2.C.5.0 - Design of Category 1 Civil Structures - v2

SUB-CHAPTER : C.
5
FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY OVERVIEW SECTION : C.5.0
UK-EPR VOLUME 2: DESIGN AND SAFETY
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CHAPTER C: DESIGN BASIS AND GENERAL LAYOUT
SUB-CHAPTER C.5 DESIGN OF CATEGORY 1 CIVIL

STRUCTURES
0. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND DESIGN BASIS FOR

CATEGORY 1 STRUCTURES
0.1. INTRODUCTION
The present Sub-chapter sets out the safety requirements applicable to the design of the safety-
classified civil structures in the EPR. These requirements are embodied in the ETC-C civil works
code. The safety requirements are established as follows:
- a survey is carried out of the relevant structures, and the various components of the
structures to which particular requirements may apply are identified,
- identification is made of the various load cases applicable to the structures, covering
reactor operation and the faults and hazards to which the structures may be subjected,
- the load cases applicable to the components of the civil structures, and the applicable
safety requirements, are identified
- the safety requirements are incorporated into the design of the civil structures and into
the definition of their associated behaviour requirements.
It should be noted that this sub-chapter focuses only on the civil structures. In particular, the
containment function is only treated from the point of view of the civil structures and the
associated structural steelwork. Other systems which are involved in the containment function
(piping, ventilation systems, etc) and their associated requirements (e.g. for avoiding containment
bypass) are outside the scope of this sub-chapter. These systems are dealt with in Chapters F
and I. The associated faults, in particular containment bypass, are addressed in Chapter S.2.4.
0.2. CIVIL STRUCTURES CONCERNED

The civil structures to which the safety requirements are applied are those having a role with
regard to the three basic safety functions of reactivity control, fuel cooling and containment of
radioactive materials. These are category 1 safety (C1) classified structures as defined in
Chapter C.2.They are:
- the reactor building (BR), the fuel building (BK) and the safeguard buildings (BAS),
which house or support equipment that fulfils an F1 classified function or components
which are likely to contain radioactive substances and which are therefore mechanically
classified M1, M2 or M3.
- the diesel generator buildings (BD), the pumping station (SP) and the associated
service tunnels which house or support equipment which fulfils an F1 classified
function,
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- the nuclear auxiliary building (BAN) and the effluent treatment building (BTE) which
house or support components which are likely to contain radioactive substances (M1,
M2 or M3 mechanically classified):
A distinction is made between these buildings with regard to their design parameters:
o buildings whose design is generic and therefore independent of the site in which they
are installed; these include the BR, BK, BAS, BAN and the diesel generator buildings,
o buildings whose design is specific to each installation site; these include the BTE, the
pumping station and the tunnel network.
For each of the buildings concerned, a list is made of the different components (structures, rooms
…) which may be subject to specific requirements.
NB: if other non-safety classified structures are subject to specific safety requirements (for
example, in terms of SC2 classification), the requirements are described in specific documents.
0.2.1. THE REACTOR BUILDING (BR)
The Reactor Building is made up of a double-walled containment and features:
o a pre-stressed concrete inner containment wall the inner surface of which is covered
with a metal liner, which is embedded in the concrete at the foundation raft /Reactor
Building internal structural boundary. The inner containment wall is penetrated by
electrical and mechanical penetrations, the largest of which is the equipment hatch
through which heavy-duty reactor coolant system components are brought into the
reactor building. The key role of the concrete structure of the inner containment is to
withstand the over-pressures which may occur in accidents. The metal liner is
designed to ensure leak-tightness in these situations,
o with regard to the internal layout, the containment is separated into two zones
(« two-room » concept). Personnel access is permitted in the upper section (outer
zone) of the reactor building when the reactor is at power. The innermost zone
contains the reactor coolant system, and the reserve water storage tank (IRWST)
which has a volume of about 2000 m3 (variable with operating conditions) and is
lined with stainless steel cladding. The empty volume within the inner containment
zone adjacent to the IRWST is designed as a spreading zone to facilitate spreading
and cooldown of corium that might be released from the reactor vessel in a severe
accident situation (see Chapter F.2.6 for a description of the spreading area and the
reactor pit),
o an outer containment wall intended both to protect the inner containment from
certain externally-generated hazards and to contain leakages from the inner
containment, by means of the containment annulus enclosure ventilation system
(EDE) [AVS],
o six « double-walled » pipes providing a connection between the IWRST and the
suction sides of the SIS and EVU [CHRS] pumps located in the various safety trains
in the BAS (Safety Auxiliaries Building). These pipes are grouted in the concrete
over a length of more than ten metres and must be accessible for inspection
throughout the reactor operating lifetime.
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o In addition to the IRWST, the Reactor Building also houses several water tanks used
during fuel unloading / reloading, namely:
o the reactor pool,
o the storage pool for reactor internals,
o the transfer pool (connected to the spent fuel pool via the transfer tube).
0.2.2. THE FUEL BUILDING (BK)
The Fuel Building is divided into three distinct parts as follows:
o A lower section consisting of two divisions each of which contains a fully

segregated safety train comprising the spent fuel cooling system and some of the
systems used for reactor coolant system volume control,
o A middle section containing the spent fuel temporary storage pool and the
compartments used to transfer fresh fuel into the reactor building and transfer
spent fuel to the outside,
An upper section which serves as a fuel handling bay. This bay is extended past the reactor
building equipment hatch and physically protects it. On the roof of the fuel handling bay is a stack
for releasing gaseous waste released from the Nuclear Auxiliaries Building.
0.2.3. THE SAFEGUARD BUILDING (BAS)
The Safety Auxiliaries Building is sub-divided into four divisions containing each of the four safety
trains. The trains comprise the mechanical and electrical systems and equipment needed to
control fault situations that are taken into account in the reactor design (EFWS, SIS, CCW
systems, etc) together with the associated supporting systems, particularly the ventilation
systems. The control room and its connected instrumentation & control systems are installed in
two of the divisions.
With regard to the Safety Auxiliaries Building layout, a distinction is made between the divisions
located between the reactor building and the turbine hall (divisions 2 and 3) and the those located
on each side of the reactor building (divisions 1 and 4) perpendicular to the axis formed by the
reactor building and turbine hall. These two pairs of divisions are distinguished as follows:
o divisions 2 and 3 are protected against certain externally-generated hazards by an

aircraft impact resistant shell. These divisions include the associated SIS rooms
and the control room,
o divisions 1 and 4, which are unprotected against aircraft impact , contain the SIS
rooms of trains 1 and 4 together with both trains of the corium cooling system
(located in the CHRS rooms). The upper sections of these divisions support, on
two different levels, the water and steam pipelines of the main secondary system
and the associated isolation valves.
The EFWS water reserve supply is divided between the four divisions of the Safety Auxiliaries
Building in four independent tanks interconnected by a header.
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0.2.4. THE NUCLEAR AUXILIARY BUILDING (BAN),
The Nuclear Auxiliaries Building does not house systems or equipment needed to perform F1-
classified functions. However, it contains auxiliary systems needed for reactor coolant system
chemistry control, which may potentially be contaminated. Therefore, its structure performs the
function of containment of radioactive materials that could be released by failure of the systems
and tanks which it contains.
With regard to layout, the Nuclear Auxiliaries Building consists of a controlled zone (containing
systems for treating borated water from the refuelling pool, water released during SG blowdown,
and gaseous waste), and a non-controlled zone.
The Nuclear Auxiliaries Building is seated on its own foundation raft.
0.2.5. STRUCTURES COMMON TO ALL BUILDINGS WITHIN THE NUCLEAR

ISLAND
The foundation raft and the shell for aircraft crash protection are two structures common to all or
most of the nuclear island. They are designed on the following principles:
• The foundation raft is in the shape of a cruciform whose sides are about 100 m long. It
forms the common base of the whole reactor building and the peripheral buildings, (the
fuel building and the four divisions of the safety auxiliaries building). Its thick
foundation ensures the stability of the buildings which it supports. The foundation raft
incorporates a corium recovery and cooling system in a sector inside the reactor
building.
• The « aircraft shell » is designed to protect the Reactor Building, Fuel Building and
divisions 2 and 3 of the Safety Auxiliaries Building against military and commercial
aircraft crashes. It takes the physical shape of an ultra-thick wall which covers the
roofs, and surrounds the outer walls of the Fuel Building and Divisions 2 and 3 of the
Safety Auxiliaries Building. For divisions 1 and 4 of the Safety Auxiliaries Building, the
vertical walls of the Reactor Building outer containment perform the aircraft crash
protection function. The outer containment also provides the same protection at its
dome and for the vertical upper section above the roofs of the Fuel Building and Safety
Auxiliaries Building. Additionally the vertical outer walls of the staircases for personnel
access to the nuclear island buildings form columns which are part of the aircraft shell.
0.2.6. THE EFFLUENT TREATMENT BUILDING (BTE)
The Effluent Treatment Building contains all the equipment necessary for the treatment of the
contaminated fluids before their release to the environment or storage for transportation off-site.
The design approach for the Effluent Treatment Building is similar to that of the Nuclear
Auxiliaries Building, since, as it contains radioactive products arising from the treatment of
contaminated fluids, its structure must perform the function of retaining radioactive materials in
case of failure of the systems and tanks which it contains.
Regarding its installation, the Effluent Treatment Building is seated on its own foundation raft.
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0.2.7. THE DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING (BD)
The diesel generators are installed in 2 buildings on each side of the aircraft shell, at a distance
which ensures sufficient geographical separation to eliminate risks from aircraft impact. Each of
these two buildings contains two main emergency diesels (EDG) together with one ultimate
emergency diesel (SBO diesel). The internal walls of these buildings are designed to avoid the
risk of common mode failure of two diesel generators.
Regarding its installation, each of these buildings is seated on its own foundation raft.
0.2.8. THE PUMPING STATION (SP)
The Pumping Station houses all the systems necessary for cooling both the nuclear and
conventional plant.
The Pumping Station comprises a set of civil structures (concrete walls and structural steelwork)
and equipment which provide coarse and fine filtration of the cooling water, and transfers it to the
waterways supplying the various pumped systems. The Pumping Station installation, comprises
four divisions containing safety trains, which are mutually separated by walls that protect the
trains from common mode failures (especially flooding). The trains are supplied by diversified
filtration systems. Divisions 1 and 4 of the structure are protected against commercial aircraft
crashes.
The Pumping Station has a connected outfall structure whose role is to discharge plant cooling
water to the sea (from both the nuclear and conventional islands) after it has performed its
cooling duty, and to provide the fire system water reserve. The outfall structure is seated on a
foundation raft separated from that of the Pumping Station.
0.2.9. THE NUCLEAR TUNNELS (GN) AND ASSOCIATED STRUCTURES
These are tunnels which contain F1-classified systems. Their geographical location ensures that
they meet criteria for protection against common mode failure with respect to externally-
generated hazards, particularly aircraft crash, earthquake and flooding.
0.3. DESIGN PROCEDURE AND ASSUMPTIONS

The structures are designed against internal and external loadings to which they may be
subjected during the plant lifetime. The load cases for the structures are derived by considering
events taken into account in the EPR safety design approach, namely:
o reference operating conditions (PCC1 to PCC4),

o operating conditions involving multiple failures (RRC-A) and core melt accidents
(RRC-B),
o internally-generated hazards,
o externally-generated hazards,
o situations analyzed as part of defence in depth that ensure that civil structures have
large design margins,
Details of the load cases design conditions are given below.

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0.3.1. REFERENCE OPERATING CONDITIONS
Four operating condition categories are used for the design of the civil structures, as follows:
Normal plant operation. This corresponds to PCC-1 conditions in the six reactor states (A to F)
and includes conditions representative of:
o a design plant service lifetime of 60 years,

o ambient conditions (temperature, pressure, irradiation) inside the buildings
applicable to reactor at-power operation,
o ambient conditions (temperature, pressure, irradiation) inside the buildings
applicable to reactor shutdown states,
o conditions resulting from the periodic checks (trials, periodic tests, etc, ).
The design conditions for normal plant operation must also include the normal environmental
conditions (wind, groundwater, etc) to which the plant is subjected.
Reactor transients, incidents and accidents. These conditions correspond to the initiators
adopted in the list of the reference transients (PCC2 to 4) and include the following
representative design conditions:
o conditions (temperature, pressure, irradiation) representative of the transients liable

to occur during reactor full-power operation,
o conditions (temperature, pressure, irradiation) representative of the transients liable
to occur during reactor shutdown states.
0.3.2. OPERATING CONDITIONS WITH MULTIPLE FAILURES (RRC-A) AND

THE ACCIDENTS WITH CORE MELTDOWN (RRC-B)
For RRC-A conditions, the load cases are bounded by those resulting from PCC-4 reference
accidents. The RRC-A conditions do not therefore constitute load cases for the design of the civil
structures.
For RRC-B conditions, the load cases are representative of conditions (temperature, pressure,
irradiation) that arise in low-pressure core melt scenarios and the phenomena which they could
induce (e.g. hydrogen combustion and deflagration). In addition to the conditions determined in
this way, a margin is included in the containment design to cover other hypothetical scenarios
involving pressure conditions exceeding those in the basic RCC-B scenarios. The characteristic
pressure/temperature curves adopted as a basis for the inner containment design are given in
figure C.5.0 FIG 4.
0.3.3. INTERNAL HAZARDS,
The internal hazards considered for the design of the civil structures are:
- High-energy pipe breaks,

- Internal flooding,
- Internal missiles,
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- Dropped loads,
- Fire.
0.3.4. EXTERNAL HAZARDS
The external hazards considered for the design of the civil structures are:
o earthquakes: these are sub-divided into two different categories, namely the design
earthquake and the inspection earthquake.
o aircraft crashes: these are sub-divided into three load cases representing general,
military and commercial aircraft categories,
Note: Commercial aircraft crashes are covered in a separate security classified
document.
o external explosions,
o rising groundwater,
o external flooding
o exceptional meteorological conditions (temperature, snow, wind, etc).
It is noted that lightning strike and electromagnetic interference are taken into account in the
design of the civil structures via construction provisions.
0.3.5. INCLUSION OF MARGINS
The design approach for the EPR civil structures includes margins with respect to the identified
scenarios:
¾ For internal events, the design of the structures must make provision for low-
pressure core melt situations with margins included to allow for uncertainties in the
knowledge of core melt phenomena,
¾ For external events, the design of the structures must make provision for loadings
beyond the design basis, whether they are due to natural phenomena such as
earthquakes or climate changes, or to human activity such as explosions and aircraft
crashes.
The design also takes into account a double-ended guillotine break of the reactor coolant
pressure boundary (LOCA-2A) and combined loading due to a simultaneous loss of coolant
accident (reactor coolant system pressuriser surge line break LOCA) with the design earthquake;
the purpose of designing against this loading combination is to ensure that substantial margins
are present in the design of the inner containment lower section
0.4. DESIGN OF THE STRUCTURES AND INCLUSION OF SAFETY

REQUIREMENTS
0.4.1. INTEGRATION OF THE EPR SAFETY REQUIREMENTS IN THE DESIGN OF

THE STRUCTURES
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Safety requirements used in the design of the EPR civil structures require different design criteria
to be assigned (shown in section 0.3.1 to 0.3.5 within this Sub-chapter) for different operating
conditions (normal, exceptional or accident conditions).
0.4.1.1. Normal situations
The basic requirement is the ability to ensure continued reactor operation in normally occurring
environmental conditions by providing protection and support to equipment over the design
lifetime of the plant.
Normal situations are considered as representative of the reactor operating conditions within the
limits set out by the technical specifications. For calculating the loadings exerted on the
buildings, the following assumptions are made:
• internal ambient conditions of pressure and temperature are those associated with
reactor states A to F,
• loads due to the fluids contained in the main primary system, the SIS pool, the EFWS
tanks, the tanks in the Nuclear Auxiliaries Building, etc are those exerted on the
foundation raft and the intermediate support floors,
• for external environmental conditions, normal air and ground temperature values are
adopted, appropriate to frequently occurring snow and wind levels and average
groundwater levels.
0.4.1.2. Exceptional situations
Exceptional situations correspond to plant operating conditions and internal and external ambient
conditions which might be expected to be encountered at one or more times in the plant lifetime.
The design requirements are linked to the strength of structures and the integrity of tanks, pools
etc. For the buildings, this results in the following:
• in terms of internal ambient conditions, the pressure and temperature ranges assumed
are those corresponding to PCC-2 reference transients.
• for loads exerted on the external structures of buildings and on the intermediate
support floors, both the movements of the fluids contained in the main systems, pools,
tanks, etc, and loads due to periodic and acceptance tests (on the inner containment,
for example), are taken into account.
• with regard to external environmental conditions, the following are included:
o Extreme values are assumed for the loads exerted by the weight of snow
and wind forces in accordance with the methodology defined in national
regulations,
o external ambient conditions leading to significant stresses in the civil
structures are assumed,
o the groundwater is assumed to be at a level liable to be encountered once
in a hundred-year period,
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In addition to this approach, a seismic level called the « inspection earthquake » is considered in
the design of the structures. The design of the structures must be such that an earthquake less
than or equal to this level would not cause any significant damage to the plant and that, if the
plant is shutdown it could be restarted without a requirement for an inspection.
0.4.1.3. Accident situations
Accident situations correspond to situations which are unlikely to be encountered during the plant
lifetime but which are nevertheless considered in the design for safety purposes and more
particularly for the purposes of defence in depth. In these cases, irreversible deformations of the
buildings are allowable. For the building design, the following are required:
• the ability to withstand the design earthquake loading values which bound the
requirements set out in French national regulations for buildings,
• The ability of the aircraft shell to withstand impact by general, military and commercial
aircraft. The load versus time curves considered for the design are presented in C.5.0
FIG 2
• The ability for all the buildings to withstand loads due to an external explosion
(characterised by a wave front as shown in C.5.0 FIG 3) and, for the load-bearing
structures and the structures at the boundary of a fire sector, to withstand loads
generated by a fire,
• The ability to withstand loads due to high-energy pipe breaks and the impact of
internally-generated missiles,
• In terms of ambient conditions inside the buildings, the pressure and temperature
ranges to be assumed correspond to those appropriate to design basis incidents and
accidents in categories PCC3 and 4, together with those corresponding to RRC-A
operating conditions.
For the particular case of the Reactor Building, the requirements result in particular from the need
to comply with the objective of limiting the radiological impact of the accident situations. For the
purpose of achieving this objective a ‘decoupled’ set of design criteria is adopted covering:
• the maximum allowable inner containment leak rate,
• the maximum allowable outer containment leak rate,
• the performance required form the EDE [AVS] system,
Achievement of these criteria results in an acceptable grace period during which the containment
annulus remains at negative pressure after the shutdown of the annulus ventilation system.
Note that the maximum leak rate from the inner containment is set at 0.3 %/d based on the mass
of gas contained in the volume bounded by the inner containment at a pressure of 0.55 MPa
absolute.
The accident situations considered for the reactor building structural analysis are:
• double-ended guillotine break of a major pipe within the reactor coolant pressure
boundary (2A – LOCA),
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• a severe accident situation with core melt (RRC-B) including the loads due to local
hydrogen deflagrations. This results in a requirement to demonstrate by calculation
internal containment leak-tightness at a maximum pressure of 0.65 MPa absolute, at a
corresponding maximum temperature of 170 °C,
• a design load case combining rupture of the pressuriser surge line and the design
earthquake (SLB LOCA + DE), resulting in a maximum containment pressure of 0.48
MPa absolute combined with an earthquake of 0.25 g.
In order to verify the leak-tightness of the reactor containment in accident situations, an initial
strength test and periodic leak-tightness tests are required. As the leak test is intended to be
performed on several occasions during plant lifetime, the test conditions are considered
exceptional loadings from the point of view of the Reactor Building design.
0.4.1.4. Functional requirements on structures after application of loading
The safety requirements expected for each of the civil structures are classified depending on the
behaviour of the structure, which may be reversible or irreversible after application a sustained,
variable or accidental loadings. The functional requirements after application of the loading are
defined and classified as follows:
• AB : serviceability of concrete walls. The application of stresses resulting from a

particular loading must not modify the subsequent behaviour of the structure
throughout its lifetime. The structure must remain fit for the purpose for which it was
designed,
• RB : capacity of the concrete wall to withstand the applied loading. Permanent

deformation may be allowable to the extent that the relevant structure remains stable
and the integrity of connected equipment is maintained,
• C : capacity to contain radioactive materials. This requirement mainly applies to the

inner wall of the containment, for which a maximum leak rate is specified for
decoupling purposes,
• AM : serviceability of metal structures, including their integrity. Avoidance of tearing is

required for cladding but without any associated leak criterion,
• RM : structural capacity of penetrations in accident situations. Permanent deformation

may be allowable to the extent that the functionality of the penetrations is guaranteed,
• E : leak tightness of fluid containers. The integrity of the container must be ensured in
all situations, even if permanent deformation occurs.
Subsidiary functional requirements are defined for some structures as follows:
• C* : the degree of containment to be ensured must include adequate working of

ventilation systems,
• C** : the degree of containment must be specified in conjunction with radiological

impact limitation objectives,
• E* : the required leak tightness applies to the bottom section of the relevant building
(generally a leak collection area).
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Tables C.5.0 TAB 1 and 2 list the functional requirements on each of the components of the
nuclear island civil structures on the basis of the loadings to which they may be subjected, using
the loading classifications: normal (N), exceptional (Ei) or accidental (Ai).
0.4.2. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO THE DESIGN OF THE

REACTOR BUILDING
The double-walled containment must be designed to ensure the containment of radioactive

materials in all normal and exceptional situations considered within the design. It must:
• allow access and egress of personnel and equipment in normal operation,
• be able to withstand loadings due to the pressure, thermal and mechanical effects
resulting from the above-described situations and environmental conditions,
• be capable of undergoing acceptance and periodic tests.
Table C.5.0 TAB 1 summarises the requirements applicable to the various parts of the Reactor
Building structure and the main structural steelwork. The features common to several buildings
(aircraft shell and foundation raft) are included in this table. The main requirements taken into
account in Reactor Building design are as follows:
- Inner containment concrete wall: Serviceability (at classification AB) must be ensured
for each reactor state (taking into account the loads generated by pre-stressing), for the
reference transients (PCC2) and for an earthquake at the level of the inspection
earthquake. Likewise, acceptance tests and periodic tests must not modify the
properties of the structure or the capacity of the steel liner to perform its containment
function (classification C).
For accident situations, the inner containment integrity (serviceability classification RB)
must be ensured for an earthquake at the level of the design earthquake, and for a
loading corresponding to PCC 3/4 design basis incidents and accidents. Likewise, the
integrity must be ensured for loadings resulting from low-pressure core melt accidents,
including effects of hydrogen deflagration. Serviceability classification RB is also
required with respect to loading due to primary pipework guillotine breaks (2A LOCA)
and due to combined effects of reactor coolant system pipework breaks and
earthquake-induced loadings.
- Reactor Building internal structures: the requirements for Reactor Building internal
structures are similar to those for the inner containment, with the exception of the
pressure tests (which do not generate loadings on these structures). With regard to
loadings taken into account for the purposes of the defence in depth, the static loads to
be considered include both the reactor coolant pipe guillotine break (2A LOCA) and the
combined effect of a reactor coolant system pressuriser surge line break and
earthquake loading (SLB LOCA + DE),
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- Outer containment. The outer containment design is focussed on its capacity to

withstand external loadings, whether they are of human or natural origin. Serviceability
(at classification AB) is required for loadings due to meteorological phenomena (snow,
wind, extreme temperatures, etc) and for an earthquake of the same level as the
inspection earthquake. Serviceability at classification RB must be ensured for an
earthquake of the same level as the design earthquake and for loadings corresponding
to the impact of an aircraft or an external explosion. To prevent releases of radioactivity
in accident situation, the external containment design should enable a negative
pressure to be maintained in the containment annulus without the operation of the
annulus ventilation system (requirement classification AB + C) for a specified « grace
period ». Lastly, the outer containment must be able locally to withstand the effects of a
high-energy pipe break,
- Foundation Raft. The foundation raft must meet the requirements of the buildings which
it supports, noting that their protection against groundwater leakage (at classification E)
is a common requirement. The foundation raft serviceability (at classification AB) must
be demonstrated for loadings similar to those considered for the inner containment. The
foundation raft integrity (at classification RB) must be ensured in a design earthquake
and aircraft crash situation. At the junction with the containment wall, the foundation raft
integrity must be ensured for the loading combination of a design earthquake with a
surge line break LOCA, and for low-pressure core melt situations. As foundation raft
cracking is considered prejudicial for these situations, a limitation of the degree of crack
opening is sought,
- Steel liner and penetrations. These components, which form the inner enclosure of the
containment, are required to meet the serviceability levels for the containment
(classification C) and mechanical integrity (classification AM) for all reactor states
(states A to F), for the PCC-2 reference transients and for an earthquakes at the level
of the inspection earthquake. Acceptance tests and periodic tests ensure compliance
with the leakage rate criteria. For all accident situations, the capacity of the liner and
penetrations to ensure containment integrity (at classification C) is also a requirement,
- Water filled pools inside the Reactor Building. The pools in the Reactor Building
comprise the IWRST and the refuelling pool which is flooded during refuelling
operations. The principle requirement of these water filled pools is that they remain
leak-tight under various loadings. The main difference between the requirements on the
two systems relates to PCC3/4 situations which are only relevant to the design of the
IWRST.
0.4.3. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO THE OTHER NUCLEAR ISLAND

STRUCTURES
Table C.5.0 TAB 2 summarises the requirements applicable to the various buildings or parts of
buildings of the nuclear island outside the reactor building. The main requirements to be taken
into account in their design are as follows:
- For the structures protected by the aircraft shell, namely the Fuel Building and divisions
2 and 3 of the Safety Auxiliaries Building, serviceability at classification A must be
ensured for the various reactor states (states A to F), for the reference transients
(PCC2) and for an earthquake at the level of the inspection earthquake. With regard to
PCC 3/4 accident situations and the design earthquake, the strength of the structures
must be ensured. For PCC 3/4, the effectiveness of the containment function of these
buildings relies on ventilation systems.
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- For division 1 and 4 of the Safety Auxiliaries Building the requirements are similar to
those of divisions 2 and 3 with the additional requirement to withstand externally-
generated hazards, as these divisions are not protected by the aircraft shell. These two
divisions include the RIS [SIS] and EVU [CHRS] rooms for which special requirements
apply owing to the conditions in which the equipment they enclose is called upon to
operate, namely:
partial protection of the isolation valves of the relevant systems from aircraft
impact is required (classified R*),
capacity to ensure the containment function (classification R / C**) in
accordance with the radiological impact limitation objectives. This results in
the requirement for a maximum static leakage rate from the peripheral
buildings (with the ventilation systems out of service) set at the conservative
value of 0.5 vol/d.
- For the Nuclear Auxiliaries Building and the Effluent Treatment Building, serviceability
at classification A is required, similar to that applied to divisions 1 and 4 of the
Safeguards Auxiliaries Building. There is an additional requirement for protection from
groundwater ingress. With regard to accident situations, the bottom section (leak
collection area) of the external structures of the Nuclear Auxiliaries Building and the
Effluent Treatment Building are subject to strength and leak-tightness requirements for
earthquake, explosion and PCC3/4 loadings.
- The aircraft shell which is a structure common to several buildings, is designed to meet
safety requirements with respect to serviceability and strength identical to those
adopted for the outer containment upper section,
- The requirements for the Pumping Station and Diesel Buildings, are practically
identical, namely that they must be fit to perform their function for the set of exceptional
situations and must withstand earthquake and explosion hazards. With regard to
aircraft impact, the protection requirement is met through geographical separation for
the Diesel Buildings. For the Pumping Station, the requirement to withstand aircraft
crashes applies only to the portion of the structure which encloses the cooling systems
of trains 1 and 4 of the nuclear island,
- Finally with regard to the water storage tanks in the nuclear island buildings, these are
considered as compartments which are drainable or otherwise. Their serviceability must
be ensured in each of the reactor states (states A to F), in PCC2 reference transients
and for earthquakes up to the magnitude of the design earthquake. The distinction
between compartments which are drainable or non-drainable introduces a leak-
tightness requirement for accident situations (PCC3/4 or RRC-A) in which these
compartments may be required.
Table C.5.0 TAB 2 comprises the summary presentation of the requirements which are
applicable to the different buildings or building sections on the nuclear island, excluding the
reactor building. The main requirements which are to be considered in the design of the BR are:
___________________________
1
The duration during which the space between containments will be maintained under
negative pressure after EDE [AVS] system shutdown must be specified and justified.
SUB-CHAPTER : C.5
PAGE : 14 / 29
- For structures which are protected by the airplane resistant shell, that is the fuel
building and two divisions of the safeguard building, their service capability (A symbol)
must be guaranteed for the different reactor conditions (A to F conditions), for the
reference transients (PCC2), as well as for an inspection level earthquake. With regard
to accident situations, their resistance must be ensured for a operational shutdown level
earthquake, as well as for a load which corresponds to the reference accidents
(PCC3/4) which are likely to occur in these buildings. In addition, for the latter, the
search for a suitable containment comprises a requirement which specifically depends
on the existence of a ventilation system.
- With regard to the two divisions of the auxiliary safeguard building, which are not
protected by the airplane resistant shell, their applicable requirements are similar to
those divisions which are protected by the airplane resistant shell, with the additional
requirements required for the consideration of external hazards. With regard to their
internal structures, these two divisions house the RIS [SIS] and CHRS rooms which
have specific requirements which must be considered the operating conditions of the
equipment housed therein, that is:
o their partial protection (a minimum of shut off valves for the systems in
question) with regard to aircraft crashes (R* symbol);
o their resistance and ability to ensure containment (R/C** symbol) which is in

line with the limitation objectives for radiological consequences. This means
taking into consideration a static leak rate for the peripheral buildings
(ventilations out of service) fixed at a conservative value of 0.5 vol/d.
- With regard to the nuclear auxiliaries building and the effluent treatment building, their
service capability requirement (A symbol) is similar to that which is applied to the BAS
divisions which are not protected by the airplane resistant shell, with an additional
requirement which takes into consideration the water table. With regard to accident
situations, only their external structures are subject to a resistance and leaktightness
requirement in the lower section of their retention tanks for earthquake, explosion and
PCC3/4 situations.
- With regard to the airplane resistant shell, a structure which is common to several
buildings, its design must comply with safety requirements (service and resistance
capability – cf. table C.5.0 TAB 1) which are identical to those used for the upper
section of the external containment.
- With regard to the pumping station and the diesel generator buildings, they have
practically the same requirements, that is, they must be able to guarantee their service
for all of the extreme situations and must be able to resist hazards from earthquakes
and explosions. With regard to aircraft crashes, the protection requirement is ensured
through geographical separation. For the pumping station, the resistance requirement
applies to that section of the structure which houses the cooling systems for the two
nuclear island divisions which are not protected by the airplane resistant shell.
- Finally, with regard to the retaining structures contained in the nuclear island buildings,
they are considered to be drainable or non-drainable compartments. Their service
capability must be ensured for the reactor's different conditions (A to F conditions), for
the reference transients (PCC2), as well as for an earthquake which could reach the
level of a operational shutdown earthquake. The distinction between the possibility of
draining or not draining these compartments introduces a specific leaktightness
requirement for the accident situations (PCC3 or RRC-A) in which these compartments
may be required.
SUB-CHAPTER : C.5
PAGE : 15 / 29
0.4.4. ASSOCIATED BEHAVIOURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CIVIL

ENGINEERING STRUCTURES
The ETC-C (EPR Technical Code for Civil Works) is the code which serves as the basis for the
design and construction of safety-classified civil works structures in the EPR. The current version
of the ETC-C consist of three sections addressing the design requirements for the double-walled
containment with a metal liner, procedures for construction and procedures for testing. The table
of contents of the three sections of the ETC-C is given in table C.5.0 TAB 4..
The ETC-C technical content reflects the need to define the behaviour requirements of the
constitutive structural features during the design phase of the civil structures. The behaviour
requirements depend on the contribution the features make to plant safety (for example to the
containment of nuclear materials or to the support of safety-significant equipment), on their
nature, their functional role and the arrangement of the plant.
The behaviour requirements can be broken down into requirements for leak-tightness, stability
(mechanical strength, support of equipment), changes in geometry, and avoidance of interactions
with nearby structural elements.
The behaviour requirements may be expressed in terms of:
- the limits on permitted reversible or irreversible deformations, for example locally to

ensure limitation of the degree of cracking of a structure contributing to the containment
of radioactive materials, or required to ensure the stability of a structural feature;
- the limits on permitted displacements, for example limits on geometrical changes or

displacement limits to avoid interactions between neighbouring structures.
The behaviour requirements of structures take into account the degree of damage which is
acceptable under different loading conditions. The different behaviour requirements of the
structures after application of specific loading conditions are as follows:
- complete functionality of the structure. This requires that the deformation of the
structure and materials is limited with no requirement for repair under normal and
exceptional loading conditions,
- partial functionality of the structure. This requires a continued capability for reactor
operation subject to any necessary repairs. The requirement applies to accident (or
highly exceptional) situations after which it may be planned to restart the plant, such as
a significant earthquake below the level of the design earthquake. The requirement for
partial functionality in accident conditions introduces margins in plant design with
respect to serious accidents (for example core melt situations),
- maintaining the containment function. This is applicable in situations when it is not

planned to restart the plant. Achievement of this requirement ensures the safety
objective of limiting the radiological impact of accidents.
The above design approach leads to a distinction being made between the accident situations
and the associated criterion levels the structures are required to meet according to the role the
structures play in performing the safety functions. It results in the creation of safety margins in the
structural design for so-called normal situations.
SUB-CHAPTER : C.5
PAGE : 16 / 29
The behaviour criteria specified in the design of the civil structures may be different for the
different load cases defined in Section 0.4.1, (normal/ frequent, exceptional and accident).
Loading conditions corresponding to the construction phases are also considered in order to
ensure the security, stability and durability of the structures. To allow for a provisional service
lifetime of the plant of 60 years, and a construction time of 5 years, design calculations for the
civil works structures assume a life of 65 years (particularly for the calculation of shrinkage/creep
and pre-stressing losses).
The loading conditions considered are divided into permanent, variable and accidental loads.
- permanent loads considered include the deadweight of the structures and permanent
equipment, the thrust of the ground and the groundwater in the case of buried structural
features, imposed displacements, pressures forces due to liquids or gases, thermal
loads, deformation forces due to the shrinkage and creep of the concrete features and
pre-stressing loads in the case of pre-stressed concrete structural features. They are
denoted G, with the exception of pre-stressing loads which are denoted P.
- variable loads considered are operating loads, the variations around the mean value of
permanent loads, and loads due to the climatic effects such as wind and snow. They
are denoted Q with indices for climatic actions, denoted W for wind and S for snow, and
T for the thermally induced loads,
- accident loads (denoted A) as discussed Chapter 3. These consist of seismic loads,

forces due to loss of coolant accidents (possibly combined with an earthquake event),
severe accidents, aircraft crash, external explosions and the high-energy pipe breaks.
For all these situations, the load combinations are defined in the ETC-C, where they are specified
against the associated behaviour criteria for each of the concrete and metal structures. Table
C.5.0 TAB 3 specifies the load combinations adopted in the ETC-C.
0.4.4.1. Materials
Concrete
The selected concrete must have the performance properties (strength, porosity, permeability,
shrinkage/creep, etc) suited to the operating conditions and environment of the structure, in both
normal service and in accident situations.
The choice of the materials must take into account the risk of cracking of young concrete,
possible deformation due to shrinkage and creep for pre-stressed concrete and the risk of
corrosion of the reinforcements.
Reinforcements
The pre-stressing reinforcements are certified by a French regulations and the selected pre-
stressing process is approved at the French or European level. The reinforcements are
corrosion-protected by a cement grout whose properties are experimentally checked.
The passive reinforcements are also corrosion-protected by a coating appropriate to the class of
the structure and its environment.
Metallic materials
SUB-CHAPTER : C.5
PAGE : 17 / 29
The materials selected for the claddings and metal parts contributing to the leak-tightness and/or
to the containment function must be qualified and certified according to French (or European)
standards. The choice of the materials must take into account:
- mechanical and thermal loads,
- chemical interactions,
- resistance to brittle fracture,
- resistance to corrosion.
Acceptance, implementation and performance checking inspections are required during

construction.
0.4.4.2. Performance levels required for structures
The behaviour requirements for the concrete structures are, depending on load case:
- stability,
- absence of excessive deformation,
- limitation of degree of cracking
- capability to maintain equipment support,
- capacity to contain hazardous material.
The justification criteria serve to demonstrate the compliance with the behaviour requirements
and are consistent with the rules applicable to the design of structures and their construction.
The behavioural requirements which are to be verified for the concrete structures are, depending
on the case:
- The stability,
- The absence of excessive deformation,
- The limitation of cracking,
- The support for the materials,
- The retention of dangerous materials etc.
The justification criteria are used to demonstrate compliance with the behavioural requirements
and are chosen in accordance with the regulations which are applicable to the design of the
structures and which are relative to the construction procedures.
SUB-CHAPTER : C.5
PAGE : 18 / 29
0.4.4.2.1. Concrete structures
Concrete serviceability requirements are as defined in Eurocode 2 (European standard pertaining

to concrete structures) in the following terms: « A durable structure must meet the serviceability,
strength and stability requirements throughout the plant lifetime, without any significant loss of
functionality or excessive unscheduled maintenance ».
- For normal situations, provision is made for loads applied during construction and
operation including effects of climatic conditions.
The criteria assigned to these « serviceability states » correspond to stress or strain

limitations in the concrete and steel materials, which ensure elastic, reversible
behaviour and provide margins for more severe loadings.
Calculations of concrete strains are only carried out when deflection conditions are
imposed.
Calculations of the degree of cracking of the concrete are carried out when the cracking
is considered to be detrimental, specifically in the case of the buried foundation rafts
and walls of buildings containing radioactive fluids which are liable to be immersed in
groundwater.
- For exceptional situations corresponding to the environmental or climatic conditions

which have a significant probability of occurrence during the lifetime of the structure,
assessment is made against maximum operating loads in accordance with usual civil
design regulations (safety factors are applied to loads and material properties).
- For accident situations such as earthquakes, high-energy pipe breaks, external

explosions and flooding assessments are considered as ultimate limit states as defined
in civil design codes. For these situations, concrete/steel strain limitations are imposed.
For the following accident loading conditions:
• Loss of coolant accidents, whether or not combined with earthquakes,
• External explosions,
• High-energy pipe breaks,
when calculating the bending and shear loadings on the reinforced concrete walls and
slabs, allowance is made for dynamic amplification effects, plasticity coefficients and
the permissible limits for the materials, in order to define an equivalent static load.
Plastic strains are allowed.
When addressing military aircraft crashes, larger deformations of the materials are
allowed, based on a methodology specifically applicable to double-walled structures
which uses criteria and values originating in German regulations (local structural
strength).
0.4.4.2.2. Containment internal wall
The aim of the criteria applied to the containment inner wall is to ensure the liner integrity by
limiting the concrete strains. No crack opening justification is required. The specific criteria
applied depend on the loading level. Three loading levels are considered:
SUB-CHAPTER : C.5
PAGE : 19 / 29
- Normal service and test situations
In order to limit tensile loads in singular zones (e.g. the equipment hatch gusset, base
of the dome), a non-tensile criterion is imposed in the continuous zone wall, which
takes into account the pressure, deadweight and the various forces due to the liner and
passive steels, and the pre-stressing losses. Tensile loads in passive steels are limited
to a maximum stress value close to 2/3 of the yield strength.
The acceptance pressure test is set at 0.6 MPa absolute which includes an allowance
for the liner thrust at temperature. The pressure applied in periodic leak tests is
assumed to be 0.55 MPa absolute in the design.
- Accident situations
Accident conditions addressed include high-energy pipe breaks, earthquakes, and

LOCAs and a severe accident scenario which results in a pressure of 0.55 MPa. For
concrete walls, a requirement for reversible behaviour is imposed. This is achieved by
introducing tensile strain limitation for the concrete and rebar in singular zones.
- Ultimate (severe accident) situations
The bounding cases considered are an over-pressure of 0.65 MPa absolute and a
combined LOCA + Earthquake case. For these cases the civil design regulations allow
concrete sections to be cracked and steel components to be in tension such that the
maximum plastic strains are limited to 1% for steel rebars and 0.3% for the concrete.
0.4.4.3. Steel lined containment
The liner and the metal components of the containment (penetrations and plates) are
interconnected and must maintain their integrity as well as fulfilling the specific role which they
have to play (e.g. to provide support for the plates and penetrations).
Steel liner
The liner is fixed to the concrete wall via continuous and localized anchor plates. The liner
deformations therefore depend on the deformations of the concrete wall to which they are
attached and pressure and temperatures effects occurring in accident and test situations.
For the steel liner and anchors, a number of requirements apply:
- during construction, they must be rigid enough to, withstand the loads induced by
building without sustaining damage;
- during reactor operation the anchors must ensure liner integrity in all the situations
which could generate elevated pressures and temperatures, concrete creep, stress
concentrations and corrosion phenomena.
The possible failure modes for the liner are of two types: elastic or elastoplastic buckling
instability with excessive deformation.
The design of the anchors must take into account three requirements:
- the liner integrity should not be compromised in case of a connector break (fuse effect),
- chain breaks in angle bars should be avoided,

SUB-CHAPTER : C.5
PAGE : 20 / 29
- buckling stability in normal service should be ensured.
Two sets of integrity criteria are, applied in all normal and accident situations, depending on
whether or not the liner is blistered.
- In the first case (liner blistered), load or displacement criteria are applied to the
anchors; the displacement criteria must supply the necessary margins to failure of the
anchors without liner tearing.
- In the second case (liner not blistered), strain limitation criteria are applied which
implicitly ensure non-failure of the anchors.
With regard to effects of hydrogen deflagration, which results in only localised stresses on the
liner, a specific criterion is defined applicable solely to skin deformation, in order to ensure non-
tearing of the liner.
Penetrations
The equipment hatch, the site access penetration, the sleeves of the fluid and electrical
penetrations and transfer tube, and the shells of the personnel air locks are addressed by the
ETC-C.
The requirements applied to the above penetrations are aimed ensuring the avoidance of:
- immediate excessive strain and plastic instability,
- localized failure induced by a spring effect,
- buckling of areas not completely joined to the concrete wall.
In the particular case of the equipment hatch, operability must be ensured during operation.
In addition to the containment-related loadings on the penetrations, provision is made, for the
loads induced by the equipment (equipment hatch end effect, pipe break effects).
For normal situations, elastic stress analysis is required. An elastoplastic analysis is allowed
when the criteria are not met.
For accident situations, a limit analysis is required (elastoplastic calculation assuming perfect
plasticity) with two levels of loading criteria that are less severe than normal situations.
Buckling analysis (Euler elastic buckling) is required for the areas emerging from the concrete
wall (e.g. the equipment hatch shell); the sleeves are treated in the same way as the steel liner.
Depending on the load case, the required margins are identical to those required for the ASME,
RCC-M or RCC-MR codes.
0.4.4.4. Leak Collection Pools
The criteria applied depend on the temperature encountered in the various situations (normal,
exceptional and accident).
Concrete walls: the applicable criteria are related to limits on strain (reversible elastic behaviour
is ensured by limiting peak stresses in rebars under normal and exceptional temperature
conditions).
SUB-CHAPTER : C.5
PAGE : 21 / 29
Cladding: The ETC-C addresses stainless steel cladding only.
The requirements are aimed at ensuring:
- Leak-tightness,
- Resistance to corrosion and decontamination capability.
The liners of the leak collection pools do not play any role with regard to structural strength.
The applicable criteria depend on whether the compartments are repairable and on the loading
conditions. The criteria make it possible to limit blistering and to ensure adequate strength of
anchors and welded joints.
The limits on the permissible magnitude of blistering amplitude are derived from experimental
studies.
For non-drainable pools, the liner is subject to an additional requirement of 100% radiographic
inspection.
0.4.4.5. Metal structures
For metal structures the applied criteria are similar to those for concrete structures (identical load
combinations).
For normal situations, the maximum stress criterion is based on 2/3 of the yield strength.
For accident situations, larger strains are permitted provided the functional capability of the
structures or portions of structures are not compromised (i.e. loads do not exceed the yield
strength to ensure reversibility).
Provisions which ensure the dissipative behaviour of the structure are stated.
No credit is taken for the effects of dissipation in reducing seismic loads: this gives margins for
singular points and for future re-assessment.
0.4.4.6. Construction and testing
Construction
The aim of the requirements applied during construction is to achieve durability of the structures
and their integrity under subsequent operating conditions. The requirements cover the following :
- choice of correct materials,
- use of appropriate design and constructional methods,
- required inspection and test procedures.
Tests
The overall leak-tightness and strength tests provide experimental confirmation of reactor
containment integrity.
SUB-CHAPTER : C.5
PAGE : 22 / 29
a) Acceptance tests:
Before the structure is commissioned, the reactor containment undergoes an ambient-

temperature pressurization test called the « pre-operational » or « acceptance » test during which
its strength and leak-tightness are confirmed.
Overall leak test
The required test pressure is 0.55 MPa absolute. The maximum leakage rate permitted in the test
is calculated from the maximum leak rate criterion for accident conditions ( 0.3%/d) by adjusting
to the pressure and temperature conditions of the test.
In this way, the test acceptance criterion for the inner containment, taking into account the
conversion coefficient of 0.69 and applying a coefficient of 0.75 to account for ageing, becomes:
Fe0 = 0.155 %/d.
During this test, a check on the leak-tightness of the containment outer wall is carried out by
confirming that a negative pressure can be maintained in the containment inter-enclosure
annulus throughout the period of the test.
Strength test:
The required test pressure is 0.60 MPa absolute (the test pressure takes into account the
thermally induced loading on the concrete due to the steel liner in accident situations, which is
dependent on the geometry of the structure and on the temperature conditions).
During this test, installed instrumentation is used to confirm that the wall behaviour matches that
predicted by the calculation model.
b) Periodic leak tests:
During the plant operating phase, leak tests are only carried out on the containment inner wall.
For these tests, the test pressure will be defined in future, taking into account autoclave effects of
the penetrations and the frequency of reactor coolant system tests.
0.4.5. REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
To follow.
0.5. CONCLUSION
In the safety approach implemented in the design of the EPR, the civil structures are required to
perform a dual function:
- they must protect the plant from hazards to which it may be subjected, particularly
externally-generated hazards,
- they must protect the environment from accident situations which have not been
eliminated by the design, and in particular limit the protective measures that might be
needed in sever accident situations.
The design loading levels adopted for the civil works structures in EPRs are higher than those
used for the in-service NPPs. In particular:
SUB-CHAPTER : C.5
PAGE : 23 / 29
- with regard to internally-generated events, the design of the structures must provide
protection against low-pressure core melt situations with margins to allow for
uncertainties in knowledge of these phenomena,
- with regard to externally-generated events, the design of the structures must

accommodate severe loadings, whether due to natural phenomena such as
earthquakes or climate changes, or due to human activities such as explosions and
aircraft crashes.
In this general context and in keeping with Technical Guidelines (see Chapter C.1) the present
sub-chapter has :
- surveyed the components and structures (including metal structures) of the EPR
nuclear island,
- outlined in a detailed manner the safety requirements which have to be incorporated

into their design,
- introduced the ETC-C and set out their main requirements.
The current sub-chapter therefore provides the interface between the general safety approach
and the design code for EPR civil structures.
SUB-CHAP : C.5 CHAPTER : C.5.0
FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY OVERVIEW
TABLE :1 PAGE : 1/1
TAB 1: TABLE CHARACTERISING THE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO THE DESIGN OF THE REACTOR BUILDING
Situations : Internal Internal External Airplane Steel IRWST BR pool

Foundation Conduits
categories and definitions containme structures containme resistant liner tank
raft
nt nt shell plate
N A to F reactor environmental AB AB / AB / C + AM C + AM E E
conditions
E1 PCC2 Environment AB AB / AB / C + AM C + AM E /
E2 Inspection earthquake AB AB AB AB AB C + AM C + AM E E
E3 Snow and wind / / AB / AB / / / /
E4 Extreme temperatures / / AB / AB / / / /
E5 Water table / / / E / / / / /
E6 Periodical tests and events AB / AB + C AB / C + AM C + AM / /
A1 Earthquake RB RB RB RB RB C C E AM
A2 Aircraft crash / / RB RB RB / / / /
A3 Explosions / fires / / RB / RB / / / /
A4 RTHE / projectiles RB RB Local RB / / C RM / /
A5 PCC3/4 and RRC-A Environment RB RB / / / C C E /
A6 RRC-B Environment RB RB C RB / C C / /
A7 2A – LOCA breakage RB RB / RB / C C / /
A8 LOCA cumulation + Earthquake RB RB / RB / C C / /
Key: characterisation of the expected function of the systems after application of the permanent, variable or accident loads
A: service capability C: containment E: leaktightness R: resistance
(Suffix B: concrete wall – Suffix M: metallic structure)
SUB-CHAPTER: C.5 CHAPTER : C.5.0
FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY OVERVIEW
TABLE :2 PAGE : 1/1
TAB 2:
CHARACTERISATION TABLE FOR SAFETY REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO THE DESIGN OF BUILDINGS FOR THE NUCLEAR ISLAND EXCLUDING BR
Situations : Bunker : BK 2 other BAN / Pumping BAS RIS BAS rooms Diesel Drainable Non-
categories and definitions and 2 BAS BAS BTEStruct. station [SIS] rooms CHRS generato compartments drainable
divisions divisions Ext r building comp.
structures
N A to F reactor environmental AB AB AB AB / / AB E E
conditions
E1 PCC2 Environment AB AB AB / AB / / E E
E2 Inspection earthquake AB AB AB AB AB AB AB E E
E3 Snow and wind / AB AB AB / / AB / /
E4 Extreme temperatures / AB AB AB / / AB / /
E5 Water table / / AB AB / / AB / /
A1 Earthquake RB RB RB / E* RB RB RB RB E E
A2 Aircraft crash / / / RB * RB * RB * / / /
A3 Explosions / fires / RB RB RB / / RB / /
A4 RTHE / projectiles / / / / / / / / /
A5 PCC3/4 and RRC-A Environment RB / C* RB / C* E* / RB / C* / / / E
A6 RRC-B Environment / / / / / RB / C* / / /
Key: characterisation of the expected function of the systems after application of the permanent, variable or accident actions
A: service capability C: containment (* with ventilation) (** radiological consequences limitation) E: leaktightness (* per retention tank) R: resistance (* partial)
(Suffix B: concrete wall – Suffix M: metallic structure)

SUB-CHAP : C.5
FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY OVERVIEW CHAPTER : C.5.0
UK-EPR VOLUME 2: DESIGN AND SAFETY TABLE :3
PAGE :1/1
TAB 3: TABLE OF LOADING COMBINATIONS

SUB-CHAP : C.5
UK-EPR VOLUME 2: DESIGN AND SAFETY TABLE :4
PAGE :1/1
TAB 4: ETC-C SUMMARY
Section 1: Design
- Actions and action combinations
- Concrete structures
- Metallic parts contributing to leaktightness
- Steelwork Lining of pools
- Steel structures
- Anchoring of mounting panels
- Appendices: seismic analysis, removal and creep, simplified procedure for military
aircraft impact, perforation form.
Section 2: Production
- Soil, concrete, surfaces and reinforcements, tendons for reinforced concrete,
prestressing
- Penetrations, liner and pool linings, pre-manufacturing, metallic structures,
- Tolerances
Section 3: Instrumentation and tests

- Leak tightness tests
- Instrumentation and resistance tests

SUB-CHAPTER : 3.5
FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY OVERVIEW CHAPTER : 3.5.0
UK-EPR VOLUME 2: DESIGN AND SAFETY FIGURE :1
PAGE :1/1
FIG 1: CHARACTERISTIC CURVES OF SEISMIC SPECTRA

SUB-CHAP : C.5
UK-EPR VOLUME 2: DESIGN AND SAFETY FIGURE :2&3
PAGE :1/1
FIG 2: MILITARY AIRCRAFT LOADING DIAGRAM
120
Force (MN)
110
100
C2
90
80
70
60 C1
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Time (ms)
FIG 3: WAVE OVERPRESSURE LOADING DIAGRAM
Surpression (kPa)
20
10
0 100 200 300 400 500

Temps (ms)
SUB-CHAPTER : C.5
UK-EPR VOLUME 2: DESIGN AND SAFETY FIGURE :4
PAGE :1/1
FIG 4: CHARACTERISTIC CURVES FOR INTERNAL CONTAINMENT LOADS

Loads under pressure
MPa
0,65
0,6 0,55
0,4
0,20
0,2
0
0 12 24 36 48 h
Final
SA
S load d design pressure
A : Beyon
Beyond
Accident
S load
A : Design pressure
°C
200
170 °C = SA : Temperature
150
100 °C
100
50
0 20 40 h
Concrete
oncrete temperature
Concrete
C SA Temperature
SLiner temperature
teel liner SA Temperature

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SUB-CHAPTER : C.

SUB-CHAPTER C.5 DESIGN OF CATEGORY 1 CIVIL

0. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND DESIGN BASIS FOR

0.2. CIVIL STRUCTURES CONCERNED

0.2.1. THE REACTOR BUILDING (BR)

The Reactor Building is made up of a double-walled containment and features:

0.2.2. THE FUEL BUILDING (BK)

The Fuel Building is divided into three distinct parts as follows:

o A lower section consisting of two divisions each of which contains a fully

0.2.3. THE SAFEGUARD BUILDING (BAS)

o divisions 2 and 3 are protected against certain externally-generated hazards by an

0.2.4. THE NUCLEAR AUXILIARY BUILDING (BAN),

The Nuclear Auxiliaries Building is seated on its own foundation raft.

0.2.5. STRUCTURES COMMON TO ALL BUILDINGS WITHIN THE NUCLEAR

0.2.6. THE EFFLUENT TREATMENT BUILDING (BTE)

0.2.7. THE DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING (BD)

0.2.8. THE PUMPING STATION (SP)

0.2.9. THE NUCLEAR TUNNELS (GN) AND ASSOCIATED STRUCTURES

0.3. DESIGN PROCEDURE AND ASSUMPTIONS

o reference operating conditions (PCC1 to PCC4),

Details of the load cases design conditions are given below.

0.3.1. REFERENCE OPERATING CONDITIONS

o a design plant service lifetime of 60 years,

o conditions (temperature, pressure, irradiation) representative of the transients liable

0.3.2. OPERATING CONDITIONS WITH MULTIPLE FAILURES (RRC-A) AND

0.3.3. INTERNAL HAZARDS,

- High-energy pipe breaks,

0.3.5. INCLUSION OF MARGINS

0.4. DESIGN OF THE STRUCTURES AND INCLUSION OF SAFETY

0.4.1. INTEGRATION OF THE EPR SAFETY REQUIREMENTS IN THE DESIGN OF

0.4.1.1. Normal situations

0.4.1.2. Exceptional situations

• with regard to external environmental conditions, the following are included:

0.4.1.3. Accident situations

• the maximum allowable inner containment leak rate,

• the maximum allowable outer containment leak rate,

• the performance required form the EDE [AVS] system,

0.4.1.4. Functional requirements on structures after application of loading

• AB : serviceability of concrete walls. The application of stresses resulting from a

• RB : capacity of the concrete wall to withstand the applied loading. Permanent

• C : capacity to contain radioactive materials. This requirement mainly applies to the

• AM : serviceability of metal structures, including their integrity. Avoidance of tearing is

• RM : structural capacity of penetrations in accident situations. Permanent deformation

Subsidiary functional requirements are defined for some structures as follows:

• C* : the degree of containment to be ensured must include adequate working of

• C** : the degree of containment must be specified in conjunction with radiological

0.4.2. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO THE DESIGN OF THE

The double-walled containment must be designed to ensure the containment of radioactive

• allow access and egress of personnel and equipment in normal operation,

• be capable of undergoing acceptance and periodic tests.

- Outer containment. The outer containment design is focussed on its capacity to

0.4.3. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO THE OTHER NUCLEAR ISLAND

o their resistance and ability to ensure containment (R/C** symbol) which is in

0.4.4. ASSOCIATED BEHAVIOURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CIVIL

The behaviour requirements may be expressed in terms of:

- the limits on permitted reversible or irreversible deformations, for example locally to

- the limits on permitted displacements, for example limits on geometrical changes or

- maintaining the containment function. This is applicable in situations when it is not