Ill. 62. Other sources are Plut. Luc. 1;
Diod. Sic. 36.9; Cic. 2 Verr. 4.147—despite Hinard (1980) p. 208 n. 63,
this last passage does not establish Lucullus’ guilt but rather illustrates the
scrupulosity of Metellus, which can also be seen in App. BC 1.29–31. For
the family relationship of the Servilii Badian (1984a) pp. 59–62 is funda-
mental. On the charge Lucullus faced see Keaveney (1982d) p. 113 n. 8.
There is no need to assume that the feud (see below) between the Luculli
and the Servilii predated this incident, as Hinard (1980) p. 205 does.
8 This is certain (cf. n. 16) even if there is disagreement as to when
the Luculli made their first move (cf. n. 9).

9 Gruen (1968) p. 178; contra Badian (1984b) p. 306.
10 Cic. Post Red. ad Quir. 6, Post Red. in Senatu 37. For Metellus’ exile
see Greenidge and Clay pp. 105–7.

8 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
Metellus was certainly popular with the nobility as a whole. By this

time they had tamed Marius and the return of his enemy would set
the crown on their triumph. As we shall see, the policies the Luculli
were to pursue would render them anyway sympathetic to the out-
look of Metellus, however much they might feel resentment against
him personally.11
The feud itself was resumed with a celebrated court case.
When his father went into exile Lucullus would have barely reached
man’s estate which was signified in Rome at the age of 16 by the
donning of the toga virilis. But when he and Marcus attained their
majority, although they did not neglect their obligatory military ser-
vice,12 they devoted most of their energies to a training in forensic
oratory. The two often worked together, and Cicero praises Lucul-
lus’ oratory as ‘sharp’, implying that his ultimate decision to seek
glory in battle rather than in court was a definite loss to the bar. He
says indeed that Lucullus was a man of natural ability and singles
out his memory as a gift with which he was particularly endowed.
We may also add that Lucullus’ tall and handsome appearance may
have added something to the effect he produced. And, even if we
concede that there may be some exaggeration in these antique lau-
dations, it must, nevertheless, be admitted that Lucullus’ oratory
would seem to have been sufficiently developed to allow him to
hold his own in the forum and the senate.13
When they were satisfied that they had had sufficient training
and had honed their talents fine enough the Luculli decided the
time had come to apply their learning and so they turned on Servil-
ius the Augur. The date is hotly disputed but I am inclined to put it
fairly early in Lucullus’ career and would favour sometime in the
11 Plut. Mar. 30–1 with Badian (1964) p. 171. See further ch. 2.
12 See further n. 35 below and ch. 2.
13 Cic. Acad. 2.1, Brut. 222 (with Douglas ad loc.); Tac. Dial. 37; Plut.
Luc. 1, 33. For memory see Auct. ad Herr. 3.28ff. In the Acad. passage
Cicero is clearly anxious to praise Lucullus’ oratory at the expense of his
military exploits but at the same time he could hardly have hoped to get
away with a complete fiction, cf. Badian (1984b) pp. 303–4. Besides the
case we are about to discuss we know of another in which the brothers
were involved. For this see Gruen (1971) pp. 54–5 and next note for its
chronological significance.
early 90s when it may even mark the brothers’ debut in court.14
What seems to have happened is that they picked the year when
Servilius was quaestor and levelled at him a charge of using public
funds for illegal purposes. In Roman law this was held to be perduel-
lio or treason.15 Great excitement was aroused by the proceedings
14 Cic. Acad. 2.1; Plut. Luc. 1 with Badian (1984b) pp. 301–6 (the
most recent discussion). In Acad. Cicero sketches the public career of

Lucullus. Although there is bias (cf. n. 43) and omission—his trib. mil.
(ILS 60) is not mentioned—there is no reason to doubt the order of
events. We must remember, however, that no dates are given and nothing
(with one exception) is said about the interval between each event. Thus
we must believe Cicero when he says Lucullus admodum adulescens prose-
cuted Servilius and that this occurred before his quaestorship, the next
event to be mentioned, but we must beware of drawing any further con-
clusion as to the amount of time which elapsed between the two. So Bad-
ian’s postulated date of 91 for the prosecution, which rests on this prox-
imity, need not necessarily be right. Furthermore we may observe how
Cicero repeats his data (idque eo . . . consumserat). The order of events is
repeated but adulescentia here is clearly a long period of time which pre-
ceded the period of the quaestura. Badian himself points out that an adules-
cens could be anywhere between 19 and 32 in Cicero. As a subsidiary ar-
gument at this point it could be added that two prosecutions by the Lu-
culli in 91 (n. 13) might be excessive.
But can we be more precise? Val. Max. 5.4.4.—see Hinard (1980) p.
206—would seem to suggest the Luculli launched their prosecution upon
assuming the toga virilis but this falls outside of the limits of adulescentia.
Instead, I would invoke two factors: (a) the Luculli must have done some
training between their father’s exile and the prosecution and (b) the likely
date of Servilius’ postulated quaestorship which should fall in or around
100 (cf. Badian and next note).
15 Plut. Luc. 1: a0diko=unta dhmosi/a|, which has given rise to a num-
ber of different interpretations. Badian (1984b) p. 305 thought ambitus was

meant while Gruen (1968) p. 177 n. 96 favoured maiestas. Among transla-
tors, the Loeb is vague (‘wronging the commonwealth’) while Scardigli
(1989) p. 327 is precise (‘malversazione verso lo Stato’), pointing to what
she believes is a resemblance to the trial of Pompey in 86 (Plut. Pomp. 4).
Against ambitus and maiestas it can be said that these terms are rendered by
dekasmo/j/dhmokopi/a and paranomi/a respectively (App. BC 2.24 with
Mason). With regard to Scardigli it may be pointed out that
kloph/ (peculatus) occurs and is beautifully exemplified a few lines above in
the Pompey passage. So something else must be meant. Plutarch uses
a0dike/w by itself in the sense of ‘harm, do wrong’, (Tib. Gracch. 9, 15;
10 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
and eventually things got completely out of hand. Both sides had
brought their supporters to the court and these set upon each
other, with the result that several deaths and injuries resulted from
the affray. The forensic performance of the Luculli was much ad-
mired but, nevertheless, Servilius was acquitted.16
A consideration of the differing reactions that this episode
awoke throws a considerable light on the Roman character. To be-
gin with we may look at the high-minded. They said it was the duty
of the public-spirited to take action when they saw evildoing in
public life. The absence of a public prosecution service in Rome
was more than made up for by the presence of a large number of
lofty-minded prigs.17 However, it was well known that this sort of
thing might wear another aspect and one that would seem to us to
be less commendable. It was a plain fact of Roman public life that
quarrels between members of the nobility were often carried out
through the medium of the courts. A charge was devised or utilized
to bring embarrassment or ruin on an opponent. So it followed
that a man must needs know how to attack or defend himself. As
Plutarch tried to explain to his Greek readers, an early start was
desirable in order to gain valuable experience and the whole busi-
ness could be likened to a young hunting dog fastening himself on
a wild beast.18 With a cluck of disapproval the Anglo-Saxon would
no doubt apply the good Italian term of vendetta to the behaviour
Comp. Ag/C. Gracch. 5). He uses dhmosi/a| in the sense, ‘at the public ex-
pense’ (Them. 10, C. Gracch. 5). Thus, putting the two together we get ‘he
was doing wrong at the public expense’ which I take to mean not that he
was stealing money (kloph/) but that he was applying it to some unlawful
purpose. The two magistrates most likely to do this were quaestors and
aediles. They were the only ones who could be prosecuted in office and
the most probable charge would be perduellio (Greenidge (1911) pp. 99,
106, 181, 208–16). Given Servilius’ suggested career, I would suspect he
was now quaestor rather than aedile.
16 Badian (1984b) p. 303 attempts to date the trial by trying to find a
political context for the riots but I would agree with Lintott (1968) p. 186
that such a context is not really necessary for it, and Cic. Prov. Cons. 22
would seem to support this view. The rioting is surely evidence of the
bitterness of the feud (see below) rather than of anything else.
17 So Quint. 12.7.3–4. See Cic. De Offic. 2.49–50 for the circumstances
that justified such a prosecution.

18 Plut. Luc. 1 with Gruen (1968) pp. 6–7; Epstein (1987) pp. 90–2.
of the brothers Luculli. The Romans took a rather different view of

the matter. They regarded an act of revenge of this type as perfectly
acceptable, nay honourable.19 Some even went so far as to regard it
as a sacred duty passed from father to son and an obligation not to
be shirked. We actually have tales of fathers on their death-beds
enjoining their offspring to prosecute in turn those who had prose-
cuted them.20 By the standards of the day the Luculli were excep-
tional in but one respect. While it was perfectly legal to prosecute a
quaestor while in office it was not a thing usually done.
We have here in this last detail, then, a measure of the inten-
sity of the quarrel between the Luculli and the Servilii, and probing
further we learn that, though of short duration, it was held to be
one of the most bitter in Roman history. Lucullus, in fact, seems to
have had a second encounter with Servilius the Augur but under
rather different circumstances. The Augur has been identified with
that Servilius who, as praetor, attempted to bar Sulla’s way in 88 as
he marched on Rome. It is notorious that Lucullus was present in
Sulla’s army, being the only officer who did not desert him. One
should beware, however, lest one reads too much into this. Some
have seen in Servilius a supporter of Marius and of his friends, but
this is not necessarily so. With equal plausibility it could be claimed
that he subscribed to that substantial body of opinion which, while
holding no brief for Marius and Sulpicius, was nevertheless out-
raged at Sulla’s behaviour. Of course, the presence of an old enemy
in Sulla’s ranks may have helped to steel his resolve, but we should
remember that P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus who also took the family
quarrel seriously saw no difficulty in joining Sulla even though Lu-
cullus was still one of his followers. Private quarrels had to be
submerged in public. Indeed, it may very well be that it was this
latter circumstance that brought about reconciliation. Romans
would not easily tolerate private feuds when they threatened the
state as a whole, and according to Cicero it was precisely the na-
tional interest that led Servilius Vatia and the Luculli to put an end
to their differences. At a time when they were both aiding Sulla in
his championship of the legitimate power in the state against those
19 It was one of the types of prosecution that Cicero (n. 17) deemed
honourable.
20 Epstein (1987) p. 93; Hinard (1980).
12 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
held to be usurpers there could be no place for personal quarrels.

So, by 83 at the latest, the feud was at an end.21
The financial position of Lucullus and his brother does not
seem to have been affected by their father’s exile. The foundations
of the family fortune had been securely laid by their once poverty-
stricken grandfather and there is no reason to suppose that his
equally unscrupulous son did not build upon them so that in turn
his sons were left comfortably off upon his departure. We certainly
hear of no difficulties when they entered public life.22 However, to
keep matters in perspective we should remember at all times that
there is no record of lavish expenditure on Lucullus’ part until he
became involved in the east.23 Plainly he was wealthy but not out-
standingly so. His brother Marcus was adopted by an otherwise
unknown M. Terentius Varro. He thus became M. Terentius Varro
Lucullus. Informally, however, he continued in his own time and
afterwards to be known as M. Lucullus and we shall continue so to
style him. The act certainly offers no clue as to the material condi-
tion of the family. Roman fathers did allow their sons to be
adopted if they were unable to supply the money to finance their
public careers, but this was not the only possible motive. Some-
times a man might be moved to act so in order to prevent a child-
less friend’s family line from dying out.24
The psychological effects of the father’s departure can only be
guessed at. As we shall see, the brothers remained close throughout
21 For the background see ch. 2 and Keaveney (2005a) pp. 45–63,
117–27, (1984b) p. 128, (1982b) pp. 154–60, (1983c) pp. 65–8. I accept
Badian’s identification of Servilius—(1984b) pp. 304–5—but not all of his
deductions therefrom. In my view, the absence of Servilius’ name from a
proscription list cannot be brushed aside nor can we assume that every
enemy of Sulla in 88 was a Marian. Likewise he need not necessarily have
vanished from sight. He could be the Servilius of Lic. 20F or one of the
two in MRR 2.72. The source for Vatia’s reconciliation is Cic. Prov. Cons.
22; the occasion my own deduction, cf. Epstein (1987) pp. 12–17.
22 Grandfather and father: App. Iber. 51 with the remarks of van Oot-
eghem (1959) p. 17. Pliny NH 14.96 might, as van Ooteghem p. 176

thought, mean that Lucullus’ father left him little. But we must remember
that what would seem a perfectly respectable fortune in the father’s gen-
eration would seem meagre in the son’s.
23 Athen. 6.274f, 12.543a with the remarks of Scardigli (1989) p. 293.
24 Shackleton Bailey (1976) p. 132; Hopkins (1983) pp. 49, 194–5.
their lives and it is, therefore, not straining credulity to suggest that
this was in part, at least, the result of their being thrown back on
their own resources in their mid-teens.25 They did not, of course,
want for friends and we shall be introducing them at the appropri-
ate points in the narrative. Since most of Lucullus’ life was given to
public service they will naturally mostly appear in a political con-
text. Mention may be made here, therefore, of one friend who,
throughout his long life, shunned public affairs. I speak of T. Pom-
ponius Atticus who is best known as the friend of Cicero but was
also the friend of Lucullus who was for a time the heir presumptive
of his uncle Caecilius.26 Outside Rome the Luculli seem to have
enjoyed a measure of influence in the south and in Sicily which
may have been a legacy of their father’s activities in those areas.
Their influence was certainly able to win the poet Archias the citi-
zenship of Heraclea (Policoro). In Sicily a leading man of Calacte
(Caronia Marina) Eupolemus was a client of the Luculli and, as a
token of respect, followed his friend in the Third Mithridatic War.
We also hear of Lucullus paying a courtesy call to Panormus (Pal-
ermo) at one time, which might just be taken as evidence of some
kind of Lucullan influence there too.27
There is a certain temptation to suggest that once the elder
Lucullus disappeared from the scene the so-called wanton Metella
took charge of the household and, turning herself into something
along the lines of Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, carefully
oversaw the education of her sons. The temptation must be re-
sisted. We already know that Lucullus himself was almost of age
when his father was exiled and so he, and not his mother, would be
head of the household. Moreover, at this stage the education of the
two sons would be well advanced, and it must be remarked it was a
good education. Lucullus, it was said, was equally at home in Latin
and Greek literature. Sulla himself paid tribute to his Latin style
25 van Ooteghem (1959) p. 17; Villoresi (1939) p. 33; Antonelli (1989)
pp. 8–9 seems to misunderstand the situation.

26 Shackleton Bailey (1965) pp. 7–8.
27 Heraclea: Cic. Pro Arch. 6; Calacte: Cic. 2 Verr. 4.49. On the mean-
ing of apud see Reid (1899) p. 45, and for hospitium see Badian (1958) pp.
11–13. In this instance the connection did Eupolemus little good. Panor-
mus: Cic. Ad Att. 1.19.10—it may be, of course, that Lucullus simply
wanted to visit Atticus.
14 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
when he asked Lucullus to revise his Memoirs. We shall see that

the request was not seriously intended but the fact that Sulla took
this way of paying a compliment is obviously not without signifi-
cance.28 Knowledge of Greek was, of course, widely diffused in
Rome at this time and among the upper classes a competence in
the language was felt to be desirable.29 In the case of Lucullus,
however, we are speaking of more than mere competence. There is
told a story of a conversation between Lucullus and two of his
friends, the orator Hortensius and the historian Sisenna. The trio
agreed that, according as lot should prescribe, Lucullus should
write a poem or history on the subject of the Social War in either
Greek or Latin. In the event the draw dictated he should write a
history in Greek. Such, however, was his command of the language
that he deliberately introduced some solecisms and barbarisms into
his text so that his readers would realize that the work was written
by a Roman.30 Later in life Lucullus built a library in his villa at
Tusculum (Frascati). It was stocked with volumes from various
sources and in particular, according to one account, with some ac-
quired during the Mithridatic War. The building was open to all
and scholars thronged the porticoes and reading-rooms where they
were often joined by Lucullus himself.31
This, of course, was much later. Now in 102 there arrived in
Rome a man whom we have met briefly before: the poet Archias.
Lucullus, by this time head of the house, welcomed him.32 Archias
28 See further ch. 3.

29 On this topic see Boyancé (1956); Horsfall (1979); Crawford (1978)
pp. 197–202; Petrochilos (1974) pp. 23–33; Rawson (1985) pp. 1–18; and
further n. 55.
30 Plut. Luc. 1; Cic. Ad Att. 1.19.10. On the vogue for histories of the
Social War see Rawson (1985) p. 26. The dogmatism of Crawford (1978)
p. 205 and n. 75 carries less than total conviction. See also Villoresi (1939)
pp. 30–1. If, as Horsfall (1979) p. 79 suggests, Romans had mastered the
Koine but still found Classical Greek difficult then Lucullus’ achievement
becomes all the greater since it is like enough he would choose a Classical
model for his work.
31 Plut. Luc. 42; Cic. De Fin. 3.7–8; Isidore 6.5.1. The use of this late
source is justified by the fact that it is in harmony with other stories of

cultural looting.
32 Cic. Pro Arch. 5. Cf. van Ooteghem (1959) p. 12 n. 9. This passage
of the Pro Arch. tells against the suggestion of Reid (1899) p. 81 that Ar-
was born in Antioch in Syria and was at this time about 16 years of
age. He was a kind of touring teenage prodigy who had won con-
siderable fame for himself with recitals at festivals in the Greek
world and in the process been awarded the citizenship of Tarentum
(Taranto), Rhegium (Reggio Calabria) and Naples. Some poems in
the Greek Anthology have been doubtfully attributed to him but
his major works have all perished. The loss to literature is not, per-
haps, all that great. His speciality seems to have been poems cele-
brating his patrons and their deeds. He was also renowned for his
facility in producing extempore verses on a given theme and then
producing alternative versions on the same subject.33
This kind of thing was much in demand in Rome and Archias
had no shortage of customers. He remained faithful, however, to
his first patrons, the Luculli, even unto old age and when he be-
came a Roman citizen he took the name ‘Licinius’.34 And he ac-
companied both brothers on their travels. When, at some stage in
the 90s, M. Lucullus served on the staff of the governor of Sicily,
Archias went with him and it was on their return journey that the
pair made the visit to Heraclea that resulted in Archias acquiring
the citizenship of the place. It was on the basis of this particular
citizenship that Archias was able in turn to claim Roman citizen-
ship in 89 under the provisions of the Lex Plautia Papiria.35 Al-
chias acted as tutor to the Luculli brothers. Nor does Pro Arch. 4 contra-
dict Pro Arch. 5 as he thinks. Some believe Archias would have arrived
while Lucullus père was still in Sicily
33 Cic. Pro Arch. 4–5, 18. Reid (1899) p. 39 does not believe Archias
could have received the citizenship of Rhegium and Naples but see what
is said in Pro Arch. 10.
34 Cic. Pro Arch. 5–6.
35 Cic. Pro Arch. 6–8. For the reading ‘M.’ in 6 see Reid (1899) p. 79.
My suggested reconstruction of M. Lucullus’ journey is based on the fact

that we are speaking of the 90s, a time when he would be a contubernalis
(cf. n. 12 above) but not yet a senator and therefore ineligible for the libera
legatio (cf. Willems (1968) I pp. 145–50) which Reid (1899) p. 40 assigns
him. I also take account of the technical meaning of decedere which Reid
recognizes but tries needlessly to deny here. Münzer (RE ‘Licinius’ no.
103) thought this was the place of exile of the elder Lucullus, and this
would explain M. Lucullus’ influence. Two less plausible suggestions (van
Ooteghem (1959) p. 170 n. 5) are that M. Lucullus was visiting Sicily to
gather materials for the prosecution of Servilius the Augur or that Archias
16 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
though he passed most of the Social War in Rome, Archias joined

Lucullus in the east when he went to serve as Sulla’s quaestor in the
First Mithridatic War. He accompanied him again in the Third
Mithridatic War. The result of this trip was a poem in honour of
Lucullus’ exploits and a reward from the treasury for the bard at
the commander’s request.36
Another Greek intellectual who lived on intimate terms with
Lucullus was the philosopher Antiochus of Ascalon.37 After leaving
his native place in Palestine this man spent a number of years in
Athens and, either during the siege of Athens by Sulla or shortly
before, he made the acquaintance of Lucullus whom he accompa-
nied for the rest of the campaign. Evidently he had formed a high
opinion of his protector for when Lucullus set out for the Third
Mithridatic War Antiochus joined him once more and perished
while the hostilities were still in progress.38
Without doubt it was this close association between the two
that led Cicero to make Lucullus one of the interlocutors in his
dialogue Academica. In Book 2 he is given a speech in which he re-
counts an attack on Scepticism which he once heard Antiochus
make at Alexandria, and it is not an unimpressive performance.
Although he is expounding the doctrines of another, Lucullus is,
nevertheless, shown to be completely at ease in handling rather
difficult material and dealing with what are—to speak frankly—
was accompanying Lucullus père. For Archias’ citizenship see Sherwin-

White (1973) pp. 151–2 and Keaveney (2005) pp. 170–1.
36 Cic. Pro Arch. 9–11 with Reid (1899) p. 45.
37 On this man see RE ‘Antiochus’ no. 62 and Dillon (1977) pp. 52–
106.
38 Cic. Acad. 2.4, 11, 61; Plut. Luc. 28, 42; Aelian VH 12.25. Conven-
tionally (cf. e.g. Dillon (1977) pp. 53–4) it is assumed Antiochus fled to
Rome in 88 to escape Mithridates’ forces. There is no evidence for this
and it does not fit well with Lucullus’ departure for the east in the spring
of 87—Keaveney (2005a) p. 68. An earlier date for the flight from Athens
sits better with the latter and indeed with the turmoil in the city in the
years preceding 88, a turmoil in which the philosophical schools were
embroiled, cf. Badian (1976) pp. 511–14. Indeed, Cicero Acad. 2.4 does
not rule out the possibility that Lucullus met Antiochus in Greece itself.
Rawson (1985) p. 81 talks of a journey Antiochus made to Sicily but this
appears to be a confusion with Archias’ trip there.
rather abstruse concepts.39 Unfortunately, Cicero had no sooner

finished the work than he began to have qualms. He felt that the
three interlocutors he had chosen, namely Lucullus, Hortensius and
the consular Catulus, were not suitable men to represent and ex-
pound these abstract doctrines. In fact they could hardly be called
philosophers at all. So he produced a second edition. Instead of
two books it was now divided into four and was dedicated to the
savant Varro who becomes one of the speakers along with Cicero
himself and his friend Atticus. The work as we have it today con-
sists of Book 1 from the second edition and Book 2 from the
first.40
On the basis of this piece of editorializing the most extrava-
gant charges have been levelled at Lucullus. Not only are his philo-
sophical pretensions attacked but doubts are cast upon his intellec-
tual capacities, his sensibilities are held to be blunted and it is de-
nied he has any claim at all to be considered a man of broad gen-
eral culture. In sum, the picture of the man we are given in Aca-
demica 2.1, a picture that clearly influenced Plutarch, is held to be
not just exaggerated but patently false.41 Maturer consideration of
the whole matter may, perhaps, lead to some slight modification of
these views.
To begin with, it has to be recognized that Cicero expressed
his doubts about Lucullus in private letters and it must be said that
in this correspondence he does not always tell the truth. For in-
39 Acad. 2.10–62.
40 Cic. Ad Att. 13.12.3, 13–.19.5, 16.1; cf. also Ad Att. 13.13.1 and
Reid (1885) pp. 32–5, 47 n. 9, 48–51.
41 Van Ooteghem (1959) p. 27; Reid (1885) p. 32. Sometimes those
who held such views may be said to slightly overstate their case. For in-
stance in Crawford (1975) p. 205 we read that ‘Lucullus’ real philistinism
can be inferred from Cicero’s desperate protestations to the contrary’. A
useful antidote to this latter will be found in the judicious remarks of Gel-
zer col. 412.
Plutarch’s debt to Cicero is obvious, cf. Reid (1885) p. 33 n. 8 and
Jones (1982). Other factors of course also come into play in forming his
portrait. As a philosopher Plutarch was anxious to see in Lucullus a fellow
philosopher and as a Platonist he liked to believe that Lucullus too aimed
at the Beautiful (Luc. 1). See Wardman (1974) pp. 211–20 and Adam
(1908) pp. 386–7.
18 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
stance out of vanity and self-importance he consistently plays down

the part that Lucullus played in public affairs during the last years
of his life so that his own role may appear the greater.42 And if he is
capable of vilipending Lucullus’ role in politics it is not straining
credulity to suggest that he would do the same to his reputation as
a philosopher. It has, however, to be admitted that Cicero may
have had more justification for acting as he did in the latter de-
partment than he did in the former. Quite simply, he was better
versed in philosophy than Lucullus and his friends and as he
looked down on them from his lofty height they may have ap-
peared to him to be smaller than they really were.43
But what role did philosophy play in the lives of Lucullus and
his friends? Probably that it played in the lives of most men of their
time and class. In the Rome of their day there was still a certain
suspicion of philosophy, and interest was largely centred on its
non-technical aspects.44 It was undoubtedly felt too that a Roman
should taste of, but not delve too deeply into, such matters.45 As
gentlemen—and Cicero never forgot they were gentlemen46—
Lucullus and his friends had certain obligations to meet and being
thus men of affairs would most likely have little leisure to spare for
literature or philosophy. It is hardly surprising then that in such
free moments as they had they sought not arcane dogma but the
spiritual nourishment and comfort that some believe philosophy
may bring.47
The nature of Lucullus’ relationship with Antiochus now be-
comes clearer. The Greek did not accompany the commander in
order to read him lectures on Scepticism but to act as his spiritual
42 This matter is dealt with in detail in ch. 8.

43 On Cicero as a philosopher see, e.g., Rawson (1983) pp. 230–47.
44 Rawson (1985) pp. 4–5, 57–8; Reid (1885) p. 23; Petrochilos (1974)
pp. 123–4.
45 This was certainly the view a century later, cf. Tac. Agric. 4.
46 Reid (1885) p. 33 n. 9 emphasizes this point.
47 This seems to have been particularly true of Hortensius, cf. Reid
(1885) p. 44. Compare the Tudor gentleman. He was well educated and
given to writing courtly verse. Cultivated and devoted to literature, he
nevertheless took his philosophy at second hand, cf. Einstein (1962) pp.
163–6, 277–85, 336–40 and Keaveney and Madden (1992).
adviser.48 Over a century later the younger Pliny vividly described a

similar figure.49 The philosopher Euphrates from Syria with his
long hair and beard was undoubtedly a guru but a sanitized guru
who was made welcome in the Roman drawing-room. Ethics was a
speciality of his. Pliny, for his part, whenever he felt depressed
sought him out in order to receive reassurance. A man who holds
public office is putting philosophy into practice and indeed has the
best part of philosophy, he was told. It is not straining credulity to
suggest that Antiochus now and again gave us similar comfort.50
Now that we have removed one of the grosser fictions from
our picture of Lucullus, it remains for us to ask what part, if any,
his upbringing and education played in forming or modifying his
character. Quite simply, we have to ask the same questions as the
ancients would have. Philosophy, some believed, could actually
improve a man.51 Was this true of Lucullus? Again, the ancients,
and after them the humanists, wondered if polite letters would add
polish to a man or simply contribute to the enervation of a warlike
spirit.52 There is an easy answer to this last: Lucullus’ military ca-
reer. As regards the degenerate practices of his later years (and they
may not be as degenerate as some have thought), they were hardly
a delayed reaction to book-learning in youth but rather took their
rise from disappointed hopes or, more likely I believe, a sense of
realism combined with a strong aesthetic impulse.53 We are told
that Aulus Albinus, who was consul with Lucullus’ grandfather in
151, produced a history in Greek and in the preface apologized for
his imperfect command of the language. For this he was rebuked
by Cato the elder who called him a trifler and asked who had com-
pelled him to write the thing in the first place.54 The contrast with
Lucullus and his History need not be laboured. Like many men of
his day he had a more perfect command of Greek than previous
generations and correspondingly a greater insight into Greek cul-
48 Cf. Rawson (1985) p. 81. He may also have acted as an adviser in
political matters, cf. ch. 2.

49 Ep. 1.10.
50 Cf. Dillon (1977) pp. 61, 75.
51 Wardman (1974) pp. 203–20.
52 Reid (1885) p. 23 and Keaveney and Madden (1992).
53 See ch. 8.
54 Gellius 11.8.
20 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
ture.55 Peoples’ reaction to this experience naturally differed but in

Lucullus’ case as a result of his reading and personal contact with
Greeks a profound philhellenism seems to have been born. When
even other Greek lovers such as Cicero could complain occasion-
ally of the Greeks Lucullus never seems to have wavered in his
golden opinion of them and often he treated them far better than
perhaps they deserved. His sensitive and kindly handling of provin-
cial Greeks must owe something to a nature which was basically
decent,56 but it cannot owe all. As we shall see, Lucullus made no
effort to understand any other foreign nation and thus his behav-
iour becomes correspondingly harsher when he comes to deal with
them.
So we may say that Lucullus’ contact with Greek culture had
the effect of refining the manners and outlook of one who was
basically of a kindly disposition. It should be observed that this
refining of sensibilities went hand in hand with more sophisticated
tastes in other areas as well. We may illustrate this point by having
recourse once more to an anecdote. We are told that when Lucul-
lus’ father gave a banquet Greek wine was only served once. By the
time his son gave a party for the people at his triumph he was able
to serve 100,000 jars. What had once been a scarce commodity had
become virtually commonplace.57 If Lucullus had more developed
sensibilities than his ancestors he could also be said to have sought
out and enjoyed to a greater degree than they the amenities and
adornments of a civilized life. Yet for all of that he was to prove
himself not a whit less able than they and, it may be said, to have
surpassed their achievements.
In sum, the polished manners and refined tastes that he
shared with other men of his age did not make Lucullus any the
less ready or able for the transaction of those duties that his station
in life imposed on him. He was a sophisticated man who lived in a
sophisticated age.
55 Generalizations are dangerous, quantification impossible. See the
useful treatment of Rawson (1985) pp. 3–18.

56 As Sulla recognized, cf. ch. 2. See also Petrochilos (1974) pp. 31,
40–5.
57 Pliny NH 14.96. See Petrochilos (1974) pp. 75, 82 n. 5.
2 MASTER AND PUPIL
Late in 91 a goodly portion of Rome’s Italian subjects rose in revolt

against her. This uprising came about as a direct result of Rome’s
persistent and stubborn refusal to open her citizenship to the peo-
ples of Italy. Equality was what her allies had long sought and see-
ing that it was not to be had from the Romans they at last deter-
mined to take it for themselves by declaring independence. So the
rebels created a new federal state of their own which they called
‘Italia’. It hardly needs to be said that the Romans were not pre-
pared to permit such a thing and the two sides were soon locked in
a ruinous conflict which we call the Social War.1
It is in this bitter struggle that we first encounter Lucullus in
the role of a soldier. However, it is likely that this was not his first
taste of the military life since the office he held, that of military
tribune, had as a pre-requisite at least five years’ service and we may
suspect that, like his brother Marcus, Lucullus had not shirked his
duty in the years preceding.2 In the middle republic the tribunes
were the most senior officers in the legion. The office had consid-
erable prestige and was often held by the politically ambitious anx-
ious to further their careers. But from about the time of the Second
Punic War the tribunate diminished in importance due largely to
the increasing practice of employing legates and from now it was
the latter post, rather than the former, which became the prize to
1 On the Social War see Keaveney (2005) and Brunt (1988) pp. 93–
143. The latter is a revision of a JRS article (1965) and in it the author
reaches conclusions similar to mine on a number of questions. It is possi-
ble to exaggerate perhaps the evil effects of the war, as in Keppie (1984)
p. 70.
2 Plut. Luc. 2; ILS 60; Polyb. 6.19.1. For length of service and its non-
fulfilment see Keaveney (1980b) pp. 171–3 and Keppie (1984) pp. 33–4.
On the office in general: Suolahti (1956) pp. 35–57, 140–1, 160–2.
21
22 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
be sought after by those who wished to advance themselves in

public life.3 Lucullus, however, was to prove to be one of the ex-
ceptions to the rule. Like so much else about the Social War details
are scarce but the reader may be offered a tentative reconstruction
of what happened. Each year the assembly elected tribunes for the
four consular legions, and it would appear that, in 89, Lucullus was
one of these. As such he served under the consul Cato, but when
the latter was killed in battle early in the spring his army was
handed over to his legate, Sulla, who was given proconsular pow-
ers, and with it went Lucullus. This, of course, was the year in
which Sulla won a brilliant reputation by his campaigns against the
Hirpini and the Sammites. Sadly, all we hear of Lucullus’ part in
these campaigns is that he acquitted himself well but the sequel
shows this report to be true. Impressed by Lucullus’ performance,
Sulla sought him out and ever after took care to have him on his
staff.4
We learn, however, that it was not just Lucullus’ soldierly
abilities that drew Sulla to him. The commander divined in the of-
ficer qualities of mildness and constancy. These, in themselves, are
not, of course, military virtues but it may be said that they are de-
sirable in a subordinate and we might guess that it was a reliable
subordinate that Sulla sought when he first searched Lucullus out.
But such qualities are also the hallmarks of a tactful and loyal friend
and that was precisely what Lucullus soon became to Sulla. At first
sight it must seem a rather odd relationship. On the one hand, we
have the fiery patrician then nearing the height of his powers, on
the other we have a slightly phlegmatic plebeian who was about
twenty years his junior. Yet, however unlikely this friendship ap-
pears, it was destined to endure until the day Sulla died. Events
3Keppie (1984) pp. 39–40; Harris (1971) pp. 13–14, 31, 36, 39–40.
4Plut. Luc. 2. For the events of 89 see Keaveney (2005a) pp. 41–44
and (2005) pp. 151–61. Like many others, e.g. Villoresi (1939) p. 34, I
assume Lucullus actually served under Sulla, although Plutarch does not
say so. This would be the most natural way for Sulla to form an opinion
as to his worth. Once this is accepted a glance at Keaveney (2005) pp.
210–11 will show how the rest of the reconstruction falls into place: since
tribunes could serve for longer than a year (Suolahti 1956 p. 39) and since
times were desperate it is quite possible Lucullus had also seen service in
90.
MASTER AND PUPIL 23
soon showed that the latter’s judgement was shrewd and that he
had made no mistake. In all the vicissitudes of the coming years
Lucullus never once wavered in his loyalty and steadfastness. Even
when asked to perform tasks such as the collection of the Asian
revenues in 84 which he obviously found distasteful he complied
without a murmur. Moreover, given the age difference and the con-
trasting personalities of the two men, I do not think it far-fetched
to suggest there was something of the master and the pupil about
their relationship, with the older and stronger leaving his impress
on the younger and weaker.5 Sulla had by now reached his political
maturity and since Lucullus in his later career shows he held many
of the former’s principles it is not, I think, rash to suggest that he
had taken them directly from their author, even after due allowance
is made for the possibility that two men of optimate outlook would
naturally and independently gravitate towards the same political
position. Again, in joining Sulla’s staff, Lucullus was attaching him-
self to the man who, along with Marius, could claim to be the
greatest general of the day and here once more we may detect that
general’s influence on Lucullus. It was, however, exercised in a
more subtle fashion than in the political sphere. Lucullus, after ob-
serving Sulla in action, seems to have deliberately chosen a style of
generalship diametrically opposite to that of his friend. In Sulla’s
campaigns we detect a great urgency. He is ever anxious to bring
the enemy to battle and when confronted with a fortified town his
first instinct is not to lay siege but to attempt to storm it forthwith.
In Lucullus’ greatest campaign there is but one major pitched battle
and he emerges as a great master both of the war of attrition and of
siege craft. Unfortunately for his young friend there was one skill
which Sulla was unable to teach Lucullus: the management of men
by love rather than fear.6
In the very next year Lucullus was to give a spectacular dem-
onstration of his loyalty. This, of course, was the bustling and trou-
5 Sulla hardly needed lessons in constancy from anybody and there is
certainly no evidence that any of Lucullus’ mildness rubbed off on him.

6 Plut. Luc. 2. For Sulla’s character see Keaveney (2005a) pp. 177–88.
It should be noted that Lucullus’ entrée to Sulla’s circle in the first place
may owe something to his being a first cousin to Sulla’s wife Metella, cf.
van Ooteghem (1959) p. 18.
24 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
bled year of 88 which some believe marks the final milestone on

the road to the destruction of the Roman republic. We shall, how-
ever, but lightly sketch the course of events since not only have we
treated of them elsewhere but, in a biography, our attention must
be focused on our subject, Lucullus.7 He was elected to the
quaestorship which was usually the first office of state held by a
man embarking on a political career. His friend Sulla meantime had
been elected to the consulship and it was under him that Lucullus
was to serve. Normally a quaestor was assigned his province by lot
but in exceptional circumstances the senate might allow a com-
mander to pick his own quaestor. This would appear to be one
such occasion for it is difficult to believe that one of the heroes of
the Social War should be refused anything.8 Certainly, Sulla would
want reliable men serving under him for he had been entrusted
with a great task: the war with Mithridates, King of Pontus. For
nearly two decades Rome had been wrangling with this monarch
and now matters had at last come to a head. The king had over-run
the Roman province of Asia and even now was advancing into
Greece. But before he could move Sulla had become entangled in
domestic politics with the result that his enemies Marius and
Sulpicius illegally deprived him of his command. Seeing no other
way out of the impasse Sulla put himself at the head of his troops
and marched on Rome where he made short work of his enemies.
But the senators, while holding no brief for Marius and Sulpicius,
were outraged by this unprecedented act and their feelings were
shared by Sulla’s senior officers who belonged to the same stratum
of society. To a man they deserted Sulla. Alone among them Lucul-
lus remained loyal and joined the march.9 No doubt this was a trib-
ute to friendship but we might also consider that Lucullus actually
accepted Sulla’s view of his enemies as ‘tyrants’. Certainly, in a few
years many others came to believe (or professed to believe) that
Sulla’s enemies were also the enemies of the state.
7 For the events of this year see Keaveney (1983c) pp. 56–77.
8 Cic. Pro Arch. 5, Acad. 2.1; De Vir. Ill. 74; ILS 60 with MRR 1.555 n.
2, 3.121 and Greenidge (1911) p. 213.
9 Badian (1964) pp. 153, 220; Keaveney (2005a) pp. 45-63 and see
McGing (1986) pp. 66–125 for the Mithridatic background.

MASTER AND PUPIL 25
At any rate, by the spring of 87 the situation in Greece had so

far deteriorated that Sulla was obliged to cut loose from his domes-
tic entanglements and go to meet the king’s armies. The advance
guard was entrusted to Lucullus. Arriving in Boeotia he discovered
another Roman army wintering there. This was commanded by a
certain Braetius Sura, legate to the governor of Macedonia. Al-
though his army was but a small one Sura had inflicted a number of
reverses on the Pontic forces in the previous year. Coming to
Chaeroneia, Lucullus found that one of Sura’s cohorts billeted in
the town had provoked a serious incident.
The gravity of the matter seems to have made a deep impres-
sion on the Chaeroneians who long preserved the details in their
folk-memory. Years afterwards they still pointed out the descen-
dents of the principal participant, one Damon, and also the place
where he was slain which was said to be haunted by his ghost. This
Damon was renowned for his good looks and the commander of
the Roman cohort duly fell in love with him. When the Roman
could not get what he wanted by blandishments he resolved on the
use of force. Damon, foreseeing what was about to happen, gath-
ered together a band of sixteen youths. After a night’s drinking they
smeared their faces with soot and killed the Roman and his friends
while they were sacrificing at daybreak in the market-place. They
then fled the town. The town council, acutely aware of the danger
in which they now stood,10 immediately met and established their
good faith by condemning Damon and his followers to death.
Their reply was swift and clear. Slipping back into the town by
night they murdered the magistrates as they were having dinner in
the town hall. Then they bolted once more to live the life of out-
laws.
It was at this point that Lucullus arrived on the scene. Despite
the pressing business on which he was engaged, he took the time to
make an investigation and ruled that not only did no blame attach
to the town but that it had actually suffered wrong. He then joined
the cohort to his own troops and marched away.
10 For what could happen to you if you killed a Roman official see
Cic. 2 Verr. 1.67–76.
26 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
Meeting with Sura, soon after, he told him he must quit

Greece. The command of the war against Mithridates had been
given to another and it was for him alone to fight it.
A few years later, however, the Chaeroneians were to ap-
proach Lucullus once more as suppliants. After his departure
Damon began to ravage the countryside round about. Eventually
he was lured back to the town and made gymnasiarch only to be
felled by an unknown hand soon after. There matters rested until
some time later the Orchomenians, traditional enemies of Chaer-
oneia, re-opened them. They hired a Roman to bring a prosecution
against the Chaeroneians for the murder of the soldiers. The case
was heard by the governor of Macedonia in whose jurisdiction it
fell. The Chaeroneians’ advocate invoked the name of Lucullus and
the governor duly wrote to him. Lucullus’ reply convinced him of
the city’s innocence and the case was dismissed. In gratitude the
Chaeroneians erected a marble statue to Lucullus in the market-
place. Here then, for the first time, we have an incidence of Lucul-
lus’ fair-minded treatment of Greek provincials even in the most
adverse circumstances. It will not be the last and it may rather be
said that Chaeroneia was not the only town to express its gratitude
to him on this campaign. Hypata in Greece, Synnada in Phrygia,
and Thyateira (Ak Hisar) in Lydia all erected statues to Lucullus
with inscriptions which variously described him as benefactor, pa-
tron and saviour.11
11 Plut. Sulla 11, Cim. 1–2; App. Mith. 29; Obsequens 56 with Keave-
ney (2005a) p. 203 n. 7 and MRR. 2.15, 3.35; Syll 3 no. 743; IGRR vol. 4
nos. 701, 1191. I once believed that Paus. 1.20.4 referred to a skirmish
between Lucullus and Archelaus but I now accept that it is only a garbled
account of the campaigns of 86. I also divided Sura’s campaigns between
88 and 87, but Sherwin-White (1984) pp. 132–4 has shown they may be
accommodated in 88 alone. I see no reason however to accept his views
on the fleet, cf. Keaveney (1981a)—and my sequel to the encounter with
Archelaus—(2005a) p. 68—still seems valid.
The dating of the incident in Plut. Cim. 1 has given rise to disagree-
ment. I believe the key lies in finding a time when Lucullus would have
both the motive and the authority to take troops away from Chaeroneia,
which was usually under the jurisdiction of the governor of Macedonia
(see Butler and Cary (1979) pp. 83–6). Hence the date adopted in the text.
The date of 74 tentatively proposed in the Loeb edition fails to meet ei-
ther of these two criteria, as does that of Gelzer col. 980 who places it
MASTER AND PUPIL 27
The first objective of the Romans was to wrest Athens and

the Piraeus from the control of Mithridates’ general, Archelaus.
Macedonia was still in Roman hands and a small detachment was
sufficient to guard Chalcis so Sulla was able to concentrate his en-
ergies on his main target. However, the Social War had drained
Rome’s coffers with the result that the money at the proconsul’s
disposal was inadequate for the job on hand. So he levied contribu-
tions on the cities of Greece and borrowed their temple treasures.
What was thus gathered was turned over to Lucullus who spent
part of the winter of 87/6 in the Peloponnese turning it into coin.12
Sulla, however, was soon to find him something more exciting
to do. Shortage of funds was not the only problem faced by the
proconsul in that winter. As the Romans possessed no ships the
Pontic fleet had total mastery of the seas and was thus able to bring
supplies and reinforcements with impunity into the Piraeus. In an
effort to close this loophole Sulla applied to Rhodes which among
Rome’s allies had by far the best fleet. He soon learned, though,
that no help would be forthcoming from that quarter. In the previ-
ous year, it is true, the Rhodians had beaten off Mithridates’ assault
on their island home but their fleet was simply not strong enough
to challenge the Pontic navy on the open sea and hence they would
not venture far from home. This, in effect, left Egypt as the only
other place which might be both friendly to Rome and capable at
the same time of giving aid. So Sulla plucked Lucullus from his
financial duties, put his brother Marcus in his place and despatched
him to gather a fleet. He was to proceed to Alexandria, collect ves-
sels there and in Syria and then, having added the Rhodian fleet to
during Lucullus’ journey home in 80. Further, his belief that Roman sol-
diers are not attested at Chaeroneia before mid-86 (Plut. Sulla 16) is con-
tradicted by App. Mith. 29. It has also been suggested (cf. van Ooteghem
1959 p. 37 n. 3) that the incident be located in early 86 when Lucullus was
setting out to gather a fleet(see below). However, it is doubtful if troops
were then billeted in such a perilous position and even more doubtful if
they could be spared, cf. Keaveney (2005a) pp. 70-71.
12 Plut. Luc. 2 with Keaveney (2005a) pp. 70–71. The coins minted
were imitations of Athenian new-style tetradrachms, cf. Crawford (1974)

1, p. 80 n. 1.
28 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
MASTER AND PUPIL 29
his numbers, return forthwith to Greece. Although it was the win-

ter season when fear of storms made ancient mariners reluctant to
stir abroad the urgency of Lucullus’ mission meant he must go at
once. Yet for all its urgency—and this is a slightly surreal touch—a
place was found in the expedition’s tiny squadron of six ships for
Lucullus’ philosopher friend, Antiochus. Plainly Lucullus did not
wish to be deprived of the comfort philosophy may bring and An-
tiochus was willing to supply it. Whatever view we may take of Lu-
cullus’ philosophical attainments we can hardly deny that Antio-
chus’ readiness to accompany him on a hazardous mission is a trib-
ute to the affection and loyalty he could command. More than
storms was to be faced. Those who held the sea in their grip would
plainly do their utmost to see that Lucullus did not loosen that grip.
Hence he was obliged to make a scuttling crab-like progress across
the Mediterranean, changing ships from time to time in order to
throw his pursuers off the scent.13
His first landfall was Crete, an island long notorious as a ha-
ven for the pirates who, in those days, were such a terror to the
peoples of the Mediterranean basin. By Lucullus’ time, however,
much of this lucrative business of pillaging had been wrested from
the Cretans and was now in the hands of the Cilicians. The latter,
with an eye to the main chance, had thrown in their lot with Mith-
ridates and formed a considerable portion of his fleet. Doubtless it
was this circumstance which led the islanders to give Lucullus a
fairly sympathetic hearing. He was unable to extract any actual aid
from them but they did promise not to take sides in the struggle
between Rome and Pontus.14 With that Lucullus had to be content
and so he headed for his next port of call, Cyrene (roughly the
coastal region of modern Libya between Benghazi and Darnah).
In this place Lucullus found another opportunity to indulge
his zeal for improving the lot of those Greeks who fell under the
shadow of Rome. Ten years before the last king of the region,
13 Plut. Luc. 2; App. Mith. 33, cf. Mith. 24–7; Cic. Acad. 2.4, 11, 61
with Keaveney (2005a) pp. 68–73, (1984a) p. 119; Sherwin-White (1984)
pp. 125, 264; Sands (1908) pp. 165–70; Antonelli (1989) p. 54. I would not
agree with Villoresi (1939) p. 40 that the mission had some kind of propa-
gandistic objective.
14 Plut. Luc. 2; Strabo 10.4.9 with Ormerod (1978) pp. 210–12, 225–6.
From App. Mith. 56 I infer that no active aid was offered to Lucullus here.
30 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
Ptolemy Apion, had died and in his will had bequeathed it to

Rome. The senate, however, decreed that the five Greek cities
there should be free and thus they were left to their own devices.15
As might be expected, the inhabitants were incapable of taking ad-
vantage of their good fortune and like many Greeks before them,
fell into stasis. In addition, they were not immune from the pirate
scourge which, as we have noted above, plagued the civilized world
in those days. The upshot was that tyrants established themselves
as a result of the strife and confusion. The Cyrenaeans were thus in
a sorry plight when Lucullus arrived and they begged him to act as
a lawgiver. Reminding them of what Plato had once said when they
had implored him to play the same role, namely, that it was hard to
be a lawgiver for the Cyrenaeans when things were going well with
them, he nevertheless consented and established a new constitution
for them. The absence of any information on the contents of this
constitution has led modern scholars to make a number of guesses
of varying quality. Some believe that Antiochus played the part of a
cultural middleman between his friend and his fellow Greeks but
we may counter this by suggesting that Lucullus’ deep understand-
ing of things Greek might render this service unnecessary. Others
would go further and claim Antiochus as the author or co-author
of the constitution and this has a certain plausibility if we accept
the view that the philosopher interested himself in matters political.
An oligarchic complexion is claimed for the constitution because
Lucullus quoted that arch-oligarch Plato before getting down to
work. A better argument for this view might be that the political
opinions that Lucullus shared with Sulla would almost inevitably
lead him to devise a constitution of such a type.16 But whatever it
was Lucullus handed down for the Cyrenaeans it was not destined
to last for, in 75, the Romans belatedly entered on their inheritance
and annexed the place.17
15 Greenidge and Clay p. 118, cf. Bevan (1927) p. 332; Romanelli
(1943) pp. 13–24; Laronde (1989) pp. 1006–11.

16 Plut. Luc. 2, Mor. 255E-257E, cf. Jos. AJ 14.114 with Ormerod
(1978) pp. 208–12; Romanelli (1943) pp. 27–46; Sherwin-White (1984) pp.
255, 263; Dillon (1977) pp. 61, 79; Laronde (1989) p. 1011.
17 See further ch. 4 and app. 2.
MASTER AND PUPIL 31
All of this must have taken time and so we are entitled to ask
why Lucullus chose to indulge his altruistic tendencies at a time
when Sulla’s perilous plight would seem to have made it imperative
he be about his proper business. This is particularly pertinent be-
cause the Cyrenaeans do not appear to have been in a position to
offer him any worthwhile assistance.18 The most likely explanation
is that his sojourn here was an enforced one. He did not come
seeking ships but a convenient bolt-hole on the road to Alexandria.
Once having been safely ensconced in that hole, he discovered that
the operations of the Pontic navy rendered it perilous to venture
forth again and so he determined to employ his enforced leisure
usefully. What happened next is in harmony with this reading of
the situation. When Lucullus did eventually take to the sea once
more he was attacked by the pirates and lost most of his ships, al-
though he himself escaped safely to Egypt.19
It was probably about the beginning of summer when Lucul-
lus came to Alexandria to be met with what was literally a royal
welcome. The Egyptian fleet went forth to meet him decked in the
livery normally reserved for the arrival of a king. He is unlikely,
however, to have been in ignorance of what lay behind this pom-
pous display. The position of the king Ptolemy Soter II was a very
delicate one indeed. He had come to the throne for the second
time in 88 after chasing out his rival, Ptolemy Alexander I. The
latter had died soon after during an attempt to regain his throne
but not before leaving something for his rival to worry over in the
form of a will bequeathing Egypt to Rome. To complicate matters
further this man’s son (the future Ptolemy Alexander II) was at this
moment in the hands of Mithridates. Self-evidently both sides had
a handle ready for use against the king should he make the wrong
move. At the moment, it was true, the Romans did not seem to be
in any state to claim their inheritance. Sulla was totally engaged in
Greece, and at Rome itself a civil war had just ended which had
resulted in the installation of a regime bitterly hostile to him. To
give aid to Sulla then would be tantamount to an invitation to a
18 Laronde (1989) p. 1011, contra Romanelli (1943) p. 44.

19 Plut. Luc. 2. In my view Sherwin-White (1984) p. 140 n. 35 under-
estimates the difficulties Lucullus faced. Antonelli (1989) p. 56 is uncon-
vincing.
32 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
victorious Mithridates to install the ‘rightful heir’ in Egypt. But

were Sulla to win, against all the seeming odds, then there might be
no safety there either, for it was not inconceivable that his enemies
at Rome would crush him and all who aided him. Rome would take
revenge by entering upon its inheritance. And were one to give
active aid to Mithridates and should he lose, then there opened up
the dreadful possibility that both Roman factions might visit their
wrath upon the hapless Ptolemy. The permutations were virtually
endless but for the king they spelt out one message: shun all entan-
glements as the very plague. So he would avoid giving offence in so
far as was possible, treat Lucullus with every courtesy and respect
and give him nothing.
Thus when Lucullus stepped ashore he found he was to be
the first foreign commander ever lodged in the royal palace. He
later discovered the allowance for his subsistence was to be four
times the norm. As befitted a man on an important mission for his
chief who was at that very moment fighting for his life, Lucullus
did his best to avoid being smothered by this lavishness. He would
only accept such expenses as were strictly necessary and refused all
gifts, although 80 talents’ worth was offered. He also ostentatiously
avoided the normal Roman practice of making the grand tour to
Memphis and other sites, judging it to be inappropriate on the pre-
sent occasion. What such a tour would have involved is shown in
the record of a visit some thirty years before by a certain L. Mem-
mius. Then there was a great flurry of activity as the royal officials
busied themselves with elaborate preparations for guest houses,
landing places and even the feeding of the royal crocodiles. Lucul-
lus would have none of this and instead remained at Alexandria
working on Ptolemy and, in his free moments, conversing with
Antiochus and other philosophers.
At length he realized that Soter would not budge and he de-
cided to resume his travels. The king, still anxious to please as long
as he did not have to commit himself, gave his guest a naval escort
as far as Cyprus. In addition, he presented the Roman with an em-
erald set in gold. At first, Lucullus was minded to refuse this bauble
as he had all other gifts. But when Ptolemy showed him that it had
on it an engraved image of himself he realized a continued refusal
would hurt his host’s feelings and so he accepted. He knew full
well the murderous propensities of the Egyptian royal house and
MASTER AND PUPIL 33
feared that an insult might lead to his meeting with an ‘accident’ on

the coming voyage.20
Only now, with the year well advanced, did Lucullus begin to
meet with success.21 As he headed for Cyprus he was able to gather
ships from the towns of the Syrian coast. However, upon nearing
his destination he discovered that the pirates were once more wait-
ing for him. Across the channel lay their base, Cilicia. They had, by
means of fortification, strengthened the already rugged coastline to
the east and west of the Calycadnos (Göksu) river. From these van-
tage-points they were able to watch for and pounce upon the traffic
from the Levant which must needs travel through the waters which
lay between them and Cyprus. But this time they met their match.
Lucullus, divining what was afoot, immediately beached his ships
and sent letters to the cities of the island asking them to make win-
ter quarters and provisions available to him. They were willing to
do this and somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, in view of this fact that
the island formed part of Ptolemy’s dominions, they also gave him
ships. But the preparations for wintering were simply a ploy to fool
the enemy. When he obtained a favourable wind Lucullus put to
sea once more and sailed safely to Rhodes. There, as his fleet was
now large enough, he was able to break the Pontic blockade of the
island. By this time too he will have learned of the great change in
20 Plut. Luc. 2–3; App. Mith. 23; Cic. Acad. 2.11, 61 cf. MRR 1.539,
3.141–2; Bevan (1927) pp. 320–41; Badian (1967); Braund (1983) contra
Villoresi (1939) p. 42; van Ooteghem (1959) p. 28. Plutarch speaks of a
summaxi/an which might be a formal foedus amicitiae. It could be the one
mentioned in Jos. AJ 14.250 but neither its date or the identification of
the Ptolemy there is certain, cf. Sands (1908) pp. 169–70. Cimma (1976) p.
241 n. 137 thought it was Alexander I, but her further suggestion—that
this alleged favouring of his enemy by Rome conditioned Soter’s attitude
now—seems unlikely. Otto and Bengtson (1938) pp. 159–60 suggest that
Memmius may have been on an official mission to conclude a treaty. If
none existed then Sherwin-White (1984) pp. 262–5 is surely right to insist
that Rome’s long association with Egypt would be sufficient to lead her to
expect aid from that quarter anyway. See also the remarks of Bulin (1983)
pp. 24–6.
Despite Plutarch, Soter was not a meira/kion (van Ooteghem p. 28 n.
1) and he lived long enough to discover he had made a mistake on this
occasion.
21 See further in text and next note.
34 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
the affairs of Greece. Not only had Athens fallen, but Sulla had
utterly destroyed Mithridates’ forces in two great battles. There was
now no need for desperate haste. A second winter’s storms need
not be braved and so Lucullus took up his winter quarters here.22
With a Rhodian squadron added to his numbers, Lucullus
judged, in the spring of 85, that his fleet was now sufficiently large
to allow him to rejoin Sulla. But he also determined that on the way
he would do Mithridates a damage.
His first landfall was at Cnidus (Tekir) in Caria and there he
induced the inhabitants to abandon the king and join him. Continu-
ing on his journey northwards he next put into Cos. This place had
willingly gone over to Mithridates when he first invaded Asia but
had saved its Roman residents from the massacre that followed.
Now it gladly imitated the example of Cnidus. With these new allies
Lucullus next made an assault on Samos, only to meet with a re-
verse. Although the island had, before the war, enjoyed the status
of a friend and ally of Rome the inhabitants at this point seem to
have chosen to support the royal garrison and Lucullus was beaten
off. After this the Cnidians and the Coans went home but Sulla
characteristically remembered the services of the latter at least
when he gave them their freedom the following year.23
Despite this diminishing of his forces Lucullus pressed on to
achieve further successes. When, in the previous year, it became
22 Plut. Luc. 3; App. Mith. 56 with Ormerod (1978) pp. 198–9 and
Bevan (1927) p. 334. No source actually says Lucullus lifted the blockade
of Rhodes but it is an obvious inference from the sequel (see text). Lucul-
lus’ voyages self-evidently extend over two years but no source informs us
of the dividing-line between the events of 86 and 85. However, since win-
ter was near by the time he got to Cyprus, now seems the logical time and
place for him to winter. On Greece see further below. It was probably
now, rather than earlier (contra e.g. van Ooteghem 1959 p. 29), that Lucul-
lus gathered ships from Pamphylia—an action which may have inspired a
revolt against Mithridates in Termessus (Bruns7 p. 94).
23 Plut. Luc. 3. On Cos see Sherwin-White (1978) pp. 138–40. Cnidus
may have been set free by Sulla but this is not certain: see Keaveney
(2005a) p. 193. Pre-war status of Samos: Magie (1950) 1 p. 115 and Sher-
win-White (1984) pp. 235–6. I follow the latter’s (p. 243) plausible deduc-
tion from Plutarch as to what happened to Lucullus there. Despite Or-
merod (1978) p. 212, the pirate attack on the place (App. Mith. 63) is
probably later.
MASTER AND PUPIL 35
plain that the war in Greece was turning against Mithridates a

number of Asiatic cities had revolted from him. Colophon (Değir-
mendere) was one of these and for its pains had a tyrant called
Epigonus set over it. Lucullus now arrived and put this man under
arrest—no doubt with a view to having him eventually displayed at
Sulla’s triumph.24 The island of Chios was his next target. In the
original invasion of Mithridates it had taken the king’s side but
there seems always to have been a strong pro-Roman party there
and as a result when the unrest we have just mentioned manifested
itself the place fell under suspicion. Mithridates vented his spleen
to the full by transplanting part of the population to the Euxine
and placing a garrison to watch the rest. This garrison was expelled
by Lucullus and, in the following year, Chios had its freedom re-
stored.25
Up until this point Lucullus’ achievements, though solid
enough in themselves, could hardly be described as spectacular or
dazzling. Certainly he had done nothing to rival the great victories
by which his friend Sulla had gained mastery in Greece. In truth his
main contribution to the war effort had been to add to the already
considerable discomfort Mithridates was experiencing at the hands
of a rival Roman army. When Sulla’s enemies installed themselves
in power they lost no time in sending out a force of their own to
attack the king in Asia. Led by a blood-thirsty but able commander,
Fimbria, this army had inflicted a series of reverses on the king.
There is a certain irony then in the fact that it was this very army
that presented Lucullus with the opportunity to cover himself in
glory for the first time in his career. Fimbria had penned up Mith-
ridates in Pitane (Çandarli) but was unable to draw the noose fully
about his victim as he possessed no ships. He therefore applied to
Lucullus, intimating that he should forget about Sulla and join his
24 Plut. Luc. 3. As the tyrant was firmly in control when Lucullus ar-
rived it seems best to assume that the earlier revolt which took place just
after the battle of Chaeroneia (Oros. 6.2.8; App. Mith. 46–8) had been
suppressed. There seems to be no need to follow McGing (1986) p. 127 in
postulating he had been imposed before the rebellion or Magie (1950) 1
pp. 225–6 in putting that rebellion in the autumn of 86. The later status of
Colophon is not clear, cf. Keaveney (2005a) p. 193.
25 Plut. Luc. 3; App. Mith. 25; Greenidge and Clay p. 179. See Keave-
ney (2005a) p. 191.

36 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
own operations. If the king were to fall into their hands then the
great battles of Chaeroneia and Orchomenus in which Sulla had
smashed the monarch’s power in Greece would appear as nothing
beside such an exploit.
Lucullus, however, would not yield to temptation and flatly re-
fused to have anything to do with Fimbria. As a result Mithridates
was able to get away to Mytilene in Lesbos. Lucullus has sometimes
been castigated for this since it would seem that had he joined
Fimbria there was a good chance that between them the pair might
have brought the career of one of Rome’s most redoubtable foes to
an abrupt end.26 However, in at least one respect, Lucullus’ deci-
sion, it seems to me, does him great personal credit. He had justi-
fied Sulla’s faith in his steadfastness and loyalty. He was simply not
prepared to upstage someone who was both his commander and
his friend by making common cause with a deadly enemy. Indeed,
this conspicuous loyalty must have led him to regard Fimbria with,
at the very least, considerable distaste since the latter had reached
his present position by murdering his own commander.
But, over and above such personal considerations, there is a
wider issue in question here. Sulla’s march on Rome in 88 had di-
vided the Roman world. Some agreed with the consul that he had
acted perfectly correctly in putting down tyrants; others held that
he had acted unlawfully and should be tried for what he did. And
when Sulla’s opponents, with Cinna at their head, came to power
they soon showed what they thought by declaring him a public en-
emy. Sulla, for his part, ignored the decree and continued to act as
a proconsul. Because of the Mithridatic War the issue lay in abey-
ance but now, with the king on the verge of defeat, both sides be-
gan to think about renewing the contest. Was it Sulla or was it the
Cinnans who represented legitimate authority in the state? Was the
hostis decree to be rescinded or not? When no satisfactory answer
to this question could be found by peaceful means both sides ulti-
mately went to war over the issue. In Lucullus’ refusal to aid Fim-
bria we can see the battle-lines already being drawn and we have
here a foreshadowing of the struggle to come. If we accept, as in-
26Add Villoresi (1939) p. 49 n. 1 and Antonelli (1989) p. 62 to the se-

lection in van Ooteghem (1959) p. 31 n. 1. Gelzer col. 379 wonders if
Lucullus’ fleet would have been strong enough to impose a blockade.
MASTER AND PUPIL 37
deed we must, that Lucullus was one of those convinced of the

legitimacy of Sulla’s position then his actions are, in themselves,
perfectly logical. He would quite simply regard Fimbria as a servant
of an unlawful regime who had no proper authorization for what
he did. Such a person must be shunned since he was little better
than an outlaw or a renegade.27
For the rest of the journey Lucullus’ appetite for attacking the
king showed no sign of diminishing. He met with and defeated part
of Mithridates’ fleet off the promontory of Lectum (Baba) in the
Troad. Proceeding on his way, he discovered that a still larger royal
fleet under the command of Neoptolemus was lying in wait for him
off Tenedos (Bozcaada). Immediately Lucullus sailed ahead of the
rest of his ships in a galley commanded by an experienced Rhodian
admiral called Damagoras who had given a good account of him-
self during Mithridates’ siege of his native island. Neoptolemus
dashed out to ram his reckless opponent in a ship which was heav-
ily plated with bronze armour. Damagoras, realizing that a head-on
encounter would be fatal, instantly turned around and backed water
with the result that Neoptolemus struck him only a harmless blow
astern. At this point the rest of Lucullus’ fleet caught up with their
chief and he, turning his ship about once more, led it against the
enemy. The upshot was that the Mithridatic forces were routed and
Neoptolemus fled with Lucullus in hot pursuit.28
About eighteen months had elapsed since Sulla sent Lucullus
on his mission and he had begun to show every sign of despairing
27 Plut. Luc. 3; App. Mith. 52; Oros. 6.2.10. Of the motives attributed
to Lucullus in the text, the first two are found in Plutarch. The third is my
substitution for his further remark that some kind of divine providence
intervened to stop Lucullus now so as to reserve Mithridates as an oppo-
nent for later—a notion which could be true but probably should not be
allowed to find its way into serious modern historical writing. Orosius
puts a hostile construction on Lucullus’ third motive. Fimbria: Keaveney
(2005a) pp. 85, 87, 91, 92, 103, 118, 189; Magie (1950) 1 pp. 222, 226–8.
Sulla’s position: Keaveney (1982b) pp. 155–6.
28 Sources: Plut. Luc. 3; App. Mith. 56. Damagoras: App. Mith. 25;
IGGR vol. 4 no. 1113. Neoptolemus: McGing (1986) p. 108; van

Ooteghem (1959) pp. 31–2 appears to connect these incidents with Lucul-
lus’ activities at Abydos (see below) but both Plutarch and Appian put
them before.
38 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
of seeing his subordinate again. In the previous year he had even

started to build a fleet of his own at Chalcis. But now, at last, Lu-
cullus rejoined his commander and found him in the Chersonesus
(Gallipoli) preparing to cross over to Asia. As we know, the course
of events had long since rendered obsolete the original objective of
Lucullus’ mission. And by this time they had moved even further.
Mithridates had yielded and agreed to terms which were to be rati-
fied at a personal meeting between himself and Sulla at Dardanus
(Mal Tepe, Sehitlik Batarya) in the Troad. So all that was left for
Lucullus to do, after his long and perilous adventure, was to secure
Abydos (Nara), Sulla’s entry-point into Asia, and ferry his troops
across the Dardanelles.29
He was, however, to play an important role in Sulla’s settle-
ment of Asia. Once the proconsul had had his interview with Mith-
ridates he made short work of Fimbria and then set about the con-
genial task of rewarding Asian friends, punishing Asian enemies
and generally making provision for the better ordering of the prov-
ince. Those who went scatheless need not concern us here. Our
attention must be focused on those who paid the price for siding
with Mithridates. In essence Sulla divided the guilty into two
groups. Those who had massacred their Roman inhabitants were
deprived of their freedom, some of them lost part of their territory
and all were made liable for five years’ back taxes. Lesser offenders,
who had not actually committed murder but whose support for
their Roman allies was judged to have been, at best, lukewarm were
forced to contribute to a war indemnity which was also levied on
the greater culprits. As Sulla was desperately short of funds and
already facing the possibility of a war with the Cinnan regime he
proceeded with utter ruthlessness and, in a single winter, collected
all the back taxes.30
But ruthlessness has its limits and, by the spring of 84, when
Sulla was ready to return to Greece the indemnity had not yet been
paid. He realized then he would have to leave behind in the prov-
ince someone to attend to this. That someone would need to com-
29 Plut. Luc. 4; App. Mith. 56. According to Appian, Sulla had only got
as far as Cypsella in Thrace when Lucullus made contact. Background:

Keaveney (2005a) pp. 70–90.
30 Keaveney (2005a) pp. 91–98, 190-93.
MASTER AND PUPIL 39
bine absolute loyalty to himself with honesty and financial acumen.

Lucullus was the obvious choice, having given signal proof of his
fitness in all spheres. So it was decided that Lucullus should join
the staff of Licinius Murena as pro-quaestor; Murena, who was
already governor of Cilicia, was now made governor of Asia as
well. His pro-quaestor, L. Manlius Torquatus, then took Lucullus’
place on Sulla’s staff.31 Murena’s activities as governor assured Lu-
cullus of a free hand and left him in virtual control of the province.
In 84 Murena was busy in Cilicia making war on the pirates. The
problem they posed was a long-standing one but there was now a
punitive intent on the part of the Romans. They would naturally
wish to settle scores with people who had made up a large part of
Mithridates’ fleet in the late war. However, Murena soon allowed
himself to be lured away from this task by fairer prospects. Hungry
after military glory and a cheap triumph, he picked a fresh quarrel
with Mithridates and for the next two and a half years (83–81) was
embroiled in warfare with the king.32
In truth the task that faced Lucullus seemed to be thankless.
Yet he emerged not only with his reputation intact but actually en-
hanced. The financial burdens Sulla laid on the Asiatic cities, com-
ing hard upon the depredations of Mithridates, reduced many of
them to beggary. In order to meet his exactions they had had to
borrow money at exorbitant rates of interest. Theatres, gymnasia,
harbours, in short every available piece of public property, had to
31 Keaveney (1982d) pp. 123–4, (1984a) pp. 119–21; contra Freeman

(1986) p. 271 n. 21, cf. MRR 3.123. The lacuna in the gubernatorial staff
of Cilicia between 95 and 84 to which Freeman p. 259 draws our attention
can, up to a point, be explained. As he (p. 264) emphasizes the provincia
was created to deal with piracy. During the Social War, a time when many
governors remained long at their posts, cf. Badian (1964) pp. 71–104,
Rome is unlikely to have put this area high on its list of priorities. With
the virtual ending of the war in 88 the time would seem right to send out
Murena. But circumstances soon changed again and if he was unable to go
near the place, neither was any Cinnan governor.
32 Pirate War: Villoresi (1939) p. 54; Keaveney (2005a) p. 97; Freeman
(1986) pp. 259–60. Second Mithridatic War: Keaveney (2005a) p. 62;

Glew (1981). For some further remarks on the chronology see app. 1. The
evidence supports Cicero’s contention (Acad. 2.2) that, in the main, Lucul-
lus’ stay in Asia was peaceful.
40 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
be mortgaged to raise the necessary cash. We may be sure this

situation caused Lucullus considerable distress. His views on how
provincials should be treated are by now well known to us, and
some ten years later when he returned to the province as governor
and found the problem persisting he took effective measures to
bring it to an end. But plainly there was nothing very substantial he
could effect now and loyalty to Sulla must be paramount. Yet Lu-
cullus did what he could and we are told he won golden opinions
for the fairness and mildness with which he carried out his distaste-
ful task. This, of course, could mean any number of things. For
one, it appears to refer to his willingness to receive deputations to
see what might be done to alleviate their plight. For another it
could mean that he always treated the provincials with courtesy and
good manners. And, I would suspect, it meant too that Lucullus
extracted no more than was strictly owed. Not for him the extor-
tion of the provincials practised by so many Roman officials. And
if he himself did not steal we may be sure he saw to it that his assis-
tants did not either. Those statues erected in Thyateira and Synnada
would seem to be the expression of genuine gratitude.33
Another Greek city was to have less pleasant memories of Lu-
cullus, largely through its own fault. Of all the towns which had
taken Mithridates’ part, Mytilene alone held out when Sulla retook
Asia. Having surrendered the Roman legate M’. Aquillius to the
enemy they knew they could expect no mercy from the vengeful
Sulla.34 It was probably not until the spring of 82 that Lucullus fin-
ished collecting his monies and Mytilene was still in rebellion. Be-
ing of a less choleric disposition than his friend, Lucullus seems to
have tried to reason with the Mytileneans and offered them, so we
learn, relatively easy terms. What exactly these were we are not told
but it is difficult to believe Mytilene could escape the financial pen-
alties, the trials of ringleaders or the loss of freedom which other
33 Plut. Luc. 4, 20; Cic. Acad. 2.1; App. Mith. 63; ILS 8772 with Magie
(1950) 1 p. 238. Cf. Keaveney (2005a) pp. 93-94. ILS 805 from Delos
erected by Greeks and Romans in Lucullus’ honour probably dates from
this period. A mutilated inscription from Delphi (SEG I no. 153) may also
honour Lucullus, cf. van Ooteghem (1959) p. 20 n. 2. Lucullus recoined
the money but no specimens have been found (Magie 1950 2 p. 1118 n.
19).
34 Keaveney (2005a) p. 190.
MASTER AND PUPIL 41
like culprits had suffered. On the other hand, since they were sur-
rendering on terms, the Mytileneans might have avoided the plun-
dering, the demolition of city walls, the loss of territory and the
selling into slavery which so many other places had undergone. But
whatever it was that was on offer, it failed to impress the townsfolk
and Lucullus was obliged to proceed against them with his forces.
They, in a show of defiance, met him in open battle and were duly
worsted. The Romans then put the town under siege. However,
when his enemies showed no sign whatsoever of yielding Lucullus
decided to employ a ruse. In broad daylight he sailed to Elaea
(Kazikbağları) which lies on a gulf off the mainland a little to the
south of Mytilene. From here he slipped back again and waited in
ambush near the city. One would have imagined that, as Asiatic
Greeks, the Mytileneans would have bethought themselves of what
had previously happened in the neighbourhood on a famous occa-
sion when a besieging army appeared to withdraw leaving a gift in
its wake. But apparently not, for they took the bait that was offered
them. Baying for the loot which the abandoned Roman camp
seemed to offer they sallied forth in a disorderly mob, only to have
Lucullus fall upon them. He captured a great number and killed
five hundred who had sufficiently collected their wits to make a
resistance.35
There can be little doubt that this was a heavy blow to
Mytilene but the city was still not disposed to give in and soon af-
terwards events elsewhere ensured it would have a respite.
Murena’s campaign against Mithridates had not, to say the least of
it, gone well and before he could repair the damage an envoy ar-
rived from Sulla, about the middle of 81, bidding him desist from
attacking one who was about to become an ally of Rome. Murena
had no option but to comply. Early in the next year Murena’s suc-
cessor, C. Claudius Nero, arrived in the province and so he was
35 Plut. Luc. 4, cf. n. 30 and App. Mith. 61. I proceed from the as-
sumption that Lucullus would settle financial matters (his main task) be-
fore dealing. with what was an isolated case of defiance. Since he was not
as harsh as Sulla we may assume he also took some time over them—
another trait which would commend him to the provincials. Hence the
suggested date in the text for the start of hostilities. With his mild ap-
proach compare Pompey’s restoration of the town’s freedom in 62 (Magie
1950 1 p. 365).
42 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
forced to withdraw. With him went Lucullus. Not only had he

completed the most important task he had been set but he had also
served for longer than a quaestor usually did. But, although he had
captured 6,000 slaves and a great deal of other booty from Mytilene
the town remained unsubdued in his wake. Nero did nothing worth
while and it was not until 79 that his replacement M. Minucius
Thermus captured the place in a storming in which the young
Julius Caesar distinguished himself.36
But by then Lucullus had taken his place in Sulla’s Rome.
36 On all of this see app. 1.

3 THE POLITIC MAN
Lucullus’ return to Rome in 80 can be said to mark his real entry

into political life. Strictly speaking, of course, his public career had
begun with his quaestorship, the first office held by a man intent
on pursuing the cursus honorum, but it is fair to say that in this posi-
tion he was given little chance to display whatever political talents
he might possess. When not about the business of soldiering or
administering, his role was simply that of a loyal supporter of
Sulla’s policies. So, it is only now, with his aedileship (79), that we
can begin to speak of him as a political figure.
But when we do speak of the political career of Lucullus or
indeed of any Roman noble there are three considerations which
we should always bear in mind. To begin with, we must remember
the ideals people such as he had before them. It was generally ac-
cepted that a noble like Lucullus should devote himself to the ser-
vice of the state. Since he was of independent means he did not
have to labour and it was expected that he should employ the free-
dom he thus enjoyed in public business. If he acquitted himself
well in office self-evidently he would have served the state well but
it would also be acknowledged that he had brought honour and
distinction to himself. And not just to himself but to his family.
Ever before his eyes the noble would have the achievements of his
ancestors and his goal would be to have men say he had equalled or
surpassed them.1
Idealism was not enough however. The noble recognized full
well that public life had its less exalted side.2 Achieving office in-
1 Cic. Rep. 1.1–12, De Offic. 1.71–8 with Taylor (1949) pp. 25–8;
Wiseman (1985) pp. 3–8. The ideal was revived in the Renaissance, cf.
Einstein pp. 189–90 and Keaveney and Madden (1992).
2 The Cicero passages cited in n. 1 acknowledge this fact of life.
43
44 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
volved struggle and competition with one’s peers who sought the
same goal. Rome was a fiercely competitive society and any man
who wished to make his way in public life there had, in essence, to
do two things. He had, first of all, to make himself pleasing to the
sovereign people, for they were the ones who would elect him to
office and pass any laws he cared to bring forward. Second, a man
had to cultivate his fellow nobles. Political friendships would have
to be formed with those who possessed power and influence and
were prepared to use them on his behalf. In other words, the Ro-
man noble soon discovered that everyday politics had its own me-
chanical processes and, if he wished to succeed, he had better learn
how to apply those processes. Like any politician anywhere, he rec-
ognized where the sources of power lay and shaped his behaviour
on that recognition.3
Finally, we have to remember that a Roman politician could
be confronted with issues on which opinion divided. Then the no-
ble would, no doubt, be swayed by diverse considerations: the urg-
ing of his political friends, the possible consequences of his deci-
sion for his own career and, we may say, the intrinsic merits of the
question being debated. The validity of this thesis has sometimes
been questioned but it will readily admit of proof. For instance,
when, in 91, the younger Drusus announced his legislative pro-
gramme a clear majority of the senate supported it because they
believed it would be beneficial to the house. But support was not
unanimous, for there were those who opposed the tribune from
the start. In some cases this opposition was based on the belief that
the proposed laws held real political dangers; in others it sprang
from personal enmity. Eventually, in an atmosphere of increasing
rancour and bitterness, these men were able to persuade a majority
of the senate to their way of thinking and Drusus’ laws were abro-
gated. It could, of course, be argued that this instance was excep-
tional but, in fact, we do have abundant evidence of cases where
less dangerous issues such as the allocation of provinces or the
granting of triumphs gave rise to sharp differences of opinion.4
3See Gelzer (1969) pp. 54–138; Millar (1984) pp. 9–14, (1986) pp. 1–
11; Wiseman (1985) pp. 3–19; North (1990); Keaveney (2005) pp. 76–92.
4 Keaveney (2005) pp. 87–92 and Millar (1984) pp. 14–16.
THE POLITIC MAN 45
These, then, are the considerations we should bear in mind

when we come to examine Lucullus’ political career. I shall not be
referring explicitly to them again for I would hope that the narra-
tive itself would make it tolerably clear how they manifested them-
selves in his particular case.
In antiquity it was claimed Lucullus was a very lucky man
since he was away in Asia while Sulla was carrying out his proscrip-
tions. He was, therefore, spared the agony of choosing between his
own instincts which would be on the side of clemency and obeying
the commands of Sulla whom he revered. Thus, not being called
upon to join in the man-hunts, he avoided besmirching his reputa-
tion.5 However, the advantage thus gained added more to his post-
humous fame than to his contemporary standing. If modern histo-
rians have not levelled the charge of savagery at him, it has at the
same time to be said that a name for bloodthirstiness would have
done him no harm at all in the Rome of his own day. Crassus, for
instance, won evil repute and even fell under Sulla’s displeasure
because of his activities at this time, yet went on to become one of
the leading figures of the next couple of decades, and who will for-
get that Pompey who was branded as an adulescentulus carnifex
(youthful butcher) because of his zeal in hounding Sulla’s enemies
was also hailed as ‘Magnus’? To be labelled a Sullan, whether zeal-
ous or not, was no disadvantage in the Rome the dictator had cre-
ated.6
In truth, we may suspect that Sulla’s friendship will have
proved extremely valuable to Lucullus. His candidature for the ae-
dileship of 79 was, in fact, made in absentia. He was either still in
Asia or on his way home with Murena when the elections of the
year 80 took place. Under these circumstances he must have relied
not only upon his brother Marcus who was also seeking the same
office but also upon friends to canvass for him. I think it not
unlikely that Sulla was among those friends and that his presence
will not have gone unnoticed by the voters. Admittedly this much
is hypothesis, but one other circumstance which aided Lucullus is
well documented. On age grounds alone, Lucullus could have been
an aedile possibly in 81 and certainly in 80. Moreover, there were
5 Plut. Luc. 4.
6 Val. Max. 6.2.8; Keaveney (2005a) p. 128; Seager (1979) pp. 8–13.
46 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
no real problems about his leaving Asia even as early as 82. His
main work there was done and he could reasonably claim he had
been a pro-quaestor for far longer than was usual. But instead of
making an early bid he elected to postpone his candidature until his
brother came of age so that they might both hold office together.
This gesture, we are told, was pleasing to the people and both
brothers were elected aediles for 79.7
The minor magistracy of the aedileship had charge of the
maintenance and improvement of roads, bridges and public build-
ings. Aediles were also required to regulate the markets and super-
intend both houses and taverns. They had a tribunal of their own
to deal with those who transgressed their ordinances. No doubt it
would be noted in the appropriate quarters how well or badly a
man carried out these tasks. But it was not really their essential but
unexciting duties that drew attention to these magistrates. Rather, it
was a further obligation they had to fulfil: that of giving games. In
April there were seven days of these in honour of Cybele, known
as the Ludi Megalenses. September saw games in honour of Jupiter
which lasted for fifteen days. These consisted of three elements:
chariot races (circenses), animal hunts (venationes) and theatrical per-
formances (scaenici).
The proper mounting of these games was of considerable im-
portance for it was by means of them that an aspiring young politi-
cian showed his respect for the Roman populace. The people ex-
pected that any man who was contemplating suing for higher office
should provide them with a suitably splendid entertainment. If he
wished to be taken seriously later on then he had better take them
seriously now. Stinginess at this stage would be remembered. It is
true that some who did reach high office could boast that they had
made only a modest outlay during their aedileship or had not both-
ered to seek that office at all. But these were dangerous precedents
to adopt as a pattern and men like Mamercus Livianus served as an
awful warning of what might happen if one did follow them. He
refused to stand for the aedileship although he was known to be a
rich man and he paid for his contumely when he forfeited the con-
sulship. Thus, the received wisdom was: court the people during
7 MRR 2.83, cf. Keaveney (2005a) p. 164, ch. 1 n. 3, ch. 2 above; An-
tonelli (1989) p. 78; Badian (1983).
THE POLITIC MAN 47
one’s aedileship. Public monies were provided to stage the games

but, when empire brought wealth to Rome, many men supple-
mented these from their own resources. They were thus enabled to
mount lavish shows which, they hoped, would give them an advan-
tage over others who would be seeking the same higher office. This
practice plainly carried danger with it. As is well known, Caesar had
to borrow extensively in order to make a display and so fell into
debt. But, dangerous or not, aediles strove to eclipse contemporary
rivals by surpassing the achievements of those who previously held
their office. The ancients have preserved for us lists of men who
were long remembered for the lavishness of their spectacles or the
novelties they introduced to stimulate the jaded palates of their
audience.8
The Luculli brothers were certainly not the ones to go con-
trary to the spirit of the age or to take any chances when dealing
with the people. Although it cannot be proved, it is like enough
that the already large family coffers were swollen by a share of the
booty from the war with Mithridates. At any rate they spared no
expense in seeing to it that the people of Rome had something
memorable set before them. Twenty years before, elephants had
made their first appearance in the Roman arena, and now a new
refinement was introduced when they were pitted in combat
against bulls. The stage, too, witnessed innovation. A machine was
provided that was capable of making the scenery revolve. These
novelties were sufficient to ensure the pair a place in that roll-call
of individuals whose aedileships had been particularly memorable.9
8 Cic. De Offic. 2.54–9 (plainly in two minds about the practice of buy-
ing popular favour); Val. Max. 2.4.6; RE ‘aedilis’; Greenidge (1911) pp.
208–12; Gelzer (1968) pp. 32–8; Scullard (1981) pp. 41, 182–3; Taylor
(1949) pp. 30–1.
Broughton’s doubts (MRR 3.31) about the interpretation of De Offic.
2.59 seem misplaced. The contrast Cicero draws is between those who
were successful sine ullo munere and himself with an exiguus sumptus. It is to
this contrast that the phrase in hoc quoddam modo refers rather than to his
failure to reach the censorship.
9 The munus quaestorium of De Vir. Ill. 74 is probably a garbled refer-
ence to these games, cf. Gelzer col. 373 and van Ooteghem (1959) p. 19
n. 3. On the stage machinery see Beare (1963) pp. 284, 300–2.
48 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
More immediately the people showed their goodwill by elect-

ing Lucullus praetor for the very next year. This was a signal mark
of affection and respect because under the Lex Cornelia annalis of
Sulla a biennium (period of two years) was required to elapse be-
tween the holding of curule offices.10 In fact we are told that a spe-
cial law had been passed, the effect of which was to allow Lucullus
to proceed in this fashion. But what law was this? Some think that
Sulla was the author of a measure designed to benefit his officers.
As their careers had been seriously retarded because of their years
of service to him in the late wars it would be but natural justice that
when they resumed them they should be allowed to make up for
the time they had lost as a result of their loyalty. So they would,
under the terms of the postulated law, be allowed to disregard the
biennium which should exist between offices. To this it has been
objected that of the Sullani Lucullus is the only man who seems to
have been able to act in this fashion. So some believe there was no
general law at all but one that benefited him and him alone.11
There is, however, yet another possibility which need not nec-
essarily invoke the hand of Sulla. We saw earlier that the people
were very taken with the fact that Lucullus had deliberately delayed
his own career in order that he might be an aedile along with his
brother. We may further postulate that the games the brothers had
given would have put them in a mellow and accommodating mood.
In this frame of mind they might very well then be amenable to a
suggestion (coming we know not from whom) that this splendid
aedile should not have to suffer for an act of generosity on which
they themselves had set the seal of approval. So they were induced
Finances: Booty was certainly gained at Mytilene (Plut. Luc. 4). See
further the observations of Scardigli (1989) pp. 293–4, although I do not
agree with her view that Cic. Pro Flacc. 85 refers to Lucullus’ first Asian
service. It surely refers to grateful provincials during his governorship.
10 MRR 2.86; Keaveney (2005a) p. 144.
11 Cic. Acad. 2.1. The first view is that of Badian (1964) p. 141 and
Gelzer col. 381, the second that of Sumner (1973) p. 114. Badian (p. 154
n. 9) supports his thesis by claiming that privilegia were illegal. However
privilegia appear to be laws harmful to the individual, cf. Cic. De Leg. 3.44,
De Domo 43. There seems to be no prohibition on laws beneficial to an
individual as, for instance, in the case of that which recalled Cicero from
exile (MRR 2.200).
THE POLITIC MAN 49
to pass a law which would allow him to become praetor in the very
year he would have expected to have done had he held the aedi-
leship at the date he was first entitled to do so.12
Early in the year of his praetorship (78) Lucullus lost his
friend and patron when Sulla died in his villa at Puteoli (Pozzuoli).
After his will was opened it was found to contain a last expression
of his friendship for Lucullus. The latter was named as the guardian
of his young children, Faustus and Fausta. At the time of his death
Sulla had been working on his Memoirs and these he dedicated to
Lucullus with the remark that his young friend would be better able
than himself to give them an aesthetically satisfying form. Yoked to
this pleasing compliment was a typically Sullan piece of advice:
above all else put your faith in the messages the gods send in
dreams. At the appropriate point in our narrative we shall see what
Lucullus made of this counsel. As regards the editorial injunction
he seems to have interpreted it in the way he was most probably
meant to: not as a sacred duty laid on him by a dying man but sim-
ply as an elegant salute to himself. Sulla, in making his request, was
likely to have been no more sincere than Caesar was later when he
said his Commentaries were not history but the raw material for
history and Lucullus was no doubt perfectly aware of this. Thus we
learn that the last book of the Memoirs left unfinished at Sulla’s
death was completed by his freedman Epicadus but we hear noth-
ing about Lucullus meddling with what Sulla himself had written.
However, if Sulla’s will is of considerable interest for what it
contains it is of equal interest for what it does not contain: the
name of Pompey. The Romans expected a man to make honour-
able mention by name of all those whom he regarded as his friends
in his last testament. Consequently, those who had thought them-
selves to be numbered among a man’s friends and now, at this late
date, found they had been mistaken were not just hurt but regarded
the omission as an insult. Given Sulla’s character there can be no
12 David and Dondin (1980) pp. 206–8 believe Cicero’s phrase (Acad.
2.1) legis praemio means that as a result of a successful prosecution under

the Lex Servilia Glaucia Lucullus was entitled to accelerate his career. How-
ever, nothing is known of this act and an exception of this sort is not at-
tested elsewhere, cf. Sumner (1971) pp. 247–8, (1973) pp. 146–7 and
Zumpt (1871) pp. 53–64.
50 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
doubt that the intention was to wound since, significantly, every

other prominent Sullan received his due mention. On two occa-
sions in the years 81–79 Pompey had caused Sulla some consider-
able political embarrassment and he did not forget it. It may also be
that this was a final attempt from beyond the grave to tame the
monster he himself had helped to create.13
In thus passing over Pompey and conferring great honour on
Lucullus, Sulla—consciously or otherwise, we cannot say—along
with his tangible bequests had left a legacy to Rome itself: enmity
between the two men. From the very moment their careers began
to coincide there must have existed a spirit of rivalry between
Pompey and Lucullus even though one was active in Italy and Af-
rica while the other was engaged in Asia. Both were young, able
and ambitious and seeking the favour of the man to whom they
had attached themselves. To Sulla they looked for important com-
missions and help in advancing their careers. They were vying with
each other in the race for advancement. However, from this point
onward we are speaking of something more than mere competi-
tiveness.
Given the heterogeneous nature of the coalition which Sulla
led to power it is hardly surprising to discover that there was a cor-
responding diversity of opinion among those who now made up
the ruling oligarchy of Rome. Leaving aside those disaffected or
about to be disaffected, we find, at one extreme, men like Lucullus
who were passionate partisans of the dictator, at the other, the likes
of Pompey, who, despite quarrelling with Sulla, were prepared to
work his system for his own advantage. Yet, whatever shades of
opinion we may detect now or later, we may, with confidence, style
the republic ‘Sullan’ and the men who ruled it ‘Sullani’ for two sim-
ple reasons. Those now in charge were where they were because
Sulla had put them there in the first place, and recognizing this they
were, for a time at least, content to live by the laws he had given
them. It therefore follows that when Sulla made his final statement
13 Plut. Luc. 1, 4, Sulla 6, 38, Pomp. 13; Suet. De Gramm. 12, Aug. 66;
Cic. Phil. 2.40–2, Brut. 262. See Peter, pp. CCCXX–CCCXXII; Pascucci
(1975) pp. 294–6; Keaveney (1982d) pp. 128–37, (1979) pp. 54–5; Valgig-
lio (1975) p. 245 n. 1 who holds Sulla gave Lucullus his Memoirs to use as
a source; Adcock (1956) pp. 10–13.
THE POLITIC MAN 51
to the world, to receive an honourable mention in it could not but

be of advantage to anybody who, for whatever reason, styled him-
self Sullan in Sullan Rome. In this instance, Sulla’s irrevocable pro-
nouncement was clear and unequivocal. By loading Lucullus with
signal marks of honour he declared him to be the first among his
friends while, at the same time, dismissing Pompey entirely from
their number. Thus we need not wonder that the latter from this
time on saw Lucullus as more than a competitor for honour and
began to harbour feelings of jealousy and dislike for the rival who
had thus surpassed him even though, on this occasion, he was able
to redeem the situation.14
The opportunity to repair the damage done presented itself
immediately and Pompey was astute enough to seize it. One of the
consuls for the year was a certain M. Aemilius Lepidus, a renegade
Marian who had made his peace with Sulla. He, in fact, owed his
elevation, in a large measure, to the support of Pompey in one of
the politically embarrassing acts that had so infuriated Sulla. By this
time (early 78) he seems to have already laid plans to overthrow the
Sullan constitution. As a kind of prelude to the great work, he set
his face against granting the dictator a public funeral. Pompey, for
his part, seeing the drift of his policies, appears to have concluded
there was nothing to be gained from further support of Lepidus
and that an instant sundering had much to commend it. So, blithely
ignoring Sulla’s insult, he boldly stepped forward to play the part of
the good Sullan and declared his support for the other consul Catu-
lus who, as an ardent Sullan, was determined his old chief should
be buried with full honours. Together the two of them smothered
Lepidus’ call and ensured that the funeral was carried out in due
and proper form. We may suspect that as he watched the funeral
pyre burn Pompey permitted himself a self-congratulatory smirk.
The alleged pariah had shown himself to be one of Sulla’s greatest
friends.
14 Plut. Luc. 4—a passage that well illustrates Plutarch’s often under-
valued capacity for psychological insight, cf. Keaveney (1982d) pp. 134–5.
To call Lucullus Sulla’s ‘political heir’ is probably going too far, cf. ch. 4.
There is nothing here analagous to, say, Cic. De Orat. 1.25. For a different
view see Antonelli (1989) pp. 80–1. Sullani: Keaveney (1984a) pp. 144–9;
Seager (1979) pp. 12–13.
52 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
It has been suggested that one of the reasons Pompey had

supported Lepidus in the first place was the expectation he would
eventually do something outrageous from which Pompey himself
might at some stage reap some benefit. Whether or not this cynical
calculation was made this was actually how things fell out. Despite
several attempts to placate him, Lepidus eventually broke out into
open rebellion and early in 77 the senatus consultum ultimum was
passed against him. As Catulus, by now proconsul, was no soldier
Pompey was appointed to assist him. Between the two of them
they put down the revolt. And almost at once another and greater
prize fell into Pompey’s hands: command in a sphere where it
would be possible to win great renown by defeating an opponent
of note. Refusing to disband his army, Pompey awaited the results
of the senate’s deliberations about Spain. There war was being
waged against Sertorius, one of the last and ablest of the Cinnans,
and it was a war which was going none too well. Indeed, the gov-
ernment’s general there, Metellus Pius, had urgently asked for help.
In the event neither the consuls nor anybody else could be found
to go and so Pompey was picked and had conferred on him the
title pro consule.15
Pompey therefore was one of the leading young men—the
leading young man, rather—of the early 70s. Living up to the
promise he had shown under Sulla he had, without ever holding
office, won for himself a position of considerable influence and
one from which he could gain yet more. In short, he was a figure
of prominence and as such had totally outstripped Lucullus in the
race for honour and renown. While the pages of the history books
are filled with the exploits of Pompey first at home then in Spain,
Lucullus’ career, despite the early benediction of Sulla, can, in
comparison, seem commonplace. Nowhere is this better brought
out than in the bustling year of 78 when all we hear of Lucullus is
his involvement in an arresting but minor incident which illustrates
not only his reverence for the law but also highlights again that
quality of mildness which Sulla found in him. One day as Lucullus
and his fellow praetors were giving judgement M’. Acilius Glabrio,
15Seager (1979) pp. 14–18; Keaveney (1982d) pp. 135–7, (2005a)

p. 173—contra Leach (1978) pp. 40–1; Spann (1987) pp. 77–85; Holmes
(1923) pp. 134–8, 365–9; Perelli (1982) pp. 160–5.
THE POLITIC MAN 53
who is believed to have been tribune at the time, passed by. When
Lucullus failed to rise from his seat as a mark of respect to the
other’s standing, Glabrio had his chair broken in pieces. Evidently
believing himself to be in the wrong, Lucullus meekly accepted this
reprimand and he, together with his colleagues, continued with his
business standing.16
Demonstrations of this sort, with or without the smashing of
chairs, are not rare in Roman history. Several instances are well
attested where a magistrate (not always a tribune), believing that the
dignity of his office has not been accorded the respect that is its
due, has forcefully brought home to the offender the necessity for
a change of attitude. There may, in Glabrio’s case, have been an
element of personal animus. He certainly had little reason to love
Sulla, who had forced him to divorce his wife so that she might
marry Pompey, and the hatred thus engendered is like enough to
have been extended to embrace one of Sulla’s leading henchmen. It
may also be that Lepidus’ contemporary call to restore to the tribu-
nate the powers Sulla had taken from it had emboldened someone
who is habitually described as sluggish to bestir himself for once
and insist upon the dignity of his emasculated office. But whatever
motives impelled Glabrio to act as he did the matter definitely
ended there and had no further repercussions. Later, indeed, Lucul-
lus was to have other unpleasant dealings with Glabrio but, on this
occasion, with the reprimand administered and accepted, there was
no more to be said or done. The incident stands in stark isolation
and has no connection with the other issues of the day.17
16 Dio 36.41.1–2 with David and Dondin (1980) pp. 119–205.
Broughton (MRR 3.121) wonders if a man like Acilius would have held
the tribunate at a time when it led nowhere (see ch. 4). Cic. Brut. 239, in-
voked by David and Dondin, which describes him as negligent and slug-
gish, might seem to answer this objection even if he was behaving here
with uncharacteristic energy. For a tentative suggestion as to another way
around the difficulty see next note.
17 David and Dondin (1980) pp. 202–5. Their discussion of the
precedents for Glabrio’s action leads me to wonder if he might not have

been standing on his dignity as a pontiff rather than as a tribune, cf. Liv.
Ep. 47 with Pais (1915) pp. 320–1. Glabrio was certainly a pontiff by 73
(MRR 2.114) but could have joined the college earlier. If this suggestion is
correct then it would remove Broughton’s objection (n. 16) but also one
54 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
With the year of his praetorship over, Lucullus became gover-

nor of the province of Africa. All that we know of his activities
there comes from a bald statement, in a late source which is as re-
nowned for its brevity as it is for its unreliability, to the effect that
he governed it justly. This calls for but two comments. To begin
with, whatever qualms we may sometimes feel about the source, we
can believe it here. What little it has to say is perfectly in harmony
with what we know of Lucullus’ behaviour in other provinces.
Likewise, the paucity of information means something else: Lucul-
lus was in a peaceful province where there was no opportunity for
military exploits. He was thus denied the chance to bring glory to
the state and shed lustre on himself. While Pompey was warring
against a worthy opponent in Spain Lucullus was performing rou-
tine administrative duties in Africa.18
Looking at all of this there is an obvious temptation to level
the charge of political incompetence at Lucullus for having allowed
himself to be thus outstripped by his rival and, in one respect at
any rate, the accusation may be justified. If it fell to anyone to voice
his support for Catulus when Lepidus began to make difficulties
over Sulla’s funeral then it surely fell to Lucullus. He, after all, had
been most honoured in the dictator’s will. Instead, he seems to
have done nothing and thus allowed Pompey to seize the opportu-
nity that had been proffered. Proceeding from this, we might go on
to level a further charge at Lucullus. He was a military man yet he
did not join Catulus in crushing Lepidus and he did not seek the
command against Sertorius. Once more it was Pompey who ful-
filled these roles. There is a simple answer to these latter charges:
Lucullus was absent from Rome when these matters came to be
considered. By the time a decision was taken to do something
about Lepidus it was already 77. Lucullus would have left for his
province by then and so would hardly be reckoned among the men
the senate might call upon for aid. However, when we probe the
issue further we discover that the simple answer is not the whole
answer. There is some reason to believe that Lucullus had not gone
of the motives for his behaviour stated in the text. On Glabrio see further
Hayne (1974).
18 Cic. Acad. 2.1; De Vir. Ill. 74. Plutarch’s silence probably indicates
he found nothing to report.

THE POLITIC MAN 55
abroad willingly and that he had had hopes of playing a prominent

part in the events that were about to unfold.
Long before the actual decision was taken to destroy him,
Lepidus had clearly become a menace. It did not require much wit
then to predict that events would fall out as they eventually did.
Lucullus seems to have divined matters correctly and tried to take
advantage of the situation. It was not, in fact, Africa that was the
province assigned him at first but Sardinia. He, however, refused to
accept this because, as he said, of the large number of Romans
whose activities in the provinces were by no means wholesome.
The targets of the barb are obvious: provincial governors, their
staff and the publicani. Such a statement is wholly typical of the man
whose own pro-quaestorship in Asia had been distinguished by its
gentle handling of the provincials. But high-minded declarations of
this sort, carrying, as they do, the implication that the speaker is
morally superior to others, are rarely popular and least of all among
those who suspect that they personally are being numbered among
the delinquents. Eventually Lucullus’ attempts to realize his ideals
with regard to provincial government were to bring him to grief,
but even now his assertion can have won him few friends.19
But, aside from this one publicly proclaimed, Lucullus, as I
hinted above, may have had another reason for this sloughing off
his province. If he were free of other commitments then he might
have some hopes of being called upon to aid in the quelling of
Lepidus. If that really was his expectation then it would appear he
was very soon disabused of it. His acceptance of Africa in place of
Sardinia shows clearly his realization that he would not be given
something more substantial closer to home. As he departed for his
province he no doubt consoled himself with the thought that he
could provide there an object lesson in provincial administration
for those he had lately castigated. Ironically, had he clove to his
original province he would have encountered Lepidus, for it was to
19 Dio 38.41.1. David and Dondin (1980) pp. 205–9 argue that Lucul-
lus refused Sardinia because he feared an accusation of repetundae on his

return but this does not explain why he did not entertain a similar fear
with regard to Africa. On praetorian provinces see Willems (1968) 2 pp.
545–6, 561–2, 570–87.
56 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
that island the rebellious proconsul retreated when he was defeated

in Italy.20
If we accept the hypothesis just expounded then we should be
in a position to appreciate fully the difficulties Lucullus would have
faced in pursuing his ambitions not only in 78 but also in 77, had
he chosen to linger in Rome. If a bright young man were to be
sought for military tasks for which his elders were unfitted then
Pompey—despite the qualms of some, which were to be proved
justified—was a more natural and obvious choice than Lucullus.21
In the elder statesman L. Marcius Philippus he had a powerful
friend whose influence won for him the command against Sertorius
and who also may have had a hand in seeing to it that he was sent
against Lepidus.22 Lucullus, indeed, had powerful friends of whom
we shall speak but they do not appear to have been strong enough
to overcome Philippus. They would hardly have been helped by a
comparison between the military records of Pompey and Lucullus.
Both had served Sulla well but the achievements of Pompey had
been the more dazzling and his repute as a soldier stood high. On
the other hand, many seem to have believed that Lucullus had no
claim whatever on the title of ‘soldier’. We who can survey his
whole career may find this a little strange but it was not an unrea-
sonable opinion to hold at the time. While Pompey was one of the
mighty warriors of the late civil war Lucullus was merely the man
who brought ships tardily to Sulla, collected monies in Asia and
had failed to capture Mytilene. The difficulties he had faced must
have been as well known to the Romans as they are to us but the
malicious, we may be sure, simply ignored them and talked only of
the failures. A few years later when Lucullus sought the Mithridatic
command we shall discover a substantial body of opinion in the
senate that does not believe him equal to the task. Then, when he
did actually receive the appointment, some said he made ready for
the coming campaigns by interrogating experienced soldiers and
reading histories.23
20MRR 2.89, 91. See also ch. 4 n. 71.

21Plut. Pomp. 16; Cic. Leg. Man. 62. On the qualms see further below.
22 Twyman (1972) pp. 843–4 although the prosopographical argu-
ment is dubious.
23 Cic. Acad. 2.1–2, cf. Schol. Gron. p. 320 St.
THE POLITIC MAN 57
Thus, Lucullus cannot be totally blamed for his failure to

achieve greater prominence at this time, despite the help of Sulla’s
will. He had to contend with Pompey’s powerful friends, the lat-
ter’s great reputation and his own relatively minor achievements to
date.
We have spent some considerable time on this comparison of
Pompey and Lucullus but we need make no apology for doing so.
Since both men can be said to have helped shape the destiny of the
Roman republic a comparison is undoubtedly important. It be-
comes vital when we reflect how as rivals—nay enemies—their
careers intertwined. Nevertheless, in carrying out this exercise we
must beware lest we acquire a distorted view of Lucullus’ career up
to this point. Judged by any standards Pompey’s career had been
extraordinary and remarkable. Brilliant campaigns, fought in his
twenties, under Sulla had resulted in a triumph for a man who had
held no office, however lowly. And still without holding office he
obtained command against Lepidus and Sertorius.24 Small wonder
that beside him Lucullus should appear very ordinary indeed. But,
if we shift our perspective and measure Lucullus’ career not against
that of this extraordinary man but against what was the norm and
against that of the mass of his contemporaries then we shall see
that it was creditable and more than creditable.25 Although his ca-
reer had been delayed by war, Lucullus still felt confident enough
to postpone it still further in order to hold the aedileship with his
brother. Then, such was his influence, he was able to have a law
passed enabling him to be elected immediately afterwards to the
praetorship. This was followed by an excellent provincial govern-
ment and, upon his return, he was elected consul within one year
of being suo anno. In sum, Lucullus’ advance to the highest office
had been one of almost unbroken, and at times privileged, pro-
gress. But before we talk of the consulship there is one other mat-
ter that must engage our attention.
It is appropriate that we say something here about certain as-
pects of the political situation at Rome in the 70s for not only did
the rivals Pompey and Lucullus advance their careers against its
24 See the remarks of Seager (1979) pp. 187–8.

25 A glance at the careers of the other consuls of the 70s will make
this clear.
58 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
backdrop but it was then, I believe, that the fate of the Roman re-
public was sealed.26
On one thing the Sullan oligarchy were virtually unanimous.
Surviving proscribed men like Sertorius would, for obvious rea-
sons, receive no quarter. The sons of those others whom Sulla had
proscribed were not to enjoy their full civil rights either. Should
such men hold office then they would inevitably attempt to recover
their lost properties. Sulla had done his work well in this depart-
ment. By distributing his enemies’ estates to his followers he bound
them to himself and ensured they would not admit unwholesome
elements back into public life.27
Yet, for all of that, the Sullan oligarchy seems to have gone in
fear of what might emerge from among its own numbers. Ever-
present before them was the possibility that someone judged sound
and respectable and admitted to public life by Sulla might imitate
the general’s example and mount a coup d’etat. The heterogenity of
the Sullani carried dangers with it. Ex-Marians were particularly
feared as being mere time-servers of doubtful loyalty, and such
fears were wholly justified in the case of Lepidus. Before he was
destroyed he had unveiled most ambitious designs: restoration of
the powers of the tribunate, re-introduction of corn doles and res-
toration of confiscated land to its previous owners. In short, he
aimed at the total abolition of the Sullan system.28 And the uneasi-
ness did not go away after that. Caesar, who owed his life and his
career to an act of grace on the dictator’s part, had never made any
secret of his enmity to the Sullan system. So when, in 65, as aedile
he began gathering gladiators ostensibly for a show, the senate took
fright and set a limit on their numbers.29 Most famous of all the
26 The decade has been extensively studied. Paterson (1985) provides

a useful introduction. Gruen (1974) pp. 7–82 is more detailed but his the-
sis that fundamentally all was well is unacceptable. Twyman (1972) is viti-
ated by mechanistic prosopography. Seager (1979) pp. 14–27 and Perelli
(1982) pp. 159–71 study the role of Pompey and the populares respectively.
Although Rossi speaks anachronistically of ‘parties’, his idea of a three-
way split in the oligarchy seems plausible to me. See further below.
27 Keaveney (2005a) pp. 152-53, 169; Hinard (1985) pp. 87–100, 152–
212; Paterson (1985) p. 25.

28 Keaveney (2005a) pp. 173-74; MRR 2.88.
29 Gelzer (1968) pp. 20–1, 37–8.
THE POLITIC MAN 59
assaults on the Sullan system was, of course, the conspiracy of Ca-

tiline in 63. Press of necessity had turned the one-time Sullan hit-
man into a champion of the poor and an advocate of the abolition
of debt.30 The senate’s initial hesitancy in dealing with Lepidus and
Catiline can in part be attributed to the fact that such a corporate
body is naturally slow to act. But even more there lies behind such
sluggishness a desire not to provoke trouble unnecessarily. Having
had one taste of civil war, the fathers were not anxious to have an-
other.31
At first sight it might appear that the lack of a standing mili-
tary force or police could have hindered the Sullan republic in its
attempts to defend itself. By way of an answer we need only appeal
to its record. When troops were needed to meet external threat
from an armed force they were found and they duly did what was
expected of them. In point of fact the consequences that flowed
from the rise of Pompey, one of its greatest defenders, proved in
the end to be far more dangerous, nay fatal, to the republic than
any assault from without. Nobody nowadays, I think, believes that
Pompey aimed at anything more than to be the first man in the
republic. With dignitas greater than anyone else’s he would be de-
ferred to and have the rules bent in his favour.32 Yet there were
times in the 70s when it must have seemed to some, at least, that
he actually sought domination. Along with his military talents
Pompey had inherited from his father, no mean practitioner of the
art, a talent for brinkmanship which he exercised to the full.33
When Lepidus was crushed his refusal to disband his forces was in
contradiction of an order from Catulus to do so and soon after he
received the command against Sertorius in Spain. On his return
from there he kept his army intact until the last day of 71 before
entering on his consulship the very next morning. On neither occa-
sion was there any violence, no treason was spoken and no overt
30 See Rawson (1983) pp. 60–88.

31 See the remarks of Rawson (1983) pp. 71–3. Paterson (1985) p. 26
speaks of a desire for compromise as a characteristic of the Sullan senate.
As we shall see (ch. 4) this could shade off into simple cowardice.
32 Seager (1979) pp. 186–8.
33 For two other examples see ch. 4 and Keaveney (1981b) pp. 202–
12.
60 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
move to seize power was made, but men must have looked uneasily
over their shoulders and bethought themselves of Pompey’s former
master, Sulla. They certainly did so in 62, for upon Pompey’s return
from the east many thought mistakenly that he would imitate the
old dictator. All in all, as we survey these incidents it is not impos-
sible to believe that Pompey’s subtle pressure played some part in
getting him what he wanted.34
Undoubtedly Sulla was responsible for giving Pompey’s career
its initial impetus and was also to blame for turning his head by
hailing him as ‘imperator’ and ‘Magnus’ and permitting him to tri-
umph. But the dictator also seems to have realized that he had cre-
ated something that ran clean contrary to his own ideal of a state
where no man might have excessive power and that something
would have to be done to smother it. It is certainly not without
significance that, after his triumph in 81, Pompey never received
any further public employment so long as Sulla lived.35
We are probably on safe ground if we say that no matter what
conditions were like in the 70s a man of Pompey’s ambitions and
abilities would have sooner or later emerged into public life once
more. As it happened, it was chance, and chance alone, that facili-
tated Pompey’s career and determined the shape it would take. We
may say it was this chance too which played a large part in the de-
struction of the Roman republic. It is very easy to understand why
the consuls of 77 should decline the dangerous honour of the
Spanish command. The Romans had a strong traditional memory
of the horrors of the Spanish wars of the previous century and
anybody might hesitate to pit himself against the inhospitable ter-
rain and an enemy like Sertorius.36 But, nevertheless, their refusal
and the refusal of anybody else to go revealed a situation of which
the Romans themselves were acutely aware: by chance it had hap-
pened that there was at this time a lack of military talent in the
state. A situation had arisen which a man might foresee but not
34 Seager (1979) pp. 16–17, 22–7, 61, 72–3.

35 Keaveney (1982d); Seager (1979) pp. 8–13.
36 See Seager (1979) p. 17 rather than Twyman (1972) p. 849. For a
judicious assessment of Sertorius as a general see Spann (1987) pp. 140–6.

THE POLITIC MAN 61
legislate against and there was but one remedy.37 Pompey might be
potentially troublesome but Sertorius was definitely dangerous.
There was really no option but to confer a special command on the
young man. In taking this decision only the dimmest can have been
unaware of what it implied. Pompey might rid them of Sertorius
but there would be a price to pay. He would be helped further on
that road which lead to the pre-eminence he craved. But neither
now nor later were the senators prepared to let him have that posi-
tion.38 The senate was ever ready to use his talents but not to re-
ward them. Now it is very easy for a historian, armed with the
deadly weapon of hindsight, to lecture the dead on what they ought
or ought not to have done in a given situation but we may, per-
haps, be permitted one observation. In hardening their hearts
against Pompey the oligarchy had erred greatly.39 Their attitude
eventually drove him into the arms of Crassus and Caesar to form
the First Triumvirate, and few will deny that out of that there came
directly civil war.40
We may now return to our narrative of Lucullus’ career and
one of the things we shall be considering is the part he played in
defending Sulla’s constitution, which, as we have just seen, was in
some danger. We do not know how long Lucullus spent in Africa.
We are thus either at liberty to assume that he returned to Rome in
76 and remained quiescent for a year before embarking on an elec-
toral campaign for the consulship or instead we may choose to be-
lieve that he was not free of provincial duties until 75 and that he
began his canvass immediately on his return. One circumstance
might favour the second alternative. If Lucullus were in Rome it is
unlikely that either his ambitions or the political situation would
have allowed him to be quiet for a whole year.
But if the date of Lucullus’ return to Rome is disputed the
date of his consulship is secure. In 75 he was elected to the consul-
37 Cic. Pro Font. 42, Leg. Man. 27. It must, of course, have been obvi-
ous even earlier. We may recall that the unwarlike Catulus had Pompey as
a ‘special assistant’ when dealing with Lepidus.
38 Seager (1979) pp. 23, 28.
39 Opposition in the senate to the lex Gabinia was ‘almost universal’,
cf. Seager (1979) p. 33.

40 Seager (1979) pp. 72–82.
62 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
ship of 74.41 We described how Lucullus wooed the people when

he sought the aedileship and although we are told nothing about
his canvass on this occasion, we may be sure that he did not ne-
glect to do so now either. Here we shall spend a little time consid-
ering another aspect of Lucullus’ campaign, namely the support he
enjoyed from the political friends he had made in his years in pub-
lic life. All men at Rome could call themselves ‘Sullan’ but some
could, and did, lay greater claim to that title than others. Lucullus
naturally was one but he was not alone in considering himself an
inheritor of Sulla’s mantle. One of the features of these years was
the existence, within the ruling oligarchy, of an informal group of
nobles who made the defence of Sulla’s constitution the chief aim
of their political life. Where others were hostile, lukewarm or
merely indifferent, they were ardent. It was they, for instance, who
were to be in the forefront of the opposition to the Gabinian law
that conferred such wide powers on Pompey.42 But now, with cer-
tain alarming developments in the matter of the tribunate,43 a sense
of urgency was lent to their support for their friend Lucullus. A
sound man was needed in a position of authority to deal with the
problems of the day. So we can with reasonable certainty state that
a formidable array of consulars, Q. Lutatius Catulus, Mam.
Lepidus, C. Scribonius Curio, Cn. Octavius and Cn. Cornelius Do-
labella, came to canvass on Lucullus’ behalf. It is very like too that
he called upon men like Q. Hortensius, the leading orator of the
day, and L. Cornelius Sisenna whose partiality for Sulla could be
seen in the histories he wrote. Probably these men will also have
aided Lucullus’ colleague, M. Aurelius Cotta, since it is almost cer-
tain that he too shared their political views.44
But more than a shared political stance linked Lucullus to
some of these men. In the case of Catulus, Hortensius and Sisenna,
Lucullus enjoyed a warm personal relationship. All four had a
41MRR 2.100.
42Seager (1979) pp. 33–5.
43 See ch. 4.
44 Keaveney (2005a) pp. 186-87, (1984a) pp. 138–9, 147–9; Gruen
(1966); Badian (1964) pp. 212–14. Gruen (1974) p. 124 makes two perti-
nent observations about Cotta: there is no evidence of dissension between
him and Lucullus during their consulship and the competition between
them for gloria in Asia has no political significance. See further ch. 4.
THE POLITIC MAN 63
common interest in literary and philosophical matters. So far as

Catulus and Lepidus were concerned there was something more.
Both shared Lucullus’ dislike of Pompey. Catulus is unlikely to
have forgotten how the young butcher flouted his order to disband
his army and Lepidus had good cause to remember Pompey’s in-
tervention in the elections of 79 as that had cost him the consul-
ship then.45
We may fittingly close our chapter on the politic man with
Lucullus’ marriage, for such an event in the circles in which he
moved usually wore a political as well as a domestic aspect. His
bride was a girl called Clodia from the family of the Claudii Pulchri.
As so often with Lucullus, the date is not known exactly but two
circumstances allow us to fix it approximately. The girl’s father,
Appius Claudius Pulcher, died about the middle of 76 and it was
Clodia’s brother, also called Appius Claudius Pulcher who, acting
as her guardian in accordance with Roman custom, gave his con-
sent to the match. Then again, Lucullus, in the course of his con-
sulship, is described as a married man. Thus the wedding day must
have fallen somewhere after the middle of 76 and before the mid-
dle of 74 when he departed for the east.46
The Claudii were patricians with a reputation for hauteur and
waywardness. Two of the present generation, Tertia and her
brother C. Claudius Pulcher, were by no means negligible figures in
the society and politics of the time but few will quarrel with the
judgement that they have been eclipsed by Clodia herself and the
other members of the family who fully lived up to the traditions of
their ancestors. Of Clodia’s own activities we will speak in another
place. A third sister, also called Clodia and like all the girls of the
family accounted a great beauty, was famed in her day for her love
affairs and she has achieved a kind of immortality through being
identified, rightly or wrongly, with that Lesbia to whom Catullus
wrote so many of his poems. The brother Appius, of whom we
45 Plut. Luc. 1, cf. the speakers in Cic. Acad.; Seager (1979) p. 165;
Keaveney (2005a) p. 173-74.

46 Sources: Dio 36.14.4; Plut. Luc. 21, 34, 38, Cic. 29; Varro RR 3.16.2;
Cic. Pro Mil. 73. The approximate date is arrived at by comparing Varro
with Plut. Luc. 21 and MRR 2.96. Its significance has not always been
recognized, cf. van Ooteghem (1959) p. 44 n. 1. See also app. 2.
64 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
have just spoken, was well known for his stubborn self-regard and
his jealous fostering of the dignity of his clan. In politics he was
perceived as being a man of fickle loyalties whose primary alle-
giance was to himself. But, without doubt, the most colourful of
the lot was P. Clodius. He early showed signs of instability and his
reputation was to be besmirched with the imputation of incest. By
deliberate and avowed choice he chose the way of the demagogue,
a choice that eventually led to his death in a brawl on the Via Ap-
pia.47
Such was the family into which Lucullus married. As I hinted,
almost invariably matters of this sort among the Roman nobility
were arranged with a view to the political advantages which would
ensue. The bond thus forged would, it was hoped, result in the
members of the two houses working together in public life. Nor is
it difficult to detect such a consideration at work here. The stature
of Lucullus, a plebeian noble, would have a number of cubits
added to it as a result of an alliance with an ancient patrician family,
even if some of its members were eccentrics. But, if we look at the
matter dispassionately, we must conclude that the Claudii stood to
reap greater benefit from the alliance than Lucullus did.48 Upon his
death the elder Appius had left his large family in straitened cir-
cumstances and so when Lucullus came to seek Clodia’s hand he
magnanimously forbore from looking for the customary dowry.
Indeed, the younger Appius in after-times would jokingly remark
that until Lucullus resigned Clodia’s portion to him he could not
afford to serve mulsum (honeyed wine) at home but could taste of it
only when he scrounged it in other people’s houses. In modern
times he would doubtless have said he never drank cognac unless
somebody else was paying for it.49
47 Sketches of the family will be found in Gruen (1974) pp. 97–8;

Wiseman (1987) pp. 15–26 and Antonelli (1989) pp. 205–10 who de-
scribes them as ‘una bella nidiata di farabutti’. Wiseman (1969) pp. 50–60
discusses the identity of Lesbia.
48 Taylor (1949) pp. 33–5; Hopkins (1983) pp. 86–8. I cannot agree
with Gruen (1974) p. 98 n. 41 that Syme (1939) pp. 20, 23 has ‘perhaps
unduly stressed’ the family’s marriage alliances.
49 Varro RR 3.16.1–2 with Gelzer col. 406. Some (cf. Loeb note ad
loc.) seem to have taken Appius seriously. On dowries see e.g. Hopkins
(1983) p. 77 and Gardner (1986) pp. 98–9.
THE POLITIC MAN 65
However, for a man in Appius’ position shortage of funds

meant more than a simple shortage of delicacies. A fair amount of
money was required to finance a political career and, in its absence,
Appius and his two ambitious brothers might, for all their distin-
guished ancestors, find some difficulty in procuring advancement.50
Hence there was a certain urgency about finding good husbands
for the girls,51 and so the acceptance of Lucullus’ overtures, espe-
cially as he was prepared to be generous when it came to financial
arrangements. He was rich and he had already made some mark in
the world. Plainly he could do something for the Claudii and they
did not hesitate to take advantage of the connection in order to
further their own careers.
A dynastic union then. However, since it defies reason to ar-
gue that no Roman couple ever felt any attraction for each other,
we are at liberty to ask if Lucullus viewed Clodia with an eye to
anything other than the events of the senate house or the forum.
We have seen that she was renowned for her good looks and since
other men found her attractive we could suppose that Lucullus did
too. To waive a dowry might indeed betoken anxiety to gain a po-
litical advantage but equally well it is amenable to the interpretation
that it reveals a smitten suitor’s ardour. The question of the exis-
tence of warmer feelings than simple cold calculation in Lucullus’
marriage is therefore an open one and I believe it is best left so.52
But whatever motive (or mixture of motives) impelled Lucul-
lus to marry Clodia, the marriage itself was not to be a happy one
and his connection with this dangerous and volatile family brought
him small profit.
50 Gelzer (1969) pp. 110–12 and Taylor (1949) pp. 67–8. Note also
what was said above (pp. 46–47) about the aedileship.
51 Tertia married Q. Marcius Rex (cos. 68) and the other Clodia was
the wife of Q. Metellus Celer (cos. 60), cf. Wiseman (1969) pp. 53–9.
52 In my view Dixon (1983) pp. 102–3 may perhaps overstate her
case. Compare Shackleton Bailey (1960). See also Hopkins (1983) pp. 84–
6. I can see no reason why the dulce and the utile cannot combine.
4 THE CONSULSHIP
Right at the very beginning of his consulship, Lucullus was obliged

to deal with a crisis that had arisen in Spain. There the forces of the
government were experiencing considerable difficulties because of
the failure of Rome to send them supplies and reinforcements.1
Pompey had despatched a stream of missives asking for help but to
no avail.2 At last he wrote in exasperation to say that if the present
situation continued he would be forced to bring his army back to
Italy with the possibility that Sertorius would then soon be hot on
his heels.3 This letter was read to the senate at the start of 74. Im-
mediately, Lucullus and the other consul, Cotta, neither of whom
had any desire to see Pompey’s return, proposed he be given what
he asked for. Their influence prevailed and the necessaries were
duly voted.
On the surface, this appears to be a straightforward transac-
tion. Recognizing the gravity of the situation, the consuls coerce a
sluggish senate into doing its duty. A closer look, however, reveals
that it is not, perhaps, all that simple. To start with, we might ask
why Lucullus should have exerted himself in this fashion to rescue
an enemy from embarrassment. Then again, we might legitimately
1 Sources: Plut. Luc. 5, Pomp. 20, Sert. 21; Sall. Orat. Pomp. Cf. Holmes
(1923) p. 378. The best discussions of this episode are Ward (1977b) pp.
35–41 and Seager (1979) pp. 19–20. What I owe to them and where I
dissent from them will, I trust, be clear in what follows. For the Spanish
background see Spann (1987) pp. 108–20.
2 Cf. Sall. Orat. Cott. 6.
3 Seager (1979) p. 19 n. 50 describes Ep. Pomp. 10 as ‘obscure’. To me
it brings out far better than Plutarch what we may guess Pompey’s mes-
sage to have been: he was a victim of circumstance and it was through no
wish of his own that he was going to do what he said he would. See fur-
ther below.
67
68 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
enquire why Pompey had been allowed to get into such a mess in
the first instance. To answer this second question first: Rome was,
at this time, faced with a financial crisis and a famine brought about
by her foreign wars and the activities of the pirates in the Mediter-
ranean.4 In short, there was very little money to spare for Pompey.
That, however, is only half an answer. If it were possible now to
scrape together what was needful, why was the scraping not done
earlier, especially since Pompey’s plight was well known for some
time? We can, I think, detect the malign influence of Pompey’s
enemies at work here.
To suggest that they deliberately withheld supplies in order to
bring about his destruction is a palpable absurdity. He was one of
the commanders duly appointed by the senate to prosecute the war
and his enemies, no less than he, fervently wished to see the cam-
paign brought to a successful conclusion with an end made of Ser-
torius. At the same time, it is not difficult to imagine a situation
where they would view with equanimity Pompey’s failure to distin-
guish himself and that they might work towards the objective of
the chastisement of youthful arrogance. Metellus Pius, the other
general in Spain, was sounder politically and it would be all to the
good if he were to gain the major part of the credit for winning this
war.5
Unfortunately, things had been allowed to go too far. There
can be little doubt that what Pompey said about his position and
about what would flow from it was perfectly true. Already a sea-
soned general, he would surely know when a position had become
untenable and when retreat was necessary.6 At the same time we
may suspect there was an element of bluff in what he said. Quite
simply, Pompey was exercising, once more, his talent for brink-
manship. A military situation was being exploited for the benefit it
4 Oost (1963) p. 21; Rickman (1980) pp. 50–1, 167–8; Ormerod
(1978) pp. 231–2.

5 Badian (1958) p. 279. Sertorius, of course, had friends at Rome, cf.
Plut. Pomp. 20 with Spann (1987) pp. 135–6, but I doubt very much if they
could be held responsible for this present state of affairs.
6 The Loeb editor takes Ep. Pomp. 6–7 to mean Pompey would retire
to Italy followed by Sertorius. I would not agree. It seems rather to refer

to the stalemate then prevailing in Spain. Either side might yet win, cf.
Leach (1978) p. 50.
THE CONSULSHIP 69
might give.7 In the present instance he dangled before his audience

nothing less than the complete collapse of the Spanish war-effort.
This, as we have noted, was a real enough possibility but it looks as
if Pompey deliberately made things look worse than they really
were by claiming that Sertorius would then go over to the offen-
sive. In fact, it is very doubtful if the latter were strong enough to
launch a serious assault on Italy.8 But there were many at Rome
who would not have known that and many more who would trem-
ble at even the very mention of such a thing. Pompey knew his
men and he made it his business to thoroughly frighten them.
So, we may say that Pompey had a very good case to begin
with and that he improved its appearance by skilful presentation.
Furthermore, from the very outset, he must have had a good idea
that the ploy would work for the simple reason that there were
people at Rome who had their own reasons for keeping him where
he was. One of these was Lucullus and this brings us to the answer
to our first question: why did he aid Pompey?9 It is sometimes
claimed that Lucullus’ motive was fear, fear that if Pompey re-
turned then the Mithridatic command would be given to him. Rela-
tions between the king and Rome had now reached the point
where another war yet again appeared virtually inevitable. Nobody
had yet been chosen to command Rome’s army since hostilities had
not actually commenced but Lucullus was determined that when
they did he himself should lead it. However, a moment’s considera-
tion will show that whoever Lucullus had to fear as a rival it could
not be Pompey.10 Someone who has botched one major operation
is not usually entrusted immediately with another. Rather, Lucullus
was anxious about something else. At the present moment he held
as his province Cisalpine Gaul and his hope and expectation would
be that he might slough it off in favour of Asia. But should
Pompey be beaten out of Spain all hope of such a swap would in-
stantly be at an end. With Sertorius seemingly about to descend on
7 Cf. ch. 3.
8 Spann (1987) pp. 147–8.
9 On the view of Twyman (1972) p. 851 that Lucullus and Pompey
were allies see Seager (1979) p. 19 n. 54.

10 Seager (1979) p. 19 n. 50 calls Plut. Pomp. 20 ‘obscure’. ‘Illogical’
might be a better term, just as ‘inconsistent’ probably fits Luc. 5 best.

70 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
Italy the senate would surely oblige Lucullus to go to the province

he had been assigned and there mount guard. Police-work would
take the place of the glamour and glitter of an Asian command. In
sum, Lucullus saw looming before himself a governorship like that
he had had in Africa.11
But this was not likely to be the only consideration that
weighed with Lucullus. He will have bethought himself of what
Pompey was likely to do should he actually turn up in Italy. In the
light of his career to date nobody can have seriously believed for
even a moment that this thrusting young man would quietly dis-
band his army and go home.12 As we know, there were those at
Rome who mistakenly believed Pompey was capable of mounting a
coup. But even those who did not share this extreme, pessimistic
view could draw little comfort from Pompey’s previous ambiguous
behaviour. More manipulation could be expected. Should Pompey
return at the head of an army then, given his record in such mat-
ters, he could almost certainly be expected to try and exploit his
position at its head in order to gain something for himself. And, as
he was a man with both friends and enemies, one could look for-
ward to tension and quarrels.13 Since Rome was now already facing
serious difficulties at home and abroad this kind of situation were
plainly best avoided.14 Pompey should be given what he asked for.
Clearly there was something statesmanlike in such an outlook
and Lucullus at this time was not motivated solely by worries over
his own career. We are explicitly told that he acted for the good of
11 For Lucullus’ attitude to Cisalpine Gaul see Plut. Luc. 5. When Sall.
Hist. 2.98M speaks of a possible loss of laus by Lucullus I suspect he had
some such scenario as this in mind.
12 For what it is worth, his legal position would probably be secure.
Being forced out of one’s province (as he claimed) could hardly be said to
be a breach of the Lex Cornelia de maiestate (Keaveney 2005a pp. 141-42).
Generals usually disbanded their armies on returning to Italy but this was
not compulsory, cf. Keaveney (1982d) p. 129; Seager (1979) p. 22. We
should also remember that Pompey was, anyway, ever a man to overlook
niceties, cf. Seager (1979) p. 16.
13 Dignitas (Sall. Hist. 2.98M) could as a result be lost. An obvious
starting-point for the quarrels would be recriminations over the military

situation and who was responsible for it.
14 See further above and below for these difficulties.
THE CONSULSHIP 71
the state.15 Apart from the disruption that might ensue from
Pompey’s return he obviously regarded it as unacceptable that the
forces of the legitimate government should be driven from Spain.
To be worsted by a bandit and a renegade would constitute an in-
tolerable affront to the majesty of Rome. Hence, Lucullus laid aside
his enmity for Pompey. And when he put his proposals to the
house he found a majority of a like mind. Those who out of indo-
lence or malignancy had been unwilling to send Pompey supplies
now showed the greatest enthusiasm for doing so.16
One other excursion that Lucullus may have made into the
domain of imperial policy may be mentioned here. Some believe
that the problems of Cyrene had become ineradicable and intracta-
ble and that Lucullus’ new constitution had failed to bring any re-
lief. Thus, so the argument runs, he now (74) urged the senate to
take up the legacy of some twenty years before and annex the
place, since that would be in its best interests. The senate was will-
ing to listen. We have just seen that Rome’s financial position was
shaky and this, in turn, had led to a food crisis, which we shall, in
due course, illustrate by reference to a famous and dramatic inci-
dent. Plainly, there was need of new areas to exploit in order to
bring some amelioration in the situation and so the senate went
ahead and erected Cyrene into a province. Neat and tidy this recon-
struction of events may appear but the reader should bear in mind
two words of warning. Though plausible, Lucullus’ intervention is
purely hypothetical. It is the kind of behaviour we expect of the
man but it is nowhere mentioned in the sources. Further, the an-
nexation may not have taken place at all in 74 for there is good
reason for assigning it to 75.17
15 Sall. Hist. 2.98M.

16 ibid. There is no evidence to support the statement of van
Ooteghem (1959) p. 47 that Cethegus (see below) opposed Lucullus on
this occasion.
17 Sources: Sall. Hist. 2.43M; App. BC 1.111. For the untrustworthi-
ness of the latter’s dating see app. 2. See also Oost (1963) pp. 19–21 and
Laronde (1989) p. 1011. In Badian (1958) p. 140 Lucullus’ intervention is
taken for fact but see (1965) p. 119.
Because Lucullus needed the aid of Cethegus to obtain the Mithrid-
atic command (see below) Oost doubts if he had sufficient influence to
sway the senate in this matter. But Cethegus only became decisive when
72 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
What is not in doubt is that Lucullus had other matters be-

sides running the empire to preoccupy him. He was also called
upon now to defend Sulla’s laws from attack. We have already seen
one weakness in Sulla’s schemes in the matter of military com-
mands and have observed that the author of the constitution was
not wholly to blame for them since they were, in part at least, not
of a sort to be legislated against. Now we encounter another, which
manifested itself about the same time and for which most of the
blame must attach itself to Sulla. I speak of the arrangements he
had made for the tribunate.
This was one of the areas towards which the dictator’s re-
forming zeal had been particularly directed, for it was from here,
since the time of the Gracchi onward, that one of the greatest chal-
lenges to stable government as he conceived it had come. So Sulla
emasculated it. Tribunes were deprived both of their power to
bring legislation before the people and of their right to summon
the senate. Their veto or intercessio could now be employed only to
protect the rights of an individual and might not be deployed
against a law. Finally, anybody who held the tribunate would auto-
matically become ineligible for any other office. Sulla’s intentions
can hardly be in doubt. With the prospect of advancement re-
moved, only the mediocre would seek to become tribunes. And if,
during their year of office, they were minded to exercise their sec-
ond-rate talents then the drastically reduced powers at their dis-
posal would ensure that their capacity for mischief-making would
be limited.18
It may very well be—we cannot say for certain—that Sulla
thought he had done his work well here. Unfortunately, a dispas-
sionate examination reveals serious flaws in his arrangements. To
begin with, he had left virtually untouched the natural power base
or constituency of the tribune: the plebs. He did nothing to reduce
their numbers, even though one presumes he might have found
there were sharp divisions and, if Lucullus really did play a part now, as in
the case of Pompey’s supplies, there is likely, given the circumstances, to
have been near unanimity.
18 Keaveney (2005a) pp. 140–41. For a different view see Hantos
(1988) pp. 74–89, 130–47. For a comprehensive survey of the tribunate

from 133 to 43 see Thommen (1989).
THE CONSULSHIP 73
places for some of them in his colonies. After all, traditionally such
foundations had been used to siphon off excessive and potentially
dangerous numbers. Indeed, so far from reducing the number of
the plebs Sulla actually increased it. A body of 10,000 slaves of the
proscribed was manumitted and, given the name of Cornelii, dis-
tributed among the tribes. The idea seems to have been that, mind-
ful of their origin, these men would have a wholesome and re-
straining influence on those whom they were set among. But the
Cornelii proved to be a grave disappointment. They vanish almost
as soon as they appear and play no discernible role in the politics of
the 70s. The supposition must be that when it came to confronta-
tion they opted to identify with the class to which they now be-
longed rather than sally forth as loyal clients of those who had
made of them freedmen.19
Now, it can be claimed that, however badly it worked out in
practice, the creation of the Cornelii was, in its basic theory at any
rate, a reasonable scheme, but the same can hardly be said of Sulla’s
abolition of the system whereby a ration of corn was sold cheaply
to the people. Even his loyal followers recognized this and the
events of the years immediately after Sulla’s death brought out
clearly the wisdom of having such a system and paid tribute, it may
be said, to the foresight of Caius Gracchus, who first devised it.
With the state guaranteeing storage and regular distribution the
vagaries in supply, so common in the ancient world, had less of an
impact. People ate regularly and when people eat regularly they are
less likely to give ear to agitators. Sulla’s measure, on the other
hand, simply ensured that when hunger came the plebs would rebel
against his system.20
In sum, Sulla left the plebs virtually untouched. They re-
mained what they had always been: a large and volatile body who, if
conditions were right, could be stirred to action by a skilled hand.
The dictator had hammered the tribunate but the people’s rever-
ence for the office had not diminished one whit. The tribune was
19 Keaveney (2005a) p. 141. Some Cornelii formed a college still in
existence in 65 but dissolved in the next year, see Treggiari (1969) p. 171.
20 Keaveney (2005a) p. 141; Rickman (1980) pp. 161–6; Garnsey and
Rathbone (1985).
74 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
their officer and, at the right moment, they could be relied upon to
respond to a call to restore to him his full powers.21
Conventionally, the bar on advancement from the tribunate to
further office is seen as one of the most effective clauses in Sulla’s
tribunician law.22 The able and ambitious would shun this magis-
tracy, leaving it to become the preserve of the sluggish and the me-
diocre. Yet the history of the tribunate after Sulla reveals a para-
doxical situation: so far from ensuring tranquillity this ordinance
merely emboldened certain people to seek confrontation. To put it
simply: a man facing political extinction at the year’s end was not
likely to worry over-much about his actions or their consequences.
He would see no reason for ingratiating himself with the great since
their power and influence would not be deployed to secure his ad-
vancement. Indeed, the only hope of such advancement lay in hav-
ing the restraints placed on tribunes removed and so it was entirely
natural he should want to work towards that end. If he were suc-
cessful then obviously he had much to gain and, if he were not, he
had little to lose.
Sulla, in fact, was scarcely dead when the call for repeal was
heard. The tribunes of that year (78) divined that Lepidus would be
their man. At first he refused their request to have full tribunician
powers restored but then as his own position became more ex-
treme, he relented and included this item in his programme. His
eventual squashing may have disappointed, but it did not deter.23
Two years later the tribune L. Sicinius demanded that ex-tribunes
be allowed to stand for higher office and directed tirades at the
consuls, Cn. Octavius and C. Scribonius Curio, who were num-
bered among Sulla’s staunchest supporters and formed part of that
circle of Sullani to which Lucullus belonged. True to his reputation
as a noted wit, Sicinius likened Curio to one Busbaleius, a famous
actor of the day who was popularly supposed to be crazed. Curio
does not appear to have found this particularly funny and he was
21Marshall and Beness (1987) pp. 361–2; PereIli (1982) pp. 231–6.
22See e.g. Gruen (1974) p. 188; Thommen (1989) p. 26.
23 Lic. 33–4F; Sall. Orat. Phil. 14; see Holmes pp. 367–8 and Marshall
and Beness (1987) p. 365. We may recall (ch. 3) the effect Lepidus may
have had on Glabrio.
THE CONSULSHIP 75
certainly not amused by Sicinius’ proposals. He therefore pro-

ceeded ruthlessly against the tribune.24
Any self-congratulations the inner circle of Sullans might have
indulged in were destined to be short-lived, for the very next year
starkly revealed the dangers attendant upon Sulla’s inadequate pro-
visions for keeping the plebs in their place. In 76 the suppression
of Sicinius had merely awoken mutterings but now the temper of
the populace had radically altered. The economic crisis, to which
we have referred, had now reached the point where the shortage of
grain had become very serious indeed, and a hungry and enraged
people soon let its feelings be known. One day as the consuls C.
Aurelius Cotta and L. Octavius, accompanied by a praetorian can-
didate Metellus Creticus, were making a stately progress along the
Via Sacra they were set upon by an infuriated mob. Dignity had to
be forgotten as the trio dashed for the safety of the nearby house
of Octavius.
But, as so often happens—the phenomenon is familiar to stu-
dents of the French revolution—the elemental cry for necessaries
can often become a call for political change. Capitalizing on this re-
awoken aggressiveness of the people, another tribune, Q. Opimius,
repeated the demand of the previous year: let ex-tribunes be al-
lowed to sue for higher offices. The Sullans, for their part, fully
recognized the dangers inherent in this changed situation. One of
them, Hortensius, was aedile in this year and, in an effort to as-
suage popular fury, he arranged for a grain distribution to be made.
24 Cic. Brut. 216–17; Sall. Orat. Mac. 8, 10, Hist. 2.23–7M; Ps.-Asc. 189
St.; Quint. 11.3.129; Val. Max. 9.14.5; Pliny NH 7.55.
Gruen (1974) p. 24 n. 52 seems to miss the point about Curio’s re-
semblance to Burbuleius. Sicinius’ fate is mysterious. Sall. Orat. Mac. 8 says
he was circumventus est and that (10) Curio ad exitium usque insontis tribuni
dominatus erat. I would not agree with Thommen (1989) p. 27 n. 44 that he
was killed—a tribune’s sacrosanctity even now was not to be lightly ig-
nored. Gruen thinks exitium might mean ‘political destruction’ but it is
difficult to see why Curio would encompass this since it would automati-
cally come at the end of the year. I take circumventus est to refer to a verbal
clash during the year (see further on Lucullus below) and exitium to be a
loose reference to a successful prosecution after the tribunate as in the
case of Opimius (see below)—a view hesitantly shared by Marshall and
Beness (1987) p. 367.
76 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
But it was too late. By now yet another flaw in Sulla’s ar-
rangements had revealed itself. He seems to have overestimated the
Roman nobility’s capacity for facing down the mob. When a man
such as Lepidus stood outside the law and had recourse to arms
there was, in one sense, no problem. The senate might dither and
hesitate, at first, but having time at their disposal the fathers even-
tually steadied their collective nerve and took the steps necessary to
deal with the threat. But with a mob on the streets of Rome time
was not given for reflection and in consequence hesitancy and fear
were not always overcome. Despite his own experiences in 88
when Marius and Sulpicius intimidated the senate, Sulla does not
seem to have taken this factor into consideration. At best, he seems
to have hoped that his senate would model itself after, say, those
who had crushed the Gracchi. If that was what he thought, then
the present instance showed his calculations to be awry.
The consul Cotta cracked. His late experiences on the Via Sa-
cra had thoroughly unnerved him and he resolved to placate the
mob. With the enthusiastic backing of Opimius and the support of
the people he passed a law removing the ban on tribunes standing
for other offices. Under any circumstances the Sullans would have
been enraged by such a bill but in the present instance they were
incensed beyond measure. Up until now they had no reason to
suppose that Cotta was anything but one of themselves. Exiled by
the Varian commission, he had been brought back to Rome by
Sulla. Owing his political life to the dictator, he had been at one
with those who sought to defend his ordinances until the day he
resolved to put the advantage of the moment before what they
conceived to be the greater and more lasting good.25
25 Asc. 66–7C (=Sall. Hist. 2.49M), 79C; Sall. Hist. 2.44–6, 48M, Orat.
Cott., Orat. Mac. 8; Ps.-Asc. p. 255 St.; Cic. 2 Verr. 3.215 with Keaveney
(1979) p. 457 n. 187, (1984a) pp. 147–8; Seager (1979) pp. 18–19; Marshall
and Beness (1987) pp. 368–9; Thommen (1989) pp. 228–9; Lintott (1968)
pp. 175–203. The long and pedestrian discussion of Malitz (1972) yields
small profit.
The connection between bread riot and political reform, needlessly
denied by Thommen (1989) p. 27 n. 44, is examined in detail by Virlouvet
(1985). For the French Revolution see e.g. Rudé (1972) pp. 112–27. We
need not press the analogy so far as to postulate that Sulla intended a pacte
de famine! While I believe their general point to be correct I think that Mar-
THE CONSULSHIP 77
The discomfiture of the Sullans was crowned and completed

in the following year when all the other laws Cotta had passed dur-
ing his consulship were abrogated but that concerning the tribunate
was suffered to remain on the statute book. So, not only had the
Sullani been unable to stop Cotta in the first place; they were now
equally unable to undo the damage he had done. Even the joy of
personal revenge was denied them and they had to be content with
venting their spleen on the lesser culprit, Opimius, deriving what
satisfaction they could from engineering against him a court case
that resulted in his financial ruin.26
So, after this reverse, we can appreciate why Lucullus’ friends
and allies would expect much from him. With Cotta’s capitulation
further trouble could be expected and a strong man would be re-
quired to deal with it. The enemy must not be allowed to advance
further. They were not to be disappointed. Another tribune, L.
Quinctius, now popped up to press for further tribunician reform.
He yoked this with an assault on the jury system, which Sulla had
left in the hands of the senators. Corruption was alleged as the rea-
son for reform here. This was supposed to have taken place during
a celebrated case of the day—the lurid details are preserved in
Cicero’s Pro Cluentio—that of Oppianicus of Larinum who was
standing trial for poisoning. At first Lucullus tried to avoid direct
confrontation and spoke privately to Quinctius in an effort to dis-
suade him from making trouble. Without a doubt such a course
came naturally to someone of Lucullus’ placid nature. But he may
also have wished to avoid further public strife. Such feuding could
not but be dangerous in view of the doubtful international situa-
tion. The war in Spain was, we know, not going well and yet fur-
ther campaigns both against the pirates whose marauding had in
shall and Beness p. 363 draw too fine a distinction between the political
and economic aspects of these moments of crisis.
The need for an external stimulus such as that observable here ex-
plains why the earlier attempts of Lepidus and Sicinius to achieve reform
were unsuccessful. One final observation: if, as some think, a tribune
could exercise his intercessio against a bill then it is strange the Sullans could
not find a suitable tool to deploy against Cotta.
26 Cic. 2. Verr. 1.155–7; Asc. 66–7C, 78C; Ps.-Asc. p. 255 St. In my
view Marshall and Beness (1987) pp. 369–70 misunderstand the sig-
nificance of the abrogation of Cotta’s other laws. See further below.
78 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
part caused the recent food shortages and also against Mithridates
had become imperative. Wars on this scale are best fought when
there is concord at home. That is to say, we can detect here the
same statesmanlike outlook that informed Lucullus’ dealings with
Pompey. Quinctius was not to be dissuaded, however. But he then
discovered that, as sometimes happens, the mild-mannered can,
when provoked, prove to be most formidable opponents. In the
present instance Lucullus deployed his oratorical powers to the full
and showed himself to be more than a match for his adversary.
Clad—to the delight of connoisseurs of the Awful—in a long pur-
ple gown reaching to his ankles, the flashy tribune called from the
rostrum for magisterial reform only to have Lucullus answer with
equal vehemence as he refused to yield anything. In the judicial
sphere Quinctius fared no better. He managed to extract from the
senate a senatus consultum directing Lucullus to investigate his allega-
tions of bribery. The latter, however, simply refused to execute the
warrant and there the matter lay. For this year, at least, there would
be no further changes in the constitution.
Modern historians, however, tend to emphasize that Cotta’s
law of the previous year had, in fact, made it inevitable that Sulla’s
other ordinances would eventually be repealed. The question of
inevitability might, ultimately, be left to the theologian but the his-
torian will, at least, want to know how Lucullus and his friends
viewed the situation. Unfortunately, our sources do not say and
thus all we can do is propound two differing hypotheses, each of
which could be possible. It may very well be that the Sullani saw
Lucullus’ successful defence of the established order as a kind of
turning-point in their fortunes. Thanks to the pusillanimity of Cotta
something had been yielded but no more would be given away. The
Sullani had shown they were strong enough to resist any further
assault. In some quarters a less sanguine view could have been
prevalent. The failure to repeal Cotta’s measure showed clearly how
weak the friends of Sulla really were. Sooner or later there would
come an attack that would prove fatal. Lucullus’ success did no
more than offer a respite. But, despite their acknowledging the
truth of this observation, all the instincts of these men would for-
bid them to follow Cotta and his example into simple craven sur-
render. They would never make a public declaration of their weak-
ness. Though recognizing their cause to be doomed, they would
preserve face by defending it to the last.
THE CONSULSHIP 79
As I have said, we have no means of telling which, if any, of

these views prevailed in Sullan circles. All that can be said is that, if
the second was held, then time showed it to be the correct one. In
70 Pompey’s influence was far greater than that of the Sullani and
when he backed tribunician reform the result was the abolition of
the remainder of the Sullan measures.27
The failure of their peers to support the Sullani can only be
understood when we have formed a just appreciation of the danger
the tribunate posed. In the case of people like Sertorius the issue
was simple: either you destroyed him or he destroyed you. Nobody
could be in any doubt that if the renegade ever returned victorious
to Rome then the ruling oligarchy could expect to forfeit power,
positions, wealth and (in many cases) life itself. Hence there could
be no compromise here. All other differences were laid to one side
and the oligarchy, as one man, proceeded against the common foe.
In contradistinction to the dangers posed by the rebel in arms,
the threat from the tribunate was neither immediate, constant or
necessarily fatal. The tribune did not only menace the senate. With
full powers he might interfere in all departments of life but riot and
revolution rarely followed his interventions. And instances where a
tribune actually menaced the position of the oligarchy had been
rare in the past.28
In the light of these remarks it is possible, I believe, to envis-
age that on the tribunician question there was room for a diver-
gence of opinion that would not have been found when the topic
of Sertorius was mentioned in polite Roman society. It seems to
me that in the Rome of the 70s everybody would have agreed on
one basic proposition: a tribunate restored to full powers had the
potential to create trouble. Dissent would then occur as people
27 Plut. Luc. 5, cf. Luc. 2 and 7; Sall. Orat. Mac. 11; Ps.-Asc. p. 189 St.;
Cic. Pro Cluentio 110, 136–7 with app. 2 (i); Seager (1979) p. 18; Gruen
(1974) pp. 28, 33–4; Oost (1963) pp. 20–1; Thommen (1989) pp. 159–60,
163, 225–6, 229.
On the theme of Rome’s domestic problems as a hindrance to her
foreign policy see app. 2 n. 91 and further below. The pirates’ connections
with Mithridates (see below) furnished yet another reason for proceeding
against them.
28 See Burckhardt (1988) pp. 159–77.
80 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
pondered the extent of that potential and the response which it

required.
Undoubtedly, Lucullus and his friends were the most pessi-
mistic in outlook and consequently most violent in reaction. It
would be a palpable absurdity to suggest that they foresaw what
was to happen when the restoration actually took place. Indeed, it
is doubtful if they looked to the future at all. Their gaze was fixed
on a past where the likes of P. Sulpicius had almost destroyed their
late chief and they could see no way of controlling such mavericks
save by muzzling the tribunate as a whole. Others who looked back
over the same years might, with some justification, have reached a
slightly different conclusion. The damage done by the tribunate
had not, perhaps, been as great as the good. Was it right then that
an ancient and revered office of state should be truncated as it was
now? Again, those who looked into a future where the tribune had
full powers may have consoled themselves with the thought that
whoever now filled the office would proceed with caution having,
like themselves, learned the lessons of the recent civil war. If the
charge of naivety be levelled at such a viewpoint I can only plead
that people do think in this way. The 1930s form a splendid exam-
ple of the consequences (far more extreme than anything experi-
enced in ancient Rome) of basing policy on such a calculation. But
the Romans were, anyway, a practical people and others looking to
the same future reached a more brutal but equally comforting con-
clusion: a man who aspired to be a Gracchus was a rarity but the
senate now, as in the past, was perfectly able to oblige him and see
that he met the same fate as his hero. Aside from these attempts to
learn the lessons of the past or divine the course of the future,
there was also the desire to enjoy the present. Once people realized
that the restoration of tribunician power did not mean their de-
struction then they will have perceived an immediate advantage in
reform. The constant agitation over this matter would be brought
to an end. True restoration of powers might lead to even more dis-
turbances but who could say for certain? In any case, doubtful fu-
ture trouble must have seemed like a cheap price to pay for certain
present ease.
We can now see how Lucullus and his friends ultimately failed
to save Sulla’s laws on the tribunate. Their stance was only one of a
number in the Rome of the day and they failed to command in the
senate the unity they required on the issue. No doubt Lucullus was
THE CONSULSHIP 81
troubled by the weakness of his position but he had another preoc-

cupation to divert him from melancholy reflection: the Mithridatic
command. We have already seen that this was an element the con-
sul had taken into account when dealing with Pompey’s request for
reinforcements and the agitation of Quinctius. The time has now
come for us to see exactly why.
With the peace of Dardanus the First Mithridatic War had
come to an end. Ratification of the treaty did not immediately fol-
low, however, and the king, who had never been very keen on its
terms, began to try and evade them. Among other things, the as-
sault Murena made on him, sometimes dignified with the title of
the Second Mithridatic War,29 brought it home to him that it were
best to regularize his position vis-à-vis Rome and become an amicus
sociusque (friend and ally). So one day in 78 his ambassadors turned
up at the senate to ask that the treaty be formally accepted but
there they received a nasty surprise indeed. The senate would not
admit them. Neither party to this transaction could be in the slight-
est doubt as to what it signified: without a formal treaty Mithridates
was, in Roman eyes, no amicus but a hostis. He was an enemy to be
attacked and destroyed.30
The senate claimed that it was too busy to receive the ambas-
sadors but nobody believed them then and nobody seems to be-
lieve them now. Preoccupation with Lepidus could hardly have
reached the point where important emissaries were simply shooed
away.31 What was most likely the real reason for this behaviour was
the general unpopularity of the peace. Even Sulla’s men had made
known their displeasure32 and the senators no doubt shared the
view of the commons that its terms were altogether too lenient for
29 See ch. 2; Keaveney (1983b) pp. 185–7; Glew (1981) pp. 109–20.
Two observations: Mithridates’ discontent with the peace of Dardanus
came earlier than Glew seems to think (Plut. Sull. 23) and the reasons he
assigns for Cicero’s laudatory remarks on Murena (p. 128) are not per-
haps, completely convincing. For a different and, I believe, more plausible
explanation see app. 1.
30 Keaveney (1981b) pp. 200–1.
31 App. Mith. 67. On senatorial practice with regard to embassies see
now Bonnefond-Coudry (1989) pp. 294–320.

32 Keaveney (2005a) pp. 89-90, where an attempt is made to justify
Sulla’s action.
82 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
the man who, in 88, had perpetrated those massacres that, in view
of their scale, we now call the Asiatic Vespers. Nor did Mithridates
himself do anything to help his case. His recent attempts to evade
his obligations under the treaty were nothing more than the latest
in a series of cheap frauds and transparent devices that he, over the
years, had attempted to foist on Rome. Nobody likes to be thought
a fool, and a Roman senator, with his ingrained sense of his own
worth, was likely to be hurt more than most if he believed some-
body so regarded him. Hence the fathers seem to have reasoned
that there was little point in concluding a treaty, of whose provi-
sions they did not approve anyway, with a man whose attitudes had
not changed and who would, in consequence, be expected to break
it at the first opportune moment.
Although, by this refusal, the senate had not just annoyed
Mithridates but seriously provoked him, it did not set out to war on
him. The king himself tells us why33 and although he can hardly be
called a totally unbiased witness what he says sounds perfectly rea-
sonable. Some years later he told the king of Parthia that only their
problems elsewhere prevented the Romans from attacking him.
Readers of this chapter so far will not quarrel with that analysis.
The unfolding of events reveals for us what Roman policy was.
Because of their preoccupations in other places, they were content
simply to watch Mithridates and do nothing so long as he made no
overt threat. But the moment he showed signs of becoming aggres-
sive then, no matter what engagements there were elsewhere and
no matter what the cost, he would be met with firmness.
For his part, the king of Pontus reacted with fury to the news
of the rebuff his ambassadors had suffered. For him, this was an
act of treachery made even worse by the hollow excuse which
cloaked it. Like many crooked people, Mithridates lacked a sense of
irony and so he indulged in feelings of moral outrage and indigna-
tion when he discovered that others could employ against him the
kind of cheap diplomatic trick he himself had used in the past. But
thinking oneself to be in the right has never been a guarantee of
security and Mithridates was acutely aware of the peril in which he
33 Or at least Sallust (Ep. Mith. 13) portrays him doing so.

THE CONSULSHIP 83
stood.34 Sooner or later there would be war with Rome and he had
best be ready for it.
To this end, therefore, he completely overhauled his army.
Profiting by his bitter experiences in Greece he now formed a force
on the Roman model. Gone was the gilding and the glitter, gone
too was the raucous multilingual indiscipline of yesteryear which
had fared so ill at the hands of Sulla. In their place there came so-
ber, well-drilled units. A search for new allies led to marriage-
alliances with Cyprus and Egypt. These, in the event, proved to be
of little practical worth but alliances with tribes such as the
Scythians and Taurians of Asia and the Sarmatians and Thracians
of Europe brought useful recruits to the ranks. Nor did the king
neglect old friends. Once more he approached the pirates and
added these, who had been so useful in the past, to the numbers of
his host.
But the most striking of all Mithridates’ alliances was forged in
75. In that year he despatched two Roman renegades, L. Magius
and L. Fannius, to Spain. These had served in Fimbria’s army35 but,
upon their commander’s death, had thrown in their lot with Mith-
ridates. Now through their agency a pact was made between the
Pontic king and Sertorius. Mithridates was to send a fleet and
money to Spain. In return, Sertorius despatched to him one of his
officers, M. Marius, to aid in training the new model army. He also
acknowledged that Mithridates might have a free hand to do as he
would with Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia and Galatia. An
agreement of this sort needs little gloss. By aiding Sertorius after
this wise, Mithridates intended to exacerbate Roman troubles in
another part of the world. And he would only have done this if he
intended to exercise shortly the rights Sertorius conferred on him
in his own area. What it was impelled Mithridates into this alliance
and, it has to be said, eventually war was no secret either in 75. For
some time it had been common knowledge that the childless Ni-
comedes IV of Bithynia, ignoring the claims of a pretender, was
going to leave his kingdom to Rome. As Mithridates had twice in
34 Ever before his mind must have been the thought that it was his
hostis status that gave Murena his excuse for attack, cf. Keaveney (2005a)
pp. 161-62.
35 See ch. 2.
84 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
the past chased this same Nicomedes out of the place it is, I think,
legitimate to infer that he believed he had as much, if not more,
right to it than the Romans. Such then was the position of Bithynia.
Both great antagonists laid claim to it and whoever yielded to the
other on the issue was not only conceding him territory but was
doing so at the expense of his own loss of face.36
So we can now see precisely why from the start of 74 Lucullus
was preoccupied with the question of the Mithridatic command.
Like everybody else in Rome he knew that the events of 75 could
have but one outcome—war—and he determined to lead it. Hence
the problems posed by Pompey and Quinctius had to be solved in
a fashion that would leave him free to bid for the command when
it was put on offer. Thereafter events moved with great rapidity.
Mithridates had not the slightest intention of backing off from con-
frontation. From the summer of 75 right through the winter of
75/74 preparations for war went ahead apace. The barbarian allies
in Asia and Europe now received requests to join their master. In
Pontus itself munitions were manufactured and down came forests
to build a fleet. Along the route this invasion was to take supply
depots were set up. Yet, for once, the Romans were way ahead of
Mithridates and moved before his preparations were complete.
Early in 74 Nicomedes died. Even though it was yet winter the
36 App. 2; Glew (1981) pp. 121–30; McGing (1986) pp. 136–45; Sher-
win-White (1984) pp. 159–62; Spann (1987) pp. 99–104; Scardigli (1971)
pp. 252–8; Cimma (1976) pp. 204–7. Some specific points may be men-
tioned. On Mithridates’ earlier sharp dealing see Keaveney (1980a) pp.
154–7. His barbarian allies will be found in App. Mith. 69, 119. For the
pirates see Ormerod (1978) pp. 212–20. Because Cicero tells us Fannius
and Magius bought the boat in which they travelled to Spain in 79 (2 Verr.
1.87) this has led to difficulties since it appears to clash with App. Mith. 68
which unequivocally puts the treaty in the year before war—compare, for
example, Glew p. 126 n. 69; Scardigli p. 255 n. 100 and McGing pp. 137–
8. Yet the difficulty is probably more apparent than real. Cicero actually
says the pair sailed ad omnes populi Romani hostes ab Dianio ad Sinopen. In
other words, a number of voyages to Roman enemies in the years 79–75
would seem to be suggested. Sertorius was not the only ally the duo se-
cured for Mithridates. As part of Mithridates’ great diplomatic drive they
may well have called on some of the peoples in App. Mith. 69. Later, we
may observe, Mithridates made more of the claims of the Bithynian pre-
tender than he did of his own (Ep. Mith. 9).
THE CONSULSHIP 85
governor of Asia M. Junius Juncus was ordered to occupy the

kingdom. He duly marched into Bithynia and began turning it into
a Roman province. Thus when spring and the campaigning season
arrived Mithridates found the enemy in occupation. But even then
he was not completely ready to engage them. First of all, he had to
give his new fleet a sea-trial. Then, before he could feel strong
enough to take on the foe, Mithridates wished to have by his side
his European allies. The most natural place for them to join him
was in Paphiagonia and Mithridates headed for there first of all. So,
as he waited for the various contingents to come in, even more
time was lost.37
The moment Bithynia was annexed the despatch of rein-
forcements became imperative. Nobody, save the most dim-witted,
could have failed to realize that Mithridates was going to do exactly
what I have just described him as doing. Juncus seems to have had
only a small force and it would require considerable stiffening if he
were going to resist the kind of assault Mithridates was about to
launch. The long-awaited Mithridatic command had become a real-
ity and it was time for Lucullus to make his bid for it.
In making that bid Lucullus enjoyed the full support of his
consular colleague, M. Aurelius Cotta.38 We have said little of this
man so far and mention has been but casual. Quite simply, this is in
keeping with his position vis-à-vis Lucullus. He was one of three
Cottae brothers then active in politics, all of whom began their ca-
reers as good Sullans. In this man’s case he seems to have belonged
to that middle group in the senate which sought to conciliate Sulla
with his enemies and, when this proved impossible, threw in their
lot with him. The elder brother we have already met. He it was
who, in the previous year, had opened the first breach in Sulla’s
constitution. The younger, Lucius, completed the work with a bill
in 70 restoring the full powers to the tribunate. Unlike this pair,
however, the middle brother never wavered in his devotion to the
Sullan ideal and was content to play the role of loyal helpmate to
Lucullus.39 He certainly cherished ambitions of a command in the
37 App. Mith. 69–70; MRR 2.98 with app. 2, especially the section on
Appian (v) and the general conclusion.

38 Contra Twyman (1972) pp. 854–5, cf. Gruen (1974) p. 124.
39 See ch. 3 n. 44.
86 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
east but any possibility that this would bring him into conflict with
Lucullus was removed when it became known that the senate in-
tended to send two commanders to deal with Mithridates.
The lesser of the two would go to Bithynia with a fleet. There
he would replace Juncus and defend the new province against
Mithridates’ attack. That task would be considerably lightened by a
further senatorial decision, namely, to wage an offensive war on the
Pontic king. L. Octavius, the governor of Cilicia, had just died, so
whoever succeeded him would be given also the province of Asia
and the command of the war. In essence what Lucullus and Cotta
had to do now was quite straightforward. Under the Lex Sempronia
of Caius Gracchus their provinces had been designated before their
election in the previous year. This, of course, was before it was re-
alized there would be war with Mithridates. So, Lucullus, as we
know, had received Cisalpine Gaul. What Cotta held we cannot say
but obviously it was not an eastern province. Therefore, the two
would have to approach the senate, be relieved of their current
provincial commands and receive charge of Cilicia and Bithynia.40
The execution of this design did not prove to be easy, how-
ever. Many men, we are told, sought the Mithridatic command.41
As we have no names this might seem to cast a doubt over the ac-
curacy of this statement. But hesitancy is needless. The lengths to
which Lucullus had to go to beat it off is proof enough that the
challenge was real indeed.42 Anonymity, in fact, probably means
simply that those who contested with Lucullus were of small tal-
ent.43 The situation now was rather different from what it had been
a couple of years before when nobody could be found to go to
Spain. Then the men of small merit reasoned that whatever might
be gained there in the way of booty would be little recompense for
the rough treatment Sertorius would hand out. Now, although no-
body will have thought of Mithridates as an easy opponent, the
wealth of Asia must have seemed to some enough to make it
worthwhile taking him on, and since there is no direct correlation
between ability and political influence it is perfectly possible that
40 Sherwin-White (1984) p. 163.

41 Plut. Luc. 5–6.
42 See below.
43 Note what Plutarch has to say in Luc. 6.
THE CONSULSHIP 87
men of this type could (and did) command sufficient of a following

to mount a serious challenge to Lucullus.
In fact, Lucullus’ colleague Cotta, with his own eastern ambi-
tions, is a perfect concrete example of the kind of second-rater
who now longed to fight Mithridates. Although totally loyal to Lu-
cullus, he possessed political influence of his own which he was not
afraid to use44 and which in another’s hands could easily have been
turned against his fellow consul. When he did get to the east Cotta
soon showed he was not up to the tasks with which he had been
entrusted. On the one occasion when he acted on his own initiative
he precipitated a great disaster from which he had to be rescued by
Lucullus. After that, Cotta was content to let his colleague conduct
the main fight while he conducted a side-campaign. This, it is fair
to say, was characterized by incompetence, cruelty, treachery and
an unslakable thirst for loot. A fitting climax was reached on his
return to Rome when Cotta had to face a charge of repetundae and
expulsion from the senate in consequence.45
The upshot of all this was that when Lucullus made informal
soundings he discovered he would not have a majority in the house
when he asked to be conferred with the Mithridatic command. His
abilities would not outweigh the malign influence of his rivals.
There was nothing else for it. He would have to approach
Cethegus. But who was Cethegus and what could he do for Lucul-
lus?
P. Cornelius Cethegus had been a senator since at least 88 and
possibly earlier. It therefore follows that by then he must have held
some office or other. But how far he had actually advanced in the
world we cannot say for definite. A praetorship in the Cinnan pe-
riod has also been conjectured but definite proof is lacking. Beyond
dispute, however, is the fact that he made a very bad mistake in 88
when he elected to become one of Sulla’s enemies. He found him-
self declared an outlaw and forced to flee for his life. Returning to
Rome in Cinna’s wake, he promptly deserted to Sulla when the
latter landed in Italy. Divining who was going to win the war
Cethegus came and made his peace with his old foe. He soon re-
deemed his promise to be of service to Sulla when he induced part
44 See below.
45 See ch. 5.
88 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
of the garrison of Praeneste (Palestrina) to surrender with a pledge

of safe conduct, which proved to be worthless.46
Thus restored to public life, Cethegus very rapidly became one
of the leading figures in the post-Sullan senate. There can be no
better illustration of or more elegant a tribute to his power than the
fact that, when in 77 the senate was debating what to do about
Lepidus, Philippus, in a speech urging strong measures, singled out
Cethegus as a most dangerous opponent. Cethegus is, in fact, the
only senator thus named and Philippus directly accuses him of be-
ing eager to renew civil strife so as to profit thereby. Taking their
cue from this, some scholars go further and implicate Cethegus in
Sertorius’ revolt. We know that the rebel had a treasonous corre-
spondence with people in Rome but no names have been pre-
served. But, in the light of Philippus’ accusations, it has been sug-
gested Cethegus was among them. Yet one wonders. Philippus’
scurrilous attack may not so much constitute a plain statement of
fact as an unwitting acknowledgement both of the difficulties
Cethegus had encountered in reaching his present position and his
success in overcoming them. In general, it can be said that men like
him, who had but lately turned, were not popular with Sullans of
long standing, and the behaviour of people like Lepidus shows
why. Therefore, it was but natural (if unfair) that in moments of
crisis it would be assumed that Cethegus and those like him were
up to no good. In the absence of any firmer evidence we may at
least wonder if the astute Cethegus really was going to risk his posi-
tion a second time. Certainly, one should not too readily believe an
accusation made by Philippus who was, in his way, as slippery as
his enemy. His past too was besmirched by his dealings with Cinna
and in consequence it may very well be that he also was an object
of suspicion. And what better way to deflect that than by turning
peoples’ attention to others?47
46 Plut. Mar. 40; App. BC 1.60, 62, 80; Val. Max. 9.2.1. Antonelli
(1989) p. 84 confuses him with the Catilinarian conspirator. Pace Sumner

(1973) p. 106, Cic. Brut. 178 does not necessarily imply that Cethegus
reached the praetorship. See further n. 51.
47 Sall. Orat. Phil. 20 with Badian (1958) p. 280 n. 3; Spann (1987) p.
136; Keaveney (1984a) pp. 139–40, 142–3, 146.

THE CONSULSHIP 89
The nature of Cethegus’ power is not in doubt. He controlled

a bloc of senatorial votes whose number was such as to make it of
decisive weight when voting in the house was close. As a conse-
quence Cethegus was a much-courted man. The mighty of Rome
waited upon him bearing gifts and begged to be admitted to the
sunshine of his favour.48 What is puzzling, though, is how
Cethegus established and maintained his control over these crea-
tures of his. Certain theories can be excluded from consideration
without hesitation. Patronage in court is one such since we are spe-
cifically told Cethegus’ influence lay elsewhere and that, in truth, he
was a very poor speaker. The speeches he made in the senate were
merely adequate for the business in hand and no more. By the
same token we may safely rule out any extensive patronage exer-
cised over Italian communities and individuals. When Cethegus
was called upon to woo the men of Praeneste it was surely because
he was a well-known Cinnan face and not because he was a power-
ful local baron. The possibility that our faction-leader lent money
to people in order to help with election expenses or to meet other
less reputable debts is obviously attractive. We must, however, re-
member that we have no evidence as to what resources he com-
manded and can only wonder how far, if at all, he profited by the
proscriptions.49
The real key to understanding the influence Cethegus wielded
lies in a statement of Cicero’s to the effect that he was a man who
knew the workings of the state thoroughly and as a result was able
to exert a power equal to that of a consular in the senate. We may
be sure that this power did not extend over those in the upper re-
gions of the house. Those who had held high office were not likely
to become the errand-boys of a man like Cethegus.50 So the influ-
ence must have worked further down. In fact, we can pinpoint
where and show how Cethegus would find his command of state-
48 Cic. Parad. 5.40 and further below. Cethegus’ influence was con-
fined to the senate—so (rightly) Twyman (1972) pp. 852–3, 860–1 against
Taylor (1949) p. 70.
49 Cic. Brut. 178. See Gelzer (1969) pp. 70–101, 110–23. Taylor’s sug-
gestion, (1949) p. 70, that Cethegus may have resorted to organized brib-
ery is unfounded, cf. further n. 51. Acceptance of gifts may betoken greed,
not need, or it may simply indicate that the recipient is an uomo di rispetto.
50 See Bonnefond-Coudry (1989) pp. 595–654.
90 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
craft especially useful there. In brief, what happened is that

Cethegus was able to exploit one particular feature of the Sullan
reforms. At any given time there was in the senate a large body of
rank-and-file members who are sometimes called pedarii. Normally
they took no part in debate but contented themselves with register-
ing their vote. They thus ranked lowest in the scheme of things and
many of them were destined to rise no higher, lacking both ambi-
tion and ability. Sulla’s augmentation of the senate naturally in-
creased their numbers and thus, at one moment, a large body of
such men entered the senate. All of them were looking for guid-
ance as to the procedures of the house and how they might best
use their votes. I would suggest that it was Cethegus with his inimi-
table knowledge of the workings of the state who came forward to
give that guidance and advice. He it was who showed them what
they must do and how they might advance their interests. In con-
sequence he won much favour (gratia) and soon had large numbers
at his command.51
In the story of Aelius Staienus we may observe, after a fash-
ion, Cethegus fulfilling his paternalistic role. Staienus was a notori-
ously corrupt senator who had, during the trial of Oppianicus, ac-
cepted money from the defendant in order to bribe the jury. When
it looked as if details of the transaction were about to come out
Staienus is said to have approached Cethegus for advice. The latter,
so the story goes, is supposed to have told him he should claim he
accepted the money to effect a reconciliation between Oppianicus
and his accuser. Some believed this to be insincere advice.
Cethegus was widely held not only to hate Staienus but to be, in
principle, opposed to conduct such as his in public life. Now, see-
51Cic. Brut. 178 (cf. De Leg. 3.41) with Gruen (1974) pp. 162–3, 175–
7, 189–99, 201–5; Keaveney (2005a) p. 145; Gelzer (1969) pp. 75–6, 103–
4; How (1926) p. 92; Bonnefond-Coudry (1989) pp. 655–76. When
Pompey entered the senate he had a handbook of procedure prepared for
his use: Seager (1979) p. 27. This is testimony not only to the complexity
of those procedures but also to the great man’s desire not to put himself
under obligation to another.
Meier (1966) pp. 180–1 points out the relevance of Cic. De Orat.
3.136 to our view of Cethegus, but I cannot agree with him that mastery
of procedure and control of a bloc of votes are two separate sources of
power.
THE CONSULSHIP 91
ing that he was unlikely to escape, he gave him this worthless coun-
sel. Others took a more benign view and declared it to be the best
possible advice that could be given under the circumstances and
the one that would put the most wholesome construction on
Staienus’ action. Wherever the truth may lie, one thing is beyond
dispute: we catch here a glimpse of Cethegus wielding his influence
over one of the lowly.52
To find an occasion on which Cethegus deployed his foot
soldiers to decisive effect we do not have to look far. In this very
year (74) M. Antonius was given a special command against the
pirates. However, he only obtained this because the consul Cotta
and Cethegus joined forces and used their combined influence to
obtain it for him.53 The lesson was obviously not lost on Lucullus
and, as we saw above, he determined to make an ally of Cethegus.
But here a further twist enters our narrative. The pair were open
enemies. We may be sure Lucullus, like the good Sullan that he
was, shared to the full that general hatred and mistrust felt for late
converts to the cause, like Cethegus. Our ancient authority also
supplies us with a second and more personal reason for dislike.
Lucullus thought Cethegus to be a fairly disgusting sort of person
because of his sexual habits.54 Ironically, it was precisely those hab-
its that enabled him to win Cethegus’ support.
52 Cic. Pro Cluent. 84–5 with Gruen (1974) pp. 201–2. A number of
points require comment: (a) Cicero does not state as a fact that Staienus
applied to Cethegus, merely that it was widely believed that he did. The
existence of such a belief, however, is significant. (b) The words improbi-
tatem versari in republica nollet accord ill with the general modern view of
Cethegus as a rascal and with Cicero’s description of him elsewhere
(Parad. 5.40) as not being probatissimus. (c) Why Cethegus was believed to
hate Staienus and see him as an adversarium is not clear. The suggestion of
the Loeb editor that they were rivals for the aedileship (cf. Pro Cluent. 69)
seems unlikely. I would tentatively suggest he feared Staienus’ ambition
and ability (Brut. 241).
53 Ps.-Asc. p. 259 St. Cf. MRR 2.101.
54 Plut. Luc. 5. For the probable basis for Balsdon’s hint, (1974) p. 53,
that Lucullus himself was guilty of sexual impropriety see ch. 8.

92 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
At this time there was in Rome a woman called Praecia.55 She

was renowned for her beauty and intelligence, although her detrac-
tors said she was nothing more than a hooker.56 Whether this acco-
lade originated with a disappointed male suitor or a jealous female
rival I cannot say, but it fits ill with our admittedly scanty knowl-
edge of the lady.57 Praecia seems, in reality, to have been somewhat
selective in bestowing her favours, specializing in the rich and
powerful. She presided over a kind of salon to which her numerous
upper-class admirers flocked.58 However, Praecia was not just con-
tent with being admired but used her influence among the power-
ful to advance the careers of those she favoured. Cethegus was
numbered among her entourage and was said to be so totally besot-
ted with her that he would do nothing save at her behest. As we
know, Lucullus was aware of the situation and, swallowing his
scruples, he set out to exploit it. He made himself pleasing to
Praecia with gifts and flattery and won her over to his side.59
Cethegus then received his instructions and he obeyed.
A triple alliance was formed between Lucullus, Cotta and
Cethegus and when it came to the assignment of provinces the trio
55 Plut. Luc. 6 is our sole source for this episode. It is very difficult to
give her a background. She might be connected with the Praecius known
to Cicero (Ad Fam. 7.8.2, 14.5.2, Ad Att. 9.9.4, 6.9.2)—see Shackleton
Bailey (1976) pp. 61, 126.
56 For Roman prostitutes (classy or otherwise) see Wiseman (1987)
pp. 30–5 and Gardner (1986) pp. 132–4, 250–3.

57 It probably deserves about as much credence as Cicero’s descrip-
tion of Clodia as a whore. See Balsdon (1974) pp. 54–5. Her exact status is
as elusive as her background (n. 55). Most likely she was a docta puella, for
which see Balsdon p. 56, and might once have been an entertainer, cf.
Gardner (1986) pp. 246-48. She must have been on a par at least with
Volumnia, actress and mistress to the great, whose presence at a dinner-
party once shocked Cicero, cf. Balsdon p. 53. No doubt her enemies
would have liked to see her wind up among the ruined women of Sall.
Cat. 24.3–4 but there is something of the Fulvia (Cat. 23) about her.
58 Scardigli (1989) p. 350 n. 74.
59 As Scardigli (1989) p. 350 n. 75 observes, a further piece of evi-
dence (cf. chs. 1 and 2) for the wealth of the Lucullan family.
THE CONSULSHIP 93
achieved their objectives. To Cotta was given Bithynia, while Lu-

cullus received Cilicia and the Mithridatic command.60
This whole transaction has attracted a good deal of comment
in modern times and, it must be said, not all of it has been favour-
able.61 Judgements such as ‘a sordid intrigue’ and ‘not a pleasant
episode’ have been passed. Yet it is difficult to fault any of the
principals for acting as they did. In the case of Cethegus one can-
not, to begin with, withhold one’s admiration for him when one
considers the skill with which he rebuilt his shattered career. From
being an outlaw with a price on his head he went on, in the face of
considerable hostility, to become one of the most powerful figures
of the day. Then, when he had shown himself to be a master of
political management we can hardly expect him to do otherwise
than use the power thus gained to influence events. Perhaps the
time has come for us to acknowledge Cethegus for what he was—a
great parliamentarian. So far as Lucullus is concerned, on a dispas-
sionate view all that he can be accused of is possessing a sense of
realism. If he were to get the Mithridatic command he would re-
quire the votes Cethegus controlled. And, in approaching
Cethegus, he had to use the services of an intermediary. So he used
the most influential. Had he won Cethegus by means of a mutual
male friend one wonders if there would have been any fuss at all.
As for Praecia this much may be said: it should occasion no sur-
prise that a spirited and intelligent woman such as this should want
to break the constraints Roman society placed on her. Instead of
just talking about politics in her salon she wanted to play a part in
actually shaping them.
Women, of course, were not permitted to hold office in Rome
but we do know that, in a number of ways, they sometimes played
an indirect role in the shaping of events and they could hope to
have some influence over what their menfolk did.62 In one sense,
60 MRR 2.101. It is but common sense to assume that Lucullus sim-
ply joined the existing alliance (n. 53) of Cotta and Cethegus and that
when Cotta pressed the senate (Plut. Luc. 6) he knew he could enjoy the
support of Lucullus and Cethegus.
61 To the selection of views in van Ooteghem (1959) p. 54 n. 6 add
now Balsdon (1974) p. 53 and Seager (1979) p. 19.

62 Dixon (1983); Wiseman (1987) pp. 39–45; Balsdon (1974) pp. 45–
62; Gardner (1986) pp. 204–65.

94 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
then, there was nothing untoward in Praecia giving advice and

Cethegus taking it; in another, there is every reason why it should
cause the greatest possible offence. If advice was to come from a
woman it was expected she would be a chaste wife, mother, sister
or daughter and not someone who was popularly rumoured to be a
prostitute. Such advice too should be tendered in a discreet manner
and not paraded in the brazenly open fashion in which it had been
given on this occasion. But, if Praecia really had the intelligence
with which she is credited—and her championship of Lucullus
would seem to indicate she had—then, whatever the Romans
might think, the question of how she earned her living is simply
irrelevant to any judgement we might wish to form. What we are
talking about here is not sexual morality but wit and political acu-
men. Acknowledging that Lucullus benefited by the advice of an
alleged whore, we should be equally ready to admit that many a
man has come to grief because of the advice of a good woman. To
see in this episode evidence of some sort of canker or distemper in
Roman political life is, I hold, absurd. So far from being proof of
rot and ruin, the whole affair is simply yet another example of indi-
rect female influence on Roman politics. Such interventions were,
as we saw, not uncommon and, we may add, one to be found in all
societies. Even our own is not immune, or so some profess to be-
lieve.63
With the immeasurable benefit of hindsight we can say that
the Roman republic was about to enter its death-throes. That same
hindsight should allow us to see that one woman’s meddling with
matters political was in no way responsible for the onset of those
convulsions.
Immediately he had received his commission, Cotta set off for
Bithynia. No doubt the desire for loot and glory had him in its
grasp but in fairness it should be said that the sooner he arrived
there with his reinforcements the better. Mithridates’ army was
growing by the day in Paphlagonia. Lucullus, however, remained
for a time in Italy. Waiting for him in Asia there were legions but
63 Of an important speech to the House of Commons by Sir Geof-
frey Howe the Guardian (14 Nov. 1990, p. 1) reported, ‘Some Tories
blamed Lady Howe, “That speech took Elspeth 10 minutes to write and
Geoffrey 10 years to deliver,” said one minister.’
THE CONSULSHIP 95
he wished to augment these forces by raising a further legion at

home.64 While about this task he was also putting his staff together.
A commander on campaign usually had the services of one or
more legates whom he, in effect, picked himself. Legati were ex-
pected to serve indefinitely but might quit with the general’s per-
mission.65 This campaign was to be a long one and the irregular
appearances that certain figures make would suggest that Lucullus
allowed the war-weary to be replaced from time to time by fresh
recruits. Political connections could secure a man a place on a gen-
eral’s staff but the prudent commander usually chose with an eye to
ability rather than birth.66
Lucullus’ political appointees were few and their presence on
his staff is readily explicable. Ap. Claudius Pulcher, who was to
prove useful on a diplomatic mission for Lucullus, plainly owed his
position to being the general’s brother-in-law.67 His brother P.
Clodius turned up in 73. He enjoyed no official title but was simply
a comes or companion. He had good reason for wanting to be out of
Rome that year. Some of the Vestals had been charged with incest
and Clodius had distinguished himself (if that is the right word) by
the savagery of his verbal assault on one of the accused, Fabia. For
his pains he received such a severe mauling from the younger Cato
that he decided the rigours of the camp were preferable to the feel
of that tongue.68 Under Sulla, Lucullus had served alongside L.
Licinius Murena, son of the instigator of the Second Mithridatic
War. The two seem to have got on well together but friendship
alone did not win Murena his place now. He was a good soldier
and having fought Mithridates both under his father and Sulla he
could provide useful experience for his new commander.69 Save for
the fact that he was active very early in the campaign nothing
seems to be known of an officer called Mamercus. There has been
64 MRR 2.101; app. 2 on Cicero; ch. 5.

65 Willems (1968) 2 pp. 608–9.
66 For an illustration of a political staff see Badian (1964) pp. 52–5
but note the different analysis of Keaveney (2005) pp. 208–9.

67 MRR 2.547. See ch. 3.
68 Plut. Cat. Min. 19 with MRR 2.140, 142 n. 10 and Greenidge (1911)
p. 324.
69 MRR 2.581. For the view that Lucullus and Murena may have been
related see ch. 5.

96 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
a suggestion, however, that he could be a son of Mam. Lepidus (cos.

77). As the latter was a political ally of Lucullus, Mamercus could
perhaps owe his position to this connection.70
A connection of a sort also previously existed between Lucul-
lus and his legate C. Valerius Triarius, a man who served him well
throughout the whole campaign until he went down to defeat right
at its very end. After Lucullus refused the governorship of Sardinia
the next governor we hear of is this Triarius and it was he who
made an end of Lepidus.71 In contrast with Triarius are four other
officers about whose background we know little or nothing: Sextil-
ius, whom we shall encounter at the Parthian court;72 C. Salluvius
Naso, who operated in Mysia and Phrygia in 74;73 M. Fabius Hadri-
anus, who first makes his appearance in 72;74 and a Censorinius
who commanded the fleet in 70.75
But if these are names they are at least names. We now enter
the realms of confusion. Similarity of name means that a Pompeius
and a Pomponius get mixed up. The former chased Mithridates to
the Armenian border. In contrast, the latter was captured by Mith-
ridates when he was a prefect of cavalry but the king, admiring his
70 MRR 2.105; van Ooteghem (1959) p. 63; ch. 3.

71 Cic. Pro Scauro 29, 2 Verr. 1.37; Asc. 19C with RE ‘Valerius’ no.
363; MRR 2.631, 3.214–15; Shackleton Bailey (1976) pp. 71–2; Wiseman
(1971) p. 269.
Exuperantius 4 describes Triarius as a propraetor in Sardinia. Marshall
(1972) p. 903 points out that all consular and praetorian governors post
Sulla held the imperium pro consule and so he deduces that Triarius was a
legatus pro praetore. The objection to this view, I think, is would Exuperan-
tius have been aware of such niceties? We should not rule out the possi-
bility that Triarius had been a praetor and may even have swapped the
province of Africa with Lucullus, cf. ch. 3.
72 MRR 2.134; Wiseman (1971) p. 259.
73 MRR 2.105; Magie (1950) 2 p. 1208 n. 15.
74 MRR 2.140. Willems (1968) 1 p. 505 thought he was the son of a
Marian governor of Africa but then he would surely have been barred
from public life. See Hinard (1985) p. 85.
75 MRR 2.129. Possibly an L. Marcius. Crawford (1974) no. 363
thought he might be the monetalis of 82 but the probability is that he was

proscribed. That the moneyer may have been the father of the cos. 39 is
neither here nor there: all disability on Marians were removed by then. See
Hinard (1985) p. 374.
THE CONSULSHIP 97
gallantry, treated him wel1.76 But this is as nothing to the problem

posed by Barba, Voconius and Sornatius. The first two we hear of
only in 73 but Sornatius is attested as being with Lucullus through-
out the whole campaign. According to taste and the scholar one
reads, there are various possibilities offered by the evidence. The
Voconii had their origins in Aricia (Ariccia) and our Voconius has
been identified with a certain C. Voconius whose name is known
from a dedicatory inscription of the first century BC. This equation
would seem preferable to the view that Voconius and Barba are
one. What we have here is a record of an addition to the temple of
Diana at Nemi, an act we might expect from one who was to put
religious duties before military obligations. Yet another blend is
favoured by some who would make Sornatius and Barba a single
person called C. Sornatius Barba, although others would keep them
separate and give us a man called Cassius Barba.77
Depressing as this confusion must seem at first sight, when
taken together with the obscurity of so many of the other names it
tells us something important about Lucullus’ army. The staff largely
consisted of men who may be described as belonging to the pro-
fessional officer class. Scholars have detected a growth, ever since
the reforms of Marius, in the number of men who do not follow
the time-honoured practice of making the army the starting-point
for their eventual political career but rather choose to make soldier-
ing itself their life. The men who officer Lucullus’ army and who
are scarcely heard of again outside of the camp illustrate perfectly
this trend in Roman life.78
By about the middle of August 74 all was ready and Lucullus
sailed away to confront Mithridates.
76 MRR 2.120, 3.167.

77 MRR 2.113, 537, 3.34, 199–200; Syme (1979) pp. 601–2; Coarelli
(1987) pp. 178–9. Against the second identification mentioned in the text
we may urge that the movements of both Voconius and Barba render it
unlikely. See ch. 5.
78 Smith (1958) pp. 59–69; Keppie (1984) pp. 76–8. We are not, of
course, speaking of some kind of irresistible force. In 67 Pompey’s army

was stuffed with political appointees: Seager (1979) pp. 36–7.
5 CONFRONTING THE KING:
THE WAR WITH MITHRIDATES
Lucullus came ashore in his province at Ephesus. Awaiting him

were four legions. Two of these had served under P. Servilius Vatia
Isauricus in his campaigns (78–74) in Cilicia against the pirates.
Vatia was a good soldier and these men, in consequence, were well
disciplined and ready for the fray. The attitude of the other two,
however, gave some cause for concern. These were the Fimbrians
(so-called). They, it will be remembered, had served under Sulla’s
enemy Fimbria and when the proconsul departed from Asia he had
left them behind since he did not wish to be stabbed in the back in
the coming civil war. It is doubtful if they had seen action since the
fall of Mytilene in 79 and their time since had been passed in garri-
son duties. As a consequence of this their sense of discipline was
not all that it might have been. Moreover, now that a fresh army
had arrived in Asia they were entitled to seek their discharge. Nev-
ertheless, they re-enlisted and submitted meekly enough to Lucul-
lus’ efforts to bring them to order.1
1 Lucullus’ entry-point: Smith (1960) p. 13 and Holmes (1923) pp.
403–4. I think Sherwin-White (1984) p. 165 is mistaken in saying all Asian

troops come from Cilicia. Servilius’ campaigns: MRR 2.87ff. Lucullus’
army: MRR 2.101. Dio 36.14.3 definitely says the Fimbrians were dis-
charged. Smith p. 13 thought this was after the departure of Murena but
after the fall of Mytilene is more likely. Either date, anyway, tells against
the view of Magie (1950) 1 p. 324 that they had not seen active service for
ten years but does pose the problem of their status in the interval until
Lucullus arrived, cf. Keaveney (1982d) pp. 128–30. Two circumstances
suggest, however, that the demobilization and re-enlistment happened as I
have portrayed it in my text. The garrison of Asia of which Cotta speaks
in 75 (Sall. Orat. Cotta 7) was surely composed of Fimbrians, a circum-
stance which, incidentally, would account for their ill-discipline (Plut. Luc.
99
100 LUCULLUS, A LIFE
Lucullus’ initial intention was to make a drive on Pontus but

events soon rendered this plan obsolete. Leaving one of his gener-
als, Diophantes by name, in Cappadocia to block Lucullus’ ad-
vance, Mithridates made his long-awaited descent on Bithynia. As
we know, Cotta had by now established himself there but such was
the fury of Mithridates’ advance that he withdrew before it and
took refuge in Chalcedon (Üsküdar).2 At once the cities of Asia,
still labouring under the debt-burden created by Sulla, began to
show signs of unrest and to look to Mithridates as a deliverer. Lu-
cullus soothed them and warned the publicani to moderate their be-
haviour. At the same time he abandoned his earlier objective and
marched to the aid of Cotta. The first part of Mithridates’ strategy
had been completely successful. The Romans had been diverted
from Pontus. The second was now to yield a like satisfactory result.
From the very start of the campaign a quick victory in the field was
necessary because of the difficulty of victualling so large an army,
and now, with the Roman armies divided, it was imperative that
victory should be won over Cotta before Lucullus could reach him.
Cotta, for his part, proved amenable. Hearing that Lucullus was on
his way, he feared lest his colleague might share in the expected
triumph and so he gave battle at Chalcedon, only to be crushed by
land and sea and bottled up in the town.
Lucullus was encamped somewhere on the Sangarius river
(Sakarya) in Bithynia when news of the disaster reached him. Some
of his officers and many of his men, resentful of being deprived of
the easy pickings of Pontus, urged him to abandon Cotta. Let him
extract himself from the mess that had been of his own making.
Archelaus, who had once been Mithridates’ chief general but had
been obliged to flee when he fell under the despot’s displeasure,
was present to add his voice to the chorus saying that Lucullus had
7) and would also square ill with Sherwin-White’s suggestion (p. 166) that
they had been in Cilicia. Further, when Lucullus’ command was taken
from him the Fimbrians claimed they had enlisted only for the duration of
his campaign, cf. ch. 6. The assumption made by McGing (1984) p. 16
that Lucullus could not move while restoring discipline is not necessarily
correct.
2 Most familiar to the English reader as Scutari.
CONFRONTING THE KING: THE WAR WITH MITHRIDATES 101
only to turn up in Pontus to become master there. Lucullus, how-

ever, would not be swayed. He told his Roman critics that it were
better to save one Roman life than to capture all of the enemy’s
territory. To Archelaus he merely said he was not the sort of hunter
who dodged the wild beasts simply in order to take possession of
their empty lairs.3
So Lucullus continued with his march towards Chalcedon.
Even before the battle Mithridates, knowing he was coming, had
despatched an army under the command of the Sertorian renegade
Marius to stop him. The two armies came face to face at a place
called Otroea near Nicaea (Iznik). Battle lines were already drawn
when, so it is said, a flame-like body fell from the sky between the
two armies. Silver in colour, it resembled a jar in shape. Both sides,
recognizing an evil omen, instantly withdrew.
Lucullus, in point of fact, had been in any case reluctant to
engage in a set battle, so, if we are prepared to believe this story,4
like any pious Roman, we should acknowledge that the gods in this
way showed approval of this attitude and the concept of strategy
that informed it. Lucullus had already divined how best this cam-
paign might be won. The Pontic army was considerably larger than
his own and, although Sulla had smashed up two such armies, Lu-
cullus, mindful of the fate of Murena sen., thought it prudent not
to engage the enemy face-to-face but simply to harass it incessantly.
Without a battle the position of the Pontic force would become
critical because, given its size, it would soon run short of supplies.
Lucullus, therefore, closely questioned some prisoners about mess
conditions and discovered that the enemy had food for only about
four days. So he waited in his own well-stocked camp until Marius
3Plut. Luc. 7–8; Sall. Hist. 3.23–4M; Memnon 27.2, 7–8 (Jacoby 3B
pp. 355–6); App. Mith. 71; Liv. Ep. 93; De Vir. Ill. 74; Oros. 6.2.13;
Eutrop. 6.6.2; Cic. Pro Mur. 33. Cf. McGing (1986) pp. 143. 145–6, and
Holmes (1923) pp. 403–4. Although the latter dates Lucullus’ decision to
abandon the attack on Pontus to the time when Cotta’s defeat became
known, it seems to me just as likely to have happened when news of the
invasion of Bithynia came in. In this respect it should be noted that Oro-
sius says Marius was despatched against Lucullus before the defeat at
Chalcedon (see below), which would seem to indicate it was already
known he was on his way.
4 Scardigli (1989) p. 359 n. 102 suggests the object was a meteor.
was forced to withdraw. The Romans followed the enemy and

skirmished with his cavalry. Not all of Lucullus’ troops approved of
his handling of matters and some, in their eagerness for a proper
fight, were at one point on the verge of mutiny.5
But as Lucullus approached Chalcedon, Mithridates executed
a bold manoeuvre. Abandoning the siege, he made for the town of
Cyzicus. Lucullus caught up with him while he was still on the road
but the king, taking advantage of a dark and rainy night, gave him
the slip and by dawn had safely reached his objective.6
Cyzicus lay on what was then the island of Arctonnesus (Bear
Island) and is now the peninsula of Kapidag.7 This is situated on
the western end of the sea of Marmara and, at the time of which
we speak, was joined to the mainland by a single causeway. The
town itself, which had two harbours, lay close to this causeway8 but
a suburb had been built on a nearby hill called Arctonoros (Bear
Mountain). Overhanging this peak was another called Dindymon,
which was sacred to Cybele.9
The fact that Cyzicus was the first major town he encountered
on his invasion of Asia and that he bore a grudge against the in-
habitants for aiding the Romans at Chalcedon were only minor
considerations in Mithridates’ decision to attack the place. His
principal motive was to capture what he regarded as the gateway to
Asia and he was encouraged to do this by the belief that it would
easily fall into his hands. Once he had taken the town he would
5 Plut. Luc. 8 with van Ooteghem (1959) pp. 69–70. For Oros. 6.2.13
see n. 3 above. Liv. Ep. 94 seems to refer to all events from the defeat of
Cotta to the start of the siege of Cyzicus. Sherwin-White (1984) p. 168 n.
37 believes that Memnon 28.1 (Jacoby 3B p. 386) probably refers to these
encounters. Lucullus’ strategy: Sherwin-White pp. 166–8.
6 Plut. Luc. 9; Sall. Hist. 3.27M with Hasluck (1910) pp. 178–9. When
our sources (ILS 60; De Vir. Ill. 74) speak of Lucullus’ relief of the siege
of Chalcedon they mean Mithridates withdrew at his approach. On this
point van Ooteghem (1959) p. 69 n. 2 is to be preferred to Gelzer col.
386.
7 ‘An imposing mountainous mass . . . roughly triangular in shape’
(Hasluck 1910 p. 1).

8 The site is close to the modern town of Bandirma.
9 Strabo 12.8.11 with the commentary of van Ooteghem (1959) pp.
71–5 and the discussion of Hasluck (1910) pp. 1–6.

have an abundant food supply at his disposal since the inhabitants

were known to be in the habit of keeping a large quantity of grain
in the town and mixing it with some kind of earth to prevent spoil-
age. The excellent harbour facilities meant that further supplies
could be brought in and that war-fleets would have a base from
which to carry the fight into the Aegean. On the landward side ar-
mies could sally forth into Asia for, as in the First Mithridatic War,
it was the king’s intention to grab as much territory as possible.
The resolution of the inhabitants and the skill of Lucullus were,
however, to bring these plans to nought.10
At first all went well. On his arrival the king took possession
of the mountain range of Adrasteia which lay on the mainland op-
posite the island and of the suburb on Arctonoros. From this last
point the Pontic forces were then divided into ten camps to en-
compass the city by land while the royal fleet mounted a blockade
on the sea.11 Then Mithridates sent his generals forth to conquer
Asia. One general, Eumachus, was despatched to Phrygia and from
there he managed to penetrate into Pisidia and Isauria. A second,
Metrophanes, was accompanied by the renegade Fannius and they
carried their campaign as far as north-east Lydia. In redemption of
his promise to Sertorius, Mithridates allowed Marius to assume the
governorship of the Roman province of Asia. Garbed as a Roman
proconsul, he received the submission of Parium (Kemer) and
Lampsacus (Lapseki).12 Shortly afterwards the Pontic king fulfilled
10 Mithridates’ intentions may be deduced from the physical location
and advantages of Cyzicus and from the narrative of the siege. Although
they were thwarted, the lineaments of his plans, as we shall demonstrate,
are clearly discernible in those events. Note also the remarks of McGing
(1986) pp. 146–7; Sherwin-White (1984) pp. 166–9; Magie (1950) 1 p. 326.
App. Mith. 73 emphasizes the importance of the corn-store (for which see
Strabo in n. 9) but, so far as I am aware, only Hasluck (1910) p. 179
among moderns recognizes this.
11 Plut. Luc. 9; Strabo 12.8.11. See Hasluck (1910) p. 48.
12 Eumachus: App. Mith. 75; Oros. 6.2.18; Liv. Ep. 94 with Magie
(1950) 2 p. 1176 n. 33. Metrophanes/Fannius: Oros. 6.2.18 (Zangmei-

ster’s Moesiam cannot be right); Liv. 94 (fr.). Marius: Plut. Sert. 24 with
Magie (1950) 2 p. 1206 n. 10. Plainly these expeditions were launched
before Lucullus blockaded Mithridates (see below). Gelzer col. 386 puts
them before the siege started at all but in the case of Marius and Euma-
chus this is impossible. The pair engaged Lucullus right up to the start of
another pledge and despatched to Sertorius the ships he had guar-

anteed him by their treaty of the previous year.13
While all of this was going on Lucullus arrived and took up
his station at the village of Thracia which lay just east of the isth-
mus. When he had fortified his camp he called his troops together
and told them they could have a bloodless victory. But in order to
achieve this the Romans would have to seize the heights of
Adrasteia so as to bottle up Mithridates and starve him out. As it
happened there was but one narrow route to it, and, as we know, it
was guarded by a part of the king’s army.14 Then in an evil moment
Mithridates gave ear to his Roman agent L. Magius. This man said
it was best to withdraw from Adrasteia. He claimed the Fimbrian
legions were on the point of deserting and thus there was really no
point in contesting the route since all the king desired would come
to pass without toil. So Mithridates pulled his troops out and al-
lowed Lucullus to occupy the heights without hindrance.15
One source suggests that with this worthless advice Magius
was trying to ingratiate himself with Lucullus. He was worried
about his future since he had heard Sertorius was dead. We have
good reason to believe this latter detail was false but obviously that
does not mean that Magius, anyway, was not trying to secure his
own position. On the other hand, Magius could have acted in good
the siege (Oros. 6.2.13) and thus there is no time for a fresh expedition
until now. In view of what we know of Eumachus’ movements Sherwin-
White’s views, (1984) p. 166, of Mithridates’ strategy may require modifi-
cation.
13 From Memnon 29.5 (Jacoby 3B p. 358) we hear of the return of
these ships but not their setting-out. I follow Magie (1950) 1 p. 326, 2 p.
1207 n. 11 since the hour of Mithridates’ greatest triumph is the logical
time and the gesture is in harmony with the indulgence of Marius. Sher-
win-White (1984) p. 170 n. 40 does not appear to have considered these
factors. Reinach (1895) p. 314 puts the despatch just after the victory at
Chalcedon.
14 Hasluck (1910) p. 48: ‘the single narrow approach . . . is possibly to
be found in the bed of a stream flowing from the neighbourhood of Aid-

injik (Edincik) to lake Aphnitis (Manyas or Kuz).’ The Aphnitis is con-
fused with the Artyma (Ulubat) in the Everyman Atlas of 1907: see further
n. 20.
15 Plut. Luc. 9; App. Mith. 72; Oros. 6.2.14; Sall. Hist. 3.25–9M. Cf.
Hasluck (1910) p. 50.

faith. The Fimbrians did have a reputation for unruliness and once
more, before the siege was out, they gave Mithridates reason to
believe they might defect. Moreover, in following Magius’ advice,
Mithridates may well have reflected that since the Roman had once
been these men’s officer he might reasonably be expected to divine
their mood correctly.16 Yet, even when we acknowledge these cir-
cumstances we cannot, I feel, escape the conclusion that Mithri-
dates had made a colossal blunder. What made it a fatal blunder
was his failure to remedy it even though he had time to do so. Lu-
cullus, it was true, was now in an impregnable position but he had
not built siege works or drawn his encirclement tight. Thus, with
his numerically superior forces, it was possible for Mithridates to
burst out and should Lucullus try and stop him it would go hard
with him, something he himself had already realized. Instead, Mith-
ridates chose to gamble. Food would now no longer be available
from the mainland but supplies might yet be brought in by sea,
even at the cost of diverting to transport work a fleet intended for
war in the Aegean. Winter would, of course, put a stop to this too
but Mithridates’ hope and expectation seems to have been that by
then Cyzicus with its corn-bins would be his.17
The king therefore pressed on with the siege preparations al-
ready begun. The harbour was blockaded with a double wall and,
on the land side, a trench was dug around the city. Mounds, towers
and penthouses were raised. One monster tower stood 150 feet
high and had yet another mounted on its top from which bolts and
missiles were to be discharged. This creature had a kind of mari-
time cousin which rested on two quinqueremes bolted together.
From it a bridge could be lowered on to the city walls.18 One can
well imagine the thoughts and feelings of the Cyziceans as they
watched all the fearsome panoply of Hellenistic siege-craft being
deployed against them. To add to their terrors they seem, for a
time, to have believed Lucullus had not yet come and that they
16App. Mith. 72. See further below and app. 2 (iv).

17App. Mith. 72–3; Oros. 6.2.14. See Reinach (1895) p. 324; Sherwin-
White (1984) pp. 167–9; Hasluck (1910) p. 179.
18 App. Mith. 73; Sall. Hist. 3.30M. I assume Mithridates began prep-
arations immediately on arrival and that they would take time to complete.
See n. 22.
stood alone. They could actually see his troops across the straits
but thought they were part of Mithridates’ army. When Archelaus
sent a messenger they simply refused to believe him. At last, a boy
who had escaped from captivity at Pontic hands was able to con-
vince them that what they were looking at in the Thracian village
really was a Roman army. According to another account, the good
news was brought by a soldier of Lucullus’ who swam over to the
city aided by two inflated skins.19 More Roman soldiers soon fol-
lowed him. Well aware that the Cyziceans were famed more for
commercial acumen than warlike valour Lucullus had a boat
dragged overland from Lake Aphnitis,20 filled it with soldiers and
despatched them to the town where they might lend their skills to
the inhabitants in the ordeal that was about to begin.21
At this point, with all in readiness for an assault, Mithridates
resolved to test the nerve of the defenders. He put on board ship
3,000 Cyzicean prisoners and sailed them up to the wall of the city.
There they stretched out their hands and begged their fellow-
citizens to pity them. However, Pisistratus, the Cyzicean general,
would not yield and merely advised them to meet their fate with
courage.22
Seeing that persuasion was availing nought, Mithridates
launched his assault. The quinqueremes came, dropped the bridge
and four men ran across. The Cyziceans at first drew back but
19 For the two versions compare Plut. Luc. 9 with our other sources,
Front. Strat. 3.13.6; Oros. 6.2.14; Flor. 1.40.16; Sall. Hist. 3.37M. Hasluck
(1910) p. 179 seems to equate the swimmer with the messenger from Ar-
chelaus but the difference in details between the two versions probably
rules it out. Hasluck p. 50 demonstrates that Lucullus’ soldiers could in-
deed be seen in the Thracian village.
20 As the town of Dascylium lay on Lake Aphnitis (Turkey Blue Guide)
Plutarch calls it ‘Dascylitis’. The equation of this lake with Ulubat in

Everyman Atlas (1907)—it is not given a name in the 1961 edition—makes
for an impossibly long journey.
21 Plut. Luc. 9. See Hasluck (1910) pp. 45–7, 181. Later in the siege we
shall discover one of these soldiers displaying his skills, and this tells
against Strabo’s statement (12.8.11) that they came tardily. In any case it
should be noted he is not offering a chronological narrative.
22 App. Mith. 73; Front. Strat. 4.5.21. Hasluck (1910) p. 179 may exag-
gerate the importance of Pisistratus and is probably wrong to suggest

Mithridates’ siege preparations were not yet complete, cf. n. 18.
when the rest of Mithridates’ men were slow to follow the leaders
they took courage and drove the four from the wall. They then
poured pitch down on the ships and forced them to withdraw. By
land there was a massed attack by the siege machines but the
townsfolk broke the heads of the rams with nooses or simply
deadened their impact with strategically placed bundles of wool.
Fire missiles were quenched with water or had their force broken
by linen cloths. However, in spite of all the efforts of the defend-
ers, a part of the wall was weakened by fire and caved in towards
evening. Fortunately for the Cyziceans, nobody dared enter the gap
because of the heat and they were able to rebuild in the night. This
piece of good luck was soon followed by another and greater. At
dawn on the next day there suddenly arose a great wind which
overthrew and utterly destroyed the larger part of Mithridates’ en-
gines. Not unnaturally the desperate Cyziceans attributed this to
direct divine intervention. Persephone, patroness of Cyzicus, had, it
was reported, appeared in a dream to the town-clerk to tell him she
was about to set the Libyan flute-player against the Pontic trum-
peter—an enigmatic statement which puzzled until it was swiftly
fulfilled before the walls. It was also said Athena had appeared to a
number of people in Ilium. She was in a dishevelled state and said
she had just come from helping the Cyziceans.23
Soon after there came a further sign which boded no good at
all for Mithridates. The festival of Persephone had come round.
The Cyziceans were wont to honour their patroness by sacrificing a
black heifer. Now they had to make do with a paste imitation since
the real one was pasturing on the mainland. At the last moment,
however, the black heifer left her pasture, swam the strait and
obligingly presented herself at the altar.24
Seeing that the place was holy, some of Mithridates’ friends
advised him to flee but he heeded them not and ascended Mount
Dindymon. From here he constructed mounds extending to the
city walls and on them built a set of towers. At the same time he set
23 App. Mith. 74; Plut. Luc. 10; Sall. Hist. 3.34–6M. Was this storm the
first sign of the onset of winter?

24 Plut. Luc. 10; App. Mith. 75 from whom the place of the incident in
the chronological sequence can be deduced. On Persephone and Cyzicus

see Hasluck (1910) pp. 210–11.
about collapsing the walls by means of mines. Now, however, Lu-

cullus’ policy of masterly inactivity paid its first dividend. Winter
had at this time set in and with the consequent closure of the seas
the Pontic army began to feel the pinch of hunger. In an effort to
be rid of useless mouths Mithridates resolved to send his cavalry
away to Bithynia since they plainly had no part to play in these op-
erations. A favourable moment occurred when Lucullus, in accor-
dance with his policy of harassment, left his camp to besiege one of
those ten encircling camps that Mithridates had established at the
start of the siege. The Pontic horse set off at speed along the
Lampsacus/Prusa (Bursa) road which runs roughly parallel to the
shores of the sea of Marmara. Learning that the birds had flown,
Lucullus returned by night to his camp. The next morning he be-
gan his pursuit. Foul weather attended his progress. Starting in a
storm, he continued through bitter cold and falls of snow so severe
as to cause many of his men to fall by the wayside. Lucullus, how-
ever, was never one to spare either himself or his men and so he
persisted with the chase until he caught up with the fugitives at
Lopadium (Uluabat), the natural crossing-point of the Rhyndacus
(Capaz) river. Falling upon them, he slew a great number and cap-
tured besides many men and baggage-animals while, it is said, the
women from nearby Apollonia came forth to loot the dead. Lucul-
lus himself then marched home, taking care to display his captives
prominently as he progressed past Mithridates’ fortifications.25
But not only did the king have to witness this galling specta-
cle, he also had to receive the news that his expeditions to other
parts of Asia Minor had failed. Metrophanes and Fannius were
driven out of Mysia by the legate Mamercus and only after many
adventures did they make their way back safely to their master.
Contemporaneously Eumachus went down to defeat at the hands
25 App. Mith 75; Plut. Luc. 11; Oros. 6.2.15; Strabo 12.8.11; Sall. Hist.
3.41–2M and possibly also 40M, cf. n. 27. Memnon 28.1 (Jacoby 3B p.
356) may refer to this too. Plutarch’s claim that Mithridates’ officers kept
him in ignorance of the extent of the famine is probably true. It was
sometimes dangerous to tell an eastern despot the truth (cf. ch. 6). On the
camp Lucullus was attacking I take my cue from Gelzer col. 387. On the
road taken by the fugitives see Hasluck (1910) pp. 78–9, 124–31 from
which I deduce the site of the battle. Apollonia: Hasluck (1910) pp. 68–9.
It lay on Lake Ulubat whose old name, Apolyont, preserved its memory.
of Deiotarus, prince of the Galatians and ally of Rome. A little later

we hear that Marius too had returned to base. Evidently his gover-
norship had not been a success and one wonders how far a certain
C. Salluvius Naso, another of Lucullus’ officers and known to be
active in eastern Mysia and Phrygia Epictetus, had been responsible
for this state of affairs.26
Now hunger became famine. Some sustained themselves by
eating the bodies of the dead. Others partook of the local vegeta-
tion but unfortunately this proved to be poisonous. To the miseries
of hunger there was soon added the horror of plague which broke
out as a result of the huge number of unburied corpses that lay
about the place. Mithridates, nevertheless, continued to press the
siege while the Cyziceans maintained their defiance by burning his
machines, sallying forth to attack his weakened army and under-
mining his mounds. In one of these operations Mithridates nearly
lost his life. A centurion from Lucullus’ army who was working
underground with the Cyziceans became friendly with some of the
enemy who were boring from the opposite direction. He offered to
betray the city but only on condition Mithridates himself should
come down in person into the mine and pledge his good faith. It is
a measure of the king’s desperation that he agreed to this. Cooler
heads, however, surrounded the royal person and they divined
what was afoot. So they constructed a doorway in the tunnel which
might be quickly shut. When, therefore, the centurion and his men
rushed Mithridates he was able to dive behind the door and go un-
scathed.
A further sign, it is said, was now vouchsafed the Pontic king.
From Mount Dindymon was heard a sound like that of a Bacchic
rout. As on a more famous occasion some forty years later, the
gods made a noisy exit as they deserted their favourite. Mithridates
26 Eumachus, Metrophanes, Marius; see n. 12. For Marius’ later ac-
tivities see below. Naso: ILS 37 with Magie (1950) 2 p. 1208 n. 15. The
usefulness of Holmes’ discussion of Eumachus (1923) p. 404 is vitiated by
his ignorance of Oros. 6.2.18. The young Julius Caesar took part in these
campaigns, see app. 2, section (viii).
at last realized there was no hope of taking Cyzicus and resolved to

bolt at the first sign of spring (73).27
But although Mithridates had decided to quit Cyzicus he had
by no means abandoned his original design of conquest. As a pre-
liminary he despatched a fleet under his admiral Aristonicus to
make war in the region. Before setting out, however, the admiral
entered into negotiation with the Fimbrians who were in a danger-
ous mood after a winter spent under canvas. The outcome was yet
another disaster to be added to the long list that had befallen Mith-
ridates in this ill-starred campaign. When Aristonicus turned up
with 10,000 gold coins, the supposed traitors, instead of embracing
him warmly, seized him and carried him off to Lucullus.28
Mithridates himself made for Parium with the rest of his fleet.
His embarkation had turned into a rout when many of his soldiers,
fearing they would be left behind, rushed the already-overcrowded
boats, with the result that a number of them overturned or sank.
Seeing their enemy’s discomfiture, the jubilant Cyziceans poured
out of their city to plunder the Pontic camps and slay the sick and
wounded they found there. Mithridates’ land-forces were des-
patched to Lampsacus under the command of Marius and another
general called Hermaeus. Twice their progress was slowed by the
natural barriers based by the rivers Aesepus (Gönen) and Granicus
27 App. Mith. 76; Liv. Ep. 95; Sall. Hist. 3.38–9M. Maurenbrecher be-
lieves Sall. Hist. 3.40M refers to the pursuit to Lopadium (n. 25), but with
equal plausibility it could refer to these famine conditions. I suspect that
Sall. Hist. 3.31M may refer to a scene akin to that in Plut. Ant. 75. In view
of the king’s recklessness, obviously consequent on desperation, I assign
Diod. Sic. 37.22b and Strabo 12.8.11 to this point in the siege. In the light
of the storms Mithridates encountered (see below) I deduce he left at the
earliest possible moment.
28 Plut. Luc. 11, 33; Memnon 28.2. (Jacoby 3B p. 380); Sall. Hist. 3.32–
3M. Cf. Gelzer col. 388. I cannot agree with Mattingly (1980) p. 1505 that
Aristonicus only had a few specimen coins with him. The need for gener-
osity was great. Sherwin-White (1984) p. 170 n. 40 equates Aristonicus’
fleet with the one in Memnon 29.5 (Jacoby 3B p. 358) but this is doubtful.
It is by no means certain the fleet sailed after Aristonicus’ capture
(Mattingly p. 1505). Moreover the fleet in Memnon 29.5 had Spain as its
objective and it is unlikely to have been sent there now, cf. n. 13. The
more modest brief of the Aegean assigned to Aristonicus fits the current
situation better.
(Biga). However, despite being attacked, and defeated at the cross-

ing-places of Denizkent and Biga, a remnant succeeded in strug-
gling into Lampsacus where they were put under siege by Lucul-
lus.29
With the enemy thus cooped up Lucullus allowed himself a
pause to savour his victory. Returning to Cyzicus, he entered the
city in triumph and was hailed as a deliverer. The grateful citizens
then initiated games in his honour which were ever afterwards
known as ‘Lucullan’. The city itself was rewarded with an increase
in territory and had restored to it the freedom it lost after the First
Mithridatic War.30
When the party was over Lucullus headed back to the Helle-
spont to conduct the next phase of the campaign. In effect, there
were two tasks to be performed. First of all, the Pontic garrisons
had to be rooted out of a number of towns which they had man-
aged to occupy in the days of Mithridates’ success. This work was
entrusted to two legates, Triarius and Barba. The pair, first of all,
reduced Prusa. Triarius then went to take Prusias (also called Cius)
while Barba received the surrender of Nicaea from which the Pon-
tic garrison had fled. Once he had done with Prusias Triarius made
for Apamea, which he stormed with great slaughter.31
Lucullus’ other objective was to gather together a navy with
which to break the mastery of the seas the enemy had enjoyed
since they destroyed the Roman fleet at Chalcedon. The senate,
29 Plut. Luc. 11; App. Mith. 76; Memnon 28.3–4 (Jacoby 3B pp. 356–
7); Oros. 6.2.19. For the Lampsacus road see n. 25. Plutarch mentions
only the Granicus, Appian only the Aesepus. Both van Ooteghem (1959)
p. 81 n. 4 and Gelzer col. 388 point out that Lucullus must have attacked
at both and they are supported by Flor. 1.40.17 who, for once, may have
got things right. Crossing places: Hasluck (1910) p. 127 and Magie (1950)
2 p. 901 n. 116. The geographical considerations tell against the elaborate
theories of Coarelli (1987) pp. 157–9.
30 Plut. Luc. 12; App. Mith. 76. See Gelzer col. 388 and Keaveney
(2005a) p. 190.
31 Plut. Luc. 12; App. Mith. 77; Memnon 28.5–8 (Jacoby 3B p. 357).
Appian confuses Prusa and Prusias. Oros. 6.2.23 attributes to Lucullus the
capture of Apamea and Prusa. This may be a mistake as Reinach (1895) p.
330 n. 2 thought, but it could be the result of compressed narration. A
glance at the map will show that, contrary to what Appian implies and van
Ooteghem (1959) p. 84 accepts, some of these battles are on land.
deeply worried lest Mithridates might swoop on Italy, voted a sum

of 3,000 talents for building a new one. Lucullus, however, refused
this money. He held firmly to the wonted Roman principle that
friends and allies of Rome must come to her aid in an hour of
need. Knowing the area intimately, he realized that all that was
needful might be got from the states in the neighbourhood and so
he proceeded to levy ships from them.32
In the interval, Mithridates, as might be expected, had not
been idle. Pressing ahead with his plans to create havoc in the Ae-
gean he sailed out of Parium. Coming to Lampsacus, he pulled out
the bulk of his forces and with them he made a descent on Perin-
thus (Erikli) in Thrace. Failing to take the place he retreated to Ni-
comedeia (lzmit) where he established his headquarters. On the
way, however, he ran into a storm which severely damaged his
fleet.33
When Mithridates quitted Lampsacus he had left behind a
hand-picked force of ten thousand men and fifty ships under the
command of an exotically named trio, Marius the Roman renegade,
Alexander the Paphlagonian and Dionysius the Eunuch. As subse-
quent events show, the intention was that they should head east-
ward while their chief operated in the north. According to the
story, Lucullus was camped at Ilium when one night the goddess
Aphrodite in whose precinct he slept appeared to him in a dream,
‘Lion, why do you sleep’ she asked, ‘when the fawns are nigh?’ As
befitted a disciple of Sulla Lucullus took this very seriously and
soon learnt what the goddess meant. Thirteen ships, hurrying to
join the main enemy force at Lemnos, had been spotted off the
harbour of the Achaeans which was on the mainland roughly op-
posite the island of Tenedos. Lucullus immediately put to sea and
captured this detachment. He then set off to encounter the main
force only to discover his opponents had very cleverly drawn up
32 App. Mith. 77; Plut. Luc. 12–13 with Magie (1950) 2 p. 1209 n. 20.
The only clue as to when the senate voted money is supplied by Plutarch
who puts it before the king’s retreat to Bithynia. Magie 1 pp. 326, 330 is
surely right to see it as a response to the events at Chalcedon and the
charges arising. See further n. 34.
33 App. Mith. 76; Memnon 28.4 (Jacoby 3B p. 357). In the light of
App. Mith. 78 and Oros. 6.2.24 van Ooteghem’s reconstruction (1959) p.

84 of Mithridates’ movements cannot be accepted.
their ships on the shore of a barren islet and he was unable to come
to grips with them. Eventually, however, he landed an infantry de-
tachment behind them. Those troops destroyed part of the enemy
and forced the rest back to the sea. There they went down to defeat
at the hands of Lucullus himself. Dionysius committed suicide but
the other two commanders were captured. Alexander was reserved
for the eventual triumph but Marius was executed on the spot since
it was not held to be proper that one who had once been a Roman
senator should be condemned to walk in such a procession. Lucul-
lus then rounded off his victory by sending laurel-wreathed des-
patches, sign of especial rejoicing, to Rome. Relief and joy met
them on their arrival. Ever since Chalcedon there had been a great
fear lest a Mithridatic fleet might sail for Italy. Although there is no
evidence to suggest this one was doing that and although its size
anyway was hardly such as to make of it a serious threat, it was
nevertheless proclaimed that Lucullus had saved Italy from inva-
sion at the hands of a Sertorian renegade.34
By now, Mithridates was growing rather uneasy in Ni-
comedeia. He had had a first-hand account of the success of Lucul-
lus’ legates when the fleeing garrison of Nicaea took refuge with
him. The message was then considerably reinforced when Cotta,
evidently judging it safe to nose abroad once more, now left Chal-
cedon and came to besiege him. He was joined soon after by Tri-
arius fresh from the capture of Apamea. Fortunately for Mithri-
dates, Triarius’ fleet was small and he was unable to block the
Astacenus channel. Reinforcements were supposed to have come
with another Roman legate, Voconius, but he was frittering away
his time in Samothrace, having himself initiated into the Mysteries
there. When, however, Mithridates learnt of Lucullus’ two victories
34App. Mith. 76–7; Plut. Luc. 12; Eutrop. 6.6.3; Oros. 6.2.21–2. Three
passages of Cicero (Pro Arch. 21, Mur. 33, Leg. Man. 21) speak of the de-
feat of a Sertorian fleet making for Italy off Tenedos. Some, e.g. Sherwin-
White (1984) p. 171 n. 42, think he is referring to the later victory of Tri-
arius at the same spot (see below). The detail in Memnon 29.5 (Jacoby 3B
p. 358) that this fleet was not sailing towards Italy is of little moment since
Rome would not necessarily know of its precise movements. What seems
to me decisive are the wreathed despatches for which see van Ooteghem
(1959) p. 86 n. 64. Cicero’s fulsome language surely fits best with a victory
announced in this fashion.
he realized the Roman commander would soon be at Nicomedeia

and that it was, therefore, time to move once more. So he set out
yet again, this time with the intention of attacking Rome’s ally
Byzantium. But there again he was thwarted by a storm which
wrecked many of his ships and scattered the rest. Thanks to friends
within the town Mithridates himself found refuge in Heraclea Pon-
tica (Ereğli) a city which, like Byzantium, was an ally of Rome’s.35
So when Lucullus finally arrived at Nicomedeia he found that
the foe had vanished. In order to decide what to do next he held a
conference with his staff. A body of opinion at that meeting be-
lieved that since the king had been driven out of Asia hostilities
should now cease. Lucullus, however, vigorously opposed this, ar-
guing that they must needs go in pursuit of the foe. This advocacy
of further action shows that Lucullus realized full well that if Mith-
ridates were allowed to refresh himself he would simply return to
the attack sooner or later. Killing or capture was the only answer to
the Mithridatic question.
Certainly the debate now centred on the strategic advisability
of a further assault on the Pontic king and not on any doubts about
the legality of such a move. By the terms of the Lex Cornelia de mai-
estate a governor might not campaign outside of his province with-
out the senate’s permission. In the case of Lucullus this proviso
had been waived. When the command of the war had been con-
ferred on him it was not intended he should be confined to Asia
but rather he was granted that freedom of movement deemed nec-
essary to wage it successfully and bring it to an end. The Asiatic
Vespers had not been forgotten. Those who would not ratify the
35 Plut. Luc. 13; App. Mith. 78; Oros. 6.2.24; Eutrop. 6.6.3; Cic. Prov.
Cons. 6; Tac. Ann. 12.62; Memnon 29.1–3 (Jacoby 3B p. 355); Flor.

1.40.18–20.
Given that Triarius probably had a fleet (Memnon 28.7) and that he
and Cotta besieged Nicomedeia e9kate/rwqen (Memnon 29.1) we must
assume it was very small and that Voconius was intended to remedy the
deficiency. There would appear to be no support for the notion (MRR
2.113) that Lucullus intended him to block the Bosporus. Although Mith-
ridates is represented as saying he was on his way home, the storm at
Parium mentioned in Ep. Mith. 14 must, as Gelzer col. 388 saw, refer to
that in n. 33. Plutarch attributes the storm to divine vengeance for the
looting of a temple at Priapus by the Pontic forces.
Peace of Dardanus for Mithridates the hostis were determined, now

war had broken out again, to destroy that enemy.
So a division of labours was agreed upon. Lucullus himself
was to invade Pontus. Cotta was given the job of subduing
Heraclea, whose defection meant it could threaten the proconsul’s
advance through Paphlagonia. Triarius, meantime, was despatched
to the Aegean. In his hour of need Mithridates had recalled the
fleet he had once sent to Sertorius and it was now known to be
close to home.36
Mithridates himself was at Amisus (Samsun)—he had trav-
elled via Sinope (Sinop)—when he learned of Lucullus’ intentions.
The need for new allies was imperative so Mithridates made appli-
cation to the kings of Parthia and Armenia while at the same time
an envoy called Diodes was despatched with a large sum of money
to buy the support of the Scythians. The Pontic king, however,
soon learned that a beaten man has few friends. Diodes took the
money and ran to Lucullus while Parthia and Armenia refused to
become involved. Even though Tigranes, the Armenian king, was
Mithridates’ son-in-law, he, like his Parthian counterpart, saw no
reason to get involved in this particular war. Only Machares, Mith-
ridates’ son, who was king of the Cimmerian Bosporus gave any
aid. So there was nothing for it but to move again and fall back on
the resources of Pontus itself. The king, therefore, took up his sta-
tion at Cabira where, in the course of the winter which now fol-
lowed, he gathered together another army. Lucullus for his part
marched south of Paphlagonia through the country of his allies, the
Galatians. Victualling presented a considerable problem which was
only solved by having thirty thousand Galatian porters follow the
army with grain for the troops. But after dearth there came plenty.
Descending the river Halys (Kizil) to a region around Amisus, the
36 Plut. Luc. 14; Memnon 29.5 (Jacoby 3B p. 358); App. Mith. 77 with
Magie (1950) 1 p. 332 and Sherwin-White (1984) pp. 170–1. For the Lex
Cornelia and exemptions therefrom see Keaveney (2005a) p. 142 and
(1982c) p. 417. Since no source taxes Lucullus with treason I assume that
he received such an exemption. Later complaints are partisan and politi-
cally motivated (cf. ch. 6). No source says why the fleet was returning.
The reason given in the text is my deduction from the war situation. If we
could be sure Sertorius really died in 73 we could then follow Magie in
giving that as the cause, but see app. 2.
Romans found there an abundance of good things. An ox could be

had for a drachma, a slave for four. Indeed, supplies were so plenti-
ful that people simply abandoned or destroyed them.37
Lucullus himself now put Amisus under siege together with its
suburb Eupatoria which derived its name from Mithridates’ sur-
name Eupator. He also sent forward another part of his army to
attack Themiscyra (Terme) which lay on the river Thermodon
(Terme). Accounts of what happened at Amisus differ. One author
says the siege went on briskly and the inhabitants, receiving sup-
plies from Machares, even dared make sallies upon the enemy. Ac-
cording to another source, Lucullus pushed the siege without any
great enthusiasm. About Themiscyra there is unanimity. Towers
were built, mounds thrown up and tunnels dug in which both sides
fought battles. A novel feature was the bears and bees that the
townsfolk stuffed into these galleries in order to dislodge the Ro-
mans.
The conflicting reports about what was going on at Amisus
match well stories about the disagreements between the Roman
commander and his men which had arisen at this time. Apparently,
when the Roman army got as far as Themiscyra they started to
complain that they had had, as yet, no booty since every town had
surrendered on terms38 and, as things stood, there was precious
little possibility of any since it looked like they were being led to
fight against the savage tribes of the Tibareni and Chaldaei who
lived in a kind of waste. Amisus was the place to be where there
was loot in abundance. Thus the eagerness with which the troops
pushed the siege may have been matched by a certain reluctance on
Lucullus’ part. They wanted booty; he wished to spare the town
37 App. Mith. 78; Plut. Luc. 14; Memnon 29.6 (Jacoby 3B pp. 358–9).
On Lucullus’ route Sherwin-White (1984) pp. 171–2 is, I think, to be pre-
ferred to Magie (1950) 2. p. 1209 n. 23. To march through friendly coun-
try such as this makes perfect sense. There is no evidence to support van
Ooteghem’s suggestion (1959) p. 89 that it was winter when Lucullus
came to Pontus. The abundance suggests autumn. For more treachery on
the part of Mithridates’ officers see below and Strabo 10.4.10, 12.3.33.
The commonly held view that Machares turned traitor now is, I believe,
mistaken. See n. 54. On Parthia and Armenia see further ch. 6.
38 Not strictly true (see above) but the context would hardly lead us
to expect a pedantic concern with accuracy.

from sack. As it turned out, the troops eventually had their wish
but not before they conceived a deep and lasting resentment at
having had to go through another winter siege.
A second complaint of a different order came from another
quarter. Why, it was asked, were they besieging these towns in the
first place when they should be pursuing Mithridates? At a contio
Lucullus explained his strategy to his officers. If they attacked
Mithridates in his present weakened state he would simply take
fright and disappear into the hinterland of Asia where it would be
difficult to lay hands on him. But, if he were given a period of re-
cuperation, he would surely take the field again and the Romans
would then be able to come to grips with him.39
With the coming of spring (72) Lucullus handed over charge
of the siege of Amisus to Murena and set off to encounter Mithri-
dates. Marching southward by way of the valleys of the Iris (Yeşil)
and Lycus (Kelkit) he met with the Pontic advance-guards at the
town of Eupatoria (which place should not, of course, be confused
with the suburb of Amisus which bore the same name).40 The en-
emy commander, Phoenix, obeyed his instructions to the letter and
lit signal-beacons to warn his master of the enemy approach. Then
duty done, he deserted to the Romans. Lucullus descended into the
plain. About twelve miles from Cabira he found the enemy cavalry
39 Plut. Luc. 14–15; Memnon 29.7 (Jacoby 3B p. 359); App. Mith. 78;
Sall. Hist. 3.58M. See Magie (1950) 2 p. 1213 n. 33; Sherwin-White (1984)
p. 171; van Ooteghem pp. 89–91.
Maurenbrecher’s denial that the Sallust fragment can be put at this
place is not convincing. There is no trace in our sources of the reluctance
of the troops to invade Armenia to which he would attribute this mention
here. On the other hand, Plutarch, despite the insistence of Maurenbre-
cher to the contrary, does show Lucullus answering some of his critics.
Now this is not to say that yet another context could not be found for the
fragment. It would fit well with the anger of the soldiers when Lucullus at
first refused them permission to loot the captured town (see below). Vil-
loresi (1939) p. 104 n. 5 would not attach much weight to Lucullus’ out-
line of strategy in Luc. 14 but, like Sherwin-White, I believe a kernel of
truth may be extracted from it. The one glaringly incongruous element—
the attribution of hostile intent to Tigranes (see above and ch. 6)—is ei-
ther Plutarch’s embellishment or a rhetorical ploy of Lucullus himself.
40 Magie (1950) 2 p. 1211 n. 26 and previous note.
waiting for him and, in the subsequent battle, he was worsted and
forced to retreat to the higher ground.41
For several days after this Mithridates brought out his forces
but Lucullus was naturally reluctant to venture back into the plain.
With the guidance of some locals whom he had captured he moved
his army into a strong position on the heights with a stream to his
front. From here he could make sallies on the enemy while at the
same time he was safe from their attacks.42
For a time both sides held off from battle until, at last, one
came on virtually by accident. Some of Mithridates’ men were
hunting a stag when they were cut off by the Romans. Men came
out from both sides to help their comrades and a skirmish devel-
oped in which the Romans were worsted. The soldiers watching
from the Roman camp begged Lucullus to do something. He duly
went down into the plain, confronted the foremost fugitives and
persuaded them to turn back. The rest followed this example and
with Lucullus at their head they drove the enemy back to their
camp. The fugitives were made to pay for their behaviour, how-
ever, by suffering a public disgrace. In ungirt tunics they were
forced to dig a large ditch while being watched by the rest of the
army.43
Mithridates, however, did not just attempt to bring Lucullus
to battle but had recourse to other methods in order to be rid of
him. One of these was assassination. Our accounts of what hap-
pened differ about minor details but agree on the main outlines of
the story. A certain barbarian prince pretended to desert from
Mithridates and offered his services to Lucullus. Soon he so distin-
guished himself that Lucullus admitted him to his friendship. Then
one day when the general was taking a siesta in his tent the barbar-
ian asked to be admitted since he said he had urgent business. The
attendants, however, would not let him in and angry words were
exchanged. Realizing that he might not be able to give a satisfactory
41 App. Mith. 79; Plut. Luc. 15; Phlegon 12.3 (Jacoby 2B p. 1163); Cic.
Mur. 33 with Sherwin-White (1984) p. 172; Magie (1950) 1 p. 334; app. 2;

n. 44.
42 Plut. Luc. 15; App. Mith. 80; Sall. Hist. 4.5M.
43 In keeping with the spirit of the age Lucullus favoured lighter pun-
ishments, cf. Keaveney (1984a) pp. 357–63.

account of his behaviour the prince mounted his horse and rode
away to Mithridates.
The other weapon Mithridates attempted to deploy was one
he had borrowed from Lucullus himself—starvation. With his
command of the lower ground he was able to cut off the Romans
from local supplies. With the possibility that the siege might drag
on into the winter the situation began to look serious. So Lucullus
sent his legate Sornatius into Cappadocia to fetch provisions. Mith-
ridates sent a force to attack the train only to have Sornatius cut it
to pieces.
In the meantime skirmishing continued until one day the Pon-
tic forces were put to flight. Mithridates himself emerged from the
camp and rallied his men who then chased the Romans back up the
hill, so terrifying them that they kept running long after the enemy
had stopped pursuing them. The king decided to puff this as a
great victory and sent messengers to announce it far and wide pre-
sumably in the, ultimately vain, hope that it might bring allies to his
side. Soon after with the onset of winter active hostilities ceased.44
44App. Mith. 79–80; Plut. Luc. 15–17; Front. Strat. 2.5.30; Sall. Hist.
4.8M; Memnon 29.8 (Jacoby 3B p. 359). Because of the discrepancies in
our main sources, Plutarch and Appian (for which see Holmes 1923 pp.
405–6), any reconstruction of events must be tentative. I see no reason to
follow van Ooteghem (1959) pp. 92–3 in conflating their two battles and I
would not attach a great deal of importance to the fact that they place the
assassination attempt at different points in the sequence. It should be
noted, though, that Appian was not altogether sure murder was being
planned. Mithridates’ cutting of supplies rests on Maurenbrecher’s inter-
pretation of the Sallust fragment. For Sornatius’ route see Magie (1950) 2
p. 1212 n. 30.
The chronology is established by Phlegon 12.3 (Jacoby 2B p. 1163)
which, as Gelzer col. 391 saw, is supported by Plut. Luc. 33. It is further
bolstered by Memnon 29.9 (Jacoby 3B p. 359): tribome/nou de\ tou=
pole/mou. Strictly interpreted, Plutarch is telling us that the troops openly
expressed discontent during a winter campaign at Cyzicus and Amisus. In
the following winters they held their peace although they were no less
annoyed. Plutarch’s own narrative supports this (see especially Luc. 7, 11,
14). Clearly, this does not rule out a second winter at Amisus where the
troops remained angry but quiescent. See also app. 2. I would not, how-
ever, agree with Gelzer when he puts Sornatius’ expedition in 71. Lucullus
would surely need supplies for winter. Phlegon may be curt but I have
The spring of 71 saw Lucullus naturally desirous of replenish-

ing his supplies. So he sent another expedition into Cappadocia
under the command of M. Fabius Hadrianus and this decision fi-
nally broke the stalemate. Mithridates sent a large cavalry force to
attack Hadrianus as he returned but it fared no better than its
predecessor had with Sornatius and was virtually annihilated. Mith-
ridates wished to conceal this fresh disaster from his men but Ha-
drianus gave him no chance as he paraded his laden wagons in de-
rision before the Pontic camp. The king now feared that Lucullus
would go over to the offensive since a great part of his cavalry had
been destroyed in the debacle and so he resolved on flight. He se-
cretly communicated his decision to his senior officers alone to
avoid panic in the ranks. Unfortunately, the officers could not wait
for the signal to march but began to move their personal belong-
ings out of the camp by night. When the common soldiers saw this
they assumed they were being abandoned and, filled with panic,
they scattered pell-mell in every direction. When he tried to stem
the tide, Mithridates himself was nearly trampled in the rush.
Lucullus, seeing what was happening, reacted swiftly. The in-
fantry were sent charging into the enemy camp and there, long-
starved of loot, they laid their hands on the rich spoils of the en-
emy. The cavalry was sent after Mithridates himself who had taken
to horse. They had almost caught up with him when by accident or
design a mule laden with gold crossed their path. To the horror of
the ancient moralizing historian who relates the incident the sol-
diers stopped to plunder and thus allowed their quarry to get clean
away.45
That quarry then made his way to Comana where he attended
to two matters of moment. First of all, he gathered about himself
an escort of two thousand horse for the next stage of his journey.
elected to follow him strictly in placing the expedition of Hadrianus alone

in the spring of 71 although I admit the possibility that the battle in App.
Mith. 80 might belong there too.
45 Phlegon 12.3 (Jacoby 2B p. 1163); Plut. Luc. 17; App. Mith. 80–2;
Memnon 29.9–30.1 (Jacoby 3B p. 359); Sall. Hist. 4.9–11M; Flor. 1.40.18;

Eutrop. 6.8.3. Memnon’s account of the panic, which is favoured by Re-
inach (1895) p. 337 n. 1, differs from that of Appian and Plutarch in that
it has Mithridates at Cabira when the rout began and in no way responsi-
ble for it, cf. Holmes (1923) p. 408 and Magie (1950) 2 p. 1212 n. 30.
Then, since he recognized that Pontus was now lost, the half-
Hellenized king revealed the oriental side of his character in his
determination that his womenfolk should not fall into the victors’
hands. He sent eunuchs to Pharnacia (Giresun), where they were
lodged with orders to kill his wives, sisters and concubines. One
sister, Nyssa, was lucky. She fell into Lucullus’ hands at the capture
of Cabira. The others, however, perished as the king’s commands
were scrupulously obeyed.
By this time, as I have just indicated, Cabira had fallen to Lu-
cullus and it was said he found dungeons there crammed with the
king’s enemies. He then despatched a force under a legate, Pom-
peius, to renew the pursuit of the king. Pompeius continued the
chase until he came to Talaura. Here he learned that four days be-
fore Mithridates had crossed into Armenia. Since he had no brief
to proceed further Pompeius returned to Lucullus. Tigranes, we
know, had never shown much enthusiasm for Mithridates and his
war with Rome. At this point, of course, neither the laws of hospi-
tality nor the ties of family could be ignored but the Armenian king
showed clearly what he was thinking by literally keeping Mithri-
dates at a distance. The fugitive was not allowed to present himself
at court but was, instead, confined to a remote estate.46
Lucullus himself turned to the task of mopping up the re-
maining resistance in Pontus. With the exception of the coastal
towns it proved to be an easy job. A swift campaign sufficed to
reduce the Calybes (Chaldaeans) and the Tibareni. This was fol-
lowed by the occupation of lower Armenia. Most of the Pontic
commanders, when they learned what Mithridates had done to his
own family, saw little point in continuing the struggle and so they
surrendered on terms to the Romans. One general actually brought
fifteen fortresses with him when he came over to Lucullus. With
the fall of these and other fortresses a goodly portion of the king’s
treasures came into Roman hands.47
46 Plut. Luc. 18–19; Strabo 13.1.55; App. Mith. 82; Memnon 30.1–2
and 31.1 (Jacoby 3B pp. 359–60); Liv. Ep. 97; Eutrop. 6.8.4; Sall. Hist.
4.12M. Pompeius: ch. 4. Pharnacia: van Ooteghem (1959) p. 98 n. 1; Scar-
digli (1989) p. 395 n. 227.
47 Plut. Luc. 18–19; App. Mith. 82; Strabo 12.3.33; Hor. Ep. 2.2.26–
40; Sall. Hist. 4.12M. Cf. Magie (1950) 2 p. 1213 n. 32 and Reinach (1895)
Coming back to the coast, Lucullus found that his subordi-

nates had not been as successful as he. Murena was still before
Amisus, baffled by the skill of the Pontic commander, Callimachus.
So Lucullus took charge and began by trying to persuade the in-
habitants to give up as so many others had done. When they re-
fused he turned the bulk of his forces against the suburb of Eupa-
toria. Pretending to carry on the siege in a desultory fashion,48 he
lured the defenders into carelessness. Then, at an opportune mo-
ment, ladders were placed against the wall, the town was stormed
and razed to the ground. Turning to the main city, Lucullus again
had recourse to the surprise attack. One evening when Callima-
chus, as was his wont, had taken most of his troops from the wall
in order that they might rest, Lucullus mounted an assault and
gained possession of part of the rampart. Callimachus, realizing his
opponent could not be repelled, pulled out his forces by sea and
fired the city behind him to cover his retreat. Lucullus ordered his
men to extinguish the flames but they paid him not the slightest
heed. With what they had so long wanted at last within reach they
clashed their weapons together and demanded to be allowed to
exercise the customary right of sacking a city that had been taken
by storm. Lucullus had no option but to yield and as the troops set
about looting they added to the destruction already begun. It was
now night and, as the soldiers went on their way, heedless of the
fate of the conquered, the torches they carried started further fires.
Only a providential rainstorm saved the town from complete de-
struction.
Lucullus himself tried to repair the damage and restore the
town by rebuilding it before he left. He added 120 stadia to its ter-
ritory and recalled the citizens who had fled, adding to their num-
ber any other Greek who might wish to settle there. A group of
Athenian exiles who had fled to Amisus to escape the tyranny of
Aristion in the First Mithridatic War was now repatriated and each
man was supplied with clothing and a stipend for the journey.
When he entered the city on the morning after the capture Lucullus
is said to have bewailed his fate. He would have been a Sulla who
p. 345. With regard to the latter note Appian’s xwri\j o0li/gwn. For Ap-
pian and the coastal towns see below.
48 Cf. the reports above (n. 39).
spared Athens. Instead, he had become a Mummius who destroyed

Corinth.49 Why was this so? So far as I know, Lucullus never came
up with an answer to this hard question, so in due course we shall
try to supply our own. At this point what is of primary interest to
us is his rather extraordinary behaviour on the present occasion.
We are told that among the captives was a certain Tyrannio
who was a grammarian. Murena asked for him as a prize and upon
obtaining him ostentatiously granted him his liberty. It was gener-
ally held that this showed Murena to have been cut from a coarser
cloth than Lucullus who believed that a learned man like Tyrannio
should never have been deprived of his freedom in the first place.
Once he had been deprived of his real liberty that which Murena
granted him was fictitious. But, as we have just observed, Lucullus
did not simply confine himself to displaying a respectful and defer-
ential attitude towards one individual Greek, however distin-
guished. His benevolence embraced the whole city which he first
tried to save from destruction and then to restore. We have long
known Lucullus for a philhellene. We now see to what lengths his
love could bring him. He lavished a species of Marshall Aid on a
town that had taken the enemy’s part, long defied him and rejected
offers of terms. That it was their Greekness the people of Amisus
had to thank for this is brought into sharp relief by the fate of its
suburb Eupatoria. This was a barbarian town created by Mithri-
dates and it bore his hated name. As we saw, when it was taken it
was levelled to the ground.50
49 Sulla did, of course, loot Athens but the point of the comparison is
that when he ordered his troops not to destroy the city and, finally, to
desist from their depredations he was obeyed, cf. Keaveney (2005a) p. 74.
In other words, when Sulla commanded he was, unlike Lucullus, obeyed.
It was he who decided what the townsfolk should suffer. See further ch.
9.
50 Plut. Luc. 19; Memnon 30.4 (Jacoby 3B p. 369); App. Mith. 83; Eu-
trop. 6.8.2; Sall. Hist. 4.13–15 M; Cic. Leg. Man. 21, cf. Magie (1950) 2 p.
1213 n. 33; van Ooteghem (1959) p. 103; Sherwin-White (1984) pp. 251–
2; Swain (1990) p. 145 n. 111.
The principle that one just man could save Sodom may have helped
Amisus. The returning refugees and the Athenian exiles must have been
solidly anti-Mithridates from the first. Note that Sulla said their famous
This strict differentiation between Greek and barbarian we

shall encounter again. What happened at Heraclea about this time
merely serves to underline how lucky the people of Amisus had
been in finding the conqueror they did. Since 73 Cotta had been
conducting the siege here without much success. Towards the end
of that year he had been joined by the far abler Triarius who, in a
battle off Tenedos, had fulfilled his charge and made short work of
the Mithridatic fleet returning from Spain. However, it was not
until now (71) that the town yielded on terms which were at once
broken. A general massacre then followed and only the interven-
tion of Triarius prevented a squabble over loot among the Roman
forces turning into a pitched battle.51
After this Triarius and his ships went on to reduce Tieium
(Filyos) and Amastris (Amasra).52 This left only Amasia (Amasya)
and Sinope in enemy hands and it was against the latter that the
Roman war-effort was principally directed. Subordinates had al-
ready begun the siege when Lucullus arrived. It was not until early
in 70, however, that the place yielded and it may very well be that
for part of the winter Lucullus simply left the conduct of opera-
tions to those same subordinates while he attended to certain ur-
gent business in the province of Asia, returning only in time for the
final surrender.53
The physical location of the town made it seem as if it would
present problems to rival those of Cyzicus. Sea attacks were impos-
sible because of the steep nature of the shore on which the city
rested and the narrowness of the isthmus which connected it to the
mainland. Sinope, too, possessed a powerful fleet which brought in
ancestors saved the Athenians, cf. Keaveney (2005a) p. 74, and Appian
also attributes a similar motive to Lucullus at Amisus.
51 Memnon 32–5 (Jacoby 3B pp. 360–4). See n. 36 and ch. 6 n. 23.
The pro\ braxe/oj of Memnon 33 following from a narrative (32) of

Cotta’s activities in 73 clearly puts Triarius’ victory at Tenedos in the same
year despite Gelzer col. 393. His tardiness in going to Heraclea was due to
business on Delos, cf. Mattingly (1980) pp. 1491–3.
52 Memnon 35.7 and 36.1 (Jacoby 3B pp. 363–4).
53 Sources: Plut. Luc. 23–4; App. Mith. 83–4; Liv. Ep. 98; Strabo
12.3.2; Oros. 6.3.2–3; Cic. Leg. Man. 21; Memnon 37 (Jacoby 3B pp. 364–
5). Chronology: see n. 55.
grain from the Crimea and was even strong enough to destroy a
squadron of Roman ships carrying supplies for the besiegers.
However, from the Roman point of view dissension within
the town was a most hopeful sign. One of the commanders had
entered into negotiations with Lucullus even before his arrival.
When this was discovered one of his fellow officers, Cleochares,
had him murdered, but so strong was the party of appeasement
that he was obliged to govern with a heavy hand and the whole
town seethed with discontent. At this juncture Lucullus himself
arrived and soon received a welcome messenger. He came from
Mithridates’ son Machares and he carried a gold crown and a re-
quest that his master be admitted to the friendship of the Romans.
Lucullus acceded to the request on condition he divert to Roman
use the supplies he was sending to Sinope. Machares complied.54
Inevitably this led to shortage in Sinope which led equally in-
evitably to hunger and so to increasing bad temper on the part of
the inhabitants. Cleochares, realizing his position was becoming
untenable, in the early spring of 70 imitated the example of Calli-
machus at Amisus. Embarking his troops aboard ship, he wrecked
the rest of the Sinopean fleet and set fire to the town. Seeing the
smoke, the Romans immediately attacked and penetrated the town
without encountering resistance, actually slaying part of the Pontic
garrison which had not escaped. Here again Lucullus played the
civilized man. No general massacre took place, the fires were extin-
guished and the city was declared to be once more free.55
54 Contrary to what is usually thought (see n. 37), Machares only

turns traitor now. Appian and Plutarch put the treachery after the siege,
Memnon during. The reconstruction in my text assumes that Appian and
Plutarch are recounting the reward for the services Memnon describes as
being rendered.
55 In settling the chronology the following data must be considered:
(a) Memnon puts the fall of Heraclea in 71 and before that of Sinope.
Appian puts the fall of Sinope after that of Amastris and Heraclea.
(b)Amisus was captured in 71, see n. 44 above.
(c)The evidence of Eutrop. 6.8.2–3 with regard to Amisus and Sinope
is self-evidently wrong. Whatever chronology we adopt (see app. 2) the
capture of Cabira must come before that of these other two towns.
(d)Oros. 6.3.2–4 brackets the siege of Sinope with the campaigns of
M. Lucullus in Thrace which finished in 71 (MRR 2.124). However, in (5)-
It was widely believed that Autolycus the patron hero of

Sinope actually summoned Lucullus to the city. He was a compan-
ion of Hercules who had been driven ashore here, so the legend
relates, and taking possession of the place he established an oracle.
In a dream a figure appeared to Lucullus, urging him to go forward
because Autolycus was waiting for him. The very next day the city
yielded and in the hurly-burly of the capture some men were seen
carrying a very large parcel. Lucullus ordered the wrappings to be
removed, to discover a statue whose features were those of the
figure in his dream and to learn for the first time that that figure
had been Autolycus. And, once more, the disciple of Sulla remem-
bered what his old chief had had to say about divine messages con-
veyed through this medium. The statue was the work of a famous
(7) he speaks of Metellus’ activities in Sicily and the invasion of Armenia,

belonging respectively to 70 and 69 (MRR 2.128, 133), as occurring eodem
tempore as the siege of Sinope. Orosius can be precise about actual years
when he wants—cf. e.g. 6.3.1, picking up with eodem anno 6.2.24, with app.
2 (iv)—so the vagueness here probably means eodem tempore extends over a
longer period than a year. So possibly (2)-(7) might extend over the period
71–69 but one cannot positively assert this.
(e)The Livian epitome does not mention the siege of Sinope but has
the closely related (n. 54) reception of Machares among the events of 70,
see app. 2 (iv).
(f)Magie (1950) 2 p. 1215 n. 40 remarks that the order of capture,
Sinope, Amisus is found in Cicero and Appian, cf. (a) above. However, I
accept Gelzer’s view, col. 394, that no chronological significance can be
attached to Cicero. For Appian see (g) and general conclusion.
(g)The order of events in Appian is: capture of Sinope; capture of
Amisus; Lucullus visits Asia.
(h)The order of events in Plutarch is: capture of Amisus; Lucullus
visits Asia; capture of Sinope.
While certainty is impossible I would on the whole jettison the order
of (g) in favour of (h). The latter dates the fall of Sinope after the return
of the embassy of Appius in 70 (see ch. 6) and this receives some support
from the Livian tradition of (d) and (e). All three—(d), (e) and (h)—agree
better with reports of the town’s strength and its eventual reduction by
starvation than does (g). Moreover, as Magie (1950) 2 p. 1213 n. 34 points
out, the clear implication of Plut. Luc. 33 is that Lucullus’ troops were on
active service in the winter of 71/70, and that could only be at Sinope or
Amasia. The latter town, it should be noted, fell after Sinope (Memnon).
See further nn. 58 and 59.
sculptor, Sthenis, and after this experience Lucullus acquired it for

himself along with another work of art, the globe of Billarus.56
With the fall of Amasia soon after Sinope, all of Pontus was
now in Roman hands and, with its king a fugitive, Lucullus thus
deemed the war to have finished. He returned to Ephesus and
there publicly proclaimed this fact. Triumphal sacrifice was offered
in thanksgiving for the victory won. Processions, festivals, gladiato-
rial contests and athletic events were the order of the day and in
response the cities inaugurated their own festivals which they called
‘Lucullan’.57 The seal then seemed to be set on Lucullus’ achieve-
ments with his request to Rome that, in accordance with standard
practice, they should despatch commissioners to oversee the erec-
tion of Pontus into a province.58
We have now to turn from war to peace and to consider what
Lucullus did in his own province of Asia at this time.59
Up until now Asia had indeed only seen Lucullus as a de-
fender in war. Now he was to have the opportunity to practise the
arts of peace. His first task seems to have been to attend to the
governor’s judicial functions which, of necessity, he had had to
neglect. So he went on a visitation of the circuits (conventus) into
56 Van Ooteghem (1959) p. 112 believes we have here a specimen of

evocatio but I would not agree. Evocatio is an active thing performed by a
Roman (Greenidge 1911 p. 57) while Lucullus here is passive. I do believe
he is right though both in his essential point, that the god is deserting
Sinope, and in that it may be compared with the scene in Plut. Alex. 24.
See also n. 27 for another divine desertion.
57 Plut. Luc. 23; App. Mith. 3.
58 From Plut. Luc. 35–6; Dio 36.43.2, 46.1 we know the commission
was in Pontus by 67 and may have been in Asia in 68, cf. Broughton
(1946) pp. 40–2; MRR 2.131 n. 6; Scardigli (1989) p. 469 n. 470; and ch. 6
n. 57. This timescale accords well with a fall of Sinope in 70 (n. 55) since
we may assume Lucullus would not make his request until that was sub-
dued.
59 My chronology (n. 55) leads me to postulate that Lucullus spent
part of the winter of 71/70 in the province of Asia, returned to Sinope

and then once more went back to his province but, as will emerge from
my narrative, a description and evaluation of his work can be made with-
out reference to precise chronology. For another plausible reconstruction
of his movements based on the same chronology see MRR 2.108.
which the province was divided.60 Next, now that the war was
ended, the problem of paying for it had to be addressed.
The Romans, of course, held firmly to the principle that those
who were friends and allies of Rome should come to her aid when
called. Lucullus himself showed his own strict adherence to this
viewpoint when, in 73, he rejected a donative from the senate to
build a fleet and instead elected to call upon the allies to meet their
obligations and supply the necessary ships.61 However, the Romans
also accepted that, in return for the revenues raised in a province,
they were responsible for the maintenance of the army that de-
fended that province and the governor who led it. Hence we have
the governor’s allowance or ornatio provinciae which, in theory, was
supposed to meet all his expenses. In practice, of course, a long
war such as that of Lucullus would strain the purse and recourse
would have to be had to other methods to supplement income.
Requisitioning was one and Lucullus did not hesitate to employ it.
Hence, for instance, the long line of laden Galatians who followed
him on the road to Amisus. A common practice, too, was billeting
but Lucullus studiously avoided it to the great anger of his troops
who, in consequence, had to spend their winters under canvas.
Their commander had seen what Sulla’s men had got up to in Asia
in 85 and he had no desire to visit his beloved Greeks with any-
thing similar again.
A commander, also, might draw on his booty but in the one
instance we know of where Lucullus may have used this source he
actually applied the monies to underwrite another’s campaign.
When in 67 Pompey made war on the pirates Lucullus lent him
money to finance his campaigns. By this time the always-strained
relations between the two had worsened even more and we cer-
tainly could not see in Lucullus’ loan a gesture of goodwill or rec-
onciliation since he had no option but to pay up. The terms of
Pompey’s command allowed him to collect expenses from the
provinces and so, when he asked, Lucullus was obliged to give.62
60 So Gelzer col. 394 pointing to Cic. Ad Fam. 5.4.2. Cf. Greenidge
(1911) pp. 325–8.

61 Cf. Cimma (1976) pp. 180–3.
62 On the revenues of Asia and their application see Broughton
(1938) pp. 562–78, cf. also pp. 525–30. Donative for Pompey: Plut. Luc.
Some, however, believe that Lucullus strictly reserved the

booty for himself, the treasury and his men. If that is so then there
is but one source from which Pompey’s donative will have come,
his emergency taxes. Neither the principle of an emergency tax nor
the types levied by Lucullus were new and, in fact, both were al-
ready well known in the Hellenistic kingdoms. So, it was in imita-
tion of practices found under the Seleucids and the Attalids that he
imposed a tax of 25 per cent on crops, while other taxes were put
on slaves and property to defray the costs of the war.63
However, it was not Lucullus’ measures to ensure that Asia
paid for its own defence that earned him the gratitude of the pro-
vincials and, it should be said, the respect of historians ever since.
Rather, it was what he did to rid the province of a crushing burden
of debt under which it had laboured since 85. Let us very briefly
recapitulate the story. Sulla had levied a large sum of money on
Asia. When he left in 84 part of this had been paid and the rest was
collected by Lucullus before his own departure.64 The cities of Asia
were not able to meet their obligations from their own resources
and so they had to borrow. With the end of the First Mithridatic
War the Roman banker soon made his reappearance in the East
and he was accompanied by the publicani whose main business was
to collect the regular taxes but who were obviously not averse to
issuing loans on the side. It was to these people that the provincials
had to turn in order to obtain the sums they needed. They indeed
got them but only at exorbitant rates of interest. Some argue that a
shortage of capital and the high risk involved in a dangerous area
justified these charges but others incline to the bleaker view that
pure undiluted greed was at work here. But, whatever the reasons
for these rates, the cities had to mortgage every piece of public
property such as theatres, gymnasia and harbours in order to get
their money.65
37; App. Mith. 94. The Plutarchean context suggests to me booty was
drawn on but see Scardigli (1989) p. 479 n. 508.
63 App. Mith. 83. See Rostovtzeff (1941) 3 p. 1563 n. 28 for Lucullus’
precedents and his imitators. So far as I am aware only Hill (1952) p. 157
saw that this revenue was destined for the treasury. See n. 69 below.
64 Keaveney (2005a) p. 93 and ch. 2.
65 App. Mith. 63 with Holmes (1923) pp. 395–6; Magie (1950) 1 pp.
250–2; Broughton (1938) pp. 518, 544–6.

Thus while cities were able to pay to the Roman state what
she demanded they did so by putting themselves in thrall to merci-
less private individuals.66 The high rate of compound interest
meant they were unable to clear the debt. By the winter of 71 it was
calculated that the amount actually borrowed had been repaid twice
over, and yet the enormous sum of 120,000 talents was still out-
standing. According to one account, things had come to such a
pass that people were selling off votive offerings, statues and works
of art to service the debt. There were reports too of acts of physical
violence and of men being sold into slavery.67
Aside from the fact that this situation was a scandal in itself it
carried with it grave dangers. The Asiatic Vespers showed what
could happen if the provincials were pushed too far. But this new
generation of entrepreneurs recked not the lessons of the recent
past, despite some ominous signs. When Mithridates invaded in 74
the cities had shown signs of restlessness and of wanting to greet
him as a saviour, and, about this time, when publicani arrived to ex-
ploit the newly conquered Heraclea they so maddened the towns-
folk that they, in a repeat of the scenes of 88, turned on them and
killed them.68
There has been controversy—cf. Rostovtzeff (1941) 3 pp. 1560 n. 17,

1567 n. 46 and Broughton p. 518—as to how Cic. Ad Quint. 1.1.34 is to
be interpreted. It seems to me that vectigal refers to the fine Sulla imposed
on all (aequaliter), cf. App. Mith. 62 and Keaveney (2005a) pp. 93-94. It
would then follow Cicero is not saying the publicani provided machinery
for the collection of the money but the actual money itself—a view which
I think receives some support from App Mith. 63. Note, however, that
such a machinery is attested elsewhere (n. 69).
66 Rostovtzeff (1941) 2 pp. 946, 953 suggests that Lucullus had not
collected the full amount owed but this is contradicted by Plut. Luc. 20
who makes it clear that we are here dealing with a debt the cities owed to
private individuals.
67 Plut. Luc. 20 with the comments of Magie (1950) 2 p. 1127 n. 46.
Both here and in Luc. 7 Plutarch describes the activities of moneylenders

and publicani so it is reasonable to believe, with Magie 1 p. 250, that some
of the enormities were committed by the latter as they tried to extract the
regular taxes from an impoverished province.
68 Memnon 27.4–7 and 29.3 (Jacoby 3B p. 355–6, 358). In (4) we read
of Cotta’s despatch to Chalcedon. Then in (5) Heraclea grants privileges

and gives ten ships to the Pontic fleet. (6) has the arrival of the publicani
Lucullus had never made any secret of where his sympathies

lay. Though he had been Sulla’s collecting agent long ago, he did
what he could to mitigate the harshness of his task and, just before
setting out on his own campaigns, he warned the publicani to mod-
erate their behaviour. These, of course, were at best palliatives but
when Lucullus had, as now, the necessary power and the leisure-
time in which to employ it, he set about putting an end to the
and their killing in the town. The battle of Chalcedon is narrated in (7)
and in 29.3 the Mithridatic capture occurs after Cyzicus.
About one point there must be unanimity: publicani will hardly have
come to Heraclea just after Mithridates’ invasion of Asia. Reactions to the
notice, however, vary. Reinach (1895) p. 318 n. 3 thought it was simply a
mistake. Others propose violating the order of events as given by Mem-
non. Magie (1950) 1 p. 325 suggested putting the granting of market privi-
leges after the battle of Chalcedon. Sherwin-White (1984) p. 165 took the
passage as proof that publicani were active in the province of Bithynia,
newly created in 74, before the Mithridatic invasion. As they would need
time to settle he argues that this is a pointer towards 73 as the starting-
date of the Third Mithridatic War (app. 2). Again, self-evidently, this dis-
turbs the order of Memnon’s narrative.
I do not believe we need to tamper with our source. Memnon is de-
scribing the incident that gave rise to enmity between Rome and Heraclea
for, self-evidently, the latter had broken their foedus. Then follows the con-
sequence of this act, i.e. the introduction of the publicani. The Romans
specifically point to the market privileges and the ships as their reason for
doing this. Memnon tells us when this happened: at the time the Romans
were also introducing publicani into other cities. A moment’s reflection on
this statement shows that it does not necessarily follow that he thought
this consequence happened immediately. He is simply telling what hap-
pened as a consequence without being very specific as to the time and,
indeed, if it is nonsense actually to have that consequence follow on at
once from the act itself, then it may be said that Memnon himself gives us
a clue or two as to where it might be more plausibly placed. The Romans,
as we saw, showed by the introduction of the publicani that they no longer
regarded Heraclea as free. The townsfolk, for their part, saw that this was
contrary to previous practice and deemed it the beginning of slavery. This
suggests too that Memnon is thinking of what happened after the capture
of the town by Cotta for it was only then, indeed, that it lost its liberty
(Magie pp. 310–11, 415) and it was only then that the Romans, citing the
wrong done, would be in a position to inflict the publicani on the place. Cf.
Memnon 39 (Jacoby 3B pp. 366–7) where, among other things, the blame
for defection is fixed on individuals.
problem once and for all. His intent was embodied in four meas-
ures. Henceforth the monthly rate of interest was to be 1 per cent
and no more. Interest that exceeded the amount of the principal
was to be written off. A creditor might take no more than one
quarter of the debtor’s income in any one year. Finally, anyone
caught adding interest to principal would forfeit the lot.
The effect of these measures was swift, salutary and whole-
some. Presented now with a manageable debt that they could pay
the cities of Asia cleared it within less than four years and received
back their property unencumbered.69
For the biographer there is little else to say. One can only join
in the paean of praise with which Lucullus’ reforms have ever been
greeted. If this represents one of the finest expressions of Lucullus’
philhellenism it is also a tribute to his basic decency as a person.
Of course, not everybody joined in the chorus of praise. The
publicani, predictably, were enraged. Some scholars believe that Lu-
cullus was being very brave in provoking these people, especially as
the reforms of 70 meant the equites once more had a place on juries
and would be ready with a charge of repetundae. Personally, I doubt
if he looked at the matter in this way at all. Whatever developments
there might be at Rome at this time and however unpleasing they
might be to a man of Lucullus’ political outlook, they would not
serve to undermine his personal position as it then was. The war
was over and all that remained to be done before going home was
69 Plut. Luc. 20. Some scholars (e.g. Gelzer col. 394) believe Appian’s
tax of 25 per cent on crops (Mith. 83, cf. n. 63) is to be equated with Plu-
tarch’s notice that creditors could not take more than 25 per cent of a
debtor’s income. As Rostovtzeff (1941) 3 p. 1563 n. 28 pointed out, this is
self-evidently impossible. Unlike Magie (1950) 2 p. 1128 n. 48 or van
Ooteghem (1959) p. 108 I cannot accept his further contention that Ap-
pian’s tax was collected by the cities and used to pay the debt. It is very
difficult to see why Lucullus should want to facilitate the moneylenders in
this way. The fact that the amount borrowed had been paid twice over by
71 (see above) points to the publicani and their friends having an efficient
collection service of their own. What was needed, therefore, was not new
machinery but a reduction in the amount which might be extracted by the
existing one. Moreover, there is, as I have tried to show, a more likely
destination for this revenue (n. 63). In general, I feel we must resist the
temptation to describe Appian’s tax as a relief measure. He quite baldly
states that Lucullus imposed new taxes on a province already in debt.
to capture Mithridates. Lucullus was optimistic about this last and

in the next chapter we shall see why. Once it was accomplished, of
course, he could return to Rome a victor in a great campaign and
display Rome’s redoubtable foe in his triumph. It would be very
hard then for anybody to level charges at the man who had con-
quered Mithridates. But even now Appius Claudius Pulcher was on
the road to Ephesus bearing a message that would change every-
thing. Mithridates could only be captured by renewing and widen-
ing the war Lucullus had just declared to be over. The vicissitudes
of that war in turn were to give the equites the opportunity they now
lacked. In a little while, Lucullus, who at this point seemed so se-
cure, was to fall victim to the advantage they took of the difficulties
he was soon to encounter.
6 CONFRONTING THE KING:
THE WAR WITH TIGRANES
Though immersed in the affairs of Asia, Lucullus had never for a

moment lost sight of his last great objective: the capture of Mithri-
dates. Now in 70 the return of an envoy was eagerly awaited. In the
previous year, shortly before he returned to the coast to deal with
Amisus, Lucullus had despatched his brother-in-law to the Arme-
nian court to request the surrender of Mithridates.1
The situation, in point of fact, was a somewhat delicate one.
In the past Tigranes, who had an unhealthy interest in the place,
had committed acts against Rome’s satellite Cappadocia which
could be construed as hostile. On the last occasion, in 77, he had
made a swift raid on the kingdom and carted off part of the popu-
lation to people his new capital, Tigranocerta. But in the present
war his attitude could only be described as correct. He had given
no aid whatsoever to Mithridates and had done no more for him
than the bare minimum when he turned up in Armenia as a fugi-
tive. When, as in the case of Cappadocia, he saw some advantage to
himself then plainly he was quite willing to become embroiled in
Mithridates’ quarrels with Rome. But otherwise he appears to have
1 This is the eminently reasonable dating of the embassy given by

Plut. Luc. 19. It would take a little while before Lucullus discovered
whether Tigranes had received the fugitive or not. Memnon 31.1–2
(Jacoby 3B p. 360) places the embassy after the fall of Amisus while App.
Mith. 83 has it after the capture of Sinope. This last is far too late (see
below). Two modern suggestions, Magie (1950) 2 p. 1213 n. 34, that Ap-
pius was sent immediately after the capture of Cabira or during the winter
of 71/70, receive no support from the sources. We have seen above why
the first suggestion is unlikely and the route Appius took (Plut. Luc. 21)
shows why the second should be ruled out.
135
CONFRONTING THE KING: THE WAR WITH TIGRANES 137
reached the conclusion that, as a matter of general policy, it were

best to maintain neutrality. However, to presume from this neutral-
ity, as Lucullus appears to have presumed, that Tigranes could, in
one way or another, be induced to yield his father-in-law was to
presume rather a lot.2 In the course of the negotiations the king
himself was to say that to do so would shame him before the whole
world.3
Plainly the situation called for the exercise of certain qualities
such as tact and finesse, for instance, but these Lucullus proved
unable to supply. In his letter requesting the extradition of Mithri-
dates, Lucullus addressed Tigranes as ‘King’. This could not but be
interpreted as an insult by a man who styled himself ‘King of
Kings’ and who was actually waited upon by vassal kings whom he
had conquered. So it happened that when Tigranes came to make
reply he repaid Lucullus with his own base coin by omitting his title
of imperator.4
One excuse that might be advanced for Lucullus’ needlessly
provocative behaviour might be that he was simply ignorant of
whom he was dealing with. A similar argument has sometimes been
used to explain Sulla’s insulting behaviour to a Parthian embassy
some twenty years before. Both suggestions fall to the ground for
precisely the same reason: they are based on the supposition that
men of Sulla’s and Lucullus’ intelligence would not have bothered
to find out about the nature of the power they were dealing with.
2 Cappadocia: Eckhardt (1909) pp. 404, 409. Both Gelzer col. 392
and Sherwin-White (1984) p. 173 compare this situation with that which
prevailed between Bocchus and Marius in Numidia. But there is a differ-
ence. Bocchus was a kinglet who might be pressurized; Tigranes, as we
shall see, was a monarch of a different order. Interestingly, even an envoy
of Mithridates urged neutrality on Tigranes, with fatal consequences to
himself when the king’s policy changed: Plut. Luc. 22; Strabo 13.1.55.
3 Plut. Luc. 21; Memnon 31.2 (Jacoby 3B p. 360). Cf. Reinach (1895)
pp. 343–4.
4 Memnon 31.2–3 (Jacoby 3B p. 360). See Plut. Luc. 21 and Dio
36.52.3 with Magie (1950) 2 p. 1214 n. 37. A man could be hailed as imper-
ator only once in a campaign (Keaveney 1982b p. 160) and as the great
battle of Tigranocerta was not yet Lucullus had probably earned the title
at Cyzicus. See also Bulletin Epigraphique (1970) p. 426 for inscriptional
evidence for the title.
Tigranes was certainly not a man to be treated lightly or carelessly.

He had come to the throne of Armenia about 95 and almost im-
mediately had embarked on a series of conquests. Sophene on the
eastern bank of the Euphrates was the first to fall to him. Then he
took from the Parthians all of northern Mesopotamia from the
Euphrates to the mountains on the border of Media Atropatene.
Next, Syria and Cilicia Campestris fell to his arms and in the region
of Transcaucasia the Albanians and Iberians became his vassals.
Lucullus was dealing with a monarch whose dominions stretched
from the Caspian to the Mediterranean and whose title ‘King of
Kings’ was plainly no empty and pompous boast.5
The natural conclusion to draw from this would seem to be
that Lucullus, of set purpose, was trying to start yet another war
with a great power. But it would not be the right one. Lucullus had
good reasons of his own for avoiding further adventures. Strictly
speaking, the terms of his command would probably allow him, as
we saw in our last chapter, to pursue Mithridates into Armenia but
such a move might not necessarily be a wise one. Developments at
home, of which the commander was well aware, meant that politi-
cal and not strategic considerations would dominate any debate on
his action and, suffice to say for the moment, that these develop-
ments were of a sort that might not guarantee a favourable out-
come to that debate. A man who, as we argued, was unassailable as
a conquering hero, might begin to look very vulnerable if he turned
himself into a military adventurer. In any case, Lucullus himself
furnished the clearest proofs that, so far from planning war, he was
not even expecting one. His victory celebrations and his call for
commissioners were surely the acts of a man for whom fighting
was at an end. Quite simply, he seems to have believed there would
be no problem at all where Tigranes was concerned and this is viv-
idly illustrated by his chagrined remark when Appius eventually
returned empty-handed: he was amazed Tigranes should wait until
Mithridates was crushed before joining him in war on Rome. The
king had acted clean contrary to Lucullus’ expectations.6
Magie (1950) 1 pp. 338–9; Eckhardt (1909) pp. 403–10; Keaveney

5
(2005a) pp. 32-33.

6 Plut. Luc. 23. See Sherwin-White (1984) pp. 173, 175–6.
We have now, of course, to offer some reason for Lucullus’

having so badly misjudged the situation. Why was it he did not
know what it was he asked and why did he not realize it was likely
to be refused? One salient feature of his career to date had been
the sensitivity he showed in dealing with Greeks and, correspond-
ingly, the harshness he visited upon non-Greeks. Tigranes, for all
the superficial veneer of Hellenic culture he had acquired, was, of
course, an oriental king. He was a barbarian ruler who was hated by
many of his Greek subjects because of his despotic ways. So, as
with any other barbarians, Lucullus found it impossible to achieve
empathy with somebody like the Armenian king, or, indeed, to un-
derstand him in any way. As a direct consequence he knew of only
one way of dealing with him. There would be no deference to sus-
ceptibilities that Lucullus could not comprehend in any case. In-
stead, he would proceed as the Romans had always proceeded with
such people. The best way to achieve results from an oriental mon-
arch was to apply the heavy hand. Oriental kings must obey the
command of a Roman and that was that. This was a method which
in the recent past had worked for Sulla, and Pompey was to employ
it with good results not long after this; Lucullus, however, lacked
their skill and finesse, and in Tigranes he found a king who would
not play the part assigned him.7
Lucullus’ choice of envoy merely underscores his resolve that
Tigranes should be informed of the will of Rome with which he
would then automatically comply forthwith. Appius Claudius Pul-
cher was not the man to be overawed by a monarch, however
magnificent, or to tiptoe around him with a delicate tread. His ini-
tial impressions of the king were not particularly favourable for, on
his journey, he discovered that the royal guides were leading him by
roundabout paths across the Armenian plateau and when he at last
arrived at his destination, Antioch in Syria, he was informed he
needs must wait as the king was away. Now, Tigranes had good
reason for being absent since he was at that moment engaged in
war in Phoenicia but both his action and that of his minions could
have a certain construction put on them. A message was being de-
livered to the Romans: they were not as great in the eyes of Ti-
7 Plut. Luc. 21 with Magie (1950) 1 p. 339; Sherwin-White (1984) p.

175; Keaveney (1981b) pp. 202–9.
granes as they were in their own. Let their envoy not hurry, for the
king would not put to one side more important concerns so that he
might meet with him. I do not know if Tigranes intended his ac-
tions to be interpreted in this way but it would certainly seem that
some such construction was put on them by Appius. If I am right
in assuming that Lucullus was not consciously looking for war,
what Pulcher did next can only be seen as an act of personal re-
venge for the insult to Rome’s (and his own) dignity.8 He passed
his enforced leisure in meddling and tampering with the loyalty of
the subject princes who were then present at court.
When, at last, Tigranes returned and granted audience, Appius
treated him as the Claudii did the rest of humanity: with disdain.
He told Tigranes shortly that either he disgorge Mithridates or he
would have on his hands a war with Rome. Tigranes, we are as-
sured, was rocked by this bluntness. One of our sources, who has
much to say about his oriental pomposity, recounts with glee that it
was the first time in over a quarter of a century that anybody had
spoken to him thus plainly. Nevertheless, regal composure was
maintained and the king continued to smile as he had from the
start of the interview. He assured Appius that he had no intention
whatsoever of surrendering Mithridates and if the Romans pro-
posed to attack then they would find he knew how to defend him-
self. The niceties of diplomacy were completed when Tigranes of-
fered Appius an array of gifts. In a gesture strongly reminiscent of
his brother-in-law’s at the court of Ptolemy years before Appius
contented himself with accepting one bowl before heading back to
tell Lucullus Tigranes was proving difficult.9
It is sometimes claimed that Lucullus next cast about for some
excuse in order to justify the assault he now determined to make
on Armenia. Reports in our ancient sources that Tigranes and
Mithridates at this time were planning an invasion of Lycaonia and
Cilicia or that Tigranes had furnished his father-in-law with a force
8 Unless, of course, we assume that Lucullus had instructed Appius to
use any means he saw fit to bring it home to Tigranes that the Romans
were in deadly earnest. Cf. Eckhardt (1909) pp. 74–5.
9 Plut. Luc. 19, 21, 23; App. Mith. 83; Memnon 31.2–3 (Jacoby 3B p.
360); Jos. Ant. 13.16.4, Bell. Jud. 1.5.3, with Villoresi (1939) p. 126; van
Ooteghem (1959) p. 101; Sherwin-White (1984) pp. 174–5.
to attack Pontus are dismissed by those who hold this theory. In

their opinion these are mere inventions devised by Lucullus in or-
der to provide that pretext which they believe he must have sought.
Tigranes, they say, actually made no hostile move until he was at-
tacked.10
Whatever surface plausibility it has, this theory must be re-
jected since it is definitely grounded on a misunderstanding of Lu-
cullus’ position and, at the same time, almost certainly misjudges
Tigranes’ likely reaction to Appius’ frank talk. In point of fact, Lu-
cullus did not need to look for any excuse. From the Roman point
of view he was completely justified in going over to the offensive.
Tigranes was harbouring an enemy of Rome. He had been given a
clear choice: surrender that enemy or face a war. The king had cho-
sen war and so war it would be. True, Lucullus would rather not
have fought and had not expected the answer he got but that con-
sideration is irrelevant. He had left himself with absolutely no room
for manoeuvre. If he wanted to lay hands on Mithridates and, inci-
dentally, avoid becoming an object of derision to foreign and do-
mestic enemies as one who made threats he could not deliver on,
then there was nothing for it but to take up arms.11
So far as Tigranes was concerned, it was but logical that after
the interview with Appius he should immediately summon Mithri-
dates to court. The whole purpose of keeping him at a distance had
been to avoid giving offence to the Romans and thus maintain
Armenian neutrality. But as we just saw this was not enough to
satisfy Lucullus. The policy was plainly a failure and so there was
no point whatsoever in going on with it. The three-day interview of
reconciliation between Mithridates and Tigranes which resulted in
the physical destruction of those courtiers who had urged neutrality
on the Armenian king was the direct consequence of Appius’ blunt
threats. Since he was now held to be at war with Rome Tigranes, as
a matter of course, reversed his policies and made common cause
with Mithridates. And, since the Romans had made no secret of
what they would do, we may credit Tigranes with the initiative to
10 Tigranes’ aggression: Plut. Luc. 23; Memnon 38.1 (Jacoby 3B p.

365). Interpretation: Magie (1950) 2 p. 1215 n. 4; McGing (1986) p. 153.
11 See Sherwin-White (1984) p. 176; Reinach (1895) p. 351.
plan a pre-emptive strike. Hence the despatch of Mithridates to

Pontus and the plans to invade Lycaonia and Cilicia.12
Lucullus, however, proved to be too quick for his opponent.
Leaving the new province of Pontus in the charge of his legate
Sornatius, he advanced rapidly through Cappadocia and came to
the Euphrates at a place now called Isogli while it was yet winter
(early 69). This unseasonable move took Tigranes completely by
surprise. Having planned his own campaign to begin in the spring,
he was still at Tigranocerta when he heard of Lucullus’ hostile
move. The man who brought the news was executed for his pains.
Tigranes had discovered what Appius had been up to and believed
this report was simply designed to unsettle his subjects further. It is
almost superfluous to add that after this nobody else bothered to
bring news of the Romans to Tigranes. All he heard were the
words of flatterers who agreed with him that the story simply could
not be true. Lucullus, they said, would be doing very well if he were
simply able to defend Ephesus from an Armenian attack.
Meanwhile, at the Euphrates, Lucullus found that, because of
his unseasonable advance, the river was still swollen with winter
floods. Towards evening, however, the level began to fall and by
the next day it had become perfectly fordable. The inhabitants of
the region said this was a rare occurrence and making obeisance
declared that the river-god had, of his own volition, lowered the
water for him. In gratitude Lucullus sacrificed a bull to the deity.
Upon crossing to the other side of the river he received a further
mark of divine favour in the form of yet another suicidal sacred
heifer. A number of these animals pastured in the neighbourhood.
They were sacred to the Perso-Babylonian goddess Anahita whom
the Greeks styled ‘Persian Artemis’. The heifers had the reputation
of being extremely hard to catch but now one of them obligingly
presented herself to Lucullus at a place sacred to the goddess and
12 Plut. Luc. 23; Memnon 38.1 (Jacoby 3B p. 365). McGing (1986) p.
154 prefers to follow Appian’s version of events (Mith. 85) which puts
Mithridates’ admission to favour after Lucullus had actually attacked. This,
I think, is to miss the point that once Rome had openly declared herself
hostile Tigranes and Mithridates would share a common cause. It also
rests on what I believe to be a mistaken view of how Tigranes would react
to a direct threat and it fails to explain away the ancient evidence (see n.
10) for aggressive intent on his part.
was duly sacrificed. In thus honouring a new and unfamiliar god-

dess, Lucullus seems, as was usual among the Romans, to have
identified her with a member of his own pantheon—in this case
Diana of Aricia—and, upon his return to Italy, gave thanks once
more with a dedication at her shrine.
Now, after turning over the nearby fortress of Tomisa to the
king of Cappadocia in acknowledgement of his services, Lucullus
marched through Sophene.13
As this was a barbarous region we might, in the light of recent
events, assume that Lucullus would allow his troops to plunder.
But he did not and in fact took from the inhabitants only what was
strictly needful. On one occasion when his troops wished to attack
a castle that they believed contained treasure he pointed to the
Taurus mountains and told them this was the fortress they should
storm. This moderation was of set purpose. The events at Rome to
which we have alluded and which we shall expound fully in due
course made it imperative that Lucullus, if at all possible, should
avoid becoming mired down in Armenia. In making war on Mith-
ridates, Lucullus had enjoyed the enthusiastic support of all classes
in Rome and so had been able to pursue a policy of attrition with
the conquest of territory as its object. But now, with many ques-
tioning the wisdom of an attack on Tigranes at all, there could be
no question of conquering land. Rather, there could be but one
aim: the swift capture of Mithridates. That, so Lucullus seems to
have reasoned, would best be done by inflicting a great defeat on
Tigranes as soon as possible. Still clinging to the view that a power-
ful demonstration of Roman might would bring Tigranes to a bet-
ter attitude, Lucullus pressed on through Sophene with all speed.
Thus, all the Roman commander really desired of the inhabitants of
this region was free passage and neutrality. This they readily gave.
13 Plut. Luc. 24–5; App. Mith. 84; Eutrop. 6.9.1; Memnon 38.2 (Jacoby
3B p. 365); Strabo 12.2.1; Sall. Hist. 4.59–60 M. See Reinach (1895) pp.
354–5; Eckhardt (1909) p. 82; Villoresi (1939) pp. 126–7; Scardigli (1989)
p. 422 n. 314; Coarelli (1987) p. 179 who also equates Diana with Artemis
Tauropolis. Scardigli p. 424 n. 321 expresses doubt about these stories of
Tigranes’ unpreparedness. McGing (1986) pp. 152–3 attributes it to a mis-
taken reading of Lucullus’ intentions by the king. I would only claim for
my view that it has, at least, the virtue of integrating all the source-material
instead of trying to explain some of it away.
Lucullus, I have suggested, had not authorized Appius Claudius to

subvert the loyalty of Tigranes’ subjects but it is possible that he
was here reaping the benefit of his brother-in-law’s initiative. One
source certainly says that, although the king’s subjects, these people
saw the present war as something that concerned Tigranes and Lu-
cullus alone. It was not one in which they felt any need to become
involved.14
There is no doubt as to where Lucullus was headed. Like a
good boxer aiming for a knock-out blow, he made for the head and
directed his march straight for the new capital of Tigranocerta (Sil-
van)15 which Tigranes had just built.
His forced marches brought Lucullus to the Tigris and once
over the river he was in Armenia proper. At this point one of the
nobles at Tigranes’ court, Mithrobarzanes by name, decided that,
whatever the risk, somebody would have to tell the king what was
happening. So he informed his master that the Romans were com-
ing. Evidently struck by his courage, Tigranes decided Mithrobar-
zanes was the man to stop them. He was given a force and his or-
ders: destroy the Roman army but bring its general back alive. The
Armenian encountered Lucullus as he was preparing to make
camp. As not all of the Roman troops had yet come up, their
commander feared lest Mithrobarzanes seize the opportunity pre-
sented by their separation to make an attack. So he sent forward
the legate Sextilius to conduct a blocking operation until such time
as the main body of the army should be encamped. Sextilius did his
best but his hand was forced when his opponent charged him. The
subsequent battle proved to be a disaster for the Armenians who
were cut to pieces with Mithrobarzanes himself among the fallen.
Upon hearing of this reverse, Tigranes put the defence of Ti-
granocerta into the hands of another noble, Mancaeus, and headed
for the Taurus mountains to raise his forces proper. Lucullus des-
patched Murena and Sextilius to do what they could to spoil these
plans. Their efforts were crowned with a measure of success. Sex-
tilius defeated and slew a large body of Arabs who were coming to
14 Plut. Luc. 24; App. Mith. 84. See Eckhardt (1909) pp. 74–5 and
Sherwin-White (1984) p. 178 who is less sure of Lucullus’ intentions than

I am.
15 See Syme (1988) pp. 245–51.
join the muster. Murena attacked the king himself when his men
were strung out as they passed through a narrow gorge. Many were
slain or captured and Tigranes himself fled, leaving his baggage
behind.16
Lucullus, meanwhile, had pushed on and put Tigranocerta
under siege. This proved to be a somewhat uncomfortable experi-
ence. The defenders numbered among them many skilful archers
who readily gave displays of their talents. There were also in the
city people who had a certain facility with naphtha and they poured
it in liberal doses over the Roman siege-machines. Nevertheless,
Lucullus persisted. Tigranes, he knew, would come with his army
and would, he reckoned, out of anxiety for his beloved city give
him the battle he wanted. Mithridates believed, however, that Ti-
granes should under no circumstances offer battle. He had been
summoned back to Tigranes’ side when Lucullus’ intentions be-
came clear and had perforce to abandon his expedition to Pontus.
At this time he was still on the road. Progress had been leisurely
because he mistakenly believed Lucullus was going to apply against
the Armenian king the same tactics of attrition that had been used
against himself. The best way to counter this was not by a set battle
but by turning Roman tactics against themselves. Cavalry should be
used, as he had once tried to use it, to cut off the enemy from their
supplies and so starve them out. He conveyed a message to this
effect to Tigranes and urged him to avoid a head-on confrontation.
The king by this time had gathered an enormous army and
with it he crossed the Taurus to confront Lucullus. His first move
was to send forward 6,000 horse to rescue his concubines and
treasures which were shut up in a fortress next to the city. Coming
by night, they broke through the Roman siege-line and, with their
dreaded archery, penned up their adversaries. They then entered
the fortress and carried away the women and the money. At dawn
the Romans, aided by Thracian auxiliary cavalry, went in pursuit.
They killed many of the foe and took more prisoner but they were
unable to recover the booty.
Tigranes now took up position on some slopes near the city.
Lucullus, after holding a council of war, left part of his army under
16 Plut. Luc. 24–5; App. Mith. 84; Liv. Ep. 98. See Sherwin-White
(1984) pp. 177–8.
Murena to continue the siege. With the rest he marched forth to do

battle. Tigranes at first had been minded to heed Mithridates’ ad-
vice but now he gave ear to the whisperers who clustered so thickly
round his court as they intimated that the Pontic king had given his
advice out of malignancy so that Tigranes might not have a great
victory. Indeed, Mithridates’ general Taxiles, who was present in
the camp and whose experience of the Romans equalled that of his
master, went in peril of his life when he continued to advise inac-
tion. The evidence of his own eyes certainly seemed to justify Ti-
granes’ aggressive intent. In full view of the enemy Lucullus had
taken up his position in the plain with a river to his front and the
army he thus deployed seemed pitifully small indeed. So tiny did it
appear in comparison with their own great host that the Armenians
began to despise him. Jests flew thick and fast and individual gen-
erals begged to be allowed to crush the Romans with but a portion
of their own huge numbers. They assured Tigranes that he himself
need do nothing except sit and watch the sport. The king himself
joined in the fun and produced an epigram that was destined to be
long remembered. The Romans, he said, were too many to be an
embassy but too few to be an army.17
17 Sources: Plut. Luc. 26–7,29; App. Mith. 84–5; Dio 36.1b-3; Memnon
38.2–4 (Jacoby 3B pp. 365–6); Sall. Hist. 4.61–3M. On naphtha see van
Ooteghem (1959) p. 124 n. 1 and on the numbers in both armies Eck-
hardt (1909) pp. 77–82, 97–9.
Memnon has Lucullus attacking other towns in the vicinity but as van
Ooteghem p. 123 n. 2 justly observes, he is unlikely to have dissipated his
small forces in this way. The mistaken belief that Lucullus was attacking
towns may have led Memnon to describe the place where the concubines
were lodged as a po/lij. Appian’s description of it as a fort seems more
likely. See Villoresi (1939) p. 140 n. 1.
Appian attributes the whole conduct of the siege to Sextilius; Plut-
arch gives it first to Lucullus and then Murena. If report of Sextilius’ ear-
lier activities is correct (see above), it is likely Lucullus himself conducted
operations until Tigranes arrived. Without any great conviction I follow
Plutarch in suggesting Murena then took over, if only because he seems to
have had a talent for this kind of thing (see ch. 5). It may be noted that
App. Mith. 85 should not be taken to indicate the kind of division of
forces we saw earlier depicted in Memnon but rather refers to the scene in
Plut. Luc. 27—allowing for the fact that the latter omits the incident of
the concubines.
Then, on the morning of 6 October 69, this contemptible lit-

tle army began to move at top speed. The Armenians were to the
east of the river but the best ford lay on a westward bend and it
was to this point that Lucullus was now leading his men. To the
watching Tigranes it seemed as if they were retreating as quickly as
they could. Taxiles, by his side, knew better. The glittering armour
that they saw was not that of men on the march, for which their
equipment was then covered, but of men about to attack. When he
had recovered from his surprise Tigranes in haste drew up his
forces. He himself took the centre, assigning the left to the king of
the Adiabeni and the right to the king of the Medes. For the Ro-
mans the 6th of October was an unlucky day—one of the times of
ill-omen when the gods might not smile on those giving battle,
since on that date in 105 a Roman army had been totally destroyed
by a Germanic horde at Arausio(Orange). When some of Lucullus’
officers mentioned this, he, confident in the auspices he had re-
ceived, simply explained that they now had the chance to make of
it a lucky day.
As he crossed the river Lucullus observed that the enemy’s
mail-clad horsemen were drawn up before the infantry on the right
wing and it was here he determined to attack. Despatching his
Thracian and Gallic cavalry, he bade them fall on the enemy flank
for it was at this point alone that the armoured troops were vulner-
able. Lucullus’ cavalry duly engaged the foe and, by pretending to
retreat, drew a part of them across the plain. This gave Lucullus
and two cohorts of infantry the opportunity to seize unnoticed the
hill which lay behind the Armenian ranks. Standing on its highest
point he yelled, ‘The day is ours, men’ and charged the enemy be-
low. The first target was the baggage train. This crashed into the
infantry and the infantry crashed into the cavalry. Lucullus then
ordered his men to make an attack on the latter’s flank. But it was
unnecessary. All along the line the enemy cavalry had begun to flee.
The horse previously despatched by Lucullus had by this time
turned on their pursuers and cut them to pieces. Now, with Lucul-
lus’ main infantry line fully formed and approaching close to avoid
the arrows and with him and his detachment still attacking, the en-
emy could turn nowhere but into their own ranks. All along the
line panic spread as they were thrown into confusion, and confu-
sion soon turned into rout as the densely packed mass tried to flee
with the Romans in pursuit. Tigranes was one of the first to bolt,
handing his diadem to his son who passed it on to a slave who, in

turn, was captured by the Romans still carrying it. When the pursuit
was done Lucullus permitted his men to plunder.18
It was the lateness of the season that cut short the pursuit.
Lucullus, therefore, decided to devote his energies to the reduction
of Tigranocerta. Within the city Mancaeus began to be uneasy
about the attitude of his Greek mercenaries and had them dis-
armed. They, however, equipped themselves with makeshift clubs
and resisted when the royal troops came to arrest them. Next they
seized part of the city walls, called to the Romans, and helped them
in scaling it. So Tigranocerta fell. Lucullus reserved the royal treas-
ures for himself but gave the rest of the city to the sack. Over and
above what he could grab in this general scramble each soldier re-
ceived from his commander the sum of 800 drachmas. Then Lu-
cullus literally set about taking the place apart. Tigranocerta was an
artificial creation of Tigranes who had desired something more
fitting than the old and remote Armenian capital Artaxata (Arta-
shat) as the head of his empire. Lucullus now determined to reduce
the place once more to the village it had but lately been. So, all of
the magnificent public buildings and palaces were ruthlessly pulled
down. The population, too, had been created artificially. Tigranes
had simply transported Greeks and barbarians from various parts
of his empire in order to fill his creation. These men Lucullus now
returned to their homes. In many instances, cities had been virtually
18 Sources: Oros. 6.3.6–7; Plut. Luc. 27–8; App. Mith. 85; Eutrop.
6.9.1; Liv. Ep. 98; Front. Strat. 2.1.14, 2.4; Memnon 38.5 (Jacoby 3B p.
366); Phlegon 12.10 (Jacoby 2B p. 1164). See Holmes (1923) p. 422 and
Reinach (1895) p. 359. No ancient source says why Lucullus elected to
fight on an unlucky day. From the useful discussion of Rosenstein (1990)
pp. 81–2 I have extracted and inserted in my text the explanation best in
harmony with his religious beliefs (see further ch. 9). For an attempt to
estimate casualties see Eckhardt (1909) pp. 110–11.
The initial cavalry attack mentioned by Appian is probably to be
equated with the attack of the Gallic and Thracian cavalry we find in Plu-
tarch despite the seeming difference in detail. Appian narrates the out-
come but Plutarch ignores it. Only Appian mentions that Lucullus in his
descent of the hill first encountered baggage and infantry. The flank attack
by the Roman infantry is found in both Plutarch and Frontinus. Appian
alone mentions the cavalry rout in the plain. All conclude with the general
panic but only Memnon succinctly describes its manner of spreading.
depopulated by Tigranes’ demands and, as their sons returned, they

hailed Lucullus with titles of benefactor and founder. In Ti-
granocerta, too, Lucullus discovered a theatre that had been just
built. Tigranes, in keeping with his veneer of Hellenism, had gath-
ered a great crowd of artistes for its dedication. Before demolishing
this place along with everything else, Lucullus had the artistes per-
form there in a celebration of his own victory. And so thoroughly
was the work of destruction carried out that Tigranocerta never
again became a place of any great consequence.19
In antiquity praise was heaped on Lucullus for his victory at
Tigranocerta. His philosopher friend, Antiochus, who incidentally
was soon to die, said, with some exaggeration perhaps, that the sun
had never looked down on the like. Strabo reported that the Ro-
mans, in retrospect, saw that they had been fighting with slaves and
were ashamed. For Livy there was no other battle in which his
countrymen had been at such a numerical disadvantage. Plutarch
also noted that military men at Rome commended Lucullus for his
flexibility. Mithridates he had destroyed by delay, Tigranes by
speed.20 Yet this fine piece of soldiering had failed in its primary
objective. Like a poker player filling to an inside straight, Lucullus
had gambled against high odds and lost for now, just as before,
Tigranes would not yield Mithridates. The two kings, in fact, had a
tearful reunion shortly after the battle and the Armenian, thor-
oughly humbled by his recent shattering experience, turned the
conduct of the war over to his once despised father-in-law on the
grounds that he had the more extensive experience of dealing with
the Romans. With that stamina and resilience which were the hall-
marks of his long career Mithridates immediately began to recruit
another army and forged weapons for it in factories throughout
19 Plut. Luc. 29; App. Mith. 86; Strabo 11.14.1, 12.2.9; Dio 36.2.3;
Memnon 38.6 (Jacoby 3B p. 366). See Eckhardt (1909) pp. 111–12; Magie
(1950) 1 pp. 331–7. There are differing accounts in the sources as to who
betrayed the city, cf. van Ooteghem (1959) p. 132 n. 3. I follow Appian
and Plutarch who are in agreement. For Tigranocerta’s later history see
van Ooteghem p. 133 and Syme (1988) p. 244.
20 Plut. Luc. 28.
Armenia. The new force was to be staffed with Pontic officers and,
once more, the Roman legions were to be its model.21
Thus the work of demolishing Tigranocerta both symbolized
and marked the beginning of a new phase in Lucullus’ war with
Armenia. As the great blow had clearly not brought Tigranes’ sub-
mission Lucullus now determined to do to his empire what he was
at this very moment doing to its capital, namely dismember it.
Acutely aware that he was becoming ever more mired in warfare in
this region, Lucullus strove to minimize the dangers attendant on
this project. He sought no territorial gains, made no effort to create
a province but instead set about detaching Tigranes’ discontented
vassals from their allegiance and making of them clients of Rome.
At the sack of Tigranocerta he had won golden opinions by saving
the wives of some of the principal men from rape and he now
reaped the benefit when a number of rulers clove to his side. An-
tiochus (king of Commagene), the Sopheni (through whose king-
dom Lucullus had marched) and a number of other chieftains all
came to treat. In Syria Tigranes’ general had been recalled. The Se-
leucid Antiochus XIII seized the opportunity thus offered and
placed himself on his ancestral throne. It hardly needs to be added
that Lucullus gave his benediction to this move.
The accession of Gordyene was not without a certain poign-
ancy. Its king, Zarbienus, had been one of those who heeded Ap-
pius, and when Tigranes found out what he was doing he had the
whole royal family wiped out. Now when Lucullus marched into
this country he duly performed funeral rites for the dead monarch.
He decked a pyre with spoils taken from Tigranes and setting fire
to it he poured libations, while calling the dead man an ally of
Rome. He then ordered a costly monument to be erected to his
memory. This last, however, did not cost the Romans a penny for
they had possessed themselves of the treasury of their dead friend.
They had also found a store of 3 million bushels of grain and so
they passed the winter of 69/68 in Gordyene.22
21 App. Mith. 87; Plut. Luc. 29; Dio 36.1.1; Memnon 38.7 (Jacoby 3B
p. 366). See Eckhardt (1909) pp. 195–7.

22 Plut. Luc. 29; Dio 36.2.3–5; Sall. Hist. 4.72M; App. Syr. 49; Justin
40.2.2. See Sherwin-White (1984) p. 179.

By this time events in Rome had begun to preoccupy Lucullus

and so, in consequence, they must now preoccupy us. If we were to
measure the power wielded by Lucullus by the extent of territory
assigned him by the state to be governed over then we might say,
with some justice, that 71 witnessed his peak. In that year, in addi-
tion to the other provinces he held, Bithynia was put into his hands
after Cotta, having reduced Heraclea, retired from the fray and re-
turned to Rome.23 The story of the downfall of Lucullus is the
story of the dismemberment of this great command.
The process took time to mature but it began early. Soon after
the fall of Cabira strange stories began to circulate in Rome. We
know that when Mithridates took refuge with Tigranes it made
good sense to reduce the rest of Pontus while, at the same time,
trying to lay hands on the fugitive by diplomatic means. However,
by the time word of these operations got to Rome they had ac-
quired rather a different complexion. It was claimed that Lucullus
had allowed the king to slip away not for military or other good
reasons but simply because of his own eagerness to get hold of the
treasures stored up in the kingdom. These charges bear a certain
resemblance to the complaints of Lucullus’ own troops that he was
not prosecuting the war with sufficient vigour and it is not, there-
fore, rash to suggest that dinner-party gossip mirrored the gripes of
the ranker. They also bring to mind the story of the ass laden with
gold which Mithridates once shoved in front of his pursuers.
Cicero, who preserves the accusation for us, saw fit to adorn this
tale with a frigid conceit. He likened Mithridates to Medea who
scattered the limbs of her brother before her pursuing father.24
Although we are dealing with patent concoctions they are,
nevertheless, powerful concoctions and they created now the en-
during myth that Lucullus was a mean and avaricious man who
would do anything for money. As late as AD 30 Vellius Paterculus
for example could describe Lucullus as a man admirable in many
ways but undoubtedly driven by a lust for coin.25
23 Magie (1950) 2 p. 1215 n. 39. Cf. ch. 5 n. 51.

24 Cic. Leg. Man. 22—the conceit is defended rather shamefacedly by
Schol. Gron. pp. 318–19 St. See ch. 5.
25 Vell. Pat. 2.33.1. In modern times the view is found, for instance,
in Villoresi (1939) p. 188 and even more recently in Hopkins (1983) p.

With the invasion of Armenia the accusation of avarice was

amplified, elaborated and had added to it other charges. If asked
about it, and if willing to give an honest opinion, then most Ro-
mans would probably have agreed with Lucullus’ moralistic view
that somebody who harboured an enemy of Rome must be treated
as an enemy himself. In our own day debate has centred on the
legal question of whether or not Lucullus had proper authority for
attacking Tigranes. The answer is usually in the negative.26 But I
dissent. When we discussed his invasion of Pontus we discovered
no specific law permitting him to attack but neither did we find any
reprimand. It was, therefore, deduced that the nature of Lucullus’
brief was such as to allow him to make war on Mithridates where
he would. The necessary dispensation from the Lex Cornelia de mai-
estate had been obtained before he left Rome. Thus, logically, it
ought to follow that, if the situation required pursuing Mithridates
further and into Armenia, then, from the lawyers’ standpoint this
campaign was as acceptable as that into Pontus.27
But, as I hinted earlier, it was not a dispassionate judgement
on the correctness of his action that Lucullus had to fear but rather
a chorus of slander. Some of the charges are in detail sometimes
contradictory but they all add up to one thing: here was a magis-
trate who was abusing his powers. From what we have seen, there
is, at least, some kind of justification for those who tried to claim
that Lucullus had actually provoked Tigranes. That is one construc-
tion that could, however mistakenly, be put upon his handling of
the king. It is very difficult though, to see what, save malignancy,
might have turned his successful wooing of native princes into an
operation that frightened many subject peoples into taking up arms
at his approach. Evidently, some did not agree with the view that
Lucullus should not have made war on Tigranes. At any rate there
were those who professed to believe he should have made a more
241. I cannot agree with him that Val. Max. 7.9.1 depicts Lucullus as a
legacy hunter since 9.1–5 deals not with captatio but unexpected legacies. It
should be further noted that Caecilius there is depicted as owing his posi-
tion to Lucullus. Like Hopkins, I wonder about the role of the people. See
van Ooteghem (1959) p. 152 and ch. 8.
26 See, for example, van Ooteghem (1959) pp. 117–18 and Sherwin-
White (1984) pp. 174–5.

27 See ch. 5.
thorough job of it. This was the second time Lucullus had let a king
slip away after inflicting a great defeat on him, and the motive was
clear to his detractors at least. The proconsul was deliberately pro-
longing the war in order to increase his own glory. But most gro-
tesque of all was the suggestion that Lucullus had not invaded Ar-
menia in pursuit of Mithridates but to commit sacrilege. Money-
grabber that he was, he had heard of some temple or other there
that was stuffed with treasure and he determined it should be his.28
The fount and origin of these tales is not difficult to discover.
By the standards of the ancient world communications between
Asia and Rome seem to have been fairly satisfactory. We hear of a
stream of letters from the publicani detailing and complaining of
conditions in the province and we also know that the Roman ar-
mies had some kind of regular postal service.29 Nevertheless, we
should ever be aware that their system fell very short indeed of the
kind of comprehensive service we enjoy today. Therefore, given
the distance involved and the general ignorance of the area, we
should not be surprised if many people simply failed to appreciate
the considerable difficulties Lucullus faced and saw only a war that
appeared to be endless. Moreover, whether a report come slow or
fast, be it full or skimpy, it is ever at the mercy of the professional
or amateur commentator. The barbershop strategist and the coffee-
house general are hardy creatures who flourish in even the most
rigorous climes and there is no reason to suppose they were not to
be found at Rome. Those who would win a cheap reputation for
cleverness would have no difficulty in imputing motives of varying
degrees of unworthiness to the man in the field. But idle and cyni-
cal talk remains but idle and cynical talk until it is taken up and util-
ized by people who have the will and the capacity to make of it a
political weapon.
28 Sall. Hist. 4.70M; Dio 36.2.1; Cic. Leg. Man. 23 with Villoresi (1939)
p. 148 n. 4 for speculation on the location of the temple; Plut. Luc. 24, 33.
For a slightly different interpretation of this evidence see Sherwin-White
(1984) p. 175. Villoresi pp. 148–9 thinks the claim of temple-robbing
originated with Mithridates. This is not implausible but it seems to have
been taken up by Lucullus’ domestic enemies. Cicero calls it an opinio but
self-evidently he is exploiting something well known at the time in Rome.
29 Cic. Leg. Man. 4, 39.
Thus when the murmurings about Mithridates’ escape first

began to be heard in late 72 they did Lucullus no damage. Un-
doubtedly he had enemies in the senate and it is likely, too, that
men anxious to advance their careers will not have been best
pleased at his prolonged and extensive command which deprived
them of potential provinces.30 The east with Mithridates about had,
a few years before, seemed a not-unattractive prospect. Now, with
the Pontic king removed, it had acquired an even greater allure.
But, such was Lucullus’ popularity and such was his success, that
nothing could be done for the moment. It was not until this very
winter of 69/68 that the first dent was put in his good fortune.
By this time he had acquired a new and very dangerous set of
enemies indeed. His provincial reforms in Asia had enraged the
publicani and with their first-class courier service they at once in-
formed their brethren at home about what he had done. The latter
were not slow to act. When Lucullus launched his invasion of Ar-
menia they put themselves at the head of the herd of his detractors
and loudly denounced the campaign. Then, after the battle of Ti-
granocerta, they appear to have calculated that the time was now
right to move from talk to action. Had Lucullus been able to carry
out his plan of a swift campaign culminating in a heavy blow to
Tigranes and the subsequent immediate surrender of Mithridates
then all complaints would be drowned out in the universal acclaim
accorded the man who had destroyed Rome’s mighty foe. As it
was, with the Roman army bogged down in Gordyene and both
Mithridates and Tigranes still at large raising yet another army, a
patina of verisimilitude could be added to a claim that Lucullus was
wantonly prolonging the war for his own selfish ends and that
claim might now be used to cause him some real trouble for the
first time. From the outset the publicani recognized the importance
of the tribunes for their campaign. This was a venal age, a time
when bribery was virtually commonplace in public life. So the fi-
nanciers simply dipped into their large money-bags and bought
themselves some tribunes to add their voices to the initial protests.
Now a further use could be found for these tools. The struggle
This theme is found in Cic. Leg. Man. 26 but it is reasonable to

30
suppose it surfaced earlier. See Sherwin-White (1984) p. 186 and Seager

(1979) p. 34.
over the tribunate had come to an end in 70 with the restoration of

full powers to that office. Thus the pensioners of the publicani were
able to lay before the people a proposal that the province of Asia
be taken from Lucullus. The plebs, ever fickle, were by this time
convinced that Lucullus really was dragging out the war and so
were ready to pare him back. Thus the bill was passed into law and
Asia was returned to the government of pro-praetors early in 68.31
To further increase Lucullus’ discomfort, one of the praetors
of that year was an old enemy, L. Quinctius. This was the man, it
will be remembered, whom he had squashed back in 74 during agi-
tation over the tribunate. Obviously he had good reason for wish-
ing to do Lucullus an injury and he readily mouthed slogans like
those of the publicani. Lucullus, he said, was prolonging the war out
of love of gain and glory. He had come not to conquer Tigranes
but to strip him. But, though he was plainly of the same mind as
the publicani, we cannot say for certain if Quinctius, like so many
others, became their pensioner. His refusal of a bribe from Lucul-
lus, who desperately tried in this way to stifle his agitation, may
therefore be attributed, with equal plausibility, to hatred, satiety or
integrity. One thing is certain: Quinctius worked hard at his mining
and he had his reward. Some time in the course of the year he suc-
ceeded in having another province taken from Lucullus. Q. Mar-
cius Rex, one of the consuls of 68, was assigned Cilicia. Of this
brother-in-law of Lucullus (he had married another Clodia, Tertia)
it need only be said here that he was of small ability and, on his
31 Asia: Dio 36.2.1–2. As Dio places this after Tigranocerta, 68—it

seems to me—is as likely a date as the more usual 69 (MRR 2.133). Hostil-
ity to Lucullus, publicani, tribunes: Plut. Luc. 20, 24, 33.
Venality of the age: Seager (1979) p. 30 and (on ambitus) Lintott
(1990). Plutarch’s ‘demagogues’ obviously covers more than tribunes, see
Thommen (1989) p. 107 and next note. Dio talks of ‘citizens and others’
and this, I think, tells against the theory of Gelzer (1959) p. 70 that Asia
and Cilicia were taken from Lucullus by the senate. ‘The others’ are
probably publicani and individual senators. The most recent discussion of
the governors of Asia immediately post Lucullus, is Broughton (1990).
Brunt’s attempt to minimize the part the publicani played in Lucullus’
downfall—(1988) pp. 152, 188, 516—is misconceived. He fails to recog-
nize that it was they who gave the initial impulse to a wave that others
were soon to ride. See below.
arrival in the East in 67, was to show himself no particular friend of

Lucullus.32
However, we must return to Gordyene and the winter of 69/
68 where we find the pro-consul wrestling with a fresh problem.
To Lucullus it must have seemed he was warring with the Hydra.
No sooner had he disposed of one head of state than another came
to take its place. The latest manifestation was Phraates II the king
of Parthia. In their plight Tigranes and Mithridates had looked to
him for help. Years before when the Armenian king had been the
coming man he had taken from the Parthians a region known as
‘the seventy valleys’. Now in the days of desperation he offered to
return the area to Phraates in exchange for his help. When Lucullus
learned what was happening he promptly sent ambassadors of his
own to the Parthian court. Once before Rome and Parthia had had
contact when, in 96, Sulla concluded a treaty with the then king,
Mithridates II. But this treaty had long lapsed since neither side had
had any dealings with each other. Present circumstances now ur-
gently dictated that they be renewed. Lucullus seems to have learnt
something from his dealings with Tigranes. While unable to refrain
from making lurid threats as to what he would do if Phraates did
not co-operate, he at the same time struck a gentler note and prom-
ised all sorts of good things should the king become Rome’s ally.
The Parthians responded with an embassy of their own and a treaty
was concluded. As in the days of Sulla, the Euphrates was fixed as
the boundary between the two powers and it was also agreed that
the Parthians should make an attack on Armenia. The legate Sextil-
ius was then sent to Parthia to co-ordinate the war effort. There he
made a horrifying discovery: Phraates had also concluded an alli-
ance with Tigranes and Mithridates. Seemingly Sextilius was unable
to hide his emotions because soon afterwards he was ejected from
the court on the grounds that he was a spy. Lucullus’ anger at this
double-dealing can well be imagined. He must have longed to show
Phraates, as he had shown Tigranes, that he was not in the habit of
making empty threats but stories that he planned an assault on Par-
thia quite simply must be dismissed out of hand. On this occasion
prudence came before pride. With Tigranes and Mithridates roam-
Plut. Luc. 33; Sall. Hist. 4.71M; cf. Schol. Gron. p. 321 St. See Sea-
32
ger (1979) p. 30 and Gruen (1974) pp. 134–5.

ing free and with public opinion at home becoming daily more hos-
tile, to embroil Rome in a war with yet another great power would
amount to nothing less than an act of breath-taking folly.
As it turned out, Tigranes, no less than Lucullus, found the
wooing of Parthia to be a useless exercise. Phraates’ primary con-
cern was the safety and welfare of his kingdom and, like his prede-
cessors on the throne, he believed this might best be secured by
being on friendly terms with all his neighbours but avoiding any
involvement in their quarrels. In pursuance of this policy he saw no
reason why he should not conclude pacts with both sides but give
aid to neither. When the war between Rome and Armenia resumed
the protagonists found that Phraates’ stance was one of careful
neutrality.33
While it was yet winter Lucullus sent orders to the army in
Pontus to come and join him for the next season’s campaigning.
For some little time before this these particular troops had been
proving difficult and now they went completely out of control de-
claring roundly that they would not take the road and, indeed, went
so far as to declare they would give up their garrison duties in
Pontus. When word of this reached the men in Gordyene they
voiced their approval and said it was time they all had a rest from
the seemingly endless toils they had to endure. The need to placate
these men, the negotiations with the Parthians and the inclement
weather all served to delay the start of Lucullus’ campaign. It was
already high summer when he crossed the Taurus mountains and
came to the Armenian plateau. There his ignorance of the land into
which he had come was made abundantly clear. Seemingly he had
not been alerted by the bad weather that attended the start of this
campaign for he was now surprised to find corn green in the fields
in July due to the coolness of the climate. This failure to acquaint
33 On all of this see Keaveney (1981b) pp. 195–204. To the bibliogra-
phy there add Bulin (1983) pp. 44–8, 81–5; Sherwin-White (1984) pp.
180–1, 218–21, and Dabrowa (1983) pp. 21–5 who thinks the Parthian
king was Sinatruces and doubts if a treaty was actually concluded with
Rome. For a discussion of Sall. Ep. Mith. see McGing (1986) pp. 154–62.
Whether or not it derives from a genuine letter of Mithridates, I would
agree with Sherwin-White (1984) p. 181 that the arguments there de-
ployed would hardly have weighed as much with the Parthians as the terri-
torial inducement mentioned by our other sources.
himself with the climatic conditions was to cost Lucullus dear in

the end. More immediately, it meant victualling problems and so
the Romans hastened down to the valleys of Northern Armenia.34
There they found their opponent waiting for them. With his
new army Mithridates was ready for a war of attrition. Refusing a
pitched battle, even when Lucullus set about devastating the coun-
tryside and plundering the villages in his search for grain, he har-
assed the Roman cavalry with his own horse which prudently with-
drew whenever infantry went to the aid of their colleagues. Full use
was made of the archers who had performed so well at Ti-
granocerta. Parthian-fashion, they shot at their pursuers as they fled
and to ensure they wreaked maximum havoc these men dipped
their arrows in poison. Eventually, however, Lucullus succeeded in
cornering Mithridates on a hillside but even now the king would
not give battle. At this point Tigranes put in an appearance and
attacked the Roman foragers but he was soundly beaten so that
foraging now went on over a yet-wider area and Lucullus moved
his lines near the hill. A second assault by Tigranes was foiled by a
swift attack by the Roman cavalry and Lucullus now began to en-
compass Mithridates with a ditch.35
Even this failed to budge the king and Lucullus therefore re-
solved to switch tactics. Breaking off the siege, he made for Ar-
taxata, the old Armenian capital. Tigranes had lodged his women-
folk here and Lucullus reckoned that, as in the previous year at Ti-
granocerta, he would not allow them to fall into enemy hands but
would come running to the rescue. His calculations proved correct.
On the fourth day of his march he found that Tigranes had con-
trived to get ahead of him and was blocking the passage of the river
Arsanias (eastern Euphrates) which had to be crossed if Artaxata
was to be reached. Here again Lucullus placated the river-deity with
a sacrifice and then crossed with twelve cohorts in the van and the
rest deployed so as to protect his flanks. The cavalry which faced
34 Plut. Luc. 30–1; Dio 36.4.2. See Reinach (1895) p. 364; Magie
(1950) 2 p. 1217 n. 48; Sherwin-White (1984) p. 182; Bulin (1983) pp. 86–
8; Eckhardt (1909) pp. 208–13.
35 App. Mith. 87; Plut. Luc. 31; Dio 36.5.1–2. Appian and Plutarch
give selective details of the campaign, Dio its general characteristics. See
Eckhardt (1909) pp. 213–14.
him was fronted by mounted archers whom Tigranes deemed to be

the very best of his forces. These, however, failed to live up to ex-
pectations for, after a light skirmish with the Roman cavalry, they
gave way before the infantry advance. Scattering on both sides,
they were pursued by the Roman cavalry. The main Armenian
army, with Tigranes at its head, now advanced. Fearing lest he be
overwhelmed, Lucullus recalled his cavalry. Then, leading in per-
son, he charged the Atropateni who were opposite with the Arme-
nian nobility. These, too, fled and the pursuit went on through the
night until the Romans grew weary of killing, capturing and gather-
ing booty.36
The road to Artaxata thus lay open but it was soon to close
again thanks to Lucullus’ own troops. Harassment by the Armeni-
ans continued, casualties mounted and supplies began to run short.
But what clinched the matter was the sudden and very severe dete-
rioration in the weather. The country itself was, anyway, unhealthy,
being full of marshes and damp defiles. But to make matters worse
climatic conditions were hardly what was to be expected for late
September even in those inhospitable regions. Snow and frost cov-
ered the ground while a coating of ice lay on the rivers. By day, the
soldiers trudged over boggy ground in snow showers, by night they
lodged in the wet and damp. Murmurings soon began and the trib-
unes were despatched to ask Lucullus to desist. When he would
not, assemblies were held and there was shouting in the tents at
night. An ancient author tells us this last is characteristic of a muti-
nous army. Lucullus now put off his hauteur and begged and en-
treated. To no avail. Eventually the commander had to give way.
Crossing the Taurus by another route he came to the region of
Mygdonia.37
36 Plut. Luc. 31. Sall. Hist. 4.74M probably refers to the arrival of Lu-
cullus while 75M relates the defeat of Tigranes’ cavalry. Unlike van
Ooteghem (1959) p. 143 and Gelzer col. 401 I do not think Dio 36.5.2
belongs here since it bears no resemblance to anything in Plutarch’s ac-
count. Since it looks like the skirmishing tactics of Mithridates I have as-
signed it to that place (see n. 35 above). It would appear that Appian and
Dio both neglect to mention this battle. The story that Mithridates was
present is universally rejected, cf. e.g. Gelzer col. 401.
37 Plut. Luc. 32; Dio 36.6.1. Magie (1950) 2 p. 1218 n. 49 objects to
Plutarch’s description of the weather on the grounds that it is too early by

Here, in the more benign climate, he began another siege, that

of the city of Nisibis (Nusaybin), a place distinguished by having
two walls of brick between which lay a moat. Filled with treasures,
it was defended by a brother of the king, Gouras, who was assisted
by that Callimachus who had fired Amisus. From the first Lucullus
pressed the siege with great vigour but without much success. It
was not until winter came and the defenders, strangely unaware of
Lucullus’ appetite for fighting in the close season, grew slack that
an opportunity presented itself. One dark night, aided by a rain-
storm, Lucullus and his men climbed the mounds they had built
and took by assault the lightly held outer wall. They then filled in
part of the moat and crossed to the second since, in the high wind,
the arrows and naphtha of the defenders availed them nought. This
second wall soon fell since it was not as strong as the outer. The
citadel held out for a little time but then Gouras yielded and was
treated honourably. Callimachus, whose destruction of Amisus had
not been forgotten, was, however, put in chains and reserved for
Lucullus’ triumph. The Romans then wintered in the town.38
far in the year for such conditions but he appears to have overlooked the
fact that it is described as unexpected. Lucullus was unlucky, campaigning
in a year of freak conditions (cf. n. 34). Sherwin-White (1984) p. 182 n. 89
says App. Mith. 87 confirms Plutarch’s story but the winter mentioned
there is that which put an end to the year’s fighting, not the Artaxata
campaign. Despite Sherwin-White p. 184 n. 95 it seems that Appian be-
lieves all the events of Mith. 88–9 fell in 67. See further n. 40.
38 Sources: Plut. Luc. 32; Dio 36.6–7; Sall. Hist. 4.79–80M; Eutrop.
6.9.1; Oros. 6.3.7. Dio is probably using ‘summer’ in a ‘Thucydidean’ or

‘Appianic’ sense, cf. Eckhardt (1909) p. 217; Holmes (1923) p. 425 and
app. 2.
Plutarch says Lucullus wintered in Gordyene. This is probably an er-
ror—so Magie (1950) 2 p. 1218 n. 50—although it would seem to accord
with a theory of Sherwin-White (1984) pp. 182–3. He points out that Eu-
trop. 6.9.2 (and we may add Fest. Brev. 15) put the notice of Lucullus’
intended attack on Parthia here (compare n. 33). Behind this Sherwin-
White sees a possible reference to a plan to march from Gordyene into
Adiabene in early 67. He therefore proposes moving the notice of troop
movements in Plut. Luc. 30 to this point and claims Dio 36.10.1 offers
support for this. Such transportation is, of course, hazardous in itself and
it may be further pointed out that if Eutropius and Festus have produced
a distortion of Lucullus’ intentions at their place then Plutarch could also
Tigranes had not bothered to come to the aid of Nisibis since

he thought it would be well able to withstand a siege. Instead, he
made for occupied Armenia to play the role of the liberator. There
he encountered a man who, if scholarly identification be correct,
can only be described as the strangest accretion of all to Lucullus’
staff. L. Fannius, the renegade who, among other services, had
acted as a broker in the negotiations between Mithridates and Ser-
torius had somehow or other contrived not only to receive a par-
don but a post of responsibility as well. In this he did not distin-
guish himself for he was put under siege by his opponent and only
relieved when help was sent by Lucullus.39
Meanwhile, Mithridates had penetrated into Lesser Armenia
and Pontus. The inhabitants, who still revered him as their lawful
king and who had already begun to experience the harshness of
Roman rule, gave him a warm welcome. Challenged by Fabius Ha-
drianus, he inflicted a heavy defeat on the legate. Only a wound
incurred in the fight prevented Mithridates from striking an even
heavier blow. As it was, he was able to shut Hadrianus up in Cabira
and the Romans were relieved only by the arrival of Triarius who
was leading reinforcements from the Bithynian coast for Lucullus.
Mithridates withdrew and was followed by Triarius. Another battle
was then fought near Comana, from which the Romans emerged as
victors. Winter was now approaching so both sides pulled back to
fortified frontiers. Mithridates to Comana, Triarius to Gaziura.40
have done so at this and he may thus be referring to the Armenian cam-
paign of Luc. 31. Certainly there is no real reason for not supposing that
the period after the hard and allegedly unrewarding campaign of 68 was a
more likely time for the discontent Plutarch describes than 69 or the
spring of 68. The latter year, as we saw, actually culminated in the seizure
of even more treasure.
39 Dio 36.8; App. Mith. 88. Identification of Fannius, see e.g. MRR 2.
140. In view of what Fannius had done one wonders how he got a par-
don. Possibly he was a beneficiary of the Lex Plautia de reditu Lepidanorum,
for which see MRR 2.128 and Gruen (1974) p. 37. Nothing save Plut. Luc.
32, which will admit of other interpretations (cf. n. 38), offers any support
to the view of MRR and van Ooteghem (1959) p. 147 that Fannius was
operating in Gordyene.
40 Dio. 36.9–11; App. Mith. 88. On the surface Plut. Luc. 34 seems to
imply Lucullus was planning a winter campaign. A careful reading of this

passage in conjunction with Luc. 35 clearly shows that the spring of 67 is
So ended the campaigns of 68 which, self-evidently, had

brought little comfort to Lucullus. What was at that very moment
happening in Rome will have brought even less. The news that Lu-
cullus’ troops were becoming mutinous did him, as may well be
imagined, little good at all. The effect seems to have been to
unleash a tide of false sympathy for the common soldier. People
deplored the fact that poor Italian lads seemed to be condemned to
wander endlessly through the wastes of Asia.41 Coincidental with
this wailing there came the election of Aulus Gabinius to the tribu-
nate.42
It was this man who early in the next year (67) completed the
destruction of Lucullus’ great command. Gabinius brought up yet
again the old complaint that Lucullus was prolonging the war for
his own personal glory. To the equally well-worn charge of avarice
Gabinius added a novel twist by parading about with a picture of a
luxurious villa that Lucullus even now was having built at Tuscu-
lum (Frascati). Finally, the tribune gave utterance to a view that we
know had been current in Rome for some time: it was undesirable
and contrary to Roman practice that one man should hold so great
a command for so long. So he passed a law giving Bithynia and
Pontus to M’. Acilius Glabrio. To this quondam chair-smasher who
was no friend of Lucullus part of the proconsular army was
handed. The remainder, which included those who had once served
under Fimbria and whose prolonged absence from Italy was caus-
ing so much sudden but commendable anxiety, were to be given
their discharge. From this latter arrangement we can see beyond a
shadow of a doubt that, along with the territories, Glabrio, a mili-
tary incompetent, was to receive charge of the war against Mithri-
dates.43
meant and that the ‘winter’ is a soldier’s excuse. See further n. 46. Appian
has Triarius marching from Asia, which cannot be literally true (see
above). I therefore have him start from his last known address (cf. ch. 5).
See further n. 43. Against Sherwin-White (1984) p. 184, I think Dio
36.12.1 shows Triarius wintered at Gaziura, not Cabira.
41 Cic. Leg. Man. 23–4. Cf. Williams (1984) p. 231.
42 MRR 2.144–5.
43 Cic. Leg. Man. 26, Sest. 93; Sall. Hist. 5.13M; Dio 36.2.2, 14.4, 15.3,
17.1; Plut. Luc. 33, 35.

Behind Gabinius there stood now, not the publicani, but one
man: Pompey. The tribune was his stooge. In a little while he was
to pass a law giving his chief a great command against the pirates
whose depredations had, by now, become intolerable. So it is
hardly straining credulity to suggest that he was also acting on
Pompey’s behalf here. Gabinius was not, of course, conferring an
immediate benefit but rather, so to speak, laying up treasures for
the future. Pompey’s patience rivalled that of the spider. He, as we
have seen, knew well how to create a situation and then stand back
from it until it had matured to the point where others would call
upon him to apply a remedy. As he headed eastwards Pompey
must have reasoned that there would be something to be gained
from the Mithridatic War now that it was removed from the capa-
ble hands of Lucullus. If, as proved the case, his own campaign
should be swift and if, as also proved the case, Glabrio showed
himself to be worthless then he, as the man on the spot, would
almost certainly be called upon to clean up the mess. After a suit-
able show of reluctance he would take up the new burden.44
At this point one obvious question arises. What were Lucul-
lus’ friends doing for him? The answer seems to be: not a lot.
When Asia was removed from his control we hear no protest from
their direction. Further, the very fact that Lucullus had to try and
bribe Quinctius to prevent more damage is an eloquent testimony
to the ineffectiveness of his friends. They, we may suspect, simply
felt unable to make headway against that sentiment which held that
Lucullus’ prolonged command was undesirable and unhealthy. It is
Only Cic. Leg. Man. 5 speaks of a change of command as opposed to

a loss of territory. Appian Mith. 90 calls the province ‘Asia’. Gelzer col.
404 believes this to be an error but in view of n. 40 it looks as if he might
have thought of Bithynia as part of Asia. On the basis of Cic. Leg. Man. 26
Gelzer col. 405 believes Lucullus handed over his troops to Glabrio but
this is contradicted by Plut. Luc. 35. See Villoresi (1939) p. 170 n. 5 and
further below.
On Gabinius’ background see Sanford (1939) pp. 68–72 and Badian
(1959) and on his role here n. 44. Glabrio: ch. 3; Hayne (1974); Williams
(1984) pp. 232–3. The latter’s attempt (p. 228) to salvage something of his
military reputation is not convincing.
44 I follow Seager (1979) p. 32. Different views will be found in, e.g.,
Williams (1984) and Sherwin-White (1984) pp. 187–8.

unlikely they actually shared it but it may have been sufficiently

widespread in the senate to render useless any attempts to block
the moves against Lucullus. Of course, in the final analysis, it was
the sovereign people who would vote Lucullus out of office but,
even with full senatorial backing, the allies of Lucullus might well
hesitate to cross them. The scenes that were to attend the passing
of Gabinius’ piracy law when, among other things, a consul was
nearly lynched show how dangerous it could be to try and thwart
the people’s wishes without good reason and, it has to be said, the
allies of Lucullus did not see his salvation as a good reason in itself.
As one acute ancient observer remarked, what Catulus and others
were interested in was not so much in saving Lucullus as in thwart-
ing Pompey.
If that is recognized then much that has previously been dark
becomes light. No doubt Lucullus’ allies deplored the dismantling
of his command but they recognized that theirs was a viewpoint
not widely shared in either the senate or the assembly. And so they
felt there was little they could usefully do to remedy matters. From
the political viewpoint, at least, the situation wore a consoling as-
pect: Gabinius’ law had given the command of the war to the
lightweight Glabrio. With Gabinius’ next proposal, to confer a
great command against the pirates on Pompey, everything changed
and the friends of Lucullus could go over to the attack.
If the senators would not bestir themselves to save Lucullus
they would certainly do all in their power to thwart Pompey whose
influence, as we saw in earlier chapters, they desperately wished to
curb. So the argument used against Lucullus was now deployed
against Pompey. Both Catulus and Hortensius claimed that it was
bad that one man should have such extensive powers. The sover-
eign people were unimpressed and, amid tumultuous scenes, the
bill passed into law.
Early in the next year (66) the people were required to listen
to further specious arguments. Events in the east had developed in
exactly the way we suggested Pompey had hoped they might. Rex
and Glabrio had accomplished nothing, Lucullus, who was still in
the area, had simply ground to an ignominious halt and he,
Pompey, had made short work of the pirates. Clearly the time had
come for a capable commander to be sent to the area to put mat-
ters to rights once and for all. So the tribune Manilius introduced a
bill which, in addition to the powers he already enjoyed, would
confer on Pompey the provinces of Bithynia, Pontus and Cilicia

and the command against Mithridates. Although Lucullus had lost
his command some time before, one can see some justification for
the claim of Hortensius and Catulus that he was, by this measure,
being deprived of the glory of winning the war. It is less easy to
imagine what people made of their further assertion. Making the
best of a bad job and seizing any weapon with which they might
beat Pompey, the pair leapt to the defence of Glabrio and Rex say-
ing it really was a shame that their commands were being thus
prematurely terminated. In point of fact it looks as if even a fair
number of senators were unimpressed. In contrast to the previous
year a number of senior men, recognizing that Pompey was the
man for the task, backed the proposal which was supported by the
eloquence of Cicero and duly became law.45
For Lucullus the start of the campaigning season for 67 had
brought with it a repetition of the scenes of the previous year when
his troops once more refused to move. They had heard of Rex’s
appointment to Cilicia and knew full well what it portended. Lucul-
lus would not be their commander for very much longer. Soon
they would have a new one, perhaps even Pompey himself, so
there was no need to obey the old one. Their resolve was stiffened
by Lucullus’ brother-in-law, Clodius. Believing himself to have
been unjustly passed over for promotion and preferment, he now
took upon himself the role of the soldiers’ friend. His particular
object was the Fimbrians who had served so long in Asia. He told
them that they had fought and toiled for no reward save to act as
escorts for the pack-animals and carts which carried Lucullus’ loot.
45 Cic. Leg. Man. passim and especially 51–3, 59; Dio 36.31.3, 42.4,
43.1; Plut. Pomp. 30, Luc. 35; Asc. 60, 65C; Liv. Ep. 100; Vell. Pat. 2.33.1;
App. Mith. 97; Val. Max. 8.15.9 with Sherwin-White (1984) pp. 188–90
and Seager (1979) pp. 32–5, 39–43. See also Watkins (1987). For the
friends of Lucullus see Scardigli (1989) pp. 285–6 and Meier (1966) p. 85
n. 131. If Glabrio had Pompeian affiliations as Gruen (1974) p. 131 thinks
then Hortensius’ defence acquires an added piquancy. The theme of the
venality of the age (n. 31) crops up in both the case of Gabinius and
Manilius, see Cic. Post Red. in Sen. 11 and Vell. Pat. 2.33.1. Plutarch is
probably speaking loosely when he says Pompey was granted the territory
and the forces under Lucullus, just as Velleius is speaking exactly when he
says he took over a war directed by Lucullus. See below.
He then went on to tell them, untruthfully, that Pompey’s troops,

who he claimed incredibly had had an easier war than they in Spain,
were, at this very moment, enjoying a well-earned retirement on
plots of land provided by their commander. The situation, which
was beginning to look very ugly indeed, was suddenly altered by an
urgent message from Triarius which reminded the troops of the
oath of allegiance they had sworn and of the duty they still owed to
their commander and their comrades.46
When spring came Mithridates had moved against Triarius.
The Roman observed that the Pontic forces had been considerably
augmented and in some alarm sent an urgent message to Lucullus
for aid. The danger in which their comrades stood had, as we saw,
a sobering effect on Lucullus’ men and they willingly followed their
leader as he set out to the rescue. But it was already too late. Tri-
arius, an able officer whose career to date had been one of almost
unbroken success,47 had gone down to a massive defeat. He had
planned on remaining in his strong position at Gaziura until Lucul-
lus should appear but he reckoned without Mithridates. The latter
launched an assault on a place called Dadasa. As this was the place
where the Roman soldiers kept their booty something akin to panic
46 Plut. Luc. 33–5; Cic. Har. Resp. 42; Dio 36.14; Sall. Hist. 5.11, 12M.
Dating: n. 40. Seager (1979) p. 31 n. 31 points out that Clodius was lying
about Pompey’s grants. A number of scholars, e.g. Seager (1979) p. 32,
Magie (1950) 2 p. 1218 n. 52, Gelzer col. 403, all believe that Dio 36.14.4
refers to this incident but I believe that a careful reading of 36.14 in its
entirety will show that two sets of disturbances are in question and that
that in 4 is the one after Zela (see below). At any rate the appointment of
Rex would, in my view, be a sufficient explanation for what was going on
now especially if there is any truth in the report (Luc. 33) that some troops
were to be discharged at this time though this detail might, one supposes,
be a doublet of the discharges upon Glabrio’s appointment (see above).
Mulroy (1985) pp. 155–65 consistently places the campaign of 68 in
69 and thus Clodius’ treachery in the winter of 69/68. No reason is given
for the re-dating and I can find none. Further, it seems to me that Mulroy
fails of his main purpose: to rehabilitate Clodius. His case largely seems to
rest on arbitrarily labelling sections of our evidence as fiction. In place of
the source-material thus removed we are given unfounded, albeit often
ingenious, hypothesis (see especially pp. 164–5 where the threatening mili-
tary situation is ignored).
47 Curiously few modern historians emphasize this point.
swept through the ranks and the men forced their commander to
take the field. The result, as I have said, was a great defeat at a place
called Zela. Somewhere in the neighbourhood of Sebasteia Mega-
lopolis (Sivas) the remnants of Triarius’ army met with the advanc-
ing forces of Lucullus and he was obliged to rescue his subordinate
from his own men, who wanted to lynch him on the spot.48
So, once more, Lucullus found himself marching against
Mithridates.49 The king who had braved the lesser man would not
face his superior, for whom he had by now acquired a healthy re-
spect. Instead, he retreated before Lucullus to high ground at Ta-
laura in Lesser Armenia. There he refused to be drawn but sent
skirmishers out to harass the Romans while he awaited the arrival
of Tigranes. Lucullus, one supposes, must have realized full well
that this was his last chance to lay hands on Mithridates and even at
this late moment to turn a disastrous campaign into a magnificent
triumph. To winkle out the quarry, though, extra troops were
needed. As it happened, Q. Marcius Rex, his successor in Cilicia,
was even now passing through Lycaonia on his way to his province
with three legions.50 Rex was actually married to a Clodia (Tertia),
sister of Lucullus’ wife Clodia, so the proconsul may have thought
this relationship might be deployed to his advantage.51 But he was
to be disappointed. Pompey’s great command was not yet and
Rex’s brief was to fight the pirates in Cilicia as P. Servilius had
done some years before. The Lex Cornelia de maiestate forbade him
to leave his province without the senate’s permission and, on this
occasion, Rex elected to put obedience to the law before familial
48 Plut. Luc. 35; App. Mith. 89; Dio 36.12. Liv. Ep. 98 with Gelzer
cols. 403–4; Magie (1950) 2 pp. 1218–19 nn. 52, 54; Sherwin-White (1984)
p. 184. Most modern scholars reject the statement of Plutarch and Appian
that Triarius gave battle in the hope of defeating Mithridates before Lu-
cullus came since it is plainly at variance with his call for help.
49 Sources for what follows: App. Mith. 90; Plut. Luc. 35–6; Dio
36.14–15, 17, 43.2, 46.1; Sall. Hist. 5.13–14M; Cic. Leg. Man. 5, 26, Ad Att.
13.6.4. Individual problems arising are discussed in nn. 50–7.
50 The sources indicate that Rex and Glabrio reached the east about
the same time but that this incident occurred before Glabrio communi-
cated with Lucullus (see below).
51 See ch. 3.
obligations.52 But Rex did not always show such scrupulosity and
another contemporary incident reveals for us a man who har-
boured deeply hostile feelings for Lucullus. When Lucullus’ troops
consented to march to Triarius’ aid Clodius had been obliged to
flee and he made his way to Rex. This time Rex seems to have felt
able to put his family before the requirements of the law for he
took this notorious mutineer on to his staff and even gave him
command of his fleet.53
Then, while Lucullus was still facing Mithridates in baffle-
ment, there came a message from Glabrio. On the voyage out the
consul had been quite keen on the idea of making war on Mithri-
dates but when he glimpsed the terrain and heard of what Lucullus
was actually doing he rapidly changed his mind and judged things
would go the better with himself if he remained in Bithynia. It was
from here then that he sent his missive. After repeating the well-
worn slander that Lucullus was needlessly prolonging the war he
ordered him to give the Fimbrians their discharge and to send the
rest of the army to himself.54 From the viewpoint of the constitu-
tional lawyer there can be no doubt that Lucullus was required to
obey these instructions. The Lex Cornelia referred to above required
a man to vacate a province within thirty days of his successor’s ar-
rival.55 One may well imagine though what Lucullus thought of
such orders and the sort of person who had issued them. He re-
solved to disobey and gamble.
52 Sherwin-White (1984) p. 187 and Keaveney (2005a) p. 142.

53 Mulroy (1985) pp. 162–3 in support of his thesis (n. 46) empha-
sizes that Clodius was never brought to book but it may be added that
nobody else, in a notoriously mutinous army, seems to have been called to
account either.
54 From a military viewpoint this verged on lunacy but App. Mith. 90
and Cic. Leg. Man. 26 would seem to indicate this was exactly what Glab-
rio envisaged.
55 Van Ooteghem (1959) p. 158 n. 2; Gelzer cols 404–5. Despite
Scardigli (1989) p. 468 n. 466 we can see from Sall. Jug. 86.5 that he was
not obliged to hand over command in person. His imperium would not
expire until he reached Rome and, as events show, people seem to have
overlooked his illegal behaviour and tacitly accepted his right to exercise
it, cf. Broughton (1946) p. 41 and further below.
His troops knew what was afoot and Lucullus seems to have
reasoned he would have a better chance of keeping them under
control if they were actually marching against an enemy than when
they were sitting around at a siege. So he led them forth against
Tigranes. The ploy, however, did not work. They were not long on
the road when the Fimbrians began to make trouble. The barrack-
room lawyers had been at work among them and they presented
Lucullus with what was, in fact, an unassailable case. They pointed
out that they had enlisted with him purely for the duration of his
command. Now that command had been terminated and so, in
consequence, was their period of service. To prove it they had a
law duly passed by the people authorizing their release.56 Totally
bereft of authority, Lucullus had no other option but to plead. Go-
ing from tent to tent, he begged the soldiers to reconsider, but to
no avail. The best that could be achieved was that the other troops
prevailed upon the Fimbrians to remain with the colours on condi-
tion that, if they were not attacked in the mean time, they might
take their departure at the end of summer. Lucullus had no choice
but to submit to these terms. Not daring to commit such an army
to battle, he took up position somewhere on the borders of Cap-
padocia and Armenia. There he had to sit and watch as Tigranes
ravaged Cappadocia while Mithridates, ever buoyant, re-established
his authority over a large area of Pontus.
56 On the position of the Fimbrians, which is misunderstood by
Brunt (1988), p. 268 see also ch. 5 n. 1. Presumably they enlisted in 86

(MRR 2.53) and they are now being discharged by the Lex Gabinia. These
circumstances led Parker (1958) pp. 24–5 to suggest that twenty years was
the maximum term the republican legionary had to serve. However, our
sources (n. 49) contradict this. Taken together, they present a clear, logical
and consistent picture. When Lucullus is dismissed his command, the
Valerians, by the law receive their discharge and they make it plain why
this is so. Lucullus has ceased to be a lawful commander and the time they
have promised to remain with him is up. In other words, the Valerians
had enlisted solely for the duration of Lucullus’ Mithridatic command and
that is now over. The stipendium that Cic. Leg. Man. 26 refers to is, there-
fore, this period. On these matters Smith (1958) pp. 29–43 is to be pre-
ferred to his (1960) p. 13 n. 72, although his belief—(1958) p. 37 n. 1—
that the Fimbrians had property in Italy must be treated with reserve.
Mulroy (1985) p. 164 correctly grasps the position of the Fimbrians but
draws from it conclusions I hold to be untenable.
At this moment Lucullus’ embarrassment was compounded

or, perhaps it is more accurate to say, his agony was increased by
the arrival of the senatorial commission for the settling of the prov-
ince of Pontus which he had summoned in the moment of seeming
victory. As was usual, it was composed of ten members, but the
names of only two are known to us. One was Lucullus’ brother
Marcus. The other was that Murena who was father to Lucullus’
legate and friend and who, in his own time, had provoked the Sec-
ond Mithridatic War.57 These men, instead of the pacified kingdom
ready to be turned into a province which they expected, found in-
stead a general prisoner of his own troops and a king, supposedly
squashed some years before, showing every sign of vigour. Never-
theless, they did what they could and issued a number of ordi-
nances. That we do not know what they were is of no real impor-
tance. Rather, it is the political consequences of their repeal that
will engage our attention shortly.
At the end of summer, the Fimbrians marched away. Years of
ill-feeling, resentment and aggrievement had at last found their out-
let and expression in the events of 67.58
Lucullus had always driven his troops hard. Even in winter
they found little respite from their labours for instead of billets they
found themselves under canvas. Lucullus indulged this dangerous
practice59 in order to spare the Greeks but in winning the love of
the provincials he earned the hatred of his own men, for whom this
matter became an especial source of grievance.60 However, had the
men been recompensed for the demands made upon them by be-
ing allowed to exercise from the outset their right to loot, then all
57 See ch. 5. Scardigli (1989) p. 469 n. 470 suggests they may have
been in the province of Asia since the winter of 68. Cicero (Ad Att.
13.6.4) does not specify which Murena he means but to equate him with
Lucullus’ legate creates, in my opinion, more problems than it solves, cf.
MRR 2.131 n. 6. As necessarii do not always have to mean relations and as
there is no other evidence we may doubt the view of, e.g. Shackleton Bai-
ley (1965) ad loc., that Murena and Lucullus were actually related. It is
easy to envisage that in the good old days amici would be barred as well as
relatives from such service.
58 So, e.g. Villoresi (1939) p. 168 after Ferrero.
59 Keaveney (2005a) pp. 74–75.
60 Plut. Luc. 33.
might yet have been well. As it was, they got nothing substantial
until Cabira fell, two years into the war. After this, contrary to leg-
end, other opportunities were given them but by then it was too
late. The picture of Lucullus as a stingy man was for ever fixed in
his troops’ minds. When they thought of their commander they
thought of the man who tried to deprive them of their rights at the
fall of Amisus. Lucullus’ willingness to lead from the front may
have proved an inspiration in battle but off the field he seems to
have awoken little warmth in his men. There are some command-
ers, Sulla and Caesar for instance, who have the capacity to estab-
lish a camaraderie with their men, so that they may ask much of
them and it will not be refused while, at the same time, seeing to it
that this community of spirit does nothing to undermine order and
discipline. Lucullus was not such a commander. One of our
sources speaks of him as a remote and haughty figure who made
no effort to empathize with his men but thought that his role was
to command while the soldiers’ was to obey.61
Yet, for so long as Lucullus was a properly constituted com-
mander with authorization from Rome, he had little to fear from
the troops and could largely ignore their feelings. For all their re-
sentment their sense of discipline remained strong and they
obeyed. It was only in the present situation that that uncertain
temper became a danger. Now, stripped of authority, Lucullus pro-
posed to them a course of dubious legality. Men who loved him
might have voluntarily followed him. As it was, these troops hated
him and we have just witnessed the response they gave in conse-
quence.
With the departure of the Fimbrians Lucullus appears to have
judged it prudent to pull back to Galatia. If he had been able to
avoid obeying Glabrio he must have realized, early in 66, that he
could not hope to do the same with the latter’s successor. Pompey,
as we know, had just been appointed to the command and he was
certainly not going to skulk in Bithynia. He immediately fired off a
series of orders by letter. All troops who had not been discharged
were to come and serve under him. Significantly, these were joined
by volunteers in the shape of the Fimbrians. Their love of Italy was
not, it would seem, as great as their interested champions at Rome
61 Plut. Luc. 33, 36. Cf. Scardigli (1989) pp. 272–3.

had liked to claim, for they cheerfully re-enlisted for another tour
of duty. Pompey also forbade Lucullus to distribute rewards and
punishments to those who had served under him and he revoked
all the measures that the commissioners had passed for the prov-
ince of Pontus.
These last two moves caused considerable resentment to Lu-
cullus and his followers. Mutual friends, therefore, arranged for a
meeting between the two at a village called Danala. This was
somewhere in Galatia but its exact location is not known. As befit-
ted such a momentous occasion it was attended by a suitable omen.
Both commanders came to the encounter with fasces which had
been wreathed with laurel. Pompey, however, had passed through a
dry region and so his laurels were withered. Some of Lucullus’ lic-
tors thoughtfully gave him their own which were fresh and green.
Those who noticed such things immediately saw here a sign: the
victories of Lucullus were to be added to those of Pompey.
To begin with, everything went reasonably well. The first en-
counter seems to have been largely ceremonial and both men, with
what in the Anglo-Saxon world would be commended as admirable
courtesy and castigated in freer-spoken regions as rank hypocrisy,
paid due tribute to the other’s achievements. Subsequent meetings
proved to be less sunny when business was discussed. Pompey,
brushing aside unconvincing assertions that the war was over, re-
fused to budge on the major issues: Lucullus was not to hand out
any rewards or punishments or make any arrangements about the
provinces. This led to what diplomats call a frank exchange of
views as the strain of maintaining politeness proved too much.
Pompey repeated the current jibes about Lucullus’ fondness for
money while his colleague retaliated with pointed observations
about Pompey’s love of power. At one session the pair almost
came to blows and had to be pulled apart by their attendants.
Lucullus then drew off a little way and from his new camp be-
gan yet again to distribute rewards and to issue provincial edicts.
Pompey, from his camp, simply countermanded them. All the
while the exchange of taunts and insults went on. Pompey claimed
that it was only now Mithridates had become really dangerous. Lu-
cullus had simply been fighting with a player king. Lucullus replied
by likening Pompey to a nasty sort of carrion fowl who hung
around battlefields to pick up what others had left. It need hardly
be said that these were two very stubborn men but the contest be-
tween them was unequal. Pompey had power and Lucullus had
none. In the end, there was nothing for it but to yield. When he
took away the rest of his troops, Pompey left Lucullus with 1,600
so that he might triumph. In the rancorous atmosphere of the time
it was easy for cynics to claim that the new commander had con-
ferred this boon on the old because he wished to be rid of a body
of troops who had the reputation of being troublemakers but the
lie is given to this assertion by their impeccable behaviour in the
years that followed.
With this small force Lucullus at last left Galatia and began
the long journey back to Rome. In our next chapter we shall see
that, although the completion of the war was now in the hands of
another, Lucullus fully expected he and his men would walk in tri-
umph through the streets of the capita1.62
Almost eight years had passed since Lucullus had last seen the
city. Much had happened in that time and much had changed.
Greatest of these changes, of course, had been the alterations to
Sulla’s constitution wrought in 70. Then, as we know, the restora-
tion of full tribunician power, against which he had fought with
temporary success, had been effected. With it, too, went a change
in the composition of the courts which some alleged had been cor-
rupt. No longer would senators judge alone but must needs share
the benches with equites and tribuni aerarii. The effects of this meas-
ure cannot be called pernicious, for the conflict between the orders
of senators and equites that had characterized the previous genera-
tion did not now recur.63 It was far otherwise with the tribunate.
Lucullus himself had already had a taste of what this reform could
mean and, to anticipate our tale, he was soon to have more.
In sum, Lucullus was returning to a world that now fell
somewhat short of what he would have regarded as the ideal. Even
at this moment the consequences of making changes in Sulla’s con-
62 Plut. Luc. 35, 36 with Scardigli (1989) pp. 470 n. 472, 472 nn. 477–
8, 474 n. 485, Pomp. 31, 32, 38; Strabo 12.3.33, 5.2; Vell. Pat. 2.33.2–4; Dio
36.46.
I suspect Epstein (1987) pp. 83–4 may underestimate the capacity of
the Romans for hypocrisy and I believe Wylie (1990) pp. 447–8 misunder-
stands the whole position.
63 On the courts see Gruen (1974) pp. 28–35.
stitution were making themselves felt and in a little while, too, the
problems attendant on giving Pompey a great command were to
become manifest. Lucullus’ career as a soldier was now at an end
and, from this point onward, we shall be concerned exclusively
with his efforts to adjust to a changed state of affairs in the political
sphere.
7 THE LIFE OF A SPONGE ?
Despite the rather inconclusive end to his campaign, Lucullus, on

his return to Rome in 66, must have had every hope that his expec-
tation of a triumph would be fulfilled. He had, of course, been
slandered but enough was known for everybody to see that his
achievement was considerable and worthy of this public acknowl-
edgement. Certainly, there is no reason to suppose that those in the
senate who had deplored his extended command would grudge
him such an honour. The opposition came, rather, from a familiar
quarter: a tribune anxious to use to the full the powers recently
restored to his office.
We are speaking of a certain C. Memmius. He came from a
praetorian family and his character has been described as ‘mercu-
rial’, while ‘erratic’ is the verdict passed on his career as a whole. It
is almost obligatory to add that he was patron of the poet Lu-
cretius, author of that dreary masterpiece De Rerum Natura.1 Now,
in the less exalted sphere of Roman politics, he turned on the Lu-
culli. Marcus was his first target. His career had not been as spec-
tacular as his brother’s but, at the same time, he could have had no
cause to blush when people made reference to it. In the year after
his brother (73) he, too, held the consulship. Then followed two
years’ successful campaigning in Macedonia and Thrace for which
he won a triumph after being recalled to help put down the slave
revolt of Spartacus. Subsequently he was, as we saw, a member of
the commission appointed to settle Pontus. We may add that he,
like his brother, was also admitted to a priestly college. At some
1 For Memmius see RE ‘Memmius’ no. 8. Judgements are from
Gruen (1974) p. 168 and Shackleton Bailey (1965) p. 331. Van Ooteghem
(1959) p. 161 confuses him with his cousin who was killed in Spain in
75—see MRR 2.98 and Gruen (1969) p. 76—and wrongly states he had
been Lucullus’ quaestor.
175
time unknown Lucius became an augur while Marcus’ pontificate

can be dated to some time before 73.2
Marcus was now prosecuted by Memmius. It was alleged that
during the time he had been Sulla’s temporary quaestor in the First
Mithridatic War some twenty odd years before (ch. 2) he had
committed sacrilege and embezzled public monies.3 The antiquity
of the alleged offences is a sure indicator of the political motivation
of the prosecutor. As so often, a court was being used to pursue a
quarrel or feud. There was, too, at this time a certain vogue for
prosecuting old Sullan adherents, and Memmius no doubt saw no
reason why he should not follow it.4 Marcus, however, was acquit-
ted and the tribune then directed his attention to Lucius.
Memmius had the reputation of being a kind of sexual adven-
turer. Voracious and indiscriminate, he delighted in sailing in dan-
gerous waters. He once propositioned Pompey’s wife, for instance,
only to have her immediately complain to her husband. This, of
course, did Memmius no good at all. He was married to Fausta,
daughter of Sulla, who also had the reputation of being promiscu-
ous, but, as so often happens, Memmius would not allow his wife
the licence he had granted himself. He is on record as having
beaten up a certain L. Octavius whom he caught in flagrante.5 So
much for Memmius’ failures. Now for his successes. Among them
he numbered Marcus Lucullus’ wife and when the injured husband
discovered what was going on divorce followed. Cicero, who tells
us about this in one of his letters, then adds an enigmatic remark,
‘our modern Paris has wiped his boots on Agamemnon as well’.
2Marcus: MRR 2.625, 3.204. Lucius augur: ILS 60.

3Plut. Luc. 37. The nature of the charge is not attested but in view of
Marcus’ duties, cf. Keaveney (1984a) p. 119, Scardigli (1989) p. 476 n. 497
is surely right to suggest sacrilege. I add what I believe to have been an-
other likely one. Note that Plut. Sulla 22 does not support Scardigli’s con-
tention that Marcus served under Sulla in the Social War. Nor does Plut.
Luc. 37 refer to a pro-praetorship in Cisalpine Gaul as van Ooteghem
(1959) p. 162 thought. This propraetorship may not exist; see Keaveney
(1984a) p. 121 n. 54.
4 For these points see Gruen (1971) pp. 56–8.
5 Suet. Gramm. 14; Val. Max. 6.1.13. See Epstein (1987) p. 125 and
Gruen (1974) p. 15.

THE LIFE OF A SPONGE? 177
With a fair degree of plausibility this has been taken to mean that
Memmius also pleasured Lucius’ wife.6
It is easy to draw an equation between Memmius’ activities in
the bedroom and the forum. On the Tacitean principle that we
hate those we injure he will have proceeded to attack in public
those he had injured in private. Unfortunately, chronology will not
support this. Cicero’s letter is dated to the 20th January 60 and it is
clear that Marcus’ divorce had occurred but a little time before.
Lucius was married twice but either wife was of the sort to give ear
to Memmius’ blandishments and so we cannot tell for certain
which is referred to here. Thus, Memmius’ seductions must be
seen, not as the start of a feud but rather as the continuation of one
which, in point of fact, began with this prosecution. Until 66 we
have no reason to suppose there was any enmity at all between
Memmius and the brothers Luculli. Quite the contrary. Lucius was
guardian of Fausta and when he gave his consent to the match we
must suppose he found nothing objectionable in him.7
The motive for Memmius’ behaviour must therefore be found
where Plutarch puts it, in the political sphere.8 Memmius, he tells
us, was acting in the Pompeian interest. This is perfectly acceptable,
providing we realize that such a wayward character was not likely
to be taking direct orders from Magnus.9 Rather, knowing how
matters stood between Lucullus and Pompey (who in Rome did
not?), he resolved to strike a blow at the former which would make
him pleasing to the latter. Pompey aside, Memmius must also have
calculated that for a young man such as he to dangle from his belt
6 Cic. Ad Att. 1.18.3 with Shackleton Bailey whose explanation (after
Ernesti’s) of the enigmatic passage I accept. The sexual context, rather

than the alleged time-lapse, I feel, tells against the alternative explanation
that Cicero is speaking of Lucullus’ triumph (see below).
7 Asc. 28C; Plut. Luc. 4, Pomp. 44. Cf. Sumner (1973) pp. 186–8 and
Twyman (1972) p. 846. I do not see why Shackleton Bailey (n. 6) thinks
the quarrel might have arisen from this connection nor why Epstein
(1987) p. 60 seems to use the divorces as evidence for enmity in 66. On
Lucullus’ wives see below.
8 Plut. Cat. Min. 29. For the chronological problems this passage
poses see n. 11.

9 Contra Villoresi (1939) p. 177 and Gruen (1969) pp. 76–7, (1974) p.
266.
the scalps of one or other of the illustrious brothers would make of

him a man of note in contemporary politics.10
Whatever motives impelled Memmius he had already done
Marcus a damage. He was now to do Lucius a far greater.
In order for a man to triumph it was necessary for the people
to grant him the right to hold imperium within the walls during the
day of the triumph. When the senate made application in the case
of Lucullus Memmius, as tribune, opposed the measure and in jus-
tification wheeled out once more some of the heavy-duty slanders
that had been deployed against Lucullus. The proconsul, he said,
was guilty of embezzling public funds (peculatus) and of waging an
unjust war against Armenia. The people responded by refusing to
pass the necessary law. So Lucullus could do nothing save kick his
heels in idleness beyond the city gates and wait upon the turn of
events. He was not without companions in his predicament. Q.
Caecilius Metellus Creticus was there too. In the previous year he
had clashed with Pompey in Crete during the latter’s pirate cam-
paigns and, although our sources do not say it, this is obviously the
cause of his predicament. Somebody, either acting on direct orders,
or trying to ingratiate himself, like Memmius, with Magnus saw to
it that he also had to wait. Certainly, when he and Lucullus did
eventually triumph one source, bracketing the two, speaks of this as
a blow to Pompey. What Q. Marcius Rex was doing in this com-
pany is not altogether clear since we have no information as to
whom he might have offended. One source does hint that he, too,
was the victim of political machinations but his mediocre achieve-
ments may have been sufficient to debar him and, in fact, he died
without attaining his triumph.
Within the city Lucullus’ political allies were busy and they
were able to ensure that most of those who reached the consulship
in the period 66–63 were no friends of Pompey. An attack was also
mounted on the radical tribunate which had proved so trouble-
some to them and those who thought as they did. The targetting of
C. Manilius hardly needs an explanatory gloss and of his fellow
intended victim, C. Cornelius, we need only say that his tribunician
activities in 67 had proved to be a considerable embarassment. In
the event, Cornelius got off while Manilius was condemned. But
10 Plut. Luc. 1. See Gruen (1968) pp. 7–8.

some thought that more than a simple act of revenge was involved
in these trials and that an attempt was actually being made to dis-
credit the tribunate and, perhaps, emasculate it once more. Cer-
tainly, the list of prosecution witnesses at the trial of Cornelius
reads like a check-list or gazetteer of those who had, since the dic-
tator’s death, taken upon themselves to defend the Sullan order:
Hortensius, Catulus, Metellus Pius, M. Lucullus and Mamercus
Lepidus. The rhetorician, Valerius Maximus, can easily be forgiven
for believing mistakenly that Lucullus himself was among them.11
But these men were, by now, middle-aged or older. New fig-
ures had begun to come forward in public life and, as may be
guessed, not all of them were friendly to the aims of the Sullans.
11 This note attempts to justify a reconstruction of events which,
given the state of our sources, can only be tentative and differs in some
respects from Gruen (1971) p. 58.
Save on one point, Plut. Luc. 37 is clear, logical, consistent and credi-
ble. The senate had plainly sought a plebiscitum (Greenidge 1911 p. 158).
Memmius persuaded the people not to grant it and we can reasonably
infer from the text that he claimed Lucullus committed peculatus and vio-
lated the laws for a bellum iustum (Greenidge p. 56) but there is nothing
there to suggest a formal charge, a point on which the fragments of his
speech (ORF3 p. 402) are uninformative. Where Plutarch errs is in saying
Lucullus’ triumph came in 66 when we know from Cic. Acad. 2.3 that 63
is the correct date. This latter detail thus invalidates Plut. Cat. Min. 29
which shows Cato (trib. pleb. 62) bringing about the triumph and must
cast doubt on the other statement there to the effect that Memmius laid
formal charges. Note carefully that Memmius did not act alone (Cic. Acad.
2.3—compare Sall. Cat. 30.3) and thus his friends would have continued
the resistance when he left office. Cato, at some time, could have worked
on Lucullus’ behalf (see my text) but the timing of Plut. Cat. Min. 29 sug-
gests to some that this is really an effort on behalf of Metellus Creticus—
see MRR 2.165 n. 5, 3.170–1 but compare Fehrle (1983) pp. 73–6, 84 n. 3.
On the political background see Gruen (1974) pp. 131–2; Seager
(1969), (1979) pp. 56–71. Note that while Vell. Pat. 2.34.2 brackets the
triumphs of Lucullus and Metellus as a blow to Pompey, Sall. Cat. 30.3
brackets Metellus and Rex as victims of the intrigues of a few men who
sold everything. This last, of course, offers no clue as to why Rex was
refused a triumph. Different men from different motives may apply the
same effective methods to different victims. We simply do not know who
was bought, and equality of misery cannot tell us why it was imposed in
the first place. See further Seager (1979) pp. 38–40.
There was, however, one whose ideals would, in certain circum-

stances, make of him a natural ally, even if his prickly personality
meant he would be a difficult one. I speak of M. Porcius Cato,
great-grandson of the famous censor and posthumously styled
‘Uticensis’. Like the Luculli he believed that the natural rulers of
Rome were her nobility, who must be informed by traditional Ro-
man virtues. Thus fortified, it was their duty to exercise their power
in uprightness and collectively. There was no place in Cato’s
scheme for the dominant individual such as Pompey. Ironically, in
view of his detestation of Sulla, he seems to have shared the great
dictator’s reverence for pre-Gracchan Rome. So deep was his devo-
tion to the republic that when he held it lost with Caesar’s victory
in the Civil War he chose not to outlive it but stabbed himself to
death at Utica. Cato, too, was a student of philosophy, but not for
him the moderate and very Roman attitude of Lucullus and his
friends. His enthusiasm for the Stoic creed bordered on the fanati-
cal and his consistent importation of its doctrines into his political
life did not always work to his own advantage nor did it make him
the easiest of people to collaborate with.
By 64 Cato had but reached the quaestorship where he had
acquired renown for his probity and efficiency. But his influence by
then was out of all proportion to the lowly position he occupied in
the Roman hierarchy. There is no more startling proof of this than
the Catilinarian debate of the next year when his speech had the
effect in turning the senate from the path of clemency to that of
severity in dealing with the plotters.
Plainly, this was a man to have on one’s side and another of
Lucullus’ contemporary misfortunes provided the opportunity to
achieve this.12
Like many before and after him who returned tardily from a
long campaign, Lucullus discovered that his wife, Clodia, had
sought solace in another’s arms. In his case, however, there was a
novel feature. When his female slaves were interrogated under tor-
ture they revealed that Clodia’s lover was none other than her own
brother P. Clodius. The affair must be dated at latest to the period
Taylor (1949) pp. 22, 23, 125–6, 167–9; Fehrle (1983) pp. 83–5;
12
Seager (1979) pp. 70–1; Gruen (1974) p. 54; MRR 3.170–1 (date of
quaestorship).
immediately following Lucullus’ departure for the east and Clodius’

somewhat hurried exit from the city in 73 but it may be a renewal
of a liaison that predated Lucullus’ marriage. At any rate by the
time he quitted the city Clodius’ reputation as a debauchee was well
established and there were people about ready to declare he had
commenced his incestuous practices young. Some, more unscrupu-
lous or perhaps more imaginative than their fellows, actually
claimed he had made love to all three of his sisters. The horns of
the cuckold are not comfortable headgear and one can imagine
what the wags and wits of Rome, both high and low, made of Lu-
cullus’ particular specimen. So Clodia received a bill of divorce.13
This naturally meant that Lucullus was free to seek another
match and, as we know, he was anxious it should be with the house
of Cato. The latter could be choosy about whom his female rela-
tives married but, in the present instance, he raised no objection
and a bride was found for Lucullus in the person of Servilia. She
was Cato’s niece, being the daughter of his beloved half-brother Q.
Servilius Caepio who had died young in 67.14
Clodia and Lucullus had but one child, a daughter Licinia. We
know of her only from the inscription on the base of a statue that
the Athenians erected in her honour in 49. That she and not her
husband, who seems to have been one of the Metelli, was so hon-
13 Main sources: Plut. Luc. 34, 38, Cic. 29; Cic. Pro Mil. 73. Clodius’
incest with varying numbers of sisters receives abundant testimony: Cic.

Har. Resp. 38, 42, 59, Pis. 29, Dom. 92, Ad Fam. 1.9.15; Plut. Cic. 29, Caes.
10. For popular wit see, e.g., Plut. Sulla 6; Suet. Div. Jul. 49–51. Wiseman
(1969) p. 55 n. 4 believes Clodius also buggered his brothers but this en-
trancing notion finds no support in the sources. Wiseman also seems to
suggest the scandal was not revealed until Clodius’ trial in 61 (see below)
but a moment’s reflection will show this to be unlikely. When a prominent
man divorced his wife Rome must have pullulated with rumours and
Wiseman himself concedes that Clodius had a bad name from his youth
up. In this context Cic. Pro Cael. 36 should be read in conjunction with
Plut. Cat. Min. 19. The latter passage gives us a terminus post quem for the
affair and leads one to wonder if Cato did not cast back at Clodius the
charge of incestum he had levelled at the Vestal. Cf. ch. 4 and app. 2.
14 Plut. Luc. 38, Cat. Min. 24, 29, 54 with Wiseman (1974) p. 113,
184–5; RE ‘Servilia’ no. 29; Hallett (1984) pp. 51, 170–1. Cf. Plut. Cat.
Min. 30.
oured looks like a tribute to her late father. The Greek world had
not forgotten one of its greatest Roman benefactors.15
Likewise, there was but one issue of Lucullus’ second mar-
riage: a son called L. Lucullus. Unlike his father, he made little im-
pression on the world and, indeed, is often confused with a cousin
of his, the son of M. Lucullus. We shall be speaking of him in an-
other place in the context of his father’s artistic interests but here
the rest of his story, such as it is, can be briefly told. He was born
sometime between 64 and 60. Certainly in 49 he was still under the
control of Cato who had become his guardian on his father’s death
and that year he and Servilia followed Cato when the latter went to
Asia to collect reinforcements for the republican forces. Five years
later, however, he seems to have reached his majority. At least, that
is the impression we seem to gain from an aside of Cicero’s which
appears to show him in full control of the property left him by his
father. After this he vanishes and leaves no certain trace behind.
The suspicion must be that he perished in the turbulent years that
followed, although silence might mean that, inheriting to the full
that streak of quietism which we detected in his father, he lived in
an obscurity that ensured survival.16
15IG 1113 no. 4233 with Wiseman (1974) pp. 113–14, 180 and Hallett
(1984) p. 100 n. 43. Assuming the inscription is correctly dated and that
Licinia was not a child-bride, then the conclusion that Clodia was her
mother is inescapable. Since nobody has suggested Clodius might have
been her real father I shall not do so either. The length of time Clodia and
Lucullus lived together—circa mid-76 to circa mid-74 (cf. ch.3)—tells
against (but not decisively) Wiseman’s theory that Clodia also had a son.
See further n. 16.
16 Sources and discussion in Hinard (1985) pp. 528–31, repeated vir-
tually verbatim in (1990), who separates Lucullus jun. from his cousin.
Taking my cue from this I base my reconstruction on the following as-
sumptions:
(a) Lucullus and Servilia married towards the end of 66 and their
divorce was probably about 58. Cf. n. 18 and ch. 8.
(b) Not to have reached his majority in 49 meant that Lucullus
jun. was 15 at the very oldest then.
(c) To have reached majority in 44 must mean that he was 16 at
the youngest.
(d) For evidence Lucullus jun. might have survived the Civil War
see Wiseman (1974) p. 113 and ch. 8.
Lucullus’ second marriage, however, proved to be no happier

than his first. In fact, it was said Servilia was an improvement on
Clodia in only one respect: she did not sleep with her brothers. For
a time Lucullus endured her amours.17 Political considerations dic-
tated this self-control since he did not wish to offend Cato. But,
when he finally decided to withdraw from public life he saw no
need for further tolerance and Servilia, too, received a bill of di-
vorce.18
Despite all their activities Lucullus’ friends were unable to do
anything for him until 63. Then, shortly before election time, they
went among the people to exercise their influence and have the ban
on Lucullus lifted. One circumstance that seems to have aided
them was the presence in the assembly of a number of Lucullus’
troops come to support his lieutenant Murena who was now a con-
sular candidate. The friends of Lucullus were helped too by the
consul Cicero. This might seem a little surprising since he had
played a part in Lucullus’ downfall with his speech in favour of the
Manilian law. However, in that speech he had spoken respectfully
of Lucullus and the latter seems not to have borne him any grudge,
for they remained on good terms to the end of Lucullus’ life. In
fact, it seems to have been generally recognized that as a novus homo
seeking the consulship Cicero, more than most, had to conciliate
and win all sections of opinion. The man who pleased the friends
of Pompey with his Manilian speech won the people by acting as
defence counsel for the tribune Cornelius and yet was the same
person who, in 65, helped Catulus block an attempt by Crassus to
have Egypt annexed. Cicero’s consulship is the measure of his suc-
cess and his aid to Lucullus now is an expression of his gratitude to
the optimate section of his supporters. He was also aware that, in
17 Since Lucullus’ arch-foe Memmius was probably one of them (n. 6)

the degree of self-restraint must have been considerable.
18 Sources: n. 14. Scardigli (1989) p. 480 n. 514 believes Cic. Ad Att.
1.18.3 refers to the divorce but this is by no means certain (n. 6) and in
view of Plut. Luc. 38 may, anyway, be too early. I cannot follow Dixon
(1983) pp. 102–3 who places an exclusively political emphasis on the mar-
riage and the divorce. For instance, the equation drawn between the mar-
riage and the obtaining of the triumph is insecure (n. 11) and in view of
the opening of Luc. 38 I would hesitate to call Gelzer’s expression of
sympathy for Lucullus (cols. 410–11) ‘anachronistic’ and ‘misplaced’.
putting an end to a major scandal, he was enhancing his own repu-

tation. In aftertimes he was to boast that it was he, as consul, who
ended three years of machinations against Lucullus and almost led
his triumphal car into the city.19
At last, Lucullus was being allowed to triumph over Mithri-
dates and Tigranes.20
The triumphal procession started on the Campus Martius and
passed through the Circus Flaminius which Lucullus had, for the
day, bedecked with the arms of the enemy and with their engines
of war. It then crossed the Velabrum and the Forum Boarium.
From the Circus Maximus it made its way along the Via Sacra and
thus to its destination on the Capitol. On the day of his departure
Lucullus had mounted the Capitol to make vows for his imperium
and the republic. Now he was returning there once more to offer
his thanks to the gods.
Leading the procession were mail-clad horsemen and scythe-
bearing chariots, together with sixty of Mithridates’ generals and
councillors. They were followed by a hundred and ten of the
bronze-beaked ships which, like the chariots, were among Mithri-
dates’ favourite instruments of war. The king himself, being un-
avoidably absent and destined actually never to adorn a triumph for
the amusement of the holiday crowd, was represented by a gold
statue 6 feet high. Then came men bearing litters of gold and silver
beakers and money. Next were eight mules bearing gold couches; a
further fifty-six of these animals carried ingots of silver and finally a
further one hundred and seven bore something in the region of
2,700,000 silver coins. Placards proclaimed the amount Lucullus
had given Pompey for the pirate war, what he had deposited in the
treasury and the fact that each of his soldiers had received a dona-
tive of 950 sesterces.
To crown the day’s celebration Lucullus gave the senate a
banquet on the Capitol, as was customary. Nor were the people
forgotten. In common with a number of other generals of the late
republic—most notably Sulla—Lucullus was devoted to Hercules
and regarded him as the god of victory. So now he dedicated a
19MRR 2.169; Rawson (1983) pp. 44–59, 69; Seager (1979) pp. 56–
62; Taylor (1949) p. 118.
20 ILS 560.
tenth of his property to the god in thanksgiving and gave the plebs
the obligatory polluctum or public banquet. This was noteworthy for
the fact that 100,000 jars of Greek wine were distributed. On one
modern calculation this amounts to the (literally) staggering total of
4,000,000 litres.21
As a further expression of his devotion to Hercules Lucullus
erected a statue of the god in public. It depicted the hero in the
shirt of Nessus. The only statue on public view in the city which
portrayed this scene, it was held to capture particularly well the ex-
pression of agony on the subject’s face. In the time of the elder
Pliny it could still be seen and three inscriptions on its base bore
testimony to its somewhat chequered career. The first recorded
that it had come from the spoils of Lucullus. From the second we
learn that Lucullus’ son, while still a minor, dedicated it in accor-
dance with a decree of the senate. In the third we hear of a certain
Sabinus who, as curule aedile, rescued it from private hands into
which it had fallen and set it up in public once more.22
So far as we can tell, this statue was the only adornment Lu-
cullus added to the beauties of Rome.23 Nor was his hand much
more lavish in Italy. A suggestion that he joined Murena jun. in
setting up a group of statues at the shrine of Juno Sospita in Lanu-
vium (Lanuvio) is no more than that—a suggestion—and one
against which some telling arguments have been advanced. Indeed,
in the present state of our knowledge, the only place which can
with reasonable certainty be associated with Lucullus is the com-
plex of Diana at Nemi. He equated her with the Persian Artemis
21 Triumph: Plut. Luc. 37; Cic. Pro Mur. 37, 69 with other sources in
MRR 2.169, although the word seni in Pliny NH 28.56 probably means
somebody else’s triumph other than Lucullus’ is in question. Route: Butler
and Cary (1966) p. 91. The Capitol: Liv. 45.13; Val. Max. 2.8.6 with Keav-
eney (1982b) pp. 163–4. Hercules: Keaveney (1979) p. 67. Polluctum: Plut.
Luc. 37; Diod. Sic. 4.21.4; Pliny NH 14.96 with van Ooteghem (1959) p.
164 n. 1. Modern estimates of Lucullus’ booty: Shatzman (1975) pp. 378–
9; Broughton (1938) pp. 529–30; Frank (1933) pp. 324–5.
22 Pliny NH 34.93 with Jex-Blake and Sellers (1896) p. 79.
23 Van Ooteghem (1959) p. 165 suggests the temple of Hercules in
Dio 43.21.1 but this is probably the temple of Felicitas built by L. Lucul-
lus (cos. 151), cf. Platner/Ashby p. 207.
who had smiled on him the day he crossed the Euphrates and in
thanksgiving he made an addition to her shrine.24
In this self-effacement and refusal to seek immortality in
bricks and mortar Lucullus can fairly be said to run contrary to the
pompous age in which he lived and to resemble his old friend
Sulla.25 Yet, as we shall see, in the private sphere he was not to imi-
tate his friend’s modesty but to build on a scale of magnificence
virtually unsurpassed at that time.
The consular elections, which had been postponed, followed
hard upon the triumph. As we saw, Murena, who was a candidate,
enjoyed the support of Lucullus’ troops fresh from the triumph
and he also had the backing of their commander who came to
commend him to the voters. In the event Murena was duly elected.
The other successful candidate was a certain D. Junius Silanus who
was Cato’s brother-in-law and must have owed something to his
canvass.26
But now Cato furnished the clearest proof of why his political
allies must have found working with him trying, to say the least.
During the election campaign rumours of bribery had circulated
widely and Cato let it be known that he would prosecute the suc-
cessful candidates. Seemingly, the grounds for this were simply that
victory in itself was a proof of guilt. It has been well said of Cato
that his zeal for chastising the sinner meant he paid no heed to
party or personal considerations and disregarded totally the ques-
tion of timing.27 In actual fact, in the present instance familial con-
siderations seem to have induced him to let Silanus be. But, in spite
of his connection with Lucullus, he launched a prosecution against
Murena. He was joined by Servius Sulpicius, one of the disap-
pointed candidates whose motives, it should be said, were slightly
less abstract. He hoped to get Murena’s place by securing his con-
viction. For the defence Hortensius, Cicero and Crassus spoke.
Hortensius’ connection with Lucullus is sufficient to explain his
24 Coarelli (1987) pp. 155–7, 178–80 with the important qualificatory
remarks of Wiseman, Gnomon (1989) pp. 278–9.

25 Keaveney (2005a) pp. 156–57.
26 Cic. Pro Mur. 37–9, 53, 69, Ad Att. 13.6.4. See Gruen (1974) pp.
129–30 and Rawson (1983) pp. 69–71.

27 Taylor (1949) p. 126.
presence. Cicero, too, may have wanted to do him another favour

but, one suspects, he was also thinking of something else. One of
the disappointed candidates had been Catiline and people believed
that even before the elections he had been hatching some sort of
plot. His failure now was his second rebuff and it was held to have
convinced him that he had no future in conventional politics. At
any rate, by this time he was in open rebellion in Etruria.28 Since
no-one could predict how long the war might be Cicero plainly felt
it desirable to have as a successor a military man like Murena. For
once the efforts of legitimate authority should not be bedevilled by
an incompetent commander. Crassus was anxious to redeem him-
self, for he had actually backed Catiline’s candidature. Moreover,
like Cicero, he, too, looked to Murena’s military talents and the
swift squashing of Catiline. Like Lucullus, he had hated Pompey
since the days of Sulla but he also feared him. Should Catiline be
still in the field when Pompey returned to Italy—and his return was
imminent—then Crassus trembled to think that the two might
make some kind of alliance against himself.
Lucullus himself did not speak but he did attend the court, for
even the presence of a prominent man could carry weight with a
Roman jury. There he had to listen as Cato described the Mithri-
datic War as a war fought with little women and branded Murena
as a ‘dancer’. Since neither Lucullus nor Murena seem to have
borne Cato any ill-will afterwards we can only presume they ac-
cepted this was just Cato being Cato. Those who would associate
with him had to learn to tolerate his eccentricities. In any case, the
invective was ineffective this time and Murena was acquitted.29
Soon afterwards some of Catiline’s associates, who had re-
mained in the city after their chief’s departure, revealed themselves.
They were caught engaging in treasonable negotiations with ambas-
sadors from a Gallic tribe, the Allobroges. On the 5th of Decem-
28 A convenient and concise narrative of the Catilinarian conspiracy
will be found in Holmes (1923) pp. 253–83 but note that more recent
scholarship, e.g. Seager (1979) p. 66, questions some of the features of the
traditional account.
29 Plut. Cat. Min. 21, Cic. 14; Cic. Pro Mur. (especially 13, 20, 31, 51)
with Gruen (1974) pp. 129–30, 273; Rawson (1983) pp. 77–8; Ward
(1977b) pp. 187–91 who points out the trial is to be dated after 8th No-
vember but before 3rd December.
ber the senate met to decide their fate. As stated earlier, it was a
speech of Cato’s that was decisive in persuading the house to apply
the death penalty. But, even before that, fourteen consulars had
given their support for severe action and, in view of their outlook,
it comes as no surprise to learn that among them were the brothers
Luculli. Early in the next year the rebellion was ended with the de-
feat and death of Catiline himself.30
Lucullus’ appearance at court on behalf of Murena was not, by
any means, the last such. Now (62) he came once more to lend
support to a friend in peril. His old protegé, Archias, was being
prosecuted by a certain Gratius on the grounds that he had been
falsely passing himself off as a Roman citizen. Cicero, who had
long been a friend and admirer of Archias, spoke for the defence.
We do not know the result but the eloquence of the defence coun-
sel and the strength of his case make it virtually certain it was ac-
quittal. What is less certain is whether any political significance
should be attached to the matter. Two circumstances suggest that it
might. The obscurity of the prosecutor (nothing more is known of
Gratius) and the feebleness of his case strongly points not to the
hope of success but the desire to be vexatious. Lucullus was being
got at through an attack on one of his friends. Gratius or perhaps
somebody standing behind him hoped to make himself pleasing to
Pompey.31
But the Archias affair does not exhaust the list of Lucullus’
court appearances in these years and he was soon to give evidence
for the prosecution in the trial of a far more colourful character
than Archias.
In December 62 the celebration of the rites of the Bona Dea,
traditionally the sole preserve of women, was violated and brought
to a sudden end when a man, clad in women’s clothes, was discov-
ered on the premises where it was being held. Unveiling revealed
the quaestor-elect and former brother-in-law of Lucullus, P. Clo-
dius. He had so arrayed himself in order to make an assignation
with Pompeia, mistress of the house and wife of one of the coming
30 Cic. Ad Att. 12.21.1 with Shackleton Bailey (1965) ad loc., Phil.
2.12, Acad. 2.3, 62. See Rawson (1983) pp. 79–85.

31 Cic. Pro Arch. with Reid (1899) pp. 10, 11–14. See van Ooteghem
(1959) pp. 171–2 for a selection of views on the significance of the affair.
men of the day, the praetor Julius Caesar. The matter was referred
to the Vestal Virgins and the Pontiffs and they ruled that sacrilege
had been committed. So a move was made in the senate to have
Clodius brought to trial.
Lucullus, of course, was an enthusiastic supporter of the
promulgation of the necessary enabling bill. The chance had come
to repay Clodius for what he had done in the past. A secondary
motive may very well have been the desire to make Caesar as un-
comfortable as possible. Lucullus could have had no love for this
man whose anti-Sullan credentials were impeccable and like Sulla
he may, discerning many Mariuses there, have begun to be uneasy
over his ambition and ability. As Caesar had made his embarrass-
ment abundantly clear by divorcing Pompeia, Lucullus may have
reasoned that keeping the affair alive would have certain advan-
tages over and above the primary one of damaging Clodius.
However, when the afore-mentioned enabling bill was intro-
duced into the senate on the statutary twenty-fourth day before
voting it ran into trouble. Clodius had some influence in the house
and he persuaded a number of powerful men to withhold their
support from it. Those who pressed on with the measure now be-
gan to look uneasily over their shoulders. Among the people, too,
Clodius was powerful and from their midst he was busy recruiting
gangs. When the day for voting arrived these gangs were promi-
nent. Nevertheless, the optimates held fast and the assembly was
adjourned. The senate then met and passed a decree asking the
consuls to urge the people to pass the bill, even though we are told
by a (perhaps hostile) witness that Clodius went down on his knees
in supplication before every senator. At this point a tribune Q.
Fufius interposed his veto and Clodius then proceeded to hold a
series of public meetings at which he heaped abuse on Lucullus and
his other opponents.
Eventually, however, Fufius was prevailed upon to withdraw
his veto and a tribunal was duly established. Lucullus, of course,
came to testify and offer distinctly hostile evidence. It was now that
he declared publicly under oath that Clodius was guilty of incest.
He also levelled at him the charge of fomenting mutiny in his army
at Nisibis. It must have seemed to many that Clodius was doomed
when Cicero blew his alibi. He had claimed to be absent from the
city on the day in question but Cicero testified he had seen him in
Rome. Yet, despite this, Clodius was acquitted and inevitably sto-
ries of vote-selling began to circulate. To protect them from Clo-

dius’ gangs the jurors had requested a guard and Catulus now sar-
castically asked if they had been afraid somebody would steal their
bribes.32
But, even as Clodius was being measured for his dress, an-
other—and arguably greater—foe of Lucullus was approaching
Rome. Pompey was coming home. The war had at last come to an
end with the suicide of Mithridates in 63 but even before then
Pompey had spent a good deal of time organizing the affairs of the
east.33 However, all tasks done, the great conqueror returned to
Italy at the end of 62. To the relief of many and, it should be said,
the disappointment of not a few he failed to fulfil the widespread
expectation that he would emulate his old chief Sulla’s behaviour of
some thirty years before. Instead, he promptly disbanded his army
and took his place among his peers. Unfortunately, the peers were
not ready with a warm welcome. They were definitely not prepared
to grant him the honourable status he craved and they were deter-
mined to show this by their response to a specific issue. Many
senators had supported the Manilian law because they recognized
that Pompey was the man best fitted to finish off Mithridates.
Now, however, the senate refused to pay the price or to accept the
natural corollary of Pompey’s campaign: his twin request that land
be found for his men and that his settlement of the east be ratified
in due form.
However much he craved to be accepted, there can be little
doubt that Pompey was not really at home in the senate. The Great
Warrior had reached his present position by the arts of war, not
peace. After his consulship he had made but rare appearances in
32 For Lucullus’ role see Cic. Ad Att. 1.13.3, 14.1–5, 16.1–5, Pro Mil.
73; Plut. Cic. 29; Dio 37.46.2 who seems to think Lucullus’ charges
formed part of the indictment. On the whole affair see Rawson (1983) pp.
93–8; Gruen (1974) pp. 248–9, 273–5 and for Caesar see Gelzer (1968)
pp. 59–60. Mulroy (1985) pp. 165–78 thinks Clodius accidentally blun-
dered into the wrong party. Clodius’ power-base among the people is well
treated in Benner. The harsh criticisms of this work by Briscoe, Gnomon
(1988) pp. 659–61, rest partly, so their author claims, on ‘a desire for brev-
ity’ which ‘led to unclear forms of expression’, cf. Gnomon (1989) p. 575.
33 Seager (1979) pp. 46–55; Keaveney (1981b) pp. 202–12; Reinach
(1895) pp. 389–410.

the senate before his departure for the east and now he could be
said to be walking in a strange land. As has been succinctly stated
by one scholar, ‘his response to the political situation at Rome re-
veals a curious mixture of overconfidence and insight’. The details
need not concern us except in so far as they have a bearing on the
sequel and that sequel may be baldly stated: it was not until 60 that
Pompey felt in a position to seek the implementation of his aims.34
Then, in rapid succession, or perhaps even simultaneously, he
moved on both of the issues in question. He himself asked that the
senate ratify his Eastern arrangements en bloc. L. Flavius, a friendly
tribune, introduced a bill that would give land to Pompey’s veter-
ans. Since the Roman plebs were notoriously touchy about land
assignments from which they were excluded and wont to react vio-
lently in consequence, Flavius took care to add a clause to his bill
to the effect that grants would also be made to other citizens who
wanted them.35
At once, Pompey’s enemies rose up in a swarm with Lucullus
at their head. His presence there needs no explanation and he was
accompanied by Cato. He, of course, did not have the strong per-
sonal motives for setting his face against Pompey his ally did but, in
the vision of the republic he shared with Lucullus, there was no
place for those who had grown to such greatness. Pompey, in fact,
had foreseen that trouble would come from this quarter and in the
previous year had tried to buy Cato off with an offer to marry one
of his nieces. The defender of the republic was not to be seduced,
however, and all Pompey succeeded in doing was adding to the
number of his enemies. Foolishly assuming that Cato would find
his offer irresistible, Pompey had prematurely divorced his wife
Mucia and her half-brother, the consul Metellus Celer, took this as
a slur on his house. He was joined in his enmity by another Metel-
lus, Creticus. This one had not forgotten the row in Crete or his
own delayed triumph. The number of named enemies of Pompey is
34 Seager (1979) pp. 72–9; Taylor (1949) pp. 130, 226 n. 45.
35 Cic. Ad Att. 1.18.6 places Flavius’ bill before 20th January 60. Plut.
Luc. 42, Cat. Min. 31 notice the request of Pompey before the bill but Dio
37.49.1–2 reverses the order. The question of precedence is probably of
little moment. See Seager (1979) p. 79 and Keaveney (2005) p. 88 on the
necessity to placate the plebs.
completed by Crassus. The enmity between them had certainly not

ended with an empty gesture of reconciliation at the end of 70 and
we have just seen Crassus’ anxieties about Pompey’s power. The
opportunity to curb him was too good to miss.
Aside from these named supporters Lucullus must have
known of the dislike felt for Pompey by a goodly portion of the
senate. In the present instance there was particular cause for anger.
When Pompey dismissed Lucullus’ commission for setting up the
province of Pontus it was expected he would apply for a fresh one
from the senate. Instead, he had gone ahead and made his ar-
rangements on his own authority. In other words, he had shown
his contempt for the principle that the senate oversaw foreign pol-
icy, and that was something not to be lightly endured.36
So, when Pompey made his request, Lucullus, confident of
widespread support, was ready with a counter-proposal. Pompey’s
arrangements should not be ratified altogether. They ought, in-
stead, to be scrutinized one by one, as nobody knew their nature.
Furthermore, he asked that his own arrangements should be re-
vived. In each instance he requested his arrangements be compared
with those of Pompey so that the fathers might judge which was
deemed most suitable. Pompey, with his inexperience of the house,
was helpless in the face of what amounted to a filibuster. His chief
agent, the consul L. Afranius who was apparently a dancer like
Murena, was of little use since he owed his elevation to Pompey
and therefore possessed no independent influence. In the end,
there was nothing Pompey could do but sit and watch as his bill
was talked out.37
His other proposal fared little better. Some writers attribute to
Lucullus a leading part in its destruction also but, in fact, he seems
to have been content to play the loyal supporter to Metellus Celer
and leave the struggle to be managed by him. The consul opposed
36 See Seager (1979) pp. 73–9; Broughton (1946) pp. 42–3. I accept
Ward’s arguments, (1977b) pp. 203–5, for Crassus’ presence but not his
dating of the incident to 61, cf. Dio 37.49.1–3. Wiseman (1974) pp. 184–5
seems to think Cato might have had personal motivation too.
37 Dio 37.49–50.1, I believe, gives a more accurate account of what
Lucullus proposed than Plut. Luc. 42, Cat. 31, Pomp. 46 which tend to ab-
breviate and simplify but not, it must be admitted, as much as Vell. Pat.
2.40.5 does. See Seager (1979) pp. 77, 79.
the measure with another filibuster and Flavius, in exasperation,

had him thrown into prison. When Metellus tried to convene a
meeting of the senate there the tribune sat in the doorway and
dared anybody to violate his sacrosanctity. Metellus, however,
proved equal to the occasion and created an alternative doorway by
knocking a hole in the wall. At this point it dawned on Pompey
that he might be looking ridiculous, so he called Flavius off. Metel-
lus, however, would not yield even when Flavius later threatened to
deprive him of his province if he did not give way. So Pompey’s
second proposal was lost.38
These things, then, Lucullus did between 66 and 60. Yet in
Plutarch we read that his life had two parts. The first, which fin-
ished with the Mithridatic War, was devoted to serious business;
the second, that period of which I have just spoken, was given over
to trifling and frivolity. Lucullus himself was falling apart. He was
like a sponge rotting at the bottom of the sea. Although it is clean
contrary to the facts as I have just outlined them, this is a verdict
that has won widespread acceptance throughout the ages.39 I now
propose to demonstrate that its fount and origin can be traced right
back to a deliberate decision made by Lucullus himself.
38 Dio 37.50.1–4; Plut. Luc. 42, Cat. 31; Cic. Ad Att. 1.18.6, 19.4,
2.1.6, 8; Vell. Pat. 2.40.5. Once more (see n. 37) Plutarch’s narrative is
abbreviated (cf. MRR 2.183) and indeed contradictory (as to who led the
attack on the bill) so I reject it in favour of Dio. That Metellus Creticus
took part in these events cannot be doubted but I suspect Velleius may
have exaggerated his role. See also Gelzer (1968) pp. 66–7.
39 Plut. Luc. 39, Mor. 792B. See further next chapter.
8 ‘… RETIRED LEISURE THAT IN TRIM
GARDENS TAKES HIS PLEASURE’
Lucullus’ public activities in the period 66–60 present to the atten-

tive reader one salient feature: with the exception of the attack on
Pompey, Lucullus follows where others lead. Even in the case of an
arch-foe such as Clodius he allows others to begin proceedings
and, if we look for instance at his court appearances, we definitely
find him playing a secondary role. In short, Lucullus now reacts to
events rather than initiates them. He acted thus, I believe, of set
purpose. In the three years spent awaiting his triumph Lucullus had
abundant time for reflection. His war with Mithridates, although
adorned with distinguished and brilliant victories, had not been
brought to a successful conclusion and another had been entrusted
with bringing it to an end. Further, his friends had not been able to
prevent the command being taken from him and, at this very mo-
ment, were giving yet further signal proof of their impotence by
their failure to rescue him from his embarrassing position. This
pointed to the obvious deduction that Lucullus would not possess
the auctoritas he would have wished. He would certainly have a posi-
tion of honour in the state but his counsel would not carry the
same weight as it would have done had he returned as the van-
quisher of Mithridates. Hence, although many people expected him
to put himself at the head of the optimate interest in the state, Lu-
cullus himself decided he was not fitted for the role. His continued
participation in public life showed he had not yet despaired of
those principles he had ever expressed but that he felt the time had
come for others, most notably Cato, to take the lead in their de-
fence. Possibly in these moments Lucullus bethought himself of his
dead friend Antiochus who believed a man should blend the active
and the contemplative in his life, for he now resolved to devote to
195
his private concerns much of the time he had once devoted to poli-
tics.1
As with ourselves, the Romans chose those leisure activities
that suited their tastes, their characters and their pockets. Thus
Cicero snootily reminded his audience that he devoted to literature
the time others gave to guzzling and gambling while Sallust, with
equal loftiness, tells us he took to writing history rather than pass-
ing his time in farming and hunting. In Lucullus’ case he decided to
build. Not, as we know, magnificent public buildings but sumptu-
ous and exciting private palaces. Monetarily there would be no dif-
ficulties. We have already marked the stages in the growth of Lu-
cullus’ fortunes. He had received from his father a patrimony that
was at least adequate and had added to it at the time of the First
Mithridatic War. Now there had fallen to him booty from his own
war. We cannot tell how much is involved but it will be obvious
from what follows that Lucullus was now a very rich man indeed.
In a pre-industrial age outlets for spare capital were limited. In Lu-
cullus’ case, he seems to have lent some of it at interest and in this
activity he seems to have been associated with Q. Caecilius. It may
be remembered from Chapter I that Lucullus numbered this uncle
of Atticus among his friends. He had, in fact, advanced Caecilius’
interests and fortunes so that it was expected Lucullus would be his
heir. Instead, Atticus was chosen and, if we can believe the story,
the enraged Roman people dragged Caecilius’ corpse through the
streets. Shortly after this (56) the plebs were to give another dem-
onstration of the love they felt for Lucullus but one wonders about
the authenticity of the report of this particular one.2
However, as I stated above, the main outlet for Lucullus’
wealth was in the buying and adorning of choice properties. Even
before he had gone out to meet Mithridates Lucullus had begun to
1 Plut. Luc. 38 (cf. 42) with Rawson (1983) p. 90; Taylor (1949) pp.
124–7; Dillon (1977). p. 75. In general, on the position of the defeated

commander see now Rosenstein (1990) who recognizes that Lucullus did
not retire at this point (cf. below). On Lucullan property see Coarelli
(1987) pp. 19, 66.
2 Cic. Ad Att. 1.1.3–4, Pro Arch. 13; Nepos Att. 5.1; Sall. Cat. 4; Val.
Max. 7.9.1 with Shackleton Bailey (1965) pp. 5–6; Shatzman (1975) pp.
63–7, 379–81 whose views of Cic. Leg. Man. 37 and Pro Flacc. 85 I accept.
Cf. ch. 1 n. 26.
‘…RETIRED LEISURE’ 197
indulge this taste of his. It will not be forgotten that in 67 when

Gabinius was trying to discredit Lucullus and paint him as a man
unfit to command he flashed around Rome a picture of the villa
the proconsul was having built in the fashionable town of Tuscu-
lum. However, we may doubt that it reached anything like its final
magnificence until Lucullus himself returned and gave it his full
attention. Some of it was perhaps built of that black marble which
Lucullus had quarried on Melos and which was named ‘Lucullan’
after him.3
Of this material, then, was created a complex of buildings of
magnificent size—a size indeed to arouse the disapproval of the
censor if his eye had been cast in that direction. The severely prac-
tical Romans held that the size of the buildings on a farm should be
directly in proportion to the acreage of that farm. In other words,
the buildings should be no bigger than what was required to house
the men and implements needed to work the land. Otherwise the
censor could take action. In this instance Lucullus had left himself
open to the well-known and customary rebuke that he had more to
sweep than to plough.4
Among the more striking features of the house was one of the
dining-rooms. This was not just a place to eat but also served as an
aviary. Thus a man might dine delicately and, while contemplating
the fowl on his plate, at the same time watch its cousins flutter be-
hind windows. This refined and exquisite pleasure was somewhat
spoilt, though, by the smell from the bird-run.5 In point of fact it is
probably Lucullus’ banquets that contribute the major share to
whatever fame he enjoys today. People who have never heard of
the man will nod sagely when reference is made to ‘Lucullan ban-
quets’.6
3 Cic. Sest. 93; Pliny NH 36.49; Isid. 16.5.17 with van Ooteghem
(1959) p. 180 n. 6; McCracken (1942) p. 325; and ch. 6.
4 Pliny NH 18.32; Col. RR 1.6. Cf. Baltrusch (1988) pp. 16–27 and
McCracken (1942) p. 325.

5 Varro RR 3.4.2–3, cf. 5.8. The treatment is a bit pedantic and heavy-
handed. Varro says there were two types of aviary, those kept for pleasure
and those kept for profit. Lucullus’ is described as being of a third type
that combined both functions.
6 See, for instance, The Brewer Dictionary of Phrase and Fable. The pas-
.
sage from Th. Gautier quoted by van Ooteghem (1959) p. 193 is probably
One of the ancients describes him as dining like a satrap.

What, I suspect, particularly prompted this remark was his habit of
decking the couches in purple. Stuff of this colour seems to have
been in abundance in the Lucullan household. At any rate, when a
praetor asked him for a hundred purple cloaks for a festival, Lucul-
lus found he had so many that he could let him have twice that
number. We know too that Lucullus’ guests drank from beakers set
with precious stones and that, as they dined, they were entertained
with choruses and recitations. Those who have left us any account
of the food served seem to have concentrated on the cena or main
course, where we are assured a great variety of meats was served
and the pastry was of surpassing elaboration. Nothing is said of the
gustatio (first course) or the secundae mensae (dessert). But, as the lat-
ter was a fruit course, we can be sure the cherry figured promi-
nently here. Before Lucullus’ time Italy had known only of the hard
variety of this fruit but to him is given the credit for bringing back
from Pontus the sweet sort.7
And that is all we really know of Lucullus’ dinners. Sadly, per-
haps, we are given no precise details of what was eaten and drunk.
Indeed, we are not even told if the guests enjoyed themselves.
What we have instead is one ambiguous anecdote, which could on
one view be interpreted as meaning Lucullus lacked all self-control,
and a number of other stories which unequivocally lay a heavy em-
phasis on his extravagance.
According to the elder Pliny, when Lucullus attended public
functions he was accompanied by a slave who had a special task.
Just as the nomenclator reminded his master of the names of those
he met so this man had the job of seeing that Lucullus did not eat
too much. For Pliny this was proof-positive that Lucullus was in-
still representative of the contemporary view of these dinners. I make a

plea for a more reasoned approach in CR 1990 (review of Baltrusch 1988).
7 Meals: Plut. Luc. 40, Comp. Luc./Cim. 1. Hor. Ep. 1.6.40–6 on cloaks
is a variant of Plut. Luc. 39, cf. Scardigli (1989) p. 486 nn. 533, 534. Cher-
ries: Pliny NH 15.102; Tert. Apol. 11.8; Servius ad Georg. 2.18; Athen.
2.50E-51A with van Ooteghem (1959) p. 194 n. 4 and RE Band 11 col.
509–15. On Roman meals see Balsdon (1969) pp. 32–53. I suspect that
something like the pastry eggs of Satyricon 33 figured on Lucullus’ menu.
To keep matters in perspective as regards the recitations see Pliny Ep.
1.15.
capable of disciplining himself. On a more relaxed view, we might

say he was acutely aware of the problems of his position and took
every precaution to minimize them. Another tale is told of a party
of Greeks who stayed as guests of Lucullus over a number of days.
They became scrupulous lest they should be eating him out of
house and home. They were soon reassured. Lucullus was, indeed,
spending some of his money on them but most of it on himself.
On another occasion Lucullus dined alone and only a modest re-
past was set before him. The steward, called to account, excused
himself on the grounds that nobody else was coming to dinner,
only to be told Lucullus was dining with Lucullus. This reminded
Plutarch of yet another tale. Cicero and Pompey, evidently only
half-believing the stories about Lucullus’ extravagance, accosted
him as he was lounging in the Forum and asked to be invited to
dinner on that day. They wished, they said, to partake of the meal
Lucullus would have had if he were eating alone. Lucullus tried to
put them off but the most they would allow him was to instruct a
slave to make ready the Apollo Room. But this was enough. Every
Lucullan dining-room—this one was in Rome—had its own
budget and a dinner in the Apollo cost 200,000 sesterces.8 Other
parts of Lucullus’ villa were, however, dedicated to more cerebral
pursuits. A portion of the house was actually a library whose quality
was widely recognized. Some of the books formed part of Lucullus’
eastern booty and, as we might have guessed, its holding in phi-
losophy was particularly strong. Lucullus welcomed visitors, and
the tradition was maintained after his death. We learn, for instance,
of a visit made by Cicero during Lucullus jnr.’s minority. He had
crossed over from his own villa nearby in order to borrow some
books. In the father’s lifetime there was an especial welcome for
Greeks, and all the rooms were thrown open to them. Lucullus
himself would often mingle and converse with the scholars. Many
of the men who called were actually in Rome on official business
8 Pliny NH 28.56; Plut. Luc. 41. Note the remarks of Scardigli (1989)
p. 489 n. 543. Observe, too, that the forum is hardly the place for a rotting
sponge, cf. ch. 7 and further below.
and they naturally approached the great philhellene for advice and
assistance in presenting their case to the Roman authorities.9
We have already met Lucullus once or twice in the role of an
art connoisseur. The most recent illustration of this trait was his
plucking of a choice piece of statuary depicting Hercules from his
spoils to adorn a public place. So we learn now of a large private
collection. Although we cannot be absolutely sure it seems like
enough that it also was housed at Tusculum and, as with the li-
brary, was open to a selected public. If there is some doubt about
the location we can, I think, nevertheless, be reasonably sure that
the statue of Autolycus and the globe of Billarus taken from Sinope
found their way into this collection. Not everything there, however,
had its origin as booty. We know that Lucullus paid two talents at
Athens for a copy of the Wreath Girl, a famous work by one Pau-
sias of Sicyon. He was also a patron of the sculptor Arcesilaus and
gave him a commission for a statue of Felicitas. The work, how-
ever, was never finished, as death overtook both of them before it
could be completed.10
The overall impression created by the Tusculan villa was one
of openness and light. We hear of viewing platforms, banqueting
halls and walks that were largely exposed to the air. This, so the
story goes, moved Pompey to remark during a visit that Lucullus
had built well for summer but not for winter. His host simply
9Plut. Luc. 42; Isid. 6.5.1; Cic. Fin. 3.1–8. See Rawson (1985) pp.
194–5.
10 Pliny NH 34.36, 35.125, 155–6, 36.41; Plut. Luc. 23, 39; Strabo
12.3.11; De Vir. Ill. 74; Cic. De Leg. 3.30–1; Varro RR 1.2.10. See Petrochi-
los (1974) pp. 77–81 and Rawson (1985) p. 195.
The date of 88/87 for the purchase of the Wreath Girl favoured by
the Loeb edition of Pliny and Jex-Blake and Sellers pp. 150-53 seems
unlikely in view of the war situation (see ch. 2). For the Athenian connec-
tion see also ch. 7. That it was Lucullus’ son and not himself who com-
missioned the statue of Felicitas is argued by Jex-Blake and Sellers pp.
179-80 on the grounds that, as Arcesilaus was still alive in 46, he would
not have ‘left an order of his patron unattended for fifteen years’. This is
self-evidently not decisive since such a thing could obviously happen.
From a passage such as NH 35.125 it seems, in fact, legitimate to infer
that Lucullus himself is also meant here.
laughed and asked if he supposed he had less wit than the migra-
tory bird which changed its home with the seasons.11
And this particular bird did have a choice of places to which
he might fly. He might, for instance, have gone to his great gardens
in Rome where stood the mansion with the celebrated Apollo
Room. These Horti Luculliani were laid out on the Pincian Hill
immediately above the place where the Aqua Virgo emerged from
the hillside. Little trace of them survives but we may suppose they
resembled in some ways the formal gardens of the eighteenth cen-
tury AD. They were much admired and in imperial times were still
lauded and coveted.12 These pleasure gardens must, of course, be
strictly differentiated from the vivaria or game preserves that Lucul-
lus also owned. Somebody called Fulvius Lippinus of Tarquinii
(Tarquinia) is said to have been the first to introduce these things
into Italy but we are assured the better-known names of Lucullus
and Hortensius were not slow to imitate him. To illustrate the kind
of use these places might be put to we have another story involving
Pompey. Once when the great man was ill his doctors recom-
mended he eat a thrush. None was to be had, not because the cac-
ciatori had got there first, but because it was the wrong season, since
the thrush in Italy is a migratory bird. Hearing that some were to be
had in one of Lucullus’ preserves, Pompey, nevertheless, refused to
ask for one. He ate something else instead and asked would he be
doomed if Lucullus were not a luxurious liver?13
Thus far we have seen Lucullus nurture the beasts of the field
and the birds of the air. Now, as we examine his Campanian prop-
11 Plut. Luc. 39. The exact location of the villa is disputed; see van
Ooteghem (1959) pp. 181–2 and McCracken (1942) pp. 327–40. For
Frontinus’ statement (Aq. 1.5, 8, 10) that three aqueducts arose on the
property and the problems it causes see McCracken pp. 322–31. Note also
the somewhat speculative remarks of Jolivet (1987) pp. 902–4.
12 Plut. Luc. 39; Tac. Ann. 11.1; Front. Aq. 1.22. See further Platner/
Ashby pp. 268–9 who place the Apollo Room here. Other discussions in
van Ooteghem (1959) pp. 192–3; Grimal (1969) pp. 126–9 and Shatzman
(1975) pp. 379–80 who may, perhaps, exaggerate the size of the buildings.
See Rawson’s remarks, (1983) p. 49, on the resemblance of this age to the
eighteenth century AD.
13 Pliny NH 8.211; Plut. Luc. 40, Pomp. 2, Mor. 204B, 786A. See Scar-
digli (1989) p. 487 n. 537.

erties, we shall find him, among other things, looking after the fish
of the sea.
The first place we must speak of is the island of Nesis (Nis-
ida). It lay in the sea roughly off Puteoli (Pozzuoli). We know that,
along with the rest of his property, it passed from Lucullus to his
son but what, if anything, he himself did there we know not. In-
deed, its fame at this period seems to rest on the size of its rabbit
population and the fact that Cicero had a meeting there with
Brutus the tyrannicide.14
Far more interesting is the villa of Lucullus which is variously
described as being near Baiae or on Cape Misenum.15 This loose-
ness in designating the site need not cause distress. Baiae is, any-
way, near Misenum and those who have studied the matter have
come to the conclusion that, as a general rule, references to the
location of villas in ancient authors are rarely precise. Furthermore,
since many of those who wrote about the villas of the Bay of
Naples were stern moralists who heartily disapproved of the alleged
luxury of such places, they would want to emphasize their nearness
to Baiae, a town that had a reputation for dissolute and loose liv-
ing.16 We do learn, however, from the sources that Lucullus’ villa
was perched on a hill and in consequence scholars have been able
to locate it either on the northwest ridge of Monte Miseno or on
the nearby Monte di Procida.17 Lucullus appears to have bought
the place after his return from the east.18 But before that it had had
a rather interesting history.19
14Sources and discussion in Jolivet (1987) pp. 885–91. His suggestion

(pp. 901–2) that Lucullus built fish-ponds here rests on a view of the
Neapolitan villa which I would not accept (see n. 25). See also D’Arms
(1970) pp. 186–7 and Beloch (1890) pp. 87–8 but note that Cic. Ad Att.
14.20.1 contradicts the latter’s theory that Brutus was the next owner of
the island after Lucullus. See further n. 25.
15 Plut. Mar. 34; Sen. Ep. 51.11; Pliny NH 18.32; Phaedr. 2.5.8. Mod-
ern discussions: D’Arms (1970) pp. 23–30, 184; Badian (1973); Jolivet
(1987) pp. 878–85.
16 D’Arms (1970) pp. 23, 27, 42–3; Badian (1973) p. 121. Modern
Baia is, apparently, but a shadow of its ancient self.

17 Beloch (1890) p. 198; D’Arms (1970) p. 185; Jolivet (1987) p. 883.
18 So we may infer from Plut. Luc. 39, but see Jolivet (1987) p. 881.
19 Plut. Mar. 34.
The first known owner was the great Marius. He was duly cas-
tigated for living in a style altogether too luxurious for someone
who was supposed to be a warrior. Some, however, remarked that
the house wore something of the aspect of a military camp and
pointed out that Marius had used his skill in constructing such
things to design a home that took full advantage of the command-
ing view the site afforded. Even his foe Sulla was to declare that all
the others who built there were as blind men compared to him.20
During the proscriptions, when the goods of the proscribed were
often sold at knock-down prices, Cornelia, Sulla’s daughter, seems
to have got herself something of a bargain when she acquired this
villa for 75,000 sesterces. It was she who later sold it to Lucullus
for the considerably larger sum of 10,000,000 sesterces.21
Needless to say, this transaction evoked comment in antiquity.
Plutarch observed that here was evidence for a rise in prices and an
increased demand for luxury items. This is a fair, if rather obvious,
comment but we should bear steadily in mind what was said in our
first chapter. This kind of thing is not to be taken as demonstrating
that Lucullus and his friends were some kind of fatty degenerates.
On a dispassionate view we may recognize that this was an age
when the desire for the intellectual and the civilized amenities of
life went hand in hand with the means to acquire them. One can
only ask where lay the virtue in the men of Lucullus’ time dining,
20 Pliny NH 18.32; Sen. Ep. 51.11. Cf. Keaveney (2005a) p. 37. On
the Pliny passage Jolivet (1987) pp. 882–3 is, I think, preferable to Badian
(1973) p. 121 n. 1 or D’Arrns (1970) p. 23. Van Ooteghem (1959) p. 188
n. 5 appears to have misunderstood the same passage. The contrast is not
between a villa of Lucullus at Naples and one of Marius at Baiae but be-
tween Marius’ villa and that of Lucullus at Tusculum. Was the cultured
Sulla echoing Herod. 4.144?
21 D’Arms (1970) p. 28 n. 33; Keaveney (2005a) p. 131. Should Schol.
Bob. p. 89 St. be right in saying that C. Scribonius Curio (cos. 76) bought
one of Marius’ properties in the proscriptions then plainly it is not this
one but another. But, if as some think, the scholiast is wrong in the cir-
cumstantial detail of the proscription then indeed Curio’s property could
be the same as Cornelia’s. This, then, leads to the suggestion that he might
have bought it from Lucullus at a later date. For full discussions of this
vexed question see the modern authorities cited in n. 15 above. I have but
one observation to make. Even if we accept Curio did not get his property
in the proscription it still does not necessarily follow that it was Cornelia’s.
like their ancestors, off acorns and professing to despise things

Greek. True, Lucullus and his contemporaries failed to solve the
political and other problems that faced them but can we say, in our
technological age, that we have done better? In short, if we are to
understand Lucullus, one of the things we must acknowledge is
that there is no correlation between life-style and political wisdom,
as Praecia, for instance, might have observed.22
But to resume the history of this place. Like Lucullus’ gardens
it eventually passed into the imperial domains and was destined, on
one more occasion, to witness an historic event. It was here, in 37
AD, that the emperor Tiberius died.23 Lucullus, for his part, seems
to have paid Marius a soldierly tribute. So far as we can tell, he al-
tered nothing here, being, presumably, well satisfied with the ar-
rangements of his great predecessor.24
Lucullus’ creative energies seem to have been principally di-
rected towards the third of his Campanian properties. This was
somewhere in the region of Naples. It is a matter for regret that we
cannot be more precise than this, for it would surely be fascinating
to contemplate even the sad ruins of what was, arguably, Lucullus’
most spectacular creation.25 Many of the buildings were actually
erected on platforms that had been built out and stretched over the
sea. This kind of bravura display was all the rage at the time. To
defy nature in this wise was for the Romans something of a fash-
ion, although in the next generation it was to prompt the poet
Horace to melancholy reflection on the essential vulnerability of
22 Modern scholars sometimes brand Cornelia as avaricious on the

basis of this role. On this charge I prefer to follow Badian (1973) p. 122 n.
8 rather than D’Arms (1970) p. 28 n. 33.
23 On the later history see van Ooteghem (1959) pp. 191–2 and
D’Arms (1970) pp. 113–15.

24 On the basis of Varro RR 3.17.9 both Badian (1973) p. 131 and
D’Arms (1970) p. 185 argue that Lucullus did make alterations but for me
the objections of both van Ooteghem (1959) p. 189 n. 3 and Jolivet
(1987) pp. 898–9 seem cogent. Plutarch’s vague (Luc. 39)
e0n toi=j parali/oij could, one supposes, just about be stretched to
cover work here.
25 Against Beloch (1890) pp. 81–2 see D’Arms (1970) pp. 185–6. Joli-
vet (1987) pp. 891–7 appears to doubt its existence entirely but he has
not, in my view, wholly explained away the literary evidence.
mankind. A landowner might thus master the seas but ever he

would be stalked by Fear and Threats.26 What seems to have been
particularly striking, though, was the channel Lucullus had dug
through a mountain. This carried the—admittedly feeble—tides of
the Mediterranean into a series of canals. These canals surrounded
those buildings of the property that were located on land. In them
there lived Lucullus’ fish, who were thus refreshed by the regular
change of water.27
The learned Varro is very informative on the subject of piscinae
(fish-ponds) and their owners, who are usually styled piscinarii (fish-
fanciers). According to him, a fish-pond could have either fresh or
salt water. Those who kept the former did so with an eye to profit,
but from the latter nothing save pleasure was to be gained. As a
typically hardheaded and tight-fisted Roman, Varro was quick to
point out that from every aspect, be it building, stocking or main-
tenance, these salt pools cost a great deal of money. We have just
seen these were not considerations that weighed much with Lucul-
lus. In truth, just as with the piers, so with the fish he was touched
with a mania that had gripped many other Roman nobles. One of
the widespread hobbies of the age was the keeping of fish as pets.
But, although Lucullus followed the mode, his behaviour, so far as
we can tell, was free from some of the more grotesque features that
attended the fad. We hear, for instance, of fish being given pet
names and being decked with jewels. Some owners apparently fret-
ted more over a sick fish than a sick slave and, if one of the pam-
pered creatures actually died then his desolate master might even
don mourning garb. After all that, it may be superfluous to add that
few could actually bring themselves to dine off their finny friends.28
But, moderate or not, Lucullus has not escaped censure for
his fish-ponds. Once more the anecdote centres on Pompey. See-
ing the tunnel through the mountain, he is alleged to have re-
marked that Lucullus was an Xerxes in a toga. This, of course, was
in reference to a tunnel that the Persian king had dug through
26 Plut. Luc. 39, Comp. Luc./Cim. 1; Cic. Acad. 2.9; Pliny NH 9.170;
Varro RR 3.17.9; Sall. Cat. 13.1; Horace Od. 3.1.33–7.

27 McCracken (1942) p. 339 thought Lucullus might also have kept
fish at Tusculum. For the tides see Loeb edition note on Varro RR 3.17.9.
28 Varro RR 3.3.10, 17.2–9. See D’Arms (1970) pp. 41–2.
Mount Athos during his invasion of Greece. We may beg leave to

doubt if a compliment was intended here. Xerxes’ expedition had
failed and he himself was believed to be impious or slightly crazed
or perhaps both.29
Now in all these little anecdotes about Lucullus and Pompey
both men play well-defined roles. Lucullus has given up serious
matters and devoted himself to luxury and trifling. Pompey is the
catalyst who provokes the reaction that throws this into relief. By
implication, too, I think we are meant to see him as a man of affairs
who stands in strong contrast to the idle Lucullus.30
Perhaps the first feature that seems a little odd is this: despite
the barb hidden in the remark about Xerxes, the pair are repre-
sented as being on civil—nay relatively friendly—terms. Does this
mean, then, they had at last put their quarrels behind them? Per-
haps, but it must be frankly admitted we cannot say for certain.
Lucullus was of a placid temperament but, like many such, exceed-
ingly dangerous when roused and prodded into action. The man
who meekly endured Glabrio’s rebuke was the same who con-
ducted against the Servilii the most bitter feud Rome had ever
known. Once Lucullus had almost thumped Pompey and he had
blocked his eastern settlement. Was this really the man whom our
anecdotes depict as having reasonably good relations with his old
foe? Yet another feature of these tales increases our disquiet on this
point.
The ubiquity of Pompey is suspicious in itself and leads to the
suggestion that some of the tales are outright concoctions or, at
least, have been subjected to the hand of the improver. When the
writer, be he rhetorician, moralist or philosopher, came to tell his
pointed tale what better way to lend it weight than to introduce
into it a worthy foil for Lucullus in the shape of Pompey the Great.
In one instance we can even detect the hand of the artist about its
work. In one version the jibe about Xerxes is not attributed to
Pompey but to a man called the Stoic Tubero. It looks as if, in at
29 Vell. Pat. 2.33.4; Pliny NH 9.170; Herod. 7.22–4.

30 Actually this is explicitly spelt out in one story: see n. 70.
least one retelling, a somebody has been put in the place of a no-
body.31
So, from an optimistic viewpoint, we can, if we wish, take
these stories for evidence of improved relations between Pompey
and Lucullus in the last years of his life.32 But even from the scepti-
cal standpoint, which I personally favour, that wonders at
Pompey’s alleged participation it is not possible to deny that these
anecdotes are in harmony with the view Lucullus’ contemporaries
had now formed of him.33
To trace that formation is not too difficult. I have tried to
convey to the reader that, after his return from the wars, Lucullus’
building, on a scale of magnificence rarely seen at Rome, was such
as would bedazzle and bewitch. At the same time I have pointed
out that, while Lucullus’ contributions to public life did not, as
some think, dry up, his part was now distinctly a secondary one.
His voice was no longer as loud in senate and forum as it once had
been. In consequence men simply paid more attention to and
talked more about that portion of his activities which was the more
exciting and colourful. To put it briefly: it was Lucullus’ private life
rather than his public deeds that preoccupied the Romans of his
own day. And, as I have argued, Lucullus had only himself to
blame. It had been as his own free choice that he devoted more
time to the arts of leisure. The evidence suggests, I think, that he
did try to arrive at some mean between his private and public ac-
tivities but he will have been very ignorant of human nature if he
assumed people were going to make a balanced assessment of what
he was about. The eloquent Cicero was certainly not one to do this.
Cicero had no time for Lucullus’ manner of living and in one
of his published works, De Legibus, he delivers a stinging rebuke to
Lucullus, now dead for some years.34 According to this account,
Lucullus answered a charge of excessive luxuriousness levelled at
31 Plut. Luc. 39. For Tubero’s identity see van Ooteghem (1959) p.
187 n. 3; Jolivet (1987) p. 875 n. 2; Scardigli (1989) p. 485 n. 529. Note

that the tongue-lashing of a young man by Cato for, among other things,
living like Lucullus is admitted by Plutarch (Luc. 40, Cat. Min. 19) to be,
perhaps, not by Cato at all.
32 So Villoresi (1939) p. 192 and Scardigli (1989) p. 440 n. 545.
33 Cf. Jolivet (1987) p. 875 n. 2 and Scardigli (1989) pp. 290–1.
34 3.30–1.
his Tusculan villa by saying that an eques lived above him and a
freedman below. Did people really expect that his place should be
less well appointed than theirs? Cicero claimed, however, that their
desire for luxury was all Lucullus’ fault. If he had not indulged his
own taste for it these others would not have followed his example.
A man in Lucullus’ position ought to know better. In one sense
this is fairly standard Roman moralizing fare, and sorry stuff at
that, but in another it acquires great importance for it shows how,
within a few years of his death, Lucullus’ reputation as a luxurious
creature was firmly established.
So much for Cicero’s public utterance. Had Lucullus, how-
ever, been able to peep into his correspondence which was not for
publication he would have found much worse and might with jus-
tice have claimed that he and his friends were being traduced and
vilipended there. As late as 25 January 61 Cicero was able to say
that both Hortensius and Catulus were politically active.35 Almost a
year later on 20 January 60 he is complaining that nobody can be
found to deal with Flavius and his agrarian bill. Among those con-
demned are the piscinarii. Lucullus is not named but self-evidently
he is of their number.36 Early in June of the same year the piscinarii
are attacked again and it is alleged they care for nothing except
their mullet.37 Here then we have the earliest depiction of a figure
still familiar today: Lucullus the flabby, back from the wars, lolling
by his ponds, indifferent to the fate of the republic. Ironically this
picture was being painted at precisely the time Lucullus and his
friends were making life very uncomfortable indeed for Pompey
and his followers.38 Fortunately, we can see why Cicero should
speak in this way of men who were, on the whole, his natural allies.
He tells Atticus, in a letter of the 15th March 60, that the fish-
fanciers were jealous of him and sometime later (after 13th May) he
repeated this charge and added that he himself since the death of
Catulus had been the only one to follow the optimate road.39 Ego-
ism, overweening vanity and an exaggerated sense of his own im-
35 Ad Att. 1.13.2.
36 Ibid., 1.18.6. Cf. Varro RR 3.9.10 and Macrob. Sat. 3.15.6.
37 Ad Att. 2.1.7.
38 See ch. 7.
39 Ad Att. 1.19.6, 1.20.3.
portance have all contrived to lead Cicero into what looks like de-
liberate misrepresentation.
Yet, it must be acknowledged that once an estimate of a man
for good or ill is fixed in the common consciousness it remains
fixed there and tends to be passed from generation to generation
so that no amount of appeal to reasoned argument can overcome
the prejudice.40 So it is with Lucullus.
Thus, for the historian Velleius Paterculus, writing in AD 30,
Lucullus was undoubtedly a great man but unfortunately he was
also the first to set a fashion for extravagance in building, banquets
and furnishing.41 His near-contemporary (died circa AD 41) the
elder Seneca was certainly in no doubt as to what was the dominat-
ing trait of Lucullus’ character: love of luxury. This was a ‘fact’ as
well established as Sulla’s cruelty.42 We may recall, too, that the
elder Pliny (died AD 70) told that story of the warning slave at the
banquet and drew from it the conclusion that Lucullus was, by na-
ture, a guzzler.43 In the second century AD Lucullus became the
butt of one of the famous sarcasms of the Christian writer Tertul-
lian. Bacchus had been made a god for what he did for the vine; it
was a shame that Lucullus was not similarly honoured for his ser-
vices to the cherry.44 From the end of that same century we have a
work called the Deipnosophistae (Banquet of the Savants) by one
Athenaeus. This windy writer, in two separate places in his work,
delivers the same verdict on Lucullus.45 Citing as his authority Ni-
calaos of Damascus, an historian of the first century BC, he first
delivers a judgement resembling that of Velleius: Lucullus took the
lead in introducing luxury into Rome. He then becomes almost
Plutarchean. Lucullus up until the end of the wars had been a
model of sobriety. After that he went to pieces.46 Coming to the
fourth century AD we meet with a work entitled De Viris Illustribus.
The anonymous author of these lives of famous men devotes, on
40 The reputation of Sulla is a good example.

41 2.33.4.
42 Con. 9.2.19.
43 See n. 8.
44 Apologeticus 11.8.
45 6.274E-F, 12.543A.
46 See end of ch. 7 and further below.
average, about half a page in modern printed text to each subject.

In common with many others, that devoted to Lucullus is rich in
error and omission but the writer still finds time to assure us that
Lucullus was over-preoccupied with clothes and that he lusted after
statues and paintings.47 And even a more worthy representative of
that age, Ammianus Marcellinus, knew Lucullus not just as a soldier
but as the benefactor of the cherry.48
So, now when we re-read Plutarch’s remarks about a sponge
and find him dividing Lucullus’ life into a period of vigour and
then a period of ignoble repose we can see that he stands four-
square in that tradition which makes of Lucullus a dissolute bon
viveur for the latter part of his life. That same source which yielded
the splendid metaphor of the sponge has more of the same. It is an
essay in which Plutarch debates whether old men should transact
public business, and when he wrote it Plutarch was in no doubt as
to what kind of an old man Lucullus had become. He had put aside
military affairs and political business and, in his listlessness, he de-
voted himself to baths, banquets and buildings.49 But, if Cicero is
condemned out of his own mouth, Plutarch is damned by one of
his own texts. In that portion of his Life devoted to the supposed
indolent old age of Lucullus he has, as we know, let slip enough
information to show that, contrary to his thesis, the subject was
very active indeed.50
47De Vir. Ill. 74.

48Compare 22.8.16 with 23.5.16.
49 Mor 785F. The Loeb translator renders
sunousi/aj meqhmesina\j ‘sexual intercourse in the daytime’ but alas! the
Greek could mean simply ‘parties in the daytime’. Note, however, that the
notion that there is a time and a place for everything and that pleasure-
seekers of the day sought their thrills by violating the natural order is
found also in Sall. Cat. 13.3. I suspect that it was this passage from the
Moralia that led Balsdon (1974) p. 55 to suggest that Lucullus might have
been guilty of sexual impropriety.
50 See the notes to ch. 7 and scrutinize carefully Plut. Luc. 38–43 with
Plut. Pomp. 46. In ch. 1 I suggested that Cicero was one of the sources for
Plutarch’s conception of Lucullus’ philosophical attainments. I would
hesitate to say, however, that this was also where Plutarch got the notion
of Lucullus as a degenerate. The whole idea does owe something, how-
ever, I would suspect, to Plutarch’s preconception of the character (Luc.
The picture of Lucullus as a flabby trifler which has come

down to modern times owes most, I suspect, to Cicero and Plu-
tarch. Of all the ancient authors these were among the most read
and the usual unthinking reverence of the humanist for the antique
would hardly be conducive to detecting the malignancy of the ora-
tor or the credulity of the biographer.51 Even into our own day Lu-
cullus has been depicted as frittering away his last years in idleness.
Perhaps the most entrancing expression of this idea comes from
Ronald Syme, ‘secluded like indolent monsters in their parks and
villas, the great piscinarii, Hortensius and the two Luculli, pondered
at ease upon the quiet doctrines of Epicurus and confirmed from
their own careers the folly of ambition, the vanity of virtue’.52
Yet, even though we have demonstrated this picture to be
false and have tracked that falsehood to its origins, there still re-
mains something to be done. If we have been able to put into per-
spective and balance Lucullus’ public and private life then, perhaps,
we should be able to offer a more sympathetic view of the latter
than is fashionable today.
The first point to be made is that, in embarking on his build-
ing programme, Lucullus was not alone. Many rich men of his time
also chose to spend their wealth on similar projects.53 In acting thus
they were, on the whole, simply following models and precedents.
So far as gardens are concerned the Romans seem to have discov-
ered about the end of the second century that they might exist as
much for pleasure as for utility. Hence when Lucullus laid out his
great horti on the Pincian hill he was, from one viewpoint, doing no
more than taking a stage further a practice already well developed
at Rome. By the same token Hellenistic kings had amused them-
39). For some further perceptive observation on Plutarch’s distortions see

Scardigli (1989) pp. 288–93.
51 See Keaveney and Madden (1992).
52 (1939) p. 23. It may be pedantic to point out that Lucullus was
never a devotee of Epicurus but it is very relevant to our thesis to note

that Cicero is Syme’s source here. In essence this same picture is also
found in Balsdon (1969) p. 141 and Seager (1979) p. 79 n. 43. In the case
of Rawson (1983) p. 102 and Antonelli (1989) p. 174 their like verdicts are
contradicted by their own narratives. For a useful corrective see Shackle-
ton Bailey (1965) pp. 302–3 on Hortensius.
53 Varro RR 3.3.10 with Jolivet (1987) p. 878 n. 15.
selves with fish-ponds long before the Romans had ever heard of
them. Again, the world knew of vivaria before Lippinus brought
them into Italy. As he travelled about Asia Lucullus cannot but
have seen there the extensive parks that dotted the countryside.
These had taken their rise with the Persians who took an especial
delight in their amenities and styled them ‘paradises’.54 But, in as-
sessing the oriental influences on Lucullus one possible source
seems to have been overlooked—the city of Tigranocerta. Accord-
ing to Appian the high walls of this place contained stables in their
base. Nearby there stood a palace with great parks, hunting-
grounds and lakes.55 In view of what we have learnt of Lucullus in
this chapter, I do not think, it fanciful to suggest there is a certain
resemblance between this eastern scene and Lucullus’ own Italian
estates. There is a delicious irony in contemplating at least the pos-
sibility that something of the city he had flattened lived on in his
own creations.
But putting Lucullus into his historical context or delineating
the traditions in which he stood brings us straight back to an issue
with which we opened this chapter: the reason Lucullus chose to
stand in this tradition. I suggested there that character has some-
thing to do with it and we may now expand on this a little. Lucullus
was a cultivated man. He spoke and wrote Greek with equal facil-
ity. He was interested in literature and philosophy and he had the
collector’s eye for painting and sculpture. In short he was pos-
sessed of the aesthetic impulse and I do not think it altogether fan-
ciful to suggest that his parks and palaces were another expression
of that impulse.
In judging any work of art there is inevitably an element of
subjectivity involved. Since we are talking principally of architecture
here we might instance baroque churches. Nobody will deny that
an aesthetic impulse created them, yet for some they are objects of
delight while to others they are but hideous confections. In the case
of Lucullus the problem of judgement and appreciation is com-
pounded by the fact that his creations have vanished and we are
left with imperfect literary descriptions. I readily concede that on
D’Arms (1970) pp. 6, 41; van Ooteghem (1959) pp. 189 n. 2, 192 n.
54
2; Grimal (1969) pp. 7–10.

55 Mith. 84.
the basis of those descriptions we might dismiss Lucullus’ houses

as the mere vulgar product of a vulgar mind. But, from that same
evidence, I would argue that something more subtle was at work
here. From the description of the villa at Tusculum we can divine
that an overall plan lay behind. Of set purpose Lucullus created a
whole whose impression was a pleasing one of airiness and light.
That same master hand positioned the buildings themselves so that
he might derive the maximum enjoyment from the countryside in
which they lay.56 Perhaps Marius was not the only old soldier to use
his military talents to create a dwelling of delight? That sense of the
surreal that created a room at once an aviary and a dining-room
finds its greatest expression in the Neapolitan villa. There the sea
becomes land and the land becomes sea. Salt channels course
through the shore while piers thrust out into the waves.57 However
imperfectly, we are catching a glimpse of the discreet charm of the
Roman aristocracy that would have delighted the camera of Bu-
ñuel.
But, whatever aesthetic judgement we make on Lucullus, his
public activities prevent us from joining in the common and facile
verdict often passed on his life as a whole at this time, that he was
creating for himself a world of his own, miniature and perfect, to
which he had withdrawn to escape from an increasingly harsh real-
ity. Rather, we should have to say that here was a man who had
come to a recognition of the limitations of his own power and po-
sition58 and, acting on that recognition, had created for himself a
way of life that combined continued duty to the state with the pur-
suit of private pleasure.
56 See McCracken (1942) p. 325.

57 Those who would castigate Lucullus might care to remember that,
like he, the Victorians built piers into the sea. Those that survive are, I
believe, treasured as architecture not reviled as expressions of decadence.
Our age, too, has had a notable piscinarius. From Miller (1985) p. 200 I
quote a daughter on a famous father, ‘he used to sit in that chair and in
the box at the side were lovely consignments of fresh grubs for the fish,
which they loved. And they used to come streaming across the pool when
they saw his figure there. And then after he’d fed them he nearly always
stayed for quite a long time in that chair in deep contemplation’. The
daughter is Mary Soames; her father was Winston Churchill.
58 As Plutarch, in his way, saw: see Luc. 38.
Yet any attempt to revise the current picture of Lucullus must,

in the end, yield much to Plutarch. In truth, there did come a time
when Lucullus withdrew completely from public affairs and shortly
thereafter lost his wits. Where the Greek biographer errs is in his
dating. The great divide—chasm is perhaps not too dramatic a
word—in Lucullus’ life came not in 66 but in 59 and, it may be
said, as a direct result of the events of that year.
Lucullus’ last recorded public appearance was as a juror in the
trial of L. Valerius Flaccus (pr. 63) which is probably to be dated to
September of the year 59. Flaccus was charged with repetundae in
the province of Asia. For Lucullus the case presented something of
a dilemma. In 70, along with reform of the laws governing the
tribunate, there had, as we noted some time ago, come changes in
the composition of juries. Now senators, equites and tribuni aerarii
shared the benches and it might, perhaps, be felt that Lucullus
should show a certain tender regard for a fellow member of his
own order, especially one who had played a prominent part in
crushing Catiline. Further, there was talk that Pompey had engi-
neered the accusation and this, it could be said, was a factor that
might have weighed with Lucullus. On the other hand, regardless
of whoever engineered the accusation, opinion then and now tends
to the view that Flaccus was guilty as charged. Lucullus then must
have wondered if he was really going to vote for the acquittal of a
man whose behaviour in the same province he had once governed
was the very antithesis of his own and, indeed, violated the princi-
ples of provincial government that he had enunciated from the
time of his praetorship.
Cicero was well aware of these tensions and did his best to
play on them. Among many other things, it was alleged that Flac-
cus had contrived to get hold of a legacy rightfully destined for an-
other. Turning to Lucullus, Cicero reminded him that he had re-
ceived many legacies from grateful provincials. Was he going to
give them up if somebody turned up and claimed them? This sort
of thing is of a piece with the rest of the speech where the charges
are hardly ever addressed and most of the time is spent abusing
Greek witnesses. Elsewhere Cicero boasts of throwing dust in the
eyes of the jury; in this speech he may be said to have raised a veri-
table sand-storm. By Cicero’s own admission Lucullus’ legacies
were the gifts of a grateful province openly given, while from his
own wriggling it is clear there is something slightly amiss with Flac-
cus’ transaction. But by bringing these two disparate entities into

comparison Cicero obviously hoped to convince the jury that Flac-
cus had done no wrong. He had only done what that model of
probity, Lucullus, would have done. And the model of probity
might like to reflect if he really were all that different from the
grubby one? How far Cicero’s argument determined the result of
the trial we do not know but we do learn that Flaccus was ulti-
mately acquitted.59
If Cicero was paying Lucullus a back-handed compliment at
this trial, a little earlier, probably in August, an even more dubious
accolade had been bestowed on him in the Vettius affair. L. Vettius
was an eques who had already acquired a nasty reputation as a pro-
fessional informer when he approached a young man, C. Scri-
bonius Curio, who was well known to be an enemy of Pompey’s, to
tell him that he was resolved to kill Pompey. The young man told
his father, who passed on the story to Pompey. Eventually the mat-
ter came before the senate and there Vettius gave a list of names.
The young men on it, he claimed, were planning assassination, and
foremost among them was Curio jun. Unfortunately, he damaged
his testimony by claiming that his own weapon—a dagger—had
been supplied by another opponent of Pompey’s, the consul M.
Bibulus. The latter had, in fact, warned Pompey of a plot on 13
May. Vettius was now kept in custody overnight and on the next
day Caesar and his henchman, the tribune P. Vatinius, produced
him at a contio. The list of conspirators had now changed and new
names had appeared. Among them was that of Lucullus. Vettius
claimed that he was using another Pompeian opponent, the tribune
C. Fannius, as a go-between. The new list, however, did not carry
much conviction either and Vettius was lodged once more in
prison to await trial de vi. A few days later he was found dead and
there were not a few at Rome who were prepared to believe he had
been murdered.60
59 Cic. Pro Flacc. (especially 84–6 with Long ad loc.) with Gruen
(1974) pp. 289–91; Seager (1979) pp. 100–1. The date is not absolutely
certain, see Shackleton Bailey on Cic. Ad Att. 2.25.1 and n. 60. Epstein
(1987) pp. 109–11 puts the case for non-Pompeian involvement.
60 Cic. Ad Att. 2.24, In Vat. 25–6; Plut. Luc. 42; Dio 38.9. Discussions
of the myriad problems the affair presents, together with further bibliog-
It hardly needs to be said that this is a strange business. More

questions can be asked of it than can be answered with any confi-
dence. Was Vettius privy to a real plot against Pompey? If he was
then I, for one, am not prepared to believe that Lucullus was a part
of it. The inclusion of his name on that second list was about as
justified as that of Cicero who also figured on it. Again, what did
Vettius hope to gain? Was he a kind of Titus Oates, hoping to ex-
ploit that streak of paranoia which some have detected in Pompey’s
character? Or did someone else stand behind him? And was that
someone Caesar, as Cicero thought? We could go on but, fortu-
nately, from the point of view of the biographer of Lucullus, the
matter is relatively simple.
When he found that his initial list failed to carry total convic-
tion, Vettius was faced with the pressing necessity to produce one
that would. In order to lend the thing some air of verisimilitude it
would have to contain the names of men who were known to be
political opponents of Pompey in the hope that some, in a year in
which political quarrels had been pursued with incredible bitter-
ness,61 might be prepared to believe that these opponents would
carry enmity to the point of murder. Given the history of Lucullus’
relations with Pompey, he was a natural choice for inclusion. The
enmity between the two was still very much alive and had found
expression in the course of 59. Now, as in the previous year, Lucul-
lus had striven to thwart the schemes of Pompey and his hench-
men. Thus, when Vettius put him on his hit-list he was, in an odd
sort of way, reflecting his contemporary importance and paying a
compliment to his standing. Lucullus was there because he was a
force whom Pompey and his friends had had to overcome, a foe
who could not be ignored.
When, in 60, Lucullus had helped to squash Pompey’s request
for veteran settlements and ratification of his eastern arrangements
we can be sure that his sense of satisfaction at striking this blow
against a hated enemy was great. Yet, in retrospect, it can be seen
as a very bad move indeed. In fact Lucullus himself must soon
have realized that, in failing to treat Pompey in the same states-
raphy, will be found in Shackleton Bailey (1965) on Ad Att. 2.22, 24; Ward
(1977b) pp. 236–42 and Seager (1979) pp. 99–101.
61 See further below.
manlike fashion as he had done during his consulship, he had done

more harm than good. In putting the pursuit of a private quarrel
before the public good he had imperilled the state.
For Pompey did not acquiesce in the rebuff but soon returned
to the fray accompanied by new helpmates. These, however, were
no longer pliant stooges like Afranius but men of substance, pos-
sessed of ability and independent influence. First, there was Cras-
sus. Now, when a pair such as this lie down together we may be
sure this was a marriage of convenience and, actually, the match-
maker seems to have been the third man in the bed, Julius Caesar
(cos. 59). He appears to have convinced the other two that if they
acted individually then their opponents would prove too strong for
them. But should they sink their differences and form a troika they
might all accomplish their desires.
What Pompey desired we know. Crassus seems to have
thought largely in financial terms. Late in 62 the publicani made ap-
plication to the senate for a rebate of part of the taxes of Asia. The
normally profitable province had been so ravaged by the Mithri-
datic War that the financiers were unable to recover their costs.
Crassus, who most likely had his own interests in the area, pressed
their suit in the senate only to have the request thrown out by
Metellus Celer and his friends. If the remedy for this state of affairs
meant not only abandonment of opposition to Pompey62 but actual
co-operation with the man then Crassus was prepared to embrace
it. Further, he may have also reasoned that when commissioners
were appointed to oversee the settlement of Pornpey’s veterans he
could contrive to be one and thus increase his own influence.
Although I have suggested that Lucullus may have wanted to
embarrass Caesar during the Bona Dea affair, they do not, so far as
we can tell, seem to have had much to do with each other up until
this.63 Now, in the year 59, they collided head-on and, in their colli-
sion, I do not think it fanciful to find a symbolic significance: the
champion of senatorial government opposed the future autocrat.
The old order had literally come face to face with the new.
62 Note what was said about Crassus in ch. 6.

63 See ch. 6. Lucullus, of course, must have been aware of Caesar’s
activities in Asia in 74, cf. app. 2.
Caesar had barely escaped with his life from the Sullan pro-
scriptions. A brief, and by no means comprehensive, conspectus of
his activities thereafter reveals without a shadow of a doubt where
his political sympathies lay. Twice in the early 70s he prosecuted
leading Sullan henchmen. He supported the calls for the restoration
of tribunician powers and the return to public life of the followers
of Lepidus and he backed Gabinius’ piracy law. Symbolic gesture
was equally unequivocal. When his aunt Julia, widow of Marius,
died he had effigies of the Marian family carried in the funeral pro-
cession, although this was forbidden by law.
Nor are we talking here of sand without lime. This was no
mere ambition unsupported by ability. Caesar’s repute is well
known, so there is no need to labour the point. One instance will, I
trust, be as instructive for us as I suspect it was for men of his own
time. I speak of his feud with Catulus. When the chief pontiff,
Metellus Pius, died in 63 Caesar, although not yet a praetor, dared
pit himself against the veteran consular Catulus and, by lavish brib-
ery, actually carried the day. Catulus then attempted to have his
revenge with an unsuccessful bid to implicate Caesar in the Catili-
narian conspiracy. For this Caesar made him pay. In 78 Catulus had
been entrusted with rebuilding the temple of Capitoline Jove,
which had been burned down in the first civil war. By 62 the work
had not been finished and in that year, in his capacity as praetor,
Caesar convened a contio at which he proposed Catulus be removed
from charge of the work and his name erased from the temple wall.
He further asked that the accounts be produced, implying as he did
so that Catulus was guilty of some kind of fraud. The accused was
given leave to defend himself but this was made the occasion of a
further insult. Caesar would not allow him to mount the rostrum
but compelled him to speak from the floor. Then, when Catulus’
friends hearing what was afoot began to crowd the meeting, Caesar
simply called the whole thing off, being content with having in-
flicted this degree of humiliation.
Little wonder then that when, in 60, Caesar hurried home
from his province of Further Spain to sue for the consulship of 59
his enemies became uneasy. Radical legislation and other troubles
could be expected from this quarter. So they had recourse to a
crude device to stop him. By law Caesar was required to declare his
candidature in person in the city. However, he was also seeking a
triumph, which meant he could not cross the pomerium, as this
meant losing the imperium that every triumphator had to possess. As

it happened, there was simply not enough time to celebrate a tri-
umph before polling day. Caesar, therefore, asked to be allowed to,
declare his candidature in absentia. But, thanks to Cato, the request
was refused. Caesar elected to forgo his triumph and was duly
made consul. This, if nothing else, must have driven him to the
conclusion we stated earlier: if he were to accomplish anything as
consul he would need the help of Pompey and Crassus.
So what historians call the First Triumvirate came into being.64
In its own lifetime people were less subtle. Varro dubbed it the
‘three-headed monster’.65
And it was not long before the monster flashed its fangs.
Early in 59 Caesar brought forward an agrarian bill by which both
the plebs and Pompey’s veterans were to receive land. The scheme
was to be administered by twenty commissioners and would be
funded from the monies garnered in the east by Pompey. The in-
evitable and, as some believe, unreasoning opposition to this pro-
posal was led by the other consul, M. Calpurnius Bibulus, who re-
ceived vigorous and able assistance from his father-in-law Cato.
Once more Lucullus joined in the fray but, after his prominent role
in the previous year, he was content to resume his familiar part as a
supporting player. Bitter conflict raged first in the senate and then
before the people but it is not until he shares Bibulus’ final defeat
and humiliation that Lucullus emerges into full view. On the day
appointed for voting Bibulus made his way to the assembly to op-
pose the measure. He was accompanied by a crowd of supporters
and prominent among them were Cato and Lucullus. However,
they were soon set upon by the mob. Bibulus was pulled from the
rostrum when he attempted to speak, his fasces were broken, and a
bucket of filth was tipped over his head. A brawl next developed
64 Background to the Triumvirate: Gruen (1974) pp. 83–90; Ward
(1977b) pp. 193–218; Seager (1979) pp. 78–84. For Caesar see Gelzer
(1968) pp. 14–70. He loses no opportunity to point to instances of Cae-
sar’s political acumen to date and it seems reasonable to suppose contem-
poraries did not miss them either.
65 App. BC 2.9.
and along with his followers Bibulus was obliged to flee. Master of
the field, Caesar was thus able to pass his law.66
Unnerving as this experience may seem to us, it did nothing to
deter a seasoned political campaigner like Lucullus. When Caesar
eventually went on to propose that most hated of measures, the
ratification of Pompey’s acts in the east, Lucullus was ready and
took charge of the opposition as he had in the previous year. The
result, however, was disastrous. He engaged Caesar in a public de-
bate only to discover this was not an Afranius or, for that matter, a
Quinctius he was encountering. Caesar let fly a stream of accusa-
tions that so unmanned Lucullus that he dropped to his knees and
begged forgiveness. The man who had once humiliated Catulus in a
like fashion had met the man who had once meekly accepted Glab-
rio’s reprimand, although, in extenuation, we might plead that there
is some reason to believe Lucullus was already in the grip of a de-
bilitating illness that would have made him soft and yielding. But,
however we characterize the two actors, it is easy to see how, after
this scene, Caesar encountered no further difficulties with passing
his law.67
66Caesar’s two agrarian laws are mentioned by Plut. Cat. Min. 31–3;
Dio 38.1–7.3; Suet. Div. Jul. 20. They are telescoped into one in Plut. Caes.
14 and App. BC 2.10–12 (but see BC 2.13). Vell. Pat. 2.44.4 notes only the
second, while Plut. Luc. 42 and Pomp. 48 inform us of the first and Lucul-
lus’ part in the resistance to it. For discussions of the dating of Caesar’s
laws see Shackleton Bailey (1965) pp. 406–8 and Seager (1979) pp. 190–2.
67 (a) This reconstruction rests on the yoking of Suet. Div. Jul. 20
and Dio 38.7.5, as reasonably suggested by Butler and Cary (1966) p.

67. Dio, of course, refers to the situation that arose as a result of what
Suetonius describes. Their further proposal that Plut. Luc. 42 be in-
voked here cannot be accepted since that refers to the agrarian law.
Nor can I follow Gelzer (1968) p. 75 n. 5 in suggesting that Plutarch is
actually mistaken in assigning the opposition now to the agrarian law,
cf. n. 66.
(b) Gruen (1974) p. 92 n. 29 thinks Lucullus may have been making a
mock submission but Caesar would want to humiliate an arch-Sullan
and had already done so in the case of Catulus (see above). Cf. Syme
(1939) p. 56 n. 1.
(c) Calumniarum metum is usually taken to mean Caesar threatened a
prosecution in connection with Lucullus’ activities in Asia, so Butler
and Cary (1966) p. 67 and van Ooteghem (1959) p. 174. This is possi-
So Lucullus played a vigorous part in the resistance to the

schemes of the triumvirs. Yet, in actuality, it had brought him
nothing save two public humiliations at the hands of his enemies.
Furthermore, if Bibulus had literally had garbage poured over his
head then we might claim that, in a metaphorical sense, Lucullus
had suffered the same fate with the accusation of Vettius. And,
viewing the matter from the aspect of the public good rather than
private pride, he could not but have agreed with the judgement
later entered by Plutarch that the state was diseased or, as one
scholar puts it, that the activities of Caesar and his friends meant an
‘alternately frivolous and vulgar farce ... was being made of the
venerable organs and institutions of the old constitution’.68 Yet he
does not seem to have sunk to the depths of depression reached by
Cicero, whose reaction to the events of 59 was to declare that the
commonwealth was in a truly desperate plight and that the republic
was finished.69 Lucullus, in contrast, appears to have judged that
even now something might be accomplished by political action. A
visit, early in 58, from the same Cicero marks the beginning of a
rapid and radical reassessment of this calculation.
Clodius, having been officially made a plebeian, had had him-
self elected tribune and, having gathered unto himself gangs, was
now embarking on a legislative programme. One proposal was that
anybody who had condemned a Roman citizen to death without
trial should fall under the aquae atque ignis interdictio. Thanks to his
handling of the Catilinarian conspirators Cicero, arguably, could
belong in this category and he was of course the target of the law
since Clodius had not forgotten his evidence in the Bona Dea af-
fair. By now (late February/early March 58) Clodius was pressing
his enemy so hard that Cicero began to contemplate self-exile.
However, in true Roman fashion, before taking such an important
step he consulted with his friends and allies. Lucullus was on this
ble but I would not invoke Cic. Pro Flacc. 85 in this context.
(d) Calumniae need not necessarily refer to a false accusation in court.
As in the similar case of Catulus charges could have been made on the
spot. If, as is thought, Caesar was behind Vettius (n. 60) then he might
for instance very well have accused Lucullus of some kind of plot
now.
68 Plut. Comp. Cim/Luc. 1; Gelzer (1968) p. 84.
69 Cic. Ad Att. 2.2.1.2, 25.2.
list and, in fact, seems to have been the only one to argue that
Cicero should stand and fight. As is well known, the advice was not
taken and Cicero soon after slipped out of town, only to bewail
thereafter that this had been a mistake.
In giving his counsel Lucullus seems to have had two consid-
erations in mind. He must have realized that for Cicero personally a
retreat now would result in a disastrous loss of face. But Lucullus
also saw that he was losing an ally or rather, in view of the part he
now elected to play in public life, a man whose initiatives he was
prepared to support. Then hard upon Cicero’s departure there
came that of Cato, and it too was engineered by a law of Clodius.
The troublesome one was shunted to one side by being despatched
to oversee the annexation of Cyprus.
The political extinction of these two men whom Lucullus
judged best-fitted to provide in defence of his ideals the kind of
leadership he, at best, was willing to give only fitfully now directly
led to his quitting public life forever. Since there were no longer
men whose leadership he might, with profit, follow and support
Lucullus saw no point in continuing in politics and so he retired
completely, saying that he was now too old for such things.
According to yet another of those stories which are told about
Lucullus and Pompey, it was the latter who delivered his political
epitaph and in one version he is joined by Crassus in his verdict.
Whatever doubts we may have about the authorship of the remark,
it certainly reflects a view common in Lucullus’ day and not un-
known in ours: if Lucullus was too old for public service he was
too old to play the Sybarite.70
These unhappy circumstances were matched, nay surpassed,
by the unhappiness of the retirement itself. In his last months in
public view he showed some signs of wandering in his wits and,
70 Retirement: Plut. Luc. 42–3, Cic. 31. Both Moles (1988) on this lat-
ter passage and Rawson (1983) p. 116 think Cicero consulted M. Lucullus.
No reason is given but I presume they are thinking of the state of Lucul-
lus’ health. If so, this does not necessarily preclude such a meeting (see n.
71). Despite van Ooteghem (1959) p. 169 I do not think Cic. Acad. 2.3
refers to the retirement. Background: Rawson pp. 113–16; Gelzer (1968)
pp. 96–101; Fehrle (1983) pp. 136–46; Benner (1987) pp. 61–3. Pompey’s
verdict: Plut. Luc. 38, Pomp. 48, Mor. 204B, 785F. Only the Pomp. passage
dates it to about mid-59. I have brought it into harmony with Luc. 43.
soon after his withdrawal, Lucullus lost them completely, so that he

had to be put under the guardianship of his brother Marcus. This
bald account, which is all we possess, would suggest to the modern
reader that, perhaps, Lucullus fell victim to the dreaded Alz-
heimer’s Disease. The ancients had another explanation and, al-
though as medicine it is nonsense, as social history it fascinates. It
was said that one of his freedmen, Callisthenes, had administered a
love potion to him which had the effect of driving Lucullus mad.
When Marcus discovered what happened he turned Callisthenes
out of doors and then took upon himself the management of his
brother’s affairs.71
The circumstances that gave rise to such a story are as follows.
In our day the chemistry of the brain is but imperfectly understood
and in ancient times it was not at all. Thus any Greek or Roman
who wanted to make the perfectly reasonable assertion that mental
illness was not the work of the gods was driven, almost by neces-
sity, to postulating the agency of some powerful outside substance.
So those who would not accept, for instance, that the alleged mad-
ness of King Cleomenes of Sparta was a divine visitation for impi-
ety had to propagate the notion that he got to be that way because
he drank neat wine with Scythians.72 Among the Romans love po-
tions were generally held to be dangerous things. Ovid, for in-
stance, warns the suitor to avoid them. They will not make a girl
mad with passion but simply mad.73 There seems to have been a
certain reluctance to disclose what went into these brews74 but if
what Theocritus details in his second Idyll can be trusted then one
might conclude that the victim was more likely to throw up than
freak out.75 In any case, in being numbered among such victims
Lucullus takes his place in a select band. It was widely believed that
71 Plut. Luc. 43, Mor. 792B-C; De Vir. Ill. 74; Pliny NH 25.25.
72 Herod. 6.84.
73 Ars Am. 2.99–106. He mentions one specific potion which is also
described by Pliny NH 8.165. Otherwise he talks vaguely of Medean herbs

and Marsian charms. For the reputation of the Marsi as wonder-workers
see Keaveney (2005) p. 25.
74 Pliny NH 25.25 and see what was said about Ovid in n. 73.
75 2.58 (with Gow ad loc.). This might be classified as a spell but the
distinction between spell and philtre is not, perhaps, always clear cut.
the poet Lucretius and the emperor Caligula had had such philtres
administered to them with similar unpleasant results.76
In his last days, then, Lucullus did indeed, as Plutarch says,
become a sponge. Mercifully he had but a short time to spend as
such. At a date which modern scholarship can locate between mid-
December 57 and mid January 56 his life, or rather existence, came
to an end.77
When the death was announced, men, as so often happens,
forgot the clouded last years and the bitter unsuccessful political
battles that preceded them and remembered only the man who had
been the great opponent of Mithridates. Lucullus, therefore, was
granted the honour of a public funeral. The body was carried to the
forum by young nobles to receive the eulogy customary on such
occasions. At this point the mob intervened and tried to carry it
away. The Roman people had not forgotten that Lucullus was their
friend too and they proposed to pay him the signal honour of bur-
ial in the Campus Martius next to his friend Sulla. No preparations
had been made for this and Marcus, who was soon to die himself,
had to have recourse to prayer and entreaties in order to call them
off.
Then, as was originally intended, the body was taken for burial
on Lucullus’ own estate at Tusculum.78
76Suet. Cal. 50; Eusebius, Hieronymi Chronicon p. 149 Helm.

77Bennett (1972).
78 Plut. Luc. 43 with Scardigli (1989) p. 498 n. 565; Keaveney (2005a)
p. 176; van Ooteghem (1959) p. 199 n. 1.

9 LUCIUS LICINIUS LUCULLUS AND HIS
AGE
For the student of Roman history the downfall of the republic

means, in essence, that the state, instead of being controlled by an
oligarchy, was now in the power of one man.1 In accounting for
this state of affairs the investigator usually does not confine himself
to a purely political explanation but ranges over a number of fac-
tors invoking, for example, matters economic, social and military.
Nor does he confine himself to the proximate causes of the change
but attempts to trace their origin in the far-off past. The Gracchan
age is often the favourite starting-point for beginning the chronicle
of decay but some even see the process as beginning with the great
changes wrought by the Second Punic War.2
The biographer of Lucullus, of course, can hardly be unaware
of the great changes that were in his day coming upon the Roman
state. After all, his subject belonged to the last generation that knew
a free republic and his ancient biographer counted it among his
blessings that he was spared by death from seeing the civil war that
destroyed the world he knew.3 Indeed, the very study of Lucullus’
career and its background permits us to make certain observations
about the downfall of the republic itself.
There can be little doubt that Sulla intended the system he de-
vised to endure. He furnished the clearest proofs that he saw him-
self introducing a new age. Civil and military strife had been
1 See, e.g., Syme (1939) pp. 7–9; Wiseman (1985) pp. 3–16; Gruen
(1974) pp. 502–3. On the democratic element in the republican consti-

tution see North’s remarks (1990) and further below.
2 The most recent attempt to explain the republic’s fall is that of
Brunt (1988) pp. 1–92.

3 Plut. Comp. Cim./Luc. 1.
225
brought to an end and laws had been given to the Romans by

which they might henceforth live in peace and harmony.4
In my view, an attempt to explain the failure to realize these
ideals must take account not only of certain fundamental weak-
nesses in some of the laws but also of the attitude of the Roman
ruling nobility towards the constitution itself and, we may add, its
deviser. Viewed from the perspective of their late allegiances in the
civil war, these were a heterogeneous lot. Some had been with Sulla
since the day of his departure to the east. Others, in contrast, had
been followers of Marius or Cinna who had become reconciled to
their enemy. Again, some who had been enemies of Cinna showed,
for a time, no desire to make common cause with Sulla and only
joined him when the military situation appeared to warrant it.
Many, too, were senators who had been caught in the middle and
tried, in vain, to uphold the authority of the house by reconciling
Sulla and his enemies. Yet, they all deserve to be labelled the ‘Sullan
oligarchy’ for it was thanks to him they held their present position
and he clearly intended that they should run the state.5
Yet if, from one viewpoint, this is a mongrel assembly, from
another it shows great cohesion.6 The Roman oligarchy might not
agree on much but on one thing there was virtual unanimity: any
clear external threat to their position would be countered with vig-
our. Hence, for all of their differing motivation, Sertorius, Lepidus,
Spartacus and Catiline all went the same way. Such hesitation as we
do find may be attributed not to a fundamental self-doubt but to
the natural slowness with which a corporate body like the senate
sometimes moves and to a very real desire, in some cases, to avoid
civil war. One taste of this had been enough for most people.
But in the sphere of domestic policies no such cohesion is dis-
cernible. There, of course, the issue was not the survival of the
state and its ruling oligarchy7 but the laws by which they might
Keaveney (2005a) pp. 156–59.

4
Ibid., pp. 169–70.

5
6 From another perspective the entrenched nature of the Roman oli-
garchy has recently been emphasized by Burckhardt (1990) p. 87 and

North (1990) pp. 16–17.
7 The two were, of course, virtually synonymous in the mind of the
average Roman noble.

LUCIUS LICINIUS LUCULLUS AND HIS AGE 227
govern. Some, as might be expected, thought as Sulla himself had

done. Reverence for their late chief and, I would insist, some kind
of recognition, however dim, of the consequences of repeal led
them to oppose any alteration whatsoever in the constitution that
had been handed down. At the other extreme, we find men who
once served the Cinnan or Marian interest and who, though admit-
ted to favour, had lost none of their enthusiasm for the old cause.
Julius Caesar, for instance, never made any secret of his hatred for
the Sullan system. Somewhere between these extremes we may
place the majority of senators. These appear never to have whole-
heartedly accepted Sulla’s claims to be a great lawgiver and, in con-
sequence, they did not share his view that his laws remain immuta-
ble lest disaster befall the state. They were not, as we might think,
men imbued with a mission. We can detect among them no feeling
of being entrusted with a sacred charge that, on no account, was to
be betrayed. So, always provided there was no direct and immediate
threat to their own power, then they were perfectly amenable to
changes in the form of government which left the essential charac-
ter of the republic untouched, even though such changes might
possibly bring peril in the future.
This is nicely illustrated by what happened in the 70s. Then,
vigour in foreign and slackness in domestic policies alike conspired
to produce a set of conditions that were, ultimately, to be fatal to
the republic. Some scholars believe that from about the middle of
the second century the appetite of the Roman aristocracy for war
had diminished somewhat.8 Whatever the truth of this assertion,
there can be no doubt that when the time came to deal with
Lepidus and Sertorius the government had found itself faced with a
lack of suitably qualified generals and had had to have recourse to
the private citizen Pompey and to confer on him a special com-
mand.9
Parallel with, and in strong contrast to, this decisive action, we
have the dithering over the question of the tribunate. As I have
suggested, there were two great weaknesses in Sulla’s measures for
8 De Blois (1987) pp. 17–19.

9 Later in the same decade a similar problem with regard to Spartacus
was solved in a somewhat similar fashion by calling on Crassus, cf. MRR
2.116, 118.
this office. He left its natural constituency, the plebs, untouched

and, in barring holders of the office from further advancement, he,
contrary to his own intent, created the conditions for further agita-
tion. Of course his political heirs opposed this agitation but, in the
absence of his authority, they could do no more than temporarily
stay the course of events. Their auctoritas was simply not sufficient
to carry the majority with them.10 As I have argued, the nobility
could not or would not see in the revived tribunate a source of
immediate danger and the heirs of Sulla were simply not strong
enough politically to break their inertia.
By the end of the decade the consequences of senatorial poli-
cies are clear and both spheres can be seen to converge.
Pompey shared to the full the average noble’s commitment to
the republic as well as his lack of strong ideological commitment to
the present system. In his case, however, these characteristics went
hand in hand with a determination that he should be the first man
in the state. And in the restoration of full tribunician power he saw
a means to achieve that goal. Returning as victor from Spain, he
became consul for 70 and used his auctoritas to ensure that that res-
toration was carried out. Unlike the contemporary alterations in the
courts, this represents the re-introduction of a source of strife into
public life. A weapon for use against the senatorial interest had
once more become available. For Pompey it was to be the means
by which further great offices were to be conferred on himself.
But if the Roman nobility showed a willingness to live with
the consequence of yielding to agitation over the tribunate they
showed none whatsoever when it came to living with the conse-
quences of Pompey’s elevation. If they could not share Sulla’s view
of the tribunate they most certainly subscribed to the dictator’s
view of the menace Pompey was thought to pose. True, it was Sulla
himself who first raised Pompey up and turned his head with signal
honours but he had in time recognized he had created a monster
and, after his triumph, never employed his erstwhile protégé in
public office again. So, as I have suggested, it was chance that
brought Pompey back into public life. The state needed a soldier
and he was the only one available. I do not doubt that those who
gave him command saw two things very clearly: he was the man for
10 Keaveney (2005a) pp. 186–87.

the job but he was also the man to demand a high price for doing
it. In the hour of need the first consideration plainly outweighed
the second but when the time came to address the second then the
nobility can, in comfortable retrospect, be said to have been blind.
They simply refused to grant him the position he craved and even-
tually drove him into the First Triumvirate from which, in the end,
there came civil war.
It may very well be true that we are talking here of the limits
of the flexibility the Roman nobility showed with regard to Sulla’s
constitution. On certain laws they would yield; on others they
would not. A moment’s reflection will show, however, that we are
not actually talking about the violation of a particular piece of legis-
lation but of the essential spirit of Sulla’s constitution and that
spirit—which dictated that no man might grow to an excessive
greatness—was the very essence of the republican ethos, having of
course existed long before Sulla. The stubborn refusal of Lucullus’
generation to dilute it was to cost them dear.11
But what part did Lucullus himself play in these events? If we
disregard the more lurid colourings which Plutarch applies to it we
can accept the Greek biographer’s view that the Third Mithridatic
War marks the great division of Lucullus’ career. Early in that ca-
reer he entered into the friendship of Sulla. From that powerful
personality he learned the business of soldiering and imbibed his
political philosophy. The first, and perhaps most telling, evidence
for his devotion to that philosophy is to be found on the day Lu-
cullus joined Sulla on the road to Rome when all other officers
fled. Thus it came to pass that when Sulla died Lucullus naturally
found a place among those men who made it the aim of their po-
litical life to defend the work of his dead friend. What is remarkable
about this group is its relative powerlessness. They were unable to
prevent Aurelius Cotta making the first breach in the provisions for
the tribunate or to repeal his law, once passed. Lucullus’ own
blocking of Quinctius and his agitation won for them a mere res-
pite and in 70 they must needs yield to the superior auctoritas of
Pompey. This weakness of the political grouping to which he be-
11 Short-sighted this generation may have been, but few today, I sus-
pect, would join in the harsh condemnation visited upon it by scholars of
a previous time, cf. e.g. Holmes (1923) pp. 133–4.
longed is mirrored in Lucullus’ own advancement. He began splen-

didly under the aegis of Sulla and even enjoyed the benefit of spe-
cial legislation which enabled him to hold the praetorship suo anno
immediately after his aedileship. Yet, after this he suffers something
of an eclipse, certainly in comparison to Pompey. The extent of
this same eclipse can be seen in the matter of the Mithridatic com-
mand. This was not conferred upon him by universal acclaim.
Rather, he had to compete with the kind of mediocrities who were
responsible for so many of Rome’s disasters at this time. Despite
his years of service in both the Social and First Mithridatic Wars
people did not believe he was a soldier and it was only by forming a
judicious alliance with Cornelius Cethegus, a man whom he found
personally obnoxious, that he obtained what he desired.
His reaction to Pompey at this time is instructive. Although he
had no love for the man, his response to a request for aid from
Spain has rightly been described as statesmanlike. He recognized
that should Pompey return prematurely then this could only result
in strife in a state already hard pressed in other ways. Moreover it
was intolerable that the man best suited for the job should be de-
nied the supplies he needed in order to put an end to a renegade
whose very existence was an affront to the majesty of Rome. Years
later when Pompey came to claim his just reward for another suc-
cessful campaign Lucullus was to be less generous but, by then, he
was arguably a very different person.
The Third Mithridatic War marks a great psychological turn-
ing-point for Lucullus. For him personally it had ended disas-
trously. He had failed to wipe out Mithridates and had to leave the
task to one whom he likened to a vulture. Moreover, that same
vulture had rendered null and void all that he had done to erect
Pontus into a province. Developments at Rome in his absence
brought little cheer. The constitution he had laboured to defend
had had holes driven in it, and this was no event to be lamented in
the abstract, for it had brought immediate concrete consequences.
The restoration of the tribunate to full powers brought with it the
end of Lucullus’ command and the creation of new commands for
Pompey. A further depressing consideration was the fact that Lu-
cullus’ political allies were unable or unwilling to prevent his re-
placement and they continued to show their impotence when,
upon his return, he had to wait three years for a triumph. To com-
pound matters he found himself a laughing-stock through having

been cuckolded in a novel fashion while abroad.
Under these circumstances it should not cause surprise to find
Lucullus acting as he did. He seems to have come to the conclusion
that his auctoritas was not sufficient to permit him to play the part
that he himself might, and others certainly did, wish, namely that of
leader of the optimate interest. Instead, he determined to give more
time than heretofore to the arts of leisure. But such was his sense
of duty that he could not abandon public life altogether but instead
elected to support, in a secondary role, those men who pursued
policies of which he approved. His aim now was to achieve a judi-
cious balance between public and private activities.
That Lucullus abandoned his part as follower and took up that
of leader only to thwart Pompey’s request for land and an eastern
settlement is of considerable significance. No doubt like most of
his class he found Pompey’s pretensions in general unacceptable
and distasteful but there is, I feel, here an element of personal ran-
cour. I shall say a little more about this side of Lucullus’ character
shortly but here it is enough to observe that he was obviously in-
tent on paying back his foe for what had happened in the east. Lu-
cullus could evidently adopt what we called a statesmanlike ap-
proach to Pompey when his own position was not directly threat-
ened and it was a question of helping the latter in the field. When it
came to giving the acknowledgement for services rendered then
Lucullus shared fully the outlook of the Roman nobility and his
response was further sharpened by a deep sense of personal wrong.
It is hard not to feel a certain sympathy for Lucullus in what he did
but equally it has to be admitted that he did not act wisely. A mix-
ture of lofty republican idealism and a desire for revenge worthy of
his old friend Sulla combined to make of Lucullus the man who
drove Pompey into the Triumvirate. The man who fought to de-
fend Sulla’s constitution was ironically the man who made the first
move that precipitated the civil war in which it finally perished.
In person Lucullus was tall and, in the judgement of antiquity,
handsome.12 This somewhat subjective verdict cannot now be veri-
fied. So far as I know, no coin bears his portraits. Statues there
were once and also, one presumes, portrait busts but all have per-
12 Plut. Luc. 33.

ished.13 But, on the assumption the ancients were not mistaken,

then this commanding appearance, together with the sharp dress-
sense that one source tells us Lucullus possessed,14 cannot but have
served to increase the impact he made on others. For instance, I do
not see it as taking from that air of lofty hauteur with which he
treated his soldiers. Nor will he have been ignorant of how appear-
ance may aid oratorical delivery. His resolve to make his career in
the field rather than the forum meant that Lucullus could never
aspire to the achievements of a Cicero or a Hortensius but he was
accounted a useful speaker and as such can hardly have been un-
aware of the importance of appearance and gesture.15
We catch a glimpse of the power of Lucullus’ oratory when
we learn of how, in debate, he crushed the tribune Quinctius. But
there must have been other occasions—for instance, when he sued
for office—on which he managed to sway the populace with his
tongue. Yet it was not just his voice that won the affection of the
plebs. They greeted with approval the signal display he made of his
love for his brother by delaying his own aedileship until they could
both hold it together. This affection between Lucius and Marcus is
one of the most pleasing features of Lucullus’ career. Born, seem-
ingly, in their teens when they were left effectively fatherless, it en-
dured unto death. At the same time, it has to be said that popular
response to it was not unconditioned by the fact that the brothers
had, as aediles, provided some splendid shows for the people of
Rome. Further, we may note that Lucullus’ hold over the people
was, to say the least, uncertain. It was they, it will be remembered,
who gave ear to those who asked them to dismantle his command
and delay his triumph. The polluctum on the day of triumph did a
lot, I suspect, to restore the peoples’ confidence in Lucullus but,
regardless of whether this is a true conjecture or not, the scenes at
his funeral show that by then Lucullus had once more become the
darling of the plebs.
For those of us who believe that the role of the people in
Roman history should receive greater emphasis from historians
13 See, in particular, Plut. Cim. 2. For the alleged portrait bust found
at Sinope in the early 1950s see van Ooteghem (1959) fig. 14.
14 De Vir. Ill. 74, cf. Plut. Luc. 39.
15 Cf. Cic. Brut. 141–2.
than has been heretofore the case then, I would submit, Lucullus’
dealings with them are instructive.
To begin with, their attitude towards him is devoid of any-
thing which might, however remotely, be described as an ideologi-
cal colouring, for they showered their favours on someone who
made no secret of the fact that he would keep firmly bound the
shackles that held fast their magistrate, the tribune. One of the
ways in which they were induced to do this was by the provision of
games and shows. This situation, I suppose, might be described as
one of political immaturity but it might also be indicative of an en-
grained hard-headed, albeit narrow, realism. In the absence of any
desire for revolution or change the sovereign people were well
aware that, as things stood, they were in a position to extract some-
thing from those who had, perforce, to seek their votes. On the
other hand, ‘whimsical’ is perhaps the best word to apply to the
other motive that fuelled the plebs at this time. They helped Lucul-
lus to the praetorship simply because they liked the way he had
treated his brother.
But Lucullus also illustrates well the point that he who gains
the favour of the people, by whatever means, can, in an instant,
lose it again. The history of the later republic is littered with in-
stances of this kind.16 In Lucullus’ case it was obviously his absence
that was fatal to him. Gone meant forgotten, and new darlings with
new proposals came to take his place. But what is lost can some-
times be easily regained. A good dinner did much to restore public
confidence in Lucullus.
In sum, those who would profit by Lucullus’ experiences must
needs be ready to confer material benefit and be alert to the possi-
bilities presented by a capricious people. They must also recognize
that what they have gained may not be lasting.17
If we now go behind that tall imposing figure that Lucullus
presents to the world we detect there something that can best be
described as a yielding quality. Could we be sure he was not already
in the grip of a debilitating illness, then his humiliation at the hands
16 Saturninus and Sulla, for instance.

17 A comparison with the efforts of Livius Drusus to woo the plebs
in 91 might, I think, be useful. See the detailed discussion in Keaveney
(2005) pp. 87–92.
of Caesar would illustrate this point to a nicety. In the face of the

onslaught Lucullus simply collapsed. As it is, however, we can still
point to his early encounter with Glabrio. Then, it will be remem-
bered, he meekly accepted the rebuke of the angry tribune. In its
most benign aspect this tendency showed itself in the qualities of
constancy and mildness which earned him the friendship of Sulla.
But it has a darker side, too. We have spoken of the psychological
blows struck by the Third Mithridatic War and its aftermath and
how they caused Lucullus to radically re-think his position in public
life. Perhaps it is not altogether fanciful to suggest that a stronger
character might have come to a different conclusion. As it was,
Lucullus’ tendency to yield may have predisposed him to succumb.
This streak of quietism may also be invoked to illuminate cer-
tain other aspects of his political career. It may, for instance, ex-
plain why it is that although Lucullus plainly did not lack political
ambition we do not detect in him that limitless thirst for power and
glory which characterizes the likes of Caesar and Pompey. More-
over, this trait may partly explain why, although we laud certain of
his acts as statesmanlike, we would deny him the title of ‘states-
man’. In what may be described as his political heyday, namely the
years before the Mithridatic War, we do not find him bringing for-
ward bold new legislation or proposing daring initiatives. Instead, a
conservative in every sense of the word, he is content merely to be
the loyal servant of a great tradition. He can attend to detail and
react to individual events but seems to lack any broad general con-
cept of the problems of his age. A recalcitrant tribune needs to be
squashed; Lucullus will do the squashing. For the good of the state
Pompey must be helped; Lucullus, statesmanlike, will provide that
help. Sulla’s arrangements for the tribunate as a whole are proving
unworkable; Lucullus has no solution to offer. Given that Lucullus
was like this in the days of hope, it becomes readily explicable why,
when disappointment came, he abandoned any pretence of being a
political leader and elected to follow another.
We have to recognize, though, that like many placid people
Lucullus could be exceedingly dangerous. A great deal was needed
to prod him into action but once roused the reaction was often far
more terrible than that from people with a more choleric disposi-
tion. When his own or his family’s position or honour was threat-
ened then Lucullus proved implacable. This mild mannered man
conducted a feud with the Servilii that was said to be the most in-
tense in Roman history, and pursued Pompey relentlessly for the

wrongs done him in Asia. It is behaviour like unto that of his friend
Sulla.
Indeed, mention of Sulla reminds us that the great dictator did
not instruct Lucullus solely in matters military and political but also
had a hand in his religious development. It was from this source
that Lucullus learned to put his faith in dreams for it was therein
that the gods sent their surest messages. Like Sulla, he also viewed
Hercules as the god of victory and duly offered him sacrifice upon
his return to Rome. For the rest Lucullus’ religious beliefs fall into
a fairly conventional Roman pattern. Like many of his class he held
a priesthood. In his case this was the augurate and his skill in the
craft may, I suggest, have steeled his resolve on the day of Ti-
granocerta. Omens, too, he held in respect as on that day in Phry-
gia when he pulled back from battle after a burning object fell from
the sky. Again, like many Romans abroad, he paid due reverence to
local gods but carefully assimilated them to his own pantheon.
Thus the Persian Artemis was thanked for help in crossing the Eu-
phrates and was duly transformed into that Diana who had a shrine
at Nemi.
‘Conventional’, too, is the word which comes readiest to mind
when we try to place Lucullus in his social setting, for his lifestyle
resembles closely that of many other aristocrats of the day. To un-
derstand it we must reject moralizing, ancient and modern, and
jettison too misplaced speculation about its deleterious effects on
mind and morals.18 That done, we discover a world where a privi-
leged élite ruled the vast majority of mankind who lived at subsis-
tence level or hovered a little above or below it. The Roman nobil-
ity moved in a setting not unlike our own eighteenth century as
they passed from senate house to town house to country house.
The profits of empire had provided them with the means not only
to procure all comforts but also to adorn their persons and prop-
erty. Lucullus was only one of the many who took full advantage of
the opportunity thus presented.
Hand in hand with the increased amenities in the physical
sphere went new possibilities to acquire the goods of the mind. At
a time when proficiency in Greek had grown we find Lucullus hav-
18 There is much good sense in Holmes (1923) pp. 92–4.

ing sufficient command of the language to compose a history in it.

He turned to Greek philosophy, too, but in a way that was essen-
tially Roman. He shunned its more austere and abstract aspects
and, with the instinct of a true gentleman, interested himself chiefly
in the comforts which some believe it may bring. Aesthetic satisfac-
tion was found also in the poetry of Archias and the assembly of an
art collection. The design, building and adorning of villas fulfilled a
similar function. That these were luxuriously appointed we need
not doubt but, over and above this, we detect in them the desire to
create something of beauty and distinction.
In an age which can be broadly characterized as philhellenic
Lucullus’ fondness for the Greeks and things Greek can still be
described as something exceptional. The proof of this is to be
found in his treatment of places like Amisus. This town had long
defied him, yet upon its capture it was restored and repaired and it
owed this indulgence to the fact that it was a Greek city. Few of his
contemporaries, one imagines, would have carried their philhellen-
ism this far. Still, we must beware lest we assume from this open-
ness and sensitivity to things Greek that Lucullus would have had
an insight into the minds and characters of other peoples besides.
The truth is far otherwise and this point is illustrated by the case of
Tigranes.
For Lucullus philhellenism wore two aspects: the cerebral and
the emotional. By the cerebral I mean the intellectual delight he
took in Greek arts and letters; by the emotional the delight he took
in the company of living Greeks. There can, I think, be no doubt
that he actually liked Greeks. Now, as regards Tigranes, I feel it
safe to say empathy was completely lacking. He shared the com-
mon Hellenic view that he was a very pompous and a very nasty
tyrant. And when the emotional element was lacking, so, too, was
the cerebral. Lucullus simply could not bring himself to make the
effort required to acquire an understanding on the intellectual plane
of a man whom he instinctively detested. We know the conse-
quences. The man who had taken pains to smooth down a trouble-
some tribune provoked a great king into war. In any enumeration
of Lucullus’ talents diplomatic capacity must rank low.
That special favour in time of war which, as we have just
noted, was accorded to places like Amisus is not to be found in the
civil sphere. Probity and correctness, not weakness and indulgence
are the hallmarks of Lucullus’ provincial administration. This is
observable from the very first in the way he ran Asia as pro-
quaestor.19 Two tasks were allotted him: the collection of revenues
and the reduction of Mytilene. The money he gathered with scru-
pulous fairness, avoiding all abuse, and to Mytilene he gave the
chance to avoid extreme punishment by timely surrender. But we
have no reason to suppose that he attempted to reduce the amount
of cash demanded or that he proposed Mytilene should escape all
chastisement for what it had done. With his proconsulate the pat-
tern repeats itself. What is vicious is cut away but the provincials
were not permitted to dodge or evade obligations held to be right
and lawful. Thus a monstrous and unfair debt-burden was wiped
out but, at the same time, the principle that Asia should contribute
to its own defence was rigidly adhered to. Allies were required to
supply men and materials and special taxes were levied to meet the
costs of the war.
Surveying Lucullus’ career in its entirety, I have formed the
impression that it may very well be that he was a happier man in
Asia than he ever was in Rome. In marked contrast to the vicissi-
tudes and complexities of political life, the soldier’s life is one of
comparative simplicity and Lucullus seems to have welcomed that
simplicity. Until near the end and its attendant difficulties there is
no trace of faltering, no hesitation, no doubt and nothing of that
occasional unsureness of touch which we detected in Lucullus the
politician. Serene master of his art he applies with equal facility his
own especial strategy of attrition or, at Tigranocerta, the tactics of
the set battle. The man who elected to be led elsewhere is here
clearly the leader.20 Naturally, there is a subjective element in this
verdict but there is one fact which we cannot escape as we ponder
the life of Lucullus. On a rough estimate, twenty-one years of that
life were spent, by a man often branded as a sybarite, with the col-
ours.
19 Note, too, the careful investigation before the absolution of

Chaeroneia and the harsh tone adopted towards Cyrene at about the same
time.
20 There may be a hint of this in Plut. Luc. 33 where in effect he says
Lucullus expected to be obeyed without question. This is surely a man

who enjoys a post of great responsibility where he does not have to share
that responsibility or defer to the sensibilities of others, cf. Plut. Luc. 14.
One of the most striking features of the later Roman republic

is the emergence of what we may call ‘professional armies’.21 The
old-style citizen militia had not, of course, entirely died out but,
from the time of Marius’ reforms in the late second century, we can
detect a change in some of the armies Rome put into the field.
They are composed of men whose way of life is soldiering.22 The
force with which Lucullus fought Mithridates displays many of the
features that we associate with such a professional army.
To start at the top, or rather near the top. We know that very
many of Lucullus’ officers were not following the time-honoured
practice of using the army as an entrée into public life. Rather, they
are men who are making a career of the army. As such, they fit eas-
ily into a pattern discernible elsewhere at this time. They, like oth-
ers of their type, represent a new sort of professional officer.23
Passing from top to bottom, so to speak, we find the rankers
of Lucullus’ army fulfilling the most important pre-requisite for
professionalization: length of service. At a minimum Lucullus’ men
will have seen seven years’ service (71-67) and most of them, nota-
bly the Fimbrians, will have had considerably more. Even those
who would deny the existence of the kind of army I am attempting
to describe here24 readily admit that Roman soldiers of this time,
whatever their origin, be it urban or rural, were often bound to It-
aly by only the most tenuous links. It has been suggested, for in-
stance, that two or three campaigning seasons would be enough to
21 For reasons which will become clear shortly I share De Blois’s
anxiety (1987 p. 57) that we should use the plural.

22 The classic discussion of this is Gabba (1976) pp. 1–69.
23 Cf. ch. 4. In his important discussion of the career officer, (1958)
pp. 59–69, Smith (p. 63) remarks that the list of legates for 74 is particu-
larly instructive for those who would study the phenomenon. Note, too,
that contrast with Pompey’s legates in 67, cf. Seager(1979) pp. 36–7,
brings out the transitional nature of the age. Old and new subsist together.
24 Brunt’s objection, (1988) pp. 255–6, 267–9, to the term ‘profes-
sional army’ and his seeming attempt to explain away the phenomenon
lack cogency. He points out that lengths of service might vary and that
many served only for a short time. Thus a man on enlistment could never
count on having a lengthy military career before him. This, of course,
does not address the problem of what would happen to a recruit, willing
or unwilling, who did find himself on long-term service. Cf. Gabba (1976)
pp. 25–6.
ruin many a peasant.25 We might add that in many cases there may
have been no ties at all. That was why they became soldiers in the
first place.26
With this in mind, it is easy to see why, when Lucullus was
done with them, the bulk of his army, and not just the Fimbrians,
remained to serve with Pompey.27 Not only had their attachment to
Italy been weakened by this time but, I suggest, many must have
taken upon themselves new obligations in Asia.28 We can also
claim, I think, that they had become habituated to their situation.
Whatever vocation they might have had on enlistment (and many
may have had none at all) had been forgotten, and soldiering had
become their trade.
In other words, in 67 we are witnessing a body of professional
warriors embracing a further opportunity to ply their craft rather
than packing up and going home.29 For such people material re-
ward takes the form of booty and donatives on campaign with a
parcel of land at its end.30 To judge from the behaviour of Lucul-
lus’ troops, booty assumed a far greater immediate importance in
their eyes than did the distant prospect of a farm. We hear a great
deal about that booty or the alleged lack of it but very little about
the farm. So far as I am aware, it is mentioned only in the course of
Clodius’ mutinous harangue and then its context is significant. He
told his audience that Pompey’s men were now settled on the land.
In contrast with the heavy emphasis laid on present toil without
immediate remuneration, the farm is described as something re-
mote. It could be said to belong to an idyllic, albeit realizable fu-
25 Brunt (1988) pp. 253–6.

26 Smith (1958) pp. 44–58; Gabba (1976) p. 39.
27 Ch. 6.
28 See Sallust’s sour comment on Roman soldiers and foreign women
(Cat. 11.6).
29 This was long ago recognized as characteristic of the professional
army by Hugh Last, apud Brunt (1988) p. 267, whose own denial of its
validity is grounded in his failure to distinguish between the consequences
of short-term and long-term service.
30 Donative: see e.g. App. BC 4.89, 118. Booty: Harris (1979) pp. 50,
56, 102–3. Land: Gabba (1976) pp. 47–8; Smith (1958) pp. 51–2 and fur-
ther below (n. 34).
ture.31 Thus I would conclude that while the professional soldier

did indeed truly want land at his career’s end he was quite willing to
act as Lucullus’ men did and postpone that end and its reward if a
fresh campaign offered the prospects of enrichment.32
Up to this time I have described the soldier’s desire for land as
a kind of ideal and I should like to continue with this theme for a
little while. That he should cherish this ideal was but natural. After
all, agriculture was the means of livelihood of the vast majority of
the population of the ancient world and many of these soldiers
were themselves originally of rural origin. Furthermore, the notion
that the Roman army should be composed of sturdy independent
peasants, having received a fillip in the Gracchan age,33 was still
dominant and to return to the land, after a campaign however long,
was plainly consonant with this belief. But, however understand-
able the soldiers’ dream may be, it wears a tinge of the anachronis-
tic, for these men represent something new in Roman history. They
are professional soldiers, not a part-time militia or the like.
So what, in effect, is happening here is that career soldiers,
with a tenuous connection to the land, are being invited to turn
themselves into peasants. New men are being required to conform
to old patterns. Until the time came to actually settle down there is
every reason to suppose that, being only dimly aware of the
changes that had come about in the world, the soldiers were per-
fectly happy to do just that. But, on the day on which ideal be-
comes reality, the illusory quality of the cherished dream is revealed
to them and us. True many of these men did become contented
farmers but others, spoiled by years of soldiering, lacked the will or
the ability to succeed and came to eventual ruin. Indeed, some,
more reckless or perhaps just wiser in their generation, did not
even try but sold their holdings for ready money.34
Plut. Luc. 34.

31
Although he seems to deny it, the other instances gathered by

32
Brunt (1988) pp. 268–9 appear to support this thesis.

33 Plut. Tib. Gracch. 9.
34 Keaveney (1982a) pp. 539–43. The case presented there has not, in
my opinion, been answered by Brunt (1988) pp. 267–73 but some further
points may be noted. Brunt pp. 243 n. 12, 245 denies that the urban plebs
were, interested in land allotments. The evidence suggests precisely the
opposite, cf. Keaveney (2005) pp. 47–92 and note the uneasy admission
It is generally conceded that the great military men of the late

republic used armies of the type we are talking about as the instru-
ments with which to wage their civil wars. Lucullus, of course, does
not belong in the number of such men but the very end of his mili-
tary career does, in its own fashion, furnish a concrete and immedi-
ate illustration of the set of conditions that theorists assure us must
prevail before one can lead a revolutionary army and, in this par-
ticular instance especially, of the impossibility of such leadership in
their absence. An army must be well disciplined and possess an
esprit de corps, it should love its commander, have received or ex-
pect to receive substantial reward from him and, in what is obvi-
ously an ambiguous situation, believe in the rightness of his cause.35
At the beginning of 67 Lucullus proposed to resume his war
against Mithridates, even though command had now been given to
Glabrio. Compared with what Caesar was soon to do, this may
seem like a comparatively minor transgression but it was definitely
against the law and his troops insisted on this point. They would
not accept the correctness of his decision and, standing firmly by
of Brunt p. 251. Since by common consent these people would not have
made good farmers their case here parallels that of the soldier: they sub-
scribed to an ideal which was for them outmoded also, an ideal that, we
may remark, finds its most eloquent expression in the Georgics of Vergil, a
man whose capacity for physical toil probably equalled that of another
eulogizer of the simple existence, Alexander Pope (‘Ode on Solitude’). It
may be further remarked that C. Gracchus seems to have known his men
well, for he would only admit the well-to-do to his colonies (Plut. C.
Gracch. 9). Grants of land, rather than cash on discharge, suited both re-
cipient and giver. For the recipient it meant the fulfilment of what his
whole education and upbringing had taught him to expect was but natural.
For the donor it meant, as Brunt emphasizes, that a potentially dangerous
element in society had been neutralized by being offered security. I would
emphasize in turn that this was an objective that was not always achieved.
Those who sold up immediately may have been more realistic and may
have had their appreciation of ready cash sharpened by handling large
quantities of booty. At any rate, Brunt himself does concede that one pos-
sible interpretation of Augustus’ cash donative of 13 is that he recognized
that soldiers did not always make good farmers.
35 De Blois (1987) pp. 19–21, 55–6, 58–9. For concrete illustrations in
the period of civil wars see e.g. App. BC 2.3, 4.89, 100, 118–19, 123, 134,
5.17, 128.
the letter of the law, they refused to follow him. Yet, at the same
time, they did not fall apart. Through a long and difficult campaign
their relations with their general had, to say the least of it, lacked
cordiality. Yet they had obeyed him. Herein, I think, we may detect
not just the efficiency of the professional but the sentiment of the
Roman who recognized where his duty to his commander and to
the state lay. Now, with Lucullus powerless, his troops still carefully
contrived to maintain their discipline and nurtured their esprit de
corps.
Nobody will deny, though, that the long history of bad rela-
tions between the commander and his troops coloured their deci-
sion in that spring of 67. They had had, it is true, substantial booty
from him but, thanks to Lucullus’ tactless handling of the issue,
they felt no gratitude but rather saw him as a mean and stingy
man—and, over and above that, they found his haughty manners
intolerable. Yet these traits need not have proved fatal to Lucullus
for even in civil war, when discipline may be relaxed, severity can
bring results.36 What it was that doomed this last enterprise of his
was the fact that he did not possess a vital but ill-defined quality:
the ability to win mens’ hearts.37
In this brief essay we have tried to set Lucullus firmly in the
world to which he belonged. We may close it then, perhaps, by
setting him against the three men who played the most important
part in his career: Sulla, Pompey and Caesar. The first was respon-
sible for launching that career and giving Lucullus his military and
political education. Throughout it Pompey was a constant and of-
ten dangerous rival while Caesar, however inadvertently, brought it
to an end. In this quartet we have personified the gradual break-
down of the old republican ideal and its replacement by the impe-
rial or autocratic outlook.
Sulla may be seen as the last great representative of the old re-
publican tradition. He wished merely to gain honour and glory for
himself and his house by distinguished service to the state. Unfor-
tunately, in his defence of the republic he found himself forced to
use methods not seen before and, in the end, came, temporarily, to
Cf. App. BC 4.123, Iber. 85.

36
It is worth remarking, perhaps, that this is strangely at variance

37
with his ability to woo the plebs.

a position of power that some, at any rate, could claim was simply
incompatible with the views he professed to hold. So it was that his
legacy to the next generation was a contradictory one: a set of re-
publican principles and an example that might be followed by any-
body who wanted to overthrow the republic.
Both Lucullus and Pompey had served under Sulla but, as the
former was closer to the great dictator, it was but natural that he
should absorb to the full his friend’s principles while avoiding his
example. Like a true Sullan republican his whole career was de-
voted to public service and to countering threats to the constitu-
tion. Nowhere is there the slightest hint that he proposed to use
force to make himself master. With Pompey we mark a subtle
change. He too is a republican but his republic is not Sulla’s. It is a
place where he has the first place and to achieve that place he is
ready to profit by Sulla’s example. No less than Lucullus he had no
intention of turning his arms against the state but he was not above
hinting that he might. There was much to be gained by playing on
fearful memories. With Caesar there is no such ambiguity. He held
Sulla and his principles in contempt but, on the day he crossed the
Rubicon, showed he had absorbed fully his example and that he
proposed to destroy the state using the same methods Sulla had
once used in its defence.
On this note we may pass our final verdict on Lucullus and
one that is, hopefully, more judicious than that allegedly given by
Pompey and Crassus.38 A cultured and humane man, possessed of
many talents, he did much good in his own lifetime and if he failed
of greatness it may very well be because he lacked what was need-
ful to achieve it in that age: ruthlessness.
38 For a severe modern judgement see Villoresi (1939) pp. 199–201.

APPENDIX 1
ASIA 81–79
In the standard works of reference,1 the sequence of Asian gover-
nors immediately post Sulla and the events of the period are tabu-
lated as follows:2
84–81: Murena governor of Asia.
81: Ordered to desist from making war on Mithridates,
Murena goes home to celebrate a triumph. He is replaced as gover-
nor by M. Minucius Thermus.
80: Thermus, possibly with the aid of Lucullus, captures
Mytilene. Both then return home. C. Claudius Nero arrives as gov-
ernor.
79: Nero’s governorship continues into this year.
In my view, this scheme stands in need of some considerable
revision. Let us begin with Murena and his quaestor Lucullus.
The embassy of Aulus Gabinius which made Murena desist
from making war on the king is obviously to be located somewhere
in 81.3 It should however be carefully noted that Gabinius seems to
have been concerned solely with hostilities. We are not told he
brought news of Murena’s successor and he himself certainly did
not fill that role. Thus news of, or the arrival of, a new governor
must be dated to late 81 or conceivably even 80. Furthermore, we
may observe that, such is the state of our evidence, 80 is as likely a
date for Murena’s triumph as is 81.4 With regard to Lucullus we
1MRR; Magie (1950); Jashemski (1950).

2For some dissent see Butler and Cary (1966) on Suet. Div. Jul. 2 and
Ormerod (1978) p. 214.
3 Keaveney (1983b) pp. 185–6.
4 Sources: MRR 2.77. Cf. Badian (1955).
245
know he was elected in absentia to one of the aedileships of 79.5 It

therefore follows that the accepted date for his departure from
Asia—80—is the correct one. He was surely elected in that year
precisely because it was known he had started (or was about to
start) for home.
Confronted with this evidence, it seems to me that three re-
constructions of events are possible:
(a) In 81 Murena, hearing news of his replacement, quitted
the province before the arrival of his successor. He would then
have left Asia in the charge of Lucullus as proquaestor pro praetore and
the latter would have handed it over to the new governor in 80.
(b) In 81 Murena handed over the province to a successor,
leaving Lucullus to serve under the newcomer.
(c) In 80 Murena yielded to his successor and took Lucullus
home with him.
Information about governors who left a province before their
successor’s arrival is scant6 but what we do know is suggestive. So
far as I have been able to discover, the only circumstances under
which a governor might quit his province in this way would be if
he had to preside over an election or, after the change in the law in
the 60s requiring personal candidature,7 if he wished to stand for
election himself. A good example of the former circumstances is
furnished by Albinus in 110,8 while the latter finds illustration in
Murena’s own son in 639 and in P. Considius Longus in 50.10 Aside
from such occasions, all our evidence points towards awaiting
one’s successor as being the norm. Thus Marshall (1972) p. 902 n.
5 MRR 2.83.
6 For instance, governors operating under the Lex Pompeia cannot be
invoked—see Marshall (1972). Temporary absence for military reasons
(cf. e.g. MRR 1.556) is self-evidently not relevant either.
7 Greenidge (1911) p. 187.
8 MRR 1.543.
9 MRR 2.169.
10 That is assuming that Sumner (1971) p. 268 n. 41 is correct in his
reconstruction of this man’s career against Marshall (1972) p. 900 n. 53

who follows Jashemski (1950) p. 133. In favour of Sumner it may be
noted that the sources (MRR 2.250) speak only of Longus’ desire for a
consulship and have nothing to say about necessity to meet the require-
ments of the Lex Pompeia (n. 6 above).
APPENDIX 1 247
59 points out that Dig. 1.16.10.1 requires a man to continue with

his duties until his replacement arrives in the province and he sug-
gests this was the practice of the republic. This conclusion is sup-
ported by a clause in the Lex Cornelia de maiestate—surely giving leg-
islative force to what was previously customary—decreeing that a
governor should leave his province within thirty days of his succes-
sor’s arrival. The clear implication of such an ordinance is that it
was normal to await one’s successor. But this practice held poten-
tial dangers that Sulla now intended to legislate against.11 We are,
indeed, fortunate in having an account of an occasion where, when
a man left with good cause before his successor came, it was seen
as being a trifle out of the ordinary by the author. When Caesar
quitted Spain in 60 to seek the consulship Suetonius explicitly
states he did so non exspectato successore. The addition of this circum-
stantial gloss strongly suggests he saw Caesar’s behaviour as un-
usual.12
Thus we see that it was usual for a governor to await his suc-
cessor unless he could show good cause, which appears to be de-
fined as the need to preside over or the wish to take part in an elec-
tion. Turning now to Murena, we can see no reason why he should
not have awaited his replacement. He certainly could not claim
good cause under either of the two headings we have given. It
might be argued that the desire to triumph (assuming he had at this
point expectations of a triumph)13 could constitute good cause but
there seems to be nothing in the sources to suggest such an idea. In
fact, the attested good cause is bound up with dates. That is to say,
in order to preside over or participate in an election one had to be
in Rome by a certain date and hence comes the concession. Tri-
umphs, however, may be celebrated at any time and so no claim
could be entered under this head. Indeed, it will be recalled that in
11 Keaveney (1983b) pp. 199–202; Badian (1965) p. 112; Marshall
(1972) p. 902 n. 58 also invokes the clause in the Lex Cornelia and the Lex
Julia de pecuniis repetundis that forbade a governor to leave his province dur-
ing his term of office. Plainly this was aimed mainly at those who would
wander abroad to do mischief but it is reasonable to suppose it would also
bind those who were simply in a hurry to go home.
12 Div. Jul. 18. Cf. MRR 2.184 and n. 14 below.
13 On this point see discussion below.
the late republic people sometimes waited just outside Rome for a
considerable period before triumphing.14
It might, of course, be argued that after his experiences there
Murena would be only too anxious to leave Asia at the first possi-
ble moment but this is not necessarily so. The indications, such as
they are, would seem to suggest that he regarded his defeat at the
hands of Mithridates as little more than a temporary set-back that
might be remedied in time. It should be borne steadily in mind that
he had contrived to be hailed imperator and showed no inclination
whatsoever to end the war until he got a direct order from Sulla to
do so.15 Moreover, Cicero was to claim that Sulla had recalled
Murena from a war in which he was beating the king, implying that
had Murena been left where he was he would have toppled Mithri-
dates from his throne.16 Since Cicero knew the family it is possible
the germ of this idea came from the Murenae, among whom it
could have been a commonplace that this member could have won
his war if Sulla had not interfered.
And even if this reconstruction of Murena’s frame of mind is
not acceptable there is one other point to consider. Since Murena
had no good cause for a premature departure, is it likely he would
risk the wrath of Sulla by departing before he should, that Sulla
who, at this very moment, was bringing order into a chaotic world?
Therefore, it appears tolerably clear that Murena would not
leave Asia until the new governor arrived. We may then rule out
possibility (a) and we can go on to consider (b) and (c) together.
Now whether Murena’s successor was Thermus or Nero, both
were of praetorian rank. But 81 was the year of the promulgation
of leges Corneliae as a result of which it became usual for praetors to
remain in Rome during their year of office and to proceed to their
14 Suet. Div. Jul. 18 (ad triumphum simul consulatumque decessit) should not
be taken to mean that Caesar gave his desire to triumph as his reason for
leaving Spain. What he sought was special permission to triumph. The
very fact that this was refused but that he was still allowed to proceed
with his candidature shows clearly what the legal basis of his return was.
Cf. Gelzer (1968) p. 64. For an example of a man kept waiting for a tri-
umph see MRR 2.168.
15 Imperator: MRR 2.70.
16 Leg. Man. 8.
APPENDIX 1 249
province in the next year.17 In this respect it should be noted that

the contemporary Cn. Cornelius Dolabella seems to have acted
after such a fashion. He was praetor in 81 and then went to govern
Cilicia in 80 (see below). So it follows that we would not expect the
new governor to appear in Asia until 80. At this point the evidence
concerning Lucullus becomes of critical importance since it sup-
ports this conclusion and shows possibility (b) to be untenable. The
vital point is this: the new governor would have his own quaestor.
Why then should he employ Lucullus? Unlike Sulla a few years ear-
lier, Murena, so far as we know, had no reason for swapping
quaestors;18 indeed, the task for which Lucullus had been seconded
in the first place (collecting the revenues) was now complete. His
tour of duty as pro-quaestor had already been far longer than was
normal.19 He could therefore reasonably expect to go home. So,
since we know of no reason why Lucullus should want to stay20 or
why Murena should want to leave him, we must reject (b) and as-
sume that Lucullus quitted the province with his chief.21 And since
we know that Lucullus’ departure fell in 80, so too must Murena’s.
But who, then, succeeded Murena? In considering this ques-
tion we discover that no sources give us an exact date for the prae-
torship of Nero or Thermus but they do furnish us with chrono-
logical data about the period of their governorships.22
Nero’s governorship coincided in whole, or in part, with that
of Cn. Dolabella who served in Cilicia in the years 80–79.23 We
know this because he became embroiled in the depredations of
Dolabella’s legate, Verres. And it is the record of those depreda-
tions that will help us to determine the exact degree of overlap be-
tween Nero and Dolabella. Cicero’s account of Verres’ marauding
is long and vivid, and such is the scale of the man’s activities that it
is certain they embraced both of the years 80 and 79.24 The diffi-
17 Keaveney (2005a) p. 143.

18 Cf. Keaveney (1984a) pp. 119–21.
19 See Badian (1983) pp. 156–71 and Sumner (1973) pp. 113–14.
20 As will be made clear shortly, the siege of Mytilene was not a rea-
son.
21 Cf. MRR 3.106.
22 MRR 2.76, 80, 81.
23 Jashemski (1950) p. 147.
24 2 Verr. 1.41–102.
culty is, of course, that it does not seem possible to say exactly
where the enormities of 80 cease and those of 79 begin. We are
fortunate, however, in being able to date one vitally important inci-
dent. Verres’ looting of the temple of Juno on Samos plainly took
place on his outward voyage in 80.25 It would therefore seem rea-
sonable to suppose that the complaint of the Samians to Nero took
place soon after, since we do not know of any reason why they
should delay. Thus we have here evidence for Nero’s presence in
Asia fairly early in 80. The riot at Lampsacus and the subsequent
court-case are less easy to date. But, to judge from Cicero’s narra-
tive, late 80 is a possibility, although early 79 cannot be ruled out.26
I would suggest that the most natural conclusion to draw from all
of this is that Nero, like Dolabella, held the praetorship in 81 and
that he became governor of Asia in 80. It remains for us to demon-
strate that what we know of Thermus is in harmony with this con-
clusion.
The date of Thermus’ pro-praetorship is inextricably bound
up with the fact that he captured Mytilene. And the date of that
capture can be deduced only from Liv. Ep. 89. This is a narrative
sequence of the events of the years 82–79 with accounts of domes-
tic events or groups of events alternating with similar notices in the
foreign sphere. The fall of Mytilene is the last event mentioned in
this epitome and it is preceded by a notice of the capture of Vola-
terrae which occurred in 7927 and followed by the opening sentence
of Ep. 90 which tells of the death of Sulla in 78. It would thus ap-
pear that the fall of Mytilene is contemporary with or posterior to
the fall of Volaterrae. The use of the word quoque suggests contem-
porary and this gives us a date of 79.28
The possible objections to this conclusion dissolve on closer
scrutiny. So far as I am aware, the date of 80 for the fall of Mytilene
is based on two assumptions: Lucullus’ presence at the fall and
Thermus’ presence in Asia in 80. I shall now try to show that both
assumptions are false.
25 Ibid. 1.50.
26 Ibid. 1.63–76.
27 Lic. 32F.
28 See app. 2 for some further remarks on the epitome.
APPENDIX 1 251
The alleged presence of Lucullus at the capture29 rests on

nothing more than making Plut. Luc. 4 say what he does not say.
Nowhere in the passage does Plutarch say Lucullus captured
Mytilene.30
But was Thermus in the province in 80? As we know that
Julius Caesar served on his staff this might suggest he was.31 Since
Caesar might be expected to want to get out of Sulla’s Rome as
quickly as possible he would attach himself to the very first avail-
able governor. However, this is not necessarily so. Once he had
been pardoned, Caesar had nothing to fear from Sulla. Certainly
Suetonius does not say (Div. Jul. 2) that fear was the motive for his
departure and the one place where we do find this motive attrib-
uted to him does not inspire confidence. It occurs in Plutarch’s
confused account (Caes. 1), where it carries about as much weight
as the suggestion in Cic. 3 that Cicero travelled because of a like
fear.32 In fact, as Gelzer (1968) p. 22 n. 2 points out, the company
he kept is a sufficient indication of the extent of his rehabilitation.
After serving under Thermus, who was a late convert to the Sullan
cause, he joined Servilius Vatia, a partisan of long standing.33 Thus
there is no compelling reason why we should put Caesar’s arrival in
the east in 80.
In fact, while his actions can be plausibly fitted into 79 we en-
counter grave difficulties if we try to assign them to 80. We are told
Thermus sent him to Bithynia to collect ships.34 Two conclusions
29 MRR 2.81; Magie (1950) 2 p. 1124 n. 41.

30 The detail of the slaves and booty invoked by Magie is not decisive.
They could have come from the territory of Mytilene. There was certainly
booty of some kind in Lucullus’ camp when the townsfolk attacked it.
Defeat before the walls does not, of course, mean the end of the siege. Cf.
e.g. App. Mith. 32. For a further factor that may have helped prolong re-
sistance see below n. 35.
31 MRR 2.78.
32 Keaveney (1982d) pp. 133–4, (2005a) p. 172. It should be further
observed that his return to Rome in 78 is not represented by Suet. Div. Jul.
3 as coming about because a threat to his life had been lifted but because
he saw advantages to himself in the contemporary political situation. Cf.
Gelzer (1968) p. 22.
33 Keaveney (1984a) pp. 128, 140. For Caesar and Servilius see below.
34 Suet. Div. Jul. 2.
flow from this. In the first place, it is a further indication Lucullus

had nothing to do with the capture of Mytilene. If he had then we
might expect Thermus to have the services of his fleet and not to
be compelled to raise ships from an ally.35 Second, it means that
whichever year (80 or 79) Mytilene fell it would have to happen
some way into that particular year. The prosecution of the siege
would depend on the gathering of the fleet and that would take
some time. Now if 80 is our chosen year and we assume that the
departure of Lucullus, the arrival of Thermus and the despatch of
Caesar all took place around the same time early in the year then
the latter’s return at some time later cannot be reconciled with
something we have already observed: the presence of Nero in the
province in early 80. If, however, we assume Thermus arrived early
in 79 and captured that town some way into that year then, self-
evidently, the problem vanishes.
And this year 79 fits best for Caesar’s subsequent move.
When Thermus’ campaign was done Caesar, as we noted, attached
himself to Servilius who arrived in Cilicia in 78 to wage war there.36
Caesar’s distinguished military record to date and the fact that he
sought after another posting suggests a desire to excel. If we as-
sume 80 as the date of the fall of Mytilene then we have to further
assume that such a character hung about the province doing noth-
ing for about 18 months. This is possible but it is, I suggest, im-
probable. It begins to seem even more improbable when we con-
sider that in this very year 80 there lay ready to hand another thea-
tre in which Caesar could have exercised his talents, namely, that
very war which he is attested as joining subsequently. At this time
Dolabella, the governor of Cilicia of whom we have spoken, was
conducting a campaign which Servilius was to continue.37 There
35This circumstance could explain why the Mytileneans held out for
so long. If the Romans did not have control of the sea they would be able
to bring in supplies.
36 Suet. Div. Jul. 3 with MRR 2.87.
37 Cic. 2 Verr. 1.73, 77; Ps.-Asc. p. 242 St. Verres’ trip to Bithynia (2
Verr 1.63) may have been in search of loot but it was hardly advertised as
such. Its ostensible object must have been to gather ships for the war.
Both Ormerod (1978) p. 214 and Magie (1950) 1 p. 286 tend to dismiss
the campaigns of Dolabella. Freeman (1986) pp. 259–60 offers a more
judicious analysis.
APPENDIX 1 253
would seem to be nothing to stop Caesar joining in at this point.

That Dolabella was a Sullan was, as we know, neither here nor
there, nor does much importance attach to the fact that Caesar was
later to prosecute a man who may have been Dolabella’s cousin.38
Future malignancy need not have been guessed at now. After all,
Dolabella himself cosseted Verres in blissful ignorance of what his
legate would do to him later.39 We must, I think, assume that Cae-
sar did not join Dolabella simply because he was not free to do so.
In sum, if we believe that Caesar’s choice of his next commander
was dictated by the conditions he found after the fall of Mytilene
then his choice of Servilius accords better with a fall in 79 rather
than in 80.
It is time to recapitulate briefly the salient points of our inves-
tigation. The practices of the Roman republic strongly suggest that
Murena would not have handed over his stewardship to his succes-
sor until early 80. What we know of the activities of his quaestor
Lucullus confirms this. We learn from Cicero that Murena’s suc-
cessor was Nero, who is attested as being in the province in 80 and
also, it would seem, 79. In fact, it is virtually certain he was there in
the latter year since he too would have to wait for his replacement.
In this picture there is no place for Thermus between Murena and
Nero. In fact, his natural place is after Nero for he stormed
Mytilene in 79, and it may be added this date accords best with
what we know of his contubernalis Caesar.
I would, therefore, propose that the sequence of events in
Asia 81–79 and their dating should read as follows:
81: Murena is ordered to desist from war.
80: C. Claudius Nero arrives as governor. Accompanied by
Lucullus, Murena goes home to celebrate his triumph.
79: M. Minucius Thermus arrives as governor. Sometime in
the course of this year he captures Mytilene.
38 Keaveney (1984a) p. 142; Gelzer (1968) pp. 22–3.

39 Cic. 2 Verr. 1.77, 95–7.
APPENDIX 2
WHEN DID THE THIRD MITHRIDATIC WAR BEGIN?

About the sequence of events that mark the opening of the war
there is no dispute. Nicomedes IV of Bithynia willed his kingdom
to the Romans and upon his death they turned it into a province.
Mithridates, who had an alliance with Sertorius, interpreted this as a
declaration of war and invaded the place. He defeated M. Aurelius
Cotta there and shut him up in Chalcedon. Upon the arrival of Lu-
cullus he made for Cyzicus and laid siege to it. Eventually, how-
ever, lack of supplies forced him to withdraw.1 There is, however,
disagreement as to when these hostilities commenced. Was it in 74
or 73? In recent years authority that once favoured the former date
(MRR 2.101,108) has shifted position and now believes the latter to
be correct (MRR 3.121–2). Sherwin-White (1984) p. 162 calls it ‘a
tiresome chronological problem’, but as a scholar of an older gen-
eration reminds us, ‘when the records of a war leave room for
doubt even as to the year in which this or that campaign occurred
one cannot expect satisfactory information about strategy or tac-
tics’.2 So a fresh look at the sources may not be untimely. At the
outset it should be pointed out that we shall also have to examine
the evidence for the death of Sertorius since one source says it oc-
curred during the siege of Cyzicus (App. Mith. 72), thus establishing
an obvious connection between two sets of chronology.
(i) CICERO
The contemporary Cicero is represented by Pro Mur. 33, Pro
Cluentio 90, 103, 108, 136–7, Acad. 2.1–3.3
1 See further ch. 5.

2 Holmes (1923) p. 398.
3 See also section (iv) on Livy.
255
In the Pro Murena 33 Cicero says ad quod bellum duobus consulibus

missis.
It has been claimed that proconsul might be meant here but
this seems unlikely.4 Cicero’s theme (cf. Mur. 32) is the magnitude
of the war against Mithridates, and the despatch of two consuls to
fight it is wholly in keeping with that theme. We may further ob-
serve that the passage could be pressed to mean that the war was
already in progress when the two set out in 74.
From Pro Cluentio 136–7 we learn that a decree of the senate
instructed Lucullus, then consul for 74, or the consuls of the next
year (already elected) to investigate the allegations of bribery made
against Junius’ tribunal. This, of course, must mean, as many have
recognized, that Lucullus was still in Rome in July/August.5 Sher-
win-White goes further. Pointing out that there is clear evidence
(Pro Cluentio 90, 108) that the condemnation of Junius took place
towards the end of the tribunician year (late November?) he then
claims that the senatus consultum (s.c.) we are speaking of followed
on this condemnation. This is a false inference for there is nothing
in our source which would permit us to make such a dating. The
agitation over this matter was severe and of some length, and it
encompassed two prosecutions of Falcula (Pro Cluentio 103). Given
that the s.c. was a direct response to this agitation (Pro Cluentio 136),
there is no reason why it should not have been passed long before
Junius’ trial. Indeed, one circumstance strongly suggests that it was.
Cicero (Pro Cluentio 137) says that the agitation of Quinctius led the
people to demand this rogatio. Then the plebs saw the tears of
Junius’ son which, I presume, refers to a theatrical display at his
father’s trial.6 The result was that their mood changed and quaes-
tionem illam et legem repudiavit. In other words, the agitation died away
at precisely the time Sherwin-White thinks it resulted in the s.c.7
One other point seems to have been overlooked in this pas-
sage. It should be carefully noted that while the s.c. is directed at
both of the consuls designate of 73 it is aimed at only one of those
of 74, namely Lucullus. The clear inference, I would argue, is that
4 Magie (1950) 2 p. 1204 n. 5.

5 McGing (1984) pp. 16–17; Sherwin-White (1984) p. 165 n. 25.
6 Compare, e.g., Pro Mur. 88.
7 Cf. Pro Cluentio 90.
APPENDIX 2 257
Cotta was absent and the most likely place for him to be was in the
east.
Acad. 2.1–3 need not detain us long. This, we saw earlier, was
tendentious in tone but accurate with regard to its facts.8 At first
sight it would seem to indicate that Lucullus had completed both
praetorship and consulship before departing for Africa and Asia
respectively. This would appear to contradict what was said in Pro
Mur. 33 (see above) but, as Holmes (1923) p. 402, observes, ‘that in
referring to a fact which all his readers knew, he contradicted in the
Academica what he had said in Pro Murena is simply incredible’.
Granted that, then McGing’s suggestion is completely plausible.9
He believes that Cicero is here marking out the various stages of
Lucullus’ career, using a different adverb for each new stage. And
the stages are magistracies and provinciae. Pro-magistracies per se are
not counted. We hear of a praetorship and Africa but not of a pro-
praetorship. Particularly striking is the case of the pro-quaestorship
where Lucullus is always referred to as quaestor.10 In other words,
here magistracy and pro-magistracy are as one.
Conclusion: Cicero tells us that both consuls in 74 went off to
a war which may have already started. Lucullus did not leave until
some time after July/August but he was preceded by Cotta.11
(ii) SALLUST
Next we must look at the following passages from Cicero’s
younger contemporary, Sallust: Ep. Mith. 9, Hist. 2.71M, Orat. Mac.
18, 21–3.
It is generally agreed that Nicomedes’ will was genuine and
that he died in 74.12 However, his queen Nysa had a son and Sallust
(Ep. Mith. 9) represents Mithridates as complaining that the Ro-
mans seized Bithynia despite his existence, implying thereby that he
had some kind of claim on the throne. Hist. 2.71M tells us that the
pretender sent envoys to Rome to gain recognition but they were
8 Ch. 1 n. 14.
9 McGing (1984) p. 15.
10 Cf. MRR 2.109 n. 6.
11 Magie (1950) 1 p. 324; Sherwin-White (1984) p. 165 n. 4 and
McGing (1984) p. 12 all concede the consuls could have left Rome in 74
although they believe the war started in 73.
12 Cf., e.g., Braund (1984) p. 135 and the section on Livy below.
followed by a multitude who claimed he was illegitimate.13 On the

basis of this scanty evidence the reconstruction of events which is
usually offered is as follows.14 After the death of Nicomedes in 74
this man’s delegation made its way to Rome and were followed
there by its opponents. The senate had to decide between the two
and, as we know, they elected to accept the will. Instructions were
then given to the governor of Asia to turn Bithynia into a prov-
ince.15 Now, so the argument runs, for all of this to be done in 74
before an invasion by Mithridates in the same year is nigh on im-
possible. One has to agree but one may then go on to point out
that matters do not necessarily have to have fallen out in this wise.
The plain fact is our source does not tell us exactly when the
suppositious son made his bid for recognition. The notice of the
embassy is a mere fragment that furnishes no clue as to its dating.16
All that we can really say for certain is that it preceded the formal
acceptance of the king’s will by Rome. We are, therefore, at liberty
to assign it a dating different from the usual if we can find a plausi-
ble context for it. Having begun on a negative note, we shall main-
tain it. We are ignorant of when the contents of Nicomedes’ will
became known. Did people have an inkling of them before he died
or did the formal publication shock and surprise the world? We
know of a number of occasions on which eastern kings bequeathed
their kingdoms to Rome and at least one of these wills was actually
published prior to the king’s death.17 There is, therefore, no real
reason why Nicomedes should not make known, officially or unof-
ficially, who his heir should be and one very good reason why he
should: Mithridates. Since Nicomedes had no natural heirs it is rea-
sonable to suppose that in bequeathing his kingdom to the Romans
he was doing as other kings had done and attempting to preserve
its integrity by placing it in masterful hands who would protect it
13 In the light of subsequent events we may, with Magie (1950) 1 p.
320, agree that while Nysa was his mother Nicomedes was probably not
his father.
14 Cf., e.g., McGing (1984) pp. 15–16.
15 For him see the section on Velleius Paterculus below.
16 Maurenbrecher places it before Mithridates’ negotiations with Ser-
torius (Hist. 2.78, 79M) and Curio’s activities in Macedonia (Hist. 2.80M).
17 For a discussion of the phenomenon of royal wills see Braund
(1984) pp. 129–39.

APPENDIX 2 259
from external threat. That threat, of course, was Mithridates who

had already twice before invaded the place. The advantages of an
early declaration are thus obvious. The Pontic king would receive
clear warning that there would be no vacuum into which he might
step. One of two consequences would thus follow. Realizing that
he would have to face the Romans yet again, Mithridates might
shrink from such a hazardous enterprise. Or, as indeed happened,
he might be provoked into making preparations for war, alert the
Romans as to what was afoot and thus they would move swiftly
into Bithynia to be ready and waiting for him when he arrived.18
If we are right thus far then we are entitled to ask when the
pretender to the throne was most likely to make his bid for recog-
nition.19 We cannot be sure but it seems to me the very instant the
king’s wishes became known. There was nothing to be gained by
waiting until the king died. If he were to await the official procla-
mation after death, then it might very well be asked by his contem-
poraries why he did so. Why was it only now he discovered his le-
gitimacy? To wait this long might, one suspects, lead to a fate like
that of Aristonicus.20 Therefore it is at least arguable that the pre-
tender could have made his bid in, say, 75 or so, when it is very
likely the ailing king’s wishes became known.
So the evidence of the Sallust passage can be made to yield a
different story from that usually presented. And there remains a
third possibility. When we place the embassies of Hist. 2.71M at
18 In my view, the preparations for war (App. Mith. 68–9) are as likely
to have arisen from the contents of Nicomedes’ will as they are from
speculative theories about his health as in Scardigli (1971) p. 259; Glew
(1981) p. 129.
19 Keeping in mind, of course, that his chances of success were slim.
20 MRR 2.98, 3.113; Ward (1977a). Since Sall. Hist. 2.71M appears to
indicate the existence of two parties in the kingdom we might expect the
pretender to seize the initiative or try and regain it. Some, e.g. Braund
(1984) p. 158, n. 31, suppose on the basis of Sall. Ep. Mith. 9 that Mithri-
dates supported the pretender. If so, then he must have returned to
Pontus after his rebuff by the Romans. But the passage need not necessar-
ily bear this construction, for it does not seem to be anything more than
an item in a long list (5–9) of Roman enormities. This opens with Philip V
of Macedon and I do not think anyone would suggest he received aid
from Mithridates!
Rome we do not have textual support for the location and are
merely following a plausible-seeming guess of Maurenbrecher. The
use of the word multi, though, arouses certain suspicions. Is it really
the term to use of an embassy? If not, do we then have to envisage
hordes of Bithynians descending on Rome? I do not think so. But
it is not, on the other hand, difficult to imagine a suppliant pre-
tender coming to the governor of Asia thus to put his case and
having him being pursued there by his opponents in large numbers.
Granted that this is so, we may have a reference here to the very
eve of annexation—a last desperate attempt to avert the conse-
quences of a decision already taken.
The passages of the Orat. Mac. (18, 21–3) are more clear-cut.
The dramatic date is 73 and from 18 we deduce that Sertorius was
then still alive. The expectation of Pompey’s return (21–3) proba-
bly is the result of good news from Spain.
Conclusion:21 The information Sallust gives us about the pre-
tender to the Bithynian throne can be plausibly fitted into our se-
quence of events at any one of three different points. For the rest
he tells us that at some time in 73 Sertorius was still alive.
(iii) COINAGE
The last piece of contemporary evidence that we have is the
Bithynian royal coinage. Numismatists tell us that a royal coin
numbered with the era-year 224 must belong after October 74 and
so Nicomedes’ death has to be put after that date. However, two
objections have been made to this argument. The coin might have
been minted by the pretender. Then again it has been pointed out
that in the First Mithridatic War there was no interruption in the
Bithynian coinage, even though the king was absent. Cities loyal to
Nicomedes and free of Mithridates’ control continued to mint and
a similar situation could have prevailed now.22
Conclusion: The royal coinage is of no use for our purposes.
(iv) LIVY
We must look now at the Livian tradition: Eutrop. 6.1–7;
Oros. 5.23–4, 6.2.13–31; Liv. Ep. 90–5.
Eutropius 6.1–7 is a narrative of four wars, Spanish, Pam-
phylian and Cilician, Macedonian and Dalmatian, which he says all
21 See also n. 91.

22 See McGing (1984) pp. 14–15.
APPENDIX 2 261
began in the consulship of Lepidus and Catulus—i.e. 78—and

which culminated with triumphs for all four areas.23 He is unaware
that the wars in Spain, Cilicia and Macedonia had already been in
progress for some time, or rather it may very well be that it is only
now that he thinks of them as being significant.24 Certainly, with
the exception of Metellus Pius and Domitius Calvinus, the com-
manders first named for these wars appear to have left for the
front in 78. From our point of view, however, the most important
thing at the moment is that we allow Eutropius consistency in his
viewpoint. Thus if he puts the start of the Sertorian war in 78, then
when he says Sertorius was slain and the war ended octavo demum
anno he ought by inclusive reckoning to mean 71.25
The death of Nicomedes is placed in the consulship of Lucul-
lus and Cotta (74). Both consuls are sent to deal with Mithridates
and it is as a consul that Lucullus opposes the Pontic invasion. A
summer and a winter are taken up with the siege of Cyzicus (6.6).
In these passages, as elsewhere, Eutropius sometimes equates
his consular dates with AUC dates. Also on occasions we find him
giving the AUC date without linking it to a consular date. To one
of these latter some attach considerable importance. Ward (1977b)
p. 83 n. 1 reports that certain scholars equate the AUC date in 6.7.1
with 74 and thus deduce the starting-date of Spartacus’ revolt.
However, it is doubtful if we can actually put any faith at all in
these dates. It was possible for Eutropius to use one of three sys-
tems for these calculations: the Varronian with its 753 epoch
(foundation date Olym. 6.3), epoch 752 (Olym. 6.4) or epoch 751
(Olym. 7.2).26 He himself tells us, however, that the city was
founded Olympiadis sextae anno tertio (1.1.2). Approaching this in
23 6.5.1 is obviously picking up 6.1.1. As each war is dealt with in turn

it is fully narrated to its end.
24 See MRR 2.70, 80, 89. The degree of inaccuracy we choose to at-
tribute to his dating of the resulting triumphs will depend on how elastic a
term we think uno tempore (6.5.2) to be. Morgan (1971) p. 290 n. 70 does
not seem to have shown much sensitivity to Eutropius’ methods in his
reading of the text.
25 The rest of the sentence et . . . redactae could be pressed to mean the
war continued after Sertorius’ death. See below. On the pro-magistrates of

78 see MRR 2.86–7.
26 For all of these see Samuel (1972) pp. 249–53.
something like a state of innocence one might assume that Eutro-

pius was following the Varronian system. Table 1 may give pause.
The list of Eutropius’ AUC dates given there is, of course, by no
means exhaustive but I think it is fair to say that it is representative.
That he made the correct equation of 681 with its corresponding
consular year in an AUC system dating from epoch 751 is surely as
much due to luck as anything else. In sum, Table 1 and the other
samples of Eutropius’ handling of AUC dates available to us show
quite clearly that no faith whatsoever can be put in them as a sys-
tem for establishing chronology.27
Table 1 A comparison of dates
AUC date and magistrates accord- BC Ep. Ep. Ep.
ing to Eutropius date 753 752 751
662 – no mag. but plainly Sulla/
88 666 665 664
Pomp. cos. (8.4)
659 – Sex. Caes./L. Phil. cos.
91 663 662 661
(5.3.1)
676 – Luc. Cotta cos. (6.6.1) 74 680 679 678
678 – M. Lucullus goes to Mace-
7228 682 681 680
donia (6.7.1)
681 – C. Lentulus and Aufidius
71 683 682 681
Orestes cos. (6.8.1)
From a comparison of Eutrop. 6.1–5 and Oros. 5.23–4 it is

clear that both are using the same source for the four wars in
Spain, Cilicia, Macedonia and Dalmatia. The difference that imme-
diately strikes the reader is that Orosius is more detailed and more
rhetorical.29 But there are other details that, from our point of view,
are more important.
27Further examples are given in den Boer’s study (1972 pp. 124–37).
28It is true that Lucullus may have left Rome in late 73 (MRR 2.109)
but Eutropius conceives of the pro-magisterial year being entered upon
after the magisterial, cf. Keaveney (2005) p. 211 and so I deduce he is
talking of our 72 BC when he says Macedoniam .. . accepit. It is only by ig-
noring this last chronological indicator and assuming that Eutropius here
is using epoch 751 that the equation 678 = 74 BC noted above can be
arrived at.
29 The equivalent passages (Eutropius first) are as follows, 6.1.1–3 =-
5.23.1–15; 6.2.1–2 = 5.23.16–20; 6.3 = 5. 23. 21–2; 6.4 = 5. 23. 23.

APPENDIX 2 263
Unlike Eutropius, Orosius knows something of Sertorius’ ad-

ventures before what we may call ‘the year of the four wars’. How-
ever, it is plain from his narrative (23.1–2) that he does not date the
beginning of the Sertorian war proper from the time of those ad-
ventures but, like Eutropius, calls it a Spanish war and puts that
beginning in ‘the year of the four wars’. However, unlike Eutro-
pius, he uses an AUC date and not a consular one to indicate that
particular year. And here again there are problems. Orosius says
that the city was founded in the sixth Olympiad but does not spec-
ify in which year.30 Thus we do not know what epoch he is using
and practice actually varies. Let us take, as an example, three fa-
mous events. The AUC date of 710 for Caesar’s murder in 44 is
obviously reckoned on the 753 epoch. But the AUC dates that are
given respectively for Cicero’s consulship (63) and Caesar’s first
consulship (59) as 689 and 693 can only be right if the epoch is
751.31 Thus when Orosius puts ‘the year of the four wars’ in 673
AUC we have no means of knowing which of our BC dates 81, 80
or 79 he is talking about.32
This in turn means that we cannot be sure when Orosius
would place Sertorius’ death. Like Eutropius he says the war per se
ended with the leader’s death. However, he goes on to add that
mopping-up operations continued after this event and he locates
the death itself in decem demum annum belli. But in the tenth year
from which date?
With regard to the Third Mithridatic War, 6.2.13–24 narrates
the events from the start to Mithridates’ flight back to Pontus
without any indication of chronology. Are we speaking of 74/3 or
73/2? The very next passage, 3.1, settles the matter. Eodem anno (i.e.
73 or 72) Catiline was acquitted of incest with a Vestal. Cicero,
speaking in 63, says that it is now ten years since the acquittal of
the Vestals (Cat. 3.9).33 The obvious inference to make is that he is
30 2.4.1.
31 5.6.1, 6.7.1, 6.18.1.
32 The problem with this passage was recognized long ago. The sec-
ond hand in the codex Rehdigeranus (cf. Zangmeister pp. XIII–XIV)

corrected the number to 676 which in the Varronian system is the equiva-
lent of our 78 BC. Was the Ignotus trying to reconcile Orosius and Eutro-
pius? Gabba (1967) p. 316 seems unaware of the problem.
33 Cf. MRR 2.114.
talking of the same event as Orosius and thus of the two possible
sets of dates 74/3 is the correct one. However, McGing (1984) p.
14 n. 5 describes this as ‘a highly speculative argument’ and says we
have no means of knowing if Catiline’s illegal partner Fabia was
among the acquitted Cicero has in mind. This objection does not
have much force. If Cicero speaks of acquittals ten years before 63
and another source mentions a trial in the period 74–72 then I
think we must assume the latter forms part of the series of trials
Cicero had in mind. It is very difficult to envisage a second set of
trials of Vestals in the same period. The issue of whether Fabia was
acquitted or not then becomes irrelevant. Both authors are speak-
ing of trials in 73. Orosius recalls one trial, without specifically say-
ing whether Fabia was found guilty or not. Cicero, on the other
hand, talks only of acquittals, without saying whether anybody was
found guilty. In fact, to judge from Cicero’s language, all the de-
fendants were acquitted and moreover I would suggest that Fabia
was among those who got off. If the case against Catiline was dis-
missed then, since the charge was incest, it seems logical to sup-
pose that the case against his co-defendant on this same charge
would automatically collapse.34 So, the chronological information
derived from the combined evidence of Cicero and Orosius must
be allowed to stand.
We turn now to the Livian Epitome 90–5.35 In a reading of this
source two things must be borne steadily in mind. The events
within a given geographical area that fall within a given period of
time are narrated together. The epitomator then moves on to the
roughly contemporaneous events in another geographical area.
Within each epitome itself the method of dating is usually by refer-
ence to the titles of the magistrates.36 The Epitome gives the follow-
ing sequence:
90
Italy: Death of Sulla. Revolt of Lepidus (78–77).
Plut. Cat. Min. 19 strongly suggests acquittal.

34
Brunt (1980) pp. 487–8 does not seem to have fully understood the
35
value of what he calls ‘the wretched Periochae’. I have taken my cue from
the more careful and imaginative approach of Badian (1964) pp. 45–6,
(1976) p. 507.
36 Cf. Keaveney (2005) p. 160 and (1983a) p. 280 n. 2.
APPENDIX 2 265
Spain: Revolt of Sertorius. L. Manlius pro cos. and M. Domitius

legatus defeated by quaestor Hirtuleius (79–78).37
Cilicia: The activities of P. Servilius pro cos. (78).38
91
Spain: Despatch of Pompey. Victories of Sertorius (77). Ap-
pius Claudius conquers Thracians (77–76). Q. Metellus pro cos. de-
feats and kills Hirtuleius (76).39
92
Spain: Pompey fights dubio eventu with Sertorius. Metellus de-
feats Sertorius and Perperna. Later Sertorius is blocked in Clunia
(76).40 Thrace: Campaigns of pro cos. Curio (75).41
Spain: Cruelty of Sertorius (75).42
37 The following considerations determine the chronological limits.

The upper limit: it is doubtful if the words hellum excitavit could refer to 80
since Ep. 89 closes with events in 79 (cf. app. 1), contra MRR 3.164.
Domitius Calvinus is believed to be praetor 81/pro cos. 80 or praetor
80/pro cos. 79 (MRR 3.84). He is closely linked with Metellus Pius (Eutrop
6.1.2; Oros. 5.23.3–4; cf. Spann 1987 pp. 65–6) who most probably did
not arrive in Spain until 79 although a date in 80 cannot be completely
ruled out. But even if the earlier date for Metellus’ arrival is accepted the
defeat must be assigned to 79 since there was probably little time left in 80
for campaigning by the time Metellus got there. The lower limit: L.
Manlius was probably pro cos. in Transalpine Gaul in 78 (MRR 2.87, 3.135).
His defeat is the last Spanish event listed by the epitomator before the
despatch of Pompey (see below) in 77, so it cannot be later than about the
middle of that year. Most likely 78 is the date, cf. Spann p. 72.
38 MRR 2.87.
39 All are agreed that Pompey was despatched in 77 but there is dis-
agreement as to whether he arrived in 77 or 76 (MRR 3.162). Obsequens

77 shows the Livian tradition favoured 77 and is in agreement with the
Epitomator’s picture of his lack of success. For Appius Claudius see MRR
2.89, 94. On this chronology the battle of Segovia here mentioned will be
in 76, cf. MRR 3.163. Note also what is said in section (v) on Appian be-
low.
40 MRR 3.163.
41 MRR 2.99.
42 As Spann (1987) pp. 117–18 points out, the disappointing cam-
paigns of 76 must have given rise to disaffection in Sertorius’ ranks and

this notice gives us his reaction. Theoretically it may belong in 75 with
Curio or 74 with Servilius but the former is to be preferred since reaction
would be expected to be immediate. That this is the only Spanish notice
93
Cilicia: Victories of P. Servilius (74).43
Asia: Death of Nicomedes. Mithridates having made a pact
with Sertorius invades Bithynia. Defeats cos. M. Aurelius Cotta
(74).44 Spain: Victories of Pompey and Metellus over Sertorius. He
drives them from Calgurris. They winter in Further Spain and Gaul
respectively (74).45
94
Asia: Campaigns of the consul Lucullus. He quells a mutiny.
Deiotarus’ victory over Mithridates (74–73).46
Spain: Victorious campaign of Pompey against Sertorius
(73).47
95
Thrace: Victories of Curio (73).48
Italy: Spartacus rebels. Legatus Claudius Pulcher and praetor P.
Varenus defeated by Spartacus (73).49
Asia: Pro cos. L. Lucullus defeats Mithridates at Cyzicus and
drives him back to Pontus (73).50
96
Italy: Q. Arrius praetor defeats Crixus. Cn. Lentulus cos. fights
badly against Spartacus. L. Gellius cos. and Arrius defeated by
for 75 in the epitome need not cause alarm. Another tradition (that of
Appian) has far worse lacunae. See also the remarks of Broughton (MRR
3.163). For more on disaffection in Sertorius’ ranks see below.
43 MRR 2.105; Ep. 93 is, of course, picking up Ep. 90. The latter no-
tices the beginning, the former the end of the campaign. This kind of
thing is quite common in the epitome: compare Ep. 80 with Ep. 84 and
see n. 48 below with Keaveney (1982a) p. 502.
44 Note ablative absolute: foedere . . . icto. Whatever date we choose for
the start of the war, I am persuaded by McGing (1986) pp. 137–9 that this
treaty belongs in the preceding year. See further ch. 4.
45 The position of this notice makes the date of 74 virtually certain. It
may be noted that it is consistent with Pompey’s receiving reinforcements

then, cf. ch. 4.
46 For these events see ch. 5.
47 Position would seem to indicate 73 since we have had already a
Spanish notice for 74 and the next notice is for 73.

48 This picks up Ep. 92, cf. MRR 2.112.
49 MRR 2.109–10, 115 n. 1.
50 Since Lucullus was cos. 74 then logically this refers to 73.
APPENDIX 2 267
Spartacus (72).51 Spain: Murder of Sertorius octavo ducatus sui anno.

Pompey’s defeat of Perperna and subjugation of Spain decimo fere
anno after the war began (72–71).52
Italy: Campaigns of Cassius and Manlius against Spartacus go
badly. War given to Crassus (72–71).53
As is well known, the titles the epitomator assigns Lucullus
and Cotta in Ep. 93 and 95 enable us to see that for him the Mith-
ridatic war began in 74.54 Corroborating evidence is provided by
the positioning of these notices. The second notice (Curio) in Ep.
92 can definitely be dated to 75. The next (Sertorius), if it is not 75
as I have suggested, can be no later than 74. Thus we may say that
Ep. 92 either finishes the sequence of 75 or opens that of 74. No
matter which view we take, Servilius’ victory in 74 naturally belongs
at the opening of Ep. 93 and with it the obviously parallel events in
Asia. In Ep. 95 we have two campaigns definitely dated to 73. It is
not straining credulity to believe, given the methods of the
epitomator, that the third one, that of Lucullus, parallels them.
We turn now to the epitomator’s data concerning Sertorius.
He was murdered octavo ducatus sui anno. This agrees very well with
the evidence of Ep. 90 where all the indications are that the
epitomator believed the Sertorian war started in 79 for, like Eutro-
pius, he has nothing to say about the earlier activities of the rebel.
Thus, by inclusive reckoning, we date the murder to 72. Moreover,
the position of the notice supports this conclusion. The last notice
of 73 is at the end of Ep. 95 and in Ep. 96 the notice of the death is
clearly flanked by events of 72–71. As we saw, Eutropius too
speaks of a death in the eighth year but for him this would be 71
because he appears to date the war from 78—a date which, I think,
all would agree is impossible. We may recall however, a further
point. Although Eutropius starts the war in 78, he names as par-
ticipants Metellus Pius and Domitius Calvinus who were active
51 MRR 2.116–17.
52 For a discussion of this date see text below.
53 MRR 2.117, 3.120, 135.
54 It is true that he sometimes gets titles wrong—cf. e.g. n. 37—but
proven error at one point does not justify postulating it in another with-
out corroborating evidence, as is tentatively attempted by McGing (1984)
p. 17. I leave Ep. 94 out of my reckoning at this point because it is flanked
by controversial Sertorian data.
before that date. Indeed, the latter was dead by then! There is, I
think, a strong suspicion that Eutropius has not got things right.
He has put the start of the war a year too late and, in writing of
Metellus and Domitius, has failed to notice this. Thus when he
speaks of the eighth year he places it too a year later than it should
be. We need not castigate Eutropius, however, for ending the Ser-
torian War with the leader’s death. Orosius does the same, as we
saw, but then goes on to speak of mopping up operations. The
epitomator, as we know, speaks of Sertorius’ death in the eighth
year of his command but also says the war itself ended in the tenth
year.
What we have reflected here is surely a difference of perspec-
tive noted in the source and slightly garbled by the tradition.55 For
some people the Sertorian war could be regarded as having, in its
essence, finished with the man’s death, a view transmitted by Eu-
tropius and Orosius. There were mopping-up operations, of
course, which Eutropius ignores and Orosius mentions apologeti-
cally. In either case they were not to be regarded as part of the war
proper. The epitomator probably reflects a different viewpoint.
The ducatus56 of Sertorius ended in the eighth year but warfare con-
tinued to the tenth.57 This last piece of data, it may be noted, sits
well with Pompey’s triumph in 70.58 And we can now see why
Orosius talks of the death of Sertorius in the tenth year of the war.
He has blended two separate concepts: a war that finished in the
eighth year with Sertorius’ death, leaving mopping-up to be done
and a war that finished in the tenth year when that mopping-up
was completed.59
55For yet another perspective see the section on Appian below.

56On this term see Scardigli (1971) p. 264.
57 Compare the tradition concerning Servilius Vatia. Eutrop. 6.3 and
Oros. 23.22 refer to his campaigns as a three-year war while Cic. 2 Verr.
3.211 talks of a quinquennium, cf. Liv. Ep. 90 and 93. One set of authorities
is plainly thinking of the duration of the imperium, the other of the actual
campaign, see Ormerod (1922) pp. 37–9.
58 It will be noted that for the Epitomator the year of the triumph
concluded the account of a campaign. Cf. Ep. 90, 92, 95 with MRR 2.105,
112.
59 Here Bennett (1961) p. 464 is to be preferred to Gabba (1967) p.
296, (1956) pp. 97–101 and Scardigli (1971) p. 264 who argue that Orosius
APPENDIX 2 269
Conclusion: The Livian tradition firmly sets the start of the

Third Mithridatic War in 74. It is listed under this consular year by
Eutropius and Lucullus and Cotta are termed ‘consuls’ in the de-
scription of their early exploits there. In first noticing them the
epitomator likewise so designates them. Further, independent of
such titles, the opening narrative of the war is, to judge from the
epitomator’s sequence, located in that portion of the epitome
which deals with 74. As regards Orosius, his main value becomes
apparent when he is considered along with a passage of Cicero and
so gives us also 74 as the opening date of the war.
With regard to the death of Sertorius, only the epitome gives
us a coherent and helpful account. Once more, the sequence of
events and arrangement of notices is important. Moreover, we can
fix the date the writer sets for the beginning of the war and thus
deduce what year was eighth from that, for it was then he says Ser-
torius died. Both this latter calculation and the position of the
death notice lead us to 72. Here Orosius and Eutropius are only of
negative value. That is to say, once we recognize their deviations
from the epitome for the errors they are, we can claim that the ac-
count they drew on was the same as the epitomator’s.
(v) APPIAN
Here we shall mostly be concerned with BC1.108–15 and
Mith. 68–72.60
There is a reasonable case to be made for the view that Ap-
pian drew a good deal of his information about the first Civil and
arrived at the figure ten because he was taking into account the two years’
hostility before the war proper began, as they think, in 80. However, it is
clear from 5.23.3 that he did not regard these events as part of the war
proper and so they should not be used in calculation. For what it is worth
one of the possible interpretations of Orosius’ AUC starting-date is 79 (cf.
above). This would certainly square with a war whose tenth and final year
was 70—the number we have deduced from the epitome, see n. 58. For
some further remarks on ancient and modern views of where we mark the
start of the Sertorian war see my final conclusion below.
60 Mith. 72 is, of course, one of the main supports of Bennett’s at-
tempt, (1961), to date the war from 73. For a refutation of his numismatic
arguments see section (iii) above. The other points he raises have, in my
view, been adequately dealt with by Scardigli (1971) pp. 259–79.
the Sertorian War from Livy.61 Nevertheless, he must be treated

separately because of the clear non-Livian elements in his narrative
and his own peculiar methods of composition. Chief among the
latter are his ways of indicating chronology. These are many and
varied, but we shall confine ourselves to those that are of immedi-
ate concern here.62
There are two that we must look at, at once. First, we should
recognize that Appian often indicates a particular year by reference
to one or more of the seasons, spring, summer or winter.63 More-
over, on occasions he will offer us a sequence of years in annalistic
fashion.64 Both of these chronological indicators are exemplified in
BC1.108–15.
In 108 we learn that Pompey after Lepidus is crushed is being
sent to Spain, which obviously means we are in 77. Then follows
an account of his campaign until a winter intervenes (109). In the
spring of the next year—which should, one supposes, be 76—
hostilities resume and carry on through the summer till another
winter (110). The next year should then be 75, but one thing would
seem to indicate to the modern reader that 74 is actually in ques-
tion. We hear of reinforcements for the government armies (111).65
Then follows another year (113) and yet another (113–15) which
saw the death of Sertorius. Obviously something has gone wrong
here. In the text, as it stands, there is a year missing.
61 It will be found in Gabba (1956) pp. 89–101.

62 I hope to publish shortly a comprehensive examination of the
question. In the mean time it should be noted that handling of the matter
can be unsure. For instance, Morgan (1971) p. 300 n. 99 searches for a
precision in phrases such as ou0 polu\ u#steron which a further survey of
the text reveals they do not have. Indeed, the complexity of the issue
seems to elude him almost entirely. He certainly seems to be unaware that
where such phrases are not simply vague, they can also be downright mis-
leading as in BC 1.4, 104. McGing (1980) pp. 36–7 adopts a more sure-
footed and mature approach.
63 See, e.g., BC 1.14, 78, 2.42, 52, 55, 5.11, 52, 76. Examples could be
multiplied. Autumn, so far as I can discover, is mentioned only once, in

Iber. 66, and then in connection with a premature withdrawal to winter
quarters.
64 See, e.g., Hann. 35, Iber. 48, 67, BC 1.103 with Gabba (1956) p. 100.
65 Plut. Luc. 5; Sall. Hist. 2.98M. See ch. 4.
APPENDIX 2 271
There are, I believe, two possible solutions. We may, with

Gabba (1967) p. 299, put the end of the narrative of 77 at the con-
clusion of BC1.108 and then have the events of 76 start in
BC1.109. This would then give us a narrative running from 77 to
72. On the other hand taking the text as it stands it could be argued
that Appian has simply coalesced 77 and 76. This would then give
us a narrative running from 77 to 73.66
Plainly a great deal hinges on what year Appian thought he
was talking about in BC1.111. It should not be too readily assumed
that the details of troop reinforcements would have for him the
significance it has for us since he nowhere says anything about the
role of the consuls. This initial impression is confirmed when we
read that this was the year Rome received the bequest of Ni-
comedes (Bithynia) and Cyrene (Ptolemy Apion). Now, if the for-
mer definitely fell in 74, there is good reason to believe the latter
may be dated to 75.67 Appian then goes on to use a system of dat-
ing found from time to time in his work: dating by Olympiads. This
particular year fell, he says, in the 176th Olympiad.68
Normally it is assumed Appian is switching from dating by
‘seasonal years’ at this point to dating by Olympiads.69 I am rather
sceptical of this view. This year, as we know, is part of a set and it
is difficult to see why Appian should wish to break it in the middle.
Moreover, it seems to me that the most natural way to read the text
is as an attempt at equivalence not conversion. Come to that, if
Appian is converting why does he not say which Olympic year is in
66 The great differences in the two most recent reconstructions of the

events of the Sertorian War after 77 (MRR 3.162–4 and Spann (1987) pp.
82–138) are a tribute to the state of our sources. Fortunately, we here
need not share their concern with assigning individual events to individual
years. We are dealing simply with the number of years Appian thought
was involved.
67 See section (iv) and Oost (1963) p. 20; Badian (1965) p. 119. The
detail about Ptolemy is probably not an error. Appian is simply telling us

when the bequest was taken up.
68 For this system of reckoning see Bickerman (1968) pp. 75–6, and
Samuel (1972) pp. 189–94. What they have to say about the difficulties of
conversion from this system to another should be borne steadily in mind
in what follows.
69 See, e.g., Gabba (1967) p. 307; Oost (1963) p. 20.
question and have done with it? Mere carelessness, the charge so
often levelled at Appian, will not do here for he is being consistent
with his own practices. Nowhere in his use of this system does he
specify the exact Olympic year,70 although he is perfectly capable of
making an exact equivalence between other systems of chronol-
ogy.71 At the very least it looks as if Appian was well aware of the
difficulty of equating exactly ‘seasonal years’ running from spring
to winter with the Olympic years, which ran from summer to
summer.72
But that is not all. As we know, Appian in BC 1.111 must be
talking of 75 or 74 depending on how we read his text.73 As back-
ground to this year he mentions that the following wars were in
progress: Sertorian, Mithridatic, pirate, Cretan and Spartacan. All
were indeed in progress at sometime in the 176th Olympiad, but
only the Sertorian was certainly taking place in 75. The pirate war
and the Mithridatic (possibly, on one view) began in 74. The other
two started in 72 and 73 respectively.74 What is the meaning of
this? Why say wars were taking place in 75 or 74 when they were
not? The answer, I believe, can be found after we have looked at
some other passages which shed further light on our author’s use
of Olympiad chronology.
Appian tells us the first Civil War ended with the death of the
consul Carbo (BC 1.96, 98), an event which is to be dated to 81.75
This gave Sulla the opportunity he wanted and he had himself
made dictator in the 175th Olympiad when the Olympic Games
were spoiled because all the athletes went to Rome (BC 1.97–9).76
That this latter act actually happened in 81 is made clear by the fact
that Appian says correctly (BC 1.100) that M. Tullius Decula and
70Appian’s other uses of Olympiad dating: BC 1.84, 99, Gall. 2.1, Iber.
4, 38, 42, Lib. 67, 135, Mith. 17, 53.
71 See BC 2.48, 54, 149, 3.50, 5.34, 97.
72 For possible solutions that Appian does not seem to have adopted
see Bickerman (1968).

73 A view not contradicted, as we saw, by the references to bequests
and reinforcements.
74 See Gabba (1967) pp. 307–9 and Bickerman’s table of equivalences
(1968).
75 Keaveney (1982d) p. 125 and further below.
76 Cf. Matthews (1979).
APPENDIX 2 273
Cn. Cornelius Dolabella were elected as consuls for that year.77

Consular dating is quite common in Appian78 and so we find that
the next year is designated by the consulship of Sulla and Metellus
Pius which makes it 80. The following year is 79, as we deduce
from the consuls Servilius Vatia and Appius Claudius Pulcher (BC
1.103).79
Save for the fact that we can securely deduce the dates of the
years this is very like the narrative sequence of BC 1.108–15. It is
precisely when we come to the Olympiad reference that we en-
counter difficulties. First of all, Appian, as usual, does not specify
what year of the Olympiad he has in mind. Moreover, his two sys-
tems of chronology actually contradict each other! The consular
yields 81 for the assumption of the dictatorship, the Olympiad the
summer of 80 at the earliest.80
Another example of the doubtful validity of Appian’s use of
Olympiad reckoning is found in Iber. 42. To say that the campaigns
of Fulvius (182–180) in Spain happened around the 150th Olym-
piad is just about acceptable, one supposes, but it is unfortunate
that he is described as a consul.81 Even less impressive are the
statements82 that the triumphs of Scipio over Carthage (146),
Mummius over Corinth (145), Metellus over Andriscus (146)83 took
place about the 160th Olympiad (summer 140–summer 136). In
fairness to Appian it should be said that he often indicates the ap-
proximate nature of his Olympiad dates (cf. refs in n. 70) but nev-
77 MRR 2.74.
78 See, for example, BC 1.29. 34, 78, 2.103, 3.50, IIlyr. 28. Examples
could be multiplied. It is astonishing to read in Morgan (1971) p. 284 that
Appian does not use consular dating. This assertion seems to rest on ei-
ther a misunderstanding of Gabba (1956) p. 9 n. 1 or a failure to appreci-
ate Appian’s style. Like the Epitomator of Livy (see above) he does not
always preface a year with the names of the consuls but rather allows the
date to be inferred from a man’s rank. Pace Morgan he does sometimes
preface a campaign with the names of the consuls. Morgan’s hasty and
superficial examination seems to have overlooked a prime example in BC
1.40—a passage fully discussed in Keaveney (2005) pp. 207–9.
79 MRR 2.79–82.
80 See Matthews (1979) pp. 241–2.
81 MRR 1.382.
82 Lib. 135.
83 MRR 1.467, 470.
ertheless the fact remains that his level of achievement in this area
is low.
Recognizing that, we can now see easily enough what has
gone wrong in BC 1.111. It has been assumed by our author that
the wars recorded for the 176th Olympiad were taking place in
every year of that Olympiad. Hence the assignment to 75 (or 74) of
wars which had not yet begun then. Earlier I suggested that Ap-
pian’s failure to specify the particular year of an Olympiad he had
in mind might have been due to his recognizing the difficulty of
establishing equivalences. But there could be another explanation.
Whatever he was drawing from84 may not have divided the Olym-
piad into years at all but simply listed the events of a particular
four-year period. Self-evidently this would furnish a plausible alter-
native explanation for the puzzling absence of specific Olympiad
years. It would also explain why Appian puts together in one year
what appear to be events of 75 and 74 respectively and why he as-
sumes the wars of the period were taking place in every year of the
Olympiad.85
Thus I conclude that Appian’s narrative sequence offers no
information about the date of Sertorius’ death since it is impossible
to establish whether it runs from 77 to 73 or 72. One other piece
of evidence however remains to be explored.
As with some of the Livians (see (iv), above) Appian believed
the war proper ended with the death of Sertorius but that some
mopping-up remained which did not take long (BC 1.115). He also
tells us that the war was of eight years’ duration (BC 1.108). Here
we encounter a familiar problem. Over what time-period did these
eight years stretch? First of all, it should be noted that Appian is
very well informed about Sertorius’ activities before 79, the earliest
date assigned to the beginning of the war in the Livian tradition,
and, indeed, he takes the story all the way back to Cinna’s attack on
84 Gabba’s guess, (1967) p. 307, of a ‘manuale di cronologia’ is as
good as any.
85 On the evidence of Lib. 135 and BC 1.99 Appian was not very
good at making such chronological calculations as he did attempt with

these Olympiads. Here may be a further explanation for yoking what may
be a bequest of 75 to one of 74.
APPENDIX 2 275
Rome in 86.86 What particularly concerns us here, however, is the

temporal relationship Appian drew between the first Civil and the
Sertorian War. We are told the Civil War lasted for three years and,
by inclusive reckoning, a method favoured by Appian, this is cor-
rect if we are prepared to accept his very reasonable assumption
that the war ended in 81.87 He makes it perfectly plain that for him
the war in Italy ended with the capture of Norba and abroad with
the execution of Carbo—both events to be assigned to 81.88
Now, the Sertorian War is twice mentioned as something left
over from the Civil War, a piece of unfinished business. In the first
of these passages we would seem to be at the start of Sulla’s dicta-
torship in 81. Norba has fallen, Italy is being chastised and Carbo
has just been rubbed out (95–97). Therefore when the Sertorian
War is mentioned we could argue that it begins now in 81. On in-
clusive reckoning eight years from this point would yield 74 as the
year of Sertorius’ death. But it may be recalled that Appian may
have coalesced two years into one.89 Then we would have 73 as our
terminus. However, this is not all. In this very passage the despatch
of Metellus is mentioned, which we know may have fallen in 80 but
is most likely to be dated to 79. Reckoning from this datum with a
full complement of years, we have 72 as the year of Sertorius’ death
eight years after 79. If we lose one year here then we arrive at 71.90
86 BC 1.65. See especially BC 1.86 (with Gabba 1967 p. 227), 94, 108
and also Iber. 101.

87 BC 1.84 with Gabba (1967) p. 221. The three years should not be
designated as Olympiad years, pace Gabba (cf. above). They are in fact an
attempt to give precision to a vague chronological indicator. This kind of
thing is not uncommon in Appian. The narrative of Spartacus’ rebellion,
for instance, is introduced with the vague words τοu= δ’αυτοu= χρo/νου
(116) obviously indicating that it fell within the notorious 176th Olympiad
(111). Precision is then attempted in 118 when we are told it was τριέτης.
For other examples of inclusive reckoning see Sic. 2.2, Hann. 60, BC 1.76,
2.19.
88 BC 1.94–7 with Gabba (1967) pp. 250–62 and Keaveney (1982d) p.
125. Note also Eutrop. 5.9.

89 See above.
90 The other passage referred to in our text is BC 1.108, which plainly
refers to 77. One supposes Appian could have dated the war from then
but that view is contradicted not only by BC 1.97 but also by the resumé
of the war this very passage contains.
Plainly it is impossible to decide what year Appian had in mind as

the starting-point for his eight years. Now that we have exhausted
all avenues of investigation we have to admit that it is not possible
to extract from Appian a date for Sertorius’ death and possibly this
may be due to the author himself. But whatever the reasons the
implications for Mith. 72 are obvious. A notice there of the death
of Sertorius cannot be used to date the siege of Cyzicus because we
simply do not know when Appian thought Sertorius died.
I would like to go a step further and present the case for be-
lieving that Appian here too has been stalked by his evil genius, the
Olympiad dating, and in particular by the 176th. Now, no matter
what date we adopt for the start of the Third Mithridatic War, be it
74 or 73, it clearly began in that Olympiad and Appian gives indica-
tions of knowing this. In a speech that he puts into the mouth of
Mithridates in Paphlagonia just before the invasion of Bithynia he
has the king point to the advantage to be derived from the present
state of the Romans. They are engaged in conflict with Sertorius in
Spain, Spartacus in Italy91 and the pirates everywhere (Mith. 70).
Furthermore, when the invasion begins (Mith. 71) the death of Ni-
comedes is, as Sherwin-White (1984) p. 160 n. 5 pointed out, men-
tioned almost incidentally. I would suggest the reason is that it is
being used as a chronological indicator not as a causal factor.
What we would seem to have here then is a list of background
details to the start of the Third Mithridatic War. The resemblance
to the other list in BC 1.111 is striking, leading to the conclusion
that in both instances the procedure is the same. An incident from
the 176th Olympiad is set against the background of other inci-
dents from that Olympiad and is roughly dated by reference to
them. And if this practice is followed twice, there is no reason why
it should not be followed thrice. Confronted with the need to ex-
plain the treachery of Magius, Appian noted that the death of Ser-
torius occurred in the same Olympiad. So he yoked the two to-
91 So I interpret the reference to stasiazo/ntwn in Italy. References
of this sort to Rome’s internal difficulties in the 70s are not uncommon
but each must be interpreted in relation to its context. By way of contrast
and example note that the interna mala of Sall. Ep. Mith. 13 almost certainly
refers to the first Civil War and the rebellion of Lepidus. See also Oros.
5.23.1 and ch. 4.
APPENDIX 2 277
gether, even though we have reason to suppose he could not really

tell which Olympiad year either event fell in.
Finally, it should be noted that there are no other real clues in
Appian’s text as to when he thought the Third Mithridatic War
began. His statement that Lucullus was chosen to fight the war as
consul and pro-consul is unexceptionable and although he does
employ ‘seasonal years’ we have no means of knowing in this in-
stance what they were.92
Conclusion: The only clue to the date of the start of the Third
Mithridatic War in the Mithridatica is a reference to the death of
Sertorius during the siege of Cyzicus. However, at the very least it
would appear that it is difficult to extract a date for Sertorius’ death
from the Bella Civilia. Hence we have no means of controlling the
reference in the Mithridatica. Indeed, there is reason to believe that
both texts are useless as a source for dating because of a severe
chronological muddle which vitiates them both.
(vi) DIODORUS
Some have found support for the view that the war began in
73 in Diod. Sic. 37.22a-b.93 This places the death of Sertorius be-
fore an incident in the siege of Cyzicus and thus the famous deduc-
tion from Appian is offered backing.94 Now, in Walton’s edition
22a is preceded (38/39.22) by what looks like a mention of unrest
in Sertorius’ army and this in turn comes after a mention of Spart-
acus (38/39.21). The problem is we have no anchor or base date
and no dates for the individual passages. In other words, we do not
know what date Diodorus gave to the first passage in the sequence
or to any of the others. Let us assume Diodorus dated the start of
Spartacus’ rebellion to 73, like most others do. Are we then to take
it that 38/39.22–37.22a and 37.22b also refer to 73? We might, but
equally plausibly we might assign both the latter to 72, since that
date for both incidents has found adherents.95 Again, what is to
stop us putting 38/39.22–37.22a in 73 and consigning 37.22b to
72? And this is not the end of the matter. Perhaps Diodorus be-
92 Mith. 69–70, 72. See Holmes (1923) p. 399.

93 MRR 3.121.
94 See section (v) above.
95 MRR 2.118, 3.121–3.
longed to the school that put Spartacus’ rebellion in 74?96 Then all
that follows that notice might belong there or it might conceivably
belong in 73 or perhaps 72. Or it might even be divided between
the two.
Conclusion: Diodorus may be eliminated from our enquiries.
(vii) VELLEIUS PATERCULUS
We have but one passage of Velleius Paterculus to consider di-
rectly:97 2.33.1. This tells us that seven years before the Lex Manilia,
passed when the pirate war was in fine, Lucullus ex consulatu sortitus
Asiam.
When Velleius speaks of a man obtaining a province ex consu-
latu or ex praetura it would appear he means a province conferred
during the magistracy and held in the year immediately after-
wards.98 In this instance he clearly means that Lucullus entered on
his province in 73 after the consulship of 74. This date is, of
course, in complete harmony with the reference to the seven years
that were to elapse before the passing of the Lex Manilia in 66.
This might look like firm evidence in favour of 73 as the date
of the war’s start. But certain considerations must give us pause.
First of all, Lucullus did not obtain Asia by sortition but by vote of
the senate after he had given up his province of Cisalpine Gaul.
Velleius is also unaware that Lucullus held Cilicia too. We must
further recognize that when Velleius portrays a man as remaining
in Rome until his magistracy is up he is writing in a mechanistic or
96See above, on Livy.

97See section (viii) below, on Julius Caesar. 2.30.5 merely states the
Sertorian War was still in progress when the revolt of Spartacus broke out.
It seems to me that 2.90.3 cannot be used either for dating the Sertorian
War since we have no means of dating the beginning of the quinquennium.
See the conflicting guesses recorded in Gabba (195
6) p. 99.
98 In a phrase such as consulatum ex quaestura (applied in Livy 32.7.9 to
Flaminius cos. 198) what is meant is that the very next office he held after
the quaestorship was the consulship and no other office intervened. One
followed the other in the cursus. However, it should not be taken always to
mean one office followed the other automatically without a break, for a
time-lapse could intervene. But in Velleius at least the expression does
mean one followed another without a break since he conceives of the pro-
magistracy as immediately following on the magistracy. See Keaveney
(1982d) pp. 123–4; MRR 1.329 n. 2, 3.123.
APPENDIX 2 279
formulaic fashion. He assumes that what was the norm in his day
was the norm earlier. But we know that in the post-Sullan republic
many consuls left for their provinces before their year of office
expired and in the present instance we have considered above in
section (i) on Cicero contemporary evidence that contradicts
Velleius by numbering Lucullus among those men.99
Conclusion: Velleius is writing loosely and cannot be taken to
tell us anything more than the fact that Lucullus was in Asia in 73.
(viii) JULIUS CAESAR
The movements of the young Julius Caesar are bound up with
the opening of the Third Mithridatic War and hence are of interest
to us.100
His adventures may be reconstructed as follows. He set sail
for Rhodes in the winter months but was captured at Pharmacusa
by pirates. He was as yet a juvenis.101 Ransom, raised by the cities of
Asia, was paid for his release. Once free, Caesar got a scratch fleet
together from those cities, pursued the pirates and captured them.
Lodging them in custody, he went to Bithynia where the governor
of Asia M. Junius Juncus102 now was. When Juncus would not give
him permission to have his captives crucified he returned swiftly to
the coast and went ahead anyway and did it.103 He continued on to
his original objective, Rhodes, but then learned that Mithridates’
men had invaded Asia. Crossing over to the mainland, he raised
another scratch force and drove them back.104 He then went home
in order to assume the priesthood to which he had been elected in
absentia after the death of C. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 75).105
Now there is no dispute about the role of Juncus. When the
Romans learned of Nicomedes’ request he was governor of Asia
and, as such, was instructed to take possession of Bithynia and turn
99 Ch. 4; Sherwin-White (1984) p. 163; McGing (1984) p. 15 n. 12;
MRR 2.106; Balsdon (1939) pp. 57–65.

100 Sources and fundamental discussion in Ward (1977a) whose views
on the relations of these sources to each other are here followed.

101 Suet. Div. Jul. 4; Vell. Pat. 2.41.3; Plut. Caes. 1.
102 For the name see Ward (1977a) pp. 26–9.
103 Vell. Pat. 2.42.1–3; Suet. Div. Jul. 4; Plut. Caes. 2.
104 Suet. Div. Jul. 4. See ch. 5.
105 Vell. Pat. 2.43.1–3. See MRR 2.113.
it into a province.106 It would therefore be useful to know what

winter Caesar travelled in so as to encounter him about his work in
Bithynia. Within broad limits Caesar’s assumption of the priest-
hood provides a terminus post quem for his travels. Cotta went to Cis-
alpine Gaul early in 74. He was granted a triumph but we do not
know when. All we know is that he died the day before he was due
to celebrate it. His successor in Cisalpine Gaul was the consul of 73
C. Cassius Longinus. We do not know when he arrived to take up
his duties but he was certainly active there in 72. Thus it is perfectly
possible that Cotta did not die until some time well into 73.107 Such
a dating would, of course, seem to square well with putting Caesar’s
capture in the winter of 74/73. Unfortunately, one detail tells
against it. The governor of Bithynia Caesar had dealings with was
definitely Juncus, whereas by the winter of 74/73 the governor was
now Aurelius Cotta (cos. 74) who, it will be remembered, had left
Rome in good time to get there by then. In other words, since Ni-
comedes died in 74 and Cotta was there by the year’s end, the only
time Juncus could be in Bithynia to meet Caesar would be at the
start of 74.
Conclusion: What we know of Julius Caesar’s activities at this
time suits a 74 date for the war rather than 73.
(ix) PHLEGON
Phlegon 12.3 (Jacoby 2B p. 1163) says that in Olympiad 177.1
(summer 72–71)108 Lucullus was besieging Amisus. Leaving charge
of this to Murena, he went to Cabira and wintered there. He or-
dered ‘Adrian’ (i.e. Fabius Hadrianus—MRR 2.119) to attack Mith-
ridates and he defeated him.
The chief inference from this passage runs as follows: Lucul-
lus’ troops had already spent two winters in sieges, at Cyzicus and
106MRR 2.98; Gelzer (1968) p. 24.

107Cic. Pis. 62; Ascon. 14C; Sall. Hist. 2.98M. See Balsdon (1939) p.
63 and MRR 2.111, 117, although the suggestion that Cotta died in either
late 74 or early 73 is only a guess. It is by no means certain that Caesar
was a legate to M. Antonius Creticus in 73: see Sumner (1973) p. 138 and
MRR 3.105. But if he were, this would obviously favour a later rather than
an earlier date for Cotta’s death.
108 Holmes’ suggestion (1923) p. 402 that Phlegon equated his Olym-
piad year with the Roman consular year does not appear to be correct. See
Magie (1950) 2 p. 1210 n. 24.
APPENDIX 2 281
Amisus respectively. Hence, this is the third winter under canvas

and as it is 72/71 the beginning of the war must be placed in 74.109
The arguments advanced against this interpretation are not
particularly strong. Emendation, a course proposed by Reinach
(1895) p. 334 n. 1 and approved of by McGing (1984) p. 13 is
surely an unacceptable mode of procedure since it is ever open to
the charge of altering the text in order to make it fit a preconceived
notion or opinion. Neither is there much force in the argument—
McGing (1984) p. 13—that in Plut. Luc. 33 the soldiers only com-
plain of successive winters in camp at Cyzicus and Amisus and not
of one at Cabira. The very next sentence says they were vexed at
every other winter as well because they were spent in enemy coun-
try or under the open sky among the allies. Personally, I do not
think it would be difficult to find a place for a siege of Cabira
among such winters.110
Difficulties too have been encountered in the differing sea-
sons assigned to Lucullus’ setting-out in our various authors.111
Phlegon must be talking of summer, Appian (Mith. 79) says
‘spring’, while Plut. Luc. 15 has him leave ‘after winter’. Yet these
differences are more imaginary than real. We must surely allow
both Phlegon and Appian the right to describe matters after their
respective systems of chronology. In using his ‘seasonal years’ Ap-
pian is telling us that Lucullus moved once fine weather came. This
may have been before summer and thus Phlegon would have diffi-
culty accommodating it to his Olympiad system. As the bulk of the
action took place in year 1 it would probably make sense to do
what he appears to have done: sacrifice strict truth to elegance and
put back Lucullus’ move a little to accommodate to his system.
Moreover, since Appian’s seasons are inexact and elastic things and
as the first year of an Olympiad did not necessarily always begin on
the same day in each Olympiad it is easy to see that Phlegon and
Appian may have been separated from each other by no more than
109 McGing (1984) p. 12. See App. Mith. 76, 78, 79; Plut. Luc. 11, 15,
33 and ch. 5.
110 The notion—see the bibliography in van Ooteghem (1959) p. 93
n. 6 and Holmes (1923) p. 402—that Lucullus wintered in the captured

city is not acceptable. See ch. 5 and Gelzer col. 391.
111 McGing (1984) p. 12.
a few weeks.112 And neither could be said to contradict Plutarch,

who, with his usual vagueness about such matters,113 simply says, as
we saw, that Lucullus moved after winter.114
It is sometimes pointed out that Phlegon must imply that Lu-
cullus took a whole summer to travel thirty miles on an unopposed
route between Amisus and Cabira, which seems an unlikely propo-
sition.115 In fact, he does not imply any such thing.116 The campaign
was long and difficult117 but Phlegon merely gives three details:
Lucullus advances, he winters, Adrian wins a victory. He should
not be taken to tell us any more than that. Quite simply, he has
nothing to say about how long the journey took nor does he supply
details of anything else that happened. He should therefore not be
charged with saying what he does not say.
Conclusion: We must believe Phlegon when he says Lucullus
wintered at Cabira in the winter of 72/71 BC.
(x) MITHRIDATES IN ARMENIA
The fate of Mithridates after Cabira has sometimes been in-
voked to fix the date of the start of the war.118 Tigranes at first
would not receive Mithridates in person when he fled to him. Ac-
cording to Memnon, twenty months elapsed before he was admit-
ted to the royal presence. Both he and Plutarch suggest this hap-
pened after the interview with Appius Claudius ‘in early 70’.119 Ap-
pian (Mith. 82, 83) puts the entrée a year later after the first en-
gagement of Tigranes and Lucullus. So, concludes McGing (1984)
p. 13, ‘if Plutarch and Memnon are right Mithridates’ flight from
112See Keaveney (2005) p. 160 n. 9 and Samuel (1972) pp. 189–94.

113See Carney (1960).
114 By way of comparison we may note that our sources for the battle
of the Colline Gate in 82—which give what appear, on the surface, to be

differing times for the start—reveal themselves, on examination, to be in
essential agreement. See Keaveney (2005a) p. 209 n. 28.
115 McGing (1984) p. 13; Holmes (1923) p. 401.
116 Nor, it should be said, can we turn Phlegon’s notice of Lucullus’
advance from Amisus into an advance into Bithynia and Pontus, as Sher-
win-White (1984) p. 172 n. 45 would wish.
117 See ch. 5.
118 McGing (1984) p. 13.
119 Memnon 31, 38.1 (Jacoby 3B pp. 360, 365); Plut. Luc. 21–2.
APPENDIX 2 283
Cabira seems to fall in 72 and the beginning of the war in 74. Ap-
pian’s evidence favours 71 and 73.’
At best, this is inconclusive; at worst, it is open to some seri-
ous objections. It is by no means certain that Appius’ mission fell
in 70; it may have been earlier.120 This has obvious implications for
Memnon’s ‘twenty months’, and the latter’s chronology is suspect
in any case, like that of Plutarch and Appian.121 Indeed, the whole
argument may be misconceived. What is at issue, maybe, is not
when Mithridates fled—a point upon which all sources agree—but
when he was admitted to Tigranes’ presence. In other words, the
length of time B takes place after A has no bearing on the existence
of A. If we know definitely the date the Second World War ended
then our knowledge of that is not affected by a dispute as to how
many years after that point the Korean War began. Conclusion:
Mithridates’ flight to Armenia tells us nothing conclusive about
when the war started.
(xi) PLUTARCH
Plutarch in his Sertorius gives us no clue as to exactly when its
subject died. The Life of Lucullus is marginally more informative. As
Plutarch depicts things in ch. 5 a war with Mithridates was regarded
as imminent in Rome at the start of 74.
We have examined our evidence piecemeal in order to see
what each element would yield and the value that might be put on
it. It is now time to view it as a whole.
The Livian tradition very firmly puts the start of the Third
Mithridatic War in 74. No contradiction is offered by the contem-
porary Cicero and, indeed, at one point he dovetails neatly with the
testimony of that tradition. Likewise, two of the three possible in-
terpretations of the evidence that another contemporary—
Sallust—offers about the pretender to the Bithynian throne can be
seen to fit the date of 74.122 Furthermore, what we know of Julius
120 See ch. 6.

121 The remarks of Holmes (1923) p. 402 n. 1 should be consulted at
this point.
122 As we saw above, the contemporary coins do not offer unequivo-
cal testimony.
Caesar’s movements ties in well with the 74 date.123 Finally, the

Livian date has the support of Phlegon.
In contrast, the arguments contra are weak. The list of Dio-
dorus proves to be undatable while the seeming exactitude of
Velleius dissolves into loose writing. Most disappointing of all is
Appian with his synchronization of the siege of Cyzicus with the
death of Sertorius. From the Bella Civilia there is no way to deduce
when he thought Sertorius died and so we cannot use this data to
date the siege in the Mithridatica. Indeed, it could be argued that, in
both accounts, Appian is employing an inexact system of chronol-
ogy that makes it impossible for him to give precise dates.124
There remains but one objection that must be met. Some ar-
gue that there is not room in 74 to cram in all of the events that we
suppose belong there.125 I would not agree. Because the Peace of
Dardanus had never been ratified the Romans technically regarded
Mithridates as an enemy and if they knew about the pact with Ser-
torius then they must have realized he was soon to become an ac-
tive enemy. In addition, it is legitimate to infer from Sallust that
they knew of a pretender who might make trouble when Ni-
comedes died.126 In other words, war will have been expected at
the start of 74, precisely the situation described by Plutarch. The
presence of Juncus in Bithynia early in 74 now becomes explicable.
The Romans were reacting to the king’s death. They moved imme-
diately not only to forestall a takeover by Mithridates but a possible
palace-revolt.127 And there is time for Cotta to arrive and replace
Juncus before Mithridates arrives to defeat him. In the secondary
123 In contrast, the movements of Mithridates after Cabira are unin-
formative: see below.

124 Part of the problem of dating Sertorius’ death, it will have been
observed, is due to the fact that our sources are unable to agree at what
point in his struggle the actual Sertorian War began. The year 82 which
seems most natural to us does not seem to have been considered as the
starting-point. See Spann (1987) pp. 40–55.
125 McGing (1984) pp. 15–16.
126 See ch. 4 and section (ii) above.
127 If I am right in suggesting what would determine Rome’s policy
on the king’s death then whenever that death would occur the occupation
of Bithynia would follow hard upon. An occupation in winter suggests
that Nicomedes died early in 74.
APPENDIX 2 285
literature it is generally assumed that Mithridates invaded Bithynia

in the spring.128 This is not so. Mithridates invaded Paphlagonia in
the spring and for a good reason.129 It was to be a staging-post for
his army.130 In App. Mith. 69 we are given a long list of Mithridates’
European and Asian allies.131 Now if we look at the map one sali-
ent point emerges: for an invasion of Bithynia the most natural
mustering-place for the Asiatic contingent would be Pontus itself.
It was otherwise with the European. Were they to go to Pontus
they would simply have to march back out again. Nor was this just
a pointless exercise but it was one fraught with real peril. One of
the problems encountered by Mithridates in the war was victualling
his army.132 It is difficult, then, to see why he should multiply his
difficulties by feeding men who were making a useless journey. On
all counts Paphlagonia was the place for Mithridates to meet his
friends from Europe, and join them to his Pontic army. Appian
certainly grasped this point. The speech he puts into Mithridates’
mouth is that of a man who is only now mounting his campaign
proper. With the muster complete the time for exhortation has be-
gun.
But gathering an army takes time and thus we may argue that
we can see how Cotta was able to get into position in Bithynia be-
fore Mithridates arrived. And it was after Cotta’s initial defeat that
Lucullus, who was delayed in Rome, came to the rescue.
And all of this, I believe, happened in 74.
128 McGing (1984) p. 17.

129 App. Mith. 70. Compare the invasion route in the First Mithridatic
War, App. Mith. 16.
130 What follows is a development from an observation of Sherwin-
White (1984) p. 164, who does not appear to have realized the full signifi-
cance of his discovery. McGing (1986) p. 145 n. 45 does not seem to have
understood his argument at all.
131 Cf. McGing (1986) pp. 57–62.
132 See ch. 5.
POSTSCRIPT
In this postscript I shall be considering once more some of the

matters originally dealt with in my first edition.1 Since that appeared
not a great deal of work has been done on Lucullus’ father or on
his family background.2 It is a different matter when we come to
the early portion of Lucullus’ career down to his consulship in 74.3
So it has been suggested, with some plausibility, that Lucullus
may have begun his book collecting very early indeed.4 But how-
ever great a bibliophile he may have been, there is no reason to
suppose, as some have done, that he produced a set of Memoirs late
in life.5
The date of Lucullus’ quaestorship has recently been scruti-
nised. When I originally wrote, I, like many others, adopted Bad-
ian’s attractive suggestion that he was the unnamed quaestor who
1 Plain page numbers in brackets refer to my original text as, for in-
stance, (pp. 5–15).

2 (pp. 1–7). Kelly (2006) pp. 83, 176–177 veers between a condemna-
tion de peculatu and de repetundis for the father but Brennan (2000) p. 479
favours the latter, as I did. Kelly also mentions the possibility that
Heraclea may have been the place of exile of Lucullus snr. and also draws
attention to Groebe’s unlikely theory that his sons then went to live with
him there.
For the intriguing possibility that the Luculli, including our Lucullus,
may have had a connection with Interamna Nahars see Bispham (2007)
pp. 321–323.
3 (pp. 7–65).
4 Dix (2000) pp. 443–444. See further n. 118 below.
5 On this point see Hillard (1987) pp. 38–39. It is worth noting too
that Lucullus seems to have had dealings with a freedman called Hector
who had distinguished himself in the literary field (Pliny NH 35.200).
How far this man may have helped in the composition of Lucullus’ his-
tory of the Social War (pp. 9–10) is a moot point.
287
did not desert Sulla when he marched on Rome. Shared political

outlook and personal friendship rendered this notion credible and
hence Lucullus’ quaestorship was to be dated to 88.6 This dating
has, however, been questioned by Thonemann (2004).7 The argu-
ment largely rests on epigraphical evidence. In all of the relevant
inscriptions from this period, those from Asia style Lucullus as
a0ntitami/aj (proquaestore) but, in one from Hypata in Greece , he
is called tami/aj (quaestor).8 From this Thonemann makes the fol-
lowing deductions. He rightly says that the inscriptions from Asia
accurately reflect Lucullus’ status at this point. As he left Greece at
the end of 87 or early in 86 we can all agree he must have been pro-
quaestore by then.9 But, reasons Thonemann, that inscription from
Hypata must mean in turn that in 87 he had been quaestor.10
6 (pp. 23–24).
7 His arguments seem to be a development of those of Sayar et al.
(1994) pp. 118 n. 12.
8 The inscriptional evidence for Lucullus’ rank in the First Mithridatic
War may be set forth as follows. Quaestor: Syll3 no.743 (Hypata); SEG 44
no.1227 (Mopsuestia). Proquaestor: IGRR vol.4 no.701 (Synnada); IGRR
vol.4 no.1191 (Thyateira); Syll3 no.475 (Rhodes); ILS 165 no.805 (Delos).
Three controversial cases should also be mentioned. Ferrary (2000)
p. 340 n. 20 doubts if SEG no.153 from Delphi (p. 215 n. 33) refers to
Lucullus. See also Ameling (1989) p. 99 n. 10. Eilers (2002) C no.89 from
Ephesus could refer to Lucullus but as Eilers p. 234 notes—following
Ameling (1989)—restoration is not certain. An inscription from Chios
(SEG 35 no.929) may refer to Lucullus but no title survives. See Ameling
(1989). Its state of preservation offers no support whatsoever to Santan-
gelo (2007) p. 126 who thinks Lucullus could have been a patron here.
The number of inscriptions and the honorific formulae adopted here
have often been commented on and seen as something out of the ordi-
nary—see, for example, Tröster (2005a) p. 307 n. 21. Ferrary (2002)
p. 340 n. 21 connects this with Lucullus’ comparatively gentle treatment
of the Greek cities (pp. 39–42). See also Eilers (2002) pp. 145–146.
9 (pp. 27–28).
10 See also Sayar et al. (1994) pp. 118–119. Santangelo (2007) p. 7
n. 17 takes Thonemann to task for what he sees as the latter’s excessive

confidence in the accuracy of official titulature in inscriptions. He may
have a point here but, in my view, he misses the most important one. This
is a period in Lucullus’ career when he was both quaestor and proquaestor
and some weight must surely attach to these differences in nomenclature.
POSTSCRIPT 289
Certain considerations, however, which Thonemann over-

looked, may prove fatal to his theory. Putting to one side entirely
that it would be odd if consul and quaestor split up after such a
signal display of loyalty, there are other substantial matters to be
weighed up.
Although he is vague about dates, Plutarch Sulla 11 very
clearly shows Lucullus exercising sole authority at some time in
Greece. Sulla has not yet come and it falls to Lucullus to establish
that he has charge of the war. He does this by ordering Sura, who
had been campaigning successfully in Greece, to withdraw to his
own province. It is these latter campaigns which provide us with a
clue as to the dating. Sura’s campaign took place in 88.11
In the light of these facts it is, I believe, possible to offer a
sounder reconstruction of events than that of Thonemann. There
is no reason to suppose that Lucullus did not cross to Greece as
quaestor in 88 and some considerations that point to his having
done so. In the first instance, it was Roman practice at the time to
despatch their armies in this piecemeal fashion. Both Flaccus and
Cinna did so a few years later.12 Nor, in the light of Sura’s victories,
would this be a particularly hazardous move. Indeed these same
victories seem to have made Sulla anxious to assert his authority in
his province.13 The rest of our evidence is in agreement with this
hypothesis. Attested as quaestor in the Hypata inscription, there is
no reason why he should not have acted in that capacity when he
removed Sura’s garrison from Chaeronea, an event which can be as
easily placed in the winter of 88 as in the spring of 87.14 Likewise
As I shall now demonstrate, Santangelo is wrong to declare ‘there are no

compelling arguments, either to refute or accept [Thonemann’s theory]’.
11 Keaveney (2005a) p. 203 n. 7.
12 Keaveney (2005a) pp. 77, 102.
13 It is worth noting that Piccirilli (1990) p. 279 revives the notion
(p. 31 n. 13) that when Lucullus was despatched to the East by Sulla in 87
his brief included asserting the latter’s authority there.
14 (pp. 25–26). Holleaux (1938) p. 153 must be right in dating the out-
rage against Damon to the winter of 88/87. However he is wrong, (1938)

p. 154 n. 3, to say, on the basis of App. Mith. 33, that the siege of Athens
began a little before the end of summer 87. App. Mith. 30 shows it started
much earlier, pointing in turn to an early arrival of Sulla in Greece and a
brief period of sole authority by Lucullus.
we can fit into our picture Lucullus acting as quaestor propraetore

when he grants a privilege to the people of Mopsuestia.15 Here
again we see Lucullus exercising his authority as quaestor in the
absence of his commander and we can also see that his decision
was later confirmed by Sulla.16 We cannot say exactly when this was
but it must be after Sulla took charge in 87, otherwise the suppli-
ants would have approached him as the source of Roman authority.
This points then to 88 as the year of Lucullus’ benefaction, a con-
clusion which is strengthened by a consideration of the situation as
it then was. This was the year of Mithridates’ invasion when people
had to choose whether to take the Roman or the Pontic side.17 The
people of Mopsuestia showed where their loyalty lay by turning to
the man who claimed to be the legitimate representative of Roman
power. And that man was then Lucullus, quaestor in 88.18
15 Text and commentary: Sayar et al. (1994); Rigsby (1996) pp. 465–
471. See also SEG 44 no.1227.
16 See Rigsby (1996) p. 466.
17 In general on the situation in 88 see Keaveney (2005a) pp. 64–68.
On Mopsuestia see Sayar et al. (1994) pp. 123–124 and Rigsby (1996)
p. 466.
18 Damon (pp. 27–28) has attracted a good deal of scholarly atten-
tion. The attempt of Mackay (2000) to play down his personal motives for
acting as he did does not seem to me totally convincing. They would
surely sharpen his desire to be on the anti-Roman side in the struggle be-
tween pro- and anti-Roman groups which Mackay believes were to be
found in Chaeronea at the time. Given the conditions of the time (see
n. 17), Mackay may well be right about the existence of such factions but
his reconstruction of events, like that of Santanagelo (2007) pp. 45–47,
seems to me excessively conjectural. We can agree however with Mackay
(2000) p. 104 when he puts the return of Damon and his subsequent
murder between Lucullus’ withdrawal of Roman troops in 88 (see n. 14)
and the arrival of Thracian auxiliaries in 87: Holleaux (1938) pp. 154, 159.
Ellinger (2005) may perhaps too have gone beyond the evidence in seeing
in Plutarch an attempt to highlight Chaeronea’s passing into the Roman
empire and a pre-occupation with the question of whether Rome was a
tyrant-city.
Kallet-Marx’s discussion (1995) pp. 280–282 is chiefly concerned
with Roman jurisdiction in the matter. There is no reason to suppose with
Santangelo (2007) p. 47 that among Lucullus’ motives for his later inter-
vention (p. 28) may have been a desire to create closer ties with a ruling
elite. Santangelo (2007) occasionally tends to see such ties where none
POSTSCRIPT 291
From the quaestorship we move to the praetorship of 78.

Taking my cue from David/Dondin (1980), I suggested that Dio
36.41.1–2 first showed Lucullus refusing the province of Sardinia
and then allowing his chair to be smashed by a certain Acilius, who
is to be identified with M.Acilius Glabrio (cos. 67) who, since no
tribunate is attested for him in that year, may have been standing
on his pontificial dignity.19 Ryan, however, wants to emend
AKILIOU to AIMILIOU and take it that we have here a reference
to M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 78). His malign influence will have
ensured, so Ryan believes, that Lucullus got the unattractive prov-
ince of Sardinia and that, in consequence of sloughing it off, he did
not take up Africa until 76.20 Brennan, however, prefers to revive
the old suggestion that we emend 41.1 from Lucullus to Lucceius and
thus the incident, as in much previous scholarship, should be dated
to 67.21
Plainly this counsels caution. Given the equivocal nature of
Dio’s text, and our failure to agree on what he says, it would seem
best to exclude it from our consideration. This leaves us with
Cicero Acad. 2.1 which has no mention of Sardinia but has Lucullus
proceed directly to Africa after his praetorship. The gap between
his governorship and his consulship might thus suggest proroga-
tion.22
We turn at this point from public office to have another look
at three individuals who figured in Lucullus’ life, Archias, Pompey
and Clodia, his first wife.
may have existed. Plutarch (Cim. 2) mentions Lucullus’ statue erected in

gratitude. On the subject of statues in Plutarch, Mossman (1991) is diffuse
and unhelpful. Duff (1999) pp. 162–170 is more surefooted.
19 (pp. 52–53).
20 (1994) pp. 186–192.
21 (2000) p. 455.
22 Brennan (2000) p. 544. This reconstruction would mean Lucullus
had no attested dealings with Glabrio before 67 (p. 53) nor with C. Va-
lerius Triarius for that matter before 74 (p. 96). There is an interesting
discussion of the career of Lucullus’ brother in Ryan (1995) which is how-
ever vitiated by the claim that Varro was Sulla’s quaestor in 81. Sulla had
no quaestor in that year. See Keaveney (2005b).
I chiefly dealt with Archias in his role as court poet and friend
to the house of the Luculli.23 Some have, however, found another
role for Archias. In a theory which goes back at least as far as Th.
Reinach, it is claimed that a poem Archias wrote about the Third
Mithridatic War is the source for much of Plutarch’s account of
that war in his Life of Lucullus. The chief reason for this belief seems
to be the amount of legendary and fabulous elements to be found
in this Life. This, so it is maintained, points to a poetical source.24
As an hypothesis this is not, perhaps, completely convincing.
At the outset we should acknowledge that Quellenforschungen without
a named source can never be more than intelligent guesswork. In
this case it will not have escaped notice that Archias is never men-
tioned as a source by Plutarch, but Antiochus of Ascalon is.25 This
I would urge is not without some significance and must cast some
doubt over the claims made for Archias.26 Further we all know that
much of ancient historiography contains the marvellous and the
heroic. One thinks of the extant Livy or the lost Memoirs of Sulla as
mediated through Plutarch’s Life.27 So, I would venture to assert,
these two considerations might just tell against the facile assump-
tion that Archias is the source for much of our information about
Lucullus’ campaign. In any case the problem is not of the greatest
23(pp. 14–16, 188). Wiseman (1982) pp. 31–34 attempts to define

Archelaus’ role in Roman society by analysing Cicero’s terminology in Pro
Archia. An over-subtle exercise one fears. All that we can really take from
that speech is that Archias had to constantly make himself pleasing to the
great and was rather good at it.
24 Coarelli (1981) pp. 254–255; Hillard (1987) pp. 40–43.
25 Plut. Luc. 28.
26 Hillard’s explanation, (1987) p. 43, that Plutarch was somehow
ashamed to name his poetical source will hardly hold up if the biographer
made the extensive use of Archias he thinks he did.
Wiseman’s attempt, (1982) p. 33, to assign to Archias’ poem the line
of verse in Plut. Luc. 12 is methodologically flawed. In App. BC 1.94 Sulla
quotes a line of Aristophanes. Are we to assume then that Aristophanes
was Appian’s source here? For a detailed critique of this mode of proce-
dure see Keaveney (2003), (2006).
27 As does Hillard (1987) p. 41 ns.119, 120 but he fails, in my view, to
answer this objection adequately. He also seems to misunderstand the

significance a dream (Plut. Luc. 12) would have for a friend of Sulla. See
(p. 113).
POSTSCRIPT 293
moment to the historian. In constructing our narrative we need

only approach Plutarch as we would any other authority. Treating
the supernatural element with care and sensitivity we can still make
a plausible reconstruction of events.28
Lucullus’ relationship with Pompey up until the consulship
has been the subject of an examination by Hillman (1991). He
wonders if Sulla’s will could have caused the disagreement or ri-
valry between the pair, which Plutarch says it did. He thinks we
could have here an example of the biographer’s ‘tendency to retro-
ject later conditions into an earlier time’.29 This is, of course, possi-
ble but I would hazard the opinion that rivalry already existed since
the late war and that Sulla’s studied insult exacerbated it.30 As I
have observed elsewhere, Plutarch’s insight into human nature is
sometimes underrated and the notion that rivalry began in a small
way only to grow is perfectly acceptable.31 What I believe Hillman
has taught us is to be very careful in our use of terminology. Before
Pompey replaced Lucullus in the command of the Third Mithri-
datic War ‘hatred’ is too strong a term.32 But ‘rivalry’ is probably
perfectly acceptable.33
28 Two examples of this mode of procedure will, I hope, suffice. We
may or may not believe the story of the heifer at Cyzicus (Plut. Luc. 10)
but, in any case, can dismiss divine intervention. On the other hand it is
good to call on an eye-witness (Xen. Anab. 1.4.1.17–18) to the lowering of
the Euphrates mentioned in Plut. Luc. 24. Indeed it is worth remarking
that Swain (1992) p. 315 n. 23 seems to think the prominence of the su-
pernatural in the Life may owe something to the fact that Lucullus is being
portrayed as a champion of Hellenism in his struggle with the barbarian.
29 Hillman (1991) p. 316 with n. 11. Note also the doubts of Wylie
(1994) p. 109 n. 1. On the phenomenon of ‘back projection’ see Keaveney

(2007) pp. 4–7.
30 Hillman’s suggestion (1991) p. 317 that Pompey might not have
begrudged Lucullus his honours may show a certain lack of acquaintance

with human nature and attributes too much generosity to the man.
31 Compare Plut. Sulla 3, 4 and see the remarks of Keaveney (2005a)
pp. 24–25.
32 A view shared by others. See, for example, Tröster (2004) p. 489.
For Lucullus’ later relations with Pompey see below.

33 It will be seen that Hillman and I are in broad general agreement
about Lucullus’ reaction when Pompey looked for help in Spain. Compare
Hillman (1991) p. 317 with (pp. 67–71). However his remarks, Hillman
When I discussed Lucullus’ betrothal to Clodia I dismissed, as

a joke, Appius’ claim that he could not afford to drink mulsum but
was prepared to believe in Clodia’s poverty and in Lucullus’ conse-
quent refusal of a dowry.34 Tatum, however, has cast doubts on the
whole story.35 Let us, therefore, rehearse the arguments.
Assuming for the moment that the Claudii were really poor,
then a man of Appius’ temperament might not want to advertise
it.36 Further there could also be a certain shame attached to mar-
riage sine dote and so it was best avoided.37 In any case, Lucullus,
whom Tatum characterises as ‘stingy’ was not the man to waive a
dowry.38 Whatever validity the first two observations may have, the
third has none. As I have been at pains to demonstrate throughout
this work, Lucullus undeservedly acquired this repute because he
had tried to stop his troops looting Greek cities in Asia.
However, even more important, we have good reason to be-
lieve the Claudii were actually wealthy at this time.39 As Tatum
points out, taking his cue from Shatzman, it would be odd indeed if
the Claudii had not profited by the proscriptions.40 This is a point
which would be strengthened if, as I argued some years ago, Clo-
dia’s father Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 79) had been with Sulla in the
East almost from the start of the First Mithridatic War.41 Such con-
spicuous loyalty could not fail to bring rewards.
Various solutions have been proposed to the seeming contra-
diction in our source material. Ultimately none have been com-
pletely satisfactory. Shatzman proposed viewing the Claudii as poor
relative to some of the other Sullans but, as Tatum pointed out,
(1991) pp. 317–318, on what Sallust might have thought about relations
between Pompey and Lucullus seem speculative to me.
34 The source is Varro R.R. 3.16.1–2 and my discussion is in (pp. 65–
67).
35 Tatum (1992). See also Tatum (1999) p. 36.
36 Tatum (1992) p. 192.
37 Tatum (1992) pp. 192–193.
38 Tatum (1992) p. 194.
39 Shatzman (1975) pp. 51, 321, 324–328; Rawson (1991) pp. 102–
124, 227–244; Tatum (1992) p. 191 n. 5.

40 Tatum (1992) p. 191.
41 Keaveney (1984a) p. 118.
POSTSCRIPT 295
this is not really what Varro seems to be saying.42 Tatum himself

was prepared to consider the possibility that Appius faced some
kind of temporary cash flow problem but, as he admits, there is no
explicit evidence to support this notion.43 Likewise I doubt if the
Claudii, who were admittedly a rackety lot, had simply run through
their inheritance.
In my view the answer may just be in the proper application
of two points made by Tatum. He urges that due weight be given
to recognising that Varro’s dialogue, which we may remind our-
selves is the only source for Claudian poverty and its alleged con-
sequences, is a piece of literature. As such it has its own preoccupa-
tions and obeys its own rules. It may, therefore, have some histori-
cal basis but we need not assume it always has. Appius is a real per-
son but the role assigned him by Varro may not necessarily reflect
reality.44 In addition Varro plainly has pretensions to being a hu-
morist, although, like most Romans, of the heavy variety.45
Putting these two considerations next to evidence for
Claudian wealth leads me to postulate that what Varro tells us may
not reflect reality. I would actually go further and suggest that, in
playing the humorist, he has inverted that reality. Appius was rich,
he could drink mulsum whenever he wanted, and could pay Clodia’s
dowry.
When we come to talk of the Third Mithridatic War our first
topic must be the man who helped Lucullus get the command in
the war, P. Cornelius Cethegus.46 I no longer believe that he might
have held a praetorship before the Social War. My reasons are
chiefly three. To begin with, Ryan (1994a) has convincingly dem-
onstrated that when Cicero Brutus 178 attributes consularis auctoritas
to Cethegus, it is simply a tribute to his influence and in no way
42 Shatzman (1975) pp. 51, 321, 324; Tatum (1992) p. 191. See Keav-
eney (2005a) p. 195 n. 16 for a better attested instance of the phenome-

non.
43 Tatum (1992) pp. 194–195.
44 Tatum (1992) pp. 195–200. Compare my remarks (pp. 16–17) and
those of Rawson (1991) pp. 71–72 on Cicero’s mode of procedure in his

dialogues.
45 See Tatum (1992) p. 196.
46 (pp. 87–94).
indicates his rank.47 Ryan (1998) pp. 52–87 has also carefully ana-
lysed the pedarii where I think Cethegus’ power base lay. He be-
lieves the term pedarius may have been specifically applied to people
enrolled in the senate by Sulla in 81.48 But in any case it is clear that
Cethegus would not need high rank to wield the influence he did in
this quarter. We must also bear in mind that Cethegus lived in very
troubled times when men might have unorthodox careers. One
thinks for instance of Pompey and Afella.49 When we remember
how they rose to prominence, we need not wonder at the unusual
features in Cethegus’ record.
From this it is a natural progression to the date of the war, a
question to which I devoted a considerable amount of space in my
first edition.50 One piece of evidence which I neglected to consider
is the Customs Law from Ephesus first published in 1989.51 This
has provoked a good deal of debate.
The first part of the inscription (ls.7–84) quotes the customs
law of L. Octavius and C. Aurelius Cotta. These men were consuls
in 75 and were reworking existing legislation.52 Since the law men-
tions the activities of the publicani in Bithynia, Merkelbach reasoned
that Nicomedes IV must have died in that year because the publicani
would not have been admitted to the area prior to its incorporation
in the province.53 This deduction did not long go unchallenged.
Heil (1991) pp. 9–10 pointed out that although the consuls of 75
leased the Asian taxes, it does not necessarily follow they were the
authors of the law. It could have been passed in that same year af-
ter the leasing of the taxes. The year 75 is thus the terminus post quem
and the law could have been introduced in 74 or 73. The terminus
47 See also Ryan (1998) p. 346 n. 381. Brennan (2000) p. 906 n. 204
finds Ryan unconvincing but offers no argument contra.

48 Ryan (1998) pp. 86–87.
49 Pompey needs no documentation here. For Afella see Keaveney
(2003a).
50 (pp. 255–285). The chronology of the Sertorian War established by
Konrad (1995) does not affect my conclusion about what may be ex-
tracted from Appian (pp. 271–279).
51 Editio princeps: Engelmann/Knibbe (1989). See also SEG 39
no.1180; L’année épigraphique 1989 no.681.

52 Engelmann/Knibbe (1989) pp. 96, 100.
53 Merkelbach (1990) p. 97.
POSTSCRIPT 297
ante quem is 72 as ls.84–87 mention a supplement by the consuls of

that year.54 McGing (1995) p. 284 accepted these arguments and
added two of his own. He pointed out that in 104, Nicomedes III,
and just before the First Mithridatic War, Nicomedes IV, were
both in the debt of the publicani, which strongly suggests the latter
could operate outside the province.55 Thus Nicomedes IV could
still be alive when the law was passed. He also claimed that a possi-
ble, but not absolutely necessary further inference from lines 22–
26, could be yet again that Nicomedes was still alive since the har-
bours of Bithynia are absent from the list of those liable to the por-
torium.56
All of this means, for me at any rate, that we must reject
Merkelbach’s inference from the inscription. We must concede to
McGing that it ‘cannot be used by defenders of the year 74 as am-
munition to fire at those supporting the year 73’.57 But at the same
time I submit it offers no comfort or support to those who opt for
73 over 74.58 The number of imponderables we have just seen
make that clear.
But if Merkelbach was wrong about the inscription, I believe
he was correct about the value to be placed on the Livian evidence
as represented by the Epitome and Eutropius.59 It is there that the
chronology is to be established. This can be demonstrated first by
showing that all of the events of Ep.93 fall within the span of 75
and 74, and then by establishing that the titles the epitomator and
Eutropius give Lucullus and Cotta are the correct ones. Finally we
54 On the basis of Memnon 27.5 (Jacoby 3B p. 355), Heil (1991) p. 10
favours 74 but seems unaware of the difficulties this passage poses, for
which see (p. 134 n. 68).
55 The first of these instances was also noted by Engelmann/Knibbe
p. 161.
56 Is there some kind of a contradiction here? The absence of publicani
here is invoked to show Nicomedes IV could still be alive. In the in-

stances above however it is also claimed that it was their presence which
could show the kings were alive.
57 (1995) p. 288.
58 A view shared by Brennan (2000) p. 560.
59 On the Bithynian coinage McGing (1995) pp. 287–288 is preferable
to Merkelbach (1990) p. 100.

should see how this evidence agrees with the narrative of events as
given in our other sources which have no chronological value.
The truth of our first proposition may be demonstrated by
drawing attention to one cardinal fact. There may be disagreement
over some details but, irrespective of whether they put the start of
the war in 74 or 73, scholars have been able to agree on the essen-
tial chronological framework of Ep.93.60
The first item in Ep.93 concerns the campaigns of P. Servilius
Vatia Isauricus. I dated this to 74 but Konrad places it in 75, while
McGing thought either 75 or 74 might be in question, as did
Merkelbach. Then comes the legacy of Nicomedes and the erection
of his kingdom into a province. I put the death of Nicomedes in
74. McGing, too favoured 74, but Merkelbach opted for 75.61 The
phrase foedere icto suggests to me that we have an account of Mithri-
dates’ activities in 75 and 74.62 The notice of Cotta as cos. self-
evidently points to 74 with his defeat at Chalcedon falling in the
same year.63. I put the Spanish campaigns of this epitome in 74, as
do Merkelbach and McGing, and we thus locate the wintering of
Pompey and Metellus in 74/73.64 Konrad, however, thinks the
campaigns of 75 are in question and thus the winter as that of
75/74.
So we can see there is broad general agreement that Ep.93
dealt with the events of 75 and 74. But we have also seen that the
designation of Cotta as consul provides us with chronological pre-
60 Aside from my contribution (pp. 264-267) I reproduce here those
of Merkelbach (1990) pp. 98–99; McGing (1995) pp. 286–287; Konrad

(1995) pp. 171–172, 187; Brennan (2002) p. 562. The assertion of Heil
(1991) p. 10 n. 14 that these notices do not give a strict chronology is ac-
cepted. For our purposes we need here only establish the broad chrono-
logical limits. That McGing (1995) p. 286 should quote Brunt’s comment
‘the wretched Periochae of Livy’ is unfortunate since this seemingly ma-
jestic dismissal was merely a cloak for its author’s failure to evaluate prop-
erly this source. See (p. 264 n. 35).
61 See further below for why the date of 75 for the death of Ni-
comedes, which could be deduced from position, is impossible.

62 So also, it would seem, Merkelbach.
63 For McGing’s view that this notice can be stretched into 73 see be-
low n. 65.
64 Brennan also favours this chronology but his recourse to emenda-
tion will not recommend itself to everybody.

POSTSCRIPT 299
cision. His campaign starts in 74. To deny that precision we should

have to make the unlikely supposition that the epitomator wrongly
gave Lucullus the same title in the précis of the next book (Ep.94).
We should further have to explain why, if the epitomator really has
twice used consul for proconsul, he suddenly becomes precise with the
latter title in Ep.95.65 Support for the epitomator comes also from
Eutropius 6.6. Drawing on the same source, he tells us Nicomedes
died in the consulship of Lucullus and Cotta, and they in that same
year were despatched to fight Mithridates.66
So it is clear the Livian tradition firmly points to 74 as the
starting date of the Third Mithridatic War.67 It still remains to con-
sider whether our other sources support this. Quite simply there
are two differing opinions here. McGing (1995) p. 287 thinks ‘im-
pressive conflicting evidence’ means they will not. I have argued in
detail for the opposing view that our other authorities can be
brought into harmony with the Livian evidence.68 I have nothing
more to add to what I said then. The reader must therefore decide
between the two opposing viewpoints but, for myself, I still believe
74 to be the correct date.
From chronology to arms. I now wish to make here some ob-
servations about Lucullus’ army as a whole and also about some of
its individual officers.69 I now believe we should use the term ‘pro-
fessional’ in connection with the armies of Lucullus or his contem-
65 On these points see Konrad (1995) p. 172. Failure to consider
them vitiates, in my view, McGing (1995) pp. 286–287 since he too readily
assumes inaccuracy in the epitomator’s use of the word consul. It then fol-
lows that if he is wrong to assume consul could mean proconsul then the
Chalcedon campaign need not stretch into 73. See n. 63 above.
66 I am not persuaded by Merkelbach (1990) pp. 99–100 when he
claims the death of Nicomedes should be put in 75. Eutropius is un-

equivocal and the course of events support him (see n. 69 below). Still less
am I persuaded by McGing (1995) p. 286 that Eutropius could have
missed a metamorphosis into proconsuls as the pair journeyed to Asia.
Eutropius’ notice hangs together well. We have consular dating, a notice
of despatch of consules, the aid of alter consul to the other and a campaign
which extended over una hieme et aestate. All of this can be comfortably
accommodated in 74/73.
67 A point conceded even by the sceptical McGing (1995) p. 287.
68 (pp. 255–285).
69 My original discussion will be found in (pp. 95–97, 238–241).
poraries with some circumspection. The rank and file who were
still recruited in the traditional manner can only be so designated in
the sense that they acquired military expertise over time. There is
nothing of the mercenary about them.70 This particular profession-
alisation of which we are speaking is especially marked among
middle and high ranking officers. The emergence in the last century
B.C. of the vir militaris or military specialist has been noted.71 At the
same time it is important to stress that these processes did not lead
to a weakening of the soldiers’ consciousness of being citizens, as I
have recently tried to demonstrate. A general who wished to turn
them into an instrument of revolution had, first of all, to convince
them of the correctness of his political programme.72
The two individual officers who will chiefly engage our atten-
tion are Barba and Murena.73 It now seems certain that Barba was
not Cassius Barba but C. Sornatius Barba, a native of Iteramnia
Praetuttiorum.74 About Murena’s identity there has been no dispute
but there has been about his relations with Lucullus. Coarelli, dis-
cussing an equestrian group from Lanuvium, Murena’s hometown,
sees in it a record in epic form of the latter’s achievements in the
Third Mithridatic War. He reminds us of the epic commemoration
of Lucullus in verse form by Archias, the connection of the fami-
lies of the Licinii Luculli and Murenae and points to two fragmen-
tary inscriptions which he thinks refer to Lucullus. All of this he
70de Blois (2000) pp. 12–14, 30.

71de Blois (2000) pp. 15–17; Birley (2000) pp. 98–100, 116. There are
also some valuable observations in de Blois (2000) pp. 23–25 on the role
of centurions and the middle ranks as a channel of communication with
the commander. This would be of particular importance for the revolu-
tionary army, on which see below.
72 Keaveney (2007) pp. 37–55. It may be that de Blois (2000) pp. 17–
22 gives excessive emphasis to the material concerns of the soldiers but he

is surely right to argue that long service would foster cohesiveness, a co-
hesiveness I noted in (2007) pp. 29–35.
73 Brennan (2000) p. 563 notes that some legates of Cotta and Lucul-
lus might have received command pro praetore in the course of the war. For
the opposition observe that the Sertorian M. Marius (p. 85) might, in the
view of some, be really an M. Varius. See Piccirilli (1990) pp. 295–296.
74 (p. 97). See Guidobaldi (1996).
POSTSCRIPT 301
believes could mean there was a joint celebration by Lucullus and

Murena at Lanuvium.75
Now, if this attempt to show the pair as being on good terms
after the war appears somewhat fragile then it must be said that
there could be some misgivings too about the attempt of Hillard to
prove the opposite.76 He thinks we can detect a pattern of denigra-
tion of Murena and other officers in Plutarch’s Life of Lucullus
which can be traced back to Lucullus himself.77
As a kind of preliminary Hillard wants us to believe that both
Cotta and Voconius have been vilipended and traduced.78 One can
only reply that, shorn of any supposed colouring, what they actually
did shows that neither Cotta nor Voconius were outstandingly suc-
cessful.79 Coming to Murena himself Hillard alludes to the story of
the liberation of Tyrannio which Lucullus thought demeaning to
the grammarian and draws attention to Plutarch’s next remark, ‘but
it was not the only case in which Murena was found to be far infe-
rior to his commander in nobility of conduct’.80 This may show
Murena to be a rougher character than Lucullus but I would say it
is going a little too far to imply, as Hillard seems to do, that it was
actually damaging to his repute. It could simply mean he was not as
profound a philhellene as his chief.81 Hillard is even less convincing
on Plutarch’s presentation of Murena’s military achievement. In
effect, what he says is this, Murena handled the siege of Amisus
well so Lucullus was happy to entrust the siege of Tigranocerta to
him.82
If there were to be enmity it would most likely be after the
pair returned to Rome. Then, as Hillard reminds us, Murena seems
75 Coarelli (1981) esp. pp. 251–254. See (p. 185).

76 Hillard (1987) pp. 43–47.
77 Mediated, he holds, through the poem of Archias. My scepticism
about this (see above) does not, of course, affect the argument.
78 Hillard (1987) pp. 44–45.
79 (pp. 100, 114, 125).
80 Plut. Luc. 19 (Loeb trans.). See (p. 126) and Hillard (1987) p. 45.
81 Ballesteros Pastor (1999) p. 335 n. 19, who is also sceptical of the
theory that Lucullus was hostile to Murena, found Plutarch’s remark (see
above) somewhat mysterious. I agree.
82 A careful reading of Hillard (1987) pp. 45–46 will show, I think,
that this is not an unfair inference to draw from it.

to have taken Lucullus’ enemy Clodius onto his staff in Gaul in 64

and soon after consented to his marrying his step-daughter. More-
over he had been elected consul with the support of Lucullus’
troops who, it will be remembered had been mutineers.83 But it is
this very last point which reveals the weakness of the theory. Not
all of Lucullus’ troops mutinied and those men who voted for
Murena also voted for Lucullus’ triumph.84
I would therefore conclude that the matter is not as clear cut
for us as it might but, on balance, I am not convinced we can speak
of enmity between Lucullus and Murena.
So we turn to the period of the war proper.85 Here we shall
largely be concerned with the campaigns rather than Lucullus’ ac-
tivities in the civil sphere.86 To be more specific there will be some
brief comments on the siege of Cyzicus and the campaigns against
Tigranes and a rather more detailed consideration of the mutinies
which occurred towards the end of the war.87
I am not inclined to agree with Ballesteros Pastor who be-
lieves Plut. Luc. 9 is simply mistaken when he has the Cyziceans
believing that Lucullus’ army before the town was really one sent
by Tigranes.88 Plainly any intervention of the Armenian king at this
point is impossible but I think that what Plutarch is doing is show-
83Hillard (1987) pp. 46–47.

84(p. 183).
85 On the tradition that Lucullus lacked military experience when he
set out for this war, see Piccirilli (1991).

86 Note, however, the attempt of McDougall (1991) to evaluate his
policy towards the natives both inside and outside the province of Asia
and the catalogue of his dealings with individuals and states in Tröster
(2005).
We have three inscriptions recording Lucullus’ proconsulship. An-
dros: C33 in Eilers (2002), although there is no reason to accept his sug-
gestion that Lucullus might have been its patron even earlier. Claros:
Ameling (1989) p. 100 n. 16. Colophon: Ferrary (2002).
We know the Lucullan era was established in Sinope, Amastris and
Abonuteichus: Tröster (2005a) p. 307 n. 20.
87 I should say at this point that I can find no evidence for the con-
tention of Wylie, (1994) p. 113, that Lucullus enriched himself during his
campaigns while starving his men of booty.
88 (1999) p. 332.
POSTSCRIPT 303
ing us that the fear of the Cyziceans was so great that they could
easily imagine such a thing happening.89
The heifer who allegedly presented himself for sacrifice must
also engage our attention briefly.90 She is omitted from a gazetteer
of willing victims in Naiden’s recent study of the willing sacrificial
victim and it may very well be that a place should be found there
for her.91
I should like to return for a moment to the theory that Ar-
chias’ poem is the ultimate source for much of what we know of
the Third Mithridatic War.92 This has led to theories, such as that
of Coarelli, that the battles at the Granicus and Aesopus are largely
modelled on a campaign of Alexander’s.93 Such a theory, in my
view, ignores geographical considerations, distorts what is found in
our extant sources and robs Lucullus of what are very real
achievements.94
I shall come back eventually to the connection between Lucul-
lus and Alexander. Here I should like to point out that I cannot
agree with Wylie that Lucullus was actively looking for war when
he sent his embassy to Tigranes.95 Nor do I accept the view of
Ballesteros Pastor that the reconciliation between Tigranes and
Mithridates is to be located after the battle of Tigranocerta. It
seems reasonable to me to place it immediately after the break-
down in negotiations with the Romans.96
The appearance of an important article by Tatum makes it
necessary for us here to examine not only Clodius’ attempt to fo-
89 On another instance where Tigranes is made to play the bogeyman

see (p. 118 n. 39).
90 (p. 108).
91 Naiden (2007). The list will be found in Naiden (2007) p. 62 ns.16,
17. Presumably she, like her counterpart in Plut. Luc. 26, would fall into
the category of animals which acted under divine inspiration, for which
see Naiden (2007) p. 65.
92 See above.
93 (1981) pp. 255–257.
94 See (p. 112 n. 29).
95 Compare Wylie (1994) pp. 114–115 with (pp. 135–140).
96 Compare Ballesteros Pastor (1994) p. 333 with (p. 140-142). For
the violation of a taboo by Lucullus when he gave battle at Tigranocerta,

see Piccirilli (1990) pp. 321–322.
ment mutiny but also the other episodes of mutiny which attended
the last days of Lucullus’ command.97 The story proper begins in
the winter of 69/68. After the victory of Tigranocerta, Lucullus
wintered in Gordyene.98 There he entered into negotiations with
the Parthians. In my original text I argued that it was reasonable to
infer from our sources that Lucullus might have indeed been con-
templating attacking Parthia but that the threatening political situa-
tion at home and even more the continuing buoyancy of Mithri-
dates and Tigranes made this impossible and he had, in conse-
quence, to be content with Parthian neutrality. Unlike Tatum
(1991) pp. 573–574, I saw no reason to adopt Sherwin-White’s
suggestion that what lies behind the story of a planned assault on
Parthia was really a proposed march into Adiabene in the spring of
68. Indeed it is perfectly clear what Lucullus was planning in the
winter of 69. He was readying himself for what he actually did, re-
suming his campaign against Mithridates and Tigranes which their
activities made necessary.99
According to Plutarch (Luc. 30) trouble preceded these cam-
paigns. Troops in Pontus under the command of Sornatius, who
had been troublesome before, now refused to budge and they in-
fected the men in Gordyene with their restlessness. The upshot of
the mutiny in Pontus was that the troops there persisted in their
refusal to move and were still to be found in the same position late
in 67.100 So far as Gordyene was concerned, we can see from Plut.
Luc. 30–31 that there was no real mutiny. Only seditious talk and
murmuring was in question.101
The campaigns of 68 were thus carried out without Sornatius’
men. They were characterised by bad weather, harassment by the
enemy and a failure to take Artaxata when the soldiers baulked at
the prospect of sitting down before it. Eventually, however, Nisibis
was captured and the troops wintered there for 68/67.102
Tatum (1991). See also Tatum (1999) pp. 44–49.

97
(p. 150); Tatum (1991) p. 573.

98
99 (pp. 156–158, 160 n. 38).
100 Plut. Luc. 35—not in 68 as MRR2.140 has it. Tatum (1991) has
overlooked this detail.

101 Again Tatum (1991) p. 575 overlooks this further detail when he
suggests we have here a doublet with the mutiny at Nisibis.

102 (pp. 157–160).
POSTSCRIPT 305
From Plutarch’s narrative sequence we can infer that the mu-

tiny in Luc. 34 must have taken place at Nisibis and this inference is
supported by the explicit evidence of Dio which places it at that
city.103 It therefore follows that Plutarch is wrong when he says it
took place in Gordyene. But, for three reasons, I believe this is a
simple geographical slip and that we are not looking at a doublet.
First of all the details we noted of the earlier mutiny in Pontus and
consequent unrest in Gordyene are completely different from what
we hear of Clodius’ fomenting of unrest and its sequel. Secondly,
the target of the demagogue would seem to have been especially
the Fimbrians.104 Thirdly, Plutarch provides a vital chronological
indicator. He says that, because of this latter instance of mutiny,
the troops would not follow Lucullus against Tigranes and Mithri-
dates who had penetrated Pontus from Armenia. But we happen to
know that that particular incursion had taken place in 68 after Lu-
cullus had left Gordyene for that year’s campaign.105 Thus, there
seems to be no real case for conflating the mutinies and distur-
bances of 69/68 and those of 68/67.
This takes us to the question of motive. Why did the troops
mutiny? In the case of the troops at Gordyene, Plutarch Luc. 30
says they were unwilling to move because they had been ruined by
wealth and luxury. Dio 36.14.13 attributes a similar motive to the
men at Nisibis but Plutarch here (Luc. 30) speaks of resentment at
spending winters under canvas.
Now, while it is easy to envisage a reluctance to leave cosy bil-
lets for a hard campaign, we must remember that the notion that
Roman troops were softened by service in the East is something of
a commonplace.106 However, at the same time what Plutarch has to
say about the motivation of the mutineers at Nisibis is perfectly
plausible. Lucullus’ campaigns had been long and they must have
been especially hard for the Fimbrians who had previously seen
103 36.14.3–4, 17.2, 37.46.2.

104 (p. 165).
105 (p. 161). Again this detail is overlooked by Tatum (1991).
106 Compare Sall. Cat. 11.
long service. Clodius’ speech as reported by Plutarch seems tailored

to their desires.107
On one issue I am certainly in agreement with Tatum. Lucul-
lus’ position was already so precarious that Clodius’ mutiny was not
of very great importance.108 As Lucullus was about to be replaced
there was little he could do, as well, to punish Clodius.109 But why
something was not done later is a mystery, especially as some other
contemporary mutineers were brought to book.110
As a kind of a coda I wish to return to a theme I touched
upon a little earlier, namely the alleged resemblance Lucullus bore
to Alexander. In itself it is not unreasonable to wonder if there
could be anything in the idea. After all we know Lucullus’ contem-
porary Pompey made much of his supposed resemblance to the
Macedonian conqueror.111 And it is possible to argue that others
may have been thinking along the same lines. When Plutarch tells
us that Crassus had ambitions not only to conquer Parthia but to
penetrate to India, could this mean he, too, was trying to emulate
Alexander?112 This example, however, exemplifies the weaknesses
in such notions. We have no direct evidence that Lucullus or his
contemporaries ever thought him a kind of Alexander.113 What we
have we owe to the ingenuity of modern scholars working at a
great temporal remove.114 And it must be claimed that such ingenu-
107 I am not sure Tatum (1991) p. 575 has given due weight to this or
to the fact that it was the Fimbrians who got their discharge in the next
year (p. 168).
108 See Tatum (1991) pp. 577–578. Ballesteros Pastor (1993) pp. 333–
335 also holds this position.

109 So Tatum (1991) p. 578. On Lucullus’ replacement see now Kal-
let-Marx (1995) pp. 311–315 who argues against the notion of a piecemeal
dismemberment and for one decisive blow, the appointment of Glabrio to
take over command of the Mithridatic War.
110 Keaveney (2007) p. 136 n. 210.
111 Plut. Pomp. 2.
112 Plut. Crass. 16.
113 A point conceded in effect even by Ballesteros Pastor (1998) p. 78
who is one of the chief proponents of the theory that Lucullus was a kind
of Alexander.
114 And even here there is disagreement. Coarelli (1981) p. 255 seems
certain of an imitatio Alexandri but Hillard (1987) p. 40 n. 117 thinks Ar-

POSTSCRIPT 307
ity, working as it does with ambiguous evidence, produces rather

strained arguments.115 On the whole, in the absence of explicit tes-
timony, I think it dangerous to attribute kingly notions to a repub-
lican such as Lucullus.116
Our discussion of Lucullus’ last years will be dominated by
three main themes. We shall be looking at his building projects,
some of his political activities and also at his alleged degeneration.
It will I think be readily appreciated that there is a certain overlap
between these themes.117
Starting on a cerebral note we may observe that there has re-
cently been an exhaustive study of Lucullus’ library by Dix;118 R.
Evans has a useful discussion of Lucullan marble and also has
some remarks on how the jibe Xerxes togatus would have made Lu-
cullus appear somewhat alien to his contemporaries.119 She also
draws our attention to a certain contemporary vogue for this kind
of name calling.120 Discussion of the gardens by Wallace Hadrill is
disappointing.121 He knows of Lucullus’ political activities in these
years but nevertheless chooses to ignore that evidence and declare
that Lucullus’ gardens are ‘not an expression of political power but
an alternative to it’.122
chias’ poem and not wider contemporary opinion coloured Plutarch’s

account.
115 See, for instance, what Ballesteros Pastor (1998) p. 79 has to say
about Lucullus’ dealings with Cyrene and Egypt.

116 Compare the attempt—unsuccessful in my view—of Gisborne
(2006) to connect Sulla with royalty.

117 It is pleasant to be able to record that around the same time and
independently Hillman (1993) and I reached broadly similar conclusions

about Lucullus’ activities in his last years and on how we must approach
our principal source, Plutarch. It is also worth recording that those who
are curious about what happened to Lucullus’ colleague Cotta after he
returned to Rome should consult Linderski (1987).
118 Dix (2000).
119 Evans (2008) pp. 93–96, 101–103.
120 Evans (2008) p. 121. This should be viewed in the context of what
I have to say below about Lucullus’ reputation.

121 Wallace Hadrill (1998) pp. 3–4.
122 The comparison he draws with gardens of Maecenas and Sallust is
purely superficial. For a report on excavation on the Pincian hill consult

Broise (1995).
In the realm of politics I wish to comment on Lucullus’ deal-

ings with the Younger Cato and Pompey.
It is usually held that when Plutarch (Cat. Min. 29) speaks of
Cato as an office holder coming into conflict with the tribune
Memmius over Lucullus’ triumph, he is speaking of something
which happened in his tribunate. As this is dated to 62 and the tri-
umph was in 63 it looks like we have an error here.123 Bellemore,
however, thinks we could have instead an example of Plutarch’s
‘chronological back-tracking’ and that, in consequence, the office
Cato held was not the tribunate but the quaestorship.124 She then
offers a reconstruction of events different from that usually pro-
posed. In essence, she thinks Cato as quaestor in 64 opposed
Memmius who was tribune in the same year.125 Obviously this has
its attractions as a possible scenario, chief among them, perhaps,
being the removal of a charge of incompetence levelled at Plutarch.
But it cannot be regarded as being completely secure and some
objections may be made to it. For instance, there is reason to be-
lieve Cato’s tribunate may have actually fallen in 65.126 Again we
cannot state with absolute certainty that Memmius was tribune of
the plebs in 64 rather than 66 as is usually assumed.127 Bellemore’s
case may, therefore, at best be marked ‘not proven’.
So far as Pompey is concerned there can be no doubt that
what had once been mere rivalry had become hatred. Their parting
in Asia was bad tempered and after that Lucullus had opposed
Pompey’s Eastern settlement both in the senate and when it was
being proposed by Caesar.128 But there is also in existence a num-
ber of anecdotes involving Pompey, and sometimes Crassus and
Cicero, on the one hand, and Lucullus on the other, which seem to
show that if the pair were not on the most friendly terms they
could at least be civil to each other.129 In general scholars seem to
123(pp. 175–184).
124Bellemore (1996) p. 505.
125 Bellemore (1996) pp. 505–508.
126 As Bellemore(1996) pp. 505–506 points out.
127 See Bellemore (1996) p. 506.
128 (pp. 172–173, 190–193, 219–220).
129 Catalogue and general agreement on the tone in (pp. 119-201, 205-
206, 222) and Hillman (1994) pp. 193–194 though I do note the barb in
POSTSCRIPT 309
have accepted that these stories are authentic and so are to be em-
ployed as historical sources.130 One has even used the account of a
dinner invitation in Plut. Luc. 41 as the basis for an elaborate the-
ory, involving an attempted reconciliation between Pompey and
Lucullus in a bid to defuse opposition in the senate to the ratifica-
tion of Pompey’s Eastern acta.131
In the first edition I accepted that these stories reflected con-
temporary opinion of Lucullus but I doubted that they were a re-
cord of real events or sayings.132 I still entertain those doubts.
These little stories deploy the main characteristics of the invented
anecdote or joke. The principal character Lucullus is a stereotype
and constantly behaves as such. He is someone given to luxury and
idleness.133 The other characters, be they Pompey, Cicero or Cras-
sus, have no real independent existence. They merely exist as vehi-
cles to be wheeled in to create the situation where the stereotype
can be displayed. Other names can be substituted for theirs and
sometimes were.134
I find there are a number of scholars who, as I do, trace back
this stereotyping to Lucullus’ contemporaries. Gossip together with
the deliberate malicious characterisation by enemies can be seen to
blame.135 The prominence of the theme of luxury in Plutarch’s Life
may best be explained by his preoccupation with such matters.
They provided a natural opportunity for moralising and philoso-
phical speculation.136 This has also led to debate about the possibil-
ity that Plutarch’s preoccupations may have led him into exaggera-
the nickname Xerxes Togatus (p. 205) and the harshness of the verdict on
Lucullus’ withdrawal from public life (p. 222).
130 So, for example, Wallace Hadrill (1998) p. 3 and Tröster (2004)
pp. 489–490. With typical magisterial confidence. Wiseman (1982) p. 41

finds the story in Plut. Luc. 41 ‘quite credible’ but there are some mild
doubts in Piccirilli (1990) p. 339. See also below.
131 Hillman (1994).
132 (pp. 206–207).
133 On Lucullus’ supposed role in bringing luxury to Rome, see Ball-
esteros Pastor (1999) pp. 338–339.

134 (p. 207 n. 31).
135 Compare (pp. 207–209) with Ballesteros Pastor (1999) pp. 340–
341 and Tröster (2004) pp. 490–492.

136 See, for example, Tröster (2005a) pp. 303–306 and Lavery (1994).
tion, particularly in the matter of Lucullus’ philhellenism.137 My

own view is that the charge cannot be sustained in this instance.
Stripped of any ideological colouring, the evidence Plutarch assem-
bles does indeed justify our calling him a phil-hellene.138 I would
even go a little farther and suggest that such debate and contro-
versy might be stilled if we were prepared to recognise that Lucul-
lus was a complex character. He was devoted to the arts of war but
also enjoyed the amenities of peace.139
137Compare Swain (1992), (1995) with Tröster (2005a) pp. 307–309.

138That evidence is assembled in Swain (1995) who, in my opinion,
draws the incorrect conclusion from it.
139 Hence, from the historian’s viewpoint, the attempt of Duff (1999)
p. 60 to argue that Plutarch tried to play down Lucullus’ taste for luxury
by playing up his taste for Greek learning is largely irrelevant. The histo-
rian will have no difficulty in recognising that both tastes could easily co-
exist in the same person.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Standard works of reference such as MRR are omitted. With minor

adjustments the abbreviations follow the practice of L’Année Phi-
lologique.
Adam, J. (1908) The Religious Teachers of Greece, Edinburgh.

Adcock, F. (1956) Caesar as a Man of Letters, Cambridge.
Alföldy G., Dobson B., Eck W. (2000) (eds.), Kaiser Heer und Gesell-
schaft in der römanischen Kaiserzeit, Stuttgart.
Ameling, W. (1989) ‘Lucius Licinius in Chios’, ZPE 77, pp. 98–100.
Antonelli, G. (1989) Lucullo, Rome.
L’Art décoratif à Rome à la fin de la république et avant la début du
Principat, (1981), Rome
Assimilation et résistance à la culture Gréco-Romaine dans le monde ancien :
travaux du VIe congrès international d’Etudes Classiques, (1976),
Paris/Bucharest
Atti del Convegno—gli storiografi latini tramandati in frammenti (1975)
Urbino.
Badian, E. (1955) ‘The date of Pompey’s first triumph’, Hermes 83,
pp. 107–18.
_____. (1958) Foreign Clientelae (264–70 B.C.), Oxford.
_____. (1959) ‘The early career of A. Gabinius (cos. 58 B.C.)’, Phi-
lologus 103, pp. 87–99.
_____. (1964) Studies in Greek and Roman History, Oxford.
_____. (1965) ‘M. Porcius Cato and the annexation and early ad-
ministration of Cyprus’, JRS 55, pp. 110–21.
_____. (1967) ‘The testament of Ptolemy Alexander’, Rh.Mus. 110,
pp. 178–92.
_____. (1973) ‘Marius’ villas: the testimony of the slave and the
knave’, JRS 63, pp. 121–32.
_____. (1976) ‘Rome, Athens and Mithridates’, in Assimilation q.v.
pp. 501–22.
_____. (1983) ‘The silence of Norbanus: a note on provincial
quaestors under the republic’, AJP 104, pp. 156–71.
311
_____. (1984a) ‘The house of the Servilii Gemini’, PBSR 52, pp.
49–71.
_____. (1984b) ‘Three non-trials in Cicero. Notes on the text. Pro-
sopography and chronology in Divinatio in Caecilum 63’, Klio 66,
pp. 291–309.
Ballesteros, Pastor L. (1998) ‘Lucio Licinio Lúculo: Episodios de
Imitatio Alexandri’, Habis 29, pp. 77–85.
_____. (1999) ‘Aspectos contrastantes en la tradición sobre L.
Licinio Lúculo’, Gerion 17, pp. 331–343.
Balsdon, J. P. V. D. (1939) ‘Consular provinces under the later re-
public’, JRS 29, pp. 57–73.
_____. (1969) Life and Leisure in Ancient Rome, London.
_____. (1974) Roman Women, London.
Baltrusch, E. (1988) Regimen morum. Die Reglementierung des Privatlebens
der Senatoren und Ritter in der römischen Republik und frühen
Kaiserzeit, Munich.
Beare, W. (1963) The Roman Stage, London, 3rd edn.
Beloch, J. (1890) Campanien, Breslau.
Benner, H. (1987) Die Politik des P. Clodius Pulcher, Stuttgart.
Bennett, W. H. (1961) ‘The death of Sertorius and the coin’, His-
toria 10, pp. 459–72.
_____. (1972) ‘The date of the death of Lucullus’, CR 22, p. 314.
Bevan, E. (1927) The House of Ptolemy, London.
Bibauw, J. (ed.), (1969) Hommages à M. Renard, Brussels, vol. 2.
Bickerman, E. J. (1968) Chronology of the Ancient World, London.
Birley, A. R. (2000) ‘Senators as Generals’, in Alföldy, Dobson, Eck
q.v. pp. 97–119.
Bispham, E. (2007) From Asculum to Augustus, Oxford.
de Blois, L. (1987) The Roman Army and Politics in the First Century
B.C., Amsterdam.
_____. (2000) ‘Army and Society in the late Roman Republic: Pro-
fessionalism and the Role of the Military Middle Cadre’, in
Alföldy, Dobson, Eck q.v. pp. 11-31.
_____. de Blois, L., Bons J., Kessels T., Schenkeveld D. M. (2005)
(eds.), The Statesman in Plutarch’s Works, Leiden, vol. 2.
Bonnefond-Coudry, M. (1989) Le Sénat de la république romaine de la
guerre d’Hannibal à Auguste, Rome.
Boyance, P. (1956) ‘La connaisance du grec à Rome’, REL 34, pp.
111–31.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 313
Bradley, K. R. (1989) Slavery and Rebellion in the Roman World 140

B.C.–70 B.C., Bloomington/London.
Braund, D. (1983) ‘Royal wills and Rome’, PBSR 51, pp. 16–57.
_____. (1984) Rome and the Friendly King, London.
Brennan, T. C. (2000) The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, Oxford,
vol. 2.
Broise, H. (1994) ‘Rome: Pincio (Jardins de Lucullus)’, MEFRA
106, pp. 450–451.
Broughton, T. R. S. (1938) ‘Roman Asia Minor’ in Frank (1938),
pp. 499–916.
_____. (1946) ‘Notes on Roman magistrates’, TAPA 77, pp. 35–
43.
_____. (1990) ‘L. Manlius Torquatus and the governors of Asia’,
AJP 111, 79–4 PP.
Brunt, P. A. (1980) ‘On historical fragments and epitomes’, CQ 30,
pp. 477–94.
_____. (1982) ‘Nobilitas and Novitas’, JRS 72, pp. 1–17.
_____. (1988) The Fall of the Roman Republic, Oxford.
Bulin, R. K. (1983) Untersuchungen zur Politik und Kriegführung Roms im
Osten 100–68 v. Chr, Frankfurt/Bern.
Burckhardt, L. A. (1988) Politische Strategien der Optimaten in der späten
römischen Republik, Stuttgart.
_____. (1990) ‘The political élite of the Roman republic: comments
on recent discussion of the concepts NOBILITAS and
HOMO NOVUS’, Historia 39, pp. 77–99.
Butler, H. and Cary, M. (1966) Suetonius: Divus Julius, New York,
repr.
_____. (1979) Cicero: De Provinciis Consularibus, New York, repr.
Carena, C., Manfredini M., Piccirilli L. (1990) Plutarco: Le Vite di
Cimone e di Lucullo, Milan.
Carney, T. (1960) ‘Plutarch’s style in the Marius’, JHS 80, pp. 24–
31.
Cimma, M. R. (1976) Reges, Socii et Amici Populi Romani, Milan.
Coarelli, F. (1981) ‘Alessandro, I Licinii e Lanuvio’, in L’Art
décoratif, q.v. pp. 229–284.
_____. (1987) I santuari del Lazio in età repubblicana, Rome.
Coşkum, A.(2005) (ed.) Roms auswärtige Freunde in der späten Republik
und in frühen Prinzipat, Göttingen.
Crawford, M. H. (1974) Roman Republican Coinage, Cambridge, 2
vols.
_____. (1978) ‘Greek intellectuals and the Roman aristocracy in the

first century BC’, in Garnsey and Whittaker q.v., pp. 193–207.
Dabrowa, E. (1983) La Politique de l’état Parthe à l’égard de Rome—
d’Artaban II à Vologèse I (CA.11–CA.79 de N.E.), Krakow.
D’Arms, J. H. (1970) Romans on the Bay of Naples, Cambridge, Mass.
David, J. M. and Dondin, M. (1980) ‘Dion Cassius XXXVI, 41, 1–
2, Conduites symboliques et comportements exemplaires de
Lucullus, Acilius Glabrio et Papirius Carbo (78 et 67 av. J.-
C.)’, MEFR 92, pp. 199–213.
den Boer, W. (1972) Some Minor Roman Historians, Leiden.
Deroux, C. (1979) (ed.) Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History
III, Brussels.
_____. (1994) (ed.) Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History VII,
Brussels.
de Sanctis, G. (1969) Storia dei Romani, Florence, vol. 4.1.
Dillon, J. (1977) The Middle Platonists, London.
Dix, T. K. (2000) ‘The Library of Lucullus’, Athenaeum 78, pp. 441–
464.
Dixon, S. (1983) ‘A family business: women’s role in patronage and
politics at Rome 80-41 B.C.’, C&M 34, pp. 91–112.
Drumann, W. and Groebe, P. (1964) Geschichte Röms, Hildensheim,
repr., vol. 4.
Duff, T. (1999) Plutarch’s Lives, Oxford.
Dumont, J. C. (1987) Servus: Rome et l’esclavage sous la république,
Rome.
Eckhardt, E. (1909) ‘Die armenischen Feldzuge des Lukullus I’,
Klio 9, pp. 72–115.
_____. (1910) ‘Die armenischen Feldzuge des Lukullus II, III’, Klio
10, pp. 192–231.
Eilers, C. (2002) Roman Patrons of Greek Cities, Oxford.
Einstein, L. (1962) Tudor Ideals, New York.
Ellinger, P. (2005) ‘Plutarque et Damon de Chéronée: une histoire,
un mythe, un texte, ou autre chose encore?’, Kernos 18, pp.
291–310.
Engelmann, H. and Knibbe, D. (1989) ‘Das Zollgesetz der Provinz
Asia. Eine neue Inschrift aus Ephesus’, EA 14, pp. 1–195.
Epstein, D. F. (1987) Personal Enmity in Roman Politics 218–43 B.C.,
London.
Evans, R. (2008) Utopia Antiqua, London.
Fehrle, R. (1983) Cato Uticensis, Darmstadt.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 315
Ferrary, J-L. (2000) ‘Inscription en l’honneur de L. Licinius l. f. Lu-

cullus imperator (entre 72 et 67 av. J.-C.)’, BCH 14, pp. 339–
340.
Flower M. and Toher M. (1991) (eds.), Georgica: Greek Studies in hon-
our of George Cawkwell, London.
Fontana, M. J., Piraino M. J., Rizzo, F. P., (1980) (eds.),
FILIAS XARIN: Miscellanea di studi classici in onore di Eugenio
Manni, Rome, vol. 4.
Frank, T. (1933) An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, Baltimore, vol.
1.
_____. (1938) An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, Baltimore, vol. 4.
Freeman, E. A. (1892) Sicily, London.
Freeman, P. (1986) ‘The province of Cilicia and its origins’, in
Freeman and Kennedy q.v. pp. 253–75.
Freeman P. and Kennedy D., (eds.), The Defence of the Roman and
Byzantine East, BAR.
Gabba, E. (1956) Appiano e la storia delle guerre civile, Florence.
_____. (1967) Appiani Bellorum Civilium Liber Primus, Florence, 2nd
edn.
_____. (1976) Republican Rome, the Army and the Allies, trans. P. J.
Cuff, Oxford.
Gardner, J. (1986) Women in Roman Law and Society, London.
Garnsey, P. and Rathbone, D. (1985) ‘The Background to the
Grain Law of Gaius Gracchus’, JRS 75, pp. 20–5.
Garnsey, P. and Whittaker, C. (eds) (1978) Imperialism in the Ancient
World, Cambridge.
Gelzer, M. (1959) Pompeius, Munich, 2nd edn.
_____. (1968) Caesar, trans. P. Needham, Oxford.
_____. (1969) The Roman Nobility, trans. R. Seager, Oxford.
_____. ‘Lucius Licinius Lucullus’, RE Band XIII.1, cols 376–414.
Gisborne, M. (2005) ‘A curia of kings: Sulla and royal imagery’, in
Hekster and Flower q.v. pp. 105–123
Glew, D. (1981) ‘Between the Wars: Mithridates Eupator and
Rome 85–73 B.C.’, Chiron 11, pp. 109–30.
Gold, B. K. (1982) (ed.), Literary and Artistic Patronage in Ancient
Rome, Austin.
Greenidge, A. H. J. (1911) Roman Public Life, London.
Grimal, P. (1969) Les Jardins romains, Paris, 2nd edn.
Gruen, E. (1966) ‘The Dolabellae and Sulla’, AJP 88, pp. 385–99.
_____. (1968) Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts 149–78 B.C.,
Cambridge, Mass.
_____. (1969) ‘The consular elections for 53 B.C.’, in Bibauw q.v.,
pp. 311-321.
_____. (1971) ‘Some criminal trials of the late republic: political
and prosopographical problems’, Athenaeum 49, pp. 54–69.
_____. (1974) The Last Generation of the Roman Republic, Berkeley.
Guidobaldi, M. P. (1996) ‘C. Sornatius C. F. Vel. Barba: una breve
nota sul legato di Lucullo in Asia’, CCGG 7, pp. 263–268.
Hallett, J. P. (1984) Fathers and Daughters in Roman Society, Princeton.
Hantos, Th. (1988) Respublica Constituta: Die Verfassung des Dictators
Sulla, Stuttgart.
Harris, W. V. (1971) Rome in Etruria and Umbria, Oxford.
_____. (1979) War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, Oxford.
Hasluck, F. W. (1910) Cyzicus, Cambridge.
Hayne, L. (1979) ‘The Politics of M. Glabrio’, CP 69, pp. 280–2.
Heil, M. (1991) ‘Einige Bemerkungen zum Zollgesetz aus Ephesus’,
EA 17, pp. 9–18.
Hekster O. and Fowler R. (2005) (eds.), Imaginary Kings: royal images
in the Ancient Near East, Greece and Rome, Stuttgart.
Hill, H. (1952) The Roman Middle Class, Oxford.
Hillard, T. W. (1987) ‘Plutarch’s Late-Republican Lives: Between
the Lines’, Antichthon 21, pp. 19–48.
Hillman, T. P. (1991) ‘The alleged inimicitiae of Pompeius and Lu-
cullus: 78–74’, CP 86, pp. 315–318.
_____. (1993) ‘When did Lucullus retire?’, Historia 42, pp. 211–228.
_____. (1994) ‘Hodie apud Lucullum Pompeius cenat : neglected History
at Plutarch Lucullus 41, 4–7’, in Deroux (1994), pp. 190–201.
Hinard, F. (1980) ‘Paternus Inimicus’, in Hommage, q.v. pp. 197–
210.
_____. (1985) Les Proscriptions de la Rome républicaine, Rome.
_____. (1990) ‘M. Terentius Varro Lucullus fils du consul de 73
a.c.’, Latomus 49, pp. 421–4.
Holleaux, M. (1938) Études d’épigraphie et d’histoire grecques, Paris, vol.
1.
Holmes, T. R. (1923) The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Em-
pire, Oxford, vol. 1.
Hommage à la memoire de Pierre Wuilleumier (1980), Paris
Hopkins, K. (1983) Death and Renewal: Sociological Studies in Roman
History, Cambridge, vol. 2.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 317
Horsfall, M. (1979) ‘Doctus sermones utriusque linguae’, EMC 22,

pp. 79–95.
Horti Romani: Atti del convegno internazionale - Roma maggio 1995,
(1998) Rome.
How, W. H. (1926) Cicero: Select Letters, Oxford, vol. 2.
Jashemski, W. F. (1950) The Origins and History of the Proconsular and
the Propraetorian Imperium to 27 B.C., Chicago.
Jex-Blake, K. and Sellers, E. (1896) The Elder Pliny’s Chapters on the
History of Art, London.
Jolivet, V. (1987) ‘Xerxes Togatus: Lucullus en Campanie’, ME-
FRA 99, pp. 875–904.
Jones, C. P. (1982) ‘Plutarch, Lucullus 42.3–4’, Hermes 110, pp.
254–6.
Kallet-Marx, R. (1995) From Hegemony to Empire, California.
Keaveney, A. (1979) ‘Sulla and the Gods’ in Deroux (1979), pp.
44–79.
_____. (1980a) ‘Deux dates contestées dans la carrière de Sylla’,
LEC 48, pp. 149–59.
_____. (1980b) ‘Young Sulla and the Decem Stipendia’, RFIC 108,
pp. 165–73.
_____. (1981a) ‘Four puzzling passages in Appian’, GIF 33, pp.
247–50.
_____. (1981b) ‘Roman treaties with Parthia, circa 95–circa 64
B.C.’, AJP 102, pp. 195–212.
_____. (1982a) ‘Sulla and Italy’, Crit. Stor. 19, pp. 499–544.
_____. (1982b) ‘Sulla Augur: coins and curiate law’, AJAH 7, pp.
150–71.
_____. (1982c) ‘The king and the warlords: Romano-Parthian rela-
tions circa 64–55 B.C.’, AJP 103, pp. 412–28.
_____. (1982d) ‘Young Pompey, 106–79 B.C.’, AC 51, pp. 111–39.
(1983a) ‘Caesars in the Social War’, Rh.Mus. 126, pp. 273–81.
_____. (1983b) ‘Studies in the Dominatio Sullae’, Klio 65, pp. 185–
208.
_____. (1983c) ‘What happened in 88?’, Eirene 20, pp. 53–86.
_____. (1984a) ‘Who were the Sullani?’, Klio 66, pp. 114–50.
_____. (1984b) ‘Civis Romanus Sum’, Crit. Stor. 21, pp. 345–72.
_____. (2003) ‘The Tragedy of Caius Gracchus: Ancient Melo-
drama or Modern Farce?’, Klio 85, pp. 322–332.
_____. (2003a) ‘The Short Career of Q. Lucretius Afella’, Eranos
101, pp. 84–93.
_____. (2005) Rome and the Unification of Italy, Bristol, 2nd ed.
_____. (2005a) Sulla the Last Republican, London, 2nd ed.
_____. (2005b) ‘The Terminal Date of Sulla’s Dictatorship’, Athe-
naeum 93, pp. 423–439.
_____. (2006) ‘Livy and the Theatre: Reflections on the theories of
Peter Wiseman’, Klio 88, pp. 510–515.
_____. (2007) The Army in the Roman Revolution, London.
Keaveney, A. and Madden, J. A. (1992) Sir William Herbert: Croftus
sive de Hibernia Liber, Dublin.
Kelly, G. P. (2006) A History of Exile in the Roman Republic, Cam-
bridge.
Keppie, L. (1984) The Making of the Roman Army, London.
Konrad, C. F. (1995) ‘A New Chronology of the Sertorian War’,
Athenaeum 73, pp. 157–187.
Laronde, A. (1989) ‘La Cyrénaique romaine, des origines à la fin
des Sévères (96 av. J-C.-235 ap. J-C.)’, ANRW II, 10.1, pp.
1006–1064.
Lavery, G. B. (1994) ‘Plutarch’s Lucullus and the Living Bond of
Biography’, CJ 89, pp. 261–273.
Linderski, J. (1987) ‘A Missing Ponticus’, AJAH 12, pp. 148–166.
Leach, J. (1978) Pompey the Great, London.
Lintott, A.W. (1968) Violence in Republican Rome, Oxford.
_____. (1990) ‘Electoral bribery in the Roman republic’, JRS 80,
pp. 1–16.
Mackay, C. S. (2000) ‘Damon of Chaeronea: The Loyalties of a
Boeotian Town during the Mithridatic War’, Klio 82, pp. 91–
106.
McCracken, G. (1942) ‘The villa and the tomb of Lucullus at Tus-
culum’, AJA 46, pp. 325–40.
McDougall, J. J. (1991) ‘From Sulla to Pompey: the Transformation
of the attitude of the East towards Rome’, CEA 26, pp. 59–
71.
McGing, B. C. (1980) ‘Appian, Manius Aquillius and Phrygia’,
GRBS 21, pp. 35–42.
_____. (1984) ‘The date of the outbreak of the Third Mithridatic
War’, Phoenix 38, pp. 12–18.
_____. (1986) The Foreign Policy of Mithridates VI Eupator, King of
Pontus, Leiden.
_____. (1995) ‘The Ephesian Customs Law and the Third Mithri-
datic War’, ZPE 109, pp. 283–288.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 319
Magie, D. (1950) Roman Rule in Asia Minor, Princeton, 2 vols.

Malitz, J. (1972) ‘C. Aurelius Cotta cos. 75 and seine Rede in Sallusts
Historien’, Hermes 100, pp. 359–86.
Marshall, A. (1972) ‘The Lex Pompeia de provinciis (52 B.C.) and
Cicero’s Imperium in 51–50 B.C.: constitutional aspects’,
ANRW 1.1, pp. 887–921.
Marshall, B. and Beness, J. L. (1987) ‘Tribunician agitation and aris-
tocratic reaction 80–71 B.C.’, Athenaeum 65, pp. 360–78.
Mason, H. J. (1974) Greek Terms for Roman Institutions, Toronto.
Matthews, V. J. (1979) ‘Sulla and the games of the 175th Olym-
piad’, Stadion 5, pp. 239–43.
Mattingly, H. B. (1980) ‘M. Antonius, C. Verres’, in Fontana, Pi-
raino, Rizzio, q.v. pp. 1491–1515.
Meier, Ch. (1966) Respublica Amissa, Wiesbaden.
Merkelbach, R. (1990) ‘Hat der Bithynische Erbfolgekrieg in Jahr
74 oder 73 begonnen?’, ZPE 81, pp. 97–100.
Millar, F. (1984) ‘The political character of the classical Roman re-
public 200–151 B.C.’, JRS 74, pp. 1–19.
_____. (1986) ‘Politics, persuasion and the people before the Social
War (150–90 B.C.)’, JRS 76, pp. 1–11.
Miller, J. (1985) An Englishman’s Home, Newbury.
Moles, J. L. (1988) Plutarch: Life of Cicero, Warminster.
Morgan, M. G. (1971) ‘Lucius Cotta and Metellus: Roman cam-
paigns in Illyria during the late second century’, Athenaeum 49,
pp. 271–301.
Mossman, J. (1991) ‘Plutarch’s use of Statues’, pp. 98–119 in
Flower and Toher q.v. pp. 98-119.
Mulroy, D. (1985) ‘The early career of P. Clodius Pulcher: a re-
examination of the charges of mutiny and sacrilege’, TAPA
118, pp. 155–78.
Naiden, F. S. (2007) ‘The Fallacy of the Willing Victim’, JHS 127,
pp. 61–73.
North, J. A. (1990) ‘Democratic politics in republican Rome’, P&P
126, pp. 3–21.
Oost, S. I. (1963) ‘Cyrene 96–74 B.C.’, CP 58, pp. 11–25.
Ormerod, H. A. (1922) ‘The campaigns of Servilius Isauricus
against the pirates’, JRS 12, pp. 5–56.
_____. (1978) Piracy in the Ancient World, Liverpool, repr.
Otto, W. and Bengtson, H. (1938) Zur Geschichte des Niedergangs des
Ptolemaerreiches, Munich.
Pais, E. (1915) Ricerche sulla storia sul diritto pubblico di Roma, Rome,
vol. 1.
Parker, H. M. D. (1958) The Roman Legions, Cambridge/New York.
Pascucci, G. (1975) ‘I Commentarii di Silla’, in Atti del Convegno q.v.,
pp. 283–96.
Patterson, J. (1985) ‘Politics in the late Republic’ in Wiseman
(1985), pp. 21–43.
Perelli, L. (1982) Il movimento popolare nell’ultimo secolo della repubblica,
Turin.
Petrochilos, N. (1974) Roman Attitudes to the Greeks, Athens.
Piccirilli, L. (1990) Commento a Vita di Lucullo, in Carena, Manfred-
ini, Piccirilli q.v. pp. 269–343.
_____. (1991) ‘L. Licinio Lucullo in Cicerone e in Machiavelli, nota
a Discorsi III.13.3’, GSLI 168, pp. 223–227.
Rawson, E. (1983) Cicero: A Portrait, Bristol.
_____. (1985) Intellectual Life in the Roman Republic, London.
_____. (1991) Roman Culture and Society, Oxford.
Reid, J. S. (1885) Cicero: Academica, London.
_____. (1899) Cicero: Pro Archia, Cambridge.
Reinach, Th. (1895) Mithridates Eupator: König von Pontus, Leipzig.
Rickman, G. (1980) The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome, Oxford.
Rigsby, K. J. (1996) Asylia, Berkeley.
Romanelli, P. (1943) La Cirenacia romana, Verbania.
Rosenstein, N. (1990) Imperatores Victi, Berkeley.
Rossi, R. F. (1965) ‘Sulla lotta pubblica in Roma dopo la morte di
Silla’, Par. Pass. 20, pp. 133–52.
Rostovtzeff, M. (1941) Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic
World, Oxford, 3 vols.
Rudé, G. (1972) The Crowd in the French Revolution, Oxford.
Ryan, F.X. (1994) ‘The Magistrates in Dio 36.40–41’, C & M 45,
pp. 185–192.
_____. (1994a) ‘The Meaning of consularis auctoritas in Cicero’,
Mnem. 47, pp. 681–683.
_____. (1995) ‘The Early Career of M. Terentius Varro Lucullus’,
Eos 83, pp. 141–145.
_____. (1998) Rank and Participation in the Roman Senate, Stuttgart.
Samuel, A. E. (1972) Greek and Roman Chronology, Munich.
Sands, P. C. (1908) The Client Princes of the Roman Empire, Cam-
bridge.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 321
Sanford, E. M. (1939) ‘The career of Aulus Gabinius’, TAPA 70,

pp. 64–92.
Santangelo, F. (2007) Sulla, the Elites and the Empire, Leiden.
Sayar M. H., Siewert P., Taeuber H. (1994) ‘Asylie-Erklärungen des
Sulla und des Lucullus für das Isis und Sarapisheiligtum von
Mopsuestia (Ostkilikien)’, Tyche 9, pp. 113–130.
Scardigli, B. (1971) ‘Sertorio: problemi cronologici’, Athenaeum 49,
pp. 229–71.
_____. (1989) Plutarco: Cimone/Lucullo, trans. S. Fuscagni and B.
Mugelli, con note di B. Scardigli, Milan.
_____. (1995) (ed.) Essays on Plutarch’s Lives, Oxford.
Shatzman, I. (1975) Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics, Brussels.
Scullard, H. (1981) Festivals and Ceremonies of the Roman Republic,
London.
Seager, R. (1969) ‘The tribunate of Cornelius: some ramifications’,
in Bibauw q.v. pp. 680–6.
_____. (1979) Pompey: A Political Biography, Oxford.
Shackleton Bailey, D. R. (1960) ‘The Roman nobility in the second
Civil War’, CQ 10, pp. 260–7.
_____. (1965) Cicero: Epistulae ad Atticum, Cambridge, vol. 1.
_____. (1976) Two Studies in Roman Nomenclature, University Park,
Pa.
_____. (1986) ‘Nobiles and novi reconsidered’, AJP 107, pp. 255–
60.
Shatzman, I. (1975) Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics, Brussels.
Sherwin-White, A. N. (1973) The Roman Citizenship, Oxford, 2nd
edn.
_____. (1984) Roman Foreign Policy in the East, London.
Sherwin-White, S. M. (1978) Ancient Cos, Gottingen.
Smith, R. E. (1958) Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army, Manches-
ter.
_____.(1960) ‘Pompey’s conduct in 80 and 77 B.C.’, Phoenix 14, pp.
1–13.
Spann, P. 0. (1987) Quintus Sertorius and the Legacy of Sulla, Fayette-
ville.
Sumner, G. V. (1971) ‘The Lex Annalis under Caesar’, Phoenix 25,
pp. 246–71, 357–71.
_____. (1973) The Orators in Cicero’s Brutus: Prosopography and Chronol-
ogy, Toronto.
Suolahti, J. (1956) The Junior Officers of the Roman Army in the Republi-
can Period, Helsinki.
Swain, S. C. R. (1992) ‘Plutarch’s Characterisation of Lucullus’, Rh.
Mus. 135, pp. 307–316.
_____. (1995) ‘Hellenic Culture and the Roman Heroes of Plu-
tarch’, in Scardigli (1995), pp. 229–264.
Syme, R. (1939) The Roman Revolution, Oxford.
_____. (1979) Roman Papers, Oxford, vol. 2.
_____. (1988) Roman Papers, Oxford, vol. 4.
Tatum, W. J. (1991) ‘Lucullus and Clodius at Nisibis (Plutarch, Lu-
cullus 33–34)’, Athenaeum 69, pp. 569–579.
_____. (1992) ‘The Poverty of the Claudii Pulchri: Varro de Re
Rustica 3.16.1–2’, CQ 42, pp. 190–200.
_____. (1999) The Patrician Tribune: Publius Clodius Pulcher, Chapel
Hill.
Taylor, L. R. (1949) Party Politics in the Age of Caesar, Berkeley.
Thomas, R. F. (1977) ‘L. Lucullus’ triumphal agnomen’, AJAR 2, p.
172.
Thommen, L. (1989) Das Volkstribunat der späten römischen Republik,
Stuttgart.
Thonemann, P. J. (2004) ‘The Date of Lucullus’ Quaestorship’,
ZPE 149, pp. 80–82.
Treggiari, S. (1969) Roman Freedmen during the Late Republic, Oxford.
Tröster, M. (2004) ‘Aspetti della tecnica biografica di Plutarco a
propositio della Trufe di Lucullo’, Maia 56, pp. 483–499.
_____. (2005) ‘Lucullus, his foreign amici and the shadow of
Pompey’, in Coşkum q.v. pp. 91–111.
_____. (2005a) ‘Hellenism and Trufe in Plutarch’s Life of Lucul-
lus’, in de Blois, Bons, Kessels, Schenkeveld (2005), pp. 303–
313.
Twyman, B. L. (1972) ‘The Metelli, Pompeius and prosopography’,
ANRW 1.1, pp. 816–74.
Valgiglio, E. (1975) ‘l’Autobiografia di Silla nelle biografe di
Plutarco’, in Atti del Convegno, q.v., pp. 245–81.
van Ooteghem, J. (1959) Lucius Licinius Lucullus, Brussels.
Villoresi, M. (1939) Lucullo, Florence.
Virlouvet, C. (1985) Famines et émeutes à Rome des origines de la Repub-
lique à la mort de Néron, Rome.
Vogt, J. (1974) Ancient Slavery and the Ideal of Man, trans. T. Wiede-
mann, Oxford.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 323
Wallace, Hadrill A. (1998) ‘Horti and Hellenization’ in Horti Romani,

q.v. pp. 1–12.
Ward, A. M. (1977a) ‘Caesar and the pirates’, AJAH 2, pp. 26–36.
_____. (1977b) Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic, London.
Wardman, A. (1974) Plutarch’s Lives, London.
Watkins, O. D. (1987) ‘Caesar solus? Senatorial support for the Lex
Gabinia’, Historia 36, pp. 120–1.
Willems, P. (1880) Le Droit Public Romain, Louvain.
_____. (1968) Le Sénat de la république romaine, Aalen, repr., 2 vols.
Williams, R. S. (1984) ‘The appointment of Glabrio (cos. 67) to the
Eastern command’, Phoenix 38, pp. 221–34.
Wiseman, T. P. (1969) Catullan Questions, Leicester.
_____. (1971) New Men in the Roman Senate, Oxford.
_____. (1974) Cinna the Poet, Leicester.
_____. (1982) ‘Pete nobiles amicos: Poets and Patrons in Late Repub-
lican Rome’, in Gold q.v. pp. 28–49.
_____. (1985) Roman Political Life 90 B.C.–A.D. 69, Exeter.
_____. (1987) Catullus and His World, Cambridge.
Wylie, G. J. (1990) ‘Pompey megalopsychos’, Klio 72, pp. 445–56.
_____. (1994) ‘Lucullus Daemoniac’, AC 63, pp. 109–119.
Zumpt, A. W. (1871) Der Criminalprocess der römischen Republik,
Leipzig.
INDEX
Abydos (Nara), 38 Amisus (Samsun), 116, 117, 118,

Achaeans, Harbour of the, 113 123, 124, 125, 126, 129, 135,
M'. Acilius Glabrio, 52, 53, 162, 160, 171, 236, 280, 281, 282,
164, 165, 168, 171, 206, 220, 301
234, 241, 291 Anahita (Persian Artemis), 142,
Adiabeni, the, 147 185, 235
Adrasteia, 104, 105 Andriscus, 273
Aegean, 104, 106, 113, 116 Antioch in Syria, 15, 139
C. Aelius Staienus, 90, 91 Antiochus of Ascalon, 16, 18,
M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 78), 19, 29, 30, 32, 149, 195, 292
51, 54, 55, 58, 59, 74, 76, 81, Antiochus(Commagene), 150
218, 226, 227, 261, 264, 270, Antiochus XIII (Seleucid), 150
291 M. Antonius, 91
M. Aemilius Lepidus Livianus Apamea, 112, 114
(cos. 77), 62, 63, 88 Aphnitis, Lake, 107
Aesepus (Gönen), river, 111 Aphrodite, 113
L. Afranius, 192, 217, 220 Apollo Room, 199, 201
Africa, 50, 54, 55, 61, 70, 257, Apollonia, 109
291 Aqua Virgo, 201
Agamemnon, 176 M'. Aquillius (leg. 88), 40
Albanians, the, 138 Arabs, the, 144
S. Albius Oppianicus (Larinum), Arausio (Orange), 147
77, 90 Arcesilaus, 200
Alexander the Great, 303, 306 Archelaus, 26, 27, 100, 107
Alexander the Paphlagonian, Archias, 13, 14, 15, 16, 188, 236,
113, 114 291, 292, 300, 303
Alexandria, 16, 27, 31, 32 Arctonnesus (Kapidağ), 103
Allobroges, the, 187 Arctonoros, 103, 104
Amasia (Amasya), 125, 128 Aricia (Ariccia), 97, 143
Amastris (Amasra), 125 Aristion, 123
Aristonicus, 111, 259
325
Armenia, 116, 122, 135, 138, Bithynia, 83, 85, 86, 93, 94, 100,
140, 143, 144, 150, 152, 153, 109, 151, 162, 165, 168, 171,
154, 156, 157, 158, 161, 167, 251, 255, 257, 259, 266, 271,
169, 178, 283, 305 276, 279, 284, 285, 296
Armenians, the, 144, 146, 147, Bithynians, 260
159 Boeotia, 25
Q. Arrius, 266 Bona Dea, 188, 217, 221
Arsanias, river, (eastern Bosporus, 116
Euphrates) 158 Q. Braetius Sura, 25, 26, 289
Artaxata (Artashat), 148, 158, Busbaleius, 74
159, 304 Byzantium, 115
Asia, 24, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 45, Cabira, 116, 118, 122, 151, 161,
50, 55, 56, 69, 83, 84, 86, 94, 171, 280, 281, 282
99, 100, 103, 104, 109, 115, Caecilia Metella, 3, 4, 6, 13, 23
118, 125, 128, 129, 130, 133, Q. Caecilius (uncle of Atticus),
135, 153, 154, 162, 163, 165, 13, 196
182, 212, 214, 217, 235, 237, L. Caecilius Metellus Calvus, 4,
239, 245, 246, 248, 249, 250, 273
253, 257, 258, 260, 266, 267, Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer, 191,
278, 279, 288, 294, 308 192, 193, 217
Astacenus channel, 114 Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus,
Athena, 108 178, 191
Athenians, the, 123, 181 Q. Caecilius Metellus
Athens, 16, 27, 34, 124, 200 Delmaticus (cos. 119), 4
Athos, Mount, 206 Q. Caecilius Metellus
Atropateni, the, 159 Numidicus, 4, 6, 7, 8
Attalids, the, 130 Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, 52,
C. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 75), 75, 68, 179, 218, 261, 265, 266,
76, 78, 229, 279, 280, 296 267, 268, 275, 298
L. Aurelius Cotta, 85 Calacte (Caronia Marina), 13
M. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 74), 62, Calgurris, 266
67, 85, 86, 87, 91, 92, 93, 94, Callimachus, 123, 126, 160
100, 114, 116, 125, 255, 257, Callisthenes, 223
261, 266, 269, 280, 284, 285, M. Calpurnius Bibulus, 215,
296, 299 219, 220, 221
Autolycus, 127, 200 Calvi, the, 1
Baiae, 202 Calycadnos (Göksu), river, 33
Benghazi, 29 Campus Martius, the, 184, 224
Barba, 97, 112, 300 Capitol, the, 184
Billarus, 128, 200
INDEX 327
Cappadocia, 100, 120, 121, 135, Clodia, (wife of Lucullus), 63,

142, 143, 169 64, 65, 167, 180, 181, 183,
Capua, 4, 5 291, 294
Caria, 34 Clodia Tertia, 63, 115, 167
Carthage, 273 P. Clodius Pulcher, 64, 95, 165,
C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 73), 168, 180, 181, 188, 189, 195,
97, 267, 280, 300 221, 222, 239, 302, 303, 305,
Cauca (Coca), 2 306
Celtiberi, the, 2 Clunia, 265
Censorinus, 96 Cnidians, the, 34
Chaeroneia, 25, 26, 35, 36 Cnidus (Tekir), 34
Chaeroneians, the, 25, 26 Coans, the, 34
Chalcedon (Usküdar), 100, 102, Colophon (Degirmendere), 35
103, 112, 114, 255, 298 Comana, 121, 161
Chalcis, 27, 38 P. Considius Longus, 246
Chaldaei, 117 Corinth, 124, 273
Chersonesus (Gallipoli), 38 Cornelia (Sulla's daughter), 203
Chios, 35 Cornelii, the, 73
Cilicia, 33, 39, 86, 93, 99, 138, C. Cornelius (trib. pleb. 67), 178,
140, 142, 155, 165, 167, 249, 179, 183
252, 261, 262, 265, 266, 278 P. Cornelius Cethegus, 85, 86,
Cilicians, the, 29 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 230,
Cinnans, the, 36, 52 295, 296
Circus Flaminius, the, 184 L. Cornelius Cinna, 36, 87, 226,
Circus Maximus, the, 184 274, 289
Cisalpine Gaul, 69, 86, 278, 280 Cn. Cornelius Dolabella (cos.
Claudii, the, 63, 64, 65, 140, 294, 81), 273
C. Claudius Glaber, 265 Cn. Cornelius Dolabella (pr. 81),
C. Claudius Nero, 41, 245, 248, 62, 249, 250, 252, 253
249, 250, 252, 253 Cn. Cornelius Lentulus
Appius Claudius Pulcher (cos. Clodianus (cos. 72), 266
79), 63, 64, 265, 273, 294 P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus,
Appius Claudius Pulcher (cos. 2, 273
54), 63, 64, 65, 95, 134, 138, L. Cornelius Sisenna, 14, 62
139. 140, 141, 142, 144, 282, F. Cornelius Sulla, 49
283, 294, 295 L. Cornelius Sulla, 11, 13, 14,
C. Claudius Pulcher, 63 22, 23, 25, 27, 30, 31, 32, 34,
Cleochares, 126 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43,
Cleomenes, King, 223 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 58, 60,
72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 80, 81,
83, 87, 90, 95, 99, 102, 123, Egypt, 27, 31, 33, 83, 183
127, 129, 130, 132, 137, 139, Elaea (Kazikbağlari), 41
171, 173, 176, 180, 184, 186, Ephesus, 99, 128, 134, 142, 296
189, 190, 203, 224, 225, 226, Epicadus, 49
227, 228, 230, 231, 234, 235, Epicurus, 211
242, 243, 248, 249, 251, 264, Epigonus, 35
288, 289, 290, 292, 293, 294 Etruria, 187, 316
Cos, 34, 321 Eumachus, 104, 109
Crassi, the, 1 Euphrates (philosopher), 19
Cretans, the, 29 Euphrates, river, 138, 142, 156,
Crete, 29, 178, 191 158, 186, 235
Crimea, 126 Eupolemus, 13
Crixus, 266 Europe, 83, 84, 285
Cybele, 46, 103 Euxine, the, 35
Cyprus, 32, 33, 34, 83, 222 Fabia, 95, 264
Cyrenaeans, the, 30, 31 M. Fabius Hadrianus, 96, 121,
Cyrene, 29, 71, 271 161, 280
Cyziceans, the, 106, 107, 108, Falcula, 256
110, 111, 302 C. Fannius (trib. pleb. 59), 215
Cyzicus, 103, 106, 108, 111, 112, L. Fannius (renegade), 83, 104,
125, 255, 261, 266, 276, 277, 109, 161
280, 281, 284, 302 Fausta, 49, 176, 177
Dadasa, 166 Fimbrians, the, 99, 106, 111,
Dalmatia, 262 165, 168, 169, 170, 171, 238,
Damagoras, 37 239, 305
Damon, 25, 26 L. Flavius (trib. pleb. 60), 191,
Danala, 172 193, 208
Dardanelles, the, 38 C. Flavius Fimbria (quaestor 86),
Dardanus (Mal Tepe, Şehitlik 35, 36, 37, 38, 83, 99, 162
Batarya), 38, 81, 116, 284 Forum, the, 184, 199
Darnah, 29 Q. Fulvius Flaccus (pr. 182), 275
Deiotarus, 110, 266 Q. Fulvius Lippinus (of
Denizkent, 112 Tarquinii), 203
Diana, 97, 143, 185, 235 Further Spain, 2, 218, 266
Dindymon, 103, 108, 110 A. Gabinius (trib. pleb. 67), 162,
Diodes, 116 163, 164, 197, 218
Dionysius the Eunuch, 113 A. Gabinius (leg. 81), 245
Diophantes, 100 Galatia, 83, 116, 171, 172, 173
M. Domitius Calvinus (pr. 80), Galatians, the, 110, 116, 129
261, 265, 267, 268 Gaul, 69, 86, 266, 278, 280, 302
INDEX 329
Gaziura, 161, 166 212, 238, 239, 264, 266, 267,

L. Gellius Publicola, 266 275, 276, 317
Gordyene, 150, 154, 156, 157, Jove, 218
304, 305 Julia, 218
Gouras, 160 Julii Caesares, 1
Gracchi, the, 13, 72, 76 C. Julius Caesar, 42, 47, 49, 58,
Granicus (Biga), river, 111, 303 61, 171, 180, 189, 215, 216,
Gratius, 188 217, 218, 219, 220, 227, 234,
Greece, 2, 16, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 241, 242, 243, 247, 251, 252,
31, 34, 35, 38, 83, 206, 288, 253, 263, 279, 280, 284, 308
289 C. Junius (iud. quaest. 74), 256
Greeks, the, 20, 29, 41, 129, M. Junius Brutus (tyrannicide),
139, 142, 148, 170, 199, 236, 202
Halys (Kizil), 116 M. Junius Juncus (pr. 76), 85, 86,
Hellespont, the, 112 279, 280, 284
Heraclea (Policoro), 13 D. Junius Silanus (cos. 62), 186
Heraclea Pontica (Ereğli), 115 Juno, 185, 250
Hercules, 127, 184, 185, 200, Jupiter, 46
235 Lampsacus (Lapseki), 104, 109,
Hermaeus, 111 111, 113, 250
Hirpini, the, 22 Lanuvium (Lanuvio), 185, 300
L. Hirtuleius, 265 Lectum (Baba), 37
Hither Spain, 2 Lemnos, 113
Q. Hortensius Hortalus, 14, 17, Lesbos, 36
62, 75, 164, 165, 179, 186, Levant, the, 33
201, 208, 211, 232 Libya, 29
Horti Luculliani, 201 Licinia, 181
Hydra, the, 156 Licinii, the, 1, 3, 300, 313
Hypata, 26, 288, 289 M. Licinius Crassus (triumvir),
Iberians, the, 138 45, 61, 183, 186, 192, 217,
Ilium, 108, 113 219, 222, 243, 267, 306, 308,
India, 300 309
Intercatia (Villalpardo), 2 C. Licinius Lucullus (trib. pleb.
Iris (Yeşil), river, 118 196), 1, 2
Isauria, 104 L. Licinius Lucullus (aed. 202), 1
Italia, 21 L. Licinius Lucullus (cos. 151), 1
Italy, 1, 21, 50, 56, 67, 69, 70, L. Licinius Lucullus (pr. 104), 3,
87, 94, 113, 114, 143, 162, 4, 5, 6, 7
171, 185, 187, 190, 198, 201, L. Licinius Lucullus (son of cos.
74), 182, 185, 199
M. Licinius Lucullus (pr. pereg. L. Marcius Philippus (cens. 86),

186), 1 56, 88
P. Licinius Lucullus (trib. pleb. Q. Marcius Rex (cos. 68), 155,
110), 1 165, 167, 168, 178
L. Licinius Murena (pr. 88), 39, C. Marius (cos. 107), 7, 8, 11, 23,
41, 42, 81, 170, 245, 246, 24, 76, 97, 203, 204, 213,
247, 248, 249, 253 218, 226, 238
L. Licinius Murena (cos. 62), 93, M. Marius (quaest. 76), 83, 102,
118, 123, 144, 145, 146, 183, 104, 110, 111, 113, 114
185, 186, 187, 188, 192, 280, Marmara, Sea of, 103, 109
301, 302 Medea, 151
M. Livius Drusus, 44 Medes, the, 147
Lopadium (Uluabat), 109 Media Atropatene, 138
Q. Lucretius Afella, 296 Mediterranean, the, 29, 68, 138,
Luculli, the, 1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 205
15, 47, 175, 177, 180, 188, Melos, 197
211, 292, 300 C. Memmius (trib. pleb. 66), 175,
Lucullus (mythical), 1 176, 177, 178, 308
M. Lucullus, 4, 8, 12, 15, 21, 27, L. Memmius (tourist), 32
45, 170, 175, 176, 177, 178, Memphis, 32
179, 182, 223, 224, 232 Mesopotamia, 138
Lusitania, 2 Metrophanes, 104, 109
Q. Lutatius Catulus, 17, 51, 52, M. Minucius Thermus, 42, 243,
54, 59, 62, 63, 164, 165, 179, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253
183, 208, 218, 261 Misenum, 202
Lycaonia, 140, 142, 167 Mithridates II (Parthia), 156
Lycus (Kelkit), 118 Mithridates VI Eupator
Lydia, 26, 104 (Pontus), 23, 26, 27, 30, 32,
Macedonia, 25, 26, 27, 175, 261, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41,
262 42, 49, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87,
L. Magius, 83, 105, 106, 276 88, 89, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101,
Mamercus (leg.), 95, 109 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108,
L. Mamercus Lepidus 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114,
Livinianus, 46, 79, 96 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120,
Mancaeus, 144, 148 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 128,
C. Manilius (trib. pleb. 66), 164, 133, 136, 137, 139, 140, 142,
178 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 151,
L. Manlius (pr. 79?), 265 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 160,
L. Manlius Torquatus (quaest. 163, 164, 167, 168, 169, 170,
88), 39 171, 173, 186, 192, 197, 198,
INDEX 331
226, 232, 240, 243, 247, 250, Paeligni, the, 1

257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, Palestine, 16
263, 265, 268, 278, 281, 282, Pallantia (Palencia), 2
284, 285, 286, 287, 292, 300, Panormus (Palermo), 13
301, 305, 306, 307 Paphlagonia, 83, 94, 116, 276,
Mithrobarzanes, 144 285
Monte di Procida, 202 C. Papirius Carbo (cos. 82), 272,
Monte Miseno, 202 273, 275
Mopsuestia, 290 Parium (Kemer), 104, 111, 113
Mucia, 191 Parthia, 82, 116, 156, 157, 304,
L. Mummius, 2, 124, 273 306
Murenae, the, 1, 248, 300 Parthians, the, 138, 156, 157,
Mysia, 96, 109 304
Mytilene, 36, 40, 41, 56, 99, 237, Pausias of Sicyon, 200
245, 250, 251, 252, 253 Peloponnese, the, 27
Naples, 15, 202, 204, 314 Perinthus (Erikli), 113
Neoptolemus, 37 M. Perperna, 265, 267
Nervae, the, 1 Pharmacusa, 279
Nesis (Nisida), 202 Pharnacia (Giresun), 122
Nessus, 185 Phoenicia, 139
Nicaea (Iznik), 102, 112, 114 Phoenix, 118
Nicomedeia (Iznit), 113, 114, Phraates II (Parthia), 156, 157
115 Phrygia, 26, 96, 104, 110, 235
Nicomedes III (Bithynia), 299 Pincian hill, 201, 211
Nicomedes IV (Bithynia), 83, Piraeus, the, 27
84, 255, 257, 258, 261, 266, Pisidia, 104
271, 279, 284, 296, 297, 298, Pisistratus, 107
299 Pitane (Çandalari), 35
Nisibis (Nusaybin), 160, 161, Pompeia, 188, 189, 319
189, 304, 305, 322 M. Pompeius (leg.), 96, 122
Norba, 275 Cn. Pompeius Magnus, 45, 49,
Nuceria, 5 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60,
Nyssa (of Bithynia), 257 61, 63, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 78,
Nyssa (of Pontus), 122 79, 81, 84, 129, 130, 139,
Cn. Octavius (cos. 76), 62, 74 163, 164, 165, 171, 172, 173,
L. Octavius (adulterer), 176 174, 176, 177, 178, 180, 183,
L. Octavius (cos. 75), 75, 86, 296 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 193,
Q. Opimius, 75, 76, 77 195, 199, 200, 201, 205, 206,
Orchomenus, 36 207, 208, 214, 215, 216, 217,
Otroea, 102 219, 222, 227, 228, 229, 230,
231, 234, 235, 239, 242, 243, 129, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143,
260, 266, 267, 268, 270, 291, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149,
293, 296, 298, 308 150, 152, 158, 159, 160, 161,
Pomponius (prefect), 96 167, 196, 197, 204, 207, 211,
T. Pomponius Atticus (friend of 223, 226, 235, 255, 257,
Cicero), 13, 17, 196, 208 258, 276, 279, 284, 295, 303,
Pontus, 24, 29, 82, 84, 100, 116, Rome, 1, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14,
122, 128, 141, 142, 145, 151, 15, 16, 18, 21, 24, 27, 29, 31,
152, 157, 161, 162, 165, 169, 33, 34, 36, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45,
170, 172, 175, 192, 198, 230, 47, 50, 54, 56, 57, 61, 67, 68,
263, 266, 285, 304, 305 69, 70, 71, 76, 79, 80, 81, 82,
L. Porcius Cato (cos. 89), 22 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 95,
M. Porcius Cato (the Censor), 110, 113, 114, 115, 122, 128,
19 129, 133, 135, 138, 139, 140,
M. Porcius Cato (Uticensis), 95, 141, 143, 149, 150, 151, 152,
180, 181, 182, 183, 187, 188, 153, 154, 156, 157, 162, 171,
191, 195, 219, 222, 308 173, 175, 177, 180, 181, 185,
A. Postumius Albinus (cos. 151), 189, 190, 191, 197, 199, 201,
19 206, 207, 209, 211, 215, 229,
A. Postumius Albinus (cos. 99), 230, 232, 235, 237, 238, 247,
246 248, 251, 256, 257, 258, 260,
Praecia, 92, 93, 94, 204 271, 272, 275, 278, 280, 283,
Praeneste, 88, 89 285, 288, 301
Prusa (Bursa), 109, 112 Rubicon river, 243
Prusias (Cius), 112 Sabinus, 185
Ptolemy Alexander I, 31 C. Salluvius Naso (leg.), 96, 110
Ptolemy Alexander II, 31 Salvius (Tryphon), 5
Ptolemy Apion, 30, 271 Samians, the, 250
Ptolemy Soter II, 31, 32, 33, 140 Samos, 34, 250
Puteoli (Pozzuoli), 49, 202 Samothrace, 114
L. Quinctius, 77, 78, 81, 84, 155, Sangarius (Sakarya), 100
163, 220, 229, 232, 256 Sardinia, 55, 96, 291
Rhegium (Reggio Calabria), 15 Sarmatians, 83
Rhodes, 27, 33, 34, 279 Scythians, the, 83, 116, 223
Rhodians, the, 27 C. Scribonius Curio (cos. 76),
Rhyndacus (Capaz), 109 215, 265, 266, 267
Romans, the, 1, 5, 11, 14, 21, 27, C. Scribonius Curio (tr. pleb. 50),
30, 31, 39, 41, 49, 55, 56, 60, 62, 74
80, 82, 84, 94, 100, 103, 105, Sebasteia Megalopolis (Sivas),
117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 126, 167
INDEX 333
Seleucids, the, 130 Ser. Sulpicius Galba (cos. 144), 2

C. Sempronius Gracchus, 73, 86 Synnada, 26, 40
L. Sergius Catilina, 59, 187, 188, Syria, 15, 19, 27, 138, 139, 150
214, 226, 263, 264 Talaura, 122, 167
Q. Sertorius, 52, 57, 58, 59, 60, Taurians, the, 83
61, 67, 68, 69, 79, 83, 88, Taurus Mountains, 143, 144,
105, 116, 161, 226, 227, 255, 145, 157, 159
260, 263, 265, 266, 267, 268, Taxiles, 146, 147
269, 270, 274, 275, 276, 277, Tenedos (Bozcaada), 37, 113,
284 125
Servilia, 181, 182, 183 M. Terentius Varro, 12
Servilii, the, 6, 7, 11, 206, 234, M. Terentius Varro (savant), 17,
312 205, 219, 295
Servilius (pr. 88 = the Augur?), M. Terentius Varro Lucullus,
6, 8, 9, 10, 11 see M. Lucullus
C. Servilius (pr. 102), 6 Themiscyra (Terme), 117
Q. Servilius Caepio, 181 Thermodon (Terme), river, 117
P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus, 11, Thrace, 113, 175, 265, 266
99, 167, 251, 252, 253, 265, Thracia, 105
266, 267, 273, 298 Thracians, the, 83, 265
Sextilius (leg.), 96, 144, 156 Thyateira (Ak Hisar), 26, 40
Sicily, 5, 7, 13, 15, 16, 315 Tibareni, the, 117, 122
L. Sicinius, 74, 75 Tiberius (emperor), 204
Sinope (Sinop), 116, 125, 126, Tieium (Filyos), 125
127, 128, 200 Tigranes, 116, 122, 135, 137,
Sophene, 138, 143 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143,
Sopheni, the, 150 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 150,
Sornatius, 97, 120, 142, 300, 304 151, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157,
Spain, 2, 52, 54, 59, 67, 68, 69, 158, 161, 167, 169, 184, 236,
71, 77, 83, 86, 125, 166, 228, 282, 283, 302, 303, 304, 305
230, 247, 260, 261, 262, 265, Tigranocerta (Silvan), 135, 142,
266, 267, 270, 276 144, 145, 148, 149, 150, 154,
Sparta, 223 158, 212, 235, 237, 301, 303,
Spartacus, 175, 226, 261, 266, 304
267, 276, 277, 278 Tigris, river, 144
Sthenis, 128 Tomisa, 143
Sullani, the, 48, 50, 58, 74, 77, Transcaucasia, 138
78, 79, 317 Triocala (Caltabellota?), 5
P. Sulpicius (trib. pleb. 88), 11, Troad, the, 37, 38
24, 76, 80 Tubero (Stoic), 206
M. Tullius Cicero, 8, 11, 13, 16, P. Varenus, 266

17, 18, 20, 77, 89, 151, 165, P. Vatinius, 215
176, 177, 182, 183, 186, 187, Velabrum, the, 184
188, 189, 196, 199, 202, 207, Venus, 1
208, 209, 210, 211, 214, 215, C. Verres, 249, 250, 253
216, 221, 222, 232, 248, 251, Vestals, the, 95, 263
255, 256, 257, 263, 264, 269, Vettius, 4, 5
279, 283, 291, 295 L. Vettius (informer), 215, 216,
M. Tullius Decula (cos. 81), 272 221
Tusculum (Frascati), 14, 162, Via Appia, 64
197, 200, 213, 224, 318 Via Sacra, 75, 76, 184
Tyrannio, 124, 301 Voconii, the, 97
Utica, 180 Voconius (leg.), 97, 114, 301
Vaccaei, the, 2 Volaterrae, 250
L. Valerius Flaccus (cos. 86), 289 Xerxes, 205, 206, 307, 317
L. Valerius Flaccus (pr. 63), 214, Zarbienus, 150
215 Zela, 167
C. Valerius Triarius, 96, 112,
114, 116, 125, 161, 166, 167,
168

Arthur Keaveney - Lucullus, A Life-Gorgias Press (2013)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Arthur Keaveney - Lucullus, A Life-Gorgias Press (2013)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Lucullus, A Life

Arthur Peter Keaveney

Gorgias Studies in Classical and Late Antiquity contains monographs

Second Edition with a New Postscript

Arthur Peter Keaveney

All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication

A Cataloging-In-Publication Record is Available

Some years ago when writing a biography of Sulla I became in-

the consul of 151 was the son or grandson of C. Lucullus, tribune

1 Van Ooteghem (1959) pp. 5–11; Drumann/Groebe (1964) p. 62; de

MRR2.83) and so we know he was born in 116. Lucius is more problem-

observations on Roman elections see ch. 3.

5 Diod. Sic. 36.2. Walton ad loc. makes what seems to me to be the

After that he seems to have done nothing. Some claimed he was

One ancient text does preserve what appears to be Metellus’ own

the Luculli made their first move (cf. n. 9).

see Greenidge and Clay pp. 105–7.

Metellus was certainly popular with the nobility as a whole. By this

most recent discussion). In Acad. Cicero sketches the public career of

ber of different interpretations. Badian (1984b) p. 305 thought ambitus was

that justified such a prosecution.

of the brothers Luculli. The Romans took a rather different view of

held to be usurpers there could be no place for personal quarrels.

eghem (1959) p. 17. Pliny NH 14.96 might, as van Ooteghem p. 176

25 van Ooteghem (1959) p. 17; Villoresi (1939) p. 33; Antonelli (1989)

pp. 8–9 seems to misunderstand the situation.

when he asked Lucullus to revise his Memoirs. We shall see that

28 See further ch. 3.

source is justified by the fact that it is in harmony with other stories of

My suggested reconstruction of M. Lucullus’ journey is based on the fact

though he passed most of the Social War in Rome, Archias joined

was accompanying Lucullus père. For Archias’ citizenship see Sherwin-

rather abstruse concepts.39 Unfortunately, Cicero had no sooner

stance out of vanity and self-importance he consistently plays down

42 This matter is dealt with in detail in ch. 8.

adviser.48 Over a century later the younger Pliny vividly described a

48 Cf. Rawson (1985) p. 81. He may also have acted as an adviser in

political matters, cf. ch. 2.

ture.55 Peoples’ reaction to this experience naturally differed but in

55 Generalizations are dangerous, quantification impossible. See the

useful treatment of Rawson (1985) pp. 3–18.

Late in 91 a goodly portion of Rome’s Italian subjects rose in revolt

be sought after by those who wished to advance themselves in

5 Sulla hardly needed lessons in constancy from anybody and there is

certainly no evidence that any of Lucullus’ mildness rubbed off on him.

bled year of 88 which some believe marks the final milestone on

McGing (1986) pp. 66–125 for the Mithridatic background.

At any rate, by the spring of 87 the situation in Greece had so

Meeting with Sura, soon after, he told him he must quit

The first objective of the Romans was to wrest Athens and

were imitations of Athenian new-style tetradrachms, cf. Crawford (1974)

his numbers, return forthwith to Greece. Although it was the win-

Ptolemy Apion, had died and in his will had bequeathed it to

15 Greenidge and Clay p. 118, cf. Bevan (1927) p. 332; Romanelli

(1943) pp. 13–24; Laronde (1989) pp. 1006–11.

18 Laronde (1989) p. 1011, contra Romanelli (1943) p. 44.

victorious Mithridates to install the ‘rightful heir’ in Egypt. But

feared that an insult might lead to his meeting with an ‘accident’ on

plain that the war in Greece was turning against Mithridates a

ney (2005a) p. 191.

26Add Villoresi (1939) p. 49 n. 1 and Antonelli (1989) p. 62 to the se-

deed we must, that Lucullus was one of those convinced of the

IGGR vol. 4 no. 1113. Neoptolemus: McGing (1986) p. 108; van