Margaret Farley - Just Love - A Framework For Christian Sexual Ethics (2008)

ß L O O M S ß U R Y
JUST
LOVE
This p a g e intentionally left blan k
JUST
LOVE
A Fram ework for
Christian Sexual Ethics
M argaret A. Farley
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c o n tin u u m
C o n tin u u m In tern a tio n a l P u b lish in g G ro u p
80 Maiden Lane, Suite 704, New York NY 10038
The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SEI 7NX
www.continuumbooks.com
© 2006 by Margaret A. Farley
First published 2006

Papcrback edition first published 2008
Reprinted 2011, 2012
The Scripture quotations contained herein are from the New Revised Standard
Version Bible, copyright © 1989 by the Division of Christian Education of the
National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., and are used by
permission. All rights reserved.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the written permission of the
publishers.
Printed and bound in the United States of America
Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library' of Congress.
ISBN: 978-0-8264-2924-7 (PB}

For Patricia a n d R obert H am m ell,
lo h n an d E lizabeth Farley, M ary Farley Valenti,
a n d th eir ch erish ed children an d grandchildren

CONTENTS
P R E F A C E ........................................................................................................... xi
1. O P EN IN G T H E Q U E S T IO N S ............................................................. 1
Finding th e Way 2
Why Wc Arc Here, 3 · New Maps, 8 · Problems with the
Terrain, 12
T he Task 15
2. T H E Q U EST IO N S AND T H E IR PA ST........................................17
Sex, M orality, a n d History: T heories o f Interpretation 18

Michel Foucault: The Historical Constitution of Desire, 18 ·
Catherine MacKinnon: Historical Silences/Gendered Violence,
22 · Evolutionary Histories: Sexuality and Change, 23
Sexual Ethics in th e West: H istorical Perspective 26

Sexuality in Antiquity: The Legacy of Grcecc and Rome, 27
• Judaism: Sexuality, Morality, and Religion, 34 · Christian
Traditions, 37 · Secular Paths: Philosophical Developments,
Medical Influences, 50
From th e Past to th e Present 56
3. D IFFIC U L T CROSSINGS: Diverse T r a d itio n s ...................... 57
Cross-C ultural Perspectives: Im p ortan ce fo r Sexual Ethics 58

Possibilities of Cross-Cultural and Interrcligious Awareness, 58
• Obstacles to the Search for Alternative Perspectives, 59
C olonialist R esearch a n d Its P ostcolonial Critics 63

The Lessons of “Orientalism," 64 · Lessons for Sexual Ethics,
65
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vin TUST LOVE
P re-m odern Islands o f th e South Seas 70

A frican C u ltures 77
Sexuality and Community, 79 · Gender, Marriage, and
Family, 80 · New Interpreters and Critics: Sustainable African
Sexualities, 82
K am asu tra: Hindu T extbook on Erotic L ov e 90
T he W orld o f Islam , 95
Diversity U nlim itedI 103
4. SEXU A LITY AND ITS M E A N IN G S .............................................. 1 0 9
H ow the B ody M atters 110

Theories of the Body, 1 1 1 · Transcendent Embodiment, 116
W hether G en d er M atters 133

Gender Theory and Practice, 137 · Christian Theologies, 138
• Biology, Culture, and Experience, 144 · Biology, Culture, and
More Experience, 149 · Whether Gender Matters, 156
Sexuality an d Its M eanings 159

Elements in Sexual Experience, 161 · Love, Desire, and
Sexuality, 164
5. JU ST LOVE AND JU ST SEX:

Prelim inary C onsiderations................................................................ 174
Sexuality an d Ju stice 175

A lternative Fram ew orks 178
Sources fo r Christian Sexual Ethics 182

Scripturc, 183 · Tradition, 186 · Secular Disciplines of
Knowledge, 188 · Contemporary Expcricncc, 190
Love a n d fu st Love 196

Moral Norms for a Just Love, 200 · Love and Freedom, 204 ·
Desire, 205
Contents ix
6. FRAM EW O RK FO R A SEXUAL E T H IC : Just S e x ............... 2 0 7
Justice 208
The Concrete Reality of Persons, 209 · Obligating Features of
Pcrsonhood, 211
N orm s f o r fu st Sex 215

1. Do No Unjust Harm, 216 · 2. Free Consent, 218 ·
3. Mutuality, 220 · 4. Equality, 223 · 5. Commitment,
223 · 6. Fruitfulness, 226 · 7. Social Justice, 228
S pecial Q uestion s 232

An Ethic Only for Adults? 232 · Sexual Relations with Oneself,
235 · The Negative Potential of Sex, 237
Character, Faith, an d Sexual Ju stice 240
7. PATTERNS O F RELATIONSHIP:
C ontexts for Ju st L o v e .........................................................................2 4 5
M arriage a n d Fam ily 245

Historical and Cultural Contexts, 247 · Christianity and Its
Influences, 252 · Descriptive and Normative Questions, 259
S am e-S ex R elationships 271

Theological and Ethical Sources, 272 · Samc-Scx Relationships
and Justice, 288 · Sexual Orientation: Given or Chosen, 294
D ivorce a n d R em arriage 296

The Marriage Commitment: Making, Keeping, Changing, 301
• Divorce, 304 · Remarriage, 307
IN D EX 313
PREFACE
I never intended or planned to write a book on sexual ethics. W hen

I began teaching, I did not plan to teach a course in sexual ethics.
Agendas in ethics, however, are seldom set by ethicists; they are set
by the questions that arise n ot only am ong students but in the wider
society. I developed the notions of "ju st love" and "ju st sex" long
ago in response to these questions. But the fuller considerations and
proposals th a t constitute this book were forged through m any years
of listening, teaching, counseling, studying, and pondering. W hat I
have taught h as been shaped by w hat I have co-learned; w hat I have
lectured on in m any contexts has been influenced by interchanges
w ith diverse groups; w hat I have previously w ritten has gained from
the m any people w ho have shared w ith m e not only their questions
but their experiences, insights, and concerns.
All along I have been struck by the urgency of contem porary issues
in sexual eth ics, n ot in spite of but along with the m any other
urgent eth ical issues that demand our attention today. W hat hap
pens in the sexual sphere of hum an life is n ot isolated from what
happens in other spheres— w hether fam ilial, religious, social, polit
ical, or econom ic. T h e possibilities for hum an flourishing in general
are nurtured or hindered by th e ways in w hich we live our sexual
lives. Everyone is aware of n ot only the fulfillm ent and joy promised
through hum an sexuality, but the harm , violence, and stigm a that
u njust actions, relationships, and attitudes bring to our sexual selves.
Perhaps never before have words of healing and hope been so needed,
especially from the churches. T h is book offers a challenge in this re
gard, even as it attem pts to provide ways of thinking about sex and
sexuality th a t will be useful for individuals and social institutions.
Although th e aim of this book is ultim ately m ore practical
than theoretical, I have tried to show that genuine knowledge and
XI
Xll TUST LOVE
understanding, discernm ent and deliberation, arc essential for sort

ing out our choices in regard to sex. In a search for insights into our
questions of today, I look to th e past of W estern culture as well as
to cultures other than Western. I try to probe the m any meanings
of em bodim ent, gender, and sexuality. I attem pt also to explore the
m eanings of love and desire, in an effort to dem onstrate the rela
tionship between love, sex, and justice. In addition, I consider w hat
sorts of person we w ant and need to be in order to love justly. I argue
that th e key to w hat and how we should love — in the sexual sphere
as in any other sphere of hum an life — lies in the ju stice of our
loves, our desires, and our actions. T h e search for wisdom about sex
and sexuality is com plex; this book aim s n ot to simplify the search
but to open new possibilities. W hat I propose is a framework for
C hristian sexual ethics. However, I have attem pted not only to in
corporate m ajor C hristian beliefs and concerns, but also to render the
framework intelligible and persuasive as part of a more general sexual
ethics. In doing so, I have n ot avoided the issues raised by historical
and cross-cultural approaches. M y collaboration in recent years with
African w om en theologians responding to th e A ID S pandemic has
reinforced m y conviction that the questions of sexual ethics are to
som e extent com m on to people, despite the boundaries of tim e and
space. N onetheless, I have taken seriously the role of social and cul
tural con stru ction in all of our understandings of body, gender, and
sexuality.
T h e com plexity of th e issues to be addressed may appear as an ob
stacle to som e readers. It is possible, however, after th e introductory
m aterial in chapter 1 to go straight to the proposals for a framework
for sexual eth ics in chapter 6. Should anyone choose this route, I
hope it will generate enough interest for them to look back, then,
to chapters 4 and 5. For those who w ant m ore specific answers to
questions about patterns of sexual relationships, it m ay be useful to
begin with chapter 7. T h e book proceeds from one step to another,
across tim e and across cultures (chapters 2 and 3), m aking each step
in each chapter significant in understanding the whole. Nonetheless,
it is possible to begin in m ore than one place.
It is also possible to read this book and to ignore its multiple
notes. Insofar as notes arc a distraction, attending to them should
Preface xi 1 1
be avoided. T h e text should stand on its own — w ith appropriate

attributions, of course. I have, however, included m any notes som e
tim es as a way to elaborate on m ore technical points, and som etim es
as a way to provide extensive bibliographical resources for those who
w ant to pursue particular questions in greater detail. T h e search for
insights on troubling and intriguing questions belongs to us all.
In addition to the m any students, colleagues, and other con
versation partners who have made this book possible, I w ant to
acknowledge m y gratitude, in particular, to: Leslie Griffin — who first
proposed my writing such a book; M arie Fortune, w hose invitation
to m e to speak at a regional gathering of her denom ination in the
m id -1970s provided the first occasion for my working out in broad
strokes the fram ew ork that is detailed here; M ary Rose D'Angelo,
G ilm ary Bauer, Letty M . Russell, David Hollenbach, Francine Carđ-
m an, Alice Kearney, C hristiana Peppard, and Jennifer Seaich, whose
responses to specific chapters provided m e w ith invaluable challenges
and suggestions; m y fam ily m em bers, friends, and co-workers who
supported m e in countless ways through the long process of writing
this book. I am grateful to my editor, Frank Oveis, whose advice and
sustained pressure made m e finally put m ost other things aside and
finish the book; and to Justus George Lawler, m y longtim e editor,
whose careful reading of the text helped to m ake it m ore readable
for others.
C hapter 1
OPENING THE QUESTIONS
i s n o t h i n g n e w about questioning the m eaning of
T
h ere
hum an sexuality or the criteria for its incorporation into a

m oral view o f hum an life. Plato responded to h is tim es by explor
ing the relation of sex to love and the possibilities o f hom osexual as
well as heterosexual relationships. T h e Stoics put forth argum ents for
the tam ing o f sex in a context of hum an reproduction. St. Augustine
analyzed the m ixed m otivations that he thought characterized even
m arital sex. M artin Luther defied a view of sexual desire that made
celibacy, rather than a settled com m itm ent to spouse and family, the
generally better option for C hristians. Sigmund Freud radically chal
lenged a w hole culture's interpretation of sex and its place in the
psychological development of the individual.
T h ere m ay be nothing new about questioning h um an sexuality,
assessing its psychological and social significance, defending or de
fying judgm ents of its m oral possibilities. Yet th e questioning that
goes on today is decidedly different from m ost of w hat has preceded
it in the history of W estern culture. As studies of sex proliferated in
the latter h a lf of the tw entieth century and continue into the twenty-
first, all sorts of perspectives have emerged. W ith m any of these we
seem far removed from the lyrical explorations of Plato's Sym posium ,
or from the calm arguments of Seneca and M arcus Aurelius, or for
that m atter from the strong polem ics of Augustine or Luther. Even
the m etapsychology and clinical theory of Freud's T h ree Essays on
the T h eory o f Sexuality are now quite distant from our view. Today
the mood of questioning is at once contentious and indifferent, de
fiant and tentative. Advocates of tradition clash w ith advocates of
modern enlightenm ent on sex, and each of these is countered by
1
2 TUST LOVE
postm odern voices that rcjcct any point of view that claim s objectiv
ity and a stable set of rules. T h e heat of the conflict between "right"
and "left" frequently becom es lukewarm because it is tempered by a
radical skepticism th at undercuts both traditional and nontraditional
m ethods in a search for new insights. All of this presents us w ith a
situation regarding sexual choices that is different indeed from the
situations of th e past.
Finding th e Way
T h e history o f ethical standards for sexual behavior in W estern soci

eties is largely a history of unambiguous rules or at least ideals. There
have, of course, been theoretical disagreements about sexual mores in
the past, and history is replete with discrepancies between societally
recognized rules and general practice. At different tim es and places
societies have varied in their form ulations of ethical norm s for sexual
relationships and activities. Moreover, cultural and class differences
w ithin societies have frequently been reflected in significantly varied
sexual norm s and practice. Yet overall, clarity and apparent continu
ity have m arked th e development and understanding of m any of the
guidelines governing our sexual lives.
Today, however, in W estern culture (and others as well) nearly
every traditional m oral rule for sexual behavior is under som e kind
of challenge. Longstanding positive obligations as well as negative
prohibitions have becom e problem atic enough for governm ents to
debate legal changes and for religious traditions to struggle with
increasingly controversial beliefs and rules. New freedoms arc cele
brated, and new fears arise. T h e problem is m ore than traditionalism
versus radical change. T h e shaking of th e foundations of sexual
m ores has brought not only conflict and not only the repudiation
of past sexual rules. Tt has also brought confusion and a genuine
concern for m oral wisdom about truly troubling hum an issues. C on
victions long taken for granted have grown into questions. T h ese
range from how the h um an race should responsibly reproduce itself,
to how we ca n elim inate destructive elem ents in sexual relation
ships; from how to integrate sexuality into the whole of hum an
life, to how w c may ensure the healthy psychoscxual development
Opening th e Q uestions 3
of children. W c arc concerned as never before about the conse

quences of sexual violence, the proliferation of sex industries, sexual
harassm ent and gender dom ination, the breakdown in com m itted
relationships, and an apparent widespread powerlessness in a search
for intimacy. Although som e individuals and groups seem certain of
the answers to these questions and the remedy for these concerns,
m any are not.
M ultiple factors help to explain the sea changes in contemporary
attitudes toward previously assumed sexual norm s (standards, rules
and principles, ethical guidelines). It w ill n ot do to lay all blam e at
the feet of so-called liberalism and its supposed offspring of m ate
rialism and hedonism , or for anyone to claim all praise for sexual
revolutionary m ovem ents as if they had no parentage and no per
plexities of th eir own. Threaded through th e m assive econom ic,
political, and social shifts in twentieth- and twenty-first-century cul
ture has been access to new knowledge and practical possibilities
that have specifically influenced sexual choice and behavior. W ithout
simplifying these factors too m uch, it is possible to identify repre
sentative developments. We who have becom e used to a torrent of
studies about sex (not only scientific, but philosophical, historical,
psychological,, anthropological, literary) and accustom ed to all sorts
of behaviors and patterns of relationship, tend to take these develop
m ents for granted. We forget how recent m any of th em are and how
com plex as shapers of h um an experience. At the risk of belaboring
the obvious, it is worth reminding ourselves of w hat som e of these
developments are.
Why We A r e H ere
T h ere is, for example, th e quite astonishing (relative to past igno

rances and distortions) increase in scientific knowledge about sexual
response as such and about the hum an reproductive process. W hile
the ovum was discovered as early (or as late, depending on one's
point of view) as 182 8 , little was known u n til the next century about
the physiologically active contribution of the female partner in the
reproductive process. In prior centuries it was possible to sustain an
image of m ale "seed" and female "ground" for reproduction, which
4 TUST LOVE
in turn supported a view of the m ale as essentially active and the

female as passive in reproduction and in sexual relations overall.1
T h e tw entieth and twenty-first centuries have brought new in
form ation n ot only from biology but psychology, anthropology, and
sociology,2 and n ot only regarding m ale/fem ale interaction but many
other m atters as well. In what is som etim es called the new disci
pline of "sexology,"3 m any m ore traditional disciplines com bine to
explore the m eaning and practice of sex, its econom ic and politi
cal im plications, th e causes and consequences of a variety of sexual
behaviors. O n the basis of laboratory and field research, analysis of
psychiatric cases and the am assing of com prehensive data regarding
sexual practices, social scientific research has proliferated. However
disputed som e of the studies have been, they successfully repudi
ated previous pscudoscicntific beliefs in, for example, the danger of
insanity from m asturbation, th e "unnaturalness" of hom osexual ac
tivity in anim als (and therefore in hum ans), the unlim ited fecundity
of w om en throughout their m enstrual cycles, and so forth. N one of
this inform ation by itself could overturn traditional sexual norms,
but it seriously loosened their hold. If, for example, Alfred Kinsey
was right (or anywhere near right) that ninety-five percent of the male
population in the U nited States, and seventy percent of the female
population, engage in autoerotic acts, the evil consequences of m as
turbation ca n hardly include inevitable insanity and disease (as was
1. T h e p re d o m in a n t trad itio n u n til th e n in e te e n th cen tu ry w as based o n A ris

to tle 's "o n e -se e d " theo ry : on ly m a le se m e n produced a n em b ry o , and a fe m a le was
needed o n ly t o p rovide " m a tt e r " in the se n se of blood . T h e r e w ere o th e r th eo ries, how
ever, ev en in a n tiq u ity . S o m e proposed a "tw o -s c c d " theory, in w h ich b o th m ale and
fem ale produced seed th a t m ix ed fo r c o n cep tio n . T h e tw o -seed th eo ry had a t le a st tw o
v ersio n s: so m e m a in ta in e d th a t alth o u g h b o th m a le and fem a le produced seed s, th e
fe m a le seed w a s in fe rio r to th e m a le ; o th e r s h eld to a m o re n e u tra l view . S e e W ay n e A .
M ee k s, T h e O rigins o f C h ristian M orality: T h e First T w o C en tu r ie s (N ew H av en , CT:
Yale U n iv e rsity P re ss , 1 9 9 3 ) , 1 3 9 .
2 . D e sp ite t h e critiq u es o f early stu d ies, it is n o n e th e le ss d ifficu lt to o v erestim ate
th e im p a ct o f th e w o rk of, fo r exam p le, H e n ry H av elo ck E llis, S tu dies in t h e P sychology
o f S ex , 7 vols. (P h ilad elp h ia: F. A . D a v is, 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 2 8 ) ; A lfred C . K in sey e t a l., S exu al
B eh a v io r in th e H u m a n M ale (P h ilad elp h ia: W. B . Sau n d ers, 1 9 4 8 ), and S ex u a l B eh a v io r
in t h e H u m a n F e m a le (P h ilad elp hia: W. B. Sau nd ers, 1 9 5 3 ) ; W illia m H . M a s te rs and
V irginia E. Jo h n s o n , H u m an S ex u a l R es p o n se (B o ston : L ittle , B row n, 1 9 6 6 ).
3 . Sexolog y refers to t h e stu d y of h u m an se x u a l behavior. I t so m e tim e s is broad
en ed fro m p sy ch o lo g ical and p h ysiolog ical ap p roach es to inclu de m a n y o f th e social
scie n ce s a s w ell a s philosophy.
previously thought or at least proclaimed). And insofar as William

M asters and Virginia Johnson accurately recorded th e physiological
responses of both m ales and females, an ideal of m ale activity and
female passivity becom es no longer tenable. Moreover, as the biol
ogy of h um an fertility has grown clearer, claim s for procreation as
the fundam ental m oral justification for all sexual activity have also
becom e m ore and m ore assailable.
C ross-cultural studies have revealed large variations in patterns
of sexual behavior am ong different cultural groups. W hat was con
sidered deviant in W estern society was found to be perm itted and
even socially accepted in other societies. M id-tw entieth-century re
ports, for exam ple, showed th at in forty-nine of seventy-six societies
studied, hom osexual activities of one kind or another were consid
ered norm al for certain m em bers of the com m unity. M asturbation
appeared am ong both sexes in alm ost every society anywhere stud
ied. T h ere w ere no con sisten t norm s for prem arital or extram arital
sex.4 Again, such inform ation did not by itself overturn traditional
Western norm s, but it did tend to relativize in the m inds of m any the
norm s they had previously assumed to be absolute and universally
adhered to by all persons. W ith each passing decade, cross-cultural
studies have contributed to a growing belief in th e social construc
tion of sexual norm s — norm s shaped and conditioned n ot by the
"essentially hum an" but by the forces w ithin a given society.
Historical studies of W estern sexual norm s have also contributed
to the relativization and weakening of these norm s. T h e very dis
closure that sexual prescriptions have a history has revealed the
contingency of their sources and foundations. To see, for example,
that a procreative ethic arose as m uch from Stoic philosophy as from
the Bible has allowed m any C hristians to question its ongoing valid
ity. And it is not only th e history of ideas about sex that has been
im portant in th is regard. It is also the in itial historical excavations of
the m oral attitudes and actual practices of peoples of the past, and an
identification of th e shifting centers of influence on the sexual mores
4. Se e, for e x a m p le , C le lla n S . Ford and F ran k A . B each , P atterns o f S ex u a l B eh a v io r

(N ew York: H a rp e r & Row, 1 9 5 1 ).
6 TUST LOVE
of different tim es and places.s In an effort to m ake sense of present

beliefs, historians have searched for the roots and developments of
these beliefs, and th e result has seldom been a reinforcem ent of the
original rationales.
In addition to developments in theoretical disciplines, the rise in
self-consciousness am ong wom en, especially in th e last three de
cades of the tw entieth century, has been a significant factor in the
loosening of traditional sexual ethical norm s. W om en's new self-
understandings have had an extraordinary effect on the perception
of sexual norm s. Long centuries of the kind of failure of vision that
allowed sexism to flourish in spite of the seemingly best moral in
sights of m ajor religious and philosophical traditions have made
m any w om en doubt th e validity of alm ost all past teachings re
garding the m orality of sex. W om en have recognized firsthand the
irrationality o f sexual taboos whereby, as Freud com m ented in re
gard to beliefs in the defilem ent of m enstruation, pregnancy, and
childbirth, " . . . it m ight alm ost be said that wom en are altogether
taboo."6 Econom ic and social changes have interacted w ith various
form s of consciousness-raising to give wom en new perspectives on
old issues. D ouble standards, oppressive and repressive gendered
social and political patterns, m ale interpretations of female sexual
capacities, m edical and social experts' identification of impossible
ideals and destructive roles — wom en's experiences of all of these
have led m any to a radical questioning of traditional sexual beliefs
and behaviors.
Besides th e wom en's m ovem ent, the rise of th e gay rights m ove
m ent made an enorm ous difference in public perceptions of the
m orality of sexual practices previously considered unacceptable.
5 . Se e, for e x a m p le , th e w ork o f lo h n T . N o o n a n Jr., C o n tra c ep tio n : A H istory o f

its T rea tm en t b y t h e C a th o lic T h eo lo g ia n s a n d C a n o n ists, en larged ed. (C am bridge,
M A : B elk n ap P re ss o f H arvard U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 8 6 ); Jo h n B osw ell, C hristianity , S o
c ia l T oleran ce, a n d H o m o sex u a lity (C h icag o : U n iv e rsity of C h icag o Press, 1 9 8 0 ) ; Joh n
D ’E m ilio and E ste lle B. F reed m an , In tim a te M atters: A H istory o f S ex u a lity in A m er
ic a (N ew York: I la rp e r & Row, 1 9 8 8 ); Jo h n C . Faut, ed ., F orbidden H istory: T h e State,
S ociety, a n d th e R eg u lation o f S ex u ality in M od ern E u ro p e (N ew York: V in tag e B ooks,
1 9 9 2 ); K a th y P ciss and C h ris tin a S im m o n s , ed s. (w ith R obert A. Padgug), P assion a n d
P ow er: S ex u a lity in H istory (P h ilad elp hia: T e m p le U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 8 9 ).
6 . S e e S ig m u n d Freud, " T h e T a b o o o f V irg in ity ( 1 9 1 8 )," T h e C o lle c te d P apers o f
S ig m u n d Freu d, c d . P h ilip R ieff, 8 (N ew York: C o llie r B o o k s, 1 9 6 3 ), 7 5 .
W hat was largely hidden has becom e visible, and the presence of
self-identified gay m en and lesbians in fam ilies, com m unities, places
of work, churches, has m ade possible a strong peripheral support
for what m ight otherwise have been a sm all m ovem ent.7 W hat was
scorned by m any is still scorned by som e, but reluctant public recog
nition of gay rights (from nondiscrim ination rights to the rights of
civil unions and gay marriages) reflects n ot only a new toleration of
alternative views of h um an sexuality, but a shaking of previous con
victions regarding sexual m orality in general. T h e volatility of public
sentim ent over issues surrounding sam c-scx relationships reveals
perhaps b etter th an anything else the depth to w hich foundations
have been jarred.
It is difficult to overestim ate the im portance, for all of these de
velopm ents, o f the technologies resulting from scientific and medical
knowledge. T h e widespread availability of effective contraceptives al
lowed for the first tim e a general practical separation of heterosexual
intercourse from pregnancy D espite failures regarding A ID S, m edi
cal technologies of prevention and treatm ent have also allowed some
reliable separation between sexual activity and infectious disease.
T h e development of reproductive technologies h as given to previ
ously infertile couples, and also to fertile individuals, possibilities of
childbearing heretofore unim aginable. Sexual dysfunctions of many
kinds have becom e treatable, whether through pharm aceutical or
other form s o f therapy.
Interesting as it is to speculate on these and other factors in the
relativization of sexual norm s, by them selves these factors do not
resolve th e questions th at continue to worry us about hum an sex
ual relationships and activities; rather, they set for u s an ethical
task.8 N one of them represents self-evidently negative developments
7 . W h a t I m e a n by th is is th a t m o v em en ts b e co m e pow erful w h en th e y are n o t

d ep end ent o n ly u p on th e co re p articip an ts b u t w h en th ey reso n ate in and are bolstered
by large n u m b e rs o f supportive p erson s.
8 . M y u se o f th e te r m s "m o ra l" and " e th ic a l" m ay need s o m e cla rifica tio n here
and th ro u g h ou t t h e ch a p ters th a t fo llo w I, like m a n y o th e rs, o ften u se th e te r m s in ter
ch angeably, a p ra c tice ju stified by the lack o f c o n s is te n t d ifferen tiatio n betw een them
in c ith e r p h ilo so p h y o r theology. In so fa r a s th e y a rc d ifferen tiated , how ever, "m o ra l"
and " m o ra lity " te n d to be c lo s e r t o th e co n cre te th a n " e t h ic s " o r th e “e th ic a l." "M o ra l"
refers to real a c tio n , ch o ice, ju d g m en t, exp erien ce; "e th ic a l" refers to sy s te m a tic reflec
tio n o n m o ra l a c tio n and ch aracter. H e n ce, " m o r a lity " h as to d o w ith life, and "e th ic s "
8 TUST LOVE
in hum an awareness or in practical options. T h ey have all held an im

portant potential to move u s toward genuine freedom and well-being
in the sexual sphere. It is, after all, a good thing to move beyond fear
and sham e generated by irrational taboos and beyond complacency
built on ignorance. It is even better to gain clarity about patterns
of sexual relationships insofar as they arc harmful and unjust. Still,
these developments have led u s inevitably to further questions. We
need good biology and psychology, useful anthropology, sociology,
econom ic theory and history; we need liberating social movements.
But we need m ore than these. Individuals and societies keep press
ing the questions: W here do we go from here? How will we address
the problems we still have in the sexual sphere? C an we incorporate
our new knowledge and m any new options into the worldviews that
have provided m eaning for the whole of our lives? N o longer able to
count solely on the com pass of traditional insights and norm s, or at
least not on our agreement about them , w hat will anchor us or pro
vide prom ise of m oral wisdom and guidance? T h ese questions have
not been pondered historically only by scientists and em pirical re
searchers. T h ey have been the responsibility of lawmakers and courts
and of com m unities of faith. Each of these, in turn, has depended to
a great exten t, and for better or for worse, on the insights and ar
gum ents of philosophers and theologians. To understand where we
are and why, we need therefore to look at developments in these
disciplines as well.
N ew Maps
Im portant philosophical and theological proposals have emerged in
the last quarter of th e tw entieth century and in th e beginning of
the twenty-first. Ju st as theologies and philosophies of sex have in
the past depended im portantly on the best biology available, so con
temporary revisions have responded to the demands of new biology
and psychology, the advent of new technologies, and the im pact of
is a d iscip lin e th a t tries to u n d erstan d th e m o ra l life. N o n e th e le ss, " e t h ic s " c a n be

equated w ith e ith e r o r b o th "m o ra l p h ilo so p h y " a n d "m o ra l th eo lo g y ," depend ing on
o n e 's so u rces a n d h isto rica l p referen ces. If th ere is a reaso n in a given c o n te x t to dif
fe re n tia te th e s e m e a n in g s explicitly, I do so ; if n o t, th ey m ay be interp reted herein
a s in terch a n g ea b le , w ith th e so m e tim e s vague and n o n cru cia l d ifferen ce I have ju s t
identified.
social m ovem ents. Indeed, there is widespread (if n ot unanimous)

recognition o f the necessity of interdisciplinary approaches. After
World W ir II, W estern philosophers like Jcan-Paul Sartre, Maurice
M erleau-Ponty, and Sim one de Beauvoir, attem pted to construct new
m eanings for hum an sexuality n ot only in the light of new scientific
data but of new philosophical theories of freedom and interpersonal
love.9 T h e w ork of M ichel Foucault m ay be as yet unsurpassed in
influence on questions of sex and sexual desire.10 Key studies by
analytic philosophers have also appeared on issues such as gen
der, marriage, family, homosexuality, and pornography.11 Fem inist
philosophers, in particular, have produced groundbreaking work not
only on questions of sexual behavior, but on the large philosoph
ical questions of hum an em bodim ent, gender identity, the nature
of sexual desire, justice in fam ilial relationships, modes of hum an
parenting.12
Theology, too, has offered im portant insights regarding human
sexuality and behavior. Som e of this work in N orth Am erica began
am ong C h ristian theologians in th e 19 6 0 s with the Rom an C atholic
9 . S e e Je a n -P a u l Sartre, B ein g a n d N oth in g n ess: A n E ssay o n P h en o m en o lo g ic a l

O ntology, tra n s. H azel E. B arn es (Lond on: M eth u en , 1 9 5 8 }; M au rice M erleau-Ponty,
T h e P h e n o m e n o io g y o f P ercep tion , tra n s. C o lin S m ith (N ew York: H u m a n itie s Press,
1 9 6 7 ); S im o n e d e Beauvoir, T h e S e c o n d S ex , tra n s. H. M . P arshley (N ew York: A lfred A.
Knopf, 1 9 7 1 ).
10. M ich el F ou cau lt, T h e H istory o f Sexu ality, tra n s. R obert H urley, 3 v o ls. vol. 1:
An In trod u ctio n (N ew Y ork: P an th eo n B o o k s, 1 9 7 8 ); v o l. 2 : T h e U se o f P leasu re (Newr
York: V intage B o o k s, 1 9 9 0 ); v o l. 3 : T h e C a re o f t h e S e lf (N ew York: V intage B ooks,
1 9 8 8 ). I sa y th is d esp ite th e serio u s critiq u e s th a t have b e e n m ad e of F o u ca u lt's w ork
in th is regard.
11. Se e, fo r e xa m p le, R obert B a k e r and F red erick E llisto n , ed s., P h ilo so p h y a n d S ex
(B u ffalo: P ro m e th e u s B o o k s, 1 9 7 5 ); A lan Sohle, ed ., T h e P h ilo so p h y o f S ex , 2d ed. (Sav
age, M D : L ittle fie ld A dam s Q u a lity Papcrbacks, 1 9 9 1 ). S e e a lso th e h isto rica l w o rk of
Jeffrey W eeks, S ex u a lity a n d Its D iscon ten ts: M ean in gs. M yths, a n d M o d e m S exu alities
(Lond on: R ou tled g e & K egan Paul, 1 9 8 5 ).
12. Se e, fo r e xam p le, A liso n M . Jaggar and S u san R . Bord o, ed s., G e n
d er/B od y /K n o w led g e: F em in ist R eco n stru ctio n s o f B ein g a n d K n ow in g (N ew B ru n sw ick ,
N J: R utgers U n iv e r sity P ress, 1 9 8 9 ); lu d ith B utler, B od ies T h at M atter: O n t h e D iscur
siv e L im its o f ‘S e x ' (N ew York: R outledge, 1 9 9 3 ); S u sa n M o lle r O k in , Ju stice, G ender,
a n d t h e F am ily (N ew York: B a sic B o o k s, 1 9 8 9 ); S ara Ruddick, M atern a l T h in kin g : T o
w a rd a P olitics o f P ea ce (B o sto n : B eaco n , 1 9 8 9 ); L uce Irigaray, An E th ics o f S exu al
D ifferen ce, tra n s. C . B urke a n d G . C . G ill (Ith aca, N Y: C o rn e ll U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 9 3 ).
S e e a lso D o m n a C . S ta n to n , ed ., D iscou rses o f S ex u ah ty : From A n sto tle t o AID S (Ann
A rbor: U n iv e rsity o f M ich ig a n P ress, 1 9 9 2 ).
10 TUST LOVE
debate on artificial contraception.13 Soon after, significant publica

tions by A nthony Kosnik and h is colleagues in th e Rom an C atholic
tradition, and Jam es Nelson in the Protestant traditions, marked
the start of a whole new era for C hristian sexual e th ics.14 T h e con
tributions of C harles Curran, André Guindon, Philip Keane, Giles
M ilhaven, Lisa Sowie C ahill, Beverly W ildling H arrison, C arter Hey
ward, C hristin e Gudorf, and m any others have been invaluable in
the search for sexual understanding w ithin C hristian co m m u n ities.15
Biblical scholars have joined w ith theologians in attem pting to in
terpret th e tradition. Phyllis Trible, M ary Rose D'Angelo, W illiam
Countrym an, Robin Scroggs, Richard Hays, and D ale M artin, among
others, have provided approaches to exegesis and interpretation im
portant for questions of sexual eth ics.16 Jewish theologians, too, have
provided significant studies on m any of the sam e issues. Writers such
1 3 . Se e, for ex a m p le , C h a rle s E. C u rra n , cd ., C o n tra cep tio n a n d H olin ess: T h e

C a th o lic P red ic a m e n t (N ew Y ork: H erd er & H erder, 1 9 6 4 ); D ie tric h v o n H ildebrand,
T h e E n cy clica l H u m a n a e V itae: A Sign o f C o n tra d ictio n (C h icag o : F ra n cisca n H erald,
1 9 6 9 ).
14. A n th o n y K o sn ik e t a l., H u m an S exu ality: N e w D irection s in A m er ica n C a th olic
T h ou g h t (M ah w ah , N J: P au list, 1 9 7 7 ) ; Tames B . N elso n , E m b o d im e n t: A n A p p r o a ch to
S ex u a lity a n d C h ristia n T h eo lo g y (M in n eap o lis: Augsburg, 1 9 7 8 ).
1 5 . Se e, a s e x a m p le s, C h a rle s E. C u rra n , C o n tem p o ra ry P ro b lem s in M oral T h e
o lo g y (N o tre D a m e , IN : F id es, 1 9 7 0 ) and T en sion s in M oral T h eo lo g y (N otre D a m e ,
IN : U n iv e rsity o f N o tre D a m e Press, 1 9 8 8 ); A nd ré G u in d o n , T h e S ex u a l C reato rs: An
E thical P ro p osal f o r C o n c e r n e d C hristian s (L an h am , M D : U n iv ersity P ress of A m er
ica , 1 9 8 6 ); P h ilip S . K ean e, S e x u a l M orality: A C a th o lic P ersp ectiv e (N ew York: P au list,
1 9 7 7 ); Jo h n G ile s M ilh av e n , "C h ris tia n E valu atio n s o f S e x u al P le a s u re ," in T h e A m er
ic a n S o c iety o f C h ristia n E th ics S e le c te d P apers 1976 , ed. M a x S ta ck h o u se (Sch olars,
1 9 7 6 ); L isa S o w ie C a h ill, Sex, G en d er, a n d C hristian E th ics (C am brid ge: C am brid ge
U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 9 6 ); B everly W ild u n g H arriso n , M akin g th e C o n n e c tio n s : E ssays in
F em in ist S o c ia l E th ics (B o sto n : B eaco n , 1 9 8 5 ); C a r te r Heyw ard, O ur Passion fo r Ju stice
(C leveland : P ilg rim , 1 9 8 4 ); C h ris tin e E. G u d orf, B ody, Sex, a n d P leasu re (C leveland :
P ilg rim , 1 9 9 4 ). T h e s e a u th o rs and w ork s c o n stitu te o n ly a sm a ll sam p lin g o f th e c o u n t
le ss w orks, by t h e individual au th o rs listed above a n d by m an y o th ers, th a t a rc now
available fro m b o th C a th o lic and P ro te sta n t th eo lo g ian s and eth icists.
16. S e e P h y llis T rib le , G o d a n d t h e R h eto ric o f S ex u a lity (P h ilad elp hia: F ortress,
1 9 7 8 ); .Mary R o s e D 'A n g clo , "W o m e n in L u k e-A cts: A R cd actio n al V iew ," lo u r n a l o f
B ib lical L iteratu re 1 0 9 11 9 9 0 ): 1 4 1 - 6 1 ; L. W illia m C o u n try m a n , Dirt, G r e e d , a n d Sex:
S ex u a l E th ics in t h e N e w T esta m en t a n d T h eir Im p lica tio n s fo r T od ay (Philad elp hia:
F ortress, 1 9 8 8 ); R obin Scroggs, T h e N e w T esta m en t a n d H o m o sex u a lity (P h ilad el
phia: F o rtress, 1 9 8 3 ) ; R ich ard H ays, "R e la tio n s N a tu ra l and U n n a tu ra l: A R esp on se to
Jo h n B osw ell's E x e g esis o f R o m a n s 1 ," Jo u rn a l o f R eligiou s E thics 1 4 (1 9 8 6 ), 1 8 4 - 2 1 5 ;
D a le B . M a r tin , "H e te ro se x ism and th e In terp reta tio n o f R om an s 1 :1 8 - 3 2 ," B ib lical
In terp retatio n 3 f 1 9 9 5 ): 3 3 2 - 5 5 .
as Eugene Borowitz, David Feldman, David Novak, Judith Plaskow,

David Biale, and Elliott D orff,17 have critically engaged the questions
of sex and sexuality in ways of im m ense im portance for th e Jewish
com m unity and beyond.
And where have we come? N ot everyone evaluates recent philo
sophical and theological proposals in th e sam e way. Nonetheless,
significant new insights can hardly be ignored, and paths th at lead in
heretofore unseen directions for exploration m ust be taken seriously.
Som e theoretical analyses of th e m eanings of hum an sexuality are
as critical to our understanding as arc th e scientific discoveries that
preceded th em . New philosophical links between sex and freedom,
sex and power, sex and history, gender and ju st about everything else,
are in som e respects so im portant that there can be no turning back
to sim pler ways of interpreting hum an experience.
Theological critiques of anthropological dualism and of an em
phasis on sin and sham e have made possible new perspectives on
sexuality in th e context of beliefs about creation, incarnation, and
eschatology. C ritical biblical exegesis has unsettled previously ac-
ccptcd sexual norm s, and it has shed new light on the place of
sexuality in th e hum an com m unity and in the call of hum an per
sons to God. Critiques of religious traditions have led in som e cases
to creative reconstruction of im portant aspects of traditions. Even
where new theological perspectives on hum an sexuality are greeted
with disagreem ent and controversy, the maps for theological dis
course on m atters of sex have been irrevocably altered. Theology,
like philosophy, has com e along som e ways from w hich there is no
turning back.
H ence, although m ajor questions have been probed, and key di
rections have been charted for a contem porary philosophy, theology,
and ethics of hum an sexuality, w hat we have overall is a work in
17. S e e E ugene B . B orow itz, C h o o s in g a S ex E th ic: A Jew is h In q u iry (N ew York:

S ch o ck e n B o o k s, 1 9 6 9 }; D av id M . F eld m an , M arital R elation s, B irth C on trol, a n d A b or
tion in Je w is h L a w (N ew York: S ch o ck e n B o o k s, 1 9 7 4 ); D av id N ovak, Jew is h S o cial
E thics (N ew Y ork: O xford U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 9 2 ); Ju d ith Plaskow , Standing A gain at
Sinai: Ju d a ism fr o m a F em in ist P ersp ectiv e (San F ran cisco : H arp er & Row, 1 9 9 0 ); David
B ia lc, F.ros a n d t h e Je w s : From B ib lica l Isr a e l to C o n tem p o ra ry A m erica (N ew York:
B a sic B o o k s, 1 9 9 2 ) ; E llio t D o rff, L o v e Your N eig h b o r a s Yourself: A Jew is h A p p r o a ch to
M od ern P erson al E th ics (P h ilad elp hia: Jew ish P u b lica tio n So ciety, 2 0 0 3 )
12 TUST LOVE
progress. O n som e issues dissension still rages in the churches and

synagogues. T h e very nature of other issues (such as the meaning
of h um an sexuality, desire, and em bodim ent, and the structures of
hum an relationships, both personal and public) makes th em peren
nial problem s for each generation to probe. It is therefore more
im portant th an ever to continue explorations, to engage the rel
evant disciplines, and to offer ethical frameworks for evaluating
relationships and activities in the sexual sphere.
P roblem s w ith th e T errain

In addition to the usual difficulties of reflection on com plex hum an
experience, efforts at eth ical analysis in the sexual sphere face par
ticular reasons for skepticism regarding the enterprise as such. First,
past failures h aun t it: if it took so m any centuries to "get it wrong,"
how m any will it take to "get it right"? T h is, of course, presumes
that there is n o wisdom whatsoever retrievable from religious, philo
sophical, and cultural traditions regarding hum an sexuality. It also
presumes th a t there can really be "nothing new under the su n ," no
new insight th a t is trustworthy at all, not even for a specific tim e and
place. O n th e face of it, this seem s an exaggerated rejection of both
the past and th e present. Even if the "last word" can never be in, the
increm ental gains of retrieval and reconstruction may be worth the
effort. W hether they are judged so or not m ay depend on how urgent
we perceive our questions to be. Insofar as we continue to harm and
to hurt one another in our sexual lives, or fail to affirm the potential
of one another; insofar as we hold ourselves in any way responsible
for future generations; insofar as fear and confusion still qualify our
sexual choices; insofar as we do n ot understand one another in these
choices and cannot agree on either our own or those of others; insofar
as our yearnings for pleasure or happiness or fulfillm ent seem unnec
essarily hindered; insofar as any and all of these situations appear to
u s to be real, the questions of sexuality rem ain to be probed — no
m atter w hat form of skepticism m ight be otherwise appealing.
T h ere is, however, another reason for skepticism th at gives us cau
tion. In W estern culture, at least since its C hristian form ation, there
has been a perduring tendency to give too m uch im portance to the
m orality of sex. T h e sexual has threatened to take over the moral
focus of w hole generations of persons. Everything about the "sexual"

is considered "m oral" or "im m oral," and "m orality" is alm ost re
duced to "sexual m orality." All of this is to the detrim ent of concerns
about econom ic injustice, th e oppression of whole peoples, political
dishonesty, even theft and th e talcing of life. Ironically, m uch of what
constitutes th e sexual sphere may n ot be a m atter of m orality at all,
or only indirectly so. Relationships— w ith others, ourselves, God —
always have m oral elem ents; but the sex or lack of sex in them may
be of less genuine m oral significance than are elem ents such as re
spect, trust, honesty, fairness, and faithfulness. Still, we do frequently
harm or betray ourselves and one another precisely as sexual human
beings. D espite th e risk, then, of escalating th e m oral significance of
sex, the need for a sexual ethic cannot be com pletely dismissed.
T h e other side of the tendency to equate m orality w ith sex is the
tendency to see the sexual sphere as isolated from the rest of hum an
life. H ence, w hile on the one hand we have given too m uch emphasis
to sexual m orality; on th e other, we m ay now give too little. Skepti
cism of this sort takes the form of a com plaint that sexual ethics is,
after all, a m in or enterprise, frivolous or obsessive, and a diversion
from the tru ly urgent m oral concerns of racism , hunger, hom eless-
ncss, poverty, and war. W hile there may be som e truth to this claim,
it nonetheless m isses the connections between social structure and
sexual relations, between political struggles and gender bias, between
sexual sanctions and social policies. Fem inists have n ot always m et
with com prehension w hen they have insisted that the "personal is
political"; but especially in the sexual ethical sphere th e private is as
likely to be institutionally determined as it is personally discerned.
In a ccntury th a t has seen rape as a part of m ilitary strategy, poverty
as the result o f lack of reproductive choice, industries based on the
econom ic exploitation of sex, race joined w ith gender and class to
determ ine th e em ploym ent options of groups, the development of a
sexual ethic cannot be a trivial concern.
A last, but twofold, source of skepticism com es from the wide
range of experience that is included in our understanding of the "sex
ual sphere," and from our growing contem porary doubts that moral
norm s will m ake any positive difference in our sexual lives. Here
14 TUST LOVE
questions abound. T h e very idea of ethical standards for sexual re

lationships and activities im plies that there is a way to generalize
about them . B u t is there? Even apart from considerations of cultural
differences, is it possible to develop an eth ic that is useful for our
sexual lives? Take only the experience of rom antic love, shaping and
shaped by sexual desire. How m any form s docs it take? A rc there
really m oral criteria that will apply to relationships of painfully unre
quited love as well as to relationships where passion grows gracefully
into m ature and m utual love in a shared and settled life? W ill eth
ical norm s determ ine w hether loves will find fulfillm ent? W hether
unfulfilled loves will prove tragic, or simply sad, or fortunate losses
along a better way? A rc eth ical principles and m oral rules the solution
to impossible loves, the roadmap to possible and beautiful relation
ships? C an eth ical norm s prevent our being harm ed or our lives from
being disrupted? C an m oral rules help us to navigate the fragile ways
of intim acy?
Arc there eth ical perspectives that can comprehend both erotic
love in rom antic relationships and passionate desire for sex w ithout
relationship? W hat about relationships that are n either rom antic or
passionate? C a n m oral boundaries be the sam e when love has en
dured a long tim e (or becom e em bittered along the way), and when
love is new, u ncertain, filled w ith power and danger? Arc ethical
norm s more plausible w hen sex and love are institutionally regulated
by structures of marriage and family, and by professional boundaries,
categories of age, self-sustaining traditions, self-contained cultures?
In other words, can enough be said about the hum an experience of
sex to generate universal, or even local, guidelines for its practice?
W hat can the experience of m oral obligation do for sexual experience
that will be protective or liberating? W hen sex fits peacefully into
the order of life, does it need ethical norm s? W hen sex is disruptive,
contradicting the order of our life, will ethical norm s help? Is the
problem with sexual ethical norm s merely the problem of abiding by
them , or does it include a prior problem of discerning th em at all?
No one would argue that ethical standards can determ ine or re
solve or even illum inate all of th e possibilities and problems of sex.
Few persons today are likely to insist that m oral rules always have
good effects on our sexual and relational lives. Yet it is difficult to
conclude finally that our sexual lives should n ot be informed and

governed by eth ical guidelines and m oral wisdom. However disparate
our sexual experiences, however diverse the contexts for our sexual
desire, however indifferent to ethical standards our sexuality may
seem , we do s till m ake judgments of right or wrong, experience moral
claim s in response to these judgments, and assum e som e freedom of
choice in the face of m oral claim s. All of this m ay prove illusory, a
m istake, a hold-over from longstanding but no longer credible taboos.
Yet we do experience genuine ethical confusion, seek m oral guidance,
and experience m oral outrage in relation to som e sexual activities,
som e sexual relationships. W hatever our intellectual theories about
sex and m orality, m oral questions do emerge at the heart of our sex
ual lives. H ence, skeptical or not, efforts to develop or at least refine
a sexual eth ic are inevitable.
T h e T ask
It is clear by now that the development of an adequate contem po
rary sexual eth ic requires paying attention to a num ber of related
explorations. C ross-cultural situations m ust be taken into account;
historical perspective m u st be achieved; social analysis needs to
be made of contem porary experience. Moreover, som e m ctacthical
issues (or w hat may be called "large questions") m ust be addressed:
the m eanings of h um an em bodim ent and sexual desire, th e m ean
ings and purposes of "sex" itself, th e relevance of gender, and the
universality o r particularity of any m oral norm s. And since ethical
frameworks do n ot com e out of a m oral vacuum , a sexual ethic will
have to draw o n (if only to repudiate) som e tradition, w hether philo
sophical, theological, cultural; or draw on m any traditions, testing
whatever critical and constructive relationships they can achieve.
Sexual ethics will need to assess hum an actions and possibilities,
asking about discernible contradictions or harm s, looking for pat
terns of relationship that prom ote individual and social well-being.
Beyond th is, it will be im portant to consider n ot only norm s for ac
tions and relationships, but questions of character or virtue as they
relate to our sexual lives. No doubt this already large task can be
expanded to include other useful or even ncccssary endeavors.
16 TUST LOVE
T h is book docs n ot aim to provide a com plete or specifically co m

prehensive sexual ethic. It will n ot address all of the issues crucial to
sexual ethics, nor all of the promising frameworks. It is largely lim
ited to issues facing contem porary W estern culture (though there is
no assum ption that all of these are irrelevant for other cultures). It is
further lim ited to providing a framework for sexual ethics that draws
upon resources im portant to the C hristian tradition, and that aims
primarily, though not solely, to m ake sense w ithin th at tradition.
T h e m ore m odest task of this book, then, includes som e of the
elem ents for a com prehensive sexual ethic. Succeeding chapters aim
to provide an historical perspective for W estern culture (chapter 2),
an exam ination of issues of cross-cultural differences (chapter 3),
and explorations of the m eanings of hum an em bodim ent, gender,
and sexuality (chapter 4). In chapter 5, I address questions th at are
prelim inary to the form ulation of a framework for sexual ethics:
questions of m ethods and sources, alternative frameworks, and the
relation of ju stice to hum an love. Chapter 6 contains my proposal
for a framework for a hum an and C hristian sexual ethics. T h e final
chapter, chapter 7, considers three of w hat m ight be called "patterns
of relationship" that involve our sexuality — because they are impor
tant for our lives, and because they m ay be illum inated w ithin the
framework for sexual ethics I will have proposed.
C hapter 2
THE QUESTIONS
AND THEIR PAST
provides an im portant per-
T
h e h is to r y o f se x u a l e th ic s
spective for understanding current ethical questions regarding
hum an sexuality. Historical overviews of sexual ethics are not w ith
out difficulties, however, as recent critical studies have show n.1W hile
it is possible to find a rccordcd history of laws, codcs, treatises,
serm ons, and other form s of m oral instruction regarding sexual be
havior, it is m u ch m ore difficult — if n ot im possible — to determine
w hat real people actually believed and did in the distant past. Im
portant historical research in th is regard is under way, but it is
still fragm entary and often tentative. Second, ethical theory regard
ing sex (what is to be valued, w hat goals arc worth pursuing, w hat
reasons justify certain sexual attitudes and activities) has been pre
dom inantly theory formulated by an elite group of m en in any given
society. W om en's experience, beliefs, values, are largely unrecorded
and, until recently, alm ost wholly inaccessible. T h e sam e is true for
m en w ho do n o t belong to a dom inant class. Third, w hat we do find
through historical research is necessarily subject to interpretation. It
1. Se e, fo r e xam p le, P eter Brow n, T h e B o d y a n d S ociety : M en . W om en , a n d Sexu al

R en u n cia tio n in E arly C h ristian ity (N ew York: C o lu m b ia U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 8 8 ); M a r
tin D u b e r m a n e t al., ed s., H idden From H istory: R ecla im in g t h e G a y a n d L e sb ia n Past
(N ew York: P en g u in B o o k s, 1 9 8 9 ); S u sa n K. C a h n , “S e x u al H is to rie s, Sexu al P o litics,"
F em in ist S tu dies 1 8 (Fall 1 9 9 2 ): 6 2 9 - 4 7 ; lo h n C . Faut, ed ., F orbidden H istory: T h e
S tate, S ociety, a n d th e R egu lation o f S ex u a lity in M od ern E u ro p e (C h icag o : U n iv ersity
o f C h ica g o Press, 1 9 9 2 ); T h o m a s W. Laqueur, "S e x u a l D esire and th e M ark et E co n o m y
D u rin g th e In d u stria l R ev o lu tio n ," in D iscou rses o f S ex u ah ty : From A n sto tle to AIDS,
cd . D o m n a C . S ta n to n (A nn A rbor: U n iv ersity o f M ich ig a n P ress, 1 9 9 2 ), 1 8 5 - 2 1 5 .
17
18 TUST LOVE
makes a difference, for example, if one is looking for historical eval

uations of h u m an sexual desire or historical silences about sexual
abuse of wom en.
All of these difficulties notwithstanding, it is possible to survey
(with appropriate caution) a history of norm s and theories in W est
ern sexual ethics and to gain thereby som e insight into contemporary
beliefs and questions.2 Before attem pting this, however, we can il
lustrate the difficulties involved, as well as the rich possibilities, by
looking briefly at three interpretive theories, all directed primarily at
historical sources and trends w ithin Western culture and som e of its
subcultures. T h e se theories provide vastly different perspectives not
only on the history of thought about sexuality and its institutional
ized norm s, b u t also on w hat is som etim es referred to as the history
of sexuality.
S ex, M o ra lity , a n d H is to ry :
T h e o r ie s o f I n te r p r e ta tio n
As suggested in chapter 1, no thinker may have been m ore influential

in determ ining current questions about sex and sexual desire than
the French philosopher M ichel Foucault. His study of the history of
sexuality in antiquity yielded ideas th at continue to perm eate much
of the work o f other sexual historians as well as of philosophers and
theologians. Yet his is not th e only form ative study of the past, and
his conclusions have provoked both positive and negative responses.
M ichel F ou cau lt: T h e H isto rica l C on stitu tion o f D esire

Foucault originally planned to write a history of w hat he called "the
experience of sexuality" in m odern Western culture. In the course of
his work, he becam e convinced that w hat was needed was a history of
desire, or of th e desiring subject. At th e heart of this conviction was
the prem ise th a t sexuality is not an abstract, ahistorical constant.
2. W h a t follow s in ih is c h a p te r rep resen ts a n expanded a n d h eavily revised version

o f m y ea rlie r a tte m p t a t h isto rica l overview . S e c M arg aret A. Farley, "S e x u a l E th ic s,"
in E n cy clop eitia o f B io eth ic s, ed. W arren T h o m a s R eich , rev. ed. (N ew York: S im o n &
S c h u ste r M a c m illa n , 1 9 9 5 ), 5 : 2 3 6 3 - 7 5 .
T he Q uestions a n d T heir Past 19
M ore radically, neither is sex a concrete natural given, a biological ref

erent that sim ply expresses itself in different experiences of sexuality,
molded historically by changes in m oral attitudes and norm s. W ith
these prem ises, Foucault was turning upside down m any traditional
theories of sex and sexual desire. Sex in his view is not som ething "in
itself/' reducible to a bodily m inim um of organ, in stinct, and goal,3
whose m ysterious m eaning needs to be exam ined and whose relent
less "drive" needs to be controlled. T o understand sexual desire, it
is necessary to understand (in this order) power, sexuality, and, then
only, sex. For power shapes the experience of sexuality, and sexuality
constitutes and structures sex. In other words, "sex" and "sexuality"
arc historical social constructs, dependent on a particular configura
tion of power in a specific historical context. Hence, any insight into
sex m ust com e out of historical study.4
Underlying Foucault's view of sex, then, is a theory of human
forces or power. Power as such, for Foucault, is diffused through a
field of m ultiple "force relations im m anent in the sphere in w hich
they operate."5 T h u s religious, political, m edical, psychological forces
have been at work at various tim es in the past both in the form of
"procedures. . . to make u s detest the body" and "ru se s. . . to make
us love se x ";6, in short, m echanism s to discipline sexuality but also
3 . M ich el F o u cau lt, T h e H istory o f S exu ality, vol. \ ,A n In trod u ctio n , tra n s . R obert
H u rley (N ew Y ork: P an th eo n B o o k s, 1 9 7 8 ), 1 5 1 - 5 2 . F o u cau lt's c o n v ictio n s regarding
th e role o f d isco u rse in th e so cial c o n stru c tio n o f "re a litie s " a rc recog nizably in lin e
w ith o th e r p o stm o d ern p h ilo sop h ical th e o rie s o f know ledge. How ever, h is p articu lar
a lig n m e n t of s o c ia l co n stru ctio n w ith an a n aly tics o f pow er and a t u rn t o h is to ry differ
e n tia te s h im fro m m a n y p o stm o d e rn ists. It is th is c o m b in a tio n t h a t h as p roven t o be so
in flu e n tia l in th e su b seq u e n t w o rk o f sex o lo g ists an d , in particular, fe m in is t th eo rists.
4 . F ou cau lt, T h e H istory o f S exu ality, 1:7 2 . T h e h isto ry t h a t F o u cau lt stu d ied w as
p rim arily a h is to ry o f “d isco u rse ," o r "d iscu rsiv e p ra c tic e s ." T h a t is, he focu sed on
w h a t he co n sid ered " se rio u s sp eech a c t s ," th e th o u g h t in v ario u s d iscip lin es a n d p u blic
d o cu m en ts th a t a ctu a lly served a s so cial n o rm s a n d practices.
5 . F ou cau lt, T h e H istory o f S ex u ality , 1 :9 2 . F o u cau lt's th eo ry o f pow er is n o t o p
erativ e o n ly in t h e c o n te x t o f h is stu d y o f sexuality. For o th e r co n te x ts, b o th th eo retical
and p ractical, s e e F ou cau lt, M ad n ess a n d C iv iliza tion : A H istory o f In san ity in t h e Age
o f R ea so n , tra n s . R ich ard H ow ard (N ew York: M e n to r B o o k s, 1 9 6 5 ); T h e A rch aeolog y
o f K n o w led g e, tra n s . A . M . S h e rid a n -S m ith (N ew York: H arp er & Row, 1 9 7 2 ); T h e Birth
o f t h e C lin ic: An A r c h a e o lo g y o f M ed ical P ercep tion , tra n s. A . M . S h c rid a n -S m ith (New
York: V in tag e B o o k s , 1 9 7 3 ); D iscip lin e a n d P u n ish: T h e Birth o f t h e P rison, tra n s. A . M .
S h e rid a n -S m ith {N e w York: P an th eo n , 1 9 7 7 ); P ow er/K n ow led g e: S e le c te d In terview s
a n d O th er W ritings, ed. C o lin G o rd o n e t a l. (B rig h to n , S u sse x : H arvester, 1 9 8 0 ).
6 . F ou cau lt, T h e H istory o f S exu ality, 1 :1 5 9 .
20 TUST LOVE
to arouse and excite it. Sexuality is a "transfer point" for relations

of power — between w om en and m en, parents and children, teach-
crs and students, clcrgy and laity, the young and the old, rulers and
people ruled.8 In Foucault's view, w hat counts as "sex ," as well as
how we interpret its m eaning, is determined by com plex and — w ith
out m eticulous deconstructive historical analysis — largely invisible
forces. Power therefore creates, produces, sexual desire as well as re
presses it; and in Foucault's view, power produces and constitutes
sexual desire much m ore than it represses it. W hat this m eans is
that cultural and social forces shape our sexual desires, so that w hat
is sexually charged (whether th in bodies or plump ones, uncovered
breasts or covered, broad shoulders or great height or whatever) in
one era or place may n ot be in another.
Foucault rejected, then, the so-called "repressive hypothesis" as an
explanation of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century W estern expe
rience of sexuality. He denied that the Victorian era had been an era
of sexual repression and socially enforced silence about sex. He ar
gued, on the contrary, that it had been a tim e of a veritable explosion
of discourse about sex and an expanding deployment of sexuality.
T h is is why th e questions that interested him were not "W hy are
we repressed?" but, "W hy do we say that we are repressed?" and
w ithin this, n o t "W hy was sex associated with sin for such a long
tim e?" but, "W h y do we burden ourselves today w ith so m uch guilt
for having m ade sex a sin ?"9 Since the key to these questions was,
Foucault thought, to be found in a study of th e history of discourse,
he began w ith an exam ination of w hat he considered a W estern im
pulse to discover the "tru th " about sex. In h is view, this included a
striking W estern com pulsion to self-exam ination and self-reporting
about sexual experience, w hether in the language and discourse of
religion, m edicine, psychiatry, or crim inal justice.
T o make sense of th e connections between power, sexuality, and
truth in the m odern period, Foucault revised his project to include
a study of th e variations on sexual them es in other historical peri
7 . ibid ., 1 :1 5 1 .
8 . Ib id ., 1 :1 0 3 .
9 . Ib id ., 1 : 8 - 9 .
ods. His m ove to the past began w ith the thesis that a forerunner
of m odern discourse on sex was the seventeenth-century C hristian
ecclesiastical em phasis on confession. To put this in perspective, he
reached further back in history, undertaking studies of pagan an
tiquity and o f C hristianity prior to the seventeenth century. Thus,
volum es 2 and 3 of h is H istory o f Sexuality address the sexual mores
of the fourth century B .C .E. Greeks and the first and second century
C .E. R o m an s.10 His thus far unpublished fourth volume, T h e C on fes
sions o f th e F lesh, exam ines developments w ithin C hristianity. T h e
contrasts he identified (and, as it turned out, the continuities) be
tween the different historical periods shed som e light on each other
and on the overall W estern pursuit of the kind of knowledge that
prom ises power in relation to sex — w hat Foucault called th e scien tia
sexualis.
Foucault cam e to th e conclusion that the sexual m orality of the
Greeks and R om ans did n ot differ substantially from C hristian
m orality in term s of specific prescriptions. He rejected the com m only
held view th a t the essential contrast between sexual ethics in an
tiquity and in early C hristianity lay either in the perm issiveness of
G reco-R om an societies as distinguished from the strict sexual rules
of the C hristians, or in the ancient positive attitude toward sex as dis
tinguished from a negative C hristian assessm ent. Both traditions, he
argued, contained prohibitions against incest, a preference for m ari
tal fidelity, a m odel of m ale superiority, caution regarding sam e-sex
relations, respect for austerity, a positive regard for sexual abstinence,
fears of m ale loss of strength through sexual activity, and hopes of ac
cess to special truths through sexual discipline. Nor were these basic
prescriptions very different, he thought, from w hat could be found in
post-seventeenth-century W estern society.
Yet Foucault insisted that there were clear discontinuities, even
ruptures, between these historical periods. T h e very reasons for
m oral solicitude regarding sexuality were different. O n his read
ing, the ancients were concerned w ith health, beauty, and freedom,
10. F ou cau lt, T h e H istory o f S exu ality, vol. 2 , T h e U se o f P leasu re, tra n s . R obert
Flurley [N ew Y ork: V in tag e B o o k s, 1 9 9 0 1 ; v o l. 3 , T h e C a r e o f t h e Self, tra n s . Robert
H u rley (N ew Y ork: V intage B ooks, 1 9 8 8 ).
22 TUST LOVE
while C hristian s sought purity of heart before God; and bourgeois

m oderns aim ed a t their own self-idealization. T h e G reeks valued
self-m astery; C hristians struggled for self-understanding; and m od
ern W estern individuals scrutinized their feelings in order to secure
com pliance w ith standards of normality. Eroticism was channeled to
ward boys for the Greeks, wom en for the C hristians, and a centrifugal
m ovem ent in m any directions for the Victorian and post-Victorian
middle class. T h e G reeks feared th e enslavem ent of the m ind by
the body; C hristian s dreaded the chaotic power of corrupted passion,·
post-nineteenth-century persons feared deviance and its consequent
sham e. Sexual m orality was an aesthetic ideal, a personal choice,
for an elite in antiquity; it becam e a universal ethical obligation
under C hristianity; and it was exacted as a m odern social require
m ent under th e power o f the m odern fam ily and th e m anagem ent of
the modern professional.
Foucault's study of th e history of sexuality left open the ques
tion with w hich he had becom e prcoccupicd: How did contemporary
W estern culture com e to believe that sexuality is the key to indi
vidual identity? How did sex becom e m ore im portant th an love,
and alm ost m ore im portant th an life? Foucault exposed the lack of
freedom in past constructs of sexuality, and he critiqued past for
m ulations of sexual prescriptions. But his presentation of current
strategies for sexual liberation yielded no less skeptical a judgment.
He suggested, rather, that however historically relative sexual ethics
may be, m oral solicitude regarding sexuality is not in every respect a
mistake.
C a therin e M a cK inn o n: H istorical S ilen ces/G en d ered Violence

M any W estern fem inists have shared Foucault's convictions th at sex
uality is socially constructed and th e body is a site of power. Like
Foucault, th ey have exposed the relentless influences o f m edicine,
education, and psychology in determ ining post-cightccnth-ccntury
sexual m ores. W ith Foucault, they have emphasized discourse as a
key to identifying underlying forces that link power, sexuality, and
identity. But m any fem inists fault Foucault for not extending his an
alytics of power to gender. Legal scholar Catherine M acKinnon, for
example, opposes a Foucault-stylc history of desire on the grounds
that his unacknowledged desiring subject is m ale.11 A history of sex

uality that em phasizes sexual desire and change m isses the stark
enduring aspects of history — that is, th e unrelenting sexual abuse of
wom en. History, then, rem ains silent regarding sexual exploitation,
harassm ent, battery, and rape. W ithout attention to these unchang
ing experiences of wom en, M acKinnon argues, there can be no
accurate analysis of sex and power, and indeed no real history of
sexuality.
A fem inist theory of sexuality, according to M acKinnon, "locates
sexuality w ithin a theory of gender inequality."17 T h a t is, it addresses
sexuality n ot as constructed by a diffuse m ultiplicity of powers (in
Foucault's sense), but "as a social construct of m ale power: defined by
m en, forced on wom en, and constitutive of the m eaning of gender."13
As a result, gendered hierarchy has been at the core of the "sexu al" in
Western culture. T h is is the past that historians m ust expose. W ith
out it, they arc likely to promote (with continuing dire consequences
for women) the stance that all sex can be good if only it is socially
reconstructed with ideas of freedom, if only it is liberated from ideolo
gies of w hat is allowed and not allowed. M acKinnon's proposal for
a fem inist history of sexuality looks very different from Foucault's
history, even though it begins with som e o f th e sam e assumptions
regarding th e social construction of sex.
Evolutionary H istories: Sexuality a n d C hange

Foucault and M acK innon represent interpretations of the history of
sexuality and sexual ethics that deny the achievem ent, though not
the possibility, of progress. T h ey refuse to applaud advances in u n
derstandings of sexuality or to sanctify the present as enlightened
and free. To som e extent, they even reject n otion s of change in
h istory— Foucault arguing for different, but n ot causally or idcation-
ally connected, historical perspectives; and M acKinnon focusing on
sim ilarities across tim e th at represent a failure to change. Others,
11. S e e C a th e r in e A . M acK in n o n , A F em in ist T h e o r y o f t h e S tate (C am bridge,

M A : H arvard U n iv e rsity Press, 1 9 8 9 ), 1 2 6 - 5 4 ; "D o c s S exu ality H ave a H isto ry ?" in
D iscou rses o f S ex u a lity , cd . D o m n a S ta n to n , 1 1 7 - 3 6 .
12. M a c K in n o n , A F em in ist T h e o r y o f t h e S tate, 1 2 7 .
1 3 . Ib id ., 1 2 8 .
24 TUST LOVE
however, have charted an evolutionary process across the Western

history of ideas about sex and the m oral norm s that should govern
it. T h o se w ho believe that contemporary sexual revolutions have lib
erated individuals and their sexual possibilities belong here. So do
those who acknowledge th e significance of advances in biology and
psychology and find appropriate historical adjustm ents in philosoph
ical and theological ethics. O thers do n ot necessarily report w hat they
judge to be real progress, but they nonetheless identify evolutionary
changes. Key representatives of an evolutionary kind of interpretive
history include Edward Shorter, John D 'Em ilio and Estelle Freedman,
and Richard Posner.
T h e historical narratives produced by these and other scholars
have in com m on two things: a strong interest in econom ic de
velopm ents and a turn to sources other than traditional forms
of philosophical and theological discourse. Population statistics,
em ployment patterns, personal diaries and m em oirs, physicians'
journals, church and court records of marriages, births, infant m or
tality, and so forth, all yield trends that illum inate m ajor changes
in W estern European and N orth Am erican sexual practices and be
liefs. In Shorter's T he M aking o f th e M odern Family, the story of
the W estern fam ily since the seventeenth century is a story of bro
ken tie s .14 U nder the influence of modern capitalism , fam ilies lost
interest in traditional kinship, generational, and wider com m unity
interaction. Preferring rom antic love, intense m other-infant bonding,
and th e close intim acy of the nuclear family, a "shield of privacy"
made the fam ily its own isolated world.15 T h e fam ily was thus grad
ually transform ed from a productive and reproductive unit into an
em otional u n it, chosen for the individual freedom and fulfillm ent
it promised. In Shorter's telling, the story ends ironically with the
destabilization of the bond between spouses and th e "destruction
of the n est" o f th e nuclear family, for soon wom en move out, and
children m ove quickly away.16
14. Edward S h o rter, T h e M akin g o f t h e M odern F am ily (N ew York: B a s ic B ooks,

1 9 7 7 ). T h e r e a rc m u ltip le stu d ies av ailable o n th e h is to ry o f m arriag e and fam ily. Sec
c h a p tc r 7 below f o r a fu ller c o n sid éra tio n o f th ese.
15. Sh orter, T h e M akin g o f th e M od ern Fam ily , 5.
1 6 . Ib id ., 2 7 7 - 7 9 .
In D 'E m ilio and Freedman's In tim ate M atters, the m ore specific
focus is on sexuality in United States history.17 Attem pting to co m
bine their ow n research w ith the findings of highly specialized studies
done by others, their goal is a "synthetic, interpretive n arrative."18
W h at they provide, then, is an account of a change from colonial
fam ily-centered reproductive system s, to "rom antic, intim ate, yet
conflicted," m arriages in the nineteenth century, and then to con
temporary "com m ercialized" sexuality in which "sexual relations
are cxpcctcd to provide personal identity and individual happiness,
apart from reproduction."19 T h e story ends w ith political crisis: T h e
apparent freeing of sex from institutional constraints fails to gain
a stable consensus, and contem porary political controversy shows
ju st how vulnerable the sexual sphere is to conflict, confusion, and
m anipulation.
In Sex an d R eason , Richard Posner constructs a narrative of change
in W estern views of sexuality based on w hat he calls an "econom ic
theory of sexuality."20 Posner relies heavily on econom ic analysis
both to describe th e practice of sex and to evaluate legal and ethical
norm s in its regard. T h ere are, he argues, three stages in th e evolu
tion of sexual morality, and they correlate w ith the statu s of women
in a given society. In the first stage, w om en's occupation is that of a
"sim ple breeder." W hen this is th e case, com panionate marriage is an
unlikely possibility, and practices that are considered "im m oral" are
likely to flourish (for example, prostitution, adultery, hom osexual li
aisons). T h e second stage begins w hen w om en's occupation expands
to include "child rearer and husband's com panion." Here, com pan
ionate m arriage becom es a possibility, and because of this, "im m oral"
practiccs th a t endanger it arc vehem ently condemned. W hen co m
panionate marriage is idealized as the preferred and perhaps only
model for everyone, societies becom e puritanical in their efforts to
promote and protect it. In stage three, wom en's roles are further
1 7 . Jo h n D 'E m ilio and E stelle B . F reed m an , In tim a te M atters: A H istory o f S exu ality
in A m e r ic a (N ew York: H arp er & Row, 1988.1.
18. Ib id ., xiv.
19. Ibid ., x i- x ii.
20. R ich ard A . P osner, S ex a n d R ea so n (C am brid ge, M A: H arvard U n iv ersity Press,
1 9 9 2 ), 3 , 1 ^ 3 - 8 0 . For a critic a l review o f P o sn e r’s persp ective, see M a rth a M . N u ss-
baum , S e x a n d S o c ia l Ju s tice (N ew York: O xford U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 9 9 ) , ch a p ter 14.
26 TUST LOVE
enlarged to include "m arket em ploym ent." M arriages arc fewer, but
where they exist they are com panionate. O ther form s of sexual rela
tionship, previously considered "im m oral," no longer appear either
im m oral or abnorm al.
T h ere have, of course, been critics of all of these evolutionary th eo
ries. O pposition is based on disagreements regarding em pirical data,
its selection and interpretation, and controversies regarding the im
portance of th eoretical discourse (as opposed to or in addition to
empirical data) in historical analysis of the m eaning and practice
of sexuality.21 Given the interest, however, in this kind of social
history, studies like these have m ultiplied in the last two decades,
frequently com bining social-scientific resources w ith an exam ina
tion of historical discourses about sex. T h ey are as likely to draw
on literature and the graphic arts as they are on population statis
tics or philosophical treatises. M any of these studies contribute to
large narrative schem es, but that is n ot their purpose. T h eir focus
is frequently lim ited to local historical periods and places, or to one
aspect of h um an sexual experience such as hom osexual relations,
prostitution, o r adolescent sexual activity
Keeping in m ind the difficulties and the possibilities of historical
research for gaining perspective on sexual practice and ethical norm s,
we still need som e overview of W estern ideas about sex and morality.
H istory in th is regard offers n ot only a background, and n ot only a
genealogy or archaeology of ideas, but a potential dialogue partner in
the search for a contem porary sexual ethic.
Sexual E th ics in th e W est:

H isto rica l Perspective
G iven the lim ited aim s of this volum e, m y focus here is on W est
ern philosophical, religious, and to som e extent medical, traditions
of sexual ethics. T h e central strands of this history can be traced
21. Se e, fo r e xam p le, L o u ise A . T illy , Jo a n W. S c o tt, and M iria m C o h e n , "W o m en 's
W ork and E u ro p ean F ertility P a tte rn s ," Jo u rn al o f In terd iscip lin ary H istory 6 (W in ter
1 9 7 6 ): 4 4 7 - 7 6 ; L aqueur, "S e x u a l D e s ire and th e M ark et E co n o m y D u rin g th e In d u strial
R e v o lu tio n ," in D iscou rses o f S exu ality, cd. D o m n a S ta n to n , 1 8 5 - 2 1 5 .
to classical G rcccc and Rome, Judaism , and early and later develop
m ents in C hristianity. T h is by no m eans signals a view that other
religious and cultural traditions are n ot im portant to th e history of
the West. Islam , for example, h as n ot only existed in W estern culture
at significant points in history,· it has contributed to developments in
W estern thought (as w hen Islam ic scholars influenced the interpre
tation of A ristotle in the Middle Ages). Native A m erican beliefs and
practices obviously count as im portant traditions in th e West, as do
traditions retrieved by African Am ericans and, more recently, Asian
A m ericans. Still, in developing a sexual ethic for W estern culture,
there can be no doubt that there is a dom inant history to be dealt
with, a history for the m ost part resistant to m odification by co
existing subcultures. "Cross-cultural" considerations will, however,
u ltim ately be im portant to our reflections, not only as they relate to
cultures far away but to cultures that dwell in the W est itself.22
Sexuality in A n tiqu ity: T h e L eg a cy o f G r e e ce a n d R om e

T he Ethos: G en era l Attitudes an d P ractice 23
A ncient G reece and Rome shared a general acceptance of sex as a nat
ural part of life. Both were perm issive regarding the sexual behavior
2 2 . S e e ch a p te r 3 below.
2 3 . I draw h e re o n a v a riety o f h isto rica l stu d ies, sig n ifica n t am o n g w h ich are:
D avid C o h e n , L a w , S exu ality , a n d Society’: T h e E n fo r c em en t o f M orality in C lassi
c a l A th e n s (N ew York: C am brid ge U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 9 1 ); K en n eth J. Dover, G r e e k
P opular M orality in t h e T im e o f P lato a n d A ristotle (Berkeley: U n iv ersity o f C alifo rn ia
Press, 1 9 7 4 ); D over, G r e e k H o m o sex u a lity (C am brid ge, M A : H arvard U n iv ersity Press,
19781; F ou cau lt, T h e H istory o f S exu ality, v o ls. 2 and 3; Jo h n B osw ell, C hristianity. S o
c ia l T oleran ce, a n d H o m o sex u a lity : G a y P eo p le in W estern E u ro p e fro m t h e B eginn in g
o f th e C hristian E ra to t h e F o u rteen th C en tu ry (C h icag o : U n iv ersity o f C h icag o Press,
1 9 8 0 ); Jo h n T N o o n a n , C o n tra cep tio n : A H istory o f Its T re a tm e n t b y t h e C a th olic
Theologians an d Canonists, e n la rg ed c d . (C a m b rid g e, M A : B e lk n a p P re ss o f H arvard
U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 8 6 ); R oger Ju st, W om en in A th e n ia n L a w a n d L ife (N ew York: Rout-
ledge, 1 9 8 9 ); O t t o K iefer, S ex u a l L ife in A n cien t R o m e (N ew York: A M S P ress, 1 9 7 5 ;
rep rin t o f 1 9 3 4 ed .); R . M a eM u llen , R o m a n S o cial R ela tio n s SO B.C . t o A.D. 2 8 4 (New
H av en, C T : Yale U niv ersity P ress, 1 9 7 4 ); S arah Pom eroy, G o d d es ses . W hores. Wives,
a n d S laves: W o m en in C lassical A n tiq u ity (N ew York: S ch o ck e n B o o k s, 1 9 7 5 ); lo h n J.
W inkler, T h e C o n strain ts o f D esire: T h e A n th rop olog y o f S e x a n d G e n d e r in A n cien t
G r e e c e (N ew York: R ou tled g c, 1 9 9 0 ); R osem ary R adford R ucthcr, C h ristian ity a n d th e
M akin g o f t h e M o d ern F am ily: R uling Id eo log ies. D iv erse R ea lities (B o ston : B eacon ,
2 0 0 0 ) , ch a p ter 1; R o ss Shepard K raem er and M ary R ose D 'A n g elo , eds., W om en a n d
C hristian O rigins (N ew York: O xford U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 9 9 ), P art I . T h e s e so u rc es are
im p o rta n t so m e tim e s fo r th e ir d isagreem en ts a s w ell a s th e ir agreem ents.
28 TUST LOVE
of m en. In A thens, for example, the only clear proscriptions appli

cable to citizen-class m en were against incest, bigamy, and adultery
insofar as it violated the property of another m an. O ne focus of con
cern in the tw o sexual cultures was significantly different, however.
For the G reeks, adult m ale love of adolescent boys occupied a great
deal of public attention, while the Rom ans focused public concern
on heterosexual marriage as the foundation of social life (although
both G reeks and Rom ans knew sam e-sex relations, and heterosexual
marriage was im portant also for the survival of the fam ily among
the Greeks). Unfortunately, alm ost any generalizations about either
ancient G reccc or Rome arc questionable given the diversity of con
texts and historical periods that are part of the separate as well as the
shared histories of b oth.24
Marriage for both G reeks and Rom ans was m onogamous. In n ei
ther G reccc or Rom e, however, was sex confined to marriage. Male
hum an nature was generally assumed to be bisexual, and the poly-
erotic needs o f m en were taken for granted. Concubinage, both male
and fem ale prostitution, and th e sexual use of slaves by citizen-class
m en were all com m only acccptcd. In Rom e, wom en as well as m en
of the elite classes "sought erotic satisfaction from partners other
th an legitim ate spouses."25 N onetheless, Rom an culture is som e
tim es today described as "polygynous," since by far m ore m en than
wom en established enduring liaisons w ith individuals other than
their marriage partners.
G reece and Rom e were m ale-dom inated societies, and for citizens
a gendered double standard prevailed in sexual morality. Both Greek
and Rom an brides but n ot bridegrooms were expected to be virgins.
Generally w om en were considered intellectually inferior to m en. In
2 4 . S e e Ju d ith P. H a lle tt, "W o m e n 's L ives in th e A n c ie n t M e d ite r ra n e a n /' in W om en

a n d C h ristian O r io n s , cd . R . S . K ra cm cr and M . R. D 'A n g elo, 1 9 . H allett d ifferentiates
w h a t w e k n o w m o r e readily a b o u t A th en s, for exam p le, fro m w h a t w e k n o w abo u t
o th e r G re e k s o c ie tie s and city -sta tes, and w h a t w e k n o w abo u t A lex an d er th e G re a t's
H e lle n is tic e m p ire fro m w h a t w e k n o w a b o u t b o th G reece and R o m e after th e R om an
E m p ire b e ca m e t h e c o n te x t fo r b o th . I p o in t m y readers to th is essay, sin c e i t is no t
p o ssible to ta k e a c c o u n t o f all levels o f d iversity in m y o w n b rie f c o n sid éra tio n here.
2 5 . ibid ., 3 1 . T h is d ocs n o t m ea n , how ever, th a t n o m arriag es w ere m ark ed by
ro m a n tic love, b u t a t least in a n c ie n t G re e c e th e s e seem to be th e ex ce p tio n rath er
th a n th e rule.
addition, husbands and wives were often unequal in age (wives were
m uch younger) and in education. N onetheless, gender differences
were m itigated by a blurring of typical m ale and fem ale role assign
m ents for th e deities and for som e m em bers of the elite classes.26 In
other words, m ale/fem ale sim ilarities as well as dissim ilarities were
acknowledged. Female goddesses in both G rcccc and Rom e were quite
capable of w arrior activity as well as dispensing wisdom. Rom an girls
from elite fam ilies, with elite male blood relatives, were som etim es
educated along with their brothers, and they exercised som e politi
cal influence after marriage. Lower class wom en could be gainfully
employed (for example, as tailors). By and large, however, these con-
struals of gender roles did n ot add up to gender equality. W om en were
still dependent on m en and on their relationships w ith m en for their
status in society. A Rom an wom an could inherit property, but only
if she had a legal guardian for the adm inistration o f the property.27
Gender dissim ilarities outweighed sim ilarities overall. G reek wives
had little or 110 public life, though they were given the power and re
sponsibility o f managing the hom e. In Rome the ideal of the p a ter
fam ilias (and patria p o t estas) reached fulfillm ent. W omen were still
largely under th e control of m en. And although by the first century
C .E. wom en in Rom e achieved som e econom ic and political free
dom, they could n ot assum e the sexual freedom traditionally granted
to men.
M ale hom osexuality was accepted in both G reek and Rom an antiq
uity. Especially for the G reeks, however, it was less a m atter of some
m en being sexually attracted only to m en (or m ore likely, boys) than
of m en generally being attracted to beautiful individuals, whether
m ale or fem ale (though m ost often am ong the citizen class, males
were considered the m ore beautiful). M en were expected to marry,
in order to produce an heir. Yet love and friendship, and som etim es
sex, between m en were considered to be of a higher order th an any
thing possible w ithin marriage — for between m en there existed
2 6 . Ibid ., 1 7 - 3 2 .
2 7 . Ibid ., 1 8 . H a lle tt n o te s th a t th e em p ero r A ugustus, hoping to provide an in ce n
tiv e to w o m e n to b e ar ch ild ren , introd u ced leg islatio n th a t allow ed frccb o rn w o m en to
be e xem p ted fro m th e req u irem en ts o f legal g u ard ian sh ip a fte r th e y had th re e ch ild ren
(and freed w o m e n to ach iev e th is sa m e ex e m p tio n a fte r giving b irth to four). H allett
adds, " b u t m o s t w o m e n did n o t qu alify fo r th is d is tin c tio n ."
30 TUST LOVE
gender equality despite differences in age. Sam e-sex relations were

not, however, wholly unproblematic, as cultural cautions against
m ale passivity attested.28 Sexual relations between m en and boys,
if both belonged to the citizen class, were preferably restricted to cer
tain physical positions, ones that would n ot represent total passivity
or subm ission on the part of the boys (and certainly n ot 011 the part
of adult m en); and these relations were to cease when a boy reached
a certain age. Moreover, th e prevailing ethos tended n ot to support
a positive evaluation of sexual relationships between w om en.29 Les
bian relationships were often judged negatively because they counted
as adultery (since wom en belonged to their husbands) or because a
cultural preoccupation w ith m ale sexual desire made sex between
women appear unnatural.
In both G reece and Rome abortion and infanticide were co m
m on forms of contraception. At various tim es concerns to lim it
population influenced G reek sexual practices, while efforts to im
prove a low birth rate in later Imperial Rom e, as I have noted, led
to legal incentives to m arry and to procreate. Divorce was read
ily available in ancient Greece and (eventually) in Rom e, and both
cultures attem pted to provide for the resulting econom ic needs of
divorced wom en.
H istorians today tend to dispute the belief that the last years of
the Roman Em pire saw a greater weakening of sexual norm s, a sex
ual dissipation at the heart of a general m oral and political decline.
T h e favored historical reading is now just the opposite, that general
suspicion of sexuality grew as th e Empire aged, and norm ative restric
tions of sexual activity increased. In part, this was the result of the
gradual influence of philosophical theories that questioned the value
of sexual activity and em phasized the dangers of its consequences.
2 8 . See, fo r e xa m p le, F ou cau lt, T h e H istory o f S ex u ality , 2 : 1 9 3 - 9 7 ; B osw ell,

C hristianity, S o c ia l T oleran ce, a n d H om o sex u ality , 7 4 - 8 2 .
2 9 . T h e r e is a g reat d eal o f am big u ity o n th is issu e, h o w ev er S e e B osw ell, C h ristian
ity, S o c ia l T o ler a n ce, a n d H om o sex u ality , 8 2 - 8 4 ; Pom eroy, G o d d es ses , W h ores, W ives,
a n d S la v es, p a s s im ; M a rtti N is s in c n , H o m o e r o lic is m in t h e B ib lica l W orld: A H istor
ica l P ersp ectiv e, tr a n s . Kirsi S tjc rn a (M in n eap o lis: F o rtress, 1 9 9 8 ), 7 4 - 7 9 ; B ern ad ette
B ro o ten , L o v e B e tw e e n W om en : E arly C hristian R esp o n ses to F e m a le H o m o ero ticis m
(C h icag o : U n iv e rsity o f C h icag o Press, 1 9 9 6 ).
G reek a n d R om an P hilosophical Appraisals o f Sexuality
Foucault and others have identified two problems regarding sexuality

that preoccupied philosophers in antiquity: the natural force of sexual
desire with its consequent tendency to excess, and the power rela
tions involved in th e seemingly necessary active/passive roles viewed
as intrinsic to sexual activity.30 T h e first problem contributed to the
form ulation o f an ideal of self-m astery w ithin a broad-gauge aes
thetics of cxistcn cc. Self-m astery could be achieved, it was thought,
through a regim en of life th at included diet, exercise, and various
practices of self-discipline. T h e second problem yielded criteria for
love and sex between m en and boys. Active and passive roles were
n ot a problem in adult m ale relations w ith wom en or w ith slaves, for
the inferior passive role was considered natural to wom en, including
wives, and to servants or slaves. As I have already suggested, how
ever, these roles could be a problem for citizen-class boys w ho m ust
eventually co m e to be equal with adult m en. T h e solution, according
to som e philosophers [for example, D em osthenes31), was to regulate
the age of boy lovers and the circum stances and goals of their liaisons
with m en. O thers (for example, Plato32) preferred the transcendence
and ultim ate elim ination of physical sex in crotic relations between
m en and boys.
Aspects of G reek and Rom an philosophical thought about sex that
were to have great influence on subsequent W estern speculation in
cluded a d istrust of sexual desire and a judgment of th e inferior status
of sexual pleasure am ong other hum an pleasures, in line w ith the in
ferior status accorded to the body in relation to the soul. Sex was not
considered evil in itself, but it was thought to be potentially danger
ous: not only in its excess but in its natural violence (orgasm was
3 0 . F ou cau lt, T h e H istory o f S exu ality , v o ls. 1 a n d 2 . S e e a lso referen ces in n o te 22

above.
3 1 . D e m o s th e n e s, T h e E rotic E ssay, tra n s. N . W. D ew itt and N . J. D ew itt (C a m
bridge, M A : H arvard U n iv ersity P ress, 1949).
3 2 . P lato’s p rc fc r c n c c for tra n s ccn d cn cc beyond sex u al d esire is to be found m o st
e xp licitly in S o c ra te s's ren d itio n of D io tim a 's te a ch in g in th e S y m p o siu m , 2 0 1 d -2 1 2 c ;
a lso in th e g en era l th em e o f t h e P h aed o; and in th e L a w s V III. A lte rn a te view s held
m o re o r le ss by P la to c a n be fou n d in A lcib iad es's sp eech in th e S y m p o siu m , 2 1 5 b -2 2 2 c ,
and in th e P h aed ru s.
32 TUST LOVE
som etim es described as a form of epileptic seizure), and in its ex

penditure of virile energy (it was thought to have a weakening effect
on m en in particular — hence the prohibition of sexual relations for
soldiers before battle). Lastly there was its association w ith death (na
ture's provision for im m ortality through procreation made sex also a
reminder of m ortality).33
T h e Pythagoreans in th e sixth century B.C .E. advocated purity of
the body for th e sake of the culture of the soul. T h e force of their po
sition was felt in the later thinking of Socrates and Plato. Although
Plato moved away from a general hostility to bodily pleasure, he made
a careful d istinction between lower and higher pleasures, identifying
sexual pleasure am ong the lower.34 W hile this m eant that the desire
for sexual pleasure required self-m astery over it, Plato nonetheless
advocated unleashing, n ot finally restraining, the power of eros (in
its highest m anifestations) for the sake of uniting the hum an spirit
with the highest realm s of good, beauty, and truth. Insofar as bodily
pleasures ca n be taken up into this pursuit, there was no objection
to them . But Plato thought that sexual intercourse dim inished the
power of eros for the contem plation and love of higher realities; it ul
tim ately even com prom ised the possibility of tenderness and respect
in individual relationships of love.
Aristotle, too, distinguished lower and higher pleasures, placing
pleasures of touch at the bottom of the scale, shared as they arc in
com m on w ith anim als.35 Less world-denying than Plato, Aristotle
advocated m oderation in sex rather than transcendence. However,
the highest form s of friendship and love, and of happiness in the
contem plation of the life of one's friend, seemed no longer to need
the incorporation of sexual activity or even of Platonic eros.36 A ris
totle never conceived of the possibility of equality or m utuality in
relationships between w om en and m en, and he opposed the utopian
design for this that Plato had offered in th e R epu blic and Laws.
3 3 . S e e F o u ca u lt, T h e History' o f SexuaUty, 2 :1 2 6 - 3 9 . F o u cau lt draw s th ese gen

e ra liz a tio n s fro m a n u m b er of te x ts, e.g ., H ip p ocratcs, T h e Seed·, P lato, P hilebu s,
S y m p o siu m , T im a e u s , and Laws·, A risto tle, D e A n im a II.4 .4 1 5 a -b .
3 4 . S e e R ep u b lic IX , a s w ell a s referen ces g iven in n o te 3 2 .
3 5 . S e e A risto tle , N ic o m a c h e a n E th ics, III. 1 1 1 8a.
3 6 . A ristotle, N ic o m a c h e a n E th ics, V1II-X.
O f all G reco-Rom an philosophies, Stoicism probably had the great

est explicit im pact on later developments in W estern thought about
sex. M usonius Rufus, Epictetus, Seneca, and M arcus Aurelius, for
example, held strong views on th e power of the hum an will to regu
late em otion and on the desirability of such regulation for the sake of
inner peace. Sexual desire, like the passions of fear and anger, was by
itself considered to be irrational, disruptive, liable to excess. T h ere
fore it needed, they said, to be moderated and taken up into a larger
whole of h um an experience and intention. It ought never to be in
dulged in for its own sake, but only insofar as it served a rational
purpose, thereby aim ing toward its real end. Procreation of offspring
was that purpose, that end. H cncc, even in marriage sexual inter
course was m orally good only w hen it was engaged in for the sake of
procreation.37 T h u s cam e to be formulated w hat others later named
the "procreative norm " for sex.
W ith the later Stoics there emerged, according to Foucault, the
"conjugalization" of sexual relations.38 T h a t is, sexual desire repre
sented a fundam ental natural drive not only to procréation but to
the com panionship of spouses. T h e norm governing sexual activity
m ust therefore be "no sex outside of m arriage." Marriage became
the context for self-control and the fashioning of the virtuous life. It
was considered a natural duty, excused only in special circum stances,
such as w hen an individual undertook the responsibilities of life as
a philosopher. Plutarch took the position, then, that marriage, not
hom osexual relationships, was th e primary locus for erotic love and
for friendship.39
Overall, however, the G reco-Rom an legacy to W estern sexual
ethics held little of the freedom for sexuality that had characterized
ancient G reece. T h e dom inant them es carried through to later tra
ditions were ones of skepticism and control. Sexuality was seldom
integrated into the fullest insights of G reek and Roman thinkers
3 7 . See, e.g ., M u so n iu s R ufus, R eliquiae·, S e n eca , F ragm en ts, n o . 8 4 ; E p ictetu s, En-

cirid ion . For a s t ill u sefu l stu d y o f th e in flu e n c e o f S to ic a u th o rs o n early C h ristia n
w riters w h o ad d ressed th e s e m a tte rs, s e c Jo h n T. N o o n an , C o n tra cep tio n , pp. 4 6 - 4 9 .
3 8 . F ou cau lt, T h e H istory o f S exu ality, 3 :1 6 6 .
3 9 . S e c P lu ta rch , D ialogu e o n L o v e and M arriage P recepts.
34 TUST LOVE
regarding h um an relationships. W hether such an integration is pos

sible in principle has been a tacit question for other traditions
as well.
Ju d a ism : Sexuality, M orality, a n d R eligion

Like m ost religious and cultural traditions, the history of Jewish
thought regarding sexuality is com plex and marked by profound ten
sions.40 M any of these tensions were present from the beginning in
Judaism 's foundational document, the Hebrew Bible. N arratives (like
the story of Ruth) stand in tension w ith strict legal codes; sexual
transgressions (such as David's adultery) are taken up into God's plan
for the future of Israel; erotic desire is subordinated to com m unal
conccrns (though not in the Song of Songs); purity laws cocxist with
indifference to w om en's perspectives on rape (as in D eut. 2 2 :2 8 -
2 9 ).41 T en sio n s did not disappear in the Talm udic writings of the
rabbis or in any of the historical periods of Jewish history, though
som e strands of the tradition were em phasized and conflicts were
submerged. H ence, while in all the branches of Judaism the attitude
toward sex h as been an enduringly positive one, it has never been
w ithout am bivalence. T h e sexual in stin ct is considered a gift from
God, a natural part of hum an life, essential to the demographic sur
vival of a frequently beleagured people. Yet this in stin ct holds danger,
both bccausc it is elose to the divine and it is liable to loss of control.
In con trast to m any neighboring religions, the Jews believed in
a god who is beyond sexuality but whose plan for creation makes
4 0 . I d raw h e re o n su ch k ey (th ou gh n o t alw ays u n iv ocal in th e ir a ss e ssm e n ts ! stu d

ie s a s: D av id B ia le , E ros a n d th e Je w s : From B ib lica l Isr a e l to C o n tem p o ra ry A m erica
(N ew York: B a sic B o o k s, 1 9 9 2 ); E llio t N . D o rff and L ou is E. N ew m an , ed s., C o n t e m p o
rary Jew is h E th ics a n d M orality: A R e a d e r (N ew York: O xford U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 9 5 ),
2 7 1 - 3 2 7 ; L o u is M . E p stein , S ex L aw s a n d C u s to m s in Ju d a ism (N ew York: B lock ,
1 9 4 8 ); D avid M . Feldm an, M arital R elation s, Birth C on trol, a n d A b ortion in Jew ish
L a w (N ew York: S c h o c k e n B o o k s, 1 9 7 4 ); M ic h a e l K au fm an , L o v e, M arriage, a n d F a m
ily in Jew is h L a w a n d T radition (N o rth v ale, N J: Ja so n A ro n so n , 1 9 9 2 ); M au rice L am m ,
T h e Jew is h W ay in L o v e a n d M arriage (San F ran cisco : H arper &. R o w 1 9 8 0 ); D av id N o
v ak , Jew is h S o c ia l E thics, ch ap . 4 (N ew York: O xford U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 9 2 ), 8 4 - 1 0 3 ;
Ju d ith Plaskow , S tan din g A gain a t Sinai: Ju d a ism fr o m a F em in ist P ersp ectiv e, ch a p . 5
(Sa n F ra n cisco : H a rp er & Row, 1 9 9 0 ), 1 7 0 - 2 1 0 ; Plaskow , "E m b o d im e n t a n d A m b iv a
len ce: A Jew ish F e m in is t P ersp ectiv e," in E m b o d im en t, M orality, a n d M ed icin e, cd . Lisa
Sow ie C a h ill and M argaret A . F arley (D ord rech t: K luw er A cad em ic, 1 9 9 5 ), 2 3 - 3 6 .
4 1 . S e e B ia le, E ros a n d t h e Jew s, ch ap . 1, 1 1 - 3 2 ; Plaskow , S tan din g A g ain a t Sinai,
1 7 8 -8 5 .
marriage and fertility holy and the subject of religious duty. At the
heart of Judaism 's historical tradition of sexual m orality is a reli
gious in ju nction to marry. T h e com m and to m arry holds within
it a com m and to procreate, and it assum es a patriarchal model for
marriage and family. T h ese two elem ents in the tradition, the duty
to procreate and its patriarchal context, account for m any of its
specific sexual regulations and the ethical com m entaries that have
surrounded them .
W hile at th e core of the imperative to m arry is the command
to procreate, marriage has been considered a duty also because it
conduces to th e holiness of the partners. H oliness includes more
than the channeling of sexual desire, although it m eans this as
well; but it includes the com panionship and m utual fulfillm ent of
spouses. M onogam ous lifelong marriage was valued from the be
ginning (though other structured relationships were long taken for
granted); in tim e it becam e th e custom as well as an ideal. In some
historical periods, however, the com m and to procrcatc stood in ten
sion with the value given to the marriage relationship as such. T h e
laws of on ah, of m arital rights and duties, aimed to m ake sex a nurtu-
rant of love. B u t polygyny, concubinage, and divorce and remarriage
were acccptcd for a long tim e as solutions to a childless m arriage. In
the eleventh century polygyny was finally banned by Rabbenu Ger-
shom of M ainz, and in the twelfth century M aim onides explicitly
banned concubinage.42
Throughout the Jewish tradition there has been a marked differ
ence in the treatm ent of wom en's and m en's sexuality.43 In part, this
was because of w om en's subordinate role in the fam ily and in soci
ety. Ross Kraem er cautions, however, against painting too gloomy a
picturc of th e lives of Jewish wom en, cspccially in th e first ccntury
C .E .44 T h e actu al stories of som e Jewish wom en indicate wom en's in
fluence in shaping their com m unities and their frequent appearance
4 2 . S e e N o v ak , Jew is h S o c ia l E th ics, 9 3 .
4 3 . Plaskow , 1 7 1 - 7 7 .
4 4 . S e e R oss Shepard K raem er, "Je w ish W o m en and C h ris tia n O rig in s ," and
"W o m e n 's Ju d a ism (s) a t th e B eg in n in g of C h ristia n ity ," in W om en a n d C h ristian O ri
g in s, cd . R. S . K ra em er and M , R . D 'A n g elo, 3 5 - 7 9 . K raem er critiq u es m an y standard
h isto rica l p re se n ta tio n s o f Jew ish w o m en in th is era a s serv in g a hid den agenda, on e
th a t w ill m a k e t h e a ttitu d es and a c tio n s o f Jesu s {and ea rly C h ristia n ity ) lo o k liberating.
36 TUST LOVE
in the public sphere. Still, in the sexual sphere, som e key differences
in th e social control of wom en and m en are apparent. T h e regulation
of wom en's sexuality was considered necessary to th e stability and
the continuity of the family. Prem arital and extram arital sex, even
rape, were legally different for women and for m en. In th e biblical
period, husbands but n ot wives could in itiate divorce (Deut. 2 4 :1 -
4), and though the rabbis later tried to find ways to allow a wife to
in itiate divorce (and hence to force a husband to divorcc his wife),
the fundam ental im balance of power between husband and wife on
this issue was n ot changed. Adultery was understood as violating the
property rights of a husband, and it could be punished by the death
of both parties. W om en's actions and dress were regulated in order
to restrict th eir potential for luring m en into illicit sex. T h e laws
of o n a h required m en to respect the sexual needs of their wives, but
the laws o in id d a h (m enstrual purity) had the symbolic consequence,
however unintended, of associating women w ith defilement.
T h e laws o f o n a h , in regulating a m an's sexual obligations to his
wife, revealed som e of th e m ost affirmative attitudes of Judaism to
ward sexuality. Although formulated in a patriarchal context (hence,
they were male-defined), they aimed to take account of women's
needs and to protect w om en's interests. Since it was believed that
wom en, being more passive than m en, would n ot initiate sex with
the sam e freedom as m en, husbands were adm onished to consider
and respond to n ot only their own desires and im pulses, but those of
their wives. T h u s they m ight together, with appropriate moderation
on a husband's part and w ith observance of the laws of m enstrual
purity, celebrate sexuality w ith tenderness and pleasure.
T h e Jewish sexual ethic, then, is traditionally an ethic that af
firms sexuality w ithin heterosexual marriage. Sex outside of marriage
(or recognized alternative heterosexual structures) has generally been
forbidden or at least discouraged (there is no explicit legislation
against prem arital sex or against a married m an having sexual re
lations w ith a single wom an, but ethical norm s have been against
these). M asturbation, incest, adultery, m ale homosexuality, have all
been considered serious transgressions. Lesbian relations were not
regulated by biblical law, and in rabbinic literature they were treated
far less seriously than m ale hom osexuality (in part because they
involve no "im proper em ission of seed").
T h e tensions in the Jewish tradition from the beginning, especially
between its overall affirm ative attitude toward sex and its concern for
the dangers o f the sexual impulse, grew sharply w hen Jewish thinkers
were influenced by H ellenistic philosophers. In the first and second
centuries C .E ., rabbinic Judaism was n ot im m une to the suspicion
of sex that, w ith the rise of Stoic philosophies and th e advent of cer
tain religious m ovem ents from the East, permeated Middle Eastern
cultures. Jewish w riters had considered th e sexual in stin ct to be a
gift from God, but they also named it the "evil im pulse" [yetzer ha-
ra). T h a t is, they believed th at it was an im pulse in particular need
of control; and w ithout careful, even ascetic, discipline it could tri
umph over an individual's possibilities of faithfulness to God and to
the com m unity. T h is fit well w ith th e Stoic pessim ism regarding sex
ual desire, and it moved Judaism of the tim e toward a more negative
view of sex th an had been central to its tradition. Correspondingly,
it exacerbated the tendency to control the female body (in order to
lim it tem ptation for men) and to cast suspicion on sex — certainly
beyond, but even within, marriage.
Judaism com prehends m ultiple rich traditions regarding sexuality
through the ages. Yet tensions w ithin the Jewish tradition rem ain as
issues for contem porary Judaism. T h e Jewish community, like other
religious com m unities, faces a growing pluralism regarding questions
of prem arital sex, gender equality, and sam e-sex relations. Current
conflicts involve the interpretation of traditional values, analysis of
contem porary situations, and the incorporation of hitherto unrepre
sented perspectives — in particular, those of w om en and of gay men
and lesbians.
C hristian T ra d ition s
Like other religious and cultural traditions, including Judaism, the
teachings of the C hristian tradition regarding sex are com plex and
subject to m ultiple influences; and they have changed and developed
through succeeding generations. C hristianity does not begin w ith a
system atic code o f ethics. T h e teachings of Jesus and his followers,
as recorded in the New T estam ent, provide a central focus for the
38 TUST LOVE
m oral life of C hristian s in the com m and to love God and neighbor.
Beyond this, th e C hristian T estam en t (or Second Testam ent) offers
grounds for a sexual ethic that ( 1 ) values marriage and procreation
on the one hand and singleness and celibacy on the other,· (2) gives
as m uch or m ore im portance to internal attitudes and thoughts as to
external actions; and (3) affirm s a sacred symbolic m eaning for sexual
intercourse, yet both subordinates it as a value to other h um an values
and finds in it a possibility for evil. As for unanim ity on m ore specific
sexual rules, this is difficult to find in the beginnings of a religion
whose founder taught as an itinerant prophet and whose sacred texts
are form ulated in "th e m ore tense world" of particular disciples, a
group of wandering preachers.45
Early In flu en ces on Christian Understandings o f Sex

C hristianity emerged in the late H ellenistic Age, w hen even Judaism
was influenced by the dualistic anthropologies of Stoic philosophy
and G n ostic religions. U nlike th e G reek and Rom an philosophers of
the tim e, C h ristian ity 's m ain concern was n ot th e art of self-mastery
and n ot the preservation of the city or the Empire. U nlike m ajor
strands of Judaism at the tim e, its focus was less on the solidity and
continuity of life in this world th an on the continuity between this
world and a life to com e. Yet early C hristian writers were profoundly
influenced both by Judaism and by Greco-Rom an philosophy. W ith
Judaism they shared a theistic approach to morality, an affirm ation
of creation as the context of marriage and procreation, and an ideal
of single-hearted love. W ith the Stoics they shared a suspicion of
bodily passion and a respect for reason as a guide to the m oral life.
W ith the G reeks, Rom ans, and Jews, C hristian thinkers assumed
45. P ete r B ro w n , T h e B od y a n d S ociety : M en , W om en , a n d S e x u a l R en u n cia tion

in E arly C h ristia n ity (N ew York: C o lu m b ia U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 8 8 ) , 4 2 - 4 3 . S e e also
W ayne A . M e e k s , T h e M oral W orld o f th e First C h ristian s (P h ilad elp hia: W estm in ster,
1 9 8 6 ); M e e k s , T h e Origins o f C h ristian M orality: T h e First T w o C en tu ries (N ew H aven,
C T Y a le U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 9 3 ), esp ecially ch ap s. 3 , 4 , 7 , 8; C o n s ta n ce F. Parvey, " T h e
T h eo lo g y and L ead ersh ip o f W o m en in th e N ew T e s ta m e n t," in R o sem ary Radford
R u cthcr, cd., R eligion a n d S e x is m : Im a g es o f W om en in t h e Jew is h a n d C h ristian T ra
d itio n s (N ew Y ork: S im o n &. Sch u ster, 1 9 7 4 ), 1 1 7 - 4 9 ; E lisab eth S c h ü sslcr F iorcn za,
"D isc ip lcsh ip a n d P atriarch y : E arly C h ris tia n E th o s and C h ris tia n E th ic s in a F em in ist
P e rsp e ctiv e," A n n u a l o f t h e S o ciety o f C h ristian E th ics (M isso u la, M T : S ch o la rs, 1 9 8 2 ),
1 3 1 -7 2 .
and rcinforccd views of wom en as inferior to m en — despite some

signs of com m itm ent to gender equality in the beginnings of C hris
tianity as a m ovem ent. As C hristianity struggled for its own identity,
issues of sexual conduct were im portant, but there was no immediate
agreement o n how all of these issues would be resolved.
G n osticism was a recurrent religious m ovem ent that influenced
form ulations of C hristian sexual ethics for the first three centuries
C .E .46 Som e Fathers of th e church taught that there were two ex
trem e positions am ong gnostics — one in opposition to all sexual
intercourse and the other perm itting any form of sexual intercourse
so long as it was not procreative. T h e ascription of this kind of
ascetic/libertine dichotom y seem s n ot to be accurate, but in any case,
C hristian thinkers tried to avoid it.
W hat did prevail in C hristian m oral teaching was a doctrine that
incorporated an affirm ation that sex is good (because part of creation)
but seriously flawed (because, as a result of a hum an cataclysm ic
"Fall," th e force of sexual passion can n o longer be controlled by rea
son). T h e S toic position that sexual intercourse can be brought back
under the rule of reason n ot by com pletely subduing it but by giving
it a rational purpose (that is, procreation) m ade great sense to early
C hristian thinkers. T h e connection made between sexual intercourse
and procreation was not the sam e as the Jewish affirm ation o f the
im portance o f fecundity, but it was in harm ony with it. C hristian
teaching could thus both affirm procreation as the central ration
ale for sexual union and advocate virginity as a praiseworthy option
(indeed, the ideal option) for C hristians w ho could choose it.
W ith the adoption of the Stoic norm for sexual intercourse,
the direction of C hristian sexual ethics was set for centuries to
com e. A sexual ethic that concerned itself primarily with affirm
ing the good of procréation and thereby the good use of otherwise
evil tendencies was, moreover, reinforced by the continued ap
pearance of antagonists who played the sam e role the Gnostics
had played. N o sooner had G n osticism begun to wane than, in
46. N o o n a n , C o n tra cep tio n , ch ap . 3 . B u t s e c a lso K aren L. K ing, W hat Is G n o s ti

c is m f (C am b rid g e, M A : B elk n ap P ress o f H arvard U n iv ersity P ress, 2 0 0 3 ) , esp . 1 2 3 - 2 4
and 2 0 1 - 8 .
40 TUST LOVE
the fourth century, M anichaeanism emerged. It was largely in re

sponse to M anichaeanism that Augustine formulated h is sexual
ethic, an eth ic th at continued and w ent beyond the Stoic elem ents al
ready incorporated by C lem ent of Alexandria, Origen, Ambrose, and
Jerome.
St. Augustine: Legacy fo r Sexual Ethics 47

Augustine argued against the M anichaeans in favor of the goodness
of marriage and procreation, though he shared w ith th em a negative
view of sexual desire as in itself an evil passion (that is, distorted by
original sin). Because evil was for him , however, a "privation" of right
order (that is, som ething m issing th at should be there, or som ething
out of order in w hat is otherwise basically good48), he thought at first
that it was possible to reorder sexual desire according to reason, to in
tegrate its m eaning into a right and whole love of God and neighbor.
T h is, he m aintained, could be done only w hen sexual intercourse is
w ithin heterosexual marriage and for the purpose of procreation.49
Intercourse w ithin marriage but w ithout a procreative purpose is,
according to Augustine, sinful, though n ot necessarily m ortally so.
M arriage, on the other hand, serves three "goods:" n ot only the good
of children, b u t also the goods of fidelity between spouses (as opposed
to adultery) and the indissolubility of their u nion (as opposed to di
vorce).50 Augustine and m any who followed h im could w ax eloquent
4 7 . Key p rim a ry te x ts fo r A u g u stin e's view o f sex u ality and e th ic s in clu d e: O n th e

G o o d n e s s o f M arriag e (4 0 1 C .E .); O n H oly Virginity (4 0 1 C .E .); -4 L iteral C o m m en ta r y
o n G e n e s is ( 4 0 1 -1 4 1 ; O n M arriage a n d C o n c u p is c e n c e ( 4 1 9 - 2 1 C .E .). U sefu l stud ies
relevan t to A u g u stin e 's se x u a l e th ic s and to o th e r early C h u rc h w rite rs in clu d e: Brow n,
T h e B od y a n d S o c iety -, R ow an A. G reer, B r o k e n Lights a n d M en d ed Lives: T h eo lo g y
a n d C o m m o n L ife in t h e E arly C h u rch (U n iv ersity Park: P en n sy lv an ia S ta te U n iv er
sity P ress, 1 9 8 6 ), esp ecially ch ap . 4 ; Jo h n M ah on ey , T h e M akin g o f M oral T h eo lo g y : A
Stu dy o f th e R o m a n C a th o lic T rad ition (O xford : C laren d o n P ress, 1 9 8 7 ), ch ap s. 1 - 2 ;
M arg aret R . M ile s , A u gu stin e o n t h e B o d y (M isso u la, M T : Sch o lars, 1 9 7 9 ); N o o n an ,
C o n tra cep tio n , ch a p s. 1 - 6 ; E lain e Pagels, A d a m . E ve, a n d th e S erp en t (N ew York: R a n
d om H o u se , 1 9 8 8 ) ; P aul R am sey, "H u m a n S e x u a lity in th e H isto ry o f R ed em p tio n ,"
Jo u rn a l o f R elig iou s E th ics 1 6 (Spring 1 9 8 8 ) : 5 6 - 8 6 .
4 8 . See, fo r ex a m p le , A u g u stin e, O n F ree C h o ic e o f t h e Will 1 .1 - 8 , 2 .2 0 ; C o n fession s
5 .1 0 , 7 . 3 - 1 3 . A u g u stin e's p o sitio n w as developed a s a refu tatio n o f th e M a n ich a ca n
b e lief th a t ev il c a n e x is t in itself, a n d th a t th ere is a n u ltim a te p rin cip le of evil ju s t as
th e re is an u ltim a te p rin cip le of good.
4 9 . A u g u stin e, O n t h e G o o d n es s o f M arriage 6 .
5 0 . A u g u stin e, O n t h e G o o d n e s s o f M arriage 3 2 .
on the real and sym bolic m eanings of C hristian marriage, but the
valuation of sex was a different matter.
In his later writings against the Pelagians,51 Augustine tried to
clarify th e place of disordered sexual desire in a theology of original
sin. Although for Augustine Adam and Eve's original sin was a sin of
the spirit (a sin of prideful disobedience), its consequences were m ost
acutely present in the conflict between sexual desire and reasoned
love of higher goods. Moreover, this loss of integrity in affectivity was
passed on from one generation to another precisely through th e mode
of procréation — that is, sexual intercourse. In this debate Augustine
argued that there is som e evil in all sexual intercourse, even when it
is w ithin marriage and for the sake of procreation. M ost of those who
followed A ugustine disagreed with this, but his basic form ulation of a
procreative ethic held sway in C hristian m oral teaching for centuries.
Som e early C hristian writers (for example, Augustine and John
Chrysostom ) also emphasized the Pauline purpose of marriage —
that is, marriage as a remedy for lust (1 C orinthians 7 :1 -6 ). Such
a position hardly served to foster a m ore optim istic view of sex,
but it did offer a possibility for m oral goodness in sexual inter
course w ithou t a direct relation to procreation. From the sixth to the
eleventh century, however, Augustine's rationale was codified in Pen-
itentials (that is, m anuals for the guidance of confessors, providing
lists of sins and their prescribed penances) with detailed prohibitions
against adultery, fornication, oral and anal sex, m asturbation, and
even certain positions for sexual intercourse if they were thought to
be departures from the procreative norm .52 G ratian's great collection
of canon law in the twelfth century contained rigorous regulations
based on the persistently held principle that all sexual activity is evil
unless it is between husband and wife and for the sake of procreation.
A few voices (for example, Abelard and John D am ascene) m aintained
that concupiscence (disordered desire) does n ot m ake sexual pleasure
5 1 . See, for e x a m p le , A u g u stin e, M arriage a n d C o n c u p is c en c e ; C ity o f G o d XIV. 1 1 -

2 4 ; A gain st Julian .
5 2 . S e e P ie rre I . Payer, S ex a n d th e P en iten lia ls: T h e D ev elo p m e n t o f a S ex u a l C o d e
5 5 0 1150 (T o ro n to : U n iv ersity o f T o r o n to P ress, 1 9 8 3 ), fo r a carefu l a n aly sis o f th e
c o n te x t and c o n te n t of the p e n ite n tia l trad itio n in i t s Iris h , F ran k ish , a n d A n g lo -S axo n
exp ressio n s.
42 TUST LOVE
evil in itself, and that intercourse in marriage can be justified by the

sim ple in ten tion to avoid fornication.53
Early C h ristian w riters easily combined negative judgments re
garding sexual desire w ith negative judgments regarding women.
Though the Eve of the canonical scriptures docs not bear the same
weight of responsibility for th e Fall as the Eve of som e apocryphal
literature, h er role was nonetheless frequently interpreted as that of
a seducer of Adam. And whether or n ot w om en were consciously
thought to be a threatening force, the great tem ptresses of men,
they nonetheless appeared throughout C hristian writings as a spe
cial agent of evil. Instead of losing an identification with pollution
and defilem ent through the development of C hristian thought, the
notion of "w om an" becam e theoretically entrenched as the dangerous
"oth er" in theologies of original sin, of higher and lower nature, mind
and body, rationality and desire. Even w ithout attributions of evil,
women were considered intellectually inferior to m en, naturally more
passive, less im portant in the m ovem ents of history, only derivatively
and partially participants in the im ago dei, the image of God. Sexual
ity was therefore essentially lodged in gendered hierarchical relations
that prevented it from being integrated into th e m ajor theologies of
grace.54
5 3 . For a n in te re s tin g overview of th e s e c e n tu rie s, w ith a focu s o n th e p ro h ib itio n of

co n tra ce p tio n , s e e N o o n an , C o n tra c ep tio n , ch ap s. 5 - 6 . Karl R a h n e r offers a m o re nu-
anced v iew o f "co n c u p is c e n c e " in T h eo lo g ic a l In vestigation s, vol. 1 (B altim o re: H elico n
Press, 1 9 6 1 ), 3 4 7 - 8 2 .
5 4 . Iro n ically , theology ex alted w o m en a t the sa m e tim e th a t it relegated th e m to
in ferio r sta tu s. A s sy m b o ls o f v irtu e, how ever, w o m en w ere m o re v u ln erab le th a n ever.
F ailin g in th e id eal rein forced an a ss o cia tio n w ith evil a n d co n firm ed a b e lief in th eir
w e a k n ess and inferiority . C o u n tle s s stu d ies h ave explored t h e w ritin g s of Ju stin M artyr,
Irc n a c u s , T c r tu llia n , O rig cn , Je ro m e , A u g u stin e , a n d o th e r s , w ith few e x a m p le s to o ffse t
th e n egative c o n c lu s io n s abo u t w o m en . G re e k fa th ers o f th e ch u rch , fo r exam p le, found
th e im a g o d e i in w h a t th e y th o u g h t to be th e n o n sex u a l so u l of b o th m e n and w om en,
b u t th ey d e term in ed th a t i t resided m o re fu lly in m e n in h isto ry sin c e m en , n o t w om en,
w ere lik e G od in t h e ir role of lead ersh ip. T h e L a tin fa th ers poin ted to th e im age o f God
in th e c o m b in a tio n o f sp irit and body; but w h ile b o th m e n and w o m en p a rto o k o f the
im a g o d e i b y re a s o n o f th e ir sp irit, o n ly th e m ale body w a s (in i t s a ctiv ity and power) in
th e im age o f G o d . H e n ce, w o m en sh ared in th e im age fully o n ly in so far a s th ey w ere
corporally join ed to m e n o r v irg in ally free fro m th e ir bodies. I t w a s left to T h o m a s
A qu in as to e sta b lish t h e in feriority o f w om en ev en in so u l (S u m m a T h e o lo g ia e 1 .9 1-
9 2 ; II-II. 1 4 9 .4 ). S e e R o sem a ry R adford Ruether, "M iso g y n ism a n d V irg in al F em in ism
in th e F a th e rs o f th e C h u rc h ," in R eligion a n d S e x is m , cd . R . R uether, 1 5 0 - 8 3 ; Kari
Overall, then, the C hristian tradition in its early centuries devel

oped a consistently negative and pessim istic view of sex, and a view of
wom en as n ot equal to m en despite th e fact that Augustine and m ost
of those who followed him were neither anti-body nor anti-marriage.
T o say that th e view of sex was negative m u st be a qualified claim , of
course, for th e early tradition was frequently silent or vacillating on
many questions of sexuality (for example, on the question of hom o
sexuality); and there is little evidence that C hristians in general were
influenced by the m ore severe sexual attitudes of their leaders.55 To
say that the view of wom en was deprecating may also be qualified,
for the earliest insight that "in C h rist there is n e ith e r. . . m ale nor
fem ale" (Gal. 3 :2 8 ) emerged from tim e to tim e. T h e direction and
tone that the early centuries gave to the tradition's future, however,
were unm istakable. W hat these writers were concerned about was
freedom from bondage to desires that seemingly could not lead to
God. In a quest for transform ation of the body along with the spirit,
even procreation did n ot appear very im portant. Hence, regulation
of sexual activity, gender complementarity, and even the importance
of the fam ily were often overshadowed by the ideal of celibacy. As
Peter Brown's m assive study has shown, sexual renunciation served
both eros and unselfish love, and it suited a worldview that broke
boundaries w ith this world w ithout rejecting it as evil.36
T h om as A qu in as: Sustaining th e Tradition7,1

T h om as A quinas wrote in the thirteenth century w hen rigorism
regarding sex already prevailed in C hristian teaching and church
discipline. H is rem arkable synthesis of C hristian theology did not
Borrcson, Sulwdination and Equivalence: The Nature and Role of Women in Augustine
a n d T h o m a s A q u in a s (W ashington, D .C .: U n iv ersity P ress o f A m erica, 1 9 8 1 ).
5 5 . S e e Jo h n B o sw e ll, C hristianity, S o cial T oleran ce , a n d H om o sex u ality , 2 0 6 and
passim .
5 6 . B row n, T h e B o d y a n d Society.
5 7 . Key p rim a ry texts for A q u in as's teach in g o n sex u ality in clu d e: S u m m a T h e-
o lo g ia e I- II.2 2 - 4 8 ; H I .8 1 .1 ; Ι Ι - Π .1 5 1 - 5 6 ; S u m m a C on tra G e n tile s III. 1 2 2 .4 and 5.
U sefu l se co n d a ry so u rc es in clu d c E lean or M cL au g h lin , "E q u a lity o f Souls, In eq u ality
o f Se xes: W o m en in M ed ieval T h eo lo g y ," in R eligion a n d S e x is m , cd . R . R u cthcr, 2 1 3 -
6 6 ; lo h n G . M ilh a v cn , "T h o m a s A qu in as o n S e x u al P le a s u re ," Jo u rn a l o f R eligious
E th ics 5 (1 9 7 7 ): 1 5 7 - 8 1 . S e e a lso Je a n Porter, "C h a s tity a s a V irtu e /' S cottish Jo u rn al
o f T h eo lo g y 3 (2 0 0 5 1 : 2 8 5 - 3 0 1 .
44 TUST LOVE
offer m uch th a t was innovative in the area of sexual ethics. Yet the
clarity of w h at he brought forward made h is contribution significant
for the generations that followed. He taught that sexual desire is not
intrinsically evil, since no spontaneous bodily or em otional inclina
tion is evil in itself; only w hen there is an evil m oral choicc is an
action m orally evil. C onsequent upon original sin, however, there is
in hum an nature a certain loss of order am ong natural hum an in
clinations. Sexual passion is damaged by this disorder, but it is not
morally evil except insofar as its disorder is freely chosen.
Aquinas offered two rationales for th e procreative norm w hich the
tradition had so far affirmed. O ne was the Augustinian argument that
sexual pleasure, in the "fallen" hum an person (as the result of orig
inal sin), hinders the best working of the mind. It m ust be brought
into som e accord with reason by having an overriding value as its
goal. No less an end than procreation can justify it.58 But secondly,
reason does n o t merely provide a good purpose for sexual pleasure. It
discovers this purpose through the anatom y and biological function
of sexual organs.59 H ence, the norm of reason in sexual behavior re
quires not only the conscious in tention to procreate but the accurate
and unimpeded (that is, noncontraceptive) physical process whereby
procreation is possible.
From the procrcativc norm followed other specific m oral rules,
m any of th em aimed at the well-being of offspring that could result
from sexual intercourse. For example, Aquinas argued against for
nication, adultery, and divorce on the grounds that children would
be deprived o f a good context for their rearing. He considered sexual
acts that do n o t m eet the requirem ents of heterosexual intercourse
im m oral because they could n ot be procreative. Aquinas's treatm ent
of marriage contained only h ints of new insight regarding the rela
tion of sexual intercourse to m arital love. H e offered a theory of love
that had room for a positive incorporation of sexual union,60 and he
suggested th a t marriage m ight be the basis of a m axim um form of
friendship.61
58. T h o m a s A q u in as, S u m m a T h e o lo g ia e I- II.3 4 .1 ad 1.

59. A qu in as, S u m m a T h e o lo g ia e II- II. 1 5 4 .1 1; S u m m a C on tra G e n tile s III. 1 2 2 .4 - 5 .
60. A q u in a s, S u im n a T h e o lo g ia e I I - I I . 2 6 . i l .
61. A q u in a s, S u m m a C on tra G e n tile s III. 1 2 3 .
Though w h at had crystallized in the Middle Ages canonically and

theologically w ould continue to influence C hristian m oral teaching
into the indefinite future, the fifteenth century m arked the begin
ning of significant change. Finding som e grounds for opposing the
prevailing A ugustinian sexual ethic in the thirteenth century w ork of
Albert th e G reat and in the general (if n ot specifically sexual) ethics
of Aquinas, w riters (for example, D enis the C arthusian and M artin
LcM aistrc) began to talk of the integration of spiritual love and sexual
pleasure and o f th e in trin sic good of sexual pleasure as th e opposite
of th e pain of its lack. T h is did not reverse the Augustinian tradition,
but it weakened it. T h e effects of these new theories were felt in the
controversies of the sixteenth century Reform ation.
T he Protestant R eform ation : N e w Perspectives on Sexuality

Questions of sexual behavior played an im portant role in the Prot
estant Reform ation. C lerical celibacy, for example, was challenged
not just in its scandalous nonobservance but as a C hristian ideal.
Marriage and fam ily replaced it am ong th e reformers as the cen
ter of sexual gravity in the C hristian life. M artin Luther and John
Calvin were both deeply influenced by the Augustinian tradition re
garding original sin and its consequences for hum an sexuality. Yet
both developed a position on marriage that was not dependent on a
procreative eth ic. Like m ost of th e C hristian tradition, they affirmed
marriage and hum an sexuality as part of th e divine plan for creation
and therefore good. But they shared Augustine's pessim istic view of
fallen h um an nature and its disordered sex drive. Luther was con
vinced, however, that the necessary remedy for disordered desire is
m arriage.62 And so the issue was joined over a key elem ent in C hris
tian sexual ethics. Luther, of course, was n ot the first to advocate
marriage as th e cure for unruly sexual desire, but he took on the
62. S e e M a r tin Luther, O n t h e E sta te o f M arriage (1 5 2 2 ). O th e r im p o rta n t prim ary

te x ts o f L u th e r rele v an t to h is se x u a l e th ic s inclu de T h e L arge C a tec h ism (1 5 2 9 ) and
A S erm o n on t h e E sta te o f M arn a g e (1 5 1 9 ). U sefu l secon d ary so u rces in clu d e Paul
A lth au s, T h e E th ics o f M artin L u th er, tra n s. R obert C . S c h u ltz (P h ilad elp hia: F ortress,
1 9 7 2 ), ch ap . 5 ; E . W. C o c k e , "L u th e r 's V iew o f M arriag e and F am ily ," R elig iou s Life
4 2 (1 9 7 3 ), 1 0 3 - 1 6 ; W illia m L azarcth , I.u th e r o n t h e C h ristian H o m e ( I 9 6 0 ) ; L azarcth,
"L u th e r o n S e x , M arriag e, and F am ily ," in C risis in M arriage, ed. G eorge Forell and
W illia m H. L a z a rcth (P h ilad elp hia: F ortress, 1 9 7 8 ).
46 TUST LOVE
whole of the tradition in a way that no one else had. He challenged

theory and practice, offering n ot only an alternative justification for
marriage but a view of the hum an person that demanded marriage
for alm ost all Christians.
According to Luther, sexual pleasure itself in one sense needs no
justification. T h e desire for it is sim ply a fact of life. It rem ains, like
all the givens in creation, a good so long as it is channeled through
marriage in to th e m eaningful whole of life, w hich includes the good
of offspring. W hat there is in sex that detracts from the knowledge
and worship of God is sinful, and it has to be forgiven (not simply
given a special justification such as th e aim of procreation), as do
the sinful elem en ts that Luther believed arc inevitable in all human
activity. A fter 1523 Luther shifted h is em phasis from marriage as
a "hospital for incurables" to marriage as a school for character. It
is, he taught, w ithin th e secular, nonsacram ental institution of m ar
riage and fam ily (part of the order of création) that individuals learn
obedience to God and develop im portant hum an virtues. T h e very
structure of th e fam ily serves this, for it is essentially hierarchical
and obediential, with the husband having authority over h is wife,
and parents exercising authority over their children.
Calvin, too, saw marriage as a corrective to otherwise disordered
desires. He expanded the notion of marriage as the context for human
flourishing b y m aintaining that th e greatest good of marriage and sex
is th e m utu al society that is formed between husband and wife.63
Calvin was m ore optim istic than Luther about the possibility of con
trolling sexual desire, though he, too, believed th at whatever guilt
rem ains in sexual desire and activity is "covcrcd over" by marriage
and forgiven by G od.64 Like earlier writers, he worried th at m ar
riage as a rem edy for incontinence could nonetheless itself offer
provocation to uncontrolled passion.
6 3 . S e e Jo h n C a lv in , C o m m e n ta r y o n G e n e s is 2 :2 8 ; C o m m e n ta r y o n D eu te ro n o m y
2 4 :5 . O th e r sig n ifica n t te x ts in C a lv in 's w ritin g s o n th e s e q u estio n s in clu d e In stitu tes
o f th e C hristian R eligion 2 . 8 . 4 1 - 4 4 ; C o m m e n ta r y o n 1 C o rin th ian s 7 : 6 - 9 . Secon dary
so u rces in clu d c G e o rg ia H ark n css, Jo h n C alv in : T h e M an a n d H is E th ics |Ncw York:
A bingdon, A pex B o o k s , 1 9 5 8 ); la n e D e m p se y D o u g lass, W om en , F reed o m , a n d C alvin
(P h ilad elp hia: W estm in ster, 1 9 8 5 ).
6 4 . C a lv in , In s titu tes o f th e C h ristian R eligion 2 .8 .4 4 .
As part of th eir teaching on marriage, Luther and Calvin opposed

prem arital and extram arital sex and hom osexual relations. So con
cerned was Luther to provide som e institutionally tem pering form for
sexual desire that he once voiced an opinion (in response to a par
ticular case) favoring bigamy over adultery. Both Luther and Calvin
were opposed to divorce, although its possibility was admitted in a
situation of adultery or im potence, or in a case where one spouse
refused to have sex w ith the other.65
M odern R om an C atholic D evelopm ents

During and after the R om an C atholic Reform ation (or "C ounter Ref
orm ation"), from the late sixteenth century on, new developments
alternated w ith the reassertion of the Augustinian ethic. T h e C ou n
cil of T ren t (1 5 4 5 - 6 3 ) was the first ecum enical council to address
the role of love in marriage, but it also reaffirmed the primacy
of procreation and reemphasized the superiority of celibacy. In the
seventeenth century, the morally austere and ultim ately heretical
m ovem ent know n as Jansenism reacted against w hat it considered
a dangerous lowering of sexual standards and brought back the Au
gustinian connection between sex, concupiscence, and original sin.
Alphonsus Liguori in the eighteenth century gave impetus to a man-
ualist tradition (the development and proliferation of m oral m anuals
designed primarily, like the Penitcntials, to assist confessors) that at
tempted to integrate the Pauline purpose of marriage (marriage as
a remedy for lust) with the procreative purpose. N ineteenth-century
m oral m anuals focused on "sin s of impurity," choices of any sex
ual pleasure, in m ind or in action, apart from procreative marital
intercourse. T h e tw entieth cen tu iy witnessed the rise of C atholic
theological in terest in personalism and the tendency on the part of
the Protestant churches to accept birth control.
In 1930, Pope Pius X I responded to the Anglican approval of
contraception by reaffirm ing for Rom an C atholics the procreative
ethic. But he also gave approval to m arital intercourse at tim es or
under physical conditions w hen conception cannot occur.66 Sufficient
6 5 . See, fo r e x a m p le , Luther, O/? t h e E sta te o f M arriage (1 5 2 2 ).

6 6 . S e e P iu s X I , C a sti C o n n u b ii ( 1 9 3 0 ) 5 3 - 5 6 , 5 9 . T h i s la tte r is n o t a new p o sition
in C a th o lic se x u a l c th ic s , s in c e A u g u stin e h im s e lf w as d e a r th a t m a rita l in terco u rse
48 TUST LOVE
knowledge of hum an reproductive processes was n ot yet available to

consider in tention al use of infertile tim es in a w om an's cycle, but
the reiteration by Pius X I of the traditional allowance of m arital inter
course w hen conception was n ot possible paved the way for Pius X II's
later approval of the "rhythm m ethod ."67 Moral theologians began
to move cautiously in th e direction of allowing sexual intercourse in
marriage w ithout a procreative intent, but for the purpose of fostering
m arital union. T h e change in Rom an C atholic m oral theology from
the 19.50s to th e 1970s was dram atic. T h e separation of procreation
and sexual intercourse by the acceptance of th e rhythm method, and
the new understandings of th e totality of the h um an person brought
about a radically new vision of sex as an expression and cause of
married love. T h e effects of this theological change were striking in
the 1 9 6 5 Second Vatican C ouncil teaching that the love essential
to marriage is uniquely expressed and perfected in the act of sexual
intercourse.68 Although the C ouncil still held that marriage is by its
very nature ordered to the procreation of children, it no longer ranked
w hat the tradition considered the basic ends of marriage, offspring
and spousal u nion , as primary and secondary.
In 1 9 6 8 Pope Paul VI insisted that contraception is im m oral.69
Rather th an settlin g th e issue for Roman C atholics, however, this
occasioned intense conflict. A world-wide m ajority of moral theolo
gians disagreed with the papal teaching, even though a distinction
between non procreative and aniiprocreative behavior mediated the
betw een ste rile co u p les (w h ether b ecau se o f age o r so m e d efect) w as allow ed. I n this
e n cy clica l, P iu s X I is stro n g ly A u g u stin ian in h is ov erall view o f sexuality.
6 7 . T h e “rh y th m m e th o d " em p loy s "fe rtility aw aren ess" in t h e se n se th a t sexual
in te rco u rse is re s tric te d to th e in fertile period in a w o m a n 's m o n th ly o v u la tio n cycle.
P iu s X II ta u g h t t h a t t h is m eth o d could b e used ev en o n a p e rm a n e n t b a s is w h en se ri
o u s m e d ica l, e co n o m ic, o r so c ia l reaso n s o b tain ed . S e e P iu s X I I, "Address to th e Italian
C a th o lic S o ciety o f M id w iv e s," A c ta A p o sto lic a e S ed is (O cto b e r 2 9 , 1 9 5 1 ), 4 3 :8 4 5 - 4 6 .
For so m e ov erview o f th e th eo lo g ical c o n te x t o f th is d evelo p m en t, s e e N o o n an , C o n
tra cep tion , 4 3 8 - 4 7 ; Jo h n G allagh er, "M a g iste ria l T e a c h in g from 1 9 1 8 to th e P resen t,"
in R eadings in M o r a l T h eo lo g y N o. 8: D ialogu e A bou t C a th o lic S o cial T eachin g, ed.
C h a rle s E. C u r r a n and R ich ard A . M c C o r m ic k |New York: P au list, 1 9 9 3 ), 7 1 - 9 2 . For
a g eneral d e scrip tio n of d ev elo p m en ts in "fe rtility aw aren ess" |or "n atu ral") m eth o d s of
b irth co n tro l, s e e M ic h a e l Policar, "F e rtility C o n tro l: M ed ical A sp e c ts ," in E n cy clop ed ia
o f B io eth ics, ed. W arren T R eich , rev. ed ., 2 :8 2 5 .
6 8 . Secon d V a tica n C o u n cil, G a u d iu m e t S p es (1 9 6 5 ) 4 9 .
6 9 . Paul V I, H u m a n a e V itae (1 9 6 8 ).
dispute for som e.70 Since then m any of the specific m oral rules gov
erning sexuality in the C atholic tradition have com e under serious
question. O fficial teachings have sustained past injunctions, though
som e m odifications have been made in order to accom m odate pas
toral responses to divorce and remarriage, hom osexual orientation
(but not sexual activity), and individual conscience decisions regard
ing contraception. Am ong m oral theologians there is serious debate
(and by the 1 9 9 0s, marked pluralism) regarding issues of prem arital
sex, hom osexual acts, remarriage after divorce, infertility therapies,
gender roles, and clerical celibacy.71
Post-R eform ation Protestantism

In the m eantim e, tw entieth-century Protestant sexual ethics devel
oped even m ore dram atically than Rom an C atholic. After the Refor
m ation, Protestant theologians and church leaders continued to affirm
heterosexual marriage as the only acceptable context for sexual activ
ity. Except for the differences regarding celibacy and divorce, sexual
norm s in the Protestant churches looked m uch the sam e as those in
the C atholic tradition; nineteenth-century Protestantism shared and
contributed to the cultural pressures of Victorianism . But in the twen
tieth century, Protestant thinking was deeply affected by biblical and
historical studies that questioned the foundations of C hristian sexual
7 0 . Se e, o n t h e o n e h an d , in d isag reem e n t w ith H u m a n a e V itae , C h a rle s E . C u rran ,

ed ., C o n tra c ep tio n , A uthority, a n d D issen t (N ew York: H erd er & H erder, 1 9 6 9 ); and
o n th e o th e r h a n d , G e rm a in G risez, Jo sep h Boyle, Jo h n F in n is , and W illia m E. May,
"N F P : N o t C o n tr a life ," in T h e T each in g o f H u m a n a e V itae: A D e fe n s e |San F ran cisco:
Ig n a tiu s, 1 9 8 8 ), 8 1 - 9 2 .
7 1 . S e e C u rra n and M c C o rm ic k , R eadin gs in M oral T h eo lo g y N o. 8 , to r key ch u rch
d o cu m en ts a s w e ll a s a co lle c tio n of w ritin g s th a t rep resen t im p o rta n t developm ents
in regard to t h e s e s o rts o f is s u e s . T h i s v o lu m e d o c s n o t, how ever, in clu d e s o m e view s
o f e ith e r th e far rig h t o r th e far left. F o r an overview o f d evelo p m ents in U .S . C a th o lic
sex u al e th ics, s e e L eslie G riffin , "A m erican C a th o lic S e x u al E th ic s, 1 7 8 9 - 1 9 8 9 , " in Per
sp e ctiv e s o n t h e A m e r ic a n C a th o lic C h u rch , ed. S te p h e n J. V icch io and V irg in ia G eiger
(W estm in ster, M d : C h ristia n C la ss ic s, 1 9 8 9 ), 2 3 1 - 5 2 , rep rinted in R eadin gs in M oral
T h eo lo g y N o. 8, e d . C . C u rra n and R . M c C o rm ic k , 4 5 3 - 8 4 . See a lso P h ilip S . K eane,
S ex u a l M orality: A C a th o lic P ersp ectiv e (N ew York: P au list, 1 9 7 7 ); A ndré G u in d o n ,
T h e S e x u a l C reato rs (L an h am , M D : U n iv ersity of A m erica, 1 9 8 6 ); L isa Sow ie C a h ill,
" C a th o lic Sexu al T e a c h in g : C o n te x t, F u n ctio n , and A u th o rity ," in V atican A u thority a n d
A m erica n C a th o iic D issen t, cd . W illia m W. M ay (N ew York: C ro ssro ad , 1 9 8 7 ), 1 8 7 —
2 0 5 ; C h ris tin e E . G udorf, B od y ; Sex, a n d P leasu re (C leveland : P ilg rim , 1 9 9 4 ); C a h ill,
Sex, G en d er, a n d C h ristian E th ics (C am bridge: C am brid g e U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 9 6 ).
50 TUST LOVE
cthics, by psychological theories that challenged traditional views,

and by the voiced experience of church m em bers. M ajo r Protestant
theologians, such as Paul T illich , Karl Barth, and H elm ut Thielicke,
incorporated questions o f sexuality and gender into their constructive
theologies, anchoring their varying perspectives in the tradition while
attem pting to incorporate new inform ation and insights.72
It is difficult to trace one clear line of development in twentieth-
century Protestant sexual ethics; or even as clear a dialectic as may be
found in R om an C atholicism . T h e fact that Protestantism in general
was from th e beginning less dependent on a procreative ethic allowed
it eventually and alm ost unanim ously to acccpt contraception as a
m eans to responsible parenting. Overall, Protestant sexual ethics has
moved to integrate an understanding of the hum an person, male
and female, in to a theology of marriage th at no longer deprecates
sexual desire as self-centered and dangerous. It continues to struggle
w ith issues o f gendered hierarchy in the family, and w ith w hat arc
often called "alternate lifestyles," such as the cohabitation of unm ar
ried heterosexuals and the sexual partnerships of gays and lesbians.
For the m ost part, the ideal context for sexual intercourse is still
considered to be heterosexual marriage, but m any theologians arc ac
cepting of prem arital sex and of hom osexual partnerships, including
gay marriage. Every m ainline Protestant church h as had since the
19 9 0 s task forces working particularly on questions of homosexuality,
professional (including clergy) sexual ethics, and sex education.
Secu la r Paths: Philosophical D evelopm ents,

M edical Influences
T h e long arm s of G reek and Roman antiquity reached down not
only through theological construals of sexuality1 and its meanings,
72. Se e, fo r e x a m p le , Paul T illic h , S y stem atic T h eo lo g y 2 . 4 4 - 5 9 (C h icag o : U n i

v ersity o f C h ic a g o Press, 1 9 6 7 ); T illic h , L o v e, Pow er, a n d Ju s tice (N ew York: O xford
U n iv e rsity Press, 1 9 5 4 ); H e lm u t T h ie lic k c , T h e E th ic s o f S ex , tra n s. Jo h n W. D obcr-
ste in (G ran d R a p id s, M I: B a k e r B o o k H o u se, 1 9 6 4 ); K arl B a rth , C h u rch D ogm atics
III/2 , 3 2 5 - 4 3 6 , a n d III/4 , 1 1 6 - 2 4 0 (Edinburgh: T . & T. C la rk , 1 9 6 0 , 1 9 6 1 ). W h a t
is im p o rta n t in thc.se w ritin g s is th e effort a t a fu ller th eo lo g ical fram ew o rk for sexual
c th ic s . W ith th e c x c c p tio n of a c c cp ta n cc o f th e m o ra l ju s tific a tio n of co n tra cep tio n , the
p o sitio n s ta k en o n sp e cific m oral q u estio n s a rc freq u en tly q u ite tra d itio n al. S e c, e.g.,
B a rth 's co n c e rn fo r "p ro test, w arn in g , and co n v ersio n " regarding th e "m a la d y called
h o m o sex u a lity ," C h u r c h D og m a tics III/4 , 1 6 6 .
but through philosophical ones as well. And all the while, medical
experts were both influenced by prevailing ideas about sex and moral
behavior, and in turn, influenced them . Even a tentative exploration
of historical perspectives on questions o f h um an sexuality has at least
to take note o f these disciplines and of others as well. Intellectual
histories do n o t take place in a vacuum; so that to m ake sense of ideas
about sex o n e m ust also study literature, m usic, painting, econom ic
developments, m igrations, political struggles, and th e m any other
elem ents of W estern society that have served to sustain or to change
view of sexuality and gender. T h e rise of the courtly love tradition
in th e M iddle Ages was probably m ore im portant for shaping ideas
about sex th an any single theologian's writings at that tim e; shifts in
econom ic structures under capitalism were m assively influential in
changing fam ilial roles and the rationales that accompanied them.
Here, unfortunately, I can only look to developments in philosophy
and m edicine, but sim ply nod to the im portance of all the other
factors in W estern sexual history.
P hilosophy a n d the U nderstanding o f Sex
As surveys o f the history of philosophy note, philosophers in m ost

periods have n ot paid m uch attention to sex. T h ey have w ritten a
great deal about love but have left sexual behavior largely to reli
gion, poetry, m edicine, and the law.73 After the Greeks and Romans,
and medieval thinkers like T h o m as Aquinas w hose work is philo
sophical as w ell as theological, there is n ot m u ch to be found
regarding sexuality until th e tw entieth century. Exceptions to this
are the sparse eighteenth-century writings on sex and gender by
David H um e, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Im m anuel Kant, M ary Woll-
stonecraft, and Johann G ottlieb Fichte, and the nineteenth-century
writings of A rthur Schopenhauer, Karl M arx, Friedrich Engels, John
Stuart M ill, and Friedrich N ietzsche. M ost of these writers reinforced
73. S e e R o b e rt B aker and Fred erick E lliso n , cd s., P h ilo so p h y a n d S ex (Buffalo:

P ro m eth e u s B o o k s , 1 9 7 5 ), 1; A la n So blc, ed ., T h e P h ilo so p h y o f S ex , 2 n d cd . (Savage,
M D : L ittlefield A d am s Q u ality Paperbacks, 1 9 9 1 ), 3 . For a u sefu l h isto rica l stu d y of
p h ilo so p h ica l tre a tm e n ts o f love and to so m e e x te n t se x , s e e Irving Singer, T h e N atu re
o f L o v e, 3 vo ls., 2 n d cd. (C h icag o : U n iv ersity of C h icag o P ress, 1 9 8 4 - 8 7 ) .
52 TUST LOVE
the norm of heterosexual procreative sex w ithin marriage. H um e in

his O f Polygamy and Divorce" insisted that all argum ents about
sexual behavior finally lead to a recom m endation of "our present Eu
ropean practices with regard to m arriage."74 Rousseau's La N ouvelle
H éloïse deplored the faults of conventional marriage but strongly op
posed m arital infidelity and divorce. Kant defended traditional sexual
mores, although in h is Lectures on Ethics he introduced a justifica
tion for m arriage n ot in term s of procreation but of altruistic love,
arguing that only a m utual com m itm ent in marriage can save sex
ual desire from making a sexual partner into a m ere m eans to one's
own pleasure.75 Schopenhauer, in T he M etaphysics o f Sexual L ov e,
viewed sexual love as subjectively for pleasure, though objectively for
procreation,· h is strong naturalism paved the way for a m ore radical
theory of sex as an in stin ct w ithout ethical norm s.76
Philosophers in these centuries represented both sides of the ques
tion of gender equality. Fichte asserted an essentially passive nature
in wom en, who, if they are to be equal to m en, will have to renounce
their fem ininity.77 But M ary W ollstonecraft in her A Vindication o f
th e Rights o f W om en, and M ill in h is On th e Subjection o f W om en, of
fered strong challenges to th e traditional inequality of gender roles in
socicty.78 M arx and Engels critiqucd bourgeois marriage as a relation
ship of econom ic dom ination.79 Schopenhauer, reacting to fem inist
agendas, advocated polygyny on the basis of a theory of m ale needs
7 4 . D av id H u m e , " O n P olygam y and D iv o rce ," E ssays M oral, P olitical, a n d L iterary,

v o l. 1, cd . T. H. G re e n and T H. G ro se (Lond on: L o n g m an s, G re e n , 1875.1, 2 3 1 - 3 9 . For
a rele v a n t and v a lu a b le fe m in is t in terp retatio n o l H u m e 's g en eral w o rk , see A n n e tte C .
Baier, " H u m e , t h e W o m en 's M o ra l T h e o r is t? " in Eva Feder K ittay and D ia n a T . M eyers,
ed s., W om en a n d M oral T h e o r y (T otow a, N J: R o w m an & L ittlefield , 1 9 8 7 ), 3 7 - 5 5 .
7 5 . Im m a n u e l K a n t, " D u tie s T o w a rd s th e B o d y in R e sp e c t o f th e S e x u a l I m p u ls e /'
L ectu res o n E th ics , tra n s. L ou is In field (N ew York: H arp er T o rch b o o k s, 1 9 6 3 ), 1 6 2 - 6 8 .
7 6 . A rth u r Sch o p en h au er, " T h e M eta p h y sics o f S e x u al L o v e," in T h e W orld a s Will
a n d R ep r es en ta tio n , vol. 2 (N ew York: D o ver P u b lica tio n s, 1 9 5 8 ).
7 7 . Jo h a n n G o ttlie b F ich tc, "F u n d a m en ta l P rin cip les of th e R ig h ts o f th e Fam ily,"
in T h e S c ien c e o f Rights, tra n s. A . E ger K reger (P h ilad elp hia: I. B . L ip p in co tt, 1 8 6 9 ),
A ppen dix, B o o k 1.
7 8 . M a ry W o llsto n ccra ft, A i n d i c a t i o n o f th e R ights o f W om en (N ew York: W. W.
N o rto n , 1 9 6 7 , orig in al p u b licatio n 1 7 9 2 ); Jo h n S tu a rt M ill, O n t h e S u b jectio n o f
W om en (N ew Y ork: F aw cett B o o k s, 1 9 7 3 , orig in al p u b lica tio n 18691.
7 9 . S e e F ried rich E ngels, T h e O rigin o f th e Fam ily, P rivate P roperty ; a n d t h e State
(N ew York: In te r n a tio n a l, 1 9 4 2 ).
and female instrum ental response.80 N ietzsche, like Schopenhauer,

moved away from traditional ethical norm s but at the sam e time
dramatically reinforced a view of the solely procreative value of
wom en.81
T h e relative silence of philosophers on sex was broken in the twen
tieth century. As noted in chapter 1, European and N orth American
philosophers — both wom en and m en — have taken up questions of
sex and freedom, paradigms of sexuality, gender bias, sexual abuse,
and m any other questions about the sexual sphere of hum an activ
ity.82 T h ese w ritings consider very seriously the findings of biological
and social-scientific studies, and they take account of philosophical
perspectives o f the past while constructing proposals for the present.
Like the publications of contem porary theologians, theirs rem ain
im portant w orks in progress.
M edicine as H istorical Agent

Historically, m edicine has interacted w ith philosophy and religion in
shaping and rationalizing th e sexual ethical norm s of a given cul
ture.s,î M edical opinion has often sim ply reflected and conserved
the acccptcd beliefs and m ores of a society, but som etim es it has
also been a force for change. In either case, its influence has been
powerful. For example, from the Hippocratic corpus of writings in
ancient G reece to the writings of the physician G alen in th e second
century C .E., medical recom m endations regarding sexual discipline
8 0 . Sch o p en h au er, "E ssa y o n W o m e n ," in T h e W orks o f S c h o p en h a u er, ed. W illia m

D u ra n t (N ew York: S im o n & Sch u ster, 1928).
8 1 . S e e Fried rich N ie tz s c h e , T h u s S p a k e Z arath u stra, Part 1, in T h e P ortable
N ie tz s c h e , tra n s. W alter K au fm an (N ew York: V ik in g , 1 9 5 4 ).
8 2 . I n a d d itio n to t h e p h ilo so p h ical w ritin g s cite d ea rlier in t h is p re sen t chapter,
and w ritin g s liste d in n o te s 6 - 9 and p a ssim i n ch a p ter 1, w e sh ou ld n o te su c h w orks
as: R obert J. S to lle r, O bserv in g t h e Erotic Im ag in ation (N ew H aven, C T Yale U n iv er
sity P ress, 1 9 8 5 ) ; R obert M . S tew art, ed ., P h ilo so p h ic a l P ersp ectiv es o n S ex a n d L o v e
(N ew York: O xford U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 9 5 ); R obert C . S o lo m o n , ed ., W ick ed P leasu res
(L a n h a m , M D : R o w m a n & L ittlefield , 1 9 9 8 }; lo h n C o rv in o , cd ., S a m e S ex : D eba tin g
t h e E thics, S c ien c e, a n d C u ltu re o f H o m o sex u a lity (L an h am , M D : R ow m an & L ittle
field, 1 9 9 8 ); A la n Soble, ed ., Sex, L o v e, a n d Friendship: S tu dies o f th e S o c iety fo r th e
P h ilo so p h y o f S e x a n d L o v e 1 9 7 7 -1 9 9 2 (A tlanta: R odopi, 1 9 9 7 ).
8 3 . F o r c o n n e c tio n s b etw een m c d ic in c and sex u al e th ic s , see E arl E . Sh clp , ed.,
S ex u a lity a n d M ed ic in e, 2 vols. (D o rd rech t: D . R eid el, 1 9 8 7 ); R onald M . G re e n , ed.,
R eligion a n d S e x u a l H ea lth : E th ical, T h eo lo g ica l , a n d C lin ic a l P ersp ectiv es (D ordrecht:
K lu w cr A ca d e m ic, 1 9 9 2 ).
54 TUST LOVE
echoed and reinforced the am bivalence of G reek and Rom an philoso

phers regarding h um an sexual activity.84 G alen's theories retained
considerable power all the way into the European Renaissance. T h e
interpretation of syphilis as a disease rather th an a divine punish
m ent cam e only in the fifteenth century as th e result of medical
writings responding to a high incidence of the disease am ong the so
cial elite. In nineteenth-century w estern Europe and N orth Am erica,
medical w riters were enorm ously influential in shaping norm s re
garding such m atters as m asturbation (physicians believed it would
lead to insanity), hom osexuality (newly identified w ith perversions
that m edicine m ust diagnose and treat), contraception (considered
unhealthy because it fostered sexual excess and loss of physical
power), and gender roles (promoted on th e basis of m edical assess
m ent of physical and psychological health). In the tw entieth century,
of course, m ost of these particular m edical opinions changed (per
haps less so regarding an interpretation of gender and im plications
for gender roles).
T h e em ergence of psychoanalytic theory at the turn of the century
brought with it new perceptions of the m eaning and role of sexual
ity in the life of individuals. It also gave new direction to m uch of
m edicine's approach to sex. W hatever the final validity o f Sigmund
Freud's insights, they burst upon the world w ith a force that all
but swept away th e foundations of traditional sexual morality. Au
gustine's and Luther's assertions about the indom itability of sexual
desire found support in Freud's theory, but now the power of sexual
need was n o t the result of sin but a natural drive, centrally con
stitutive of the hum an personality.85 Past efforts to order sexuality
8 4 . F o u ca u lt draw s o n th is m a te ria l to a g reat e x te n t in T h e Historyt o f Sexuality,

vol. 2 . For a n a lte rn a tiv e read in g o f th e H ip p ocratic C o rp u s th a t ta k e s m o re a cco u n t of
th e g ynecological w ork s o f th e C orpu s, s e e L esley D e a n -Jo n e s, " T h e P o litics o f P leasure:
F em ale S e x u a l A p p etite in t h e H ip p ocratic C o rp u s," in D iscou rses o f S ex u ality , ed.
D o m n a S ta n to n , 4 8 - 7 7 .
8 5 . S e e in p a rticu lar, Sig m u n d Freud, T h ree E ssays o n t h e T h e o r y o f Sexu ality, in
T h e S tan dard E d itio n o f th e C o m p le te P sy ch o lo g ical W orks o f S igm u n d Freud, 2 4 vols.
(Lond on: H o g a rth , 1 9 5 3 - 7 4 ) , 7 : 1 3 0 - 2 4 3 ; C iv ilization a n d Its D iscon ten ts, S E 2 1 : 6 4 -
1 4 5 . V aluable co n tem p o rary in terp retatio n s o f Freud’s th e o rie s o f sexu ality , e sp ecially as
th ey relate to e th ic s , c a n be fou n d in E rn est W allw ork, P sychoan alysis a n d E thics (New
H av en, C T : Yale U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 9 1 ); and in T e re s a d e L au retis, "Freud, Sexuality,
and P e rv ersio n ," in D iscou rses o f Sexu ality, cd . D . S ta n to n , 2 1 6 - 3 4 .
according to rational purposes could now be interpreted as repression.

After Freud, w hen sex w ent awry, it was a m atter of psychological ill
ness, n ot m oral evil.86 Taboos needed demythologizing, it was widely
thought, and freedom m ight be attained n ot through repentance and
forgiveness b u t through m edical treatm ent.
Yet psychoanalytic theory raised as m any questions as it answered.
Freud argued for liberation from sexual taboos and from the hypocrisy
and sickness th ey cause, but he nonetheless m aintained the need for
sexual restraint. H is theory of sublim ation called for discipline and
a channeling of the sexual in stin ct if individuals and society were
to progress. T h e concern for sexual norm s therefore rem ained, and
Freud's own recom m endations were in m any ways quite traditional.
But new w ork had clearly been cut out for those in both secular and
religious traditions.
W ith the m edicalization of hum an sexuality, sex becam e less an
ethical or even aesthetic problem th an a health problem. Ironically,
however, experts of all kinds — physicians, counselors, therapists,
social workers, teachers — offered guidance; and the guidance car
ried m oral weight. Exam ples of this abound in the long efforts to
define and identify sexual deviance or perversion, the new pressures
on individuals toward sexual activity as a part of hum an flourishing,
the intertw ining of m edicine and law in the punishm ent or reha
bilitation of perpetrators of sex crim es. W om en in particular have
appeared vulnerable to m oral restrictions and judgments based on
prevalent m edical assessm ents of their sexual capabilities, "fem i
n in e" characteristics, and com pliance with the rules for m othering.87
Similarly, gay m en and lesbians have been stigmatized as m uch by
the m edical profession as by religious traditions. Accused of im
m orality or diagnosed with a pathology, they have been marginalized,
8 6 . In t h e la te tw e n tie th cen tu ry , how ever, th ere h a s been an im p o rta n t sh ift to

co n sid e r p h y sio lo g ical, n o t o n ly p sy ch olo gical, ca u se s fo r sex u al d ysfu nction .
8 7 . F e m in is t stu d ie s have m u ltip lied in w h ich th e s e p h en o m en a h a v e been d e
tailed and d o cu m e n ted in w o m en 's exp erien ce. See, fo r exam p le, A d rien n e R ich , O f
W om en B orn : M o t h e r h œ d a s E x p erien ce a n d In stitu tion (Buffalo: P rom eth eu s, 1 9 7 6 );
J. B . D o n cg a n , W o m en a n d M en M idw ives: M ed icin e, M orality, a n d M isogyn y in Early
A m erica (W estport, C T : G reen w ood , 19781; M ary O 'B rie n , T h e P olitics o f R eprodu ction
(Lond on: R outledge and K egan Paul, 19811; S u sa n M . W olf, F e m in is m a n d B io eth ics:
B e y o n d R ep ro d u ctio n (N ew York: O xford U niv ersity P ress, 1 9 9 6 ).
56 TUST LOVE
som etim es even jailed, and subjeeted to strategies of behavioral and

character reform . W hatever the politics behind the A m erican Psychi
atric A ssociation's removal of hom osexuality from the official list of
pathologies in 1973, the social consequences of this decision were
significant.88
From th e P ast to th e Present
We have long recognized, especially in regard to h um an experience,

that the m eaning of the past is som ehow in the present, and the
m eaning of th e present is at least in part in the future. W hether
there arc or should be any grand narratives; w hether unbiased talcs
can be told or hum an events neutrally recorded; the history of ques
tions and convictions about h um an sexuality is useful for the tasks
that rem ain. W hat we have traced in this chapter is incomplete,
subject to interpretation, in need of ongoing revision. One glaring
om ission is th e sam e one M acKinnon observed in Foucault's h is
torical accounts: that is, history of violence toward wom en. T h is is
largely because it has n ot been th e subject of m uch historical atten
tion, although awareness of it surely lurks in th e prevailing gender
inequality through each tradition and era.
T h is chapter, then, offers only the proverbial "tip of the iceberg."
Still, it provides both resources and historical context, relevant and I
hope useful for discernm ent of a contem porary sexual eth ic. Today's
questions are n ot com pletely new, though they are n ot ju st old, either,
and they are surely a t least as com plex as they were at m ost points
in the past. W e turn again, then, to som e of the larger questions that
fascinated antiquity, troubled faithful believers in religious traditions,
and th a t have preoccupied m odern professionals. T h e reasons for
caution rem ain; if anything they are intensified by a look at history.
But historical perspectives may free us as well as enrich us, for the
conversation they help to keep open.
88. T h e r e is a p leth o ra o f literatu re — m ed ical, p sy ch iatric, and so cio lo g ical — on

th e s e d ev elo p m en ts. For u sefu l c o n tcx tu a liz a tio n o f it all, see, fo r exam p le, D av id F.
G reen berg, T h e C o n stru ction o f H o m o sex u a lity (C h icag o : U n iv ersity o f C h icag o
Press, 1 9 8 8 ), e sp e cia lly ch ap s. 9 - 1 1 ; A nd rew S u lliv a n , L o v e U n d ete c ta b le : N o te s on
F rien dship , S ex , a n d S u rvival (N ew York: A lfred A . Knopf, 1 9 9 8 ), esp ecially ch ap . 2
C hapter 3
DIFFICULT CROSSINGS
Diverse Traditions
that rem ain open and troubling regard
T
h e e t h ic a l q u e s t io n s
ing h um an sexuality include not only those regarding specific

m oral rules or categories of acceptable sexual behaviors. They include
larger and in som e respects m ore basic questions, such as w hat are
the aim s of sexual desire, the value of sexual pleasure, the purposes of
sexual activity, the place of gender in public and private lives, th e role
of personal and fam ilial affiliations in the form ing of identity and the
structuring o f societies. Som e of these questions have been opened
in chapter 1, and they have been explored historically in chapter 2.
W hen questions are difficult there is always hope that history will
shed the light we need for discerning th e answers. W hen a turn to
history does n o t suffice, there is strong m otivation to look for insight
beyond our own W estern traditions. Knowledge of other traditions at
the very least helps us to clarify an understanding of our own tradi
tion, but it m ay also open up new possibilities for an overall approach
to the issues a t hand.
Ever since studies of culturally diverse sexual practices have be
com e available, W estern readers interested in sexual ethics have
largely used them , on th e one hand, to critique our own cultural
assum ptions and m les, suggesting that we can be freed from rigid re
strictions because we now know they are n ot universally recognized;
in other words, there m ust n ot be a naturally "h u m an " m oral require
m ent to believe and a ct as W esterners have traditionally done. O n the
other hand, we have used cross-cultural studies to reinforce our own
traditional eth ical perspectives, by identifying som e com m onalities
across cultures or by attributing differences to the fact that th e sexual
57
58 TUST LOVE
practiccs of other cultures arc sim ply more prim itive th an ours. In re
cen t years, however, both of these options have becom e problem atic.
For example, th e supposed sexual freedom in som e cultures has now
been relativized by th e discovery of m ore com plex patterns of rela
tionship internal to the cultures themselves (as we shall see below).
And it is no longer generally acceptable to rank cultures in terms
of som e theory of progress. T h is does n ot m ean that cross-cultural
studies are n o longer im portant for th e understanding of sexuality,
but their contribution is now as problematized as is the retrieval of
a usable past from the W estern tradition.
C ross-C u ltu ral Perspectives:

Im p o rtan ce for Sexual E th ics
Possibilities o f Cross-Cultural a nd
In terreligio us A w areness
T here are significant theoretical and practical reasons to engage in
cross-cultural studies of sexual beliefs and practices. T h e simple need
for a broader perspective is one of them . But so is the growing ac
knowledgment of the im portance of respecting differences in cultural
backgrounds, of m oderating th e tendency to universalize Western
cultural experience as if it represented the essentially hum an, and of
correcting th e often naive assum ptions of W estern C hristianity when
it com es to judging the sexual m ores of other societies and cultures.
Moreover, C hristianity itself, insofar as it is a world religion, exists
in cultures other th an those of W estern Europe and N orth America,·
and challenges to a m onolithic sexual ethic have been part of the
agenda for a C h ristian sexual ethic for a long tim e.1 Finally, it is al
m ost im possible for one culture to ignore others in the twenty-first
century w hen com m unication and transportation bring th e practices
1. A n o b v iou s ex a m p le is th e trou blin g q u estio n o f polygyny (or polygam y) a s

it h a s be en m e t over th e years by new ly baptized C h ris tia n s in A frican n a tio n s. See
E ugene H illm a n , P olygam y R eco n s id e re d : A frican P lu ral M arriage a n d t h e C hristian
C h u r c h es (M a ry k n o ll, N Y: O rb is, 1 9 7 5 ); M u sim b i R . A. K anyoro, "In te rp re tin g Old
T e s ta m e n t P oly gam y th ro u g h A frican Eyes/ ' in T h e Will t o A rise: W om en , T radition,
a n d t h e C h u rch in A frica, cd . M ercy A m b a O d uyoyc and M u sim b i R. A. K anyoro
(M a ry k n o ll, N Y: O rb is, 1 9 9 2 ), 8 7 - 1 0 0 ; A n n e N asim iy u -W asik e, "P olygam y: A F e m in is t
C r itiq u e ," in W ill t o A rise, 1 0 1 - 1 8 . I w ill retu rn to th is q u estio n in ch a p ter 7.
Difficult Crossings: D iverse Traditions 59
of alm ost all cultures into closc interaction w ith one another. T h e
issue of fem ale circum cision, for example, confronts n ot only world
organizations operating in m any countries, but it com es across bor
ders as the m igration of peoples increases for a variety of political
and econom ic reasons.2
Obstacles to the S ea rch fo r A lternative Perspectives

R esources
If there arc reasons for engaging in and w ith cross-cultural and inter-
religious studies regarding sexual beliefs and practices, there are also
significant practical and theoretical reasons against it. First among
these is the nature of the resources available for W estern readers,
particularly for eth icists.3 D isciplines engaged in studies of sexual
practices in diverse cultures are them selves facing internal profes
sional criticism s, conflicts, and questions of direction and purpose.
For example, the field of "folklore studies" has becom e radically
sclf-critical, n o longer collecting traditions but questioning the very
m eanings of "folk" and "trad ition."4 Anthropology in the twentieth
century produced an explosion of studies focused on sexuality in a
variety of cultures. But the anthropological (and w ithin it, eth n o
graphic) study of sexuality produces som etim es confusing results,
for a variety of reasons. T h e field of study rem ains difficult to define,
perhaps prim arily because there is not a univocal m eaning for "sexu
ality " across all cultures. T h e scope of empirical studies is extremely
broad, covering sexual behavior, identity, institutions, structures,
2 . T h e lite ra tu re o n th is p articu lar issu e is grow ing. A s an exam p le o f th e power

o f th e issu e to fu e l th e co n trov ersy over cro ss-cu ltu ra l e th ic s , see San d ra D . L an e and
R obert A . R u b in ste in , "Ju d gin g th e O th er: R espon d in g to T ra d itio n a l F em a le G e n ita l
S u rg e rie s," The Hastings Center Report 2 6 (M a y -Ju n e 1 9 9 6 1 : 3 1 - 4 0 .
3 . S e e th e d ifficu lties no ted by R ita N a k a sh im a B ro ck and S u san B ro o k s T h is tle -
th w a ite reg ard ing th e ir w o rk o n issu e s o f p ro stitu tio n in C astin g S to n es: P rostitution
a n d L ib era tio n in A sia a n d t h e U n ited S tates (M in n eap o lis: F ortress, 19961, 2 4 . In the
la st te n y ears, resou rces o n th ese a n d o th er issu e s have m u ltip lied consid erably, but
th ey c o n tin u e to be d ifficu lt to u se in w ays I d escrib e fu rth e r in th is chapter.
4 . S e e A r ju n A ppadurai, F ra n k J. K oro m , and M arg aret A . M ills, ed s., G ender,
G e n re, a n d P ow er in S o u th ea st A sian E xpressive T radition s (P h ilad elp hia: U niv ersity
o f P en n sy lv a n ia P ress, 1 9 9 1 ), 3 - 5 . T h e r e i s a tte n tio n paid h ere to th e fa ct th a t w om en
sch o la rs have m oved to th e fore in th e s e effo rts, brin g in g to g eth er fo lk lo ristics, a n
thropology, h is to ry of relig io n s, and a study o f g eographical areas in d ra m a tic new
w ays.
60 TUST LOVE
orientation, passion and desire, health and disease, sex education,

and so forth.5 Despite the breadth of scope, traditional research has
tended to focus (with som e exceptions6) on rites of initiation, and
on kinship system s and marriage — in other words, on sexuality as
a mode of social organization. W ithin this, there has been a ten
dency on th e part of researchers to emphasize the "exo tic," which is
basically w hatever is different from the scien tist's own culture.7
Not only th e focus but the actual investigation of anything like
a stable su bject m atter has becom e m ore problem atic. As the world
in a sense grows smaller, interaction between and am ong cultures
brings about change.8 Sim ple passage of tim e accounts for internal
change w ithin cultures as they adapt to new situations. T h e study
of cultures, especially w hen they are distant from our own, becomes,
therefore, an attem pt to grasp "an ever-receding point of social refer
ence."9 Personal and cultural biases of researchers,10 as well as their
frequent need to align with political authorities, yield som etim es con
flicting results as one researcher challenges the findings of another.
Perhaps th e greatest difficulty of all has been the influence of colonial
ism on cross-cultural research, particularly research on the sexuality
of colonized peoples. T h is issue m ust be exam ined in its own right,
and I return to it shortly.
5 . S e e L en o re M an d erso n , L inda R ae B e n n e tt, and M ich e lle Sh eld rake, " S e x , S o

c ia l In stitu tio n s, and S o cia l S tru ctu re: A n th rop o log ical C o n trib u tio n s to t h e S tu d y of
Sexu ality ,'' A n n u a l R ev iew o f S ex R es ea rch 10 11 9 9 9 ): 1 8 4 - 2 1 0 .
6 . T h is refers to th e w ork of a few sch o la rs su ch a s B ro n islaw M alin o w sk i and
M argaret M ead , w h ic h I tak e up below.
7. It m u st b e n o ted , how ever, th a t so m e o f th is h a s ch an g ed in th e la st tw enty
y ears, a s e m p irica l research o n sex u al p ra ctices h as been m o re and m o re driven by
p u b lic h e a lth co n ce rn s.
8. In th e tw e n ty -firs t c e n tu r y th e re a re s o m e s till-is o la te d p eo p les, b u t n o t m an y ,
and probably n o t for long. I n 1 9 9 9 D ia n a le a n S c h e m o reported th a t th e B razilian
A m azo n valley s h e lte r s "ap p ro xim ately 15 trib e s of t h e ra in fo rest t h a t h ave never been
studied or, in s o m e in sta n ces, ev en n am ed by sc h o la rs.'' S e e S c h e m o , " T h e L ast T rib al
B a ttle ," N e w York T im e s M ag a zin e 1 4 8 (O cto b e r 3 1 , 1 9 9 9 ): 72.
9 . E ric H o b sb a u m and T e re n c e R anges, T h e In v en tio n o f T rad ition (N ew York:
C am brid ge U n iv e r sity Press, 1 9 8 3 ), 2 2 .
10. T h e p ro b lem o f b ia s in an th rop olog ical stu d ies is d ram atically u n d erlin ed in
regard to in te rp re ta tio n s of m ale/fem ale in eq u a lities, a s n o ted b y M arily n S tra th c rn in
h e r " C o n c lu s io n " t o D ealin g w ith In eq u a lity : A n alyzin g G e n d e r R elation s in M elan esia
a n d B ey o n d , ed. M arily n S tra th e rn (N ew York: C am brid g e U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 8 7 ),
2 7 8 -3 0 2 .
C om parative Sexual Ethics

Even the best of social scientific research on sexual beliefs and prac
tices across cultures is not generally m atched by com parable studies
of the religious and cultural underpinnings of attitudes and prac
tic e s ." Moreover, w hat resources there arc regarding sexual m ores in
diverse cultures and religious traditions rem ain largely untapped for
dialogue regarding sexual ethics, whether because of language bar
riers or because sexuality tends n ot to be high on th e agenda of
intcrrcligious or inter-cultural dialogue. A n exception may be the
new work of fem inist scholars in eth ics.12 U ntil recently, compar
ative religious ethics has, for its part, focused largely on issues of
theory and m ethod. Even now, w hen specific norm ative ethical issues
are addressed, the tendency is to concentrate on questions such
as nonviolence, genocide, th e environm ent, distributive justice, and
general h um an rights.13 W hile this is changing, especially in regard
11. A n early e ffo rt to brid ge th e gap betw een anth rop ology and t h e stu d y o f religious
tra d itio n s c a n be found in G eo ffrey Parrinder, S e x in t h e W orld's R eligion s (N ew York:
O xford U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 8 0 ); and in P in g -C h cu n g L o, " Z h u X i and C o n fu cia n Sexual
E th ic s ," Jo u rn a l o f C h in e s e P h ilo so p h y 2 0 (1 9 9 3 1 : 4 6 5 - 7 7 .
12. Se e, e.g ., P a tricia B e a ttie ju n g , M a ry E. H u n t, and R ad h ik a B alak rish n an ,
ed s., G o o d Sex: F em in ist P ersp ectiv es fro m t h e W orld’s R elig ion s (N ew B ru n sw ick ,
N J: R utgers U n iv e r sity Press, 2 0 0 1 ) ; Laura E. D o n a ld so n and K w ok P u i-la n , eds..
P ostcolon ialism . F e m in is m , a n d R eligiou s D iscou rse (N ew Y ork: R outledge, 2 0 0 2 ).
13. T h e e ssa y s in S u m n er B . T w is s and B ru ce G relle, ed s., E x p loration s in G lo b a l
E thics: C o m p a r a tiv e R elig iou s E th ics a n d In terrelig iou s D ialogu e (Boulder, C O : W est-
vicw, 1 9 9 8 ), rep resen t a sig n ifican t co n trib u tio n in th is regard. S e e a lso lo h n Kclsay,
"Is la m a n d C o m p a ra tiv e E th ic s: R eview o f Se lected M a te ria ls, 1 9 8 5 - 9 5 , " R eligious
S tu d ies R e v ie w 2 3 (Jan u ary 1 9 9 7 ) : 3 - 9 ; and th e fo cu s is s u e o f th e Jo u rn a l o f R eligiou s
E th ics 2 6 (Fall 1 9 9 8 ) : " T h e 5 0 t h A n n iv ersary o f th e U n iv ersal D e c la ra tio n o f H u m an
R ig h ts ." A grow ing n u m b e r of cro ss-cu ltu ra l stu d ie s in m éd ical c th ic s c a n a lso be found,
th o u g h th ese are n o t n ecessarily ta k e n up in to co m p arativ e religious e th ic s . See, for
exam p le, A . S . B erg er and J. Berger, ed s., To D ie o r N o t t o D ie? Cross-disciplinary'. C u l
tural. a n d L eg al P ersp ectiv es o n t h e Right t o C h o o s e D ea th (N ew York: Praegcr, 1 9 9 0 );
R obert Baker, "A T h e o r y o f In te rn a tio n a l B io e th ics: M u ltic u ltu ra lis m , P ostm o d ern ism ,
and t h e B a n k ru p tcy o f F u n d a m e n ta lism ," and "A T h e o ry o f In te rn a tio n a l E th ic s: T h e
N eg o tiab le a n d t h e N o n -N eg o tia b le," K en n e d y In stitu te o f E th ics Jo u rn a l 8 (Septem ber
1 9 9 8 ): 2 0 1 - 3 1 a n d 2 3 3 - 7 3 . For m o re general co n sid era tio n s o f th e o ry and m eth od ,
see S u m n er B . T w is s and B ru ce G relle, " H u m a n R ig h ts and C o m p arativ e Religious
E th ic s: A N ew V en u e," in A n n u al o f t h e S o c iety o f C h ristian E th ics , ed. H a rla n B eck ley
(W ashin g to n, D C : G eorgetow n U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 9 5 ), 2 1 - 4 8 . S e c a lso D avid L ittle
and S u m n e r B . T w is s , C o m p a ra tiv e R elig iou s E th ics: A N e w M eth o d (N ew York: H ar
per & Row, 1 9 7 8 ) ; and fo r a su b sta n tiv e co m p arativ e stu d y of v irtu e, s e e Lee H . Ycarlcy,
M en ciu s a n d A q u in a s : T h e o r ie s o f Virtue a n d C o n c e p ü o n s o f C o u ra g e (A lbany: S ta te
U n iv e rsity of N ew York Press, 1 9 9 0 ).
62 TUST LOVE
to questions o f gender and its relevance to hum an rights, the sexual

ethical conversation is still in its beginning stages.14
Cultural C onstructionism a n d C om m on Morality
M ore seriously, cross-cultural and interreligious studies can chal

lenge the very enterprise of ethics as a discipline insofar as they
reinforce questions of ethical relativism and of the overwhelming de
term ination o f m oral norm s by historical and cultural contingencies.
If m oral rules and principles are in every respect specific to and con
ditioned by particular cultural contexts (including particular religious
traditions); if they have no basis whatsoever in a shared hum anity
or a universally intended com m and of God; then no am ount of eth
ical reflection will yield anything like an objective m oral assessm ent
of hum an sexual behavior (one capable of transcending a particular
culture), or anything of a com m on sexual m orality that would apply
to hum an persons as su ch .15 T h ese questions, not new to com para
tive religious and ethical studies in general, are especially significant
for sexual eth ics. T h e social construction of m oral rules is hardly
anywhere m ore evident than in the historical-cultural shaping of sex
ual roles, duties, prohibitions, even desires. Insofar as knowledge of
cross-cultural differences threatens all strong claim s to universality
for sexual norm s, perhaps all that ethicists can do is describe atti
tudes and practices as they appear in diverse cultures, acknowledge
their validity w ithin th e context of each culture (or even subculture),
and critique th em internally but judge them as a whole to be of equal
ethical m erit. If this is accurate, cross-cultural studies rem ain impor
tant, but prim arily for th e sake of fostering tolerance of diversity in
sexual behaviors and respect for differences in interpretations of the
m eaning of sexual desire.
14. For im p o rta n t m o ra l p h ilo so p h ical w o rk th a t cro sses c u ltu re s in regard to gen
d er issu es, see M a rth a N u ssb au m , S e x a n d S o c ia l Ju s tice (N ew York: O xford U niv ersity
Press, 1 9 9 9 ); a n d th e m a n y relevan t e ssay s in M a rth a N u ssb a u m and Jo n a th a n Glover,
cd s., W om en , C u ltu re a n d D e v e lo p m e n t: A S tu d y o f H u m an C a p a b ilitie s (O xford:
C la ren d o n Press, 1 9 9 5 ).
15. F o r a sp e ctru m of view s o n th e q u estio n o f a c o m m o n m orality, s e c G e n e O u tk a
and Jo h n P. Reeder, ed s., P rospects f o r a C o m m o n M orality (P rin ceton , N J: P rin ceto n
U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 9 3 ).
However, cross-cultural work on sexual cth ics may be n ot only

less useful b u t less benign than this. C ritical assessm ents of the cul
tural bias involved in all of these studies (biased precisely because of
the W estern lenses through w hich non-W estern cultures are viewed)
m ake one less than confident that w hat is produced through research
on non-W estern cultures is accurate or adequate. T h e problem is no
doubt less serious as m ore and more research is done by persons in
digenous to th e cultures and standing w ithin the religious traditions
being studied. Yet even here, older stereotypes as well as new biases
m ake it an u phill clim b for ethicists who w ish to take cultural and
religious traditions other th an their own into account.
C o lo n ia lis t R esearch and Its P ostco lo n ial C ritics
M assive problem s have emerged in the late tw entieth and early

twenty-first centuries regarding Western interpretations of non-
W estern cultures, and perhaps especially regarding sexual practices
w ithin these cultures. As we have already seen, studies of sexual
beliefs and practices in non-Western cultures have n ot been under
taken in a kind of historically "pure" world, where peoples form
com m unities and live out traditions autonomously, w ithout a m ix
ing with outside traditions. Past studies that continue to influence
our understanding of cultures other th an our own were done m ainly
in a world already divided into colonizers and colonized. Scholars
am ong the form er studied peoples am ong the latter. Even when a
particular people had n ot yet been colonized, the ways upon w hich
they were looked by scholars were the ways o f a colonizing power,
ways that rationalized the colonization of "backward" people by those
who considered them selves to be "progressive," m ore fully evolved,
and therefore rightful leaders am ong nations. Colonies were estab
lished under ancient regimes, but it is the four hundred years of
post-Renaissance W estern colonialism th at blanketed th e world into
w hich anthropologists (particularly ethnographers) entered in the
nineteenth and tw entieth centuries. It is into a largely postcolonial
world th a t th ey now go, but a world n o less already inscripted by a
history of powerful outside influences.
64 TUST LOVE
T h e Lessons o f “O rientalism ”
Edward Said's 1 978 publication of O rientalism provided a sobering

perspective on W estern approaches to non-Western cultures.16 T h is
by now classic work offered new lenses for th e interpretation of social
scientific research as well as literary depictions regarding formerly
colonized A sian, Latin Am erican, and African lands. O rientalism has
served as a m odel for postcolonialist critique that now calls so much
of th a t research into question. Said's own focus was on the historical
development of concepts and attitudes regarding the so-called O ri
ent. O rie n ta lis m " for him m eant (1) an academ ic field of studies
(crossing disciplines of anthropology, sociology, languages, history,
philology, and more) that addresses things O riental; (2) a way of
thinking about or im agining differences betw een the "O rien t" and the
"O ccident"; and (3) a discourse (in Foucault's sense of language and
knowledge shaped by power, and in this case, by powerful Western
system s of thought) that produces and circum scribes th e meaning
of the O rient politically, ideologically, socially, militarily, scientifi
cally, and artistically. As such, O rie n ta lis m " (or Said's analysis of it)
provides a tool for the interpretation of all colonizing efforts: It rep
resents colonization as a restructuring of people's experience and an
exercising of authority over an "O th er" — a hitherto unknown other
who m ust be understood according to the colonizer's categories. With
the em ergence of O rientalism out of the eighteenth century, Euro
pean (mainly French and British) culture created an understanding
of the cultures of the East (particularly India, C hina, Japan, the East
Indies), an understanding w hose content was shaped by W estern atti
tudes of superiority, racism , and im perialism .17 T h is understanding
constituted a stage on w hich the whole of the East was to be con
fined.18 O rientalism "is fundam entally a political doctrine willed over
the O rient, because the O rient was weaker than the West, w hich
elided the O rient's difference with its w eakness."19
16. Edward W . Said , O rien talism |Ncw York: V in tag e B o o k s, 1 9 7 9 ; originally

pu blished in 1 9 7 8 by P an th eo n B ooks}.
17. Ibid ., 3 - 4 .
18. Ib id ., 6 3 .
1 9 . Ibid ., 2 0 4 .
Said's claim is n ot that there is no correspondence at all between

O rientalism and w hat is to be found in the East; nor does h e claim
that only those who are indigenous to a culture can truly understand
it.20 It is, rather, that however m uch the W est w ants to define it,
there is no stable, essential reality that is "th e East." T h e im agina
tive m eanings of the people of the O rient, their custom s and destiny,
can be produced from w ithin but also from without. Said's analy
sis leads him to the broader observation that "th e notion that there
are geographical spaces w ith indigenous, radically 'different' inhabi
tan ts who ca n be defined on th e basis of som e religious, cultural, or
racial essence proper to th at geographical space i s . . . a highly debat
able idea."21 In th e case of the colonization of the East, its meaning
was predom inantly shaped from w ithout — so that Easterners as
well as W esterners internalized th e m eaning established through the
eyes of the colonizers. Scholars who studied the East looked at it
through these sam e eyes; and the results of their research m ust now
be interpreted in that light.
Since Said denies that O rientalism is sim ply a system atic weaving
of fictions and lies by outside powerful observers and rulers, h is plea
is not that n o one study or interact w ith another culture, but that
outsiders becom e cautious and critical in their interpretation of the
aim s, discourse, and power relations involved.22 C olonizer and colo
nized arc changed by their historical encounter; images of the "W est"
depend in part on the W est's images of the "E ast" (and vice versa);
rescarchcr and subject arc both changed as well. Every effort to under
stand ourselves and others, therefore, requires that we challenge the
legacies of previous interpreters, probe our own biases, critique our
place in the historical dynam ics of power and knowledge, and identify
the categories th at lead to error and to harm.
Lessons fo r S ex u a l Ethics
Said's perspective may be nowhere more helpful th an in efforts to

understand th e sex u al beliefs and practices of cultural and religious
2 0 . Ibid ., 4 - 6 , 2 7 2 - 7 3 , 3 2 2 .
2 1 . Ib id ., 3 2 2 ,
2 2 . Ib id ., 2 7 2 - 7 3 .
66 TUST LOVE
traditions th a t arc alien. It is, in fact, astonishing how central

sexuality appears in the programs of colonization everywhere (and
the influence of colonial views on subsequent W estern interpreta
tions of non-W estern expressions of sexuality). T h e m ore distant
and different peoples appeared to their visitors and colonizers, the
m ore were th eir "native" bodies sexualized, eroticized, in racially
charged fields.23 Postcolonial (particularly fem inist) scholarship to
day has begun to shed light on the epistem ic violcncc24 visited upon
non-W estern cultures by their W estern conquerors or settlers — a
violence that indeed aimed to restructure th e experience and the
self-understanding of peoples through the im position of Western
ideas. In the early tw entieth century, Carl Jung popularized a view
of the peoples of India and C hina as reflective of the archetypal "a n
im a," com plem entary to a W estern "an im u s."25 C onsonant w ith this
view, Eastern sexuality was understood as lyrical, childlike, in no
cently free, and radically different from sexuality in the West. Early
visitors and colonizers of the South Seas, Africa, and Latin Amer
ica interpreted indigenous sexual practices as permissive, licentious,
"savage," an affront to W estern sensibilities.26 Such practices were
measured against longstanding W estern religious and cultural beliefs
that sex is a powerful and instinctive drive, requiring discipline and
2 3 . T h e lan g u age o f th e "ero ticiz ed b o d y " o f d om in ated p eo p les h as b e c o m e quite

c o m m o n in p o stco lo n ia l stu d ies, b u t s e c in particular, A n n Stolcr, "E d u c a tin g D esire
in C o lo n ia l S o u th e a s t A sia: F ou cau lt, Freud, and Im p erial S e x u a litie s ," in S ites o f D e
sire /E co n o m ies o f P leasu re: S ex u a lities in A sia a n d t h e P acific, cd . L cn o rc M an d crso n
and M arg aret Jo lly (C h icag o : U n iv e rsity o f C h ic a g o Press, 1 9 9 7 ), 2 7 - 4 7 .
2 4 . S e e L a u ra A . D o n a ld so n , " T h e B re a s ts o f C o lu m b u s: A P o litical A n a to m y o f
P o stco lo n ia lism a n d F e m in is t R elig iou s D is c o u r s e ," in P ostcolon ia h sm , F em in ism , a n d
R eligiou s D isco u rse, 51.
2 5 . Kw ok P u i-la n , "G end er, C o lo n ia lism , and th e Stu d y o f R elig io n ," in P ost-
c o lo n ia lism , F e m in is m , a n d R elig iou s D iscou rse, 1 9 - 2 3 . S e e a lso th e critiq u e o f
op p osition al and co m p le m e n ta ry in terp retatio n s o f E ast/W est in S h e rry O rtn er, "E a s t
B ra in , W est B ra in : D o W ays o f T h in k in g C leav e A lon g L in e s of G eog rap h y ?" N e w York
T im e s B o o k R e v ie w (April 2 0 0 3 ) . O rtn e r is review ing R ich ard E. N is b e tt's T h e G e o g ra
p h y o f T h ou g h t: f l o w A sian s a n d W estern ers T h in k D ifferen tly . . . a n d W hy (N ew York:
F ree Press, 2 0 0 3 ) .
2 6 . S e e S te p h e n O . M u rra y and W ill R osco c, ed s., Boy-W ives a n d F e m a le H u sban ds
(N ew York: Palgravc, 1 9 9 8 ), xi; A dam R ccd , "C o n te ste d Im ag es and C o m m o n S tra te
g ies: E arly C o lo n ia l S e x u al P o litics in th e M a s s im ," in S ites o f D esire /E c o n o m ies o f
P leasu re, 4 9 .
control. H ence, indigenous peoples were informed that their scxual-

ized bodies w ere in need of restraint, and their sexual practices m ust
be lim ited in purpose.
Ironically, w hite m ale colonizers who liked the sexual freedom they
them selves could exercise apart from w hat they considered to be the
bourgeois norm s of their own countries, took local wom en in the
colonies as concubines.27 T h is was particularly true of white men,
often soldiers, who could easily hire native wom en as both domestic
and sexual servants. W hen w hite wom en arrived, they were segre
gated in order to “protect" them from the supposed licentiousness of
the local inhabitants. W hether married or single, w hite w om en be
cam e m odels of European dom esticity and restrained sexuality, and
helped to set the standard for civilization in th e colonies.
It was not only visitors, conquerors, settlers, and researchers who
shaped W estern (and ultim ately non-Western) beliefs about sexual
ity am ong th e inhabitants of far away lands. O n the contrary, it is
hardly possible to overestim ate th e influence of religious m ission
aries in this regard. W hile som e colonizers and researchers were
interested in the sexual m ores of "native" peoples insofar as they
provided a basis for critique of W estern practices, m any C hristian
m issionaries dircctcd their zeal toward changing indigenous behav
iors and beliefs. T h ey judged inhabitants of m ission countries to be
unrestrained and sexually dangerous to them selves and to their colo
nizers. If these as yet "uncivilized" peoples were to be redeemed, they
m ust be educated to a radically m ore disciplined practice of sexuality.
T h is becam e a criterion for receiving the good news of the C hris
tian gospel. W hat m any m issionaries did, therefore, was to focus on
the sexual bodies of indigenous persons and groups, m aking these a
"target of in terven tion."28
T h e goals of m issionary activity reinforced th e goals of coloniza
tion — that is, to "civilize" peoples. Civilization, of coursc, was
equated w ith judgments of progress according to W estern ways. As
Sophia C hen observes, "m issionaries who cam e to C hina were not
prepared to m eet a culture that could rival the one they had been
2 7 . S e e Sto ler, "E d u ca tin g D esire in S o u th e a st A s ia ," 3 2 - 3 8 .

2 8 . Reed, "C o n te s te d Im ag es and C o m m o n S tra te g ic s," 4 8 .
68 TUST LOVE
used to ."29 Although C hina was no doubt a spécial case in this re
gard, som ething of th e sam e could be said of m issionaries in parts of
Africa and Latin Am erica as well.
Despite the fact that m ost colonies have by now achieved political
independence, colonialism continues. C olonial ideologies continue
to shape the interaction between W est and East, and between the
West and the world's South. T h e em ergent leaders of newly in
dependent countries were, after all, largely trained in the schools
and sem inaries of the colonizers. W estern notions of modernity,
industrial progress, and sexuality continue, therefore, to shape the
self-understandings of formerly colonized peoples. Moreover, many
econom ic and political form s of contem porary globalization sustain
power relations whereby the West continues to control the ordinary
lives of peoples around the world.
Postcolonialist critiques of colonialist interpretations of non-
W estern sexual m ores aim n ot only to deconstruct the processes
that led to these interpretations but to offer remedies. T h a t is, they
aim n ot only to avoid w hat are considered m istakes or at least con
fusions of th e past, but to propose necessary new ways of interacting
with diverse cultures in the present. For example, Lenore Manderson
and M argaret Jolly indicate their "desire to view sexuality n ot just
as an autonom ous realm of the senses, but as embedded in a social
world structured and saturated w ith relations of power/'30 a world
in which gender, sexual orientation, race, and class m ust be taken
into account. And African theologian M usa Dube insists that post
colonialist analysis m ust include "a search for answers and change in
the face of entrenched global structures of oppression and exploita
tio n ."31 To th is end, postcolonialist theories m ust highlight n ot only
2 9 . So p h ia H . C h e n , "A N o n -C h ris tia n E s tim a te ," C h in e s e R eco rd e r 6 5 { 1 9 3 4 ): 1 1 4 ,

a s cited in K w o k P u i-la n , "U n b in d in g O u r F eet: Saving Brow n W om en and F e m in is t
R elig iou s D is c o u r s e ," in P ostcolon ialism , F em in ism , a n d R eligiou s D iscou rse , 6 2 .
3 0 . M a n d e rso n and lolly, S ites o f D esire/E co n o m ies o f P leasu re, 2 6 . S e e also G ayatri
C h ak rav orty Sp ivak , In O th e r W orlds: E ssays in C u ltu ral P olitics (N ew York: M eth u en ,
1 9 8 7 ) ; Spivak, " C a n th e Su b a ltern S p e a k *" in M arxism a n d t h e In terp retation o f
C u ltu re, ed. G . N e ls o n and L. G ro ssb erg (U rb an a: U n iv ersity o f Illin o is P ress, 1 9 8 8 ).
3 1 . M u sa W. D u b e , "P osteolo n iality , F e m in is t Sp aces, and R elig io n ," in P ost
c o lo n ia lism , F e m in is m , a n d R elig iou s D iscou rse, 102.
oppression and exploitation, but the ways in w hich colonized na

tions developed strategies "to resist dom ination, to decolonize their
own lands, m inds, and to charter their own liberation as well as to
propose better, more ju st form s of international relations."32
T o avoid here an overly abstract theoretical consideration of these
issues, one th a t rem ains two or m ore levels removed from actual sex
ual practices, it is useful to look at som e particular studies, reports,
and analyses of cultural and religious traditions. Given the general
critiques we have ju st seen of such studies, we m ust proceed w ith all
due caution, b u t nonetheless proceed. After all, the argument I made
at the beginning of this chapter regarding the im portance of taking di
verse traditions into account, still holds. O ur access to the traditions
is necessarily mediated by m ore or less helpful interpretations, with
all of their inevitable biases. But it may not be com pletely blocked.
We may learn from studies and representations of diverse traditions,
even if a m ajor part of w hat we learn is through the critiques they
have provoked. Moreover, the caution w ith w hich we approach this
m aterial may serve, to som e extent, to m itigate the problems of ideo
logical overlay. If we do not count on an adequate and stable view
of diverse traditions, we may nonetheless com e to understand why
there is conflict and confusion regarding sexual ethics n ot only in the
W est but elsewhere as well.
It is n either possible nor appropriate to attem pt here a com prehen
sive survey o f cross-cultural and interreligious studies of sexuality.
A small sam pling of reports on indigenous traditions in the South
Pacific and A frica,33 a new study of a classical text from India (the
K am asutra), and a critical rendering of M uslim sexual beliefs and
norm s, can serve to particularize questions at stake. I am aware that
my "sam p les" do n ot fit a com m on category (for example, all of them
fitting into cultural o r religious traditions); yet as such they provide
3 2 . Ibid.
3 3 . I n E x p loration s in G lo b a l E th ics , 1 6 7 - 7 1 , T w is s provides a s u ccin ct overview of
"in d ig en ou s tr a d itio n s " a s a co n tem p o rary cla ss of trad itio n s rep resen tin g m o re th a n
3 0 0 m illio n p eople in A sia, A frica, th e A m ericas, a n d th e P acific Islan d s. H is a tten tio n
to ind ig en ou s p eo p le d iffers fro m w h a t follow s in th is ch a p te r in th a t it addresses
general q u e stio n s o f h u m an rig h ts, and i t d ocs n o t go b a ck in h isto ry to s e le ct exam p les.
M y id e n tific a tio n of o n e tra d itio n in th e n in e te e n th cen tu ry , w hile le ss sa tisfa cto ry in
so m e resp ects, m a k e s th e p o in t abo u t sex u al m o re s th a t is im p o rta n t here.
70 TUST LOVE
a broader sweep of possibilities, w hich I hope will be instructive in

the end.
P re-m od ern Islands o f th e Sou th Seas
Som e of the m o st im portant ethnographie studies done in the early

1920s, focusing on people in th e South Sea Islands, continue to be
influential in our thinking about sexuality and "oth er" cultures to
day Bronislaw M alinowski, for example, studied the sexual lives of
the natives o f the Trobriand Islands (located off the coast of w hat is
now Papua N ew Guinea, in the Solom on Sea).34 Though his work is
in m any ways outdated, it rem ains significant as an early study fo
cusing precisely on sexual m ores. T h e perspective he brought to his
studies and articulated as a result of th em still pervades the W estern
anthropological interpretation of indigenous sexuality am ong sim ilar
peoples.35 Influenced by early m issionary reports of sexual perm is
siveness on th ese islands, M alinowski began his work with a hope
of ultim ately critiquing, by contrast, w hat he considered to be Eu
ropean m oral rigidity regarding sexuality. He cam e to agree with
m issionary im pressions of other-world perm issiveness, but unlike
the m issionaries, M alinow ski by and large refrained from judging un
fettered "savage" sexuality as morally inferior to repressive Western
practices and attitudes.
W hen M alinow ski arrived to study the sexual lives of the T r o
briand Islanders, he found w hat appeared to h im to be a truly
different world.36 Sex was more than a physiological transaction
between two individuals, and m ore than a mode of reproducing a
people; it perm eated alm ost every aspect of the Islanders' lives. In its
3 4 . S e e B ro n isla w M a lin o w sk i, T h e S ex u a l L ife o f S avages in N orth-W estern

M ela n esia (N ew Y ork: H alcy o n H o u se, 1 9 2 9 ).
3 5 . See, lo r e x a m p le , Reed, "C o n te ste d Im ag es and C o m m o n S tra te g ie s," 4 8 .
3 6 . For a p a rtia l h isto ry o f an th rop olog ical stu d ie s regarding sex u ality in M elan esia,
see G ilb e rt H . H e rd t, "In tr o d u c tio n ," in R itu a liz ed H o m o sex u a lity in M ela n esia , ed.
G ilb e rt J . H e rd t (Berkeley: U n iv ersity o f C a lifo rn ia P ress, 1 9 8 4 ), 1 - 6 ; and B ru ce M .
K nau ft, S o u th C o a s t N e w G u in ea C u ltu res: H istory, C o m p a riso n . D ia lectic (N ew York:
C am brid ge U n iv e r sity P ress, 1 9 9 3 ), 1 6 - 2 4 . For an overview o f t h e islan d c u ltu re s of
M ela n esia , see M a tth e w Spriggs, T h e Isla n d M elan esia n s (C am brid ge, M A : B lackw ell,
1 9 9 7 ), esp ecia lly ch ap s. 1 -7 .
widest m eaning it constituted a "sociological and cultural force."37

Sex am ong the islanders, as M alinowski interpreted it, implied love
and love-making; it was at the heart of marriage and family; it m o
tivated art and was incorporated into m agic and spells. But precisely
because sex was woven in to th e fabric of life, both desire and activity
were formed and colored by the details of that life. It looked different
from w hat M alinow ski and other researchers were used to in Eu
rope, yet in som e respects, at least, it appeared to be the sam e — not
parallel, but analogous.38
For exam ple, am ong th e Trobrianders, som e occupations were
strictly gender assigned. M en were expected to carry loads on their
shoulders, w hile wom en carried them on their heads. W om en were
responsible fo r the water supply, and it would be unthinkable for
them n ot to spend tim e every day filling jars at water holes. House
hold tasks were divided along gender lines. Should there be a crossing
of gender roles on these m atters, however sm all they might seem , the
result was sham e for the whole of a family.
As for gender equality, nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century
W estern visitors and researchers found it difficult to understand.
Here was a m atrilinear society where legal relations of kinship and
descent were determined through the m other.39 Trobrianders be
lieved that a child's body was solely and exclusively formed from
the m other.40 A child, therefore, is of th e sam e substance as its
m other; between father and child there is "no bond of physical union
whatsoever.41 (Indeed, there was — according to M alinowski — no
understanding of reproduction as the joining of two entities through
intercourse; all that was essential was the "sim ple dilation of the
vagina."42) Yet strong em otional ties could be forged between father
and child, and (som ething M alinowski considered "odd") the male
child was considered to resemble the father, n ot the m other or her
brothers.43
3 7 . M a lin o w sk i, T h e S ex u a l L ife o f S avages, xx iii.

3 8 . Ib id ., X X V .
3 9 . Ibid, ch a p s. 1, 5 , and 8.
4 0 . Ib id ., 3.
4 1 . Ibid ., 4.
4 2 . Ib id ., 1 8 2 .
4 3 . Ibid ., 2 0 6 .
72 TUST LOVE
W hile the society was m atrilineal, marriage was patrilocal, m ean

ing th a t a wife moved to h er husband's village and the married couple
lived in the husband's house. Here the wife was the legal head of the
family, and she could have h er own separate possessions (though she
could n ot own land). Yet in effect, the husband was m aster of the
house, since the house was in his village, and it belonged to him.
Moreover, regarding children, a wife was actually second in co m
mand, next to her own eldest brother. Gradually a m ale child learned
that he was n ot from the sam e clan as his father, and that his prop
erty rights and rights of citizenship were lodged in the village where
his m aternal uncle lived, an uncle who assumed increasing author
ity over him . In other words, social position was handed on in the
m other-line, b u t from a m an to h is sister's children. Social privi
leges were passed down through wom en, but they were exercised by
m en. As M alinow ski put it, in every generation wom en continued
their line, and m en represented it. Power and functions in the family
and clan were vested in m en, though they had to be transm itted by
w om en.44
A nother area of sexual behavior of great interest to researchers
like M alinow ski was the sexual experience of the young. Early years
of sexual experience for Trobrianders were m arked by great free
dom.45 Since there was little privacy in the hom e, children knew
a lot about th e sexual activities of their elders. As children, their
own sexual activity "in the bush" was not regulated. W hen they be
cam e adolescents, however, it was usual for personal preferences to
develop, based on passion or "affinity of characters."46 Gradually, m u
tual ties strengthened and stabilized, leading ultim ately to marriage.
Marriage was preceded by a period of active sexual life during which
two individuals could live together as publicly recognized lovers, but
w ithout legal obligations. For econom ic and social reasons, these re
lationships usually moved eventually into marriage. M alinow ski's
observation w as that after marriage, th e passionate stage of sex was
left behind, and m uch more rigid expectations of propriety cam e into
4 4 . ibid ., 2 8 .
4 5 . Ib id ., e sp e cia lly c h a p s. 3 , 4 , and 10.
4 6 . Ib id ., 6 7 .
placc. Privacy was lost, as the couplc moved into th e husband's par
ents' house; and in public, intim acy was n ot to be expressed (there
could be no holding of hands, nor even walking side by side).
Interestingly, although sexual activity am ong th e young and as
yet unm arried was frequent, illegitim ate children were rare and con
sidered reprehensible. O u t of fam ily interest, they were concealed
and u ltim ately adopted by a m ale relative. W hat they needed was a
"social fath er/' since, as noted above, physical fatherhood was not
understood.
M alinow ski reported observable sexual behavior that was very dif
ferent from w hat he and other researchers were fam iliar w ith: for
example, they seldom saw kissing, but they did see rubbing of noses,
cheeks, and m ouths, and biting and scratching as signs of love and
affection.17 W h en it cam e to particular sexual rules, however, these
M alinowski interpreted as at least analogous to European norm s.48
Incest taboos were absolute, n ot only between parent and child but
between brother and sister (something required in the m atrilineal
structure of th e society where brother-sister relations had to be care
fully restricted). Marriage was monogam ous (except for tribal chiefs,
who had the privilege of m ore than one wife). Adultery was pro
hibited. If a m arriage did n ot work out, it could easily be dissolved
(som etim es sim ply by one party leaving). Divorce was frequent, and
w hen it took place, children followed the mother, n ot the father. Sex
and marriage were n ot allowed between m em bers of th e sam e clan.
T here were lim its (as suggested above regarding married couples) to
w hat was acceptable in public regarding touching or the showing of
tenderness. M odesty was required in dress.
Bestiality, exhibitionism , oral and anal sex, were all prohibited,
though not necessarily unpracticed. M asturbation was judged undig
nified for a m an, though it was considered more am using than
repulsive. Hom osexuality, as M alinow ski reported it, was held in
contem pt, except in the form of nonsexual friendship.49
M alinow ski looked for a strange new world, and he found one; but
in the end, it was n ot so strange. T h e Trobrianders had as many
4 7 . Ibid ., 3 3 1 .
4 8 . Ib id ., 1 2 0 - 4 2 , 2 0 1 , 4 3 8 - 3 9 , 4 5 5 - 5 6 .
4 9 . Ib id ., 4 4 8 , 4 5 3 , 4 6 8 , 4 7 1 - 7 6 .
74 TUST LOVE
rules as they had liberties. T h eir society was stabilized by norm s of

decency and decorum as well as rigid restrictions. Sexual indulgences
had their place, but the place was circumscribed. M alinow ski's find
ings seem clear, and his reports straightforward. Yet h is research and
publications have been problematized in ways th at both justify the
caution with w hich we began and sustain the interest (and labor)
needed to understand better any traditions that are n ot our own.
M alinow ski's research has been challenged in several respects.
Subsequent claim s made by other anthropologists regarding M elane
sian attitudes toward hom osexuality offer an interesting case in
point. G ilbert Herdt, for example, is critical of M alinowski (and
other researchers) for w hat Herdt considers to be a biased inter
pretation of m ale sam e-sex relations in island cultures.50 He argues
that hom osexuality is denied, left out, or treated as a perversion in
these cultures (as in M alinow ski's report of contem pt for it) primar
ily because of researchers' prejudice. Hcrdt's own study distinguishes
ritualized hom osexuality from hom osexual "id entity" and finds the
form er to be com m on in island cultures. By "ritualized" Herdt usu
ally m eans th a t it is incorporated into m ale initiation rites, so that
it involves sex between m ales of different ages. He later cam e to re
fer to it as "boy-inscm ination." W hat this m eans is that there is not
contem pt for outward hom osexual behavior (as M alinowski alleged);
there just is n o concept of feelings, goals, or an internal sense of self
that yields an accepted hom osexual identity.
In response to Herdt, Bruce Knauft tends to support M alinowski,
though he acknowledges a postm odern skepticism regarding the pos
sibility of any real objectivity in ethnographic research.51 C ritical
of Herdt's own bias, Knauft in sists that it is "highly questionable"
w hether ritualized hom osexuality was in fact prevalent in w est or
lowland sou th New Guinea, though there is som e docum entation of
it along the southern coast.32 Knauft argues that a search for accurate
data is and ca n be driven by confidence in som e degree of possible ob
jectivity Ethnographic research need not, therefore, sim ply produce
an artefact, a projection of the researchers' own cultural biases.
5 0 . S e e H e rd t, R itu alized H o m o sex u a lity in M elan esia.

5 1 . K n au ft, S o u th C o a s t N e w G u in ea C u ltu res , 3 - 9 , 4 5 - 4 8 .
5 2 . Ib id ., 4 7 - 4 8 .
As for M alinow ski's report of gender relations, subsequent scholars

have quarreled about whether or n ot m atrilineal societies as he de
scribed them brought anything like gender equality. M ale dom inance
seem s to hold sway, no m atter w hat im portance is given to women's
biological role in inheritance. In response to this dispute, M arilyn
Strathern suggests that questions of equality sim ply cannot be adju
dicated by W estern scholars attem pting to interpret a non-Western
culture. T h e ir contemporary categories of power do n ot allow them
to understand quite different categories and experiences of power as
it was and is divided between m en and w om en in other cultures.
Her claim is th at peoples in pre-modern indigenous cultures simply
did n ot have conceptual tools for understanding notions of co m
m on hum anity or individual agency.53 D istin ction s between active
and passive roles were not rccognizcd. Relationships were sufficiently
com plex that it is alm ost impossible for us to sort out w hat various
descriptive term s like "com plem entarity," "dom inance," "separation"
really m eant in contexts far removed from our own. W estern ideas
about equality have legal and political, as well as philosophical, roots.
N onetheless, Strathern observes that in m any cases it is men who
appear to be th e principal public "transactors of value" and women
the "transacted ."54 M en everywhere have authoritative responsibility
for public and cultural activity, while w om en rem ain associated with
powers in th e spheres of reproduction.
In addition to challenges regarding the usefulness of M alinowski's
findings on sam e-sex relations and on gender parity, there are critics
of his and others' work on the sexual behavior of indigenous young
people. T h e m ost direct attack on this kind of work was m ounted in
5 3 . S tra th e rn , cd ., D ea lin g w ith In equ ality , 1 - 1 4 . F o r a sk ep tical view abo u t

w o m en 's a c h ie v e m e n t o f au to n o m y in m a trilin eal so c ie tie s , s e e also A n n C h ow n in g,
'" W o m e n are o u r B u sin e ss': W o m en E xch an g e and P restig e in K o v e," in D ea lin g w ith
In eq u a lity , 1 3 1 . M a rth a M a c ln ty rc i s m o re o p tim is tic in h e r e ssa y in th is s a m e v o lu m e:
"F ly in g W itc h e s a n d L eap in g W arriors: Su p ern atu ral O rig in s o f Pow er and M atrilin eal
A u th o rity in T u b e tu b e S o ciety ," in D ealin g w ith In eq u a lity , 2 0 7 - 8 . M a tth e w Spriggs
o b serv es th a t m a trilin e a l s o c ie tie s are d efin itely n o t m a tria rch ie s, hut in th em w om en
a rc h eld in h ig h e r e ste e m th a n in p atrilin eal o r p atriarch al so cieties; see Spriggs, T h e
Islan d M ela n esia n s, 2 7 9 - 8 1 .
5 4 . S tra th e rn , "C o n c lu s io n ," D ealin g w ith In eq u a lity , 2 7 8 , 2 9 8 - 9 9 . F o r rep orts of
v a ria tio n s o n d is tr ib u tio n o f pow er b etw een w o m en and m en , see K n au ft, S ou th C oast
N e w G u in e a C u ltu res, 8 6 - 1 1 6 .
76 TUST LOVE
response n ot to Malinowski but to another ethnographer, Margaret

Mead. T h e questions raised, however, are applicable to M alinowski's
research as well.
M ead, like M alinowski, contributed to the view of the indigenous
individual as an "inn ocen t savage," unrepressed by civilization and
its constraints. Beginning her work as a graduate student in the
1920s, Mead first sought to determ ine whether th e experience of
adolescents is as difficult in non-Western cultures as in W estern.55
Also like M alinow ski, she went to the South Seas, in particular to
Sam oa, an island group east-northeast of Fiji. T h e subjects of her
research w ere 6 8 young w om en. From them , she heard and reported
that Sam oan young people deferred marriage but n o t sex for many
years. After considerable experience w ith w hat W esterners would call
"casual sex," th ey later married, reared children, and helped to build
and sustain th eir fam ilies. T h e society appeared com pletely stable;
there was no adolescent angst; and all m em bers were incorporated
into Sam oan society in patterned ways that were n ot threatened by
m ultiple early sexual encounters.
Unfortunately, M ead's work cam e under a cloud after h er death in
1978. T h e anthropologist, Derek Freeman, claim ed that his own field
work in Sam oa fifty years later revealed that M ead's subjects had lied
to her about th eir sexual experiences.56 Indeed, he reported that one
of M ead's primary inform ants confessed that she and a friend had
played a joke on Mead; that, in fact, w hat they had told h er was co m
pletely untrue. Far from young Sam oans being sexually promiscuous,
they adhered to a very strict sexual code wherein fem ale virginity
prior to marriage was valued and required. T h e controversy about
this research raged for several years am ong anthropologists, with
Mead n ot alive to respond. Freeman had a larger thesis he wanted
5 5 . S e e M a rg a re t M ead , C o m in g o f A ge in S a m o a (N ew York: W illia m M orrow ,

1 9 2 8 ).
5 6 . D e r e k F re e m a n , M argaret M ea d a n d S a m o a : T h e M akin g a n d U n m a k in g o f
a n A n th ro p o lo g ica l M yth (C am brid ge, M A : H arvard U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 8 3 ). Freem an
reiterated h is c la im s in an a rticle h e w ro te in 1 9 9 2 and in a seco n d book in 1 9 9 9 .
S e c F reem an , "P arad ig m s in C o llisio n : T h e F ar-reach ing C o n tro v ersy O v er t h e S am o an
R esea rch es of M a rg a ret M e a d ," A c a d e m ic Q u estio n s 5 (S u m m er 1 9 9 2 ): 2 3 - 4 4 . S e c also
F reem an , T h e F a tefid H oaxin g o f M argaret M ea d : A H istorical A n alysis o f H er S a m o a n
R es ea rch (Boulder, C O : W estview , 1999].
to prom ote: that is, n ot only was M ead's research invalid, but the
assum ptions about Polynesian sexuality w ith w hich she began, and
the conclusions that she drew about the social construction of sexu
ality, were also both wrong. T h e heart of the controversy was, then,
really over w hether there are som e biological universals for hum an
sexual activity, or whether each culture completely shapes the sexual
paradigms th a t operate w ithin it.
T h e issue here is n ot w hether Mead or Freeman were right (many
anthropologists today th in k it is impossible to settle this definitively),
but whether cross-cultural social-scientific studies can help in the de
velopment of a sexual ethic. For one thing (as I have noted above),
no culture rem ains static over tim e, and w hat were thought to be
"prim itive" cultures have n ot remained so, by and large. M ead's re
search subjects, for example, are now great-grandparents in a culture
that has endured, but changed. As Mead herself said in a later edi
tion of her work: "T h e young Sam oans in universities throughout
the U nited States often find this account of how their ancestresses
lived as em barrassing as all of u s find the clothes our m others wore
w hen we w ere young."57 Yet m any W estern thinkers continue to reify
"prim itive" cultures, holding them in seemingly tim eless images that
are convenient w hen com parisons are made to m ore "progressive"
cultures.
A frican C u ltu res
W hat is true of W estern perspectives on sexuality am ong the peoples

of the South Sea Islands is to som e extent mirrored w hen it com es to
W estern perspectives on African peoples. Yet th e African con tinent is
in a m uch m ore com plicated historical relationship with the West,
and it presents a m uch m ore complicated su b ject— w hether for col
onizers and form er colonizers, m issionaries, visitors, or researchers.
In fact, it is probably foolhardy to try to represent anything about
sexuality as it is experienced, understood, and lived, in Africa as a
whole. For o n e thing, Africa is a con tinent w ith hundreds of different
peoples in every country, each with its own cultural histories, kinship
5 7 . M ead , " P rc fa c c 1 9 7 3 E d itio n ," C o m in g o f A g e in S a m o a , vi.

78 TUST LOVE
structures, rituals, and m orality codcs. T h e difficulty of generalizing

from one African people to another is rendered even more complex
by today's growing m ovem ent of individuals and fam ilies from ru
ral to urban settings and by the forccd m igration of workers and of
political refugees.
Moreover, throughout Africa there are at least three layers of h is
torical experience that continue to shape sexual m ores. T h ese are the
layers of (1) indigenous traditional experience, (2) the experience of
colonialism , and (3) "m odern" and contem porary cxpcricncc. These
historical periods did not simply succeed one another; they remain
as elem ents of belief and practice w ithin Africa today. Traditional
system s that were once integral wholes may have broken down, yet
they endure in significant m easure and influence. Even th e legal sys
tem s in m ost parts of Africa are a m ixture of customary, colonial,
and postcolonial law.*8 Moreover, each of these layers of experience
is permeated and shaped by religious traditions — African traditional
religions, the religions of colonizers and conqucrors (primarily C hris
tian and M uslim ), and the m ixture of these traditions as they coexist
in the contem porary world of change. C ustom , law, and religious
belief all have significant im pact on sexual m eanings and practice.
A n additional com plication in approaching African ways of living
out hum an sexuality is that w e have today not only co-m ingled el
em ents from different historical periods but significant retrospective
and prospective critiques of beliefs and practices. T here are fem inist
postcolonialist critiques, C hristian theological ethical critiques, and
the existential critical questions raised by the dire situation regarding
H IV and A ID S across vast regions of the continent. Critiques are rev
elatory of traditions, but they focus on w hat is problem atic and tend
only to presum e whatever constitutes the strength and richness in
traditions they critique. T h is works well as internal critique, though
it can be m isleading for W esterners w ho stand outside the traditions
them selves. D espite these com plications, it is im portant to attend to
58. S e e Ifi A m a d iu m e , M ale D au ghters, F e m a le H u sb an d s: G e n d e r a n d S ex in

a n A frican S o c iety (London: Z ed B o o k s, 1 9 8 7 ), 1 8 5 - 8 6 ; Je a n n e M ad d o x T ou n g ra,
"C h a n g in g th e M e a n in g o f M arriage: W o m en and Fam ily Law in C ô te d 'Iv o ire ," in
A frican F e m in is m : t h e P olitics o f Survival in S u b-S aharan A frica, ed. G w end oly n M ikell
(P h ilad elp hia: U n iv e rsity o f P en n sy lvan ia Press, 1 9 9 7 ), 5 4 - 5 6 .
African cxpcricnccs of culture, religion, and sexuality. W hatever the

diversity w ithin Africa, there are som e generalizations w ith w hich we
can begin, as long as we identify th em provisionally. W ithout denying
the problems raised from w ithin by a tradition's adherents, it may
be possible to glim pse som ething of th e fabric of life th at has served
peoples well, at least u n til now.
Sexuality a n d Com m unity

If there is a shared central elem ent in African understandings of sex,
it is that sexuality is primarily for the sake of the com m unity. T h is
cardinal belief shapes m any sexual norm s in ways that m ake them
difficult for W esterners to interpret. M arriage, for example, is gener
ally expected of everyone. And despite hundreds of years of colonial
and m issionary efforts to prom ote and even enforce a principle of
individual choice, the arrangem ent or at least approval of marriages
rem ains to a significant extent in the hands of fam ilies, each ex
tending to m ultiple generations in th e present and in the past. T h e
com m unitarian character of marriage is represented by th e tendency
of traditional marriage (unlike cither civil or ecclesiastical marriage)
to take place in stages, allowing for fam ily covenanting.S9 T h is char
acteristic also explains other aspects of a sexual ethic — such as the
im portance o f blood lineages (over th e relatively unim portant status
of th e nuclear family); th e power of m ale elders both in life and in
death (as revered ancestors) over processes of discernm ent regarding
sexual arrangem ents; practices such as bridewealth (or brideprice)
w hich signal th at a w om an is married not only to her husband
but to his fam ily; strict gender role differentiation; widespread fos
tering of children by relatives; incest taboos w hose boundaries are
m uch broader than those of W estern m ores (in Africa extending to
all degrees of relationship in a fam ily tree).
59. I a m in d eb ted h ere to su c h w o rk s a s: B é n éz et B u jo , F o u n d atio n s o f a n A frican

E lh ic : B ey o n d t h e U n iversal C la im s o f W estern M orality (N ew York: C ro ssro ad , 2 0 0 1 } ;
Jo h n C . C ald w ell and Pat C ald w ell, " S e x u a l In terco u rse in P re-literate S o c ie tie s ," in T h e
E volu tion t h e o f M ea n in g o f S ex u a l In te rc o u rs e in t h e H u m a n , ed. G iu sep p e B enagiano,
G ia n C a rlo D i R en zo , E rm elan d o V. C o s m i (C o rto n a , Italy: In te rn a tio n a l In stitu te for
th e Stu d y o f M a rria g e, 1 9 9 6 ), 5 7 - 6 5 ; M c rcy A m b a O d uyoyc, D au ghters o f A n ow a:
A frican W om en a n d P atriarchy (M ary k n o ll, NY: O rb is, 1 9 9 5 ); O d uyoyc and Kanyoro,
ed s., T h e Will to A rise; A drian H astin g s, C h ristian M arriage in A frica (Lond on: SPC K ,
1 9 7 3 ).
80 TUST LOVE
Above all, the subordination of sexuality to the well-being and

perpetuation of family and com m unity explains th e focus on fertil
ity, rather th an sex, at the heart of traditional African sexual ethics.
T h e w orst death for m ost Africans is to die childless. Yet sexuality
from an A frican perspective aim s at m ore th an m ere procreation,
as is evidenced in som e parts of Africa by the cerem onial practice
of intercourse at events such as the marriage of one's children, the
appearance o f a child's first tooth, initiation rites, and funeral rites.
W hether increasing or sustaining family and tribe, sexuality is for
the sake of th e good of the whole.
G ender, M arriage, a n d Family

Both patrilineal and m atrilineal fam ilies can be found in Africa,
though th e large m ajority are patrilineal. Ju st as in M elanesia, these
represent th e line of descent in term s of fam ily m em bership. In
m atrilineal societies neither the wife nor children are m em bers of
the husband's family, although husbands are expected to house and
m aintain th eir children (in exchange for their help w ith the father's
work). In patrilineal societies, m ale offspring (brothers and their off
spring) of th e sam e patriarch constitute a family; fem ale offspring
(sisters) are also members of the patrilineal family, but their ch il
dren are not (the latter attaining their fam ily m em bership through
their own fath er's lineage).60 Inheritance rights of wom en and girls,
as well as th eir prerogatives in fam ily decision-m aking, are generally
weaker than those of m en and boys. Fem ale rights are determ ined by
a variety of factors (such as w hether or n ot the living accom m oda
tions of a fam ily are gender segregated; how m uch w om en and girls
contribute to family resources; how econom ically autonom ous — in
either a m atrilineal or patrilineal society — wives actually are; how
colonial ordinances support or underm ine custom ary law).
Sex is considered to be beneficial, not enervating, and attitudes
toward sexual activity are generally n ot pessim istic or suspicious in
ways rem iniscent of W estern cultures. Yet sexual rules vary along
gender lines. M ale but n ot female extram arital sex is condoned in
60. S e e T a k y iw aa M a n u h , "W iv es, C h ild ren , and In te s ta te S u ccessio n in G h a n a ,"

in A frican F e m in is m , 7 9 - 8 3 .
m ost traditional codes of behavior, though in som e parts of Africa

wom en, too, ca n engage in extram arital sex as long as they are dis
creet.61 T h ere has been a general assum ption, however, that m en
need sex m ore than wom en, and that they therefore require more
than one sexual partner (an assum ption n ot effectively modified by
the C hristian m issionary work of a hundred years). Despite this, m en
are n ot usually considered "m ach o" in traditional African societies.62
G irls and boys are brought up traditionally with gendered sex edu
cation. M utuality is ultim ately prized between wom en and m en, and
both gain th eir identity in roles of im portance. Yet Isabel Apawo Phiri
notes: "G irls learn from their m others that they are created to serve
their brothers. Boys also grow up believing that they were born to be
served by girls and w om en ."63 Gender roles arc reinforced through
traditional puberty rites, and the traditional and religious education
that precedes them . Initiation includes an introduction into th e se
crets of sexuality, shaped to accord w ith th e responsibilities, rights,
and expectations of wom anhood and m anhood. Boys and young m en
are taught th a t they both need and have a right to sexual intercourse
with girls and wom en. Sexual experience for them m ost likely be
gins after in itiation and before marriage. G irls and young wom en arc
taught that th ey are to satisfy the sexual needs of their husbands. For
m ost of th em , sexual experience traditionally begins w ith marriage.
As they are prepared for marriage, young wom en m ust also learn the
strict and precise regulations that govern not only their relationship
w ith their husbands but w ith the whole of the husband's family.
Husbands hold exclusive sexual rights over their wives, but wives
can ordinarily n ot expect to have exclusive sexual rights in regard to
their husbands.64 Moreover, given the em phasis on fertility, childless
ness in a m arriage is often remedied by the addition of a second wife
or a concubine. T h ese two factors — the belief in m ale sexual needs
and an overwhelm ing concern for children — account in large part for
6 1 . C ald w ell a n d C ald w ell, "S e x u a l In terco u rse in P re-literate S o c ie tie s /’ 6 1 - 6 2 .

6 2 . Ib id ., 6 3 .
6 3 . Isa b el A paw o P hiri, "A frican W o m en o f F a ith S p e a k O u t in a n H IV /A ID S E ra,"
in A frican W o m en , HIV/AIDS , a n d Faith C o m m u n itie s , cd . Is a b e l A paw o P h iri and
Beverly H addad |P ietersbu rg: C lu s te r P u b licatio n s, 2 0 0 4 ) , 9.
6 4 . A n n e N a s im iy u W asike, U n p u blish ed m a n u scrip t and p erson al co rresp on d en ce
(April 2 0 0 4 ).
82 TUST LOVE
the institution of polygyny.6* T h e traditional rationale, therefore, for

polygyny is th a t it can serve the goal of both sexuality and marriage,
w hich is to keep the com m unity together. It secures offspring, helps
in the accum ulation of wealth, prevents widespread prostitution and
adultery, stabilizes the hom e by providing help for a first wife, and
allows sexual activity to th e husband in th e long periods w hen ac
cess to any given wife is forbidden (according to taboos prohibiting
sexual intercourse with a wife during m enstruation, pregnancy, and
a stipulated lengthy post partum period after each child is born).66
Divorce is not com m on in m ost African com m unities, at least
until recent tim es. Marriage is intended to be lifelong, though it is not
indissoluble.67 Traditional structures are designed to serve stability
and provide fo r contingencies. Reconciliation processes are available
w ithin a larger social organization — the clan or tribe.
One can im agine a tim e w hen a seam less order prevailed, n ot chal
lenged or disturbed by the uprooting of peoples from their lands, or
the destruction of traditional econom ies, or the im position of alien
cultures on long-surviving social system s. Yet further exploration of
all historical periods now coexisting in Africa gives warning that w hat
may have worked in the past cannot by itself solve the problems of
the present.
N ew In terp reters a n d C ritics: Sustainable A frican Sexualities

Interesting and im portant constructive critiques have been made of
som e elem ents in African sexualities by African C hristian theologi
cal ethicists such as Bénézet Bujo.68 Strongly affirm ing th e value of
an African em phasis on com m unity, he nonetheless cautions against
6 5 . T h o u g h , a s is su g g ested in c h a p te r 2 , th e te rm m o s t o fte n u se d b y W e ste rn e rs to

d escribe th is fo rm o f m arriag e is "p oly g am y," "p o ly g y n y " is t h e m o re accu rate t e r m for
th e sim u lta n e o u s m arriag e o f o n e m a n to m o re th a n o n e w o m an . "P o ly an d ry " refers
to th e m arriag e o f on e w o m an to m o re th a n o n e m a n . S in ce th e exp erien ce in A frica is
ov erw helm in gly o f o n e m a n m arried to m o re th a n o n e w o m an , th e b e tte r te rm h ere is
"polygyny."
6 6 . For b o th tra d itio n a l ra tio n a les for polygyny and a rg u m en ts th a t it c a n be c o n
siste n t w ith C h r is tia n belief, s e c H illm a n , P olygam y R eco n s id e re d ; H a stin g s, C hristian
M arriage in A frica, 6 - 2 2
6 7 . S e e H a stin g s, C h ristian M arriage in A frica, 3 5 ; O duyoye, D au ghters o fA n o w a ,
1 4 7 -5 1 .
6 8 . B u jo, F o u n d atio n s o f a n A frican E thic.
too "rom antic" an idealization of traditional African culture, includ

ing an "exaggerated understanding of com m unity."69 W hile arguing
that polygyny, for example, is n ot "autom atically u n ju st" (since it
once served to protect wom en and to assure stability in marriages
where childlessness m ight have led to adultery), Bujo observes that
today it no longer serves these functions. Rather, in h is view, second
and third m arriages are now frequently entered into on hollow pre
texts, and the result is often damaging to first wives who are deceived
(their husbands concealing a second marriage in another locality)
or ignored (sim ply set aside sexually and em otionally in favor of a
younger second wife).
Contem porary anthropologists and historians are also shedding
new light on traditional as well as twenty-first century African sex
ual practices. N otable in this regard arc studies of hom osexuality
in African societies.70 C hallenging w hat they consider to be the u n
founded m yth that sam e-sex relationships are absent or extremely
marginal in these societies, researchers document form s of hom o
sexual relations in every region of the continent. T h e results of these
studies are interesting and significant, even though their meaning
rem ains controversial.71
By far the strongest new voices — both affirmative and critical
of African sexual systems — are those of a rapidly growing number
of African fem in ist writers, including theologians.72 W hile they, like
6 9 . Ib id ., 1 6 2 - 6 9 .
7 0 . S e e M u rra y and R o sco e, ed s., Boy-W ives a n d F e m a le H usban ds.
7 1 . S e e A m a d iu m c 's c o n te n tio n th a t n a m in g so m e in stitu tio n alized relation sh ip s
betw een w o m en "le s b ia n " in a W estern s e n s e is a fa ls e in terp retatio n o f th e s e rela tio n
sh ip s. It w ould b e , sh e say s, "sh o c k in g and o ffen siv e" to th e A frican w om en involved.
A m a d iu m e , M a le D au ghters, F e m a le H u sb an d s, 7.
72. I am indebted here especially to the work of Mcrcy Amba Oduyoyc, Anne
N a s im iy u W a sik e, M u sim b i R . A . K anyoro, Isab el A paw o P hiri, B everly Haddad,
M ad ip oan e M a sen y a , and Ifi A m ad iu m e, so m e o f w hose w ritin g s are cite d ea rlier in this
c h a p te r I a m g ratefu l to all th e m em b ers o f th e C irc le of C o n ce rn e d A frican W om en
T h e o lo g ia n s w h o se co n feren ces and in crea sin g n u m b ers of p u b licatio n s have enabled
m e t o h e a r (w ith m y o w n lim ita tio n s) th e v o ice s o f A frican w o m en . I a m s im ila rly g rate
ful to a ll th e p a rticip a n ts in th e A ll-A frica C o n fe re n ce : S is te r t o Sister, w h o h ave allowed
m e to sh a re in th e ir d elib eratio n s regarding A frican c u ltu re and resp o n ses to I I I V and
A ID S . Finally, I h a v e learn ed a g reat deal fro m th e A frican "fa ith fello w s" w h o have com e
to Yale U n iversity , 2 0 0 2 - 5 : Sylvia A m isi, F ulata M o y o, Vuadi V ibila, A n n e N asim iy u -
W asike, D o ro th y U ch eaga, C o n s ta n ce Sh isan y a, T h e r e s e T in k a s iim ire , Isab el P hiri,
D o rca s A k in tu d c, and H azel A yanga. M y ren d erin g of w h at I have learn ed fro m all of
84 TUST LOVE
Bujo, affirm th e African com m unitarian charactcr of sex, marriage,

and family, th ey believe it can be sustained only in ways th at do
not threaten th e inherent dignity of wom en or ignore w om en's need
for som e degree of econom ic and social control over their own lives.
T h e well-being of children, they argue, as well as that of wom en and
m en, requires som e m odification in traditional marriage structures
and in the possibilities accorded wom en and girls. W ithout this, not
only will the b a sic structures of African societies fail to survive con
temporary social, econom ic, and political challenges, but Africa as
a whole will be devastated by th e H IV and A IDS pandemic of the
tw entieth and twenty-first centuries.
In order to understand what changes are needed, African fem i
n ists' task h as been to identify w hat is problem atic in African sexual
system s. W hat they focused on first was the problem of gender dispar
ity — endem ic, it seemed, to African traditional social arrangements.
T h a t is, A frican sexual practices are lodged in gendered patterns of
relationship th a t currently put wom en at risk (and harm m en and
children as well). W hen cultural practices jeopardize the well-being
of wom en, they are alm ost always part of a sexual system that sub
ordinates w om en to m en and that takes away their choice regarding
their own sexuality. Traditional patterns of relationship that provided
security and dignity to w om en in the past were perhaps always also
vulnerable to abuse as long as these patterns (not unlike W estern pat
terns) accorded honor to m others, queens, and goddesses, but at the
sam e tim e assigned female images for m oral evil (whores, polluters,
witches) and treated wom en as m inors.73 Prior to colonization, gen
der ideologies in a few parts of Africa (for example, am ong the Igbo in
w hat is now Nigeria) were flexible, w ith roles not so rigidly circum
scribed.74 In som e instances, then, colonization and the influence
th e s e A frican w o m e n m ay still be in accu rate and in ad eq u ate in m an y resp ects, fa il

ings th a t a rc in s p ite of, a n d n o t b ecau se of, th e ir effo rts to h elp m e to un derstand .
For fu rth e r in fo rm a tio n o n th e s e o rg an izatio n s and program s, s e e M arg aret A . Farley,
“P artn ersh ip in 1 lop e: G ender, F aith , and R esp on ses to H IV /A ID S in A frica ," Jo u rn al
o f F em in ist S tu d ie s in R eligion 2 0 (Spring 2 0 0 4 ) : 1 3 3 - 4 8 .
7 3 . S e c M u to m b o N k u lu -N 'S cn g h a, "B u m u n tu Paradigm and G e n d e r Ju s t ic e / ' in
W hat M en O w e t o W o m en : M en's V oices fo r W orld R eligions, ed. Jo h n C . R a in e s and
D a n ie l C . M a g u ire (A lbany: S ta te U n iv e rsity o f N ew Y o rk P ress, 2 0 0 1 ) , 7 0 - 7 1 .
7 4 . S e e A m a d iu m c, M a le D au ghters, F e m a le H u sb an d s, 16.
of W estern religions may have tipped the balance so that women's

roles becam e m ore severely lim ited and monitored. Yet patriarchy
(whether in patrilineal or m atrilineal systems) seem s embedded in
m uch, perhaps m ost, of traditional, colonial, and postcolonial Africa.
W ith a general critique of gender-differentiated roles and identi
ties has co m e an identification of particular practices th at appear
harm ful to w om en and girls. Here, the focus is on dom estic in sti
tutions and on specific cultural practices th at are either supported
or tolerated b y these institutions. T h u s, for example, while family-
arranged m arriages have served com m unities and societies, they have
also som etim es fostered extrem e form s of coercion with regard to
girls and young wom en. "C hild m arriage" is one of these. In order to
assure continuation of the fam ily line when there is only one son,
a little boy's father m ight propose marriage (for h is son) to a girl's
family. If the proposal is accepted, th e girl is given to a relative of
the boy's fam ily for "m arital" sexual relations until the boy is old
enough, at w hich tim e she is required to jo in h im .75 It is, of course,
still n ot infrequent that teen-age girls are m arried to elderly m en as
second or third wives.76 Moreover, som etim es girls continue to be
"kidnapped" ( th w ala ) for marriage from their schools, w ithout their
own prior knowledge but with the knowledge and approval of their
fam ilies.77
T rad itional custom s (som etim es reinforced by C hristian and M us
lim teachings) still promote the belief that w om en's bodies and their
sexualities are n ot their own. O nce m arried, w om en's bodies belong
to their husbands. W omen are expected to respond to their husbands'
needs and w ishes, often w ithout regard for their own. But at the same
tim e, as we have seen, husbands' bodies can be shared w ith other
w om en.78 A m ong som e African tribes w ith w hich fem inist writers
are familiar, th is belief undergirds practices not only of polygyny, but
7 5 . Ju d ith M b u la B a h em u k a , "S o c ia l C h a n g es a n d W o m en 's A ttitu d es Tow ard

M arriag e in E a st A frica ," in Will t o A rise , 122.
7 6 . N asim iy u -W asik e, u n p u b lish ed m a n u scrip t, 2 0 0 4 .
7 7 . S e c P. W h o olcy , "M a rria g e in A frica: A Stu d y in th e C is k c i," in C h u rch a n d
M arriage in M od ern A frica: 1975 S u p p lem en t t o R eport to C a th o lic B ish o p s o f East
a n d C en tra l A frica, ed. T re v o r D av id V erryn (Johan nesbu rg : Z e n ith P rin ters, 2 0 0 1 ) ,
2 9 5 -9 8 .
7 8 . P hiri, "A frican W o m en o f F a ith Sp eak O u t in a n H IV /A ID S E ra ," 1 1 6 .
86 TUST LOVE
of "wife sharing," wherein the giving of one's wife to a guest for sex
constitutes a form of hospitality. And there are com m unities in Africa
where, w hen a m an dies, his w ife's sexuality still belongs to h is fam
ily Ia function of the practice of bridewealth).79 Hence, she can be
required to undergo "ritual sexual cleansing" (by m eans of sexual in
tercourse w ith a m an designated or self-identified for this purpose),
and to abide by the custom of "wife inheritance" (or "leviritc m ar
riage"] whereby she is thought to continue h er conjugal relationship
with her husband by m arrying a relative of h is.80
It is perhaps not surprising that fem inists have found polygyny
troubling. We have already seen the significance of polygyny in
traditional and contemporary Africa (as well as B u jo 's critique of
it, not from th e perspective of a standard C hristian preference for
monogam y b u t from the perspective of its present loss of past benign
rationales). Polygyny rem ains extrem ely im portant in Africa, con
stituting approximately 40 percent of marriages in W est Africa and
2 0 - 3 0 percent in Eastern and Southern Africa.81 It is still not only
accepted but promoted by m any w om en and m en, for all the reasons
I have already noted. M any W estern m ale scholars, in an effort to
counter longstanding C hristian opposition to polygynous marriages,
have unfortunately waxed eloquent about its value for African soci
ety. Eugene H illm an, for example, argues that it is the context out of
which African virtues of unity, harmony, solidarity, and hospitality
are developed.82
7 9 . S e e O d u y oy c, D au ghters o f A n oa h , 1 3 3 - 3 4 , lo r an a ltern a te v ie w o i w h a t gilts

g iven by o n e fa m ily to a n o th e r m ig h t m e a n if th e y are recip rocal and if th e y do no t
involve o n e fa m ily "b u y in g " a w o m an from a n o th e r fam ily w h o "g iv es" h e r (a hu m an
being) away.
8 0 . N asim iy u -W asik e, u n p u b lish ed m a n u scrip t, 2 0 0 4 . T h e b ib lical p arallels to
so m e o f th e s e p ra c tice s a rc no tab le.
8 1 . T h e s e p ercen tag es a rc u n stable and rep orted d ifferently in a v ariety of so u rces.
O bviously, p referred fo rm s o f m arriag e a rc in flu x. N o n e th e le ss, th ese n u m b ers give
so m e se n se o f t h e co n tin u in g prevalen ce of polygyny th ro u g h o u t A frica.
8 2 . T h is is t h e w h o le th e s is o f H illm a n in h is P olygam y R e c o n s id e r e d Adrian
H a stin g s o ffers a u sefu l h isto rica l overview of resp o n ses to polygyny by th e C h ris
tia n ch u rch es in A frica, and co n clu d es th a t tw e n tie th c e n tu ry m arriage, esp ecially in
So u th A frica, ch a n g cd in w ays th a t suffered fro m th e to o n egative ap p raisals of tra
d itio n a l "d o m e s tic in s titu tio n s " by m issio n a ries. S e e H a stin g s, C h ristian M arriage in
A frica , 2 0 .
For African fem inist critics, polygyny has becom e a more and
m ore controversial form of marriage, even though there are many
wom en who continue to accept and support it. Fem inists appear
of one m ind in at least challenging, and often directly opposing, it.
Anne Nasimiyu-Wasike, for example, argues that even traditional ra
tionales for polygyny show it to be an arrangem ent for th e sake of
m en and harm ful to w om en.83 It represents m en's search for progeny
and im m ortality; it sees wom en as dependent on m en, yet made for
the sexual and econom ic service of m en; it identifies w om en's worth
with childbearing; it yields n ot harm ony but conflict between women
as co-wives; it subordinates som e women to other women. Women
are, Nasimiyu-Wasike m aintains, culturally conditioned to project
their dislike of polygyny n ot 011 the institution itself but on their co-
wives. "T h e tongue of co-wives is bitter."84 Fier conclusion is that
polygynous relationships have crippled both wom en and m en, and
that this dom estic institution is a sign of hum an brokenness.85
T h e problem s that African fem inists identify in African sexual sys
tem s becom e, in their view, even m ore dire in the context of H IV and
A ID S, especially w hen th e m ajor tran sm itter of th e A ID S virus is (as
it is in sub-Saharan Africa) heterosexual sex. M ost of the patterns
and practices described above — that is, little power on the part of
wom en over their own sexuality, m ultiple sexual partners through
polygynous m arriages, wife-sharing as a mode of hospitality, and the
treatm ent of widows (with ritual cleansing and wife inheritance) —
put populations at risk for H IV Even if these patterns and prac
tices were beneficial in their original contexts, they becom e extremely
problem atic w hen people die from them .
T w o other problems arc often cited by African fem inist writers
when it com es to sexuality and the spread of H IV and A ID S in Africa.
One is the problem of gender violence. As in m any other parts of the
world, rape, dom estic violence, and the abuse of w om en in settings
of political instability and warfare, are all too com m on.86 Fem inist
83. N asim iy u -W asik e, "P oly gam y : A F e m in is t C r itiq u e ," 1 0 1 - 1 8 .

84. Ib id ., 1 1 2 . N asim iy u -W asik e i s h ere c itin g a tra d itio n a l A frica n proverb, drawing
o n th e tre m e n d o u sly im p o rta n t role o f proverbs for u n d erstan d in g A frican cu ltu res.
85. Ib id ., 1 0 7 and 1 1 6 .
86. U n ited N a tio n s S p e c ia l S essio n o n AID S F a ct S h e e t (Ju n e 2 0 0 1 ) , 2 1 .
88 TUST LOVE
analysts point to a link between unequal power relations between

wom en and m en, toleration of dom estic violence, and HIV.87
T h e other problem is th at of fem ale circum cision in regions of
Africa. Its prevalence varies from country to country, with no prac
tice of it in som e countries and practice in others that includes nearly
8 0 percent of the fem ale population. As I have noted at the be
ginning of this chapter, fem ale circum cision is a practice that has
received a great deal of attention in recent years — by fem inists and
others. Som etim es called "fem ale genital cutting" or even "female
genital m u tilatio n ," it has proven n ot to be a simple cultural or ethi
cal question. O n the face of it, it looks like it harm s girls and women
terribly. It ca n take various form s: the least extensive form involves
the removal o f only the cliteral hood and som e (or som etim es all)
of the clitoris; the m ost com m on form entails the removal of all
or part of th e labia m inora (in addition to th e clitoris and clitoral
hood); the m ost radical form (known as "infibulation") involves the
removal of all external genitalia and a portion of the labia m ajora
(which is th en stitched together, leaving a sm all opening for pas
sage of urine and m enstrual blood). T here are other perm utations on
these form s, but in the m ajority of practices, these predom inate.88
In all of its form s, female circum cision is thought to add to the risk
of H iy since it is often not carried out w ith hygienic precautions
(the use of th e sam e knife for a whole group being circum cised may
signify a blood bond between th e subjects, but it also transm its in
fection). In its m ost severe form s, it m akes sexual intercourse and
childbirth so difficult that open lesions are generated, and infection
has its chance.
U sual explanatory concepts, such as patriarchy, tradition, religion,
are n ot the on es given by participants in the practice.89 Clearly for
women who value this practice, it is a source of personal and social
identity, and it ultim ately allows th em the possibility of marriage
w hich is their entry into the m ost im portant gender roles of wife and
8 7 . See, e.g ., B ev erley I Iaddad, "C h o o sin g t o R em a in S ile n t: L in k s B etw een G en d er

V io len ce, H IV /A ID S and th e S o u th A frican C h u rc h ," in A frica n W om en , HIV/AIDS a n d
Failh C o m m u n itie s , 1 4 9 - 6 7 .
8 8 . S e e L ori L eon ard , "In te rp re tin g F em a le G e n ita l C u ttin g : M o vin g B eyond th e
I m p a s s e / ' A n n u a l R e v ie w o f S e x R e s e a r c h 11 (2 0 0 0 ): 1 5 8 - 9 0 .
8 9 . Ibid.
mother. As part of a rite of initiation, it stands also as a test of a

girl's capacity to w ithstand suffering; it is a sign th at she is ready
for adult life. African fem inist critics observe (and often decry) that
all of this sym bolic m eaning is embedded in traditions of female
subscrvicncc, fear of wom en's sexual desire or pleasure, and concern
to prevent w om en's engaging in prem arital sex and later adultery.
W hat rem ains to be explained is why som e African subgroups "have
only recently adopted fem ale genital cutting"90 in situations where
adolescent girls themselves demand it, over the opposition of their
parents and traditional leaders.
Som e A frican fem inists have been loathe to criticize fem ale cir
cum cision, especially if it is n ot practiced am ong their own people.
Yet w hen they com e face to face w ith it, it is difficult to support it.91
O ne obvious problem is that Western scientists and others (including
W estern fem inists) have focused on th e issue of fem ale circum cision
in ways that are perceived by African fem inists as showing disre
spect, even contem pt, for Africa. All of this is perhaps why there
is so little com parative ethics or even interreligious discussion of
this m ost delicate of m atters. Som e African fem inists, as fem inists
elsewhere, dccidc to take a stand against fem ale circum cision —
especially in its m ost radical form s — only w hen they see women
opposing it and speaking out of the regions where female circum ci
sion is practiced. T h e response becom es, then, n ot one of criticism
from another cultural context, but of standing in solidarity with those
whose experience it is.
T h e overall conccrns of African fem inists include breaking the
silence on cultural practices that injure wom en. T h e point of lis
tening to th em here is n ot sim ply to gain another perspective on
African sexual beliefs and practices, although this is im portant. It is,
rather, to consider w hether a more adequate understanding of African
sexual system s and practices can be achieved when th e anguish of
wom en becom es a vantage point of interpretation, w hen it has its
own herm eneutical function.
9 0 . Ib id ., 1 5 8 .
9 1 . S e e A m a d iu m e, M ale D au ghters , F e m a le H u sb an d s, 8 7 n. 6 ; Lloyda Fanu sie,
"S e x u a lity and W o m en in A frican C u ltu re ," in Will t o A rise, 1 4 8 - 4 9 .
90 TUST LOVE
K a m a s u tr a : H indu T ex tb o o k on E ro tic Love

H induism is n o t a single unified religion but a fam ily nam e that cov
ers a variety of religious teachings, philosophical perspectives, and
practices. It h a s no single founder or predom inant teacher, and no
central institution or spokesperson. It is sustained by a wide array
of oral and w ritten sacred sources, including hym ns and m antras,
m anuals for rituals and prayers, instructions for religious hermits,
philosophical treatises, and m ystical discourses. Am ong its tradi
tional w ritings are also texts (or m ore accurately, textbooks) on erotic
love and techniques for achieving sexual union and pleasure. T h e
oldest and best known of the erotic texts is Kam asutra.
As one m ight imagine, K am asu tra has had a m ixed past in terms
of its acceptance both in th e East and in the West. Written in the
third century C .E. by Vatsyayana Mallanaga, a scholar from north
ern India, it incorporates texts by earlier authors whose works are
no longer extant. It is cited as a foundational text by authors of n u
m erous erotic textbooks that followed. Scholars today claim th at "no
other single w ork has influenced m ore the treatm ent of love themes
in Indian sculptures, paintings, and literature."92 T h is is despite the
fact that K am asu tra was n ot widely read by Hindus u n til the publica
tion of an English translation by Richard Francis Burton and Forster
Fitzgerald A rbuthnot in th e late nineteenth century, which made it
popular am ong tourists to India.93
K am asu tra m eans a "treatise on pleasure," com ing from sutra
(treatise or guide) and k a m a (erotic desire and sexual pleasure). It
has been thought of primarily as a guide to positions for sex, even
a form of pornography, but its purpose and substance — and hence
its historical im portance — extend m uch farther. Divided into seven
books, each w ith m ultiple chapters, th e K am asu tra covers a broad
statem ent regarding hum an life (Book I), a typology of form s of lov
ing and m inutely detailed and categorized accounts of acts of love
(Book II), guidance for m en w ho w ant to woo wom en who arc still
9 2 . M o n i N a g , "P arad o x o f E ro ticism a n d Sexu al A b stin en ce in H in d u C u ltu r e /’ in

E volu tion o f t h e M ea n in g o f S ex u a l In terco u rse, 1 7 1 . N ag o ffers here, in ad d itio n to an
a n aly sis of th e K a m a su tra , a b rie f b u t te llin g overview o f e ro tic scu lp tu res in and on
In d ia n tem ples.
9 3 . Ib id ., 1 7 1 .
virgins (Book III), descriptions of the roles of wives, co-wives, and

m em bers of a harem (Book IV), analyses of ways to seduce other
m en's wives (Book V), a discussion of courtesans, their aim s and
strategies (Book VI), and "exotic esoteria" regarding such things as
becom ing "lucky in love" (Book V II). It is Book II — notably only
one book of th e seven — that has been the object of prurient inter
est, satire, and a certain am ount of infamy; indeed, th e K am asutra
is frequently equated with the sorts of m aterial in this one book. It
is w ithin B ook II that we get primarily descriptions of heterosexual
foreplay and intercourse, but also som e considerations of m ale hom o
sexuality and lesbian relations (the latter are treated as som ething
that happens only w hen there are no m en available).
Scholarship regarding K am asu tra h as taken on surprising new life
since the publication in 2 0 0 2 of a contemporary English translation
by Wendy D oniger (American scholar in th e history of religions and
an expert in Sanskrit, the original language of the text) and Sud-
hir Kakar (Indian psychoanalyst and Hindu scholar).94 N ew readings
of the purpose and predom inant them es of the text are strongly
suggested by the presentation, translation, and interpretation that
Doniger and Kakar provide. Like other scholars today, they arc highly
critical of the 1 883 Burton-Arbuthnot English translation, claim ing
that it is filled with m istranslations and skewed by the translators'
fear of Victorian censorship.95 T h e bias of Burton and A rbuthnot was
twofold. T h a t is, they were all too happy to translate and publish a
text that w ould serve as an antidote to the European C hristian sub
ordination of sexual pleasure to th e goal of reproduction and to what
they considered nineteenth-century prudishness about sex. But at
the sam e tim e they were conccrned to avoid the kind of backlash
that would underm ine the distribution of th e text and harm their
9 4 . V atsy ay ana M a llan ag a, K a m a su tra : A N ew , C o m p le te English T ra n sla tio n o f th e

S an skrit Text w ith E x cerp ts fr o m t h e S an skrit Ja y a m a n g a la C o m m e n ta r y o f Y ashodhara
In d rap a d a, t h e H in di fa y a C o m m e n ta r y o f D ev ad atta Shastri, a n d E x p lan atory N otes by
t h e T ran slators, tra n s . W endy D o n ig er and Su d h ir K ak ar (N ew York: O xford U niv ersity
Press, 2 0 0 2 ) . T h e e x tra cts th a t follow o n pp. 9 3 and 9 4 are used by p e rm issio n of
O xford U n iv e rsity Press.
9 5 . F o r m o re d etailed in fo rm a tio n abo u t th e tra n sla to rs w h o w orked w ith B u rton ,
see D o n ig er and K akar, "In tr o d u c tio n " t o K a m a su tra , li-lx ii. I am indebted p rim arily to
D o n ig e r and K a k a r 's w ork fo r m y ren d erin g o f th e n atu re and co n seq u en ces of B u rton 's
ed ition .
92 TUST LOVE
own carccrs. T o remedy this fear, they did things w ith their transla
tion to m ake the m ost salacious passages appear "O rien tal," hence
m ore of a curiosity than som ething that m ight be read as relevant to
W estern experience. T h ey used Hindu term s for words they thought
m ight be offensive to a W estern readership, and they modified texts
to m itigate th e force of som e of the K am asu tra’s instructions.
Doniger and Kakar also had particular aim s in producing their new
translation. In the contem poraiy W estern world, there is no longer
the fear of scandalizing the potential readership for Kam asutra. Even
Book II is hardly shocking in th e twenty-first century. W hat m ight be
appalling to current readers is the apparent gender bias of the text.
It is, for exam ple, fairly clear (though n ot w ithout m inor dispute)
that Vatsyayana M allanaga was w riting for m en, especially for m en-
about-town or urbane playboys. Yet, Doniger and Kakar point out
that w om en's voices are heard in the text, and their roles are not
totally passive (whether in sex or in social relations).96 So Doniger
and Kakar in som e respects have opposite aim s from Burton and
Arbuthnot. T h e y w ant K am asu tra to speak to the experience of their
readers across the world, both W est and East. Even m ore importantly,
they w ant th e full breadth of the text to be more visible. A more
accurate tran slation (of both text and som e com m entaries), can show
how this an cien t textbook is situated in Hindu culture as a whole. A
further result of this will be to reveal the parallels and analogies with
other cultures and world religions.
In this new translation, then, th e explicitness of sexual description
is n ot watered down, but it is integrated into the larger aim s of the
treatise. T h e te x t as a whole is made m ore accessible by the accuracy
and the gracefulness of th e translation itself, as well as by the selec
tion of com m entaries that go w ith the text. Moreover, th e translators'
introduction and clarifying notes point th e reader to th e structure of
the text and th e passages that identify the aim s and caveats of the
author. In Book I, for example, Vatsyayana M allanaga sets the stage
by announcing that the subjects of th e text are threefold: religion,
power, and pleasure. T h ese correspond to H induism 's three aim s
of hum an life: d h arm a (religion, morality, law, duty, justice), artha
9 6 . Ib id ., x x v iii-x x x ii.
(wealth, political power, succcss), and k a m a (sensual and sexual de

sire and pleasure).97 T h ese are n ot u ltim ately to be separated, says
Vatsyayana, since th e achievem ent of power depends on religion, and
the attain m ent of pleasure depends on som e form of power.
Undertake any project that m ight achieve

th e three aim s of life, or two, or even ju st one,
but not one th at achieves one
at th e cost of the other two.98
Doniger and Kakar conclude th at K am asutra is about the art of living,

not ju st about s e x ." But, of course, it is about sex and the interper
sonal and physiological m ethods that arc related to sex. "Because a
m an and a w om an depend upon one another in sex, it requires a
m ethod, and this m ethod is learned from the K am asu tra.”'™
K am asu tra sits in the middle of w hat som e scholars call a para
dox in the com plex beliefs and practices of H induism .101 O n the one
hand, Hindu culture includes the astonishing display of eroticism in
literature and sculpture and even religion (for example, the salvific
use of sexual intercourse in religious rituals in Tantrism and Sahajiya
Vaishnavism 102). O n the other hand is the powerful strain of asceti
cism in H indu religion, the tradition of the yogis, of Gandhi, and
of som e of th e Hindu epics. O n the one hand, a concerted search
for every form of pleasure; on th e other hand, sexual abstinence
as a route to spirituality through sublim ation. K am asutra seem s to
be clcarly on the side of eroticism and the search for pleasure. Yet
w ithin it there are h ints of the traditions of renunciation; at least
there are brief and paradoxical rem inders that asceticism ought not
be forgotten.
Both religion and pleasure require restraint. Both require tech
niques of control of the body. K am asu tra is interested in pleasure,
9 7 . T h e r e i s w h a t is so m e tim e s called a fo u rth a im , m o k s h a , w h ic h im p lies sp iritu al

release.
9 8 . V atsyayana, K a m a su tra , tra n s. D o n ig er and Kakar, 1 .2 .4 1 .
9 9 . D o n ig er a n d Kakar, "In tr o d u c tio n ," K a m a su tra , xi.
1 0 0 . V atsyayana, K a m a su tra , tra n s. D o n ig er and Kakar, 1 .2 .1 8 .
1 0 1 . S e e N ag, "P a ra d o x o f E ro ticism and Sexu al A b stin en ce in H in d u C u ltu re ," 1 8 3 -
8 5 ; a lso D o n ig e r and Kakar, "In tr o d u c tio n ," xiii-xiv.
1 0 2 . N ag, "P a ra d o x o f E ro ticism and S e x u al A b s tin e n ce in H in d u C u ltu re ," 1 7 7 - 7 9 .
94 TUST LOVE
but the texts of restraint arc not m issing. Vatsyayana insists that
in a "scien tific" text like the K am asu tra , it is necessary to describe
everything, but n ot recom m end everything. Hence, som e practices
are presented th at the reader is ultim ately warned against. Every
form of lovem aking is described, but som e arc finally judged to be
"b a se."103 "Pleasures are a m eans of sustaining the body, ju st like
food, and th ey are rewards for religion and power. But people m ust
be aware of th e flaws in pleasures, flaws that are like diseases."104
A m an w ho knows \Kamasutra's\ real meaning

sees religion, power, and pleasure,
his own convictions, and th e ways of the world
for w hat th ey are, and he is not driven by passion.
T h e unusual techniques employed to increase passion,
w hich have been described as this particular book required,
are strongly restricted right here in this verse,
right after it.
For the statem en t th at 'Th ere is a text for th is'
D oes not justify a practice. People should realize
that th e con tents of the texts apply in general,
but each actual practice is for one particular region.
. . . [Vatsyayana] made this work in chastity and in the highest
m editation,
for the sake of worldly life;
he did n ot com pose it
for the sake of p assion .105
O f what use is this text in our search for wisdom about sexual
ethics? For o n e thing, the history of its translations tells us that
classics arc read and understood with eyes and minds shaped by par
ticular cultural experience. In part, we learn from th em according
to w hat we seek. In part, we learn som ething new w hich can illu
m inate our own experience and som etim es teach us w hat we ought
to seek. If th e bridge between one era and another, one culture and
1 0 3 . T h is , a t le a s t, is th e ju d g m en t of s o m e o f V atsy ay an a's c o m m e n ta to rs. Sec

D o n ig e r and K akar, "In tr o d u c tio n ," xx-xi.
1 0 4 . V atsyayana, K a m a su tra , tra n s. D o n ig er a n d Kakar, 1 .2 .3 7 - 3 8 .
1 0 5 . Ib id ., 7 . 2 . 5 3 - 5 5 , 5 7 .
another, is crosscd even part way, our eyes turned forward and back
ward m ay be sharpened, and our thoughts may be both concentrated
and provoked.
T h e \Vorld of Islam
In the early tw enty-first century it is all too easy to reduce Islam ic

understandings of sexuality to dram atic stereotypes drawn from
right-wing fringe groups such as th e Taliban in Afghanistan. T o do
so is to add to a "clash of ignorance," as Said called efforts to pit
"th e W est" and "Islam " against each other w ithout taking account of
the "intern al dynam ics and plurality of every civilization."106 Islam
had its beginnings nearly 1500 years ago, and its history of spir
itual devotion, political struggle, com m unity and em pire building,
intellectual pursuits, acsthcthics, and profound hum anism provides
a basis for th e deep com m itm ents of its now m ore th an a billion
adherents worldwide. Like the other m ajor religions that we have
considered both in the previous chapter and this one, Islam repre
sents a tradition of great complexity. It is rich w ith m ultiple sacred
texts, diverse in the cultures of its m any nations, and profoundly
varied in its great schools of thought.
M uham m ed ibn Abdallah ( 5 6 0 - 6 3 2 C .E), the Prophet and founder
of Islam , believed he was bringing to the Arabs th e sam e faith that
Abraham had given to the Jews and Jesus to th e C hristians. In a full
ness of tim e, Allah gave to M uham m ed a revelation for his people,
calling them to repentance and to surrender ["islam") to the one true
God (in w hom m any had already com e to believe through the cu lt of
Kabah).107 T h e ethics of Islam is ultim ately based on th e Q u r'an, the
1 0 6 . Said , " T h e C la s h o f Ig n o ra n ce /' T h e N a tio n 2 7 6 (O cto b er 2 2 , 2 0 0 1 ) : 1 1 - 1 3 .

In th is essay S a id is respon din g to S a m u e l H u n tin g to n 's th eo ry o f t h e "c la s h of civ
iliz a tio n s ," ex co ria tin g it fo r its sim p lis tic and u ltim a te ly false ch a ra cte riz a tio n of
in te rn a tio n a l c u ltu ra l stru ggles today. F o r a n ea rlier critiq u e of W estern p ercep tio ns
o f and a ttitu d es tow ard Is la m , s e e a lso Said, O rien talism , 4 8 - 4 9 , 6 0 - 6 3 , 1 5 1 - 5 2 , and
passim .
1 0 7 . I a m d raw ing h ere o n K aren A rm stro n g , Isla m : A S hort H istory (N ew York:
M o d ern Library, 2 0 0 0 1 ; M au rice C .au d cfro y -D cm o m b y n cs, M u slim In stitu tion s , tra n s.
Jo h n P. M a cG re g o r (Lond on: A llen & U n w in , 1 9 6 1 ); G eorge H o u rani, R ea so n a n d
T radition in Is la m ic E th ics (C am brid ge: C am brid g e U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 8 5 ) ; A . Kevin
96 TUST LOVE
Book of Revelation that is M uham m cd's record of w hat the Archangel

Gabriel transm itted to him over twenty years, directly from God.
After M uham m ed's death, other texts were needed to com pensate
for the com m u n ity 's no longer receiving new revelations (in response
to problems and crises) through M uham m ed. Hence, those who had
known M uham m ed well — m em bers of h is fam ily and close com pan
ions — recorded the sayings and actions of M uham m ed in w hat are
now called ahadith (h a d ith , in the singular). After several centuries
scholars considered these reports of the Prophet's words and actions
to be a second binding source for Islam ic ethics and law. Laws, of
course, had to be discerned and tested for authenticity by tracing
th em to the sacred sources, ultim ately to the Q ur'an. T h e body of
laws, discerned and tested, was and is the shariah.
Laws and eth ical norm s could not, however, simply be read out of
the Q u r'an o r the ahadith. T h eir m eaning had to be interpreted and
applied as w ell as authenticated. T here are, for example, inconsisten
cies in the Q u r'an itself and in the ahadith. And there is actually very
little legislation in the Q u r'an that deals w ith m oral m atters, with
the exception of prescriptions regarding fam ily law, sexual relations,
and wom en. Yet Islam ic laws can be very detailed, covering ways of
praying, eating, washing, sleeping, even whether to use th e right or
left hand. H cnce the development of detailed prescriptions regarding
the behavior of w om en or the suitability of sexual relations is not
surprising. N ew insights were needed as the M uslim com m unities
encountered new situations and challenges. Religious understanding
of laws, therefore, had to be achieved through a process called fiqh,
wherein scholars and m ystics pondered th e sacred texts, disagreed
over the usefulness of philosophical reasoning, formed strong but
som etim es opposing traditions of scholarship and teaching, sought
consensus wherever possible, brought to bear a kind of "com m on
sense" on specific m atters of com m unal life.
T h e first duty of every M uslim is to build com m unity. In a sense,
the sum m ary of all law has to do w ith solidarity in community.
R ein h a rt, " Is la m ic Law a s Is la m ic E th ic s ," Jo u rn a l o f R eligiou s E thics 11 (1 9 8 3 ): 1 8 6 -

2 0 3 ; E liz a b e th A n n Meyer, Isla m a n d H u m an Rights: T radition a n d P olitics, 3rd cd.
(Boulder, C O : W estview , 1 9 9 9 ); A k b ar A h m ed , Living Isla m : From S a m a r k a n d to
S to rn o w a y (L o n d on : B B C B ooks, 19931.
Throughout Arab nom adic history, the lesson was learned that one
cannot survive alone in the desert. Everything depends on the clan
or the tribe. I f an individual does anything th at contradicts or u n
derm ines th e solidarity of th e group, it cannot be tolerated. Even
w hen tribes becam e econom ically successful and more sedentary (as
in M ecca), there was th e danger (to the com m unity) of a gap between
rich and poor. A traditional tribal ethic called for som e form of eq
uitable sharing in the goods that everyone needed. M uham m ed saw
the failures in this regard, and reinforced the m oral requirem ent of
caring for and being responsible to one's neighbor (within the tribe).
So in som e sense, from th e beginning, the central m oral virtue of
Islam had to do with social justice and com passion am ong believ
ers.108 O ur concern here, of course, is w ith Islam ic sexual ethics. As
in any other religious and cultural tradition, however, it is difficult
if not im possible to understand the overall sexual system of M us
lim s w ithout trying to sec it against both th e spiritual and ethical
framework of Islam .109 W hat I have offered above is all too brief, but
at least it takes note of com plexities in m oral discernm ent as well
as the im portance of historical perspective when it com es to consid
ering specific sexual m oral rules. D espite ongoing controversies and
the need for discernm ent, as well as variations in custom s in differ
en t parts of th e world where M uslim s live, there are com m onalities
to be identified in the overall tradition of Islam ic beliefs and practices
in the sexual sphere.110
W hen contrasted w ith Christianity, Islam is often considered a
"sex-positive" tradition, one that eschews mind/body dualism, and
1 0 8 . S e e H o u ra n i, R ea so n a n d T rad ition in Isla m ic E thics, 3 1 ; A rm stro n g , Isla m , 6.

1 0 9 . I a m q u ite aw are th a t I a m d oing n o th in g h ere w ith cru cia l e th ic a l q u estio n s
regarding, fo r e x a m p le , w ar and peace, fo rm s o f g o v ern m en t, etc. I refer readers to th e
e x ce llen t w ork o f, for e xam p le, Jo h n K elsey and o th ers. S e e n o te 13 above.
1 1 0 . I w ill be d raw in g h e re o n su ch so u rc es a s Parrinder, S e x in t h e W orld’s R eligion s,
ch ap . 8 ; B . F. M u sa lla m , S e x a n d S o ciety in Isla m (Lond on: C am brid ge U niv ersity
Press, 1 9 8 3 ); G a m a l I. Serour, “T ra d itio n a l Sexu al P ra ctic cs in th e Is la m ic World
and T h e ir E v o lu tio n ," in E volution o f t h e M ea n in g o f S e x u a l In terco u rse, 1 0 1 - 1 0 ;
A yesha M . Im a m , " T h e M u slim R eligious R ig h t 1'F u n d am en talists'l and S e x u ality ," in
G o o d S ex , 1 5 - 3 0 ; V aleric J . IIo ffm an -L ad d , " M y s tic ism and S e x u a lity in Sufi T h o u g h t
and L ife ," M y stics Q u arte rly 18 (1 9 9 2 ), 8 2 - 9 3 ; a n d above a ll, Valerie J . H o ffm an ,
"Is la m ic P ersp ectives o n th e H u m a n Body: Legal, S o cial, and S p iritu al C o n s id e ra tio n s ,"
in E m b o d im en t, M orality, a n d M ed icin e, ed. L isa So w ie C a h ill and M arg aret A . Farley
(D ord rech t: K lu w cr A cad em ic, 1 9 9 5 ), 3 7 - 5 5 .
98 TUST LOVE
that m akes room for the attain m ent of m ystical union w ith God
through — and n ot in spite of — sexual passion. Sexual desire is not
tainted by sin ; in fact, strictly speaking, there is no "fall" and no doc
trine of original sin in Islam ic literature.111 T h e physical delights of
sex belong n o t only to this world but also to Paradise. T h e em otion
ally overw helm ing characteristics of the sexual drive arc not evil, but
a part of nature, and able to be incorporated into M uslim spirituality
and life. M uham m ed him self offers a model of sexual prowess, and
an example o f th e im portance of marriage.
"N atural sexuality" is n ot solely for the sake of reproduction, but
it is always heterosexual. T h is m eans that — at least in the dom i
nant Islam ic sexual discourse — m asturbation, homosexuality, and
bestiality are all condemned as unnatural. (M ale hom osexuality is
prohibited in the Q ur'an, though sex between Islam ic m en and their
m ale slaves h as been acceptable in som e historical instances, as have
erotic relationships between eunuchs.) T h e assum ption regarding a
natural desire and need for heterosexual sex also m eans that celibacy
has been generally denounced by M uslim s, although Islam ic m ys
tical traditions (such as Sufism) have affirmed the value of celibacy
for liberating the spirit to begin its ascent to God. M uham m ed is
reported to have said, "I fast and eat, sleep and pray and practice my
m arital relation. T h ese are my traditions. T h o se w ho don't follow
my traditions are disobedient."112
In Islam as in other traditions, sexuality is perceived as good, nat
ural, but in need of boundaries and controls. For all of its importance
to hum an flourishing, sex also has a destructive potential. Relevant
to this is the belief am ong M uslim s that wom en's sexuality is natu
rally greater and m ore powerful than m en's, even though it is more
passive. As Ayesha Im am puts it, "w om en are thought to have nine
1 1 1 . T h o u g h th e r e is n o d octrin e o f a " F a ll" in Isla m , o r o f Eve a s th e cau se o f A dam 's

d isobed ience, Is la m ic th eo lo g ian s have been m u ch in flu en ced by Jew ish and C h ristia n
in te rp re ta tio n s o f G e n e s is in th is regard. W h ile n o n e o f th e s e th eo lo g ical trad ition s,
for e xa m p le, a ctu a lly h o ld s Eve resp on sible for h u m a n sin , popular im p ressio n s w ith in
th e m ten d t o do s o . S e e R iffa t H a ssa n , "M u s lim W o m en and P o st-P atriarch al I s la m ," in
A lter Patriarchy: F em in ist T ra n sfo rm a tio n s o f t h e W orld R eligion s , cd . Paula M . C oocy,
W illia m R . E a k in , and Jay B . M c D a n ie l (M ary k n oll, N Y: O rb is, 1 9 9 1 ), 4 7 - 5 1 .
1 1 2 . H a d ith S h a reef, a s q u oted in Serour, "T ra d itio n a l S e x u al P ractices in th e Isla m ic
W orld and T h e ir E v o lu tio n ," in E volu tion o f th e M ea n in g o f S e x u a l In te rc o u rs e , 1 0 3 .
tim es the potential for sexual desire and pleasure" than that of men,
but it is "w om en's passive exuding of sexu ality"11* th at m akes men
vulnerable and constitutes a threat to the order of the com m unity
From this perspective, nothing will succeed as sufficient restraint
of the destructive potential of sex unless there is im portant control
of women.
Not unlike som e strands of C hristianity, Islam affirm s that m ar
riage is the primary remedy for the destructive potential of sex;
w ithout m arriage, the indom itability of sexual desire leads to dis
cord and corruption. Yet protection against unruly desire is not the
only or the primary goal of marriage. Abu Hamid al-C«hazali, a
revered religious authority at th e end of the eleventh and beginning
of the tw elfth century (d. 1111), cites "five advantages to marriage:
procreation, satisfying sexual desire, ordering the household, provid
ing com panionship, and disciplining the self in striving to sustain
th e m ."1,4 Procreation, he goes on to say, is the prim e advantage and
the m ain reason for the institution of marriage. But the other advan
tages arc also extrem ely im portant. Sexual desire "bridled by piety"
becom es a harbinger of th e pleasure to be enjoyed in Paradise. Sex
between husband and wife is a form of giving alm s, one to the other,
and both husband and wife have a right to be sexually satisfied. W rit
ing to m en, al-G hazali observes that "th e com panionship of women
provides relaxation which relieves distress and soothes the h eart."115
Moreover, a virtuous wom an who takes care of the house leaves her
husband free from the concerns of household duties, thereby abet
ting his spiritual devotions.116 And finally, both husbands and wives
achieve self-discipline and m oral reform through their fam ily duties
and burdens.
1 1 3 . Im a m , " T h e M u slim R elig iou s R ig h t ('F u n d am en talists') a n d S e x u a lity ," in

G o o d S ex , 18.
1 1 4 . A b u H a m id al-G h a z a li, M arriage a n d S ex u ality in Isla m : A T ran slation o f al-
G h azali's B o o k o n t h e E tiq u ette o f M arriage fro m t h e Ih y a , tra n s. M . Farah (S a lt L ake
C ity : U n iv e rsity o f U ta h Press, 1 9 8 3 ), 5 3 .
1 1 5 . Ibid ., 6 5 .
1 1 6 . T h o u g h A rm stro n g n o tes th a t M u h am m ed h im se lf "scru p u lo u sly helped w ith
th e ch o res, m en d ed h is ow n clo th e s and so u g h t o u t th e co m p a n io n sh ip o f h is w ives."
A rm stro n g , Is la m , 16.
100 TUST LOVE
T h ese "advantages" notwithstanding, marriage in traditional

Islam ic societies did n ot generally involve m uch interpersonal part
nership (though it m ust be admitted that we know little about w hat
really w ent o n between husbands and wives). Marriage was for sex
ual satisfaction and children. Beyond this a kind of gender apartheid
prevailed. T h e architecture of houses was such that wom en and m en
lived in different rooms or quarters. M arriages were negotiated and
arranged by fam ilies. (M ost of M uham m ed's marriages, for example,
were entered into for the sake of forging alliances w ith important
tribal fam ilies.)
Traditionally, m en have been allowed m ore than one wife, but only
as m any wives as they can support and treat equally and fairly (this
was usually lim ited to four, though M uham m ed, when he becam e a
great chief, was expected to have a large harem). T h e Q u r'an itself
perm itted polygyny, though the reasons for this frequently included
protecting w om en w hose husbands had been killed in war. There
have always been som e M uslim guidelines for sex in marriage —
such as a requirem ent of privacy, preference for vaginal (not oral)
intercourse, prohibition of anal intercourse, and avoidance of sexual
intercourse (though n ot other form s of sexual relating) w ith a wife
w hen she is m enstruating.117
Today, w hile m edically assisted reproduction is acceptable for
Islam ic couples, the use of third party genetic or conceptual contribu
tions is n o t.118 In cest is prohibited; adultery is forbidden and subject
to p u nish m ent for both m en and wom en (though severe punish
m ents such as stoning were n ot m eted out early on in the tradition;
they have, however, emerged in frightening ways in countries where
right-wing Isla m ic forces now hold sway). Divorce has a t tim es been
relatively easy for m en, but also available to wom en; contemporary
restrictions o n w om en have tended to m ake divorce a m ore difficult
option for them .
As Ziba M ir-H osscini h as noted, "W om en's issues and gender re
lations have been central to religious and political discourses in the
1 1 7 . S e e Serou r, "T ra d itio n a l P ra ctic cs in th e Isla m ic W orld and T h e ir Evolu

tio n ," 1 0 4 .
1 1 8 . Ib id ., 1 0 4 .
M uslim world since early in this century."119 As she notes, too, there
is now a "vast literature" on w om en and gender in Islam .120 For
alm ost a century there have been M uslim m odernist and fem inist
m ovem ents th a t promote the education of women and their greater
participation in national life. T h e issue of wom en's rights appears at
the heart of today's struggles for Islam ic cultural identity. Yet (as in
other traditions) it was not always so. A rm strong argues that the
Prophet M uham m ed favored the em ancipation of w om en.121 T h e
Q u r'an gave wom en rights of inheritance and divorce (long before
wom en were granted these in m ost W estern societies). It prescribes
"som e degree" of segregation and veiling for the Prophet's own wives
(as a protection from custom s that m ade w om en vulnerable to abuse),
but the Q u r'an does n ot require these for all w om en.122 In the early
years of the Islam ic m ovem ent w om en were im portant participants
in the public life of the com m unity; som e even fought as warriors
along with M u slim m en. And while M uslim societies have never
regarded wom en and m en as equal before one another, the Q ur'an
offers texts in which they stand as absolutely equal creatures before
God. In tim e, these did n ot prevent Islam from incorporating into its
social and political structures the patriarchy that was all around it.
T h ese structures rem ain reinforced by Q u r'an ic verses and ahadith
literature calling on women to be obedient to m en, acquiescent to a
m ale m anagem ent of their lives.
W hile M uham m ed m ay have introduced restrictions on women's
activities, dress, and participation in public life in order to protect
them , th e tradition cam e to require these restrictions as a m eans of
protecting m en and society from the passive allure of wom en's sex
uality that w c have identified above. T o solve this problem, M uslim
wom en in m any localities are secluded in the hom e, forbidden to go
1 1 9 . Z ib a M ir- H o ss e in i, Isla m a n d G e n d e r : T h e R eligiou s D e b a te in C o n tem p o ra ry

Iran (P rin ce to n , N J : P rin ceto n U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 9 9 ), 3.
1 2 0 . F o r so m e u sefu l ex am p les, see H a ssa n , "M u s lim W o m en a n d P ost-P atriarch al
Is la m ," 3 9 - 6 4 ; F a tim a M e rn issi, T h e Veil a n d th e M ale E lite , tra n s. M . J. Lakeland
(Reading, PA: A ddison-W esley, 1 9 9 1 ); M e rn issi, B ey o n d t h e Veil: M a le-F em ale D y
n a m ic s in M o d ern M u slim S o ciety , rev. cd . (B loo m in g to n : In d ia n a U n iv ersity Press,
1 9 8 7 ).
1 2 1 . S e e A rm stro n g , Isla m , 16.
1 2 2 . Ib id ., 16. T h e n o tab le d iscrep an cy b etw een th is report and th e rep orts I have
heard fro m A frica n w om en regarding polygyny are puzzling.
102 TUST LOVE
out in public w ithout the perm ission and accom panim ent of a male,
and required to cover themselves if they do leave the hom e. W omen's
beauty m ust be visible only to their husbands (and sons and som e
tim es other close relatives); in relation to all other m en, they m ust
be invisible. T h ere is a hadith that says, "W hen you see a wom an
approaching you, she com es in the form of S atan ."123
Today's stories of forced marriages of young girls with old men;
wom en unable to suivive econom ically because they cannot leave
hom e to find work; wom en accused of adultery and sentenced to be
stoned; w om en attacked if they do n ot wear required veils and appro
priate clothing; wom en and girls forced to accept practices (although
n ot Islam ic in origin) such as female circum cision; w om en without
any say in political decisions that affect their everyday lives: these
are stories of Islam where it is in the hands of conservative leaders
who m ake w om en th e line of battle in thwarting th e perceived threat
of n on -Islam ic sexual mores. Som e wom en have other stories, how
ever, wherein they refuse to let a veil determ ine their identity, yet
they wear it gladly because it allows th em safe space in the public
world; or th ey em brace the wearing of headscarves because it does
acknowledge their identity in ways they affirm; or they refuse to ac
cept certain interpretations of the Q u r'an, ahadith, and custom ary
practices, choosing instead to challenge th e tradition to be truer to
itself and to th e capabilities and rights of its women.
Sexual eth ical and gender ju stice stmggles are n ot unique to Islam.
Even the role of extrem ists w ithin Islam (or "fundam entalists" — a
term first coined proudly by Protestants in the U nited States, and
not com pletely apt for th e situation of contemporary Islam ) has par
allels with conservative m ovem ents in other religious and secular
traditions. Yet the particular history of Islam makes its challenge its
own. T h e evolution of its sexual system bears the m arks not only
of th e original vision of its Prophet and its acknowledged duties to
build and sustain community, but also the m arks of the cultures in
which it h as been embedded and th e scars of an era of colonization.
Its current battle involves devising a way to live on its own terms
in a modern and postm odern world. Its desire is to sustain its own
1 2 3 . Q u oted i n H o ffm a n , " Is la m ic P ersp ectives o n th e H u m a n Body," 4 8 .

identity. Its challenge is to do this in the face of modern individual

ism on the o n e hand, and on the other hand with genuine concern
for the role o f w om en as well as m en in a just and com passionate
sexual system.
D iv ersity U n lim ited ?
But where sh all we go from here? O f w hat use in developing a fram e

work for contem porary h um an and C hristian sexual ethics is the
kind of m aterial I have presented above? Perhaps we just need to
know m ore. W e need to move from here to countless other cultures
and traditions, finding worlds upon end in w hich sexuality gains its
m eaning in profoundly different ways of living and believing. O r we
need to explore m ore deeply th e traditions I have already sketched
so briefly. If w e go m ore carefully, for example, to traditional African
cultures, we can focus more directly on the intricacies of marriage
structures in w hich for centuries polygyny has served social, eco
nom ic, and religious ends. If we travel to India, we can see better
the m ultiple paths w hich have led to intersections between religious
rationales for sexual asceticism and sex m anuals for flamboyant and
creative sexual practices. We can also study the com plex image of
the Hindu goddess Kali, learning to appreciate the com bination of
benevolence and malevolence, sorting out the possibilities of sexual
creativity and destruction. In Japan we m ight try to understand the
juxtaposition of extrem e sexual reserve in marriage and toleration of
sex outside o f marriage, even to the point of a vast sex industry for
pornography and access to prostitution. We could enter into strands
of Buddhism w here m ortality is n ot the whole story, and where both
sexual asceticism and dom esticity serve concerns for transcendence.
If we go to C hina, we may learn how a relatively sexually free Taoism
is muted from one C hinese dynasty to another by the rational plausi
bility of C onfucianism . We m ight also observe the tensions between
the deep-seated sexual austerity of a Confucian past and a culture
now influenced by notions of liberated sex.
We may com e to observe not only diversity but sim ilarity among
the m any cultures and religious traditions. After all, everywhere there
is the effort to m ake sense of sexuality as a positive force in human
104 TUST LOVE
life that is also potentially destructive. All cultures have m oral and
political concerns for the procreation and rearing of children. They
all try to provide for som e stability in fam ilial and com m unal rela
tions. In cest taboos appear everywhere, despite differences in w hat
relationships count as incest. All traditions find it necessary to under
stand, restrict, or provide for sexual desires aimed otherwise than at
reproduction. Every tradition, at least to som e degree, offers gen
dered structures, differentiating identities and roles for m en and
wom en. T h ere are tensions everywhere between recurring themes
of asceticism and valuations of sexual pleasure, between com m unal
concerns and individual preferences, and between past practiccs and
new circum stances and demands.
T h e closer we com e to each of these contexts, the m ost important
factor that em erges m ay n ot be either difference or similarity. It may
be th e very plasticity of hum an sexuality, its susceptibility to different
meanings and expressive form s. N ot that it is infinitely malleable,·
nor that it m atters very little how its m eaning and practices are
constructed; and not that it sim ply varies, despite sim ilarities, from
culture to culture. Rather, along w ith variety am ong traditions, w hat
is striking is th a t any particular tradition's internal understanding of
sexuality and gender m ight have developed differently had there been
som e variation in particular circum stances. It may be th at such an
observation is possible only in a critical age such as our own, when
reformers em erge in alm ost every m ajor tradition — reformers who
do n ot reject th eir traditions, but who advocate change, transform a
tion that is grounded in lost (silenced or contradicted) elem ents in
the tradition itself.
T h u s, ju st as Judith Plaskow argues for a new perspective on
hum an sexuality w ithin Judaism, and C hristine Gudorf for a new
C hristian sexual ethic, so Lina Gupta m ain tains that in Hindu
images of Kali there are resources for new interpretations of the tradi
tion that will be more conducive to the liberation of women, and Ziba
M ir-H osscini attem pts to retrieve an Islam ic tradition that is capa
ble of addressing the questions of the present age.124 African novelists
124. S e e Ju d ith Plaskow , S tam iing A gain a t Sinai: Ju d a ism fro m a F em in ist P ersp ec
tive (Sa n F ra n cisco : H arp er & Row, 1 9 9 0 ) ; C h ris tin e E. G u d orf, B ody, Sex, a n d P leasu re:
like T sitsi Dangarembga and M anam a Bâ provide talcs of anguished

individuals and conflicted tribes in search of change yet continuity
in the sexual system s of their African hom e cou ntries.125
Having barely glimpsed the m ultiple tracks of cross-cultural and
interreligious experience and values, we nonetheless cannot here pur
sue th em further. N either can we forget them . They belong to the
map of h um an sexual m eanings. To assure our rem em brance, we can
identify what we have learned that may help us in the next stages
of our exploration. T hree questions will yield som e brief and provi
sional conclusions: ( 1 ) How m uch do we really know at this point?
(2) W hat procedural clues may we have gained for developing a sex
ual ethic? (3) W h at substantive insights m ay be useful in our ongoing
explorations?
(1) In response to the first question, it can be said that overviews
such as the ones I have offered above do give us som e inform ation
about various traditions. Yet we still know so little. T h is m akes our
use of this inform ation highly vulnerable to oversim plification and
distortion. W e know so little because, as I suggested earlier, it is one
thing for th ose standing outside a tradition to glim pse a general out
line of its sexual practices and norm s; it is quite another to know
what really goes on in the hum an relations involved. T h is latter
depends on genuine experience, even if vicarious experience, of the
tradition itself. It requires long listening n ot only as researcher but as
friend. It requires access and attention to hearts and voices w ithin a
tradition and to texts that are literary, symbolic, practical, mystical,
sacred, of every available genre.126
R eco n stru ctin g C h ristia n S e x u a l E th ics (C leveland : P ilg rim , 1 9 9 4 ); L in a G u p ta, "K ali,
th e S a v io r/’ in After Patriarchy, 1 5 - 3 8 ; M ir-H o s s e in i, Islam and Gender.
1 2 5 . S e e T s i t s i D an garem bga, N erv o u s C o n d itio n s (N ew York: Seal Press, 1 9 8 9 );
M a n a m a B â , S o L o n g A L etter, tra n s. M o d u p é B o d é -T h o m a s (O xford: H e in e m a n n Ed
u c atio n a l, 1 9 8 1 ). I n th e first of th ese, D an g arem bg a te lls th e sto ry o f a y ou ng g irl in
R h o d esia in th e 1 9 6 0 s , stru ggling to fin d h e rself in th e trib al trau m a o f a colonized
n a tio n . In th e se co n d , Bâ re c o u n ts a new k in d o f e m o tio n a l trau m a in a M u slim S e n e
g a lese w o m a n w h o se h u sb and tak es a seco n d w ife and w h o se ev en tu al w idow hood
m a k e s h e r stru g gle o n e of survival.
1 2 6 . F o r se x u a l c th ic is ts , it m ay b e th a t a n u an ccd ca se stu d y approach, w ith in an
in te r-tra d itio n a l d ialog u e, is a rem ark ab ly helpful w ay to co m e to s o m e understand ing.
T h i s is e x e m p lified in R egin a W en tzel W olfe and C h ris tin e E. G u d orf, ed s., E th ics a n d
W orld R eligion s: C ro ss-C u ltu ral C a s e S tu dies (M ary k n o ll, N Y: O rb is, 1 9 9 9 ).
106 TUST LOVE
Having said this, w c can tem per our fears of never being able to
understand another tradition, especially regarding n ot only the poli
cies but the intim acies of its sexual life, by noting that those who are
w ithin a tradition often do n ot understand it well, cither. Wc need
only take ourselves as examples. W hatever th e sexual experience of
an individual or a group, it is seldom marked by great reflection. Ad
herents of a tradition are themselves often unaware of the roots of
their practices. O nly when the practices becom e problem atic is there
the need to understand th em and to assess them . Hence, as sexual
ethicists pursue our own tasks, the questions we ask may generate
insights both for those w ithin a tradition and without. But this leads
directly to th e second question I have posed above.
(2) W hat procedural clues may we have gained through the exer
cise of a chapter such as this one? My response is that we have four
clues. First, it is im p ossib le sim ply to transplant the b eliefs a n d p rac
tices fro m o n e tradition to an oth er, nor should we w ant to do so.
"M u lticu ltu ralism ," embraced by m any N orth Am erican thinkers,
represents a critique of any one tradition's cultural superiority in rela
tion to the practices and values of any other.127 M ulticulturalism grew
in the late tw entieth century as a response to the kind of W estern lib
eral hegem ony assumed in relation to other cultures and exhibited
in, for example, the colonizing and evangelizing of non-Western sex
ualities. Efforts to change other traditional sexual system s to accord
with ours have not succeeded well; in fact, they have all too often
left confusion and injury, as well as anger, in their wake. N or will it
work to try sim ply to im port sexual m ores from other cultures into
our own.
Any sym pathy with m ulticulturalism entails a correlative clue.
T h a t is, n ot only should we not attem pt to im pose our sexual beliefs
and practices on peoples of another culture, w e sh ou ld also not stand
in gen eral judgm en t o f oth er cultures (whether we act to change them
or not). It is n ot a priori obvious that our sexual practices are more
127. S e e Jo sh u a C o h e n , M a tth e w H ow ard, and M a rth a N u ssb au m , ed s., Is M uhi-

cu ltu ralism B a d fo r W o m en ! (P rin ceton , N f: P rin ceto n U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 9 9 ), 4 . T h e
fo rm u la tio n a ssu m e d in th is v o lu m e is of m u lticu ltu ra lism a s th e "rad ical id ea th a t
p eople in o th er c u ltu re s, foreign a n d d o m estic, are h u m a n bein g s, to o — m o ra l equals,
e n title d to e q u a l resp ect and c o n c e r n ."
conducivc to h um an flourishing and hum an happiness than arc those

of others.
But a third clue goes along with th e first and second and may
qualify them in a way. If "m ulticulturalism " as an ethical and po
litical stance m eans th at no assessm ents can be made, culture to
culture, this too is problem atic. We cann ot respect every' cultural
practice, w h e th e r our ow n o r oth ers’, unconditionally.126 If, for ex
ample, respecting other cultures' gender arrangem ents m eans that
we m u st never again th in k in term s of hum an rights (including
w om en's rights), then th is is unacceptable. If it m eans th at we can
draw no conclusions regarding a practice like female circum cision,
then it yields n ot pluralism but relativism . Deception, coercion, en
slavem ent, m anipulation, oppression: We need n ot extend moral
respect to all. Hence, each culture m ust make som e judgment on
other cultures, mindful (one hopes, whether at h om e or abroad) of
the tem ptation to judge only because som e cultural practices are dif
ferent from o u r own. If judgments are grounded in basic respect for
other peoples, they will be made in ways th at are n ot harm ful to
cultures or to their adherents.
T h e fourth clue is that w hat we learn from the sexual beliefs and
practices of cultures other th an our own m ay be usefu l in critiquing
ou r ow n cu lture a n d traditions. In seeing the vulnerability of all tra
ditions to extrem es, to forgetfulness of their more salutary roots, to
internal contradictions through tim e, we may understand better the
problem s in every tradition, including our own.
(3) In response to m y third and last question, w hat substantive
insights may be useful in our ongoing explorations into a contem po
rary sexual eth ic, let m e say that we surely do n ot — from this brief
entry into cross-cultural studies of sexual system s — have sufficient
knowledge to propose policies for cross-cultural interactions. We do,
however, have insights into (or at least im pressions of) flaws in every
system, not excluding our own. T h ese insights should serve u s well in
proposing a fram ew ork for contem porary C hristian sexual cthics. We
surely have learned som ething about the genuine tensions between
128. Ib id . T h i s is th e p o sitio n o f S u san M o lle r O k in , vigorously d ebated in th e w hole

o f Is M u lticu ltu ralism B a d for W om en f
108 TUST LOVE
the goods of individual and community. Wc may have learned that

ongoing transform ation of sexual system s can profit from (and not
only be injured by) respectful dialogue, extended learning, between
one tradition and another.
We turn again, therefore, to general questions about the sexual
sphere of h um an life, influenced by our own cultural com m itm ents
and vantage points; but we do so w ith an eye on practices and beliefs
of cultures and tim es other th an this one. We turn again to th e "large
questions" th a t precede norm ative considerations of a sexual ethic.
C hapter 4
SEXUALITY
AND ITS MEANINGS
th at ethical issues w hich remain
I
s a id in p r e v io u s ch apters
open and difficult regarding h um an sexuality include large ques

tions, questions that are in som e respects m ore basic than those of
specific m oral rules. O f course, the m ost basic questions of all are
those th a t underlie all ethical discernm ent: inquiries into the nature
and goals of hum anity, the relation of hum an persons to God and to
the rest of creation, the sources and m ethods of cthical discernment,
the m eaning of good and evil, and m any more questions that have
kept philosophers, theologians, scientists, and poets busy from gen
eration to generation. In this chapter, however, my concern is with
questions th a t are m ore particular to ethical discernm ent regarding
hum an sexuality.
O f w hat I have been calling the "large questions" about sexuality, at
least three are central to the intelligibility of any framework for sexual
ethics. T h e first has to do with the m oral status of th e hum an body —
its m eaning, its interest and value vis-à-vis the whole person, its
givcnncss and contingencies. T h e second is the increasingly complex
question of gender — the social construction (or not) of its meaning
and its role in personal identity and h um an relationships of every
kind. A third question focuses on th e sources and aim s of sexual
desire — perhaps the heart of th e question of the m eaning of sexuality
in hum an lives. In term s of their relevance to sexual ethics, these
three questions are inseparable, though they can be distinguished.
T h eir interconnectedness is finally part of each question, and it holds
th em all together.
Each of these questions points to a part of whatever m eaning we
give to sexuality. T h e com plexity of the questions and the variety of
109
110 TUST LOVE
answers put forward for them today tell u s that there is surely more
th an one m eaning for sexuality. T h e question th en becom es how we
discern and assess m ultiple m eanings, and how these m eanings may
fit w ithin a worldview that makes sense to us. U ltim ately for C h ris
tians, the question is whether and how these m eanings fit w ithin a
C hristian fram ew ork of faith; and how they can be shared, or not,
w ith others w hose frameworks are significantly different.
In this chapter, then, I explore questions related to th e human
body, gender differentiation, and hum an experiences of sexuality. I
return here to a primary focus on W estern and C hristian thought,
though I try n ot to ignore or leave behind the significance of
cross-cultural and inter religious approaches. T o pursue questions of
em bodim ent, sex, and gender, it seem s logical to start with questions
about th e body, since our understandings of it seem more basic than
either sex or gender. We begin here with som e risks — of skewing
our subsequent explorations of gender and sexuality, of choosing a
logic whose presuppositions arc themselves in question, and m ost
of all of getting caught in and delayed by conflicting metaphysical
analyses of h um an em bodim ent. M y aim , however, will n ot be to
settle the m eaning of hum an em bodim ent (an effort bound to be
disappointing in any case) but to suggest ways of thinking about
it that may shed light on the further questions of sexuality and
gender.
H ow th e Body M a tters
It docs not take acutc powers of observation to note that in con

temporary W estern culture we are preoccupied w ith the "body," even
though we frequently describe ourselves as "body-alienated." T h is
does n ot m ean only that we are obsessive about health and beauty,
or that we are concerned about the control of som e persons' bodies
by others — though both of these arc true. It m eans, in addition,
that the body is of great interest to theorists w ho are trying to figure
out what we are as hum an beings — bodied, sexed, gendered, in the
world. Shedding an Enlightenm ent focus on the "m in d ," they have
tried to understand w hat it m eans to be "em bodied." At stake in all of
this for sexual ethics is the question of whether, or to w hat extent, our
Sexuality an d Its Meanings 111
bodies provide a basis, or even sm all clues, for determ ining acceptable
practices of h um an sexuality.
T heories o f th e Body
T here are two sets of issues around w hich swirl m ost of the contro
versial questions regarding the m eaning of the hum an body. T h e first
is the centuries old, yet still alive and well, set of issues about the re
lation between soul (or m ind or spirit1) and body. T h ese are the issues
of dualism (we are made up of two distinct parts, perhaps even two
distinct entities) and m on ism (we are really only one entity, either
soul or body; o r we are one entity, but it has distinguishable aspects).
T h ese issues have som etim es proven critical in m oral assessm ents
of th e body and m oral understandings of sexuality.
T h e second set of issues is m uch newer, and it usually includes
a rejection o f the first set as misguided or irrelevant. T h ese are
the issues of social constructionism ; th at is, w hether and how the
m eaning of th e body is culturally and socially formed, influenced,
constructed. W h ile I do not w ant to becom e m ired in th e seemingly
endless debates about these two sets of issues, it is n ot possible to
explore hum an em bodim ent w ithout taking them into account. Both
of them , for exam ple, arc key to understanding the h um an self, or to
discerning w hether or n ot there even is a hum an self. Both can be
im portant, th en , to understanding w hat gender m eans for identity,
w hat sex m eans to being "hu m an ," and w hat society has to do with
our conceptions and images of our bodies.
1. For s o m e th e o r is ts , th e b in a ry d iv isio n is b etw een m in d a n d body, fo r o th e rs,

b e tw een so u l o r sp irit and body. 1 a m n o t ad d ressing an y o f th e s e th eo ries in d etail;
h e n c e , I w ill u se t h e te rm s "m in d ," " s o u l," " s p ir it" interchangeably. How ever, th ere
are d ifferen ces a m o n g th e m th a t are im p o rta n t to m any . "M in d ," fo r exam p le, m o st
o fte n c o n n o te s t h e th in k in g , know ing, reason in g , and d irectin g " p a r t" and ca p a b ili
tie s o f th e p e rso n ; " s o u l" o ften co n n o te s th e "p a rt" th a t fo rm s th e body and gives life
to th e p e rso n ; " s p ir it" c a n m e a n th e sa m e a s " s o u l," th o u g h it ten d s to co n n o te no t
on ly th e life p rin cip le b u t th e ca p a cities of m in d and h eart, a s w ell a s an op enn ess
to o th er bein g s. I n d u alistic th e o rie s — th o se th a t em p h a siz e th e d is tin c tio n betw een
th e s e term s, o n th e o n e h an d , and th e body, o n th e o th e r — "m in d /so u l/sp irit" all
ten d to refer to t h e " im m a te ria l" p art o f d ie h u m a n p erson , w hile "b o d y " refers to the
"m a te r ia l" part.
112 TUST LOVE
Body an d Spirit: One, Tw o, o r Tw o-in-O ne I

M ajor philosophical traditions of W estern culture have tended to ex
plain the h um an body by distinguishing it from, and often opposing
it to, the soul (or spirit or m ind). T h e boundary between body and
soul, in such views, constitutes a fissure w ithin the hum an individ
ual, and it prevents full u nion between persons. As I have indicated
above, som e theorists (notably in Platonic traditions2) hold that the
distinction between body and soul is th at of two separate entities
temporarily held together in the hum an person. In this binary di
vision, the soul is frequently the truly "h u m an ," while the body
constitutes an unfortunate and temporary lim itation on the hum an
spirit (signified by fam ous m etaphors like container and contained,
prison and imprisoned).
For other th eorists (for example, St. Augustine3), the m ind and
body are separate entities yet inseparable as parts of hum an nature.
Both are part of w hat it m eans to be hum an, but they are held
together in a kind of fragile "political" unity. T h e soul needs the
body for knowledge (which is dependent in the beginning on sense
perception), b u t the soul is ideally to rule the body, ordering its feel
ings and desires and providing for its needs. Soul and body are thus
essentially related, each dependent on the other and m utually deter
mined in som e ways. C enturies later, René Descartes also coupled
two substances — m ind and body — in th e person, but weakened
their relationship to the point where m ind is the cen ter of the self,
and th e body — although close to and interacting w ith the m ind —
is rather like a com plex m achine.4
A ristotle and T h om as Aquinas, on the other hand, thought that
soul and body are not two entities but two m etaphysical principles,
2 . S e c, fo r e x a m p le , P lato , L aw s 8 9 6 a 1 - 2 ; P h a e d o 8 5 e 3 - 8 6 d 4 , 9 3 c 3 - 9 5 . Sec
a lso P h ilo , A lleg o rical In terp retatio n o f th e L a w s 3 .6 9 .
3 . A u g u stin e, C ity o f G o d X X I I .2 6 ; D e G e n e s i a d liltera n i X I I.3 5 .6 8 ; S e rm o n es
CLV.15.
4 . R en é D e s c a rte s, M ed itation s {1 6 4 1 ), cited by R ich ard M . Z a n e r in "E m b o d i
m e n t: th e P h e n o m e n o lo g ical T r a d itio n ," E n cy clop ed ia o f B io eth ic s, cd . W arren T h o m a s
R eich , rev. cd . (N e w York: S im o n &. S c h u ste r M a c m illa n , 1 9 9 5 ), 1 :2 9 1 . S c h o la rs like
Z a n e r c a u tio n t h a t D e s ca rte s ap p ears in h is la ter w ritin g s to have m odified th is view,
observin g a m o re in tim a te m in d /b od y rela tio n based o n a m o re co m p le x un d erstan d in g
o f th e body.
"form " and "m atter," together m aking up a hum an essence that exists
as one entity or substance.5 T h e soul m akes the body to be a hum an
body, while th e body individualizes th e soul so that a particular,
unique h um an being can exist. Although the soul is in an impor
tant sense "im m aterial" and hence (at least according to Aquinas)
can exist apart from its body (which m akes im m ortality plausible), it
could not have existed in the first place w ithout being individualized
(limited to th is particular share of hum anity) by a m aterial principle,·
and it cannot exist after death w ithout som e ongoing relationship to
m atter (which m akes resurrection of the body plausible).
For still other theorists, body and m ind arc not finally distinguish
able. T h ey arc in fact reducible one to the other. Either the body
is reducible to m ind (as in extrem e form s of philosophical ideal
ism or som e form s of linguistic constructionism ), or the m ind is
reducible to th e body (the m ajority view am ong contem porary scien
tists). From th e latter perspective, the m ind is a function of a highly
developed organism . T h is is a perspective frequently represented in
behavioral psychology, sociobiology, and neuroscience. Philosophical
appropriations of these scientific theories are m ore and more on the
increase.
Religious traditions, too, have worried about such m atters.6
Th em es of em bodim ent have been inevitably intertwined with be
liefs about creation, good and evil, the order of the cosm os, individual
hum an im m ortality, and on and on. Som e religions have emphasized
the d istinction between body and soul, som e the unity. Philosophi
cal perspectives have been incorporated into theologies of the body,
often w ith th e sam e diversity noted above. Practical religious con
cerns have led to interpretations of the m oral statu s of the body and
evaluations o f bodily practices in relation to h um an wholeness and
to relationships with the divine.
T h e trouble with theories and beliefs th at em phasize a distinction
between soul and body is that dualisms breed hierarchies. Hence,
5 . A ristotle, D e A n im a 4 1 2 a; T h o m a s A qu in as, S u m m a T h e o lo g ia e 1 .7 5 - 7 6 , I-
11 22
. .
6 . F o r in te re s tin g and sig n ifican t c o lle ctio n s o f e ssa y s o n diverse relig iou s trad i
tio n s and th e ir a p p ro ach es to th e body, sec S arah C oakley, ed ., R eligion a n d t h e B ody
(C am brid ge: C a m b rid g e U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 9 7 ); Ja n e M a rie Law, R elig iou s R eflection s
o n t h e H u m a n B o d y (B loo m in g to n : In d ia n a U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 9 5 ).
114 TUST LOVE
in Western intellectual history, the soul has been persistently valued

over the body, the intellect over em otions, the will over bodily needs
and desires. It is easy to see how such dualisms have influenced
the m oral evaluation of sex. O n the other hand, th e trouble with
theories that elim inate any mind/body distinction is that the dra
m as of h u m an freedom, and the experiences of personal dividedness,
dim inishm ent, and death, can be underestim ated or ignored.
Constructing the Body

Contem porary fem inist theories have addressed problems about the
body in significant ways, to som e extent changing the very landscape
of our thought on the hum an body.7 Fem inist philosophical debates
have becom e n o t so m uch about w hether to be hum an is to be a body
or to be a soul, or even how body and soul are related (though these
questions rem ain im plicit in m ost of the views set forth).8 T h e goal of
fem inist theorists is primarily to remedy the deficiencies of the past,
particularly theories that have had bad consequences for wom en.
Som e fem in ists explore the possibilities of de-emphasizing gen
der, of focusing, rather, on universal understandings of hum an bodily
capabilities and needs.9 O thers w ant to revalue w om en's bodies as
gendered and different, looking to w om en's experience for new in
sights into th e varieties of hum an em bodim ent.10 Still others offer
powerful postm odern proposals regarding the social construction of
7 . For s e lc c tiv c and critic a l overview s, see C a ro lin e B y n u m , "W h y A ll th e Fuss

abo u t th e Body? A M e d ie v a list's P ersp ectiv e," C ritical In q iu ry 2 2 (A u tu m n 1 9 9 5 ): 1 -
3 1 ; A m y H ollyw ood, "T ra n sc e n d in g B o d ies," R elig iou s S tu dies R e v ie w 2 5 (January
1 9 9 9 ) : 1 3 - 1 8 . F o r a help fu l tre a tm e n t o f th e o rie s in th e c o n te x t o f bio m ed ical e th ics,
see R o sa ly n D ip ro se, T h e B od ies o f W om en : E thics, E m b o d im e n t a n d S ex u a l D ifferen ce
(Lond on: R ou tled g e, 1994).
8. I t is a rg u a b le, fo r e x a m p le , th a t p o stm o d e rn s o c ia l c o n s tr u c tio n is t v iew s o f th e
bod y fin ally le a v e o u t m ateriality , o p tin g o n ly for langu age a s th e re ality of t h e body. I
a m n o t su re I ag ree w ith th is charge, th o u g h i t is tem p tin g . S e c M a rth a C . N u ssb au m ,
" T h e P rofessor o f Parody," T h e N e w R ep u b lic (February 2 2 , 1 9 9 9 ): 3 7 - 4 5 .
9 . S e c, fo r e x a m p le , N u ssb au m , " H u m a n C ap a b ilitie s, F em a le H u m a n B ein g s,"
in W om en , C u ltu re, a n d D e v e lo p m e n t: A Stu dy o f H u m a n C a p a b ilitie s , ed. M arth a
N u ssb a u m and Jo n a th a n G lov er (O xford : C laren d o n P ress, 1 9 9 5 ); L isa Sow ie C a h ill,
Sex, G e n d e r a n d C h ristian E th ics (C am brid ge: C am brid ge U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 9 6 ).
10. S e c, fo r ex a m p le , L uce Irigaray, T h is S ex W h ich is N o t O n e, tra n s. C ath erin e
Porter, w ith C a ro ly n B urke (Ith aca, N Y: C o rn e ll U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 7 7 ); Irigaray, An
E th ics o f S ex u a l D iffe r e n c e , tra n s. C aro ly n B urke and G illia n C . G ill (Lond on: A th lon e,
1 9 9 3 ).
bodies, whereby all of our understandings of the hum an body arc

the result of, 011 the one hand, powerful social forces shaping our
experiences and perceptions of our bodies; and, on the other hand,
our own activities and practices that accord w ith the social content
of what is shaping u s.11 Ideas and practices of the past are n ot ir
relevant, for these beliefs and practices have played key roles in the
construction o f the m eaning of the hum an body a t any given point in
tim e. H ence, theorists debate historical interpretations, challenging
biased readings and offering new texts for our consideration.12 T h e
aim o f all of these fem in ist approaches, however diverse, is n ot only
to enhance understandings of th e hum an body but to correct the ex
clusionary results of past theories wherein som e bodies have counted
in im portance, and som e have not.
I cannot here take on cither all of these theories and perspectives
(fem inist or otherwise) or th e histories on w hich they build. We recog
nize how theories of the past ha\'e yielded dualisms with which we still
live. We know that views of the h um an person as a soul imprisoned in
or tem porarily dependent upon the body continue to operate in our
cultural interpretations of who w c arc. Wc realize that neither Au-
gustinian theories of a political relation between soul and body, nor
A ristotelian/Thom istic theories of an ontological relation between
soul and body, have succeeded in preventing gendered privileging of
som e bodies over others. We know that, despite our efforts to dis
lodge it, D escartes' split of mind from body has becom e our split. We
also know th a t contemporary scientific default theories w hich see the
hum an as only body have not remedied (and in som e ways m ay have
reinforced) tendencies to torture or instrum entalize hum an bodies.
11. S e e e sp e cia lly Ju d ith B utler, B o d ies T h at M atter: O n th e D iscu rsive L im its o f
S ex IL ond on : R outledgc, 1 9 9 3 ).
12. B y n u m , " W h y A ll th e F u ss A b o u t th e B od y ?"; M a rg a ret R . M iles, A u gu stin e on
th e B o d y (M isso u la , M T . S ch o la rs, 1 9 7 9 ); M iles, " S e x and th e C ity (of G od ): Is Sex
Forfeited o r F u lfilled in A u g u sin e's R esu rre ctio n o f th e B od y ?" to u rn a i o f t h e A m erica n
A c a d e m y o f R eligion 7 3 (Ju ne 2 0 0 5 ) : 3 0 2 - 2 8 . S e e a lso th e m assiv e p ro ject un d ertak en
by a m u lti-c u ltu ra l group o f sch o la rs fro m m u ltip le d iscip lin es (som e fe m in ists, so m e
not) w h o se w ork h a s opened up n e w v is ta s in te rm s o f th e h isto ry o f th e body’s "m od es
o f c o n stru c tio n " i n re la tio n t o G od , society, bodily tech n iq u es, relig iou s and p h ilo so p h
ical ideologies a n d so fo rth : M ich a el Fehcr, ed ., w ith R a m o n a N ad daf and N ad ia Tazi,
F ragm en ts for a H istorv o f th e H u m a n B ody, 3 v o ls., Z o n e Series (N ew York: U rzo n e,
1 9 8 9 ).
116 TUST LOVE
N onetheless, I have found m yself impressed by the kernels of truth

in each of th e theories and each of the historical accounts. We may
be at a point where we need n ot settle for either/or interpretations
of the h um an body (for example, either we completely transcend our
bodies, or w hen our brain is damaged our spirit shrinks as well; either
there is a solid m aterial reality in tim ate to ourselves, or constructions
of its m eaning give us an unsettled, sedim ented but always shifting
and elusive reality).13 I agree with those who express dismay that
understandings of the body m ight today dissolve into nothing but
language disputes, and that we m ight thereby forget th e needs of real
women and m en. I therefore agree with those who observe that as
bodies we still need to eat and sleep and deal with pain and pleasure.
Yet I also agree that if anything has been culturally and socially con
structed, surely it is our understandings and hence our experiences
of th e h um an body especially as gendered.
If this chapter, as it presses questions of hum an embodiment,
is n ot prim arily about grappling w ith historical and contemporary
theories, it is about finding new ways to understand ourselves as em
bodied. M y atten tio n is focused on experience (though I know there
is no such thing as "raw" or "pure" experience). I w ant to ask all
over again how it is that hum ans are com plex beings w ho experience
them selves as bodies but n ot only as bodies, as spirits but n ot only as
spirits. As I exam in e experiences of h um an em bodim ent I assum e a
basic background of C hristian perspectives, but I consider the ques
tions I raise to be genuine questions — for Christians no less than
for everyone else. T h a t is, they are questions for w hich we all still
search for understandings.
T ra n scen d en t E m bodim ent

O ur task is to explore what it m eans to be "embodied spirits" and
"inspirited bo d ies."14 I use these term s interchangeably, though I am
1 3 . I a m n o t a lo n e in th is p rovision al co n clu sio n . S e e B y n u m , “S h a p e and Story:

M eta m o rp h o sis in th e W estern T r a d itio n ," Jefferso n L ectu re in H u m a n itie s, Kennedy
C e n te r fo r th e P e rfo rm in g A rts (W ashington, D C , M a rch 2 2 , 1 9 9 9 ). B y n u m , however,
w ould n o t in clu d c q u ite so m u ch in her c o n clu s io n a s 1 do; s h e refers o n ly to certain
d ich o to m ies in u n d erstan d in g th e self.
14. A lth o u g h th e co n cep t "em b od ied sp irit" is no w fairly c o m m o n cu rren cy am on g
m a n y th e o lo g ia n s and so m e p h ilo sop h ers, m y ow n first ap p réciation o f it c a m e in
aware that others may use them to em phasize either body or spirit.
T h e fact that hum ans are embodied spirits, inspirited bodies, is the
glory of our species and the basis of its vulnerability. We live incar
nated in a world that is revelatory of the sacred. We are gifted in body
and spirit by all creation's speaking to u s God's word and providing
for us a h om e where we may find sustenance and joy. We embody
ourselves in in tim ate relationships with one another, and in less in ti
m ate though still bodily relationships with m any others in societies
where our dwellings extend our skins and we learn to thirst n ot only
in body but in spirit. We are the ones who ask questions of ourselves
as embodied and w ho can encounter God in whatever searches we
undertake and whatever answers we find.
Yet, our inspirited em bodim ent renders u s vulnerable to th e world,
ourselves, and even to God. We are m isfits am ong other creatures in
our world because we are the ones who worry about w ho we are
and what we are doing. We are, w ithin our species, one another's
enem ies n ot because the conflicts am ong us are like conflicts among
other embodied living beings; ours arc conflicts in w hich we harm
one another a s e m b o d ie d spirits, inspirited bodies. And we are the
ones who challenge God as we contradict our own incarnation or
violate the rest of divinely created beings.
I will u ltim ately propose a view of ourselves as hum an persons
whereby our bodies and our spirits are one — distinguishable as as
pects of our personhood, but unified in a way that they are neither
mere parts of one whole nor reducible one to the other. I w ill also pro
pose that the self-transcendence that C hristians associate w ith what
it m eans to be a hum an person pertains to ourselves not ju st as spirits
but as bodies. At stake in this view is the basis for a comprehensive
reading G a b rie l M a r c e l, w h o a lo n g w ith M au rice M erleau-Ponty, Jean-P au l Sartre, and

o th e rs in th e e a rly tw e n tie th c e n tu ry b eg an ra isin g th e so rts o f q u estio n s I raise here.
Se e, lo r e xa m p le, G a b riel M arcel, B ein g a n d H aving: A n E xisten tialist D iary (N ew York:
H arp er T o rch b o o k s , 19651; M arcel, C reativ e F idelity, trans. R obert R o sen th a l (New
York: N oonday, 1 9 6 4 ) , esp ecially 1 7 - 2 0 , 2 2 - 2 6 , 9 4 - 9 5 , 1 0 1 - 2 ; M arcel, T h e M ystery o f
B ein g, vol. 2 (C h ica g o : G atew ay ed itio n , I 9 6 0 ) ; M a u rice M erleau -P o n ty , P h e n o m e n o l
o g y o f P erce p tio n , tra n s. C o lin S m ith (N ew York: H u m a n itie s, 1 9 6 2 ), p a rt 1, ch ap . 6;
Jcan -P au l Sa rtre, B ein g a n d N oth in g n ess, tra n s. H azel E . B a rn e s (N ew Y ork: W ashington
Square, 1 9 6 6 ), p a rt 3 , ch ap . 2 . M y e x p lo ratio n of th e c o n ce p t d oes n o t depend o n th ese
ea rlie r w ritin g s, th o u g h th e ir p lace in th e h is to ry o f th o u g h t h a s n o d oubt prom pted
so m e o f m y o w n q u estion s.
118 TUST LOVE
approach to h um an flourishing, an approach that is neccssary — if

n ot sufficient — for an understanding of hum an sexuality. At stake
also is the cla im that som e h um an suffering is imposed by us 011 one
another n ot ju st by and in our bodies, not ju st by and in our souls,
but by and in ourselves as embodied spirits, inspirited bodies.
Although it m ight make sense to proceed by exam ining our m ost
obvious experiences of body/spirit unity, I shall do the opposite. T h e
m ore interesting and significant challenge is to find clues for this
unity by reflecting on our experiences of disunity. First I will try to set
the problem, and then turn to som e of our m ore troubling experiences
of the lack of internal unity between body and spirit.
T he Problem
T h e problem I am looking at arises out of our diverse cxpcricnccs

of body and spirit. O n the one hand, we experience our bodies as
burdens, lim its, adversaries of ourselves in our efforts to labor and
to love. O n th e other hand, we experience som ething of th e unity
of body and spirit when, for example, we reflect on our body m em o
rie s — of pain, joy, striving— as m em ories of ourselves, our coming
to be who we are. Som etim es we experience a kind of total unity
of body and spirit, as w hen our skill in dancing and our im m ersion
in m usic bring our whole being together in one glorious activity; or
w hen our experience of bodily union w ith another person transcends
our divided self and our divided selves in loving gesture and joy of
m ind and body.
Despite our experiences o f both disunity and unity of body and
spirit, we tend to be, as som e theorists have observed, "natural du
a lists."1* No m atter w hat our theory, it is easy to th in k of ourselves
as made up o f two parts, parts that we value differently on diverse
occasions and from w ithin diverse traditions. We arc often unaware
of our bodies until we experience pain or a particular pleasure, and
these experiences are quickly interpreted in dualistic ways. For ex
ample, we m ay be intently reading a book, our body and spirit one in
15. P aul B lo o m , D esca rtes' B aby: H o w th e S c ie n c e o f C h ild D e v e lo p m e n t E xplains

W hat M a k e s U s H u m a n (N ew York: B a sic B o o k s, 2 0 0 4 1 , x ii.
the effort, u n til our eyes begin to h u rt.16 O ur body appears as an inter
ference w ith w h at we are so in tent on doing. Or, we may be walking
along blithely on a lovely spring m orning, thinking n ot at all of our
feet on w hich we w alk — until they begin to ache and call attention
to them selves as lim it to our plans and our discoveries. O ur body
can become our "p roject," as we attem pt to improve its fitness, or to
enhance it through chem icals or genetic engineering. It can be for us
a kind of m achine, w hich we m ust tune up as best we m ay as long as
wc may, replacing parts if necessary or finding the right lubricant for
our faltering system s. We experience our body as som ething we have,
m ust care for, som ething whose tissues and organs we may give to
another. Wc question the "ownership" of our bodies and their parts:
D o they belong to God, to ourselves, or to society?17
Som etim es in one another we see no spirit, but only bodies to
be liked or disliked, manipulated, enslaved, ignored, and abandoned.
Som etim es w e sec only spirit in one another, w ith no thought for the
spirit's need for food for the body.
No wonder we have had trouble understanding who we are, and
who th e other person is. N o wonder we have had difficulty figuring
out these two aspects of our experience, these two aspects of our
selves. Ju st w hen we th in k we have an adequate understanding, we
com e across new experiences, or old ones for which our previous
interpretations seem no longer tenable or tolerable. W ith all of our
theories, it is n o t superfluous to explore again the unity between soul
and body and their m utual transcendence. W hether this is a task of
discovery or o f reconstruction, it seem s necessary for it to continue.
Body/Spirit D isunity R evisited

I begin my exploration w ith a search for unity in the unlikely
places of our experiences of disunity. I therefore look for clues in
experiences th a t seem to challenge the very possibility of genuine
spirit-em bodim ent. I consider four such experiences: (1) profound
suffering, (2) objectification, (3) aging and dying, and (4) experiences
16. T h e e x a m p le is S artre's. See h is B ein g a n d N oth in g n ess, 4 3 6 - 3 7 .

17. S e e H e n k A. M . J. te n H ave and Josep h V. M . W elie, ed s., O w n ersh ip o f th e
H u m a n B ody: P h ilo s o p h ic a l C o n sid era tio n s o f t h e U se o f t h e H u m a n B o d y a n d its
Parts in H e a lth c a r e |Boston: K luw er A cad em ic, 1 9 9 8 ).
120 TUST LOVE
of w hat wc often call a "divided self." Although this exploration ap

pears as a digression from our exam ination of sexuality and th e body,
I intend it to com e full circle w ith insights that are central to this
m ain concern.
(1) T h ere are paradigmatic experiences of hum an suffering in
w hich spirit and body appear to be wrenched apart. T h e dim ension
of spirit, insofar as it continues at all, becom es alm ost an abstrac
tion, so that it fades out of our conscious awareness. Alternatively,
if spirit is th e location of our agony, w c com e to have no use for
em bodim ent; we no longer care for our body or attend to its needs.
W hat we thought was unified is cu t asunder, or it collapses into only
body or only spirit. T h ese arc the kinds of sufferings that som e have
called "tales o f terro r" and "whirlpools of to rm en t,"18 where bodies
are destroyed, m inds ravaged, and spirits broken.19 T h ese are the suf
ferings that go on in hum an history, generation after generation — a
"voice heard in Ram ah weeping" (Jer. 3 1 :1 5 ), peoples subjugated by
peoples, w om en violated in their very persons, fam ilies rent asun
der, stories of abandonm ent, starvation, and death. T h is is the sort
of h um an pain th at Sim one Weil nam ed "afflictio n ," differentiating
it from "suffering" in the ordinary sense.20 But at its heart, as Weil
says, affliction is always both physical and spiritual; it is never only
of the body (like a toothache that is soon over and gone), and it is
also never only of the spirit. W ith this kind of suffering the person
suffers a s a u n ified w h ole; there is no com petition between miseries
of the body and m iseries of the soul. Affliction w hen it is of the spirit
also afflicts, leaves wounds in, the body; and when it is bodily, if it
goes on long enough, it always also afflicts the spirit. T h is is the kind
of suffering th a t has the potential to attack the self, m aking thoughts
becom e a sta te of m ind that persons can live with for twenty, thirty,
1 8 . S e e P h y llis T rib le , T exts o f T error: L iterary-F em in ist R eadin gs o f B ib lica l N ar

ra tiv es (P h ilad elp h ia: F o rtress, 1 9 8 4 ), and Ja m e s C rensh aw , A W hirlpool o f T orm en t:
Isra elite T rad ition s o f G o d a s a n O p p ressiv e P res en ce (P h ilad elp hia: F ortress, 1 9 8 4 ).
1 9 . 1 have w ritte n o f th is k ind o f su fferin g m a n y tim e s; as, for exam p le, in m y
"H o w Sh all W e L ove in a P ostm o d ern W orld ’ ” A n n u al o f t h e S o ciety o f C h ristian Ethics
(1 9 9 4 ), 1 2 - 1 3 .
2 0 . S im o n e W eil, W aiting for G o d , tra n s. E m m a C rau ford (N ew York: H arp er &
Row, 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 1 7 - 2 5 .
fifty years, a lifetim e; so that the soul and body becom e its accom
plices, pulling to inertia and despair. But only inspirited b od ies, only
e m b o d ie d spirits , can experience such suffering. In th e very threat to
the whole self, on th e brink of ultim ate disunity, com es a glim pse of
a unity in th e possibility of its destruction.
(2) Wc com m only consider objectification of a person as a fail
ure to apprehend and respect the person in h er or his whole reality.
T h is can happen w hen one is valued only for one's skills, m ental
or physical. I t can happen w hen one is reduced, in the eyes of the
beholder, o n ly to one's bodily beauty or disability or racial difference.
It can happen w hen an individual is looked upon only as a source
of an oth er's pleasure. O bjectification of an other is especially oner
ous w hen it is accompanied by efforts to make the other into w hat
she is judged to be, constrain the other into roles and actions that
are judged for her to be appropriate, subject th e other in ways that
allow no identity beyond the judgment imposed. At the heart of the
experience of objectification is an experience of being put in a box,
one's m eaning and value determined w ithout appeal, one's supposed
self-unity canceled.
No more d ram atic depiction of objectification can be found than
in Jean-Paul Sartre's description of the conflict inherent in human
relations. H is telling exam ple is the by now classic one of the "key
hole peeper."21 I am outside a door, listening and peering through a
keyhole. I hear footsteps behind m e. I feel th e eyes of another on me.
In whatever way I have previously understood m y own action (how
ever justified I considered m y reasons for being outside this door and
looking in), th e other who approaches will give it (and me) a different
meaning. I begin to feel profoundly threatened, m y justification taken
away by the suspicious stare of th e other who com es up behind me.
I am prevented from determ ining my own m eaning for my action,·
the judgm ent of the other im prisons m e in a category of meaning
("keyhole peeper") that is not m ine. I am made into, frozen into,
21. I rep eat h e re m y ren d erin g of th is exam p le in m y article, "A F e m in is t V ersion

of R e sp e ct fo r P e rso n s ," Jo u rn a l o f F em in ist S tu d ies in R eligion 9 (Spring/Fall 1 9 9 3 }:
1 9 2 - 9 3 . T h e so u rc e is Sartre, B ein g a n d N oth in g n ess, 3 4 8 - 4 9 . It sh ou ld be no ted th a t
S a rtre 's co n c e rn w ith th is exam p le w as no t th e sa m e a s m in e. In flu en ced by Hegel's
"m a ste r/sla v e " a n a ly sis, h e w as b u ild in g a large th e o ry o f h u m a n rela tio n s — n o t, a s I
am here, sim p ly in s ta n c in g "o b je ctifica tio n " o f o n e individual by a n o th e r o r o th ers.
122 TUST LOVE
w hat m y body appears to be. T h is, according to Sartre, is the basis of

the ordinary form s of conflict between h um an persons — judgment,
suspicion, categorization, sham e — and an ultim ate threat to peace
and unity w ithin. So potentially devastating is the block to m y free
dom, m y spirit, from every suspicious stare, that I feel compelled to
respond. T h e threat of objectification is unbearable. I have two op
tions, says Sartre. I can either overpower the gaze of the other ("knock
out his eyes" literally or figuratively), or I can subm it to the gaze so
fully, absorb th e o th er's judgment so completely, that I no longer feel
it or see it; I lose my own eyes and becom e w hat the other is judging
m e to be. In th e first case, m y freedom prevails, but only by taking
away the o th er's freedom and judgment in my regard. I reduce the
other to h is body. In the second case, I reduce myself to my body. I
use my freedom to subm it, to let m y m eaning be determined by the
other. I do w hat is expected of m e, lim it m yself to the role prescribed.
T h e power of the o th er's gaze and freedom prevails.
In Sartre's theory, all of this not surprisingly is played out m ost
clearly in th e sexual sphere. For Sartre, sexuality represents the
m ost basically structured attem pt to overcome or to subm it to the
subjectivity, freedom, and judgm ent of th e other. T h e fundamental
responses becom e sadism or m asochism . I can try to m anipulate the
other's gaze by seduction, attem pting to shape it, to change it, to
elicit it as a gaze I will accept. Failing this, I can turn upon th e gaze,
m aking the other m y object, subduing th e other through physical or
em otional violence and pain. T h ese are th e sadistic responses. Alter
natively, I can let m yself be so lost in my desire to be judged well by
the other th a t I am lost to myself, m asochistically absorbed by the
other's gaze, so com pletely subm issive to it that I no longer recognize
or feel it.
We need n ot think as Sartre did that all hum an relations or all sex
ual relations are dram atically conflictual in this way. Yet we recognize
an accurate description of the experience endem ic to som e hum an
relationships, or a t least to som e m om ents in h um an relationship.
T h ese are experiences, so it seem s, of the ultim ate disuniting of body
and spirit, or th e ultim ate collapse of spirit into body. And yet, at the
heart of such experiences there lies a clue to body/spirit unity. For to
conquer an oth er's body in this way, or be conquered, is precisely to
conquer the o th e r's spirit, or be conquered. If w c were not embodied

spirits, inspirited bodies; if we could eclipse either body or spirit in a
significant way, we would not have such experiences. O bjectification
of one by the other is, finally, not a reduction of the other to body or
spirit, but an effort to dom inate an e m b o d ie d spirit.
A sim ilar illustration of objectification is to be found in the work
of Elaine Scarry on the torture of hum an persons.77 One would think
that torture would have as its goal sim ply to destroy hum ans, with
the goal only of extracting inform ation or whatever else serves the
purpose of th e torturer. As Scarry analyzes it, however, torture has as
its goal the destruction of persons; but it is the destruction of persons
a s p erson s th a t is a t stake. Torture is aim ed a t m aking people "disap
p ear" as people, the deconstruction of their hum anness. It is not the
sam e as hum an torture of anim als m ight be — achieving a bizarre
pleasure in causing pain to another living being. T h e intention in
torture of hum ans is, rather, to silence the other's voice by wreck
ing h is or h er body; it is to m ake the tortured speak th e torturer's
words instead of h is own. Hence, torture is unsuccessful if it does
n ot gain the o th e r's spirit as well as body. Such an aim would make
no sense unless there are beings who are e m b o d ie d spirits, inspirited
bodies. Once again, in experiences of greatest disunity, we can find a
presupposition of unity between body and spirit.23
(3) It may be instructive to turn now to m ore ordinary experiences
of aging a n d dying. Here, if anywhere, are experiences of the body
as lim it and burden, and of the soul as gradually and finally being
disunited from its em bodim ent, even as th e body is in process of dis-
unification from soul. All of our discovered or socially constructed
m eanings for the hum an body are challenged at this point. Embodi
m ent is no longer opportunity, but loss of opportunity in the life of the
person. T h e experience of aging, in particular, gives powerful evidence
that we are m ore th an our bodies, unless we w ant dim inishm ent of
2 2 . E la in e Scarry , T h e B o d y in P ain: T h e M akin g a n d U n m a k in g o f th e W orld (New

York: O xford U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 8 5 ), 2 7 - 5 9 .
2 3 . I g ra n t t h a t th e u n ity m ig h t o n ly be th e k ind o f m u tu al in flu en ce o f body and
sp irit th a t A u g u stin e and o th ers envisaged. S till, the w h o le p ro cess o f to rtu re is aim ed ,
it s e e m s to m e, a t overpow ering a p erso n a s em bodied spirit.
124 TUST LOVE
body to en tail dim inishm ent of self. But aging is m ore complicated
th an this.
T h e realities of aging include dim inishm ent, fear, pain, loneli
ness; they also can include courage, graciousness, patience, and
trust. T h ere is loss, insecurity, one part of th e body after another
breaking down, and the m enace of injury. T here is the necessity
to relinquish freedom — certainly freedom of m ovem ent, but also
of self-disposition in countless ways. C on stant adjustm ents are re
quired as identity is threatened and as relationships change. For
som e, indom itable spirits m ay rage against the inevitable, but for
others, gradual and gracious acceptance may also prevail.
T w o im portant observations can be made about these experiences
of hum an aging. O ne is that although body and spirit do appear to be
diverging (in an experience of disunity), they are nonetheless one in
the process. N o t all individuals experience dim inishm ent of m ental
acuity as th eir bodies break down. Som e do. In either case, both body
and spirit are profoundly affected by aging; aging is both biological
and spiritual. W hether experiences are of dim inishm ent or enhance
m ent (in w isdom and grace), they are tied to the body and spirit in
the process of aging.
A second observation is that the experience of aging, like other
experiences o f embodied spirits, is to an im portant extent socially
constructed. I t can be shaped and transformed as it is thought about
differently— w ithin given cultures or religious traditions, and within
significant interpersonal relationships. In other words, it makes a dif
ference to our actu al cxpcricncc how we com e to th in k about aging.
Take, for example, a C hristian view of aging like th e one Karl R ah
ner articulated. 'O ld age is a grace (both a m ission and a risk) not
given to everyone, ju st as, in the C hristian understanding, there are
possibilities and situations (thought of] as graces which are granted
to som e and withheld from o th ers."24 In other words, n ot everyone
gets to live in to old age; but for anyone who does, it is a part of
her or his vocation. Old age is n ot merely an external situation,
"like a costum e in w hich a person plays a role in the theatre of
24. K arl R ah n er, "G ro w in g O ld ," P rayers a n d M ed itation s: An A n th olog y o f Spiritual

Writings, cd. J . G riffith s (N ew York: C ro ssro ad , 1 9 8 1 ), 9 1 .
life w hich rem ains extraneous to himself, which he sim ply drops
at death."25 O n the contrary, the period of life that is old age is,
like every other period in life, potentially definitive of the meaning
of a given life. O ther religious and cultural traditions have offered
analogous interpretations of the experience of aging and its signifi
cance for both individual and com m unity. T h e point is that although
aging and biological dim inishm ent offer experiences of body/spirit
disunity, they are nonetheless for hum an beings a signal of body/spirit
unity.
D eath, of course, is another matter. It is n ot in us, as som e say,
all our lives — at least n ot in th e sam e way that life is in us. It is
on our horizon throughout our lives, however, and it com es closer as
our circu m stances change. In contem porary Western culture, we lean
toward understanding death as sim ply part of the life span. Death
is natural, we say, even though we find ourselves pleading, along
with Dylan T h o m as, "D o n ot go gentle into that good n ig h t. . . [but]
rage, rage against th e dying of the light."26 However we "naturalize"
death, it rem ains a problem for u s — in a way that it is n ot for other
biological beings. We are the ones w ho anticipate it, worry about it,
struggle against it, try to understand it. In this sense, we transcend
it. We stand outside of it and ponder it, fear it, attem pt to com e to
peace w ith it. We are the ones who rebel against it or accept it —
though no m atter what, we die.
We m ay conclude that in death the natural resources of the biologi
cal life of th e individual sim ply exhaust them selves. D eath therefore
stands as an inevitable lim iting condition for our possibilities in this
life, the ultim ate "given" in relation to w hich our freedom will have
its last stand. Wc can think of it as a necessary lim it, one that allows
us to focus our lives and to finalize our choices in relation to God,
one another, o u r own selves. But, as either biological lim it or psycho
logical horizon and existential m om ent of personal self-integration,
death defies our interpretation of it as only a natural process. In fact,
it seem s unnatural to us th at our very selves dim inish and die, that
2 5 . Ibid.
2 6 . D y la n T h o m a s , "D o N o t G o G e n tle in to t h a t G oo d N ig h t," in C o lle c te d P oem s
o f D ylan T h o m a s 1 9 3 4 - 5 2 |New York: N ew D irec tio n s, 1 9 7 1 ), 128.
126 TUST LOVE
our relationships arc torn asunder, that the w renching that occurs at
the heart of our beings is possible despite all of our efforts against it.
It is n ot only our spirit th at rages against our death; it is our bodies.
We try our b e st to control death in all circum stances; and if we cannot
control it, even our bodies weep. Why? Bccausc the body struggles to
live, just as does the spirit. T h e forces w ithin body and spirit are, from
each perspective, each dim ension, both for and against death. It is not
accurate to th in k that only our bodies die. D eath is an event for us
as spiritual persons, not only as biological persons. Wc as embodied
spirits, inspirited bodies, die. In a C hristian context, our understand
ings of death and life are shaped by the prom ises of God offered in
Jesus C hrist. T h is transform s th e m eaning of death as we anticipate
it and prepare for it. It may harbinger a new u n ity of spirit and body
in an unlim ited future. But it does n ot erase the clues of body/spirit
unity in every experience of dying.
(4) A final clue for body/soul unity in experiences that appear to
signify only disunity may be found in those experiences that m ake us
speak of a “divided self. ” Philosophical and religious traditions have
tried seem ingly forever to understand such experiences. A com m on
interpretation is th at th e soul is divided from the body. T h e desires
and needs of the body arc often a t odds with the desires and needs of
the spirit. Experiences of precisely this division have yielded beliefs
about the adversarial relation of spirit and body. T h e m oral life is
explained as a struggle by the soul against th e body and the body
against the soul. W hatever was originally intended by God in creating
hum an persons, som e kind of general hum an m oral "Fall," terrible
m oral failure, has had as its chief consequence th e disordering of
body and soul, a disorder between intellect and em otions, between
will and the dynam ics of th e body.27 T h e soul's task is to deal with
this, to m anage it, to bring back a reasoned order, and to continue to
hold control over a disciplined body.
27. T h e r e are th eo lo g ies of "original s in " th a t d o n o t today h a rk b a c k t o an original

" F a ll." T h e y in te rp re t t h e h u m a n co n d itio n , rather, a s a so cial p h en o m en o n t h a t in fects
ind ivid uals; o r th e y co n sid er th e stru ggles e n d cm ic to h u m an e x iste n c e n o t to be the
resu lt o f m oral ev il a s su ch b u t a s a p art o f an e v o lu tio n a ry p ro ccss in w h ic h th e h u m an
race is engaged. W h a tev er in terp retatio n is m ade, th e sam e k ind o f exp erien ce of a
"divided s e lf " is p o ssib le and co m m o n , a n d the sa m e m isin te rp re ta tio n of spirit/body
u n ity is a lso p o ssib le and co m m o n .
But is this accurate? It is true that in our experience, as the saying

goes, "th e spirit is w illing but the flesh is w eak." Yet our interpre
tations of th is experience are not w ithout dispute. T h e history of
theological, philosophical, psychological, scientific analyses of the
body's need for governance by the spirit is a contested history. At
the heart of th e controversy is the question of ju st where the source
of conflict and hence the remedy lies. Writers of C hristian classics,
including St. Augustine, have consistently m aintained that the real
division w ithin us is w ithin the spirit, n ot between spirit and body.
But w c need to say more. Wc do indeed cxpcricncc ourselves as
divided. A probing of the experience, however, tells u s that the di
vide is n ot so m uch "body" versus "sp irit," as it is th e body divided
against itself — som etim es desiring this, som etim es that — and the
spirit divided against itself — som etim es desiring this, som etim es
that. T h ese divisions within body, w ithin spirit — can be m ore acute
than anything that could be described as division b etw een body and
spirit. T h ese divisions— w ithin body, w ithin sp irit— are deep within
the self, that self w hich is an embodied spirit, an inspirited body.
T h e "divided self" gives us clues, n ot contradictions, for the unity of
spirit and body. It points to an underlying unity that calls m ore for
integration th a n control.
In the end, then, am ong the m ost dram atic experiences of disunity
w ithin the h um an person are experiences that nonetheless tell us of
the unity of th e person. T h ey are experiences of disunity that are only
possible in unified inspirited bodies, embodied spirits. It is as such
that we are self-constituted. O ur language falters here, for it is w e
who are embodied, inspirited. If you touch m y arm , you touch m e. If
you m in ister to m y diseased body, you m inister to m e. If our bodies
com e together in tenderness and love, it is w e who com e together.
T h e bodies th a t we "have" are also the bodies that we "are." Despite
our incom pleteness, our lim itations, our experiences of fragmenta
tion and lack of wholeness, we are in an im portant sense whole in
ourselves.28
28. H av in g a rticu la te d th is p o sitio n , I believe th a t i t is p o ssible to lo o k b a ck on

th e th e o rie s I no ted ea rlier (th e "o n e, tw o, o r tw o -in -o n e " th eo ries a s w ell a s social
c o n stru c tio n ist th eo ries) and argue th a t th ey d o n o t have to b e in o p p o sitio n to w h at 1
hav e be en sa y in g · A risto telia n and T h o m is t ic th e o rie s do offer a n on tolog ical b a sis
128 TUST LOVE
U nity an d T ran scen den ce

I said at the start of this section that hum an em bodim ent is a
"transcend ent" em bodim ent. U nity and destiny m ust be combined.
H ence, to say that spirit and body are united in one personal whole is
not yet to say enough about either body or spirit. T h e transcendence
that characterizes embodied spirits is self-transcendence. For any
thing to be self-transcendent is for it to be at least potentially m ore
than it is at any one point in tim e. I suppose everything in a dynamic
universe, at least every living thing, is transcendent in som e sense; it
grows and is transform ed according to its potential. But hum an per
sons are self-transcendent in ways beyond m ere growth and simple
change. We com m only consider hum ans transcendent in at least two
particular ways: first, through free choice, and second, through active
and inspirited relationships to others.29
Freedom is a capacity to determ ine oneself in a way that is not
totally explainable in term s of the past, of w hat has already com e to
be, w hat one already is. T h e capacity for free choice is the capacity
to introduce som ething new into w hat one is — as w hen we ratify
for a th e o ry of b o d y /sp irit u n ity w h ereb y e a c h h u m a n b ein g is c o n stitu te d by two

"p rin cip le s," n o t tw o parts. W h atev er ch an g e ta k e s p lace in a h u m a n ind ivid ual is
o f th e p erso n a s a w h o le. T h e body is n o t a p assive o b ject, n o t ev en a p assive p rin
cip le. F o r th ere is n o ex istin g h u m a n body, fro m th is persp ective, th a t is n o t already
en sou led; th e re i s n o e x istin g h u m a n sp irit th a t is n o t already em bodied. M oreover,
th e o rie s a cco rd in g to w h ich t h e h u m a n p erso n is o n ly a body o r o n ly a sp irit m ay
m is s t h e reality o f spirit/body unity, b u t th e y need n o t do so . If th ere is a "w isd o m "
in h e re n t in th e body, and if em b o d im e n t evokes reflexive w on der and aw e, th e n the
co n sc io u sn e ss o f t h e body is n o t far fro m th e em b o d im e n t o f co n sc io u sn e ss. S e e Sher-
w in B . N u la n d , T h e W isdom o f th e B o d y (N ew York: A lfred A . K nopf, 1 9 9 7 ), 3 6 9 ; see
a lso T e ilh a rd d e C h ard in , w h o w as b y n o m e a n s a m o n is t, b u t w hose th e o ry o f c o n
scio u sn e ss in m a tte r c o m e s to m in d . See T h e P h e n o m e n o n o f M an, rev. ed. (London:
C o llin s & H arper, 1 9 6 5 ). S e c a lso th e im p ressiv e th e o ry w orked o u t by Lynn Rudder
B aker in P ersons a n d B od ies: A C o n stitu tio n V iew (C am brid ge: U n iv ersity o f C a m
bridge Press, 2 0 0 0 ) . A nd finally, u n le ss so c ia l c o n s tru c tio n is m tak es a fo rm w hereby
t h e co n cre te bod y is lo s t in language, o r t h e in te rp re ta tio n o f th e body i s fated by social
forces w ith o u t t h e p o ssib ility o f c ritic a l d ista n ce and ch an g e, i t a lso n eed no t ru le o u t
spirit/body unity.
29. I a m n o t m a k in g a s ta te m e n t h ere a b o u t w h a t p o ssib ilities o th e r h ig h er an im als
m ay o r m ay no t have in th e s e regards. I sim p ly d o n o t k n o w th e s e p o ssib ilitie s. I am
a lso ob viou sly n o t u sin g th e te rm " tra n s c e n d e n t" in th e sam e w ay th a t Ju d ith B u tler
u ses it. For B u tler, tra n sce n d e n ce o f t h e body and tran scen d en ce of g en d er m e a n s on ly
(th ou gh th is is sig n ifica n t) th a t w e are n o t trapped in given m ean in g s fo r body and
gender. S e e B u tler, B o d ies T h a t Matter.
love in a new way, nurture an attitude that is only partially formed,

develop talen ts in this way or that, attem pt to gain possessions or
to let th em go, respond to a call that still beckons, or choose against
all calls and all loves and hence end up alone. We usually th in k of
freedom as a capacity of the spirit, and free choice as an act of the
spirit, with th e body being sim ply the object or the instru m ent of
our choice in som e w ay Yet choice is always of an action, and al
though action m ay som etim es seem to be wholly interior (as when
we choose to accept a situation about w hich we can do nothing), it is
always action that rises from and is realized by ourselves as embodied
spirits, inspirited bodies. As I have been trying to show, our bodies
are n ot purely passive, n ot appendages, n ot m erely instrum ents for
our selves; they are intrinsic to our selves. T h e body, inspirited, is
therefore in trin sic to ourselves as subjects; we "live" our bodies even
w hen we are using th em .30 O u r m otivations for choice, actions of
choice, and choice itself are embodied and inspirited. Hence, it is
as embodied spirits, inspirited bodies, that wc arc sclf-transccndcnt
through our freedom.
Moreover, w hen w c open to relationship through knowledge and
love, we transcend what we already are. To step into relation with
another is to step out of a center that holds only ourselves. We open
ourselves radically, w hether m inim ally or m aximally, to com e into
union by knowing and loving and som etim es also by being known
and being loved. O ur center is now both beyond ourselves and w ithin
ourselves.31 H ere, too, we enter into relation n ot only as spirits but
3 0 . F o r a f u lle r d escrip tion o f w h at I m ean by free c h o ic e , see m y P erson al C o m m it

m e n ts : B eginn in g, K eepin g, C h a n g in g (San F ran cisco: H arp er & Row, 1 9 8 6 ), 2 3 - 2 9 .
S e c a lso ch a p te r 6 below. I a m in s o m e se n se going beyond th is d e scrip tio n in e m
p h asizin g th e su b je ctiv ity o f th e body — a to p ic th a t needs m u ch fu ller exp lo ratio n . I
a m draw ing p a rtia lly o n in s ig h ts generated by w rite rs lik e S a rtre and M erleau-Ponty,
b u t a lso Paul R ico eu r, F r e e d o m a n d N a tu re: th e V oluntary a n d t h e In volu n tary, tra n s.
E razim V. K o h a k (E van ston , IL : N o rth w e ste rn U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 6 6 ), ch ap . 2 ; H enri
B ergson, M a t t e r a n d M em ory , tra n s. N an cy M . Paul and W. S c o tt P alm er (Lond on: A llen
& U n w in , 1 9 7 0 ) ; R ich ard Z aner, T h e P ro b lem o f E m b o d im e n t (T h e H ague: M artin u s
N ijh o ff, 1 9 7 1 ). I a m also affirm in g h ere so m e o f (th ou gh n o t all, and in m a n y ways
m u ch m o re th a n ) th e in s ig h ts and arg u m en ts of Ju d ith B utler, B od ies T h at M atter,
e sp ecia lly ch ap . L.
3 1 . S e e M a rg a re t A . Farley, "A F e m in is t V ersion o f R esp ect fo r P e rso n s ," fo u r n a l o f
F em in ist S tu dies in R eligion 9 (Spring/Fall 1 9 9 3 ): 1 8 3 - 9 8 .
130 TUST LOVE
as embodied spirits, inspirited bodies— w hether or n ot our relation

ships are "physical" in the ordinary sense of the word. It is w e who
know and love and are known and loved. O ur subjectivity is embod
ied consciousness, conscious em bodim ent; and hence as bodies we
are transcendent of ourselves in relation to others.32
W hatever transcendence is ascribed to spirit, then, m u st also be
ascribed to body— for they are intim ately one. T here are boundaries
to transcendence; there are "givens" that we cannot transcend —
w hether biological, ontological, or socially constructed — and we re
m ain hum an throughout. Yet we n ot only yearn to becom e w hat we
im agine we ca n yet be; we choose to becom e w hat we w ant to be. Our
m em ories and hopes, our strivings for survival and for a future, our
affirm ation o f life-plans, are the m em ories, hopes, strivings, choices
of beings th a t are embodied and inspirited. T h e hum an body gets its
m eaning only in the context of w ho w c arc.
Finally, but of utm ost significance, these explorations would be
incom plete if we did n ot acknowledge that religious traditions have
a great deal to say about hum an em bodim ent in relation to hum an
self-transcendence.33 Given the C hristian framework that I am pre
supposing, I m ust integrate a C hristian perspective on the ultim ate
3 2 . In so fa r a s t h e exp erien ce o f o u r bodies is s o cia lly c o n stru cted , it m ig h t appear

th a t free c h o ice is an illu sio n a n d th a t rela tio n sh ip s are cau sally d eterm in ed so lely by
forces o u tsid e o f o u rselv es. In th is view, th e p ra ctices th a t are th e re su lt o f th ese social
fo rccs sh a p e o u r e a tin g o r fastin g , o u r se x u a l p ractices, th e w ay w c c lo th e ou rselves;
th ey produce e c o n o m ic , ju rid ical, and relig iou s in s titu tio n s t h a t provide u s w ith beliefs
th a t w e in te rn a liz e in o u r bo d ies. Yet so c ia l c o n stru c tio n d oes n o t h ave to b e reduced to
th is, a n y m o re th a n a m eta p h y sic of th e bod y h a s to be reduced to th is. Even so cial c o n
stru c tio n ists lik e B u tler argue th a t h u m a n b o d ies are n o t p assive s la te s o n w h ich society
im p rin ts m ea n in g . T h e r e are en o u g h gaps in so cia liz a tio n th a t q u estio n s c a n a rise and
w e c a n sh a p e o u r bodies anew . S e e M . T h e r e se Lysaught, "Body: II. S o cia l T h e o rie s,"
in E n cy clop ed ia o f B io eth ic s, rev. ed., 1 :3 0 0 - 5 ; B ry an T u rn er, T h e B o d y a n d S ociety :
E xploration s in S o c ia l T h e o r y (N ew York: B lack w ell, 1 9 8 6 ); M ary D o u g las, Purity a n d
D an g er: A n A n aly sis o f t h e C o n c ep t o f P ollu tion a n d T a b o o (Lond on: R outledge K egan
Paul, 1 9 6 6 ). S e e a lso su ch stu d ies a s C a ro lin e W alker B y n u m , H oly F east a n d H o ly East:
T h e R eligiou s S ig n ifica n ce o f F o o d to M ed iev a l W om en (Berkeley: U n iv e rsity o f C alifo r
n ia Press, 1 9 8 7 ); Valerie S teele, T h e C o rse t: A C u ltu ral H istory (N ew H av en, C T : Yale
U n iv e rsity P ress, 2 0 0 1 ) ; H arold Koda, E x trem e B ea u ty : T h e B od y T ra n sfo rm ed |New
H av en, C T : Yale U n iv ersity P ress, 2 0 0 1 ) ; A n n e L . H ollander, S e ein g T h rou g h C loth es
(N ew York: V ik in g , 1 9 7 8 ). See a lso Butler, B o d ies T h at M atter, 10.
3 3 . S e e C o ak ley , R eligion a n d t h e B ody; Law, R eligiou s R eflectio n s o n t h e H u m an
B od y ; L isa S o w ie C a h ill and M arg aret A . Farley, ed s., E m b o d im en t, M orality, a n d
M ed icin e (D o rd rcch t: K luw cr A cad em ic, 1 9 9 5 ).
telos, goal or end of the body. N ot everyone in the C hristian tradition

has interpreted th e body, its past and its future, in th e sam e way. If
this were a book on a theology of the body, we would need to exam ine
the multiple thinkers and traditions w ithin C hristianity in this re
gard, assessing their coherence, intelligibility, and persuasiveness as
interpreters of th e Bible, and as illum inators of our ow n experience. I
sim ply lift up here one m ajor pattern of C hristian theologizing about
the body because it seem s to m e to make m ost sense of th e clues of
embodied unity and transcendence glimpsed in our explorations in
this chapter thus far.
Despite th e m any historical and contem porary perm utations in a
C hristian theology of the h um an person, at the heart of C hristian
belief is the affirm ation that n ot only is the h um an body good, but
it is in trin sic to being hum an. Created by God, sustained in being
by God, offered an unlim ited future by the promises of God in Jesus
C hrist, each h um an person — embodied and inspirited — has the
possibility of and the call to a destiny of relation and wholeness as
embodied spirit, inspirited body. T h e inclusion of the body in this
destiny is by n o m eans an afterthought 011 the part of a God who
becam e embodied and w hose own body now lives still in this world
and in the reign of God.
T h ere are two m ajor frameworks in w hich C hristian theologians
have tried to th in k about the hum an body: the framework of creation,
fall, and redem ption, and the framework of creation and consum
m ation. If Augustine adopts the first of these, T h om as Aquinas
adopts th e second. David Kelsey explores the second in his careful
comparative study of Aquinas and Karl Barth.34 Bodily creation and
consum m ation are located w ithin a context of belief that all things
com e forth from God w ith the destiny to return to God. Aquinas's
rendering of th is belief is in m etaphysical and cosm ic terms,· Barth's
is in relational, covenant term s. For both, however, the body is one
with the soul in the hum an person, and the body as well as the soul
is engaged by G od's grace.
34. D av id H . Kelsey, "A qu in as a n d B a rth o n th e H u m a n Body," T h e T h o m is t 50

(O cto b er 1 9 8 6 ): 6 4 3 - 8 9 .
132 TUST LOVE
Aquinas's account of the hum an person is in term s of "ration

ally empowered bodily life"35 w hich is concretely related to God as
creator and consum m ator. God destines the hum an person for u lti
m ate and u tter union w ith God and with other hum an persons in
God. G od's action in this regard (grace) engages u s "precisely in our
bodiliness," "a s a term inal individual [an end in herself, with the
responsibility of freedom] to which bodiliness is intrinsically neces
sary."36 Barth follows an overall plot line sim ilar to that of Aquinas:
the h um an being com cs forth from and returns to God. T h e hum an
person is "bodily soul, as he is also besouled body."37 G od's "prim al
in tention " in creating hum ans is to enter into covenant com m union
with them , in and through th e incarnation of and redemption by God
in Jesus C hrist. T h ere are im portant differences in the theologies of
Aquinas and Barth — overall system atic differences in argum ents for
body/soul u n ity and differences in the ultim ate sacram ental view of
the body th a t Aquinas provides, on one hand, and th e relational view
that Barth offers on the other. Despite these differences, the view of
the hum an body as self-transcendent in its path from creation to
consum m ation is shared.
From this C hristian perspective, then, the hum an person is uni
fied and transcendent. St. Paul wrote that all creation groans for its
promised future, and "we ourselves.. .w ait fo r . . . the redemption of
our bodies" (Rom. 8:23). W hat is promised to h um an persons in and
through Jesus C hrist is an ultim ate bodily, inspirited, resurrection
of those w ho have died, and as Barth says, "from this m anifestation
of redemption no hair of our head can be excluded."38 Both in via ,
on the way, and in the end, this is th e fram ew ork in w hich hum an
sexuality m ust som ehow also be understood.
3 5 . I a m u sin g K elsey 's fram ew o rk , alth ou g h if th e r e w ere sp ace h ere, I w ould w an t

to expan d u p on h is rendering o f th e th eo lo g ical an th rop olog y of T h o m a s A qu in as. See
Kelsey, "A qu in as and B a rth o n th e H u m a n Body," 6 4 6 , 6 5 5 .
3 6 . Ib id ., 6 5 1 , 6 6 0 .
3 7 . Karl B a rth , C h u rch D og m atics, ed. G . W. B rom iley and T. F. T o rran ce , trans.
H. K n ig h t c t al. (Ed in bu rgh: T & T . C lark , 1 9 6 0 ), III/2 , 3 5 0 . H ere, too , m y th in k in g
h a s been focused and stim u la ted by K elsey 's essay, alth ou g h I am w o rk in g d irectly w ith
B a rth ’s ow n text.
3 8 . B a rth , T h e E p istle to t h e R o m a n s, tra n s. Edw yn C . H o sk y n s (Lond on: Oxford
U n iv e rsity P re ss , 1 9 3 3 ), 3 1 3 .
W heth er G ender M a tters
T here is a story to be told about what m any people consider the m ost
basic characteristic of inspirited bodies. It is narrated as a rom antic
story, a glorious and inspiring story, and in m any of its chapters, a
tragic story. It is th e story of gender. It starts with a shared belief that
sex, m ale or fem ale, characterizes every hum an being and is central
to everyone's identity, for it qualifies not only bodies but embodied
spirits. Sex serves, therefore, to divide the hum an species in utterly
im portant ways. Building on sex, all people grow into a gender iden
tity; they becom e n ot only m ale and female but boy or girl, m an or
wom an. G ender is influenced by cultural and social factors, but it is
nonetheless universally recognizable across cultures. It yields images
of wom en as representatives of an "eternal fem inine" and som etim es
also images of m en as representatives of an "eternal m asculine."
In this story, cosm ic rhythm s arc interpreted in m asculine/
fem inine term s, and these provide background and context for the
story of h um an sexual and gender dualities. Societies are universally
ordered along gender lines,· particular roles and tasks arc assigned
either to w om en or m en but not to both. Traditional kinship struc
tures, religious associations, and social arrangem ents of all kinds are
fam ously gendered throughout the centuries. Scientific evidence for
the im portance and inevitability of this division is presented within
this story. Philosophical and theological anthropologies take gender
dualities for granted, and dram atic renderings of the gender story can
be found n ot only in the past but in the present. "In the whole reach
of hum an life ," wrote Karl Barth, "there is no abstractly hum an, but
only concretely m asculine or fem inine being, feeling, willing, think
ing, speaking, conduct and action, and only concretely m asculine
and fem inine co-existence and cooperation in all these things."39
"T h e polarity of m an and w om an can stand as the paradigmatic
instance of th e thoroughgoing com m unal character of hum anity,"
echoed H ans U rs von Balthasar.40 And this was reiterated tim e and
again by Pope John Paul II: "In the 'unity of the tw o / m an and
3 9 . B a rth , C h u rch D og m atics III/2 , 2 8 6 .

4 0 . H a n s U rs von B alth asar, T h e Von B alth asar R ea d er, ed. M ed ard K ehl and W erner
Löser, tra n s. R o b e rt 1. D a ly and Fred L aw rence (N ew York: C ro ssro ad , 1 9 8 2 ), 7 2 .
134 TUST LOVE
wom an arc callcd from the beginning n ot only to exist 'side by side'
or 'together/ but they are also called to exist m utually 'one for the
o th er.'"41
T h is story, this rendering of embodied persons, inspirited bodies, is
questioned today — not because the history of the story is completely
false, but because the message of the stoiy is problem atic. No one
doubts that h um an persons are in som e sense gendered, but w hat
this m eans and w hether or why it is im portant are disputed ques
tions. Equally contested are the assum ptions that there are only two
genders and th e question of whether and why gender should control
social roles w ithin hum an com m unities. Sexologists and fem inist
writers in th e 1960s and 1970s distinguished "sex" from "gender,"
accepting sex as a biological and anatom ical category, but challenging
gender as a socially constructed category. T h is distinction has been
blurred since then, however, with th e im plication that our under
standings of sex arc socially and culturally constructed as well. T h is
m eans that both sex and gender have becom e unstable, debatable,
categories.
Challenges to the m eanings and the im portance of gender arose
first out of th e recognition that role differentiations disadvantage
wom en. M asculine/fem inine dualism is as likely as spirit/body dual
ism to breed hierarchy. Hence, as fem inists have noted,42 throughout
4 1 . Jo h n P a u l II, O n t h e D ignity a n d V ocation o f W om en , A p o sto lic L etter issued

A ugust 1 5 , 1 9 8 8 , O rigins 18 (O cto b er 6 , 1 9 8 8 ): 2 6 6 .
4 2 . I hav e b e e n referrin g to th e w ritin g s of fe m in is ts in e a c h ch ap ter, assu m in g
so m e g eneral u n d e rsta n d in g o f w h a t it m e a n s to be a fe m in is t. H ere, how ever, it seem s
fin a lly im p o rta n t and ap p rop riate to in d ic a te w h a t I un d erstand " fe m in is m " to b e . It
is cle a rly a c o n te ste d te rm in th e tw en ty-first cen tu ry , and it is n o t w ell understood
by its o p p o n en ts. T h e th eo ry th a t c a n b e called "fe m in is t th e o ry " n o w ta k e s m u ltip le
fo rm s (so t h a t it w o u ld b e b e tte r to re fe r to " f e m in is m s " in th e p lu ra l). N o n e th e le ss,
fe m in is m in its m o s t fu n d am en tal se n se m e a n s a p o sitio n (a b e lie f and a m ovem en t)
th a t is opposed t o d iscrim in a tio n o n t h e b a sis o f gender. F e m in is m a s s u c h is n o t anti-
m a le o r a n ti-fa m ily ; its c e n tr a l c o n c e rn in clu d es tak in g a c c o u n t o f w o m en 's exp erien ce
a s a w ay to u n d erstan d w h at w ell-bein g m e a n s fo r w o m en and m e n and ch ild ren .
A n o th e r w ay o f p u ttin g th is is: F e m in is m is th e " b e lie f th a t w o m en sh ou ld n o t be
disadvantaged b y th e ir sex, th a t th e y sh ou ld be recognized a s h av in g h u m a n dignity
equ al to th a t o f m e n , a n d th a t th e y sh ou ld have th e op p o rtu n ity to live a s fulfilling
and a s freely c h o s e n liv es a s m e n ." S u san M o llc r O k in , Is M ulticu ltu ralism B a d for
W om en ?, cd . Jo sh u a C o h e n , M atth ew H ow ard, and M a rth a C . N u ssb a u m (P rin ceton ,
N J: P rin ce to n U n iv e rsity P ress, 19991, 1 0 . For a fu lle r ren d erin g o f m y o w n view o n th is
see M arg aret A . Farley, "F e m in is t e th ic s ," in T h e W estm in ster D ictio n a ry o f C hristian
Western h istory the m ale has been more valued than the fem ale; men
have been considered m ore appropriate for roles of leadership; m en
have been identified with mind and w om en w ith body; wom en have
been considered intellectually inferior to m en; wom en are thought to
be passive, w hile m en are active; and on and on. Moreover, wom en
cam e to recognize a profound disparity between their own experience
of them selves on the one hand, and on the other hand, the ways
in which th eir gender identity had been construed. T h e conclusion
drawn by m any wom en in response to blatantly inaccurate interpre
tations of fem ale gender identity and role capabilities was that indeed
gender is a constructed concept. Q uestions quickly becam e how to
counter the inju stices spawned by inaccurate views of gender and
of women.
Fem inist theorists have argued variously (and n ot infrequently
against one another) for th e equality of persons, with gender as only a
secondary attribu te of h um an beings,· for the revaluation of women's
em bodim ent whereby gender becom es even m ore im portant; for a
general denaturalization of notions of gender; and for a kind of so
cial constru ctionism that destabilizes n ot only gender but sex and
that can accom m odate m ore form s of gender th an the binary gen
der systems o f the past could imagine. N one of these theories has
to date appeared either to settle all questions about gender or to
change the world so that gender injustices no longer occur. Yet all
of th e theories have helped in som e way to focus questions, provide
insights helpful to m any people, and show som e ways to justice.
Still, liberal theories of equality often appear to submerge gender
too quickly, underestim ating the im portance of difference and cov
ering over w ithout healing th e scars of gender differentiation.43 But
revaluation o f wom en's (and men's) bodies tends to reinforce tradi
tional gender stereotypes, however m uch its aim is against th is.44
E thics, ed. Ja m es F. C h ild ress a n d Jo h n M acq u arrie (P h ilad elp hia: W estm in ster, 1 9 8 6 ),
2 2 9 -3 1 .
4 3 . A lth o u g h i t m a y b e argued th a t th is v e rs io n o f fe m in is m , in th e h an d s o f so m e
o n e like M a rth a N u ssb a u m , h a s found a w ay t o in co rp o rate gend er and s till to ad vocate
for th e co n cre te n e ed s o f g end ered p erson s.
4 4 . T h e h ig h lig h tin g o f gend er d ifferen ce in th e fo rm o f w o m en 's re c la im in g th eir
bodies, a s w ell a s d iffcrcn cc in th e w ay w o m en 's m in d s and h e arts w ork, h a s yielded
136 TUST LOVE
Postm odern cultural and social constructionism probes these m at

ters m ore deeply than all of its forerunners, perhaps, but it leaves
little leverage for th e kind of political action m ost form s of fem inism
consider im portant.45
So acute and far-reaching have these questions becom e that Susan
Parsons asks whether, on account of them , ethics itself has com e to
som e kind of end.46 Postm odern ways of thinking have so subverted
and destabilized notions of the hum an body and of gender that there
is no longer any room for a moral "law ." O r in other words, our very
understandings of the "good" are called into question w hen we dis
cover how intertwined they are with assum ptions especially about
gender. W h ether or n ot th e situation is as dire (or as filled with pos
sibility) as Parsons suggests, we can all articulate deep concerns for
the injuries th a t have been perpetrated both against groups w ho carry
the burdens o f gender role differentiation and against individuals who
are judged n o t to be gendered in acceptable ways. T h is m eans, how
ever, that considerations of sex and gender do n ot begin as neutral
exam inations of "interesting" aspects of what it m eans to be human,
embodied and inspirited. T h ey begin as efforts to correct or reinforce
previous understandings and to challenge or to deny im balances of
power based on gender. T h ey continue as investigations into "th e po
litical stakes in designating as an origin and a ca u se those identity
categories th a t are in fact the effects of institutions, practices, and
discourses w ith m ultiple and diffuse points of origin."47 They yield
personal and political challenges, and they m ay both heighten and
dim inish the im portance of gender for th e h um an com m unity of the
future.
pow erful in s ig h ts fo r m an y w om en. W h a t began in an im p o rta n t w ay w ith t h e w ork of

C a ro l G illig a n ra n g bells for w o m en . Y et it left th e c o m m u n ity w ith "d iffe ren ce" and
n o cle a r w ay t o brid ge th e gap to equality.
4 5 . Ju d ith B u tler, fo r o n e , d oes offer so m e leverage for p o litic a l a ctio n , b u t i t takes
th e stran g e fo rm o f parody. For m a n y w o m en , th e th eo ry is in sig h tfu l, and the reasons
for th is fo rm o f a c tio n a rc u n d erstan d able, b u t th e q u estio n s rem ain regarding w h a t to
th in k and w h a t to do.
4 6 . S u sa n F ra n k P arsons, T h e E thics o f G e n d e r (M ald en , M A : B lackw ell, 2 0 0 2 ).
4 7 . B utler, G e n d e r T ro u b le : F e m in is m a n d th e S u bv ersio n o f Id en tity (N ew York:
R outledge, 1 9 9 0 ) , ix.
G en d er T h eo ry a n d Practice
I once heard th e Kenyan linguist and fem inist theologian, M usim bi

Kanyoro, ask of a group of Southeastern African wom en, "In your
tribes, who m ilk s the cows? wom en or m en?" W hen the hands went
up, they w ere about evenly divided between those w ho said that
in their tribes wom en m ilk th e cows and those who said m en do.
Dr. Kanyoro's point was clearly made — that is, that gender-assigned
roles can seem quite arbitrary as wc view them across cultures (in this
case, across African tribes). So serious are these gender-assignments,
however, th a t if a wife from a tribe in w hich wom en arc expcctcd to
m ilk the cow s actually m ilks the cows belonging to the tribe of her
husband— w ho is from a tribe where this task belongs to m en — she
can be cursed, shunned, and exiled. T h is is n ot just an isolated ex
ample from traditional and contem porary African life. It is analogous
to situations in W estern cultures where wives of civic leaders, for in
stance, are still excoriated for attem pting their own leadership roles
in the public sphere or even for expressing their opinions in public. It
is also analogous to the plight of widows in parts of India whose caste
determ ines th a t they may not work outside th e hom e — even if their
survival depends on it.48 Countless other examples can be found in
m ultiple contexts, from the continued gendered division of labor into
low and high paying em ploym ent to the gender restrictions on roles
of leadership still sustained in m any religious traditions today.
W hen no o n e questions sexual arrangem ents, they are assumed to
be based in nature — in the givenness of anatomy, physiology, and
the directions of sexual desire.49 W hen no one questions gendered
divisions of labor, they look neutral (what is needed for efficient life
in fam ily and society) and benign (everyone has their assigned roles,
4 8 . S e e th is c a s e and o th ers in M a rth a C h e n , "A M a tte r o f Survival: W om en ’s R igh t

to E m p lo y m en t i n In d ia and B an g lad esh ," in W om en , C u ltu re, a n d D ev elo p m e n t, cd.
M . N u ssb a u m a n d J. G lover, 3 7 - 5 7 . S e e a lso N u ssb au m , S e x a n d S o cial Ju s tice (O xford:
O xford U n iv e rsity P re ss , 19991, 2 9 and p assim .
4 9 . A s w ill b e co m e clear, I d o n o t h ere in clu d e co n sid era tio n s o f gend er and sexual
o rie n ta tio n . O bviously, to h e tero sex u als and to gays and lesb ia n s th e gend er o f a sexual
p a rtn e r m a tte rs. W h a t I a m trea tin g h e re in th is chapter, how ever, is n o t w h ic h gender
m a tte rs b u t m o re deeply, w h a t g en d er is. See m y d iscu ssio n o f s a m e -s e x re la tio n s in
ch a p te r 7 b e lo w
138 TUST LOVE
and no roles arc better than others). Pain in body and spirit, how
ever, m akes u s thin k about sexual arrangem ents and gender roles.
We th in k first about the rationales for sexual arrangem ents and gen
der division; we th in k next about the effort it takes to sustain these
rationales. In recent years such thinking has involved m ajor histor
ical, philosophical, and theological explorations of the foundations
for beliefs about sex and gender, and m ajor sociological, anthropo
logical, and psychological explorations of th e patterns of practice
undergirded by these beliefs. T h e overwhelming results have been
theoretical challenges to rationales and political challenges to social
practiccs. W h ether these results arc in every way helpful rem ains to
be seen. T h ere is no doubt, however, th at the story of gender h as be
gun to change. In order to understand this change, we need n ot and
cannot here survey the m ultitude of im portant studies and analyses,
but it is helpful to look at som e of them .
Christian Theologies
H istorical studies of gender identity and roles have m ultiplied in
C hristian theology in the last half cen tu ry /0 C hristian m isogynism
is now well docum ented in the texts of patristic and medieval w rit
ers such as Ju stin Martyr, Tertullian, Origen, Augustine, Thom as
Aquinas, Bon aventure; and of sixteenth-century Reform ers like M ar
tin Luther and John Knox.51 N otions of "w om an" were from the
beginning theoretically entrenched in sophisticated theologies of
original sin and in anthropological theories of higher and lower
nature. W om en were considered to be (like Eve) a source of tem p
tation to m en ; hence they were sym bolically identified with evil and
5 0 . See, f o r ex a m p le , su c h stu d ies a s G eorge Tavard, W om an a n d t h e C hristian

T radition (N otre D a m e , IN : U n iv ersity o f N o tre D a m e P ress, 1 9 7 3 ; R o sem a ry Radford
R uether, ed., R eligion a n d S ex ism (N ew Y ork: S im o n & Schu ster, 19 7 4 ) ; M ary Daly,
T h e C h u rch a n d t h e S e c o n d S e x (N ew York: H arp er & Row, 1 9 7 5 ); M arg aret A . Farley,
"S o u rce s o f S e x u a l In eq u a lity in t h e H isto ry o f C h ris tia n T h o u g h t," jo u r n a l o f R eli
g io n 5 6 (April 1 9 7 6 ) : 1 6 2 - 7 6 ) ; B arb ara H ilk crt A n d o lsc n , "W h o se Sexu ality ? W h o se
T ra d itio n ? W o m e n , E xperien ce, and R o m a n C a th o lic S e x u al E th ic s ," in R eadin gs in
M oral T h eo lo g y N o. 9: F em in ist E th ics a n d th e C a th o lic M oral T rad ition , ed. C h a rle s E.
C u rra n , »Margaret A . Farley, and R ich ard A . M c C o r m ic k (M ah w ah , N J: P au list, 1 9 9 6 ),
2 0 7 - 3 9 ; S a ra h C o a k lcy , P ow ers a n d S u b m issio n s: Spirituality, P h ilo so p h y , a n d G e n d er
(O xford : B la ck w e ll, 2 0 0 2 ) . S e e a lso ch ap . 2 above.
5 1 . It w ould b e su p erflu ou s to n o te the b e s t k n o w n te x ts in th is regard. T h e y have
all been w ell d o cu m en ted in su ch stu d ie s a s th o se cited in n . 5 0 above.
disorder. T h e y had to be controlled, relegated to ordered spheres

(marriage and fam ily or cloister). W om en's bodies needed redemp
tion either through childbearing or through alienation from the body
by virginity.
Paradoxically, C hristian theologies of the past exalted "woman"
and her role a t the sam e tim e that they considered her to be inferior in
body and m ind. She was a t once the symbol of sin and the symbol of
all virtue. T h e latter, unfortunately, reinforced the former. If a woman
is on a pedestal, there is presumably no cause for appeal for better
status or m ore accurate rendering of h er reality as a hum an person.
Moreover, w h at is perceived too easily as sacred is also perceived too
easily as profaned.
As noted earlier, the G reek fathers m aintained that the im ago dei,
the image of God, is in the nonsexual soul, but not body, of both
wom en and m en, although it resided m ore fully in m en's souls —
since they were judged to be more like God in their roles of leader
ship. Augustine and the Latin fathers pointed to the image of God
in both spirit and body; but they thought that only the m ale body
(in its characteristics of activity and power) is in th e image of God.
For T h om as Aquinas, both m en and wom en (in body and in spirit)
participate in the image of God, but in different degrees. In agree
m ent with Aristotle, Aquinas considered wom en deficient as human
beings, and hence deficient in their status as images of God.
Although through th e centuries there were other perspectives —
those of medieval wom en, for example, whose gender identity, lead
ership roles, and relationships to God were radically different from
w hat the fathers and doctors of the church thought possible for
wom en — these other perspectives were marginal to the church's
central traditions. Today, however, with the persistent and dram atic
critique (fem inist and otherwise) of m ainstream traditional notions
of gender and th e status of wom en, alternative theologies have ap
peared that n ot only critique but retrieve and reconstruct central
C hristian teachings regarding God, hum an persons, the im ago dei,
and all other C hristian doctrines that have contributed to the op
pression of people by reason of their gender. Key examples of these
new theologies are to be found in Elizabeth Johnson's S he W ho Is
and Friends o f G o d an d Prophets, w hich together take seriously, yet
140 TUST LOVE
transform in term s of gendered concepts and conclusions, the cen

tral C h ristian beliefs about a Triu n e god, redemptive incarnation,
and an eschatological future.52 Serene Jones, in her Fem inist T heory
an d C hristian Theology, also transform s, in regard to gender, m ajor
C hristian beliefs as articulated primarily in Reform theology.53
B iblical C hallen ge
T h e m ajority of contem porary theologies eschew the kinds of gen
dered hierarchies of the C hristian past. Few if any theologians today
argue that w om en are intellectually inferior to m en. N ot m any argue
that a binary division of gender characteristics (men are strong,
wom en weak; m en are active, wom en passive; m en appeal to re
quirem ents o f justice, wom en to com passion; m en prefer principles,
women focus on relationships) applies absolutely. So theological
claim s for gender hierarchy are to som e extent removed or moder
ated; the m o st contestable attributions of gender characteristics have
faded; and in som e theologies gender plays a completely new and
transform ing role. T h ere is, however, no serious or widespread move
to elim inate th e binary construction of gender as such. Yet within
C hristianity there is som e basis for doing ju st this, at least in the
context of relationships am ong Christians.
C hristian scripture itself records: "T h ere is no longer Jew or Greek,
there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer m ale and fem ale; for
all of you are o n e in C h rist Jesus" (Gal. 3:28). W hen Paul's "no longer
m ale and fem ale" is juxtaposed to high theological claim s about the
centrality of gender such as w c have seen in the writings of Barth
and John Paul II, w hat are we to think? Even w hen these words are
compared w ith the kind of transformed use of gender that can be
seen in Johnson and Jones, w hat are we to think?
Barth thought that Paul never m eant to say that th e male/female
distinction should be canceled, but only that there should be equality
5 2 . E liz a b e th A Jo h n so n , S h e W ho Is: T h e M ystery o f G o d in F em in ist T h eo lo g ica l

D iscou rse (N ew Y ork: C ro ssro ad , 1 9 9 2 ) ; and Jo h n so n , Friends o f G o d a n d P ro p h ets:
A F em in ist T h e o /o g ic a l R ea d in g o f th e C o m m u n io n o f Sain ts |Ncw York: C o n tin u u m ,
1 9 9 8 ).
5 3 . S eren e Jo n e s , F em im st T h e o r y a n d C h ristian T h eo lo g y : C a rto g rap h ies o f G race
(M in n e a p o lis: F o rtress, 2 0 0 0 ) .
and m utuality between men and w om en.54 Equality for Barth docs
not, however, rule out super- and subordination, since both are in
Jesus C h rist (who is above all hum ans, but who also subordinated
him self to G od and hum ans). W hat is revealed in th e com m and of
God regarding gender does not include culturally shaped specific m as
culine and fem in in e traits, but it docs include a "sequential" ordering
where m en are "A" and wom en are "B ," and where w om en m ust cover
their heads (or do som ething analogous), but m en need n ot do so
(1 Cor. 1 1 :1 -1 6 ).55 So for Barth, Paul's "no longer m ale and fem ale"
m eant that th e "m ale is m ale in the Lord only, but precisely, to the
extent that h e is w ith the fem ale, and the female likewise. T h a t they
are one in th e Lord holds th em together/'56 each "in their proper
place."57 G ender distinction rem ains sacrosanct, and despite Barth's
disclaim ers, it is still haunted by the shadows of hierarchy.58
John Paul II certainly did n ot think that Paul intended to elim i
nate gender difference. In a theology of gender based on the accounts
of creation in G enesis, John Paul understands th e very substance
of the hum an, the im ago dei, to incorporate the transform ation of
Adam 's solitude into the com m union of persons made possible only
by sexual difference.59 R em iniscent of Plato's Sym posium in which
Aristophanes tells the m ythical tale of hum ans being only halves of
the whole they once were, longing and searching always in love for
their other half, John Paul presents m an and w om an as incomplete
u n til they co m e into union w ith one another.60 H um an life, then,
54. B a rth , C h u r c h D og m a ü cs III/2 , 3 1 0 - 1 2 ; III/4 , 1 5 3 - 5 6 , 1 6 4 , 174.

55. B arth , C h u r c h D og m a tics 1II/2, 3 1 0 ; III/4 , 1 6 9 - 7 2 .
56. B a rth , C h u r c h D og m atics III/4 , 1 6 4 .
57. Ib id , 1 7 4 .
58. Ib id ., 1 6 9 - 7 6 . B a rth in tro d u ces th is seq u en tia l order a fte r h e h a s in sisted th a t
m e n a n d w o m e n a rc e q u a l b efo re G o d . H e h e re a ck n o w le d g es t h a t "e v e ry w o rd is
dangerous and lia b le to b e m isu n d ersto od w h en we ch aracterize th is order. B u t it
e x is ts — A p re ced es B, and B follow s A. O rd er m e a n s su cce ssio n . It m e a n s preceding
and follow ing. It m e a n s super- and s u b -o rd in a tio n ." Ibid ., 1 6 9 .
5 9 . }o h n P aul II, O riginal U n ity o f M an a n d W om an (B o sto n : P au lin e B o o k s and
M ed ia, 1 9 8 1 ), 5 6 .
6 0 . P la to , S y m p o siu m , 1 8 9 e - 1 9 4 e. T h e r e are so m e obviou s d ifferences betw een
P la to 's ta lc o f A risto p h a n e s a n d th e appropriation of th e G e n e sis sto ry by Jo h n Paul II.
In th e S y m p o siu m th e h is to ry o f the h u m a n racc d ocs n o t begin w ith a sin gle h u m an
w ho is so lita ry b u t w ith th re e k in d s o f h u m a n s: m ale, fem ale, and and rogyn ou s. T o
co n tro l th e u n ru lin e s s o f th e s e bein g s, th e gods c u t th e m in half. F orever a fte r each
o n e ro a m s t h e w orld lo o k in g fo r its o th e r h a lf leach m a le fo r a m a le, e a c h fem a le fo r a
142 TUST LOVE
would not be hum an were the distinction between m an and woman

erased. For lo h n Paul, th e reason why w om en and m en seek one
another is because they are com plem entary. They need their "other
h a lf" who is different from th em but who will com plete them . B i
nary gender characteristics rem ain, and the im portance of gender
escalates.
Biblical scholars have other things to say about G alatians 3:28,
however, observing th at the brief form ula, "no m ale and fem ale," in
volves m ajor problems of interpretation. Situated in a pre-Pauline
tradition regarding baptism , and in th e associated belief in a "new
creation" for th e baptized, the words "no m ale and fem ale" offer an
interpretation — perhaps an abrogation — of G enesis 1:27. T o abro
gate G enesis 1 :2 7 would be to abrogate: "So God created humankind
\adam] in h is image, in the image of God he created th em [him];
m ale and fem ale he created th em ." For Paul and the G alatians, "new
creation" m ay transform or leave behind som e things given in the
first creation .61
It is not im m ediately clear, however, w hich of the m any meanings
attached to "m ale and fem ale" in G enesis 1:27 m ight be abrogated
by th e baptism al formula in G alatians 3 :2 8 . M ary Rose D'Angelo
identifies four functions of th e phrase, all of w hich can be found in
texts of the first to third century C .E. or at least supported by sim ilar
usages during this period:62 (1) "M ale and fem ale" is here a figure
of speech (used frequently in antiquity) w hich nam es a whole reality
by nam ing its opposite poles. Hence, "m ale and fem ale" in G ene
sis 1:27 m eans "all hum an beings," as does, in a negative form , "no
male and fem ale" in G alatians. In Genesis, gender division applies
fem ale, an d each m a le for a fem a le fand v ic e versa] w h e n th e y w e re o rig in a lly p a rt of

th e androgyne).
6 1 . F o r th is d e scrip tio n I draw o n M a ry R ose D 'A n g elo , "G e n d e r R efu sers in the
E arly C h ris tia n M is s io n : G a l 3 :2 8 a s a n In te rp re ta tio n o f G e n 1 :2 7 b / ' in R eadin g in
C hristian C o m m u n it ie s : E ssays o n In terp retation in t h e E arly C h u rch , ed. C h a rle s A.
B o b crtz and D a v id B rak k c (N otre D a m e , IN .: U n iv ersity o f N o tre D a m e Press, 2 0 0 2 ) ,
1 4 9 - 7 3 . D ’A n g elo exp an d s o n P aul’s n o tio n o f "n ew c re a tio n " by tu rn in g to o th e r texts,
su ch a s 2 C o rin th ia n s 5 :1 7 - 1 8 ("S o if an y o n e is in C h r is t, th ere is a new creatio n ;
ev eryth in g old h a s p assed away; se c , ev ery th in g h as b e co m e n e w !"). Sh e also adds the
o b serv a tio n th a t th is need n o t m e a n th a t all o f G e n e s is 1 - 3 is negated. M o re likely,
w h at Paul t h in k s h a s passed aw ay a rc ce rta in a sp e cts o f h u m an life in co m m u n ity ,
p a rticu la rly th o se th a t fo r h im w ere co n sid ered "flesh ly ."
6 2 . D 'A n g e lo provides d etailed d o cu m en ta tio n o f th e s e te x ts and usages.
to all; in G alatians all, regardless of gender, arc included in C hrist

through baptism . (2) "M ale and fem ale" in G enesis refers to a "re
lation of disadvantage." "N o m ale and fem ale" in G alatians would
then m ean a n abrogation of disadvantage in the relation of m ale and
female. (3) T h e G enesis "m ale and fem ale" can m ean "se x and m ar
riage," so th a t "no m ale and fem ale" in G alatians m eans no m ore sex
and m arriage. T h is corresponds to 1 C orinthians 7:1 and 7 :1 7 -2 4 ,
and to the belief am ong early C hristians that everything "fleshly"
of this world would soon pass away. (4) Finally, "m ale and fem ale"
in G enesis 1 :2 7 refers to the original Adam, the image of God, as
androgynous. T h a t is, Adam was both m ale and female until the cre
ation of Eve, w hich in som e traditions was interpreted to m ean (like
A ristophanes's myth) that Adam was split into two (Eve taken from
Adam's side), so that only then did hum an gender com e into the pic
ture. In this case, "no m ale and fem ale" in G alatians could m ean a
return to the androgyne — for all th e baptized.63 W ith this, the new
creation would transcend sexual and gender division.
D'Angelo considers th at of the four interpretations of "m ale and
fem ale" in G enesis 1:27, the second (disadvantage to one pole of
the relationship) is the m ost likely to be negated by G alatians. T h is
negation fits with the other pairs in the text; it is consonant with
the vision of equality in the early church; and it is visible in the
early church practice of both m ale and fem ale leadership. T h e third
m eaning (sex and marriage), according to D'Angelo, is th e easiest to
dem onstrate from the first century tradition of interpretation. T h e
fourth (the im age of the adrogyne) has been deduced from a wide va
riety of texts that refer in som e way to sexual duality. Various m ythic
images are absorbed in the idea of the image of the adrogyne, each
of w hich m ight have explained or reinforced any of th e other three
functions of G alatians 3 :2 8 .64
6 3 . S e e D 'A n g e lo , "G en d er in th e O rig in s o f C h r is tia n ity /' in E qu a l a t tlie C reation :

S ex ism , S ociety, a n d C h ristian T h ou g h t (T o ro n to : U n iv ersity o f T o ro n to Press, 1 9 9 8 ),
2 5 -4 8 .
6 4 . For a help fu l stu d y o n th e androgyne in an tiqu ity , s e e D 'A n g clo , "T ra n scrib in g
Sexu al P o litics: Im a g es o f th e A ndrogyne in D isc o u rse s o f A n tiq u e R elig io n ," in De-
scriz ion i e iscriz io n i: p o lit ic h e d e l d isc o rso (T re n to : D ip a rtim cn to di S c ie n z e F ilo log ich c
e S to rich e , 1 9 9 8 ) , 1 1 5 - 4 6 ; see a lso W ayne A . M ee k s, " T h e Im ag e of th e A ndrogyne:
S o m e U s e s of a S y m b o l in E arliest C h ristia n ity ," in In S e a r ch o f th e E arly C h ristian s:
144 TUST LOVE
W hat seem s clear is that the second and fourth options, in par
ticular, offer a radical challenge to later theological traditions in
w hich gender distinction becom es central to an understanding of
the hum an (as it does in Barth, von Balthasar, and John Paul II,
for example). T h ese options would not m ean that gender differences
disappear in term s of bodily anatom y but in term s of the irrelevance
of gender distinctions between people. T h ese options challenge m ost
especially theologies in which gender hierarchy is neither elim inated
nor transform ed in a "new creation." Fem inists have appealed to
G alatians 3 :2 8 primarily as an argument for equality am ong wom en
and m en — in the church, the family, and even society. M ore can
be said about its contemporary relevance, however, and I return to
this below.
Biology, C ulture, a n d E xp erien ce

It is tem pting to th in k that w c m ight be able to solve all of our gender
questions through advanced scientific studies. We know' that inade
quate scientific m ethods have contributed to th e problems we have
had in understanding sexual and gender difference in the past. Is
it possible th a t the behavioral and biological sciences are now fi
nally "adequate" to the task of discerning these differences and/or
sim ilarities? T h is is a question n ot only for the sciences but for
other disciplines as well. Philosophers and theologians, for example,
have based m any of their theories about gender on their perception
of the biological and m edical inform ation of their tim es — or more
likely, they have used this inform ation to bolster their own culturally
formed presuppositions about gender.
T h e problem with expecting all of our answers to com e from sci-
cncc is that th e "facts" of sexual and gender diffcrcncc have been
looked for and seen through the lenses of context and culture.65 As
the historian T h om as Laqueur concluded from his lengthy study of
S e le c te d E ssays, e d . A lle n R . H ilto n and H . G reg or)· Sn yd er (N ew H av en, C T : Yale U n i

v ersity P ress, 2 0 0 2 ) , 3 - 5 4 . For an in terp retatio n of G e n e s is 1 :2 7 th a t ru n s co u n te r to
th e idea o f a n and ro g yn ou s c re a tio n o f A dam , s e e P h y llis T r ib lc , G o d a n d t h e R hetoric
o f S ex u a lity (P h ilad elp h ia: F o rtress, 1 9 7 8 ), 1 2 - 2 3 .
65. F o r a fa sc in a tin g stu d y of th e role o f c u ltu re in relation to sc ie n tific stud ies
of gender, see C y n th ia Eagle R u ssett, S ex u a l S c ie n c e : T h e V ictorian C o n stru ction o f
W o m a n h o o d (C am brid ge, M A : H arvard U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 8 9 ).
the m eanings of sex and gender from the Greeks to Freud, "destiny
is anatom y," rather than, as Freud thought, the other way around.66
T h is sort of insight is w hat has led m any of those who th in k about
gender and sex to elide sexual and gender difference into cultur
ally constructed m eanings and behaviors — rejecting a presumed
"givenness" for sex, and a presumed "construction" only of gender.
T h e m ost striking exam ple of Laqueur's phrase appears in w hat he
calls onc-scx and tw o-sex models of hum an bodies. In the onc-scx
model w hich prevailed from th e Greeks to th e eighteenth century,
there is only o n e kind of hum an body T h e difference between m ale
and female is a difference of incom pleteness on the part of th e fe
male. T h e m ale is unquestionably hum an; the fem ale is an inverted
male, the vagina is an inverted penis, and so forth. As such, the
female body is a lesser, deficient, version of th e m ale body In the
eighteenth century, the two-sex model emerged as a result of con
cern for the '‘'otherness" of the female and th e "opposition" of the
sexes. D ifference then was between two incom m ensurably different
bodies, one m ale and one female. T h e female was still the anomaly,
however, th e o n e that needed to be explained, and th e one who was
u ltim ately disadvantaged. T h e challenge was to decipher w hat about
her accounts for h er difference, h er otherness, in relation to the m ale.
T h e m eanings already given to gender had to be secured by a founda
tion in w om en's bodies — "in the very nature of their bones, nerves,
and, m ost im portant, reproductive organs."67 Hence, for example,
an explanation of wom en's supposed lack of passion (or women's
greater than m en's ability to control passion) had to be found in the
female body.
6 6 . T h o m a s Laqueur, M akin g S ex : B o d y a n d G e n d e r fro m t h e G r e e k s t o Freud

(C am brid ge, M A : H arvard U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 9 0 ), 2 5 and p a ssim . O n e fo rm of s c i
e n tific th eo ry th a t g o es co m p letely ag ain st arg u m en ts fo r th e cu ltu ra l co n stru ctio n of
g en d er is sociobiology. It proposes, o n th e co n trary , a v iew o f ev o lu tio n th a t in s is ts th a t
in h u m a n a s in n o n h u m a n a n im a ls th e r e is an in sa tia b le drive in g en es to reproduce,
an urgency in m a le g en es to find m u ltip le p artn ers, and a settled ten d en cy in fem ale
g en es n o t to h a v e m an y p artn ers b u t to se ttle dow n and n u rtu re. W h e n it c o m e s to
h u m a n s, how ever, th is s e t of a ssu m p tio n s needs te stin g . Even i f wrc a cccp tcd th e s e a s
su m p tio n s, it is s t ill p o ssible th a t h u m a n s c a n in terv en e in th e ir g e n e tic d eterm in ism
and ch a n g e its co u rse.
6 7 . Ib id ., 1 5 0 .
146 TUST LOVE
O f course, from the eighteenth century on, there has been definite
gain in knowledge about sexual em bodim ent. According to Laqueur,
however, this new knowledge was n ot w hat changed ways of viewing
wom en and m en. O n the contrary, it was shifts in cultural meanings
of gender th a t changed th e scientific questions about sex and influ
enced the answers that were found. It is not certain that the sam e
dynam ic does not exist today. W hen the equality of w om en and men,
for example, is challenged, we see a flurry of scientific studies claim
ing to explain why boys are better at som e things (say, m athem atics)
and girls are better at others (say, literature). It is hard not to be skep
tical about th e unstudied variables in studies such as these especially
w hen other studies show, for example, that girls in Iceland arc ahead
of boys in their m athem atical prowess.
But w hat do we know today? We know that, biologically speaking,
wom en and m en have different chrom osom al make-ups, different
horm ones (or more accurately, different am ounts of the sam e gender-
related horm ones), as well as the different anatom ies (particularly
reproductive organs) and secondary sex characteristics that chrom o
som es and horm ones produce. We also know that m ajor illnesses
such as lung cancer, osteoporosis, and heart disease require different
medical treatm ents for wom en and for m en .68 We know th at brain-
imaging technologies show differences in the responses of women
and m en to external stim ulations of all sorts, even though brain re
sponses along gender lines frequently do n ot seem to represent gender
differences in behavior.69
M uch of w hat science tells us about gender difference is confusing,
however. C urrently significant brain studies tell us that on average
6 8 . R e cen t c r itic is m o f th e m ed ical p ro fession s for providing th e sa m e treatm en ts

for m e n and w o m e n (assu m in g th a t o n ly rep rod uctive p ro b lem s req u ire d ifferential
trea tm en t), a n d t h e co rrelativ e c ritic is m o f th e n eg lect o f m ed ical research o n w om en,
hav e led to m o re focu sed stu d ies o f se x u a l and gend er d ifferences and to in s is te n ce o n
d eeper gend er a n a ly sis. M u ch o f th is is s till in beg in n in g stages.
6 9 . S e c, for ex a m p le , D eb o ra h B lu m , S e x o n t h e B rain : T h e B io log ical D ifferen ces
B e tw e e n M en a n d W om en (N ew Y ork: V ik in g , 1 9 9 7 ). E xam p les o f th e tw o sid es o n
th e issu e of th e sig n ifica n ce of biology fo r u n d erstan d in g gender, h u m a n freed om , and
so fo rth , s e c (on t h e p ro biology side) P atricia S m ith C h u rch lan d , N eu rop h ilosop h y :
T ow ard a U n ite d S c ien c e o f th e M ind/B rain (C am brid ge, M A : M I T Press, 1 9 8 6 ), e s
pecially 8 8 - 9 7 ; a n d (pro lim its o n w h a t th e scie n ce s c a n offer) Jo h n D u p rć, H u m an
N atu re a n d t h e L im its o f S c ien c e (O xford : C laren d o n P ress, 2 0 0 1 ) , esp ecially c h a p s. 3
and 7.
m en's brains arc 9 to 10 percent larger than women's, but w c also

know that gender-related brain size is not a predictor of intellectual
perform ance (men and women perform sim ilarly on IQ tests). We
know that th e parts of the brain related to intelligence appear to
be different for wom en and m en, although th e net results appear
to be sim ilar on average. We know that the connector between the
brain's two hem ispheres is larger in wom en than in m en, and that
this lessens th e damage of som e strokes. T h e speculation that this
is the source of "wom en's intuition" seem s m ore dubious, more a
m atter of th e lens being used th an th e object being seen. We know
that brain size for girls peaks at eleven and a half years, and for boys
three years later. We also know th at som e areas (sources for certain
capabilities) m ature faster in boys, and that som e mature faster in
girls; but th a t as they age, these capabilities even out. Wc do not
know w hether developmental differences may be due less to the brain
itself than to sensory capacities, or for that matter, to the ways boys
and girls are stim ulated differently from birth by their parents and
others.
As noted above, brain-imaging technologies m ake it possible to
see differences in the responses of w om en and m en to external influ
ences, but n ot necessarily to sec gendered correlations w ith behavior.
T h e brain changes constantly in reaction to horm ones, personal en
couragement, th e development of behavioral habits, w hat we eat,
the m edications we take. We do n ot know for sure w hether th e brain
is hardwired for gender difference, or w hether it accrues software
through social and cultural influences from birth. And we do not
know w hether the brain "lights u p" (on the brain-imaging screen) be
cause it is causing som e action, directing som e em otion; or whether
the person (whose em bodim ent includes a brain) is acting, directing,
responding, in a way th at simply requires the brain for support and
com pletion. W ithout returning to questions of mind/body; alm ost
everyone nonetheless rem ains confused as to w hat a gendered brain
does to determ ine w hat w e do. If th e claim s of biology (or biologists)
rise too high, so that they render m oot our thinking about gender
and its problem s, or m ake futile our efforts to change gendered at
titudes and behavior, wc can hope for caution lights to go on in our
148 TUST LOVE
brains and in our selves. We need biological studies; we ju st should

not expect m ore from them than they can deliver.70
If biology is vulnerable to cultural bias, how m uch m ore so are the
behavioral sciences of anthropology, sociology, and psychology. Still,
as we saw in chapter 3, anthropological and sociological studies are
im portant to cross-cultural perspectives and to th e understanding
of ourselves. Psychologists still give us m ultiple, often contradic
tory, explanations of why people act in certain ways, as we shall
see below, b u t the interpretations of even descriptive studies com e
under scrutiny for their cultural biases.71 Ongoing work by schol
ars like C arol G illigan and Lyn M ikcl Brown never fail to illum inate
hum an experience of th e development of young girls in a process of
growing insecurity, yet questions rem ain about the causes of such
development and about the im portance of such gender differences in
adults.72
We cannot avoid, then, the scientific as well as cultural challenges
to our assum ptions about gender difference w hen it com es to fe
m ales and m ales, women and m en. But there are also scientific and
cultural challenges that go beyond this, that ask whether there are
7 0 . In te re stin g a n im a l stu d ies are av ailable to u s a s w ell a s stu d ies o f h u m a n s.

Stu d ies of ch im p a n z e e s and b o n o b o s, c lo s e to u s o n th e ev o lu tio n är}' tree, are esp e
c ia lly in te re stin g . M o s t fem a le p rim ates, i t is rep orted , are caring, w hile m ales are
co m p etitiv e ; m a le s a rc p ro m iscu o u s, and fem ales a rc less so (alth ough in so m e species
b o th m a le s a n d fe m a les have m u ltip le m a te s !. B o n o b o s (a sp e cies o f g reat apes), u n lik e
ch im p a n z e e s, a r c ruled by fem ales, n o t m a les; th ey s e ttle d isp u tes by fo rm in g allian ces
ra th e r th a n fig h tin g w ith co m p etito rs. M o s t sch o la rs a rc aw are of th e c a u tio n s th a t are
needed w h en co m p a ris o n s a rc m ad e b etw een n o n h u m a n p rim a te s and h u m a n . See,
for e xa m p le, M e red ith E . S m a ll, F e m a le C h o ic e s : S ex u a l B eh a v io r o f F e m a le P rim ates
(Ith a ca , N Y: C o rn e ll U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 9 3 ); R ich ard W ran g h am and D a le P eterson ,
Demonic Males (N e w Y o rk : H o u g h to n M ifflin , 1 9 9 6 ).
7 1 . See, for e x a m p le , E lean or E. M accoby, T h e T w o S e x es: G row in g Apart. C o m in g
T og eth er (C am b rid g e, M A : H arvard U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 9 8 ) . T h i s is a b o o k a b o u t evi
d en ce th a t w h en boys and g irls are very young, th e y p refer to play in g en d er identified
groups, b u t th a t in tim e , th e y co m e together. O n e review er o f th is b o o k n o tes th a t th is
e v id en ce is in te re s tin g and in so m e w ay s v ery u sefu l, b u t th e r e are m a n y q u estio n s
th e a u th o r d oes n o t a s k — for exam p le, w h at abo u t th o se ch ild ren w h o d o no t fit th is
pattern? A nd w h a t a bo u t ad u lt in flu e n ce s t h a t m a y b e sh ap in g ch ild ren 's behavior? Sec
C a rla G o ld e n , "S e p a ra te and U n e q u a l," T h e W o m en ’s R ev iew o f B o o k s 16 (D ecem b er
1 9 9 8 ): 2 4 - 2 5 .
7 2 . Lyn M ik e l Brow n and C a ro l G illig a n , M eetin g a t t h e C rossroad s: W o m en ’s
P sy ch olog y a n d G irls' D e v e lo p m e n t (C am brid ge, M A : H arvard U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 9 2 ).
m ore genders than two; and that ask w hether gender assignm ent at
birth settles th e b asic gender issues for all hum an persons.
Biology, C u ltu re, a n d M ore E xp erien ce
We can always return to the few things we seem sure of, bolstered
by scientific research: M ales and fem ales are, baseline, sexually dif
ferentiated by chrom osom es, horm ones, and anatomy. Gender may
be constructed out o f a myriad of influences, but it h as to relate
som ehow to biological difference. And yet even here our surety be
com es unstable. Wc have learned, m ainly from people's experience
but also from scientific exploration, that these clearly defined m ale
or fem ale configurations are n ot universal am ong hum ans. T o at
tend to differences in this regard is no longer a marginal or m inor
concern.
T h ere arc hum an bodies that arc neither entirely fem ale nor en
tirely m ale; th ey do not fall neatly into a binary sexual division.
Som e persons are born w ith alternative chrom osom al sexual con
stitutions — th at is, alternative to the statistically standard X X for
fem ales and X Y for m ales. Moreover, som e persons have a m ixture of
m ale and fem ale reproductive organs; others have secondary sex char
acteristics th a t appear to be out of harm ony with their chrom osom al
sexual identity. Hence, in the h um an com m unity there are n ot only
unam biguously identifiable m ales and fem ales but intersexual s.73
73. E s tim a te s o f th e in cid cn cc o f in te rs c x in th e p o p u latio n are d ifficu lt to m ake,

b u t so m e h a v e offered 1 .7 p ercen t; o th ers 1 in 2 0 0 0 . T h is m a k e s it relativ ely rare, b u t as
A n n e F a u s to -S te rlin g n o te s, "E v e n i f w e've ov erestim ated by a facto r o f 2 [h er e stim a te
is 1 .7 p ercen t], t h a t s till m e a n s a lo t of in tersex u a l ch ild ren are b o rn e a c h year. A t th e
ra te o f 1 .7 p e rc e n t, fo r e x a m p le , a c ity o f 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 w o u ld h ave 5 ,1 0 0 p e o p le w ith v ary in g
degrees o f in te rs e x u a l d ev elo p m en t." A n n e F au sto -S te rlin g , S exin g t h e B od y : G e n d er
P olitics a n d t h e C o n stru ctio n o f S ex u ality (N ew York: B a sic B o o k s, 2 0 0 0 ) , 5 1 . O th e r im
p o rta n t reso u rce s o n in te rse x u a lity in clu d e: A lic e D o m u ra t D reger, " A m b ig u o u s S e x ' —
o r A m b iv alen t M e d icin e? E th ica l Issu es in th e T r e a tm e n t o f In tersex u a lity ," H astings
C e n ter R eport 2 8 [M ay-Tu ne 1 9 9 8 ): 2 5 - 3 5 ; D reger, H erm a p h ro d ites a n d t h e M ed ical
In v en tio n o f S e x (C am b rid g e, M A : H arvard U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 9 8 ); S u zan n e J. Kessler,
L esson s fr o m t h e In te rse x ed (N ew B ru n sw ick , N J: R utgers U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 9 8 );
K essler and W. M cK e n n a , G e n d e r : A n E lh n o m eth o d o lo g ic a l A p p roa ch |Ncw York: W i
ley, 1 9 7 8 ); S te p h a n ie S . T u rn er, "In te r s e x Id e n titie s: L o catin g N ew In te rse ctio n s o f S ex
and G e n d er," G e n d e r a n d S o c iety 13 (A ugust 1 9 9 9 ): 4 5 7 - 7 9 . T h e r e is a lso th e novel
by Jeffrey E u g en id cs, M id d lesex (N ew York: Farrar, S trau s & G iro u x , 2 0 0 2 ).
150 TUST LOVE
O nce called herm aphrodites and still so callcd in som e scientific cir
cles, they are n ot new to the hum an com m unity.74 A ristotle thought
they were a kind of twin; G alen believed they represented an inter
m ediate sex. Physicians in the middle ages thought they were in the
middle of a sexual continuum . By the n ineteenth century science
and m edicine took over, determ ining that intersexuality is patholog
ical and requires a medical remedy — surgery, horm one treatm ents,
and social programming. W ith this remedy, intersexuals largely dis
appeared from the public eye, for they were medically and surgically
melded into th e standard binary sexual model.
Today, however, th e heretofore hidden stories of intersexed persons
arc being told. T h ey arc stories of individuals w hose sex is deemed
"am biguous" at birth (neither "purely" m ale or fem ale). In W est
ern cultures a child with mixed sex is deemed so anom alous that
physicians and parents consider them selves faced with a "medical
emergency." So im portant is gender difference that a baby m ust be
assigned one gender or the other, and this m ust be done im m edi
ately. C riteria are in place to determ ine m ale or fem ale assignment,
and standard medical practice has u n til recently favored not chro
m osom es but the possibility of a penis of acceptable length for males
and interior reproductive organs for females. T h e use of these criteria
is based on th e medical opinion that gender identity is changeable
u n til approximately eighteen m onths of age, after w hich it can be
wholly determ ined by the way in w hich a child is reared. T h is view
usually includes the corollary th at healthy psychosexual adjustm ent
74. A cco rd in g to M y ra J . H ird and Je n z G e rm o n , t h e te rm "in te rs e x u a lity " w as

first introd u ced i n 1 9 2 0 , and before th a t tim e , "h e rm a p h ro d itis m " w as t h e c o m m o n
te rm . S e e M y ra J. H ird a n d Je n z G e r m o n , " T h e In tc r s c x u a l B o d y a n d th e M ed ica l
R egu lation o f G e n d e r," in C on stru ctin g G e n d e r e d B od ies , ed. K ath ry n B a ck e tt-M ilb u rn
and L inda M c K ic (N ew York: Palgrave, 2 0 0 1 ) , 1 7 5 , n. 1. For a su ccin ct h isto ry o f in ter
sexu als, s e e F a u sto -S te rlin g , S ex in g t h e B od y , 3 2 - 3 6 . M y b rie f h is to ric a l c o m m e n ts h ere
a rc d ep end ent u p o n F a u sto -S te rlin g and th e h is to ria n s s h e c ite s. N o te a lso th a t sin ce
th e m id -n in e te e n th cen tu ry p h y sician s have so m e tim e s m ad e a d is tin c tio n betw een
" tr u e " h e rm a p h ro d ites and "p se u d o " h e rm ap h ro d ites. T h e d is tin c tio n is based o n th e
p articu lar co n fig u ra tio n o f sex u al o rg an s — the p seu d o -h erm ap h rod ite hav in g m ixed
se x u a lity b e c a u s e o f t h e d ev elo p m en t o f o n e s e t organs in to an in tc rs c x configu ration
o r hav in g on ly o v a rie s o r on ly te ste s; th e " tr u e " h erm ap h ro d ite hav in g tw o genu inely
d ifferen t se ts o f organs o r a t le a st h av in g te s te s and o v aries. S e e F au sto -S terlin g ,
ibid ., 3 7 - 3 8 .
Sexuality an d Its Meanings 15 1
is related to the appearances of the genitals.75 T h e experiences of

persons w hose intersex has been resolved according to these criteria
are, however, often fraught w ith confusion and pain.76 D ebate rages,
therefore, between physicians w ho hold to this gender theory and
medical practice, and those who critique it as false and harm ful.77
A n organization of persons whose intersex was managed according
to this theory was formed in 1993 to oppose th e theory and practice,
and to advocate n ot only for consideration of other criteria for treat
m ent but for the delay of any treatm ent u n til the intersexed child is
old enough to choose a gender assignm ent or to choose simply to be
a person of m ixed sex.
T h e question for all of u s is n ot only w hat treatm ent should be
given for a condition considered to be pathological, but w hether the
condition is pathological or not. In other words, if a culture were
less preoccupied with m ale/fem ale sexual division and with boy/girl,
m an/w om an gender differentiation, would the m edical imperative
regarding intersexed persons rem ain as it is? O r m ore fundamentally,
is gender assignm ent as a "pure" m ale or female, m an or woman,
essential to h um an flourishing?
T h ere is an oth er form of hum an social gendering that is relevant
to these questions. C ross-cultural anthropological studies have led
7 5 . S e e S u s a n n e J. K essler, " T h e M ed ical M an ag em en t o f G en d er: C a se M an ag e

m e n t o f In te rse x e d I n fa n ts ," Signs: Jo u rn a l o f W om en in C u ltu re a n d S o c iety 1 6 ( 1 9 9 0 ) :
3 - 2 6 ; M ilto n D ia m o n d and H. K eith Sig m u n d so n , " S e x R eassig n m en t a t B irth : L ong
te rm R eview and C lin ic a l Im p lic a tio n s," A rch iv es o f P ediatric A d o lesce n t M ed icin e 151
(M ay 1 9 9 7 ): 2 9 8 - 3 0 4 . F o r in terrelig io u s p ersp ectives o n th e s e issu es, s e c C h ris tin e E.
G udorf, " T h e E ro sio n o f Sexu al D im o rp h ism ," Jo u rn al o f t h e A m er ica n A c a d e m y o f
R eligion 6 9 (D e ce m b e r 2 0 0 1 1 : 8 6 3 - 9 1 .
7 6 . See, for exa m p le, Jo h n C o la p in to , /Is N atu re M ade H im : T h e B o y W ho Was
R a ised a s a G irl (N e w York: Ila rp e r C o llin s 2 0 0 0 ) . T h i s is a ctu a lly a sto ry o f a bo y w h o
w as n o t b o rn w ith m ix ed s e x a t b irth , b u t w h o se p e n is w as accid en ta lly severed during
a circu m cis io n p ro ced u re. It has, how ever, sh ed w h at appears to be a g reat deal o f ligh t
for critiq u in g th e crite ria fo r s e x a ssig n m e n t a t b irth . S e e a lso D a p h n e S c h o lin sk i, T h e
L ast T im e 1 W ore a D ress (N ew York: R ivcrhead B o o k s, 1997).
7 7 . T h e th e o ry w as first articu lated b y Jo h n M o n ey and h is colleagues a t Jo h n s
H o p k in s U n iv ersity . S e e Jo h n M oney, J. G . H a m p so n , and J. L. H a m p so n , "H e rm a p h ro
d itism : R e co m m e n d a tio n s C o n ce rn in g A ssig n m e n t o f S e x , C h a n g e o f Sex, and
P sch olog ic M a n a g e m e n t," B u lletin o f t h e Jo h n s H op k in s H osp ital 9 7 (1 9 5 5 ): 2 8 4 - 3 0 0 .
T h e m a jo r c r itic s of M o n e y 's th e o ry and rec o m m en d a tio n s arc M ilto n D ia m o n d and
H . K eith Sig m u n d so n . S e e D iam on d and Sig m u n d so n , " S e x R eassig n m en t a t B irth ."
M a n y believe n o w th a t M o n e y 's ap p roach h a s been d iscred ited . S e e a lso H ird and
G e rm o n , " T h e In tersex u a l Body and th e M ed ical R egu lation o f G en d er," 1 7 9 - 2 0 3 .
152 TUST LOVE
som e scholars, n ot w ithout controversy, to identify w hat they call

a "third se x ."7S T h is differs, at least in som e cases, from intersex
in that it does n ot refer necessarily to a sexually formed body but
m ore specifically to a social role. Gender for a third sex is n ot one
(m an or woman), and n ot always two (intersexed m an and woman),
but more often neither w om an nor m an. Examples include hijras in
India,79 b er d a c h e s 80 in traditional N ative A m erican societies, and the
g u ev ed o ce in the D om inican Republic,81 A hijra is a m ale according
to chrom osom al make-up and anatomy, w ho is im potent and who
is thought to receive a call from a m other goddess to dress and act
like a w om an, as well as to undergo removal of m ale genitals. Some
hijras can be chrom osom ally and anatom ically fem ales who do not
m enstruate. In either case, hijras are considered to be vehicles of
divine power w ho live and act as such in the com m unity.82
B erdaches, m ale or female, are not only accepted m em bers of their
com m unities; they enjoy special respect. T h e honor attributed to
their social role is n ot m easured in standard ways by gender. T h e
productive specializations of b erd a ch es tend in traditional Native
A m erican com m unities to involve dom estic work and crafts for both
m ale and fem ale b erd ach es, though fem ales may be hunters and war
riors. T h ey are renowned for their spiritual powers — w hether as
visionaries or wise spiritual guides w ithin th e com m unity. T h ere is a
great deal of gender variation in th e behavior of individual berdaches.
Cross-dressing a t least used to be com m on though n ot universal;
sexual partnerships were generally sam e-sex but they could also be
bisexual and heterosexual. T h e prestige of th e b erd ach es, however,
is based m ore on th e religious dim ension of their role, along with
7 8 . S e e G ilb e r t H erdt, ed ., T h ird Sex, T h ird G e n d e r : B e y o n d S e x u a l D im o rp h ism in

C u ltu re a n d H istory (N ew York: Z o n e B o o k s, 1 9 9 4 ); C a rl E llio tt, "W h y C a n 't W e G o
O n a s T h r e e ? " H astin gs C e n te r R eport 2 8 (M a y -Ju n e 1 9 9 8 ): 3 6 - 3 9 .
7 9 . S e e S e re n a N an d a, " H ijr a s : A n A ltern ativ e S e x a n d G e n d e r R ole in In d ia ," in
H erdt, T h ird Sex ; T h ird G e n d e r , 3 7 3 - 4 1 7 .
8 0 . S e e W ill R o sco e , "H o w to B eco m e a B erdache: T ow ard a U n ified A n aly sis of
G en d er D iv e rsity ," in H erd t, T h ird Sex, T h ird G e n d e r , 3 2 9 - 7 2 .
8 1 . J u lia m c Im p c r a to -M c G in lc y c ta l., "A ndrogens and th e E volu tion o f M a lc-G en d er
Id entity' a m o n g M a le P seu d oh erm ap h rod ites w ith 5-alp h a R cd u cta sc D eficien cy ," N e w
E nglan d Jo u rn a l o f M ed icin e 3 0 0 (1 9 7 9 ): 1 2 3 5 - 3 6 , a s citcd in E llio tt, " W h y C a n 't We
G o O n as T h re e ?" 36.
8 2 . N an d a, " H ijr a s : A n A ltern a tiv e S e x and G e n d e r R ole in In d ia ," 3 7 9 - 8 0 .
their econom ic success, than it is on their assumed gender identi

ties.83 T h is m eans, however, that their gender identities are accepted
as part of w ho they arc in the community.
G u ev ed o ce are children whose physical sexual ambiguity at birth
leads th em to be identified and reared as girls but who at puberty
develop less ambiguous m ale sex organs and secondary sexual char
acteristics. A s scientists in the 1970s determined, these children
have a rare deficiency of testosterone m etabolism called 5-alpha-
reductase deficiency syndrome. T h ey are genetically XY, but at birth
they present as sexually ambiguous. W hen it becom es visible at
puberty that th ey are "really" boys, they appear to change their gen
der identity w ithout m uch difficulty, w hich provides support for the
m uch debated position th at it is biology th at m atters, n ot rearing.84
G ilbert H erdt has argued, to the contrary, that the change is eas
ier for these adolescents than it m ight be for their counterparts in
other cultures precisely because they live in a culture which, despite
a strong em phasis on the binary m ale/fem ale physical and social gen
der m odel, have nonetheless developed a concept of a "third sex ."85
H ence, the g u ev ed o ce move from a stigmatized identity that is am
biguously fem ale, to a preferred one w hich is male, but they rem ain
som ething else, som ething that represents an alternative to the two
genders, m ale and fem ale. T h is may indeed be a "third gender," but
it m ay also m ean th at here arc individuals whose gender sim ply docs
not matter.
T h ere arc also persons who may be unambiguously m ale or female
in term s of chrom osom es, horm ones, and anatomy, but who are cer
tain th a t their gender identity is at odds w ith their biological sex,
at odds with their bodies. Hence, in the hum an com m unity there
are transsexuals; or better, there are transgendered persons, w hich
is a broader designation that can include cross-dressing and other
8 3 . R o sco e, " H o w to B e co m e a B erd a c h e," p assim . I u se th e p re sen t te n s e in sp e ak

in g o f b e r d a c h e s , sin c e th e ir trad itio n did no t sto p w ith th e m ove of N ativ e A m erican s
to t h e reserv a tio n stage o f th e ir history.
8 4 . E llio tt, " W h y C a n 't W e G o O n a s T h r e e ? " 3 6 .
8 5 . H erd t, "M is ta k e n S e x : C u ltu re , B iology and th e T h ir d S e x in N ew G u in e a ," in
H erdt, ed ., T h ird Sex, T h ird G e n d e r , 4 1 9 - 4 5 . H e rd t draw s co m p ariso n s b etw een the
D o m in ic a n R ep u b lic exp erien ce and th a t of t h e S a m b ia of Papua N ew G u in ea.
154 TUST LOVE
form s of gender identity change86. T h e goal for transsexuals is n ot a

new kind of gender but only a change from the sexual body of their
birth, w hether m ale or female, to the sexual body needed by their
psyche, w hether m ale or female. Transsexuality does n ot necessarily,
therefore, call into question th e m ale/fem ale binary, but in fact can
reinforce it, even though the alignm ent of transsexuals w ith cross
dressers and others has brought with it greater interest in flexibility
of categories o f gender. Here arc persons w hose experience tells them
that gender identity is fixed, unchangeable, and so im portant that if
it docs not correspond with anatomy, then anatom y m ust change.87
Transsexu als may have been around a long tim e, too, but the
possibilities o f actually transform ing bodies from one biological sex
to another depended on developments in contem porary medicine.
W hile intersexed persons are beginning to resist surgery as a remedy
for anything that has to do w ith them , transsexuals have become
m ore assertive in demanding the surgery they believe is appropri
ate for them . In the 1950s the first sex reassignm ent surgery was
performed in the U nited States, and it brought resistance from the
medical co m m u n ity — resistance to the idea of removing tissue or or
gans that are perfectly healthy.88 T h e availability of this surgery grew
in the 1960s, however, and increased after th a t.89 At the sam e time,
the broader category of transgender includes transsexuals — some
who w ant surgery, som e who do n ot — but also individuals who are
not looking for change between sexes. T h ey w ant som ething other
8 6 . For a so cio lo g ica l d escrip tion o f th e m e a n in g s th a t c a n be inclu ded in th e

te rm "tran sg en d er/ ' s e e R ich ard E k in s a n d D a v e K ing, "T e llin g Body T ran sg en d crin g
S to rie s ," in C on stru ctin g G e n d e r e d B o d ies , ed. M ilb u rn and M c K ie ," 1 8 0 .
8 7 . F o r a v ery u sefu l resou rce o n tran ssexu ality , s e e lo a n n e M ey erow itz, H o w S ex
Changed: A History o f Transsexuality in the United States (C a m b rid g e, M A : H arvard
U n iv e rsity Press, 2 0 0 2 ) .
8 8 . T h e r e h a v e b e e n s o m e an alo g ies draw n b etw een s e x reassig n m en t su rg ery and
th e k in d o f su rg ery req u ested by ind iv id uals w ith "bod y in teg rity id en tity d is o rd e r" —
th a t is, in d iv id u als wrh o are p sy ch olo gically driven to have a rm s o r legs o r fin gers, e tc.,
a m p u tated . O n e o b je ctio n to th e analogy is th a t tra n sse x u a ls w an t a ch an g e fro m on e
"n o rm a l s ta te " t o a n o th e r |that is, from o n e s e t o f sex u al organs to an o th er), w hereas
th o se w h o w an t to b e am p u tees go fro m a n o rm al sta te to an ab n o rm a l state.
8 9 . A t first, i t w a s o n ly Jo h n M o n ey and colleagues, again a t Jo h n s H o p k ins, w h o
co u ld provide t h is surgery in new and m o re so p h isticated w ays, alon g w ith criteria,
req u irem en ts fo r can d id ates, and pre- a n d p o st-o p erativ e h o rm o n a l tre a tm e n ts. T h e
su rg ical te c h n iq u e s are no w m o re broad ly rep resen ted in th e U n ited S ta tes.
than these, o r in the middle of these, and in fact reject the either/or of
Western gender system s. O nce again, the stories of persons' lives are
m ore com plex than labels can accom m odate.90 Even w hen transsex
uals w ant to change bodily identity, surgically and otherwise, they do
so in a way th a t their deepest personal identity does n ot change; they
understand them selves, after all, as seeking to becom e more wholly
them selves. I am reminded of th e deeply poignant scene in the film,
N orm al, w hen the husband (who is in the process of changing his
body to a w om an's body) says to h is wife, "It's me. I'm still here";
and she still loves him , for "h e is my heart, he is my heart, he is my
h eart," she tells an uncom prehending m inister.91
No one ought here pass judgment on any configurations of gender.
In fact, this is m y point. O nce w c sec other possibilities for gen
dering, gender is itself rendered at once m ore im portant and less.
It is more im portant for those who m ust struggle to discover their
gender identity and com e to be at hom e in it. It is less important
as a way to exclude som e identities from th e circle of our com m on
humanity. T h e sam e can be said w hen wc exam ine the supposed
differences between wom en and m en — differences other than chro
m osom al, horm onal, and anatom ical — gender rem ains important,
9 0 . E v en t h e d e scrip tio n "g en d er qu eer," w h ich is claim ed by m a n y tod ay a s a w ay of

c o m m u n ic a tin g a r e je ctio n o f all cu ltu rally im posed id en tities, d oes no t w ork for every
o n e . C o n c re te sto r ie s o f p e rso n s' liv es a rc perhaps, o n c e again, th e b e st w ay to co m e
to in sig h ts in to h u m a n exp erien ces. W c have had t h e w ell k n o w n sto rie s of C h ristin e
Jo rg en sen , R e n ee R ich ard s, and m o re recen tly of Jen n ifer F in n ey B oy lan , a s w ell a s d e
scrip tio n s of in d iv id u al and fam ily stru ggles to d eal w ith s e x ch an g e o r g en d er id en tity
ch a n g e. Sec th e p o ig n an t and graceful sto ry o f fo rm erly Ja m e s B oy lan , a no v elist, w h o
b e ca m e Je n n y B o y la n : Je n n ife r F in n ey B oy lan , S h e ’s N o t T h ere : A L ife in T w o G en d ers
(N ew York: B road w ay B o o k s, 2 0 0 3 ) . S e e a lso th e sto rie s of o th ers (th e le ss co m m o n
fem ale to m a le tra n s se x u a ls) to ld by the n o v elist and p sy ch oth erap ist, A m y B lo o m , in
N o rm a l: T ra n ssex u a l C E O ’s , C rossdressin g C op s, a n d H erm a p h ro d ites W ith A ttitude
(N ew York: R a n d o m H o u se, 2 0 0 2 ) . A nd see th e very u sefu l s e t of sto rie s a s w ell as
in te rp re ta tio n o f th e sto rie s overall in E k in s and K ing, "T e llin g Body T ran sg cn d erin g
S to rie s ," 1 8 3 - 9 9 . H ere th e sto ry o f the tran ssex u al is s e e n a s a n in s ta n ce o f th e a rch ety
pal sto ry t h a t b e g in s w ith su fferin g, m ov es through epiph any and new u n d erstand ing ,
in clu d es a d esire for a ctio n , and leads to tra n sfo rm a tio n .
9 1 . I a m rem in d ed also of C a ro lin e W alker B y n u m ’s stu d y of ta lc s o f "m e ta m o r
p h o sis," fro m Chad to t h e m cd icv als to a co n tem p o rary w riter. B y n u m is trying to
un d erstand w h a t it m e a n s for ou r b o d ies t o ch an g e, ev en d rastically. S h e argues finally
th a t w h ile c h a n g e is a stag g ering fact, th ere is n o story i f th ere is o n ly ch an g e w ith ou t
c o n tin u ity B y n u m , M eta m o rp h o sis a n d Id en tity (N ew York: Z o n e B o o k s, 2 0 0 1 ).
156 TUST LOVE
but it becom es less im portant — certainly for the social roles wc

aspire to play.
W hether G e n d e r Matters
I return to th e question with which I began our exploration of gender:
w hether and how m uch gender should matter. I hope m y own answer
is at least som ew hat clear. Gender m atters, indeed; yet gender also
does not m a tte r Let m e try to say, in summary, what I m ean by
these apparently paradoxical (but not contradictory) statem ents. I
begin with the negative: gender does not matter, ought n o t to matter,
in certain respects.
T h ere are three ways in w hich I w ant to argue, finally, th at gen
der ought n ot to matter, or at least ought not to m atter so much.
( 1 ) G ender ought n ot to divide us, one from another. W hen we look
across creation, and across unfortunate gender divides, we are after
all m ore alike than different. Gender wars would ccase if w c saw
that we are n ot "opposite" sexes but persons w ith som ewhat differ
ent (but, in fact, very similar) bodies. T h is is a significant reason why
we are m em bers of the hum an com m unity. Moreover, gender gives
us no reason to judge other embodied hum ans as "abject bodies"
(to use Judith Butler's term 92); it provides no justification for dom i
nance over o n e another, or for exclusion, sham ing, or doing violence
to other hum an bodies. W hatever the forces and powers of culture
and society, they m ust be disarmed insofar as they make u s lose sight
of what we share.
(2) T h e solution to the gender divide, however, does n ot lie in an
uncritical n otion of "com plem entarity." N o one of u s is com plete as
a person, and maybe n ot even as a gendered person. Yet w hen all de
term inations of, for example, m asculine and fem inine "traits" prove
nonuniversal; w hen these characterizations of w hat is norm atively a
wom an or a m an prove deeply culturally constructed; w hen women,
for example, do not find them selves in th e descriptions of th e traits
they arc supposed to represent; then wc m ust sec these characteriza
tions as w hat they are: social and cultural stereotypes that promote
hierarchical relations, and that do not, in th e end, succeed in making
9 2 . Butler, B w lie s T h at M atter, ch a p tc r 6.

u s com plem ents across a gender divide. T o say that we arc incom
plete in ourselves does n ot m ean th at we are "halves" of persons
who will be "w hole" only w hen we find our gendered com plem ent.
We may indeed long for union w ith another, for a kind of wholeness
that com es from both a profound love and a sharing of our lives. G en
der by itself h as never guaranteed we will find w hat we seek. Rather,
as the poet R ainer M arie Rilke once wrote, we m ust move toward a
tim e w hen "th ere will be girls and women whose name will no longer
signify m erely an opposite of th e m asculine, but som ething in itself,
som ething that makes one think n ot of any com plem ent and limit,
but only of life and existence."93
(3) Gender may have im portance, but it is n ot in the differentiation
of roles. T h is is an argument that is easier to m ake in the twenty-
first century th an in th e past. T h ere are still many, however, who do
not understand it and are not persuaded by it. Opposition to it com es
generally from those who are still convinced of gender com plem entar
ity: w hat applies to persons in term s of gender applies, they believe,
to roles. In response, it m ust be said that there are indeed differences
am ong us, b u t they cannot be reduced to gender. W hat differences
there arc between wom en and m en arc n ot differences that justify
gender-specific variations in a right to education, to work, to partic
ipation in political life, to ju st wages, to a share in th e burdens and
responsibilities of family, society, and church. W hat is a t stake, then,
is the structure of institutions — from the family to the state, from
business corporations to universities and churches. T h e removal of
restrictions to roles that are based solely on gender requires and has
to som e exten t brought about a political as well as a m oral revolution.
T h ere arc also three ways in w hich gender certainly docs m at
ter. (1) A ttention m ust be paid to the struggles of individuals and
societies to address precisely the problems of gender. T h is is why
"gender analysis" is necessary for all of our social structures, situ
ations, and patterns of relating. We cannot simply cover over the
93. R a in e r M a r ie R ilk e, L etters t o a Young P oet , tra n s. M . D . I I . N o rto n (N ew York:

1 9 6 2 ), 5 9 . I a m n o t su re R ilk e 's view w ou ld fit co m p letely a fe m in is t view o f today,
b u t it is a p o e tic ren d erin g o f t h e need fo r every g en d er t o be consid ered w h o le in itself;
so th a t in so fa r a s g en d er sig n als p o te n tia l re la tio n , it w ill be o f tw o w h o les, n o t two
halves.
158 TUST LOVE
wounds that have been inflicted or the vulnerabilities that continue

to exist, w hether in m an/w om an gender conflicts or in the lack of
interest, understanding, and acceptance of those who deal with al
ternative gender identities. T h is m eans that we m ust work toward
societies th a t will understand the im portance of biology and the
im portance o f culture, but that will n ot yield every question about
gender either to biological or cultural determ inism .
(2) G ender m atters in hum an relationships, especially in ones of
in tim ate love. I do not refer here only to gender and genitals, but
to the whole bodies of persons who com e together in th e gestures
of love. W h en wom en-persons and m en-persons, or persons of the
sam e sex, or persons of unspecified sex, com e together in respect,
love, passion, or tenderness, it m atters to each of th em who the other
is — in respect to gender and in every other respect. Gender identity
in this con text can be causc for célébration.94 Gender also m atters in
nonsexual h u m an relationships and h um an endeavors, if for no other
reason th an th a t wom en and m en are still socialized very differently.
They thus som etim es do bring different experiences to relation and
action, experiences that enrich or correct one an oth er's contribution.
(3) Finally, we do n ot know fully what it m eans that in th is world
and the next "th ere is no longer m ale and fem ale." We do n ot know, in
other words, w hat transcendence will finally m ean for gender. Gender
still m atters in this world, so we can expect that it will m atter in the
next. If so, it will n ot be burdened by this world's stereotypes nor this
world's judgm ents of w hat we ought to w clcom c or cxcludc, celeb rate
or m ourn. In a new world we will not m istake lim ited possibility for
unlim ited; we will not m ake strangers out of our differences; we will
not cxpcct cith e r too m uch or too little from our identities as women
or m en. For now, we have eyes th at do n ot yet see as far as a world
with gender transform ed, and ears that do n ot yet hear of what is
prepared for u s. Yet also for now, som e things are demanded of us in
term s of our justice and our care for one another in w hat can be a
better gendered world.
94. I d o n o t h ere m e a n to preclu de situ a tio n s in w h ich resp ect, love, p a ssio n , o r
ten d ern e ss are e ith e r m issin g , m isju d g ed , o r d istorted. C learly w h en th is is t h e case,
g en d er m ay b e c a u s e fo r d estru ctio n . I p o stp on e co n sid era tio n s o f th is to th e n e x t
ch ap ters.
Sexu ality and Its M eanings
If our historical and cross-cultural considerations of sexual ethics in

previous chapters and our explorations of em bodim ent and gender
in this chapter have served us well, we do not start from zero in
our thinking about th e m eanings of sexuality. T h e term itself is rel
atively new (appearing in English dictionaries only since the early
nineteenth century). Its m eaning in the abstract rem ains difficult to
identify, despite the dictionaries. I take it here to include everything
that pertains to th e sexual — in th e sense of sexual desires and loves,
feelings, em otions, activities, relationships. As such, sexuality can
have physical, psychological, em otional, intellectual, spiritual, per
sonal, and social dim ensions. W hen we ask about its m eanings, we
can include individual, relational, species, and cosm ic m eanings, pri
vate and public m eanings, biological and cultural m eanings. Sex can
refer to genital and non-genital sex, sex with or w ithout desire, sex
with or w ithout pleasure. T h e aim s and goals of sex and sexuality in
clude, but do n o t necessarily reduce to, the aim s and goals com m only
thought to be in trin sic to sexual desire or sexual activity.
W h en we co m e to ask about the m eanings of sexuality, it is hard
not to recall Foucault's questions in its regard. T h a t is, how did con
temporary W estern culture com e to believe that sexuality is the key
to individual identity? How did sex becom e m ore im portant than
love, and alm o st m ore im portant th an life? G iven the sexualization
of our societies, the desire for sex is m atched by the desire to under
stand it, to find or to produce the truth about it. "W h at is peculiar to
m odern so c ie tie s. . . [is that] they dedicated them selves to speaking
of it [sex] a d in fin itu m , while exploiting it as th e secret."95
One would think that after Foucault's own search into the history
of sexual desire, and the m assive literature it generated in response,
we would finally now understand sexuality; we would have uncov
ered its secrets. But historical studies still proliferate, and scientific
research tu rns in the direction of sex more often than ever before.96
9 5 . F ou cau lt, T h e H istory o f S ex u ality , vol. 1: A n In trod u ctio n |Ncw York: P an
th e o n B ooks, 1 9 7 8 ) , 3 5 and p a ssim . S e e m y id en tifica tio n o f th e s e q u e stio n s above in
ch a p te r 2.
9 6 . Im p o rta n t h isto rica l w ork s n o t previously cited in clu d e: P hilipp e A riès and
A nd rć B ć jin , e d s., W estern S exu ality: P ra ctice a n d P recep t in Past a n d P resen t T im es,
160 TUST LOVE
Philosophies and theologies of sex are as num erous as those of the

body or of gender.97 T h e fact that we still do not understand th e "sex
ual" fits well w ith our contem porary recognition that so m uch of the
m eaning of body, gender, sex, and sexuality is socially and histori
cally constructed. Hence, experiences of sexuality will vary n ot only
from individual to individual but in significant ways from culture
to culture and across tim e.98 T h is is why I do n ot here attem pt a
definition of hum an sexuality. Yet descriptions of varied experiences
have enough in com m on to be generally recognized (at least today)
as "sexu al." Perhaps the only way to understand this is to m ull over
the multiple elem en ts that m ay be integral even if not distinctively
essential to sexual experiences.
tra n s. A n th o n y F o rste r (O xford: B lack w ell, 1 9 8 2 ); Jeffrey W eeks, S ex u a lity a n d Its D is
c o n te n ts : M ean in g s, M yths a n d M od ern S ex u a lities (Lond on: R ou tled g c & K cgan Paul,
1 9 8 5 ); L esley D c a n -Jo n c s , " T h e P o litics o f P leasu re: F em ale S e x u al A ppetite in th e H ip
p o cratic C o rp u s ," in D iscou rses o f S ex u ality : From A ristotle to AID S, ed. D o m n a C .
S ta n to n (A nn A rb or: U n iv ersity o f M ich ig a n P ress, 1 9 9 5 ); D av id A llyn, M a k e Love,
N o t War: T h e S e x u a l R ev o lu tion : A n U n fetter ed H istory (B o ston : L ittle, Brow n, 2 0 0 0 ) ;
L aw rence S to n e , " S e x in th e W est: T h e S tran g e H isto ry o f H u m a n S e x u ality ," T h e
N e w R ep u b lic 1 9 3 (July 8 , 1 9 8 5 ): 2 5 - 3 7 ; T im o th y Taylor, T h e P reh istory o f S e x (New
York: B a n ta m B o o k s , 1 9 9 6 ); G iu sep p e B cn ag ian o , G ia n C a rlo D i R enzo, E rm clan d o V.
C o sm i, c d s., T h e E volu tion o f t h e M ean in g o f S ex u a l In terco u rse in t h e H u m a n (Rom e:
In te rn a tio n a l In s titu te fo r th e Stu d y o f M a n , 1 9 9 6 ); R oy P orter and L esley H all, T h e
Facts o f Life: T h e C reation o f S ex u a l K n o w led g e in Britain, 1 6 5 0 -1 9 5 0 (N ew H aven,
C T : Yale U n iv e r sity P ress, 1 9 9 5 ). In te re stin g sc ie n tific stu d ies n o t previou sly cited :
S h aro n K. T u r n b u ll, "S e x T h e ra p y a n d Sex R esearch : S c ie n tific and C lin ic a l P erspec
tiv e s," in E n cy clop ed ia o f B io eth ic s, rev. ed., 5 : 2 3 4 8 - 5 1 ; T i m B irkh ead , P rom iscu ity:
A n E v olu tion ary H istory o f S p erm C o m p e titio n (C am brid ge, M A : H arvard U niv ersity
Press, 2 0 0 0 ) ; G eo ffrey M iller, T h e M ating M ind: H o w S ex u a l C h o ic e S h a p e d tlie E v olu
tion o f H u m a n N a tu re (N ew York: D oublcday, 1 9 9 9 ); M a rle n e Z u k , S ex u a l S electio n s:
W hat W e C a n a n d C an 't L earn A b o u t S ex fr o m A n im a ls (Berkeley: U n iv e rsity o f C alifo r
n ia Press, 2 0 0 1 1 ; H e le n Fisher, W hy W e L o v e : T h e N a tu re a n d C h e m is tr y o f R o m a n tic
L o v e (N ew York: H enry H o lt, 2 0 0 3 ) ; N ile s Eldredge, W hy W e D o It: R eth in k in g S ex
a n d t h e S elfish G e n e (N ew Y ork: W. W. N o rto n , 2 0 0 3 1 .
9 7 . A s ev id en ce o f th is, see th e m a n y u se fu l an th o lo g ies, su ch as: A la n Soble,
cd., T h e P h ilo so p h y o f S ex : C o n tem p o ra ry R ead in g s, 4 t h cd . (N ew York: R ow m an &
L ittlefield , 2 0 0 2 ) ; S o b le, ed ., S ex , L o v e, a n d F rien dship: S tu dies o f t h e S o ciety fo r th e
P h ilo so p h y o f S e x a n d L o v e 1 9 7 7 -1 9 9 2 (A m sterd am : E d itio n s Rodopi, 1 9 9 7 ); Ja m e s B.
N elso n and S a n d ra P. Longfellow , ed s., S ex u ality a n d th e S a cred : S o u r ces fo r T h eo lo g i
c a l R eflectio n (L o u isv ille: W e stm in ste r Jo h n K no x, 1 9 9 4 ) ; Earl E. Sh clp , ed ., S ex u ality
a n d M ed icin e, 2 v o ls . (D ord rech t: D . R cid cl, 1 9 8 7 ).
9 8 . T h is a c c o u n ts fo r t h e v alu in g of person al sto rie s su ch a s th e o n e s recorded of
n in e te e n A frican A m e rica n w o m en in T r ic ia R o se, Longin g to Tell: B la c k W om en T alk
a b o u t S ex u a lity a n d In tim a c y (N ew York: Farrar, S trau s & G iro u x, 2 0 0 3 ) .
Elem ents in S exu al E xp erien ce

If sexuality involves anything at all, it involves em b o d im en t; even
phone sex involves th e body if it really is experienced as sexual. Yet
sexuality is embodied in multiple ways. Som etim es only genitals and
erogenous zo n es— w hich vary according to cu ltu re " — arc involved,
som etim es th e whole body. Som etim es the body as a whole is in
volved but either with or without special attention to genitals or other
erogenous parts of the body. Som etim es the role of the body is very
different — as in sex experienced between sexual partners and, for
example, m aternal feelings of som e m others as they nurse their in
fants. Som etim es inexplicit sexuality perm eates relationships — both
private and public — sim ply because powerful embodied, gendered
personalities awaken w holeness of engagement and response.
E m otions also seem in trin sic to sexuality, whether em otions of
love, desire fo r pleasure, or desire for union with another person. Yet
loves and desires can be extrem ely diverse in sexual experiences —
selfish or unselfish, angry or jealous, rom antic or w ithout romance,
passionate or steady, m ature or im m ature, promised or uncom m it
ted. Prim ary em otions may reflect experiences of em powerm ent and
freedom on th e one hand, or vulnerability on th e other. They may
be m ore closely tied to the perceived consequences of sexual activity
than to the activity itself (conscqucnccs ranging from a desired ex
pansion of o n e's own personality, future bonding w ith one's lover, the
possibility of creating new life, or feared consequences such as u n
wanted pregnancy or disease). Diverse feelings and em otions related
to sex can include pleasure and pain, joy and sadness, peacefulness
and anger, a sense of well-being and a sense of sham e. Experiences of
a totally indifferent partner, or of prostitutes, or of victim s of sexual
assault may be largely em otionless, or m arked by em otions radi
cally different from those com m only associated with the meaning
of se x .100
99. In s o m e so cie tie s b re a sts, fo r e xam p le, are e ro tic, b u t in o th e r c u ltu re s th ey are
n o t; h e n ce in t h e la tte r th ere is n o w is h o r n eed to h id e them ,· th e y are sim p ly taken
for gran ted in c o m m u n a l living situ atio n s.
100. A t le a st o n e o f th e s e exam p les, se x u a l assa u lt, leads to t h e c o n clu s io n th a t the
e x p e rie n ce is n o t a sex u al exp erien ce; it is an cx p cricn ce of v io len t atta ck , and th e
e m o tio n s o f th e o n e attack ed w ill n o t be " s e x u a l" b u t th o se e m o tio n s th a t c h aracterize
b ein g v iolated. T h i s c o n clu s io n is sig n ifica n t, s in c e it d isallow s all so rts o f ju d g em en ts
162 TUST LOVE
Despite all of this diversity, sex is som ehow embodied, and it has a
range of recognizable constitutive em otions. Moreover, in m ost sex
ual experiences (though n ot all) pleasu re is a key com ponent. T h is
is one reason sexual activity can be desired for its own sake; plea
sure is a good in itself (though n ot all traditions have thought this,
and it rem ains for us to consider w hether sexual pleasure is in every
context and circum stance an overall, or moral, good). Following the
focus of researchers such as M asters and Johnson, it has been co m
m only thought (and promoted by popular media) that "successful"
sex and sexual pleasure are to be measured in term s of orgasm s.101
Indeed, overwhelm ingly passionate sexual activity that produces or
gasm s certainly represents one of life's m ost acute and treasured
form s of pleasure; yet it is n ot the whole of the pleasurable possibili
ties of sexuality, nor even necessarily their height. Sex and th e sexual
involve, or can involve, multiple forms and dim ensions of pleasure —
or in a broader sense, enjoym ent. Physiological pleasure (and the
zest for life th a t can com e from this), psychological pleasure, spiri
tual pleasure, the pleasures of mutuality, bonding, transcendence: All
of these kinds of pleasure can be part of sexual experience — either
constitutive o f the experience or an accom panim ent to it.
Sex has also been considered a form of language a n d social
co m m u n ica tio n .102 Pleasure and com m unication arc n ot mutually
exclusive; th e one need n ot be an obstacle to the other. For w hat sex
com m unicates can be pleasure itself, as well as passionate love, de
sire, trust, com passion, poignant sweetness in relation, gratitude, joy,
hope and prom ise for future relation. (It can also express and co m
m unicate co n flict — as Sartre thought — or anger, em barrassm ent,
possessiveness, subm ission.) T h e language of sex can articulate
many things, including a desire for fruitfulness in a shared love.
su ch a s " s h e w as a sk in g fo r it," o r th e perp etrator "w as sim p ly d riven to have s e x ." O n

th e o th e r h an d , e v e n th is e x p e rien ce involves in s o m e se n se th e " s e x u a l," w h ich is w hy
th e tra u m a inv o lv ed is so radical.
1 0 1 . S e e W illia m 11. M a s te rs and V irg in ia E. Jo h n so n , H u m a n S ex u a l R esp on se
(B o sto n : L ittle, B ro w n , 1 9 6 6 ).
1 0 2 . S e c t h e in te re s tin g co n v ersa tio n betw een R obert So lo m o n and Ja n icc M o u lton
o n th is a sp e ct o f sexuality. R obert S o lo m o n , "S e x u a l P arad ig m s," in T h e P hilosophy
o f S ex , ed. A la n S o b le, 3rd ed. (B o sto n : R o w m an & L ittlefield , 1 9 9 7 ), 2 1 - 3 0 ; Jan ice
M o u lto n , " S e x u a l Behavior: A n o th er P o sitio n ," ibid., 3 1 - 3 8 .
T h e m eanings of sex and sexuality in the past emphasized its pro-

creative aim along with the aim of union between two persons. Today
w hen we focus on the significance of sex in itself, alm ost for its own
sake — depending on w hether som e of its aim s are considered in
trinsic to it — the procreative dim ension of its action and its goals
is often relegated to som ething alm ost extrinsic to sexual love and
activity. It is true that sexuality h as m ultiple possibilities beyond its
reproductive capabilities and design, and even when it is procreative,
the focus of attention in the im m ediate experience of sexual activ
ity is, as Lisa Sowie C ahill h as said, "m uch m ore likely to be one's
own sexual cxpcriencc and that of one's partner, and the physical and
affective relation of the couple, rather than the likelihood of concep
tio n ."103 N onetheless, as Cahill goes on to argue, if we are to take
account of all of the m eanings of sex, we m ust include its capabil
ity for procreation. T h is is obvious when we consider the meaning
of sex for the hum an species as well as for individuals w ho w ant to
parent children. Although, like th e other aspects of sexuality, procre
ation need n o t and cannot, given considerations of actual fertility,
be part of every sexual experience, it is an utterly significant part of
som e. And in these experiences it is possible that m eanings o f sexu
ality com e together— in passion, tenderness, and a love so full that
sexuality m ediates new being.
As I have already suggested, the m otivations an d aim s of sex are as
m ultiple as are its form s of em bodim ent and pleasure. For different
individuals and on different occasions these can include a desire to
enhance self-esteem , drive out depression and despair, express love
and faithfulness, sustain a relationship or a marriage that is w ith
out m utual love, repay favors, escape into recreation and play, reveal
one's in tim ate self and attain access to the in tim ate self of another,
earn a living, and on and on. We shall have to assess these aim s, but
for now the goal is dcscriptivc n ot norm ative.
Pow er is often associated w ith sexuality — w ith its aim s, forms,
and m otivations. Sex offers the possibility for individuals to exer
cise power over one another, and for society to garner its forces for
103. L isa So w ie C a h ill, " O n th e C o n n e c tio n o f S e x to R ep ro d u ctio n ," in S exu ality

a n d M ed icin e, cd . Earl E . Sh elp , 2 : 3 9 - 5 0 .
164 TUST LOVE
or against individuals and groups. T h e kind of power ov er sexual

ity that Foucault and others have found m ost significant, however,
is th e power to "norm alize" sex according to social and cultural in
terests and expectations, the power to make sex conform to certain
values. T h is, as we have seen, is the power of largely hidden social
and cultural forces to produce sexuality and sex (to awaken it and
shape the directions it takes). " In a sense power works on sex more
deeply than we can know, n ot only as an external constraint or repres
sion but as th e formative principle of its intelligibility."104 T h is is a
power (or powers) to determ ine the m eaning of sexuality in our lives,
to m ake it central or m arginal to our identities. Socially constructed
m eanings are n ot unim portant ju st because they are constructed and
n ot embedded in our beings from the beginning.
Simply to nam e diverse sexual m eanings and their probable
sources and grounds can leave u s w ithout m uch to go on w hen it
com es to a sexual ethic. Hence, as a prelim inary step toward more
norm ative considerations, we need to probe m ore deeply one of the
central elem ents in sexuality and sexual experience. We need to look
m ore carefully at the m eanings for sexual desire and love.
Love, D esire, a n d Sexuality
Just about everyone today thinks that sex has som ething to do with
love — som ewhere, somehow, for som e persons; or at least that this
is possible. S e x and sexual desire, of course, cannot be reduced to
or equated w ith sexual love. Moreover, it is always a risk to focus
on love in relation to sexuality since it tends to cscalatc the rhetoric
about love in ways that imply that sex, no m atter what, is always
about love — and about certain form s of love.
Despite these caveats, it is im portant to focus at som e point on
the m eanings of sexuality in relation to love. A t least in a C hris
tian context, this is reasonable, since com m andm ents and calls to
love are arguably at the heart of any C hristian ethic. From this per
spective, it is im portant to offer a rem inder of th e significance of
love. I do th is, initially, n o t by exam ining psychological, theologi
104. T eresa d e L au retis, "F reu d , Sexuality, and P erv ersio n ," in D iscou rses o f S ex u a l
ity, ed. D . S ta n to n , 3 4 9 .
cal, philosophical, biblical analyses of love. I begin only w ith some

rem inders of experiences of hum an interpersonal love — sexual and
nonsexual. W e need here to rem em ber an array of such experiences:
tender love as w hen a longtim e friend touches one's arm to express
sym pathetic understanding; sweetly m em orable love as w hen par
ents taking a drive w ith their children begin to sing the love songs of
their youth; endearing love as w hen a child offers a wild flower to her
grandmother; love as shared excitem ent and relief w hen colleagues
working intensely together on a treasured project collapse united in
satisfaction and fatigue. We need also to rem em ber experiences (vi
carious or our own) of fierce love, w hen separation between lovers is
like an arm being torn off; or "first love," w hen the whole world be
com es patterned w ith the color of love. We m u st rem em ber troubled
loves, w hen feelings arc disparate, or love becom es war, or insecurity
threatens to destroy the future of love. Insofar as w c can, wc m ust
remember, too, the love that dawns between persons from vastly dif
ferent cultures as they grow in m utual knowledge and respect. We
rem em ber courageous love, w hen parents struggle against those who
would be u njust to their child, or w hen co-believers challenge what
they consider distorted practices of faith. We rem em ber love's ex
perience of pcacc and of turmoil, of gentleness and of passion, of
wisdom and confusion, bitterness and respect, com panionship and
death, endurance and transcendent hope.
T h ese experiences and m any others like th em characterize the
fabric of our lives. All life is n ot love, but life's significance surely
depends on w hat we love. Like love in general, love conjoined with
sexuality can take m any form s. Consider the experiences described in
these two poem s by Am erican authors in the tw entieth centuiy. T h e
first is an excerpt, entitled "Aria," from D elm ore Schwartz's Kilroy’s
Carnival. I originally saw this text on a page opposite a photograph
of a m agnificent glass sculpture of two figures: a w om an and a man,
as beautiful as G reek gods, glorious and shining in naked strength
and splendor, standing in m utual embrace. T h e lines of the poem
are n ot gender assigned, and it does not really m atter w hich figure
speaks w hich lines (or for that matter, w hether the figures arc male
and female):
166 TUST LOVE
" — Kiss m e there where pride is glittering

Kiss m e where I am ripened and round fruit
Kiss m e wherever, however I am supple, bare and flare
(Let th e bell be rung as long as I am young:
le t ring and fly like a great bronze wing!)
U ntil I am shaken from blossom to root."
" — I'll kiss you wherever you think you are poor,
W herever you shudder, feeling striped or barred,
Because you think you are bloodless, skinny or marred:
U n til, until
your gaze has been stilled —
U ntil you are sham ed again no more!
I'll k iss you u n til your body and soul
th e m ind in the body being fulfilled —
Suspend their dread and civil w ar!"105
Taken on its own (without attem pting to interpret it in the con

text of the au th o r's life and writings but only in th e context of the
m eaning offered by the sculpture th at reflects it), the poem speaks
of embodied and inspirited love, expressing profound vulnerability
and acceptance, affirm ation of the sort that allows a loved one to be
whole. Together with the sculpture it inspired, it is a poem about one
aspect of sexual love.
T h e second poem, by Sybil P. Estess, is entitled "T h e W oman who
Married Her Brother-in-law." It tells a story which, like "Aria," is
about sexual love of a sort — though the storyteller denies that it is
about rom antic or erotic sexual love.
I was living happily in Boston when he called:

"W ill you fly on a crow 's back back to H ouston?"
"I don't love you — rom antically," I replied.

I am n ot pretty and do n ot speak well.
105. “A ria (from K ilro y 's C a rn iv a l)" by D clm o rc S ch w artz, fro m L ast a n d L ost P oem s,
co p y righ t © 1 9 6 2 T h e N ew R epublic. R eprinted by p e rm issio n o f N ew D irectio n s
P u b lish in g C orp.
"N o m atter/' he argued. "T h a t wall com e."

I returned, and we had a lovely courtship, then
wedding. W hen people ask m e, "D o you love

h im ?" I am honest: I say, "N o, but he is
th e best of good husbands so I can't com plain."

Forty years together and I never loved
m y first husband, either. M y background, I suppose;

it's m y background: undem onstrative.
I don't rem em ber m y m other kissing or

hugging m y brother, m y sister, or me.
She was sort o f . . . Victorian. But m y sister

and I were close anyway. Since I married
her husband, I moved into her old house, wear her

old clothes he never removed.
Last w eek was her birthday. I saw myself

buried with her, felt her in m y bones. But I,
who don't know about feelings, am content.

It hardly m atters at a ll.106
As I interpret it, the wom an who speaks in th is poem is not denying

love for her second husband, only rom antic love. Still, her affirmation
of him , and perhaps her sex w ith him , represent a kind of affection,
approval, and gratitude th at go beyond her words. We m ay w ish more
for her, but she herself does n ot com plain, and she is n ot unhappy;
she is, she says, contcnt.
It would be good to add other stories or poems of sexual love
here — steam ier perhaps, newer and younger perhaps, less happy
perhaps. But m y only point is to show that there arc varieties of sex
ual loves. No doubt som e are rom antic, and som e are not. No doubt
all rom antic loves are in som e way sexual, though they need n ot all
express them selves, or even desire to express them selves, in sexual
106. S y b il P. E ste ss, " T h e W o m an W h o M arried H e r B ro th er-in -law ," T h e N e w

R ep u b lic (Febru ary 2 9 , 1 9 8 8 }.
168 TUST LOVE
(especially gcnitally sexual) ways. But all sexual love need not be ro
m antic in th e ordinary sense of the term , as the poem above shows,
or as persons' lives show when they stabilize in a love deeper than
rom ance. W ith these com plexities in mind, we can look m ore closely
at love, ro m an tic love, sexual love, and the form s of desire th at may
flow from each.
Love, as I understand it, is sim ultaneously an affective response,
an affective way of being in union, and an affective affirm ation of
w hat is loved.107 T h is applies to love of m any different kinds of
objects — w hether personal or nonpersonal. It applies to love of na
ture, of food and drink, of soft m aterials and great drama and lilting
melodics. It applies to our loves of neighbors near and far, and to our
love of God. It m ay n ot be th e only way to define love, or even to
describe it — as we know from those who argue that "real" love is a
duty, or is reducible to th e deeds of love, or is a power that is not
ours but th a t sim ply flows through u s from God to objects whether
they are lovable or not. Although I do th in k that love as affective re
sponse to, u nion w ith, and affirm ation of w hat is loved is central to
the m eaning of every love, 1 need n ot insist on this here. I will, how
ever, presum e that this description of love fits well the kind of love
that I am focusing on in this context — that is, love that is somehow
sexual love. I t certainly fits love that is rom antic love.
First, then, sexual love and rom antic love do indeed involve an
affective ("em otion al," if you will)108 response because love is awak
ened by a beloved. T h e beloved, w hether knowingly or not, rcachcs
inside of us, figuratively speaking, and touches our capacity to love.
T h e positive affective powers or capabilities that we have w ithin us
are, in other words, specified and activated when we behold a lovable
object, or w hen we at least perceive lovable qualities, characteristics,
in the one w e love. It makes little sense to th in k of rom antic love,
1 0 7 . S e e Farley, P erson al C o m m itm e n ts , esp ecially ch a p ter 3 . S e e a lso Ju les J. T on er,

T h e E x p erien ce o f L o v e (W ashin g to n, D C : C o rp u s B ooks, 1 9 6 8 ).
1 0 8 . E m o tio n s c a n be equ ated w ith affectiv e resp on ses. T h e y o ccu r o n m o re than
o n e level — th a t is , o n a sen so ry level, w h ere th e y a rc m o re lik ely to b e experienced as
"fe elin g s" (a ffectiv e resp on ses th a t c o m e and go, w ith p h ysiological co n n e ctio n s); but
a lso a t th e level o f ra tio n a l resp on se, w here th ey have a cle a r co gn itive c o n te n t, and
w here th e y c a n en d u re d esp ite th e c o m in g and g oin g of feelin gs th a t acco m p an y th em .
and one can hope also sexual love, as love for w hat wc pcrccivc to be
in every way "u n lo vable."109
T h ere is som e mystery, of coursc, in our cxpcricncc of the possibil
ity of rom antic love for som e persons and n ot others — even though
we m ight perceive many, indeed all, other persons as in som e way
lovable. To love som e persons, even intensely, does n ot m ean that
we love, or are able to love, th em w ith a rom antic love, or a sexual
love. But w hen wc do love in any of these ways, it is because the
other som ehow awakens in us a response. Love, therefore, is in the
first instance receptive — of the lovableness of the other.
Second, love is itself a form of being united with who or what
is loved. T h is is often obscured by a m ore strongly felt desire for
union — to be w ith the beloved, to know the beloved better, to be
closer, to share with the beloved m ore deeply. Yet we do n ot desire
u nion w ith som eone wc do n ot already love. To love is already to be
w ithin the beloved in som e way, and to have th e beloved in one's
heart. I m ay be working closely w ith som eone, or sitting crunched
up against som eone in a crowded bus, but all the while m y m ind and
heart are in union with th e one I love who is far away. Loneliness
can be a form of desire for union w ith those w hom we love, but we
are n ot lonely for those we do not love. T h is kind of loneliness arises
from the love that is already a union, and it reveals to us the union
that is love itse lf.110
1 0 9 . T h e r e are th eo ries o f love, esp ecially C h ristia n love, th a t are b u ilt o n th e belief
th a t love is n o t g e n u in e ly love u n le ss i t is so oth er-cen tered th a t i t h a s n o ele m e n t
w h atso ev er o f resp o n se to w h a t is lovable. I n th ese th eo ries th e p o in t is th a t resp on se
to w h at is lo v a b le im p lies th a t th e lover is rewarded b y t h e b e a u ty o f th e beloved,
o r th a t love is co n d itio n a l o n th e "w o rth " o f th e beloved. W h ile th e s e in s ig h ts are
im p o n a n t, n o n e th e le s s th ere is a se n se in w h ich love o f th e "u n lo v a b le ," th e “n o t able
to be loved," is a co n tra d ictio n . If th e c o n c e rn is t h a t h u m an love g o forth to all persons
w ith o u t regard f o r th e ir obviou s attra ctiv e n e ss {w h ether p h ysical o r m oral), th e n it is
an im p o rta n t co n c e r n . If i t m ean s th a t w e do n o t care , o r try to see, th a t all person s
a rc indeed w o rth y of love (becau se G o d loves th e m , o r b ecau se p erso n s a s p erso n s arc
in trin sic a lly lovable in so m e profound se n se), th e n a co n tra d ictio n rem a in s. I stan d by
m y d e scrip tio n o f love a s a resp on se to th e lov ab len ess o f th e other, a lov ab len ess th a t I
behold o r a t le a s t a lo v ab lcn css in w h ich I believe. S e e Farley, P erson al C o m m itm e n ts,
2 9 -3 2 .
1 1 0 . I realize, o f c o u rsc, th a t th ere is a lso a fo rm of lo n elin ess th a t c h a ra cte riz e s no t
y ea rn in g fo r s o m e p a rticu lar p erso n w h o m we already lov e bu t, rather, th e em p tin ess
and y ea rn in g s im p ly fo r so m e o n e to love.
170 TUST LOVE
Finally, love is an internal action that is at once response to and

union w ith, but also affective affirm ation of the beloved. It is this as
pect of love th a t differentiates it from som e other affective responses,
such as hate. For hate is indeed also an affective response — not, of
course, to lovableness and to beauty but to w hat we perceive in an
other as in im ical to us (or to others w hom we love). And hate may
also give rise to a desire for greater union — all the better to harm or
destroy the o n e wc hate. But by love w c affectively affirm, not negate,
the other, fu st as we affirm som eone in knowledge ("you are," "you
are this or th a t"), so we affirm som eone in love. A ffective affirm ation,
however, goes beyond the affirm ation of knowing, for affectivity, at
least w hen it is in the form of love, engages m ore of ourselves than
does knowledge alone. By love we pick up our own being, so to speak,
and put it down in affirm ation of the beloved, though there arc ob
viously degrees of loving. T h e sign and test of this is that w c do the
deeds of love insofar as they are possible and called for. In and by love
I do not say sim ply "you are," but "I w ant you to be, and to be firm
and full in being."
T h e kind o f love we are m ost concerned w ith here is primarily the
kind we find in rom antic love or in the friendship that can com e as
rom antic love m atures. Despite my earlier qualifications, and for the
sake of simplicity, I am going to use the term "sexual love" to encom
pass these insofar as they have a sexual dim ension — w hether only
felt or acted upon. T h ese are loves that involve our whole affective
self in som e way, that engage u s deeply, often intensely, som etim es
passionately. As I have said before, there are loves like this that do
n ot have as a primary ingredient sexual attraction or an orientation
to physical sexual union. But they do involve em bodim ent in some
w ay— our ow n bodily dim ensions of affectivity and our delight in or
desire for bodily connection with th e one we love. W hether or not
such a love attem pts to touch the other; whether or not it speaks
its desires; w hether or n ot these desires are param ount in the expe
rience of love; sexual love (especially w hen it is rom antic, but even
w hen it is not) involves som e yearning to touch and be touched by
the beloved. T ou ch can m ean, though it need not, genital touching
or lips m eeting in a kiss; it may m ean only touching, or wishing
to touch, the hand of the other. Still, there is a relational bodily (in
im agination if n ot in physical fact] dim ension to sexual love.
Sexual love, like all love, gives rise to and is th e ground of desire —
for fuller u nion with, and greater affirm ation of, the beloved. Neither
sexuality as a whole nor sexual desire is to be explained solely in
term s of an indom itable biological and psychological drive for which
love and the object of love have no meaning. D espite the long history
of Western ideas th at focus on such a drive, and the rem aining views
that interpret sexuality still in this way (whether because it can be
so disruptive in hum an lives or because sex industries seem to thrive
011 this view), sexual desire is or can be m ore than this. Even Freud,
who has been so often blamed for m odern m echanistic interpreta
tions of sexuality, now has supporters who believe th at in his later
writings, he moved well beyond these view s.111 Sexuality in these
later writings has greater plasticity in object and aim . It is shaped by
experience — and, one m ust add, by culture, and by w hat happens
in hum an relationships. W hatever the biological aim s of sexuality,
they can be redirected or transform ed into genuine love for another
person, as w ell as sublim ated into the larger concerns of civilization.
Sexual desire rising from love m ay also be distinguished from
"lu st" in our ordinary use of this term . As we frequently understand
it, lust is a craving for sexual pleasure without any real affective re
sponse to, u nion w ith, or affirm ation of th e other. If there is any love
here, it is of oneself, for the sake of w hich som ething or som eone else
is "lusted after." T h e objects of lust in this sense are fungible, both
interchangeable and substitutable; they are whatever entices one in
sexually passionate ways. A lust for power is analogous to lust for sex
ual pleasure in that it can be satisfied by m any form s of achievement
of power, m an y "objects" that constitute situations of power.112
1 1 1 . Se e, fo r e x a m p le , E rn est W allw ork, P sychoan alysis a n d E th ics (N ew H av en, CT.

Yale U niv ersity P ress, 1 9 9 1 ) ; and Jo n a th a n Lear, O p en M in ded: W orking O u t t h e Logic
o f t h e S o u l (C am b rid g e, M A : H arvard U n iv e rsity Press, 1 9 9 8 ).
1 1 2 . It goes w ith o u t say in g th a t th e te rm " lu s t" m ay be u sed in le ss c o n strictiv e w ays,
a s in " lu s t fo r life ." If it m e a n s sim p ly a stro n g ly felt d esire, ev en se x u a l d esire, then
it m ay be cq u a ta b lc w ith "sex u a l d esire" a s I a m u sin g it — presupp osin g sex u al love.
B u t if it is used to m ea n , fo r exam p le, sim p ly feelin g sex u ally need y in a generalized
se n se; o r if it m e a n s d esire for sex u al c o n n e ctio n w ith an o b jectified (in n o w ay cared
for o r loved) o th er, th e n it is n o t w h a t I m e a n by se x u a l d esire. E ith er way, I a m n o t y et
su ggesting an e th ic a lly n o rm ativ e u n d erstan d in g o f sex u al d esire o r of lu st.
172 TUST LOVE
Sexual and rom antic desires and loves as I am describing them

are m ore like Plato's eros than Freud's, even though the new inter
pretations of Freud bring th em closer together. T h e love, erotic love,
that is the substance of D iotim a's speech in Plato's Sym posium is
personified as a com bination of poverty and plenty. She — or he, in
Plato's dialogue — experiences a lack of som ething until she encoun
ters beauty. T h e n the lover's desire is a m ixture of both pain and joy;
for she is n ot yet full of beauty yet she is filled in part by beholding
beauty. She ca n begin on a journey to happiness and wholeness by
learning to love one beautiful m aterial being, w hich can lead her to a
love of all m aterial beauty; and on to a love of one im m aterial form of
beauty, and to a love of all im m aterial beauty. At each stage, love gives
"b irth " in beauty, so that beauty endures im m ortally even though
love m oves on. In D iotim a's view, if the lover can clim b this ladder
of love all the way to the top — leaving behind sexuality and the m a
terial, leaving behind even the lim ited im m aterial individual — he or
she will finally com e to the absolutely Beautiful.113
Sexual ro m an tic love and desire as I have described th em have a
lot in com m on with the eros described by D iotim a. Love gives rise
to desire, and perhaps desire can also be transform ed into love. Both
love and desire are a com bination of lack and fullness, poverty and
plenty. Both are shaped by knowledge of w hat is loved. Both at least
begin in embodied, sensual form s. Both can be transcendent of th em
selves, rising up the stairs (or, to change the metaphor, descending
ever m ore in to the depths) of love to what is always beyond.
Yet sexual rom antic love and desire as I have been presenting them
can also be quite different from D iotim a's vision. T h ey need not
be for beloved beauties and unions th at are m ere stepping stones,
or stairs, to som ething else — which, despite "birthing" in beauty,
makes of the beloved a m eans to an end. Sexual love and desire,
moreover, need not be primarily for the sake of th e fulfillm ent of the
lover, for they can take other-centered form s. T h ey can also become
part of a m utual love and desire, fruitful beyond w hat one person's
love and desires could be by them selves. Finally, unlike D iotim a's
rendering of a ladder of love where th e body is left behind, sexual
1 1 3 . P la to , S y m p o siu m 2 0 3 c - 2 1 5 a .
rom antic love and desire, even when they arc u ltim ately incorporated
in a great love that affirm s m ore than sexual union, need n ot discard
sex or sexuality along the way
In response to the questions pursued by Foucault, we may begin to
see why sexuality is a key to identity, but n ot th e only key; why sexu
ality, by itself, is n ot more im portant than love. Socially constructed,
but n ot w ithout the possibility of critique even in our cultural con
text, th e m eanings of sexuality are multiple — som e creative, some
destructive,· som e filled w ith love, som e with the opposite of love.
Although I have n ot yet offered an ethically norm ative view of any
of these ways of loving and desiring, w c may begin to suspect that
only a sexuality formed and shaped w ith love h as the possibility for
integration in to th e whole of the hum an personality. At its m ost in
tense and m ost exhilarating heights, th e experience of sex com bines
embodied love and desire, conversation and com m unication, open
ness to the other in the intim acy of embodied selves, transcendence
into fuller selves, and even encounter w ith God. T h ese hum an pos
sibilities need not be lim ited by culturally constructed boundaries
of gender; th ey can tell us som ething im portant about transcendent
bodies; and th ey give clues to the kinds of loves th at are stronger
than death.
C hapter 5
JUST LOVE AND JUST SEX

Preliminary Considerations
s a i d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g th at this book is about the m eaning of
I h um an sexuality and the ways in w hich it can be incorporated

into a m oral view of hum an and C hristian life. We began by looking
to the past of our own traditions and th en to traditions and cultures
that are different from our own. T h e insights from our own history
and from other traditions are significant and necessary for framing
a sexual eth ic for today; but they are n ot by them selves sufficient.
We turned, then, to contem porary understandings of h um an em
bodiment, gender, and sexuality, identifying m ore questions and also
m ore insights w ithout w hich we will not be able to fram e a sexual
ethics.
We com e finally to m ajor norm ative ethical questions. 1 have, of
course, already pointed to som e norm ative conclusions in previous
chapters — offering guidelines for cross-cultural approaches as well
as som e prelim inary proposals regarding the hum an body, gender,
and sexuality. T h is chapter will move yet closer to the development
of a fram ew ork for C hristian sexual ethics, while leaving th e actual
framework to the following chapter. T here arc four im portant pre
lim inary considerations still to be undertaken — som e useful to our
ultim ate task and som e not only useful but ncccssary. First, it is n ec
essary to introduce a connection between sexuality an d ju stice , and,
in so doing, provide a perspective for w hat follows. Second, it is help
ful to look briefly a t alternative eth ical fram ew orks — in particular,
Jewish and C hristian frameworks that arc different in som e respects
from my own. Third, the classical sou rces for C hristian ethics, in
cluding sexual ethics, require som e delineation. Fourth, and essential
174
Just Love an d Just Sex: Prelim inary Considerations 175
to the framework I propose, is a consideration of the relationship

between ju stice a n d love.
Sexu ality and Ju stice
W hen I first began this project, I was struck by som ething th at Paul
Ricoeur wrote in his early work, T he Sym bolism o f Evil. H e was
identifying th ree m om ents, or stages, in the ways in w hich Western
civilization h as symbolized the experience of m oral evil.1 He named
the stages and their symbols: (1) defilem ent, (2) sin, and (3) guilt.
R icoeur's exploration of the m om ents, or stages, is focused largely
on religious considerations, but it can be argued th at these have
their secular analogues as well. In R icoeu r's term s, "defilem ent" as a
symbol refers to an experience of evil as pre-ethical, irrational, quasi-
m aterial, som ething that leaves a symbolic stain. One feels "dirty."
D efilem ent resists reflection because it is the result of breaking a
taboo. Taboos as such do n ot need (or even allow) reflective ratio
nales; th e point is sim ply th at they are not to be broken — on pain of
punishm ent. Sym bolically infected w hen one violates a taboo, there
is no recourse except in rituals of purification.2
1. R icoeur, T h e S y m b o lism o f Evil, tra n s . E m e rs o n B u ch a n a n |New York: H arper

& Row, 1 9 6 7 ), ch a p . I and p a ssim . I s e e n o reason to apply th e s e stages n ecessarily
and o n ly t o th e d e v elo p m en t o f cu ltu res; for, in s o fa r a s th e y a rc applicable to cu ltu res,
th ey a rc a lso ap p licable to th e m oral d evelop m ent o f individuals — all o f us. It is in this
la tte r s e n s e th a t I appeal to th e m h e re. M y ren d erin g o f th e stages is w ith o u t th e full
rich n e s s o f R ic o e u r 's an aly sis, b u t I tru s t it s relev an ce to th e fram ew ork I develop will
be clear. A lso , b e ca u se o f m y c o n c e rn for th is relev an ce, m y ren d erin g o f th e stag es to
so m e e x te n t g o es beyond w h at R ico eu r h im se lf h as w ritten .
2 . Ib id ., ch a p . 1. T h e r e is n o t alw ays an e x a c t co ro lla ry b etw een R ico e u r’s n o tio n
o f d e file m e n t a n d th e w o rk t h a t h a s b e e n d o n e by sc h o la r s in a n u m b e r o f d isc ip lin e s
o n sh a m e, esp e cia lly a s d istin g u ish ed fro m g u ilt. N o n e th e le ss, th e s e stu d ie s are rele
v a n t to t h e p o in t th a t R ico eu r w an ts to m ake, and th e y o ffer resou rces fo r probin g th e
p h e n o m e n o n o f d e file m e n t and the tabo o m o ra lity th a t g en erates it. See, fo r exam p le,
R u th B en ed ict, P attern s o f C u ltu re (B o ston : H o u g h to n M ifflin , 1 9 3 4 ); M a ry D ouglas,
Purity a n d D an g er: A n A n alysis o f C o n c ep ts o f P ollu tion a n d T a b o o |London: Rout-
ledge & K egan P au l, 1 9 6 6 ); G e rh a rt P iers and M ilto n B . Sin cer, S h a m e a n d G u ilt: A
P sy ch oan aly tic a n d a C u ltu ral S tu d y (N ew York: W. W. N o rto n , 1 9 7 1 ); N cl N oddings,
W om en a n d E vil (Berkeley: U n iv e rsity o f C a lifo rn ia Press, 1 9 8 2 ); A g n es H eller, T h e
P ow er o f S h a m e : A R a tio n a l P ersp ectiv e (Lond on: R outledgc & Kegan Paul, 1 9 8 5 ); Jean
D e lu in e a u , Sin a n d Fear: T h e E m e rg en ce o f a W estern G u ilt C u ltu re, 1 3 th -1 8 tli C e n
tim e s (N ew York: S t. M a rtin ’s P ress, 1 9 9 0 ) ; A nd rew P. M o rriso n , T h e C u ltu re o f S h a m e
176 TUST LOVE
"Sin / ' on th e other hand, is for Ricoeur the experience of evil not
in the transgression of an abstract rule but in the rupture of a re
lationship, th e violation of a personal bond. In religious term s, sin
is the breaking of the covenant with God. It involves the violation
of laws, but th e laws have their m eaning as part of th e covenant.
Because the covenant includes relationships with neighbors, sin is
a rupture in relations between hum an persons as well as God. T h e
remedy for sin is repentance on the part of the sinner and forgiveness
from the one who has been sinned against; only so is a relationship
healed.3
"G u ilt," in R icoeur's use of the term , is the subjective side of sin.
It is my recognition, m y consciousness, that a rupture in relationship
is th e result o f m y freedom. Set in th e context of all three m om ents
of fault, guilt involves w hat Ricoeur calls a "double m ovem ent";4 be
ginning from the two other stages, it includes them yet goes beyond
to a new understanding of one's own responsibility. At this stage
there is a "veritable revolution in the experience of evil: that w hich is
primary is n o longer the reality of d efilem ent. . . but the evil use of lib
erty."5 G u ilt is the subjective awareness that evil is in my heart. T h e
cause of evil is n ot extrinsic to me; I am n ot caught in a cosm ic web
of taboos where m y infraction may or m ay n ot be authored by me.
G u ilt is therefore different from either defilem ent or sin, though it
nonetheless inherits their sym bolism . In the experience and symbol
ism of guilt w c recognize (accurately or inaccurately) sinfulness, and
with this recognition m ay com e also an experience of defilem ent, the
result now of m y m isused freedom, n ot my ritual impurity. T h e con
version of heart required to remedy sin is now possible, and it requires
a choice. Yet only the forgiveness and acceptance of God (and/or the
neighbor w ho has been harmed) w ill "ju stify " m e or heal m e.6
(N ew York: B a lla n tin e B o o k s, 1 9 9 6 ); M a rily n M c C o rd A dam s, "H u rrica n e Sp irit, T o p

p lin g T a b o o s," i n O u r S elv es, O u r S o u ls a n d B o d ies : S ex u ality a n d t h e H o u s e h o ld o f
G o d , cd . C h a rle s H eflin g (B o sto n : C o w ley P u b licatio n s, 1 9 9 6 ), 1 2 9 - 4 1 .
3 . R icoeur, S y m b o lis m o f Evil , ch ap . 2 .
4 . Ib id ., 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 .
5 . Ib id ., ch a p . 3 , 1 0 2 .
6 . R ico e u r’s view o f s in and g u ilt, a s I u n d erstan d it, co rresp on d s m o re closely to
a P ro te sta n t, p erh a p s a c la s s ic L u th eran , view th a n a R om an C a th o lic . S till, th e bare
b o n es re p re se n ta tio n th a t I have given o f i t sh o u ld fin d a re so n a n ce in C a th o lic readers
a s w ell a s o th e r C h ristia n s.
Just Love an d fu st Sex: Prelim inary Considerations 177
Now, w c m ay ask, w hat docs all of this have to do w ith sexuality?

Although R icoeu r's com m ents on this question are m inim al, they
are telling: O u r understandings of sexuality in particular rem ain im
mersed in th e econom y of defilem ent. One is struck, he says, "by
the im portance and th e gravity attached to the violation of inter
dictions [based on taboos| of a sexual character in the econom y of
defilem ent."7 Sexual prohibitions against incest, sodomy, relations
at forbidden tim es, in forbidden places, and with forbidden actions
are so fundam ental th at "th e inflation of th e sexual is characteristic
of th e whole system of defilem ent, so that an indissoluble com plicity
between sexuality and defilem ent seem s to have been formed from
tim e im m em orial."8
However, belief in the defilem ent of sexuality is, in fact, pre-ethical
and has nothing to do with th e developed sense of evil th at is sym
bolized in R icoeu r's term s by sin and guilt. But th e sense of sexual
defilem ent, unfortunately, is not easily left behind. An inarticulablc
but persistent tie between sexuality and evil rem ains in the im
plicit consciousness of persons, and in the sym bolic structure of the
West. So great is th e resistance of conceptions of sexual defilement
to correction that, as Ricocur suggests, it is n ot from m editation on
sexuality alone that we will com e to an adequate sexual ethics. D e
spite our contem porary openness in displaying and deploying sex,
we carry too m uch baggage regarding sex into our m oral discern
m ent and judgm ents. We m ust therefore turn away for a tim e from
the sexual sphere to other spheres of h um an existence — such as la
bor, politics, and econom ics — and learn in these other spheres w hat
justice m eans. It is here th at "a n ethics of relations to others will be
formed, an ethics of ju stice and love, capable of turning back toward
sexuality, of re-evaluating and transvaluating it." 9
Advanced notions of justice in bonds between persons have not yet
been fully translated into the sexual dim ensions of personal relations.
T h u s, a necessary step in th e form ulation of a contem porary sexual
ethic m ust b e to move sexuality m ore com pletely from the realm of
the pre-ethical (the realm of taboos) to th e ethical. T h e blind sense
7 . R icocur, S y m b o lis m o f Evil, 2 8 .

8 . Ibid.
9 . Ibid, 2 9 .
178 TUST LOVE
of defilem ent that still haunts sex and sexuality m ust be subjected
to relentless criticism and responsible repudiation. One of the ways
in which th is can be done is to refine a ju stice ethic for sexuality.
Ricoeur did n ot do this, and insofar as it requires long exam inations
of other spheres of hum an life or analyses of the m ultiple theories
of ju stice currently on our tables in th e West, I shall n ot be doing it
here, either. N onetheless, w hat I will do is to try to develop a justice
ethic for sexual activities and relationships based sim ply on a general
understanding of justice. To form ulate a ju stice ethic in this regard is
precisely not to ignore the fact that sex docs, in fact, have a potential
for evil and h arm in our lives.
Before we move to a consideration of "ju st sex," however, it is
useful to consider foci and frameworks for sexual ethics that arc
alternative to the one I will propose.
A ltern ativ e Fram ew orks
T h e alternative contemporary sexual ethical frameworks I have in

m ind are n ot those that are completely at odds w ith the one I propose.
T h ey are ones whose identification of specific foci and elem ents for
sexual ethics I consider significant and useful. I m ight indeed attem pt
to incorporate them into the approach that I will take, or indicate how
they m ay already be there, but from a different angle or w ith different
language. I respect th em sufficiently, however, to w ant them to stand
on their own. Probably no one approach is adequate to the task of
contem porary sexual ethics, but a continuing dialogue and a shared
search for w h at is more adequate will be helpful to u s all.
I think here, for example, of the em phasis placed on the erotic in
m any tw entieth- and twenty-first-eentury fem in ist (largely Christian)
approaches to sexuality and morality. From Audrc Lordc to Carter
Heyward to M arvin Ellison, the path has been opened for an ethic
that not only affirm s th e value of eros but calls for its liberation.10
10. S e e A udrc Lordc, "U s e s o f th e E ro tic: T h e E ro tic a s Pow er," in S ister O u tsider
(T ru m a n sb u rg , N Y : C rossin g , 1 9 8 4 ), 5 3 - 5 9 ; C a rte r H eyw ard, O u r P assion fo r Ju stice:
Im a g es o f P ow er, Sexuality, a n d L ib era tio n (N ew York: P ilgrim , 1 9 8 4 ); M arv in E lli
so n , E rotic Ju s tic e : A L iberatin g E th ic o f S ex u ality (L ouisville: W e stm in ste r lo h n K nox,
1 9 9 6 ). I n id e n tify in g th e s e w ritin g s land th o se th a t I su b seq u en tly cite) in te rm s of focal
I also think, on the other hand, of the thoughtful work of Barbara

Blodgett, w ho in critical response to these approaches identifies a
need for realism and for boundaries, and who proposes instead a
sexual ethic based primarily on tr u s t." Beverly Wildung Harrison
em phasizes "right relationship" and the need for new approaches to
sexual boundaries that take im portant account of eros, justice, and
power.12 A m ong fem inists, I also think of the writings of Lisa Sowie
C ahill, with h er profound and inspiring stress on com m unity as a
focus for sexual ethics; of C hristine G udorf's em phasis on the ele
m ents of pleasure, mutuality, em bodim ent, and spirituality; of Karen
Lebacqz's attention to vulnerability at th e heart of sexual ethics; and
of Barbara Andolscn's opposition to violent or coercive sex and pro
m otion of sexual enjoym ent and intim acy.13 T o cite these approaches
docs n ot exhaust the contributions of C hristian fem inists to sex
ual ethics; it does, however, acknowledge the m any possibilities for
developing fram eworks on the basis of fem in ist con cern s.14
p o in ts o r "fra m e w o rk s," I a m c e rta in ly n o t d escrib in g th e fu lln e ss of th e th e o rie s to be

found in ea ch o f th e m . It w ould be fair fo r th e a u th o rs to o b je c t th a t I have m issed the
m o st sig n ifica n t e le m e n ts in th e ir approaches, ev en th o u g h I have raised up so m eth in g
c e n tr a l to th em .
1 1 . Barbara J . B lodgett, C on stru ctin g t h e E rotic: S ex u a l E th ics a n d A d o lescen t
G irls (C lev eland : P ilg rim , 2 0 0 2 ) . F e m in is t critic a l resp o n ses (even by "p ro -e ro s " a u
th o rs th e m se lv e s ) m a y c ite th e dangers o f "e ro ticiz a tio n " w ith o u t b o u n d aries, a s w hen
d o m in a tio n is ero ticiz ed , a lm o st alw ays to th e d etrim en t o f w om en.
12. B everly W ild u n g H arriso n , Ju s tice in t h e M aking: F em in ist S o c ia l E th ics, ed.
E liz a b e th M . B o u n d s e t a l. (L ouisville: W e stm in ste r Jo h n K no x, 2 0 0 5 ) , esp ecially Part
I; M akin g th e C o n n e c tio n s : E ssays in F em in ist S o c ia l E th ics, ed. C a ro l S . R obb (B o ston :
B eaco n , 198 5 ).
13. S e c L isa S o w ie C a h ill, Sex. G en d er, a n d C hristian E th ics (C am bridge: C a m
bridge U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 9 6 ); C h ris tin e E. G u d orf, B ody, Sex, a n d P leasu re:
R econ stru ctin g C h ristia n S ex u a l E th ics (C leveland : P ilgrim , 1 9 9 4 ); K aren L ebacqz, "A p
propriate V u ln erab ility : A Sexu al E th ic fo r S in g le s ," C h ristian C en tu ry (M ay 6 , 1 9 8 7 ):
4 3 5 - 3 8 ; Barbara H. A n d olsen , "W h o se Sexu ality ? W h o se T r a d itio n · W om en , E xperi
e n ce , and R o m a n C a th o lic S e x u al E th ic s ," in R eligion a n d S ex u a l H ea lth , ed. R onald M .
G r e e n (D o rd rech t: K luw er A cad em ic, 1 9 9 2 ), 5 5 - 7 7 .
14. I w a n t to acknow ledge h e re, too , th e w ork of fe m in is ts su c h a s b e ll ho ok s,
Ju d ith Plaskow , a n d S arah H oagland. It w ould be u sefu l to pursue in m o re d etail th ese
and o th e rs ' p ersp ectiv es o n sex u al e th ic s — w h eth e r C h ristia n , Jew ish , o r secu lar —
e v e n w h e n w h a t th e y p ropose is n o t a full fram ew ork. S e e bell h o o k s, F em in ist T h eo ry :
From M argin t o C e n t e r (B o ston : S o u th End, 1 9 8 4 ); Ju d ith Plaskow , Standing A gain at
S in a i: Ju d a ism f r o m a F em in ist P ersp ectiv e (San F ran cisco : H arp er & Row, 1 9 9 0 ); Sarah
Lucia H oagland, L e s b ia n E th ics: T ow ard N e w Value (Palo A lto, C A : In s titu te o f L esb ian
Stu d ies, 1 9 8 8 ).
180 TUST LOVE
T h ere arc also significant proposals from other Catholic, Prot

estant, and Jew ish ethicists whose principles and frameworks have
becom e in m any ways com plem entary to one another, despite their
different perspectives. I think here of the Jewish eth icist Eugene
Borowitz, w ho offers an ethic of ascending degrees of co m m itm en t—
from a safe-sex requirem ent of m ethods of contraception w hen the
goal is sim ply ''healthy orgasm "; to m u tu al con sen t when th e rights
of persons m u st be rcspcctcd as m uch or more than their desires
for pleasure; to lov e w hen the relationship itself is intrinsically im
portant; to m arn ag e w hich incorporates the other three levels but
establishes th em in covenant and perm anent co m m itm en t.15 What
Borowitz provides is a nonjudgm ental, yet powerfully persuasive,
argument for som e ethical norm s in a variety of sexual relation
ships. T h e efforts of the C entral Conference of A m erican Rabbis to
articulate values for incorporation into any sexual ethic arc also sig
nificant. T h ese values include: th e image of God in all persons; truth
and mercy; health; justice; fam ily orientation,· modesty; covenant
relationship; joy; and love.16
Jam es G ustafson, a Protestant ethicist, in 1981 proposed three
fundam ental "bases" for a C hristian sexual ethic: hum an nature as
both biological and personal; an acknowledgment of th e reality of
sin in the form of selfishness; and covenant as a reflection of hum an
sociality and a framework for m utuality and accountability.17 Stan
ley Haucrwas has argued for a particular focus in C hristian sexual
ethics on the m ission of th e church and the tasks of th e C hristian
com m unity — in other words, a sexual ethic where the issue is not
so m uch the good of the individual but the good of the ch urch.18 And
there are the m ultiple docum ents produced by the various Protes
tant denom inations in recent years, focusing on specific questions,
1 5 . E ugene B . B orow itz, C h o o s in g a S e x E th ic: A Jew is h In q u iry (N ew York:

S c h o ck cn B o o k s, 1 9 7 9 ).
16. C e n tra l C o n fe re n ce o f A m e rica n R ab b is, Ad H o c C o m m itte e o n H u m an
Sexuality, “R e fo rm Jew ish S e x u al V alu es," CCA R Jo u rn al 4 3 (Fall 2 0 0 1 ) : 9 - 1 3 .
1 7 . Ja m e s M . G u sta fso n , "N a tu re , S in , and C o v en a n t: T h r e e B ases fo r Sexual
E th ic s ," P ersp ectiv es in B iology a n d M ed icin e 6 8 (Spring 1 9 8 1 ): 4 8 3 - 9 7 .
18. S ta n ley H a u crw as, " T h e P o litics o f S e x : H ow M arriag e is a Subversive A ct,"
A fter C h riste n d o m : H o w t h e C h u rch is to B e h a v e i f F reed o m , Ju s tice , a n d a C hristian
N ation a r e B a d Id e a s (N ash v ille: A bingdon, 19911, 1 1 3 - 3 1 .
Just Love an d Just Sex: Prelim inary Considerations 18 1
often homosexuality, but in doing so, delineating frameworks fitting

to denom inational beliefs about sexuality.19
Am ong R om an C atholics, efforts at modifying the traditional
framework for sexual ethics have been ongoing, certainly since the
publication o f H um an Sexuality: N ew D irections in A m erican C ath o
lic Thought in 1 9 7 7 .20 T h is volume proposed a framework based
on particular values associated w ith hum an sexuality: self-liberation,
other-enrichm ent, honesty, fidelity, service to life, social responsibil
ity, and joy. T h e elem ents in the traditional framework that many
C atholic thinkers consider problem atic include procreation as a n ec
essary ju stification of any sexual activity, and an assessm ent of each
and every eth ical infraction in the sexual sphere as gravely sinful. Ef
forts to develop new frameworks are visible in th e writings of many
contem porary C atholic eth icists, including C harles C urran, Richard
M cC orm ick, Andre Guindon, and Jam es Keenan, as well as Gudorf,
C ahill, and A ndolsen w hom I have noted above.21
M y own proposal for a framework for a C hristian sexual ethic
looks like, yet unlike, m any of these approaches. I am n ot sure that
19. S e c, fo r e x a m p le , th e rep ort and rec o m m en d a tio n s of th e E vangelical L u th eran

C h u rc h in A m e rica (ELCA ): Jo u rn ey T o g eth er Faithfu lly: A C a ll t o S tu d y a n d D ia log u e ,
w w w .eIca.org /faith fu liou rn ey /tfrep ort.h tm I, dow nloaded F ebruary 1 6 , 2 0 0 5 ; P resbyteri
a n s a n d H u m a n S ex u a lity 1991 (2 0 3 rd G en eral A ssem b ly R esp on se to th e R eport o f the
Sp ecial C o m m itte e o n H u m a n Sexuality, 1 9 9 1 ); T h e B o o k o f R eso lu tio n s o f t h e U n ited
M ethodist C h u rch (N ash v ille: U n ite d M eth o d ist P u b lish in g H o u se, 2 0 0 0 1 . W h ile th ese
and o th e rs like th e m in a ll o f th e m a in lin e P ro te sta n t ch u rch es m ay be "d a te d " in tim e,
th ey signal a d ire ctio n th a t d eserves a tte n tio n .
2 0 . A n th o n y K o sn ik , W illia m C a rro ll, A g n es C u n n in g h a m , R onald M o d ras, and
Ja m es S ch u lte, H u m a n S exu ality: N e w D irection s in A m er ica n C a th o lic T h ou g h t (Rah-
w ah , N J: P a u list, 1 9 7 7 ). T h i s w a s th e resu lt o f a stu d y co m m issio n e d b y th e C a th o lic
T h e o lo g ica l S o c ie ty o f A m erica. It w as w elcom ed by m an y C a th o lic s , but a lso severely
criticiz e d b y o th e r C a th o lic s (notably, lead ers of th e ch u rch ). I t sh ou ld a lso b e n o ted th a t
d a tin g new d e v elo p m en ts in C a th o lic sex u al e th ic s from 1 9 7 7 is so m ew h at m islead in g ,
e v e n th o u g h th is p u b lica tio n w as a m ile sto n e . M o re a ccu rately , how ever, d iscu ssio n s o f
sex u al e th ic s ch an g ed sig n ifican tly w ith V atican II, and th e n in (largely critical) resp on se
to th e papal e n cy clica l o n co n tra ce p tio n , H u m a n a e V itae, pu blished in 1 9 6 8 .
2 1 . M a n y of th e s e im p o rta n t w ritin g s are co llected in R eadin gs in M oral T h eo lo g y
N o. 8: D icdogue A b o u t C a th o lic S ex u a l T ea ch in g , ed. C h a rle s E. C u rra n and R ich ard A.
M c C o r m ic k (N e w York: P au list, 1 9 9 3 ); R eadings in M oral T h eo lo g y N o. 9: F em in ist
E th ics a n d t h e C a th o lic M oral T rad ition , cd. C h a rle s E. C u rran , M argaret A . Farley,
and R ich a rd A . M c C o r m ic k (N ew York: P au list, 1 9 9 6 ); and R eadings in M oral T h eo lo g y
N o. 1 3 : C h a n g e in O fficial C a th o lic M oral T eachin gs, ed. C h a rle s E. C u rra n (N ew York:
P au list, 2 0 0 3 » .
182 IUST LOVE
the conclusions regarding specific sexual ethical questions would be

so different w ithin any of these frameworks — though they m ight be.
T o som e exten t, the frameworks I have so briefly identified above—
especially th ose articulated by fem inist ethicists — have recognized
the im portance of justice in regard to sexuality. Insofar as there is
a focus on ju stice, th e primary concern is with power inequities in
gender relations or w ith m ore general considerations of social justice
as it shapes sexual identity and activity. T h is focus is unquestion
ably significant — indeed, essential — as part of a ju stice framework
for sexual eth ics. But the task of articulating such a framework has
barely begun.
All of th ese frameworks I have considered here pay serious atten
tion to the standard sources for theological ethics: that is, Scripture,
tradition , secu lar disciplines, and con tem p orary ex p erien ce.22 As a
way of understanding any proposals it is helpful to consider these
sources.
Sources for C h ristia n Sexual E th ics
D espite past tendencies to em phasize one source or another — sola

scriptura, for example, or church tradition identified w ith church
authority— today there is general recognition am ong C hristian ethi
cists that adequate m oral discernm ent requires attention to all four
of the sources. Moreover, it requires m ethods for correlating sources
and for resolving apparent conflicts am ong them . In part, this recog
nition has com e about as a result of developments in biblical studies
(biblical scholars have made th e texts more readily accessible for eth
ical discernm ent). In part, it has com e through historical studies and
the development of theories of interpretation not only for the Bible
22. I offer m y ow n v ersio n of th e esse n tia l so u rces fo r C h ris tia n e th ics, th o u g h I

acknow ledge th e m a s fairly "sta n d a rd " for m o st C h ris tia n e th ic s . M y v e rs io n is on e
th a t p arallels t h e origin al M e th o d is t "q u a d rila te ra l." I began to develop i t w h en co-
te a ch in g w ith m y colleag u e C h a rle s P ow ers, w h o had a s im ila r ren d erin g o f th is; b u t I
hav e su p p lem e n ted and revised th e c o n ce p ts a g reat d eal through th e y ears. M y form er
stu d e n ts w ill recog n ize th e "m a p " o n w h ich th is appeared in nearly every co u rse th ey
to o k w ith m e . F o r th e M e th o d is t "q u a d rila te ra l," see W. S te p h e n G u n te r e t al., W esley
a n d th e Q u a d rila teral: R en ew in g th e C o n v ersa tio n (N ash v ille: A bin gd on , 1 9 9 7 ).
but for traditions. In part, this récognition derives from the prolifer
ation of scientific studies and th e acknowledgment of differences in
experiences o f hum an sexuality.
A broadened use of sources for C hristian cth ics in general and sex
ual ethics in particular has com e n ot only from their positive promise
of moral insight, but from a recognition of the lim its of each of the
sources w hen appealed to by themselves. T h is recognition has served
to relativize each in relation to the others and to look for their co
alescence wherever possible. Hence, for example, C atholic ethicists,
faced w ith th e lim its of past natural law perspectives (in term s of
lim ited scientific inform ation, a variety of philosophical analyses,
and the weaknesses of m ere reiteration of traditional church teach
ings), have opened m ore to the biblical w itness and to contemporary
experience as necessary com plem ents w hen attending to new ques
tions in sexual ethics. And although Protestant ethicists have not
abandoned Scripture as a primary source, they attend also to critical
studies of th eir traditions, to the sciences, and to th e experiences of
co-bclicvers. All of the sources arc necessary, then, but they arc all
in their own way problem atic as well.
S cripture
T h e Bible is cen tral to the received wisdom that C hristians cou nt on

to illum inate their m oral questions. Th ose for w hom it counts as sa
cred w riting reverence its authority. Although God seem s n ot to have
revealed everything we w ant to know, n ot in Scripture or through any
other m eans, our assum ption is th at enough has been revealed for us
to live on. Yet w hen we turn to Scripture, to the Bible, for guidance
in our sexual lives, th e m essage is spare and often confusing.
In the cultures of th e Hebrew Bible, sexuality is situated in polit
ical and fam ilial contexts, with a primary view to fertility. As David
Biale has noted, "w ith the exception of th e Song of Songs the Bible
displays little interest in erotic desire as su ch /'23 but only in its role in
relation to th e com m unity. C entral to th e teachings of these founda
tional scriptures regarding sexuality (as noted in chapter 2) arc two
23. D av id B ia le , E ros a n d th e Jew s: F rom B ib lica l Isr a e l t o C o n tem p o ra ry A m erica

(N ew York: B a sic B o o k s, 1 9 9 2 }, 13.
184 TUST LOVE
elem ents th a t account for the laws of marriage and for alm ost all
other sexual regulations. T h e first of these is the com m and to pro
create w hich is a t the heart of the com m and to marry. T h e second is
the presum ption of a patriarchal model for all sexual relationships. In
addition, however, the Hebrew Bible is replete w ith stories that have
been and rem ain extrem ely im portant in our (both Jewish and C hris
tian) attem pts to understand the new sexual situations w ith w hich
we are faced. Yet, conflicting conclusions are often drawn from the
Bible, each assum ing "th at th e biblical text and biblical culture [are]
stable and m o n o lith ic."24 T h is is a clue for us th at the biblical legacy
m ust be received as a whole, w hich includes patriarchal culture with
its som etim es harsh strictures but also w hat Bialc calls the "subver
sive texts" th a t counter these strictures — such as the stories of Ruth
and N aom i, and the Song of Songs.25 Finding in the Hebrew Bible
the light we need for contemporary sexual ethics involves, therefore,
a serious exegetical and interpretive task.
W ith the C hristian T estam ent, there is no less a task for sex
ual ethics. Here we find no system atic code of sexual ethics (again,
as noted in chapter 2), but only occasional responses to particu
lar questions in particular situations. Yet m oral guidelines for every
sphere of h um an life, including the sexual, arc to be gleaned from an
overall com m and to love God and neighbor. Guidelines can also be
drawn from instru ction s about the m oral life that call for a radical
re-orientation of each person toward God and a consequent transfor
m ation of all h um an relations. T h e depiction of hum an life provided
in this T estam en t is essential to developing a C hristian sexual ethic,
but th e challenge of exegesis, interpretation, and ethical discernm ent
is considerable.26
2 4 . Ib id ., 11. W e sh a ll s e e a d ra m a tic c a s e in p o in t fo r th is w h en we c o m e to a
co n sid e ra tio n o f s a m e -s e x re la tio n s in ch a p ter 7.
2 5 . Ib id ., 1 2 , and th e w h o le o f ch a p ter 1.
2 6 . For an e x c e lle n t ex p lo ratio n o f th e b ib lical w itn e ss in regard to h u m a n se x u
ality, esp ecially th a t o f th e N ew T e s ta m e n t, s e e C a h ill, Sex, G en d er, a n d C hristian
E thics, ch ap . 5 . S e e also , am o n g th e m a n y helpful w orks by b ib lical sch o la rs, Ray
m on d F. C o llin s , S ex u a l E th ics a n d t h e N e w T esta m en t: B eh a v io r a n d B e lie f |Ncw
Y ork: C ro ssro a d , 2 0 0 0 ; W ayne A. M ee k s, T h e O rigins o f C h ristian M orality: T h e First
T w o C en tu ries (N ew H av en , C T : Yale U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 9 3 ); D a le B . M a r tin , T h e
C orin th ian B o d y (N ew H av en , C T : Yale U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 9 5 ).
How considérations of justice in both Jewish and C hristian scrip

tures relate to sexuality m ay be the m ost im portant question of
all. Justice (or righteousness) is a central concept throughout the
Bible. God alone is completely just and righteous, and God acts righ
teously and ju stly in relation to creation. G od's ju stice — exceeding
all hum an com prehension — is m anifest both in judgment and in
the forgiveness of G od's people, again and again, from one gener
ation to another. Hum ans are called to live righteously, by God's
gift and G od 's com m and. They are called to believe and to hope in
God who m akes prom ises and whose m ercy extends forever. They
are called to an inward wholeness of love that both expresses the
centrality of their G od-rclation and extends in action to their neigh
bors near and far. "Self-righteousness" is n ot an option that Scripture
allows.
W hen it conies m ore specifically to justice in relation to hum an
sexuality, however, the biblical w itness is blurred — at least as we en
counter it in today's world. In the Hebrew Bible, rules for justice in
hum an sexual relationships have exceptions, som etim es approved,
som etim es punished, by God. Moreover, both rules and exceptions
appear culture-bound so that it is difficult to know w hat to make
of them today. Inju stice to Susanna is rectified (Dan. 1 3 :1 -6 4 ); but
in ju stice to th e daughter of Jeptha is counted as "ju stice" — even
to her, w ithin a grand schem e that looks to u s more u njust than
ju st (Judg. 1 1 :2 9 - 4 0 ) . Real sin and guilt are m anifest in experi
ences of contagious "defilem ent," as w hen a w hole household bears
the consequences of David's adultery (2 Sam. 1 1 :1 1 -1 5 ). T h e God
of righteousness and mercy is all too often depicted as the faith
ful and forgiving husband in relation to Israel, the unfaithful and
adulteress wife — m etaphors that reinforce patriarchal depreciation
of women.
N onetheless, the Bible rem ains a central source for discerning how
to live our lives as sexual beings. At the v ciy least it puts sexuality in
perspective: it is n ot m ore im portant than love, not more im portant
th an life. T h e m oral issues surrounding our sexual actions m ay be
difficult for u s all, so discernm ent in relation to revelatory texts as
well as elsewhere m ust be careful, but judgment can be cautious.
Self-righteousness may not be an option, though clearsightedness
186 TUST LOVE
is a goal. To those who wanted "ju st punishm ent" for a woman

caught in adultery, Jesus responds w ith silence. W hen he speaks,
he m akes only one point: we are all sinners whose stones are cast at
our own great peril. To the w om an he says, "H as no one condemned
y o u ?. . . N eith er w ill I condem n you" (John 8 :1 0 -1 1 ). T h e w hole of
the biblical w itness m ust be probed.
Tradition
Trad ition adds to the received wisdom of w hich Scripture is a part.27
As a source it refers to m ultiple elem ents that m ake up th e ongoing
life of a faith com m unity through tim e. It includes, therefore, not
only church teachings, laws, and practices but the history of theolo
gies and the "sen se of th e faithful" as it has been formed and made
m anifest down through the years. As we saw in chapters 2 and 4, the
tradition of C hristian ity is often as difficult to interpret as is Scrip
ture. N ot the least of its difficulties is that there are m any strands,
and strands w ithin strands, in the whole tradition of Christianity.
H ence, like Scripture, tradition and its strands require careful histor
ical analysis, interpretation, and discernm ent about its usefulness for
contem porary ethics.
Trad ition in the sense of a "living" tradition certainly docs not
m ean sim ply whatever has "always" been thought, taught, or prac
ticed. As Joseph Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI) once wrote:
"N o t everything th at exists in the C hu rch m u st for that reason be
also a legitim ate tradition; in other words, n ot every tradition that
arises in the C hu rch is a true celebration and keeping present of
the m ystery o f C hrist. T here is a distorting, as well as legitimate,
tradition___Consequently, tradition m ust not be considered only af
firmatively, but also critically."28 If, in fact, tradition did m ean only
whatever h as always, or for a long tim e, been taught or practiced,
2 7 . I do n o t h e re d etail th e altern a tiv e w ay s o f u n d erstan d in g the rela tio n betw een

Scrip tu re and tra d itio n th a t have m arked d evelo p m ents in b o th R o m a n C a th o licism
and P ro te sta n tism . T h e r e are, how ever, co n cise and helpful d escrip tion s of th e s e a v ail
able. S e c, fo r e xa m p le, Jo h n E . T h ie l, S en ses o f T rad ition : C o n tin u ity a n d D ev elo p m en t
in C a th o lic Faith |Oxford: O xford U n iv e rsity P ress, 2 0 0 0 ) , 3 - 5 .
2 8 . Josep h R atzinger, " T h e T ra n s m is s io n o f D iv in e R e v e la tio n /' in C o m m en ta r y
o n t h e D o c u m e n ts o f Vatican II, vol. 3 , ed. H erbert V orgrim ler (N ew York: H erd er &
Herder, 1 9 6 9 ] , 1 8 5 .
then inequality between m en and wom en would have to rem ain part
of the ongoing tradition. Rather, if th e rationales behind longstand
ing beliefs and practices are n o longer persuasive in the context of the
tradition as a whole, then the practices and beliefs will be challenged,
and they m ay need to change.29
In a living tradition, beliefs and the theologies that interpret beliefs
can be challenged by new experiences, cultural shifts, and new per
spectives on th e past. W hen this occurs, new and better rationales
m ust be found to undergird ongoing beliefs, or beliefs themselves
may evolve in their m eaning and som etim es even be replaced. W hat
is no longer "seriously im aginable" as a genuine part of th e tradition
gives way to w hat is coherent with th e deepest held truths of the
com m unity.30 T h a t there is room for development of C hristian be
liefs and m oral codcs regarding sexuality is generally acknowledged
by theologians and ethicists today. T h a t som e doctrines and some
m oral convictions are m ore central th an others is also generally rec
ognized.31 T h e fact that all beliefs and convictions, perhaps especially
those that are considered m ost central, can be understood from di
verse perspectives, adm it of new insights, are subject to more than
one form ulation, is w hat provides a task for theology and ethics.
How to excavate historical layers of meaning, find lost treasures,
take account of historical and cultural contexts for church life, hold
on to gems of revelatory experience and shared faith: this is the ques
tion for those who go to tradition as a sourcc of contem porary moral
and theological insight. T h is, in part, is what is behind the question
raised by m any fem inists: W hat is the "usable past" in the C hristian
2 9 . For a p e r tin e n t ex a m p le o f critiq u e and proposal for re c o n stru ctio n of s o m e

th in g o th erw ise co n sid ered t o b e in th e "tra d itio n ," s e e C a th o lic T h e o lo g ica l S o ciety of
A m e rica , " T r a d itio n and t h e O rd in a tio n of W o m e n ," P ro ceed in g s 5 2 (1 9 9 7 ): 1 9 7 - 2 0 4 .
3 0 . T h e te r m w as co in ed by D avid H. K elsey in T h e U ses o f S criptu re in R ecen t
T h eo lo g y (P h ilad elp h ia: F o rtress, 1 9 7 5 ), 1 7 2 ; sec a lso th e w h o le of K elsey 's ch ap . 8 for
a profound, in cisiv e, and high ly origin al d iscu ssio n of th e so u rces fo r C h ris tia n th e o l
ogy a n d th e ir au th o rity . 1, o f co u rse, a m co n cern ed h ere a b o u t c o n v ictio n s a n d beliefs
p ertain in g to se x u a l m orality, n o t abo u t m o re ce n tra l b e liefs su c h a s th o se articulated
in C h ristia n crcc-ds.
3 1 . F o r an in sig h tfu l ex p lo ratio n o f p a tte rn s and p o ssib ilities o f d ev elo p m en t of
d octrin e, s e e T h i e l , S e n s es o f T radition . W h ile th is b o o k fo cu ses o n th e R o m a n C a th o lic
tra d itio n , its a n a ly se s a rc applicable to and illu m in a tin g for o th er tra d itio n s a s w ell.
188 TUST LOVE
tradition as w ell as other traditions? And, one m ight add, how shall
we find it?
W hatever th e tasks involved in accessing tradition, there is no
doubt that it is an im portant source for theology and ethics. T h e
presupposition here is that a com m unity's beliefs and moral insights
through tim e n ot only are a fund of wisdom for each generation but
are revelatory of God's presence and action in the life of the com m u
nity. T h e fact that m oral insights and even official church teachings
have changed on som e issues (for example, slavery, usury, marriage,
religious liberty37) does not m ean that tradition is less ncccssary for
discerning m oral questions th at emerge in the church today. It does
m ean that we cannot expect simply to “read o ff" answers from h is
tory as if they were all obvious, or as if there were only a "literal" or
"fundam entalist" m eaning of tradition. W hat we have inherited by
way of teachings and practices requires probing — in order to inter
nalize or to m odify or to find som ething new to w hich tradition has
thus far only been able to point.
Tu rn in g to tradition with questions of ju stice and sexuality will
m ean asking new questions of traditional teachings and practices.
Obligations o f spouses in relation to one another for care, for love, for
sexual intim acy, as well as responsibilities to fam ilies are embedded
not only in theologies but in canonical regulations.’·3 W hat these
can m ean for sexual ethics today has to be both winnowed for their
ongoing validity and wisdom and contextualized in the present as
they have been in the past.
Secu la r D iscip lin es o f K now ledge

Som e delineations of the sources of C hristian theology and ethics
identify the third source as "reason." T h is, however, is misleading.
Reason, after all, is involved in addressing all of the sources. O f
course, insofar as it is a distinctive source, "reason" m eans what we
can know from th e "light of hum an reason" as distinguished from
3 2 . S e e lo h n T . N o o n an , A C h u rch T h at C a n a n d C a n n o t C h a n g e (N otre D a m e , IN :
U n iv e rsity o f N o tre D a m e Press, 2 0 0 5 1 ; "D ev e lo p m en t in M o ra l D o c t r in e /' T h eo lo g ica l
S tu d ies 5 4 ( 1 9 9 3 ) ; "E x p erien ce and th e D ev elo p m e n t o f M oral D o c trin e ," in C a th o lic
T h e o lo g ica l S o c ie ty o f A m erica, P ro ceed in g s 5 4 (1 9 9 9 ), 4 3 - 5 6 .
3 3 . See, fo r e x a m p le , T h e C o d e o f C a n o n L aw , C a n . 1 1 3 5 , 1 1 3 6 .
spécial revelation (as in Scripture). It is clearer and m ore useful, how

ever, to consider this source as referring to every "secular discipline,"
every discipline n ot based in or dependent upon revelation, th at offers
the possibility of insight into the aspects of creation we seek to under
stand. Hence., in sexual ethics, the relevant disciplines will include
not only philosophy but biology, m edicine, psychology, sociology, an
thropology, and even history, literature, and art. T h e achievements
of these disciplines arc n ot always lasting, of coursc, for they make
m istakes, m iss insights, and change in their conclusions. For ex
ample (one I have referred to before), biological understandings of
hum an sexuality have expanded and improved — from beliefs that
the whole of w hat constitutes a new hum an being is contained in
a sperm to convictions about th e contributions of both ovum and
sperm. Psychological and sociological studies of sexual response, con
sequences of self-pleasuring, influences on sexual orientation, and on
and on, have corrected past m istakes, generated new insights impor
tant to sexual ethics, or sim ply called into question as yet unverifiable
conclusions long taken for granted.
H ence, the resources in secular disciplines for a sexual ethic re
quire a kind o f "exegesis," interpretation, and discernm ent of their
usefulness, in ways not com pletely unlike what is needed in relation
to the resources of th e Bible or tradition. However, insofar as these
disciplines give u s a kind of "access" to reality — to the world and
the universe, to hum an persons and the m eanings of sexuality, to
tragic or beneficial consequences o f action — they are necessary for
the doing of sexual ethics. Even if these disciplines do not give us
actual access to "reality,"34 but only a pragmatic way of dealing with
the world and ourselves, they rem ain im portant to our m oral dis
cernm ent. We shall see how they assist us in discerning what is just
in th e sphere of sexuality.
34. P erhap s w h erever I u se t h e te rm "re a lity " (and 1 have a n d w ill c o n tin u e t o u s e it
a lot) I sh o u ld u s e q u o tatio n m ark s. I a m m in dful o f D av id T r a c y 's appeal to V lad im ir
N o b o k o v 's sta te m e n t: " ‘R e a lity ’ is th e o n e w ord th a t sh o u ld alw ays appear w ith in
q u o ta tio n m a r k s ." S e e D avid T racy , P lu rality a n d A m bigu ity: H erm en eu tics , R eligion ,
a n d H o p e (Sa n F ra n cisco : H arp er & Row, 1 9 8 7 ), 4 7 . T h e p o in t is th a t w e never have
full a cce s s to re a lity ; o u r know led ge is alw ays p artial, in so m e w ay provisional.
190 TUST LOVE
Contem porary Experience

Experience is also potentially misleading as a nam ed source for C hris
tian insight, for it is not just one source am ong many.35 It is an
im portant part of the con tent of each of the other sources, and it
is always a factor in interpreting th e others. Scripture, for example,
is the record of som e persons' experiences of God; tradition is the
lived experience of a faith com m unity through tim e; and secular dis
ciplines, too, arc shaped by the cxpcricncc of those who engage in
them . As a discrete source, however, I shall m ean by “experience"
the contem porary actual living of events and relationships, along
w ith the sensations, feelings, em otions, insights, and understand
ings th a t are part of this lived reality. In this sense, experience is a
given, providing data to be interpreted; but it is also som ething that
is already interpreted, its con tent shaped by previous understandings
in a context o f multiple influences. Because experience is a m ore con
tested source than the other sources for C hristian ethics — especially
sexual e th ics— we need to explore it at greater length.
As Foucault has helped to show, sex is probably the m ost "looked
upon," m ost exam ined, hum an experience both in public discourse
and in the m in u te self-exam ination which that public discourse de
term ines in private. Experiences in the sexual sphere, perhaps more
th an in any other sphere of h um an life, are shaped by social norms,
both religious and cultural, even to the point of determ ining w hat
experiences are possible and w hat they will m ean. T h is m eans that
publicly provided norm s, w hether religious or secular, have shaped
experiences so that, for example, sex is som etim es ex p erien ced as
evil precisely because it has been socially interpreted as evil; sex has
som etim es been ex p erien ced as deviant because it has been identi
fied and treated as deviant; sex has been ex p erien ced as n ot open
to com m union with God because it has been interpreted as w ithout
this possibility. In other words, experience is constituted for us and
interpreted by us w ithin the lim its and possibilities of the languages
we already have, the social and cultural influences we absorb, and
35. I draw h e re o n so m e o f m y ea rlier w ork. S e e Farley, " T h e R o le of E xp erien ce

in M o ral D is c e r n m e n t/ ' in C hristian E th ics: P ro b lem s a n d P ro sp ects, ed. L isa Sow ie
C a h ill and la m e s F. C h ild re ss {C leveland : P ilg rim , 1 9 9 6 ), 1 3 4 - 5 1 .
the worldview w c already hold. Hence, it is never "pure" experience,

unm ediated by anyone or anything else.
Experience can belong both to the self and to the self together with
others; that is, it can be both personal and com m unal. It is private,
unique to the one who experiences; but there are shared experiences,
com m unicated as well as formed w ithin com m unities, cultures, and
societies. Experiences are diverse, and we have learned the claim s
upon us to acknowledge diversity. Yet we take diversity seriously for
the sake of com m unity — not in order to separate ourselves finally
and hopelessly from one another. W hat is learned uniquely from po
sitions of experience gives privileged access to understanding, but
w hat is learned from unique, privileged, pcrspcctival experience can
be rendered a t least partially intelligible to others whose experience
is nonetheless different.
T h u s, for exam ple, those who have not yet lost a parent through
death have, in an im portant sense, no direct experience of this
hum an event. And one m ight add, no two experiences of a parent
dying are exactly the sam e. Yet if those w hose parents are still living
nonetheless share deeply in the experience of som eone else who has
previously lo st a parent, they m ay already understand som ething of
w hat this m eans. Later, w hen their own m other or father dies, they
will experience som ething new, yet not wholly new; they will learn
som ething they did n ot know before, but they will also recognize
w hat has been shared w ith th em from the experience of another.
T h is is true also in the sexual sphere. A w om an may not be a prosti
tute, or caught in the web of exploitation which characterizes the sex
industry in m any parts of the world, but she need not rem ain w'holly
outside of, a stranger to, such experiences if she attends to the narra
tives of others. O ne m ay n ot be a lesbian or a gay m an, but she or he
can grasp th e integrity of w hat gays and lesbians say w ith their lives
and w hat th ey tell of their lo\'es and their hopes. One may n ot have
borne a child, but he or she can hear the cries of w om en through the
centuries and today in the situations where they have suffered vio
lence in both child-conceiving and child-bearing; and one can share
the burdens and th e joy of parents in the welcoming and rearing
of their children. Although it is true that our vicarious experiences
and th e analogies w c draw from them rem ain different in important
192 TUST LOVE
respects from the direct experiences of others, it is also true that

we can to a significant extent not only understand the experiences
of others but stand in solidarity with those whose experiences they
m ost in tim ately are.
N ot surprisingly, however, problems beset experience in term s of
access, authority, and criteria for its use in ethical discernm ent. For
example, w hat sort of evidence does experience actually offer? W hat
sort o f generalization from experience is possible? How is the au
thority of experience to be reconciled w ith the authority of the Bible,
tradition, and system atized disciplines of reason? T h e first of these
questions is closely related to w hat theologians and philosophers call
the "herm eneutical circle," the circle of interpretation. As theories of
language, social location, and power are developed, they threaten to
m ake any appeal to experience vacuous. As an instance, w hat can an
appeal to w om en's experience m ean if that experience is shaped co m
pletely and ineluctably by norm ative expectations of a culture? W hat
are we to m ake of an ethics of care based on w om en's experience of
caring if w c suspect that its construction is attributable to the social
pressures on wom en to take care of m en and children? As C athe
rine M acK innon cautions, "W om en are said to value care. Perhaps
wom en value care because m en have valued wom en according to the
care they give. W om en are said to think in relational term s. Perhaps
wom en th in k in relational term s becausc w om en's social existence
is defined in relation to m en ."36 T h e supposed bedrock of evidence
that experience provides disappears in the endless circles of social
construction. N onetheless, and perhaps ironically, it is experience
itself that h a s taught us: th e worldviews that shape experience can
be challenged and in som e respects modified and even overturned.
T h e herm eneutical circle is n ot so tightly shu t that we are denied a
critical edge o r opening.
T h e second question (about the aptitude of experience to gen
eralization) I have already addressed in part. Everyone recognizes
that experience is particular precisely because it is concrete, but is
there sufficient overlap in th e content of one person's experience
36. C a th e r in e A . M a cK in n o n , T ow ard a F em in ist T h e o r y o f th e S ta te (C am bridge,

M A : H arvard U n iv e rsity Press, 1 9 8 9 ), 5 1 .
and an oth er's so that generalizations can be warranted? For ex

ample, w om en have learned to be cautious in generalizing for all
wom en out o f their own particular and hence lim ited experience
and self-understanding. Ju st as w om en have argued that the expe
rience of m en cannot be universalized to stand for the experience of
all hum ans, so they have had to acknowledge that diversity among
w om en's experiences disallows uncritical generalizations based on
the experience of only som e wom en — in this case, white, middle-
class, heterosexual, W estern w om en. Yet som e generalization from
experience and insight is necessary to give power and inspiration
to concerted action. As 1 have argued elsewhere, whatever the vast
differences in h um an lives it is nonetheless possible for hum an per
sons to weep over com m only felt tragedies, laugh over com m only
perceived incongruities, and yearn for com m on hopes. H um an per
sons can and ought to cxpcricncc m oral claim s in relation to one
another, and som e of these claim s can and ought to cross (though
not ignore or disrespect) th e experiential boundaries of culture and
history.37
T h e third question (on the authority of experience) is in a way
particular to experience as a source, but it belongs also to all of
the sources of m oral insight. W hose cxpcricncc counts, w hen ex
periences differ? How can experience — elusive, socially constructed,
diverse — be authoritative in the process of m oral discernm ent and
decision-m aking? Should n ot experience be subject to the Bible and
to faith traditions for its own interpretation and for its validity? We
can identify som e guiding criteria for appeals to experience in moral
discernm ent, such as: coherence of th e insights from experience with
general m oral norm s; intelligibility of accounts of experience in re
lation to fundam ental beliefs; m utual illum ination w hen measured
with other sources of m oral insight; harmful or helpful consequences
of interpretations of experience; confirm ation in a com m unity of
37. Farley, " T h e R ole o f E xp erien ce in M o ral D is c e rn m e n t"; "F e m in is m and U n iv er
sa l M o ra lity /’ in P ro sp ects (o r a C o m m o n M orality, cd. G e n e O u tk a and lo h n P. R eader
(P rin ceto n , N J: P rin ce to n U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 9 3 ), 1 7 0 - 9 1 ; "F e m in is t C o n scio u sn e ss
and th e In te rp re ta tio n of S c rip tu re /' in F em in ist In terp retatio n o f t h e B ib le , ed. L etty M .
R u ssell (P h ilad elp h ia: W estm in ster, 1 9 8 5 ), 4 1 - 5 4 .
194 TUST LOVE
discernm ent; and integrity in the testim ony of those w ho present

their experiences. All of these m ay be tests for the validity and use
fulness of given experiences in a process of m oral discernm ent. Yet
experience m ay challenge its own tests and assert an authority that
modifies th e prior norm s that would order it. Som ething deeper is
at stake.
Like the other sources for m oral insight, cxpcricncc is a necessary
but n ot sufficient sourcc for sexual cthics. T h ere is here, as elsewhere,
no incontestable, foundational, im m ediate, and direct "deposit" for
insight in a fund of experience. Experience does not explain every
thing else w ithout needing to be explained itself. N ot only does it
not autom atically yield full-blown ethical universale, it also cannot
be understood as an "anything goes" approach based on rival expe
riences of seem ingly equal instructive value. Interpretations of some
experiences ca n yield illusion and falsehood on a par w ith som e in
terpretations of the Bible and of tradition. T h is is why actual or
vicariously and analogously shared experience is necessary to sex
ual ethics, but also why in a C hristian eth ic at least, interpretations
of sexual experience need to be rendered m utually coherent with
interpretations of the whole of h um an and C hristian life.
T h is question, as I said, belongs som ehow to all of the sources.
How can any of th em be finally authoritative if they m ust cohere in
som e way w ith the others? If we ought not to adopt a fundam en
talist view of experience, can we adopt one for the Bible, tradition,
or w hat th e scien ces report? Underlying all of these considerations
is an understanding of authority. It is impossible, however, to sep
arate the question of authority from the question of the content
or m eaning o f w hat is presented as authoritative. Hence, even if
one accepts th e authority of a source on som e apparently extrin
sic basis (for exam ple, that it is God's word, or that the voice of the
faith com m unity is determ inative), this very acceptance m ust have
m eaning, m u st "m ake sense" to the one who accepts it. T h e moral
authority (th at is, the power to "au th o r" life) of any source is u lti
m ately contingent on a "recognition" of the truth it offers and the
justice of its aim s. No sourcc has real and living authority in rela
tion to our m oral attitudes and choices unless it can elicit from us
a responding récognition.38 W hen C hristian cth icists consider Scrip

ture, tradition, secular disciplines, and contemporary experience as
authoritative sources, it is precisely because they find in and through
these sources access to m oral insight and m otivation. T h is docs not
m ean, of course, th at their "recognitions" of truth never change, or
that they are so adequate and full that they are never subject to
critique and m odification.
T h e biblical witness, in particular, claim s to present truths that
will heal us, m ake u s whole; that will free us, n ot enslave u s to what
violates our very sense of truth and justice. Its appeal to us is, in
the words of th e philosopher Paul Ricoeur, a "nonviolent appeal."39
As a revelation of truth, it asks for som ething less like a subm ission
of will and m ore like an opening of the im agination — and hence
the whole m ind and heart. In its own term s, then, it cannot be be
lieved unless it "rings tru e" to our deepest capacity for truth and
goodness.
But is the Bible, or tradition for that matter, really required to an
swer th e dem ands of reason and th e cries of th e hum an heart? Is this
to reduce it to a m easure th at is outside of it? It depends, of course on
w hat one m eans by the "dem ands of reason" and the "desires of the
heart." But surely there is a sense in w hich every religious tradition
has power only insofar as it offers ju st this — insofar as it helps to
m ake sense o f the whole of hum an life, to give m eaning to hum an
tragedy and horizons to hum an hope. "Hard sayings" can be liberat
ing truths; and reason need not be opposed to presence and mystery,
nor experiential insight inim ical to a great-hearted love.
3 8 . T h is does, n o t m e a n t h a t so u rces are c o m p letely su b jectified , th a t th ere i s — for

exam p le — n o rev e latio n in th e B ib le u n less everyo ne perceiv es it. It d oes m e a n th a t
n o t every in te rp re ta tio n o f every verse o r text o f th e B ib le c a n be "a u th o rita tiv e " o r
n o rm a tiv e by its e lf for every p erson . N o n e th e le ss, a su b jectiv e "reco g n itio n " of a text
(o f w h a tev er so rt) a s "m a k in g s e n s e " is in s o m e w ay in ev itab le. T o tak e a n ex trem e
e xa m p le: W h a tev e r sch o la rs m ak e of th e c o m m a n d o f G o d to A b rah am to sa crifice h is
so n , Isa a c, A b ra h a m appears to have heard th e co m m a n d a t so m e deep level a s u lti
m a te ly n o t c o n tra d ictin g th e visage and p ro m ise of th e G od w h o m h e had cn co u n tcrcd .
O n th e o th e r h an d , I a m fully aw are th a t o n e 's w orldview c a n be co m p letely co h esive,
so th a t every in te rp re ta tio n w ill co h ere — a n d y e t b e m istak en .
3 9 . P aul R icoeur, E ssays in B ib lic a l In terp retatio n , ed. Lew is S. M udge (Philad elp hia:
F ortress, 19801, 9 5 .
196 TUST LOVE
T h e reason, then, why cxpcricncc may challenge other sources and

the interpretations of other sources is that m oral truth m ust “make
sense." W h en a deeply held conviction such as the equality of wom en
and m en, grounded in our experience, appears to be contradicted by
inform ation from other sources, it m ust be tested against them . But
if it continu es to persuade us, continues to hold “true" so that to deny
it would do violence to our m oral sensibilities, our affective capacity
to respond to th e good, and our very capacity for knowing, then it
m ust function also as a measure against w hich the other sources are
tested.
Experience in each of these senses — given but not primitive,
im m ediate b u t n ot innocent of interpretation, personal but n ot iso
lated, unique but not w ithout a social m atrix — plays an im portant
part in m oral discernm ent. As such, it is the experience of concrete
persons and groups, and it is to be taken into account in moral
discernm ent. Like Scripture and tradition, it requires analysis, inter
pretation, and decision about its usefulness in determ ining attitudes
and behavior. In other words, experience, like every other source,
is not self-interpreting. We all have had experiences, the meaning
of w hich we interpret differently today th an we did ten or twenty
years ago.
Love and Ju st Love
A final prelim inary consideration rem ains. In order to situate an

understanding of “ju st sex" in a larger framework of hum an and
C hristian morality, it is necessary first to introduce the notion of
a “just love." T o look briefly, but closely, at love in this respect will
prevent us from assum ing that love is the sufficient answer to all
of our sexual ethical questions. It will not do, as som e wish, to end
all ethical discernm ent by simply saying th at sexual relations and
activities arc good w hen they express love,· for love is the problem
in ethics, n o t the solution. As I suggested in the previous chapter,
our experiences of love, and our loves, take m ultiple form s. Some
thinkers prefer to reserve the nam e “love" for a love that has norm a
tive content — that is, for loves that they consider to be good loves.
Yet we know th at not all of our loves arc good, though they arc loves.
T here arc wise loves and foolish, good loves and bad, true loves and
m istaken loves. T h e question ultim ately is, what is a right love, a
good, ju st, and true love?40
I have som e worries about once again exam ining here the meaning
of love. W hat I offer is a som ewhat abstract analysis w hich as such
may be a deterrent to our finding ju stice as th e norm ative content
of love. Taking this route, there is danger that w c will lose sight of
the object of love — of who and w hat we love. T h is is not m y intent.
Since I consider this analysis of love necessary for understanding the
criteria of ju s t loving, it is m y hope and intention that, in the end, wc
will arrive at a stronger, n ot weaker, focus on who and w hat we love. I
also worry th a t all we have seen thus far about the social construction
of hum an em bodim ent, gender, and sexuality will seem to be ignored
in a search fo r th e m eaning of "ju s t" love and the nature of its objects.
T h is also is n o t m y intent. As I shall try to show along the way,
insofar as our understandings of anything arc socially constructed,
this is im portant to know. Recognition of this is a part of our search
for th e m eanings of love and its objects. Finally, m y analysis of love
(and its derivative, desire) is an effort to describe our experiences of
love in som e kind of ethically norm ative way. T h e test of the accuracy
and adequacy of m y description will be w hether or not it actually does
describe experiences that others can recognize. H ence, it is farthest
from m y m in d to substitute abstract analysis for concrete experience.
Description and analysis are here for the sake of entering more deeply
into the experience of love and the requirem ents of justice.
40. F o r now, I am u sin g th e te rm s "rig h t," " tr u e ," " ju s t ," and "g o o d " in terch an g e
ably, a n d I a m a s s u m in g a c o m m o n se n se o r popular u n d erstan d in g o f th e m . T h e r e
are, o f co u rse, sig n ifica n t te c h n ic a l d ifferen ces am o n g th e m a s th e y are used in m oral
theology and ethics. The primary meaning that I am giving to all of these at this point
is m o s t clearly v isib le in th e te rm s " t r u e " and " ju s t ." B y " tr u e ," h ere I m e a n tru e in
th e se n se th a t a c a rp e n te r m ig h t u se it, a s in to " tr u e " a board in re la tio n to a larger
stru ctu re , o r to b a la n ce, sq u are so m e th in g in rela tio n to so m eth in g else. A nd , a s we
w ill s e c below , b y " ju s t " I m e a n ren d erin g w h at is "d u e ." T h e s e tw o te rm s c o m e very
c lo s e t o b ein g sy n o n y m o u s a s I em p loy t h e m h ere. T h e te rm "rig h t" is o fte n u sed w h en
co n sid erin g a duty, a s in right v e rsu s w rong, and it th ereb y refers to th e q u a lity o f an
a ctio n in so fa r a s it accord s w ith m oral n o rm s, req u irem en ts o f a co n tra ct, o r w hatever
it is th a t d e te r m in e s w h a t is o b lig atory betw een p erso n s o r b etw een p erso n s and any
th in g e lse . " G o o d ," a s opposed to bad, ten d s to m ean so m e th in g in trin s ic to a being,
o r to a n end. It re la te s to a c tio n in s o fa r a s a c tio n serves th e good o f a b ein g o r lead s to
th a t good; o r e v e n in s o fa r a s a c tio n reflects th e g ood n ess o f G od.
198 TUST LOVE
I have already given a non-norm ative description of love, in partic

ular sexual rom antic love, in chapter 4. In this description lie clues
for th e norm s (the criteria, requirem ents, standards) of right and good
loving. If love is an affective response to, union w ith, and affirm a
tion of an object, it will be accurate and adequate insofar as it does
not "m iss" th e object, th e beloved — that is, ( 1 ) insofar as it is not a
response shaped by an illusory, distorted, or falsified understanding
of w hat is loved; (2) insofar as it really is an interior uniting with
the beloved (which need not always imply m utuality of loves); and
(3) insofar as it affirm s the beloved in ways that do n ot m iss the
actuality and potentialities of th e one who is loved.41 Put positively,
love is true and ju st, right and good, insofar as it is a true response
to the reality of the beloved, a genuine union between the one who
loves and th e one loved, and an accurate and adequate affective affir
m ation of th e beloved. Perhaps the m ost basic exam ple of this is to
be found in our récognition that things are n ot to be loved as if they
were p erson s, and p erson s are not to be loved as if they were things.
W hat is wrong with loving a person as a thing is that the person is a
person , n o t a thing
But we ca n look at m ore specific examples: A rom antic love will
be less accurate, true, and even less just if it sees and responds to the
beloved n ot for w hat he or she is but solely for the prestige he can add
to my nam e; if this is the shape of the love, it will fail as union with
the beloved, and it will affirm for him w hat may be destructive not
only of h im b u t of our relationship. Or a love for a child will be in
accurate and potentially destructive if it takes no account of the fact
that this individual is, say, only five years old — with limited capac
ities and significant potentialities, both of w hich are to be respected
and nurtured, not cut off or stifled in their beginnings. O r again, love
of a spouse (at least in a contemporary W estern context42) will be not
4 1 . I have ad d ressed th ese sam e co n sid era tio n s in P erson al C o m m itm e n ts : B egin
ning, K eep in g , C h a n g in g (San F ran cisco : H arper a Row, 1 9 8 6 ), 2 9 - 3 2 , 8 0 - 8 4 . S im ila r
issu es are a t sta k e in m y effo rts to co m b in e co m p a ssio n and respect in C o m p a ss io n
a te R es p ect: A F em in ist A p p r o a ch to M ed ic a l E th ics a n d O th er Q u estio n s (N ew York:
P au list, 2 0 0 2 ) , 2 1 - 4 3 .
4 2 . O u r p e rcep tio n s, and h c n c c , o u r loves a rc indeed in m an y w ays so cially c o n
stru cted . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n th a t th ey are u n im p o rta n t o r t h a t th e y c a n n o t h ave m oral
n o rm s th a t ta k e so c ia l co n stru ctio n in to a cco u n t. If, fo r exam p le, w c live in a society
only inadequate but distortive and u njust if it affirm s the spouse only
as an in stru m ent for housekeeping or breadwinning or producing a
child. In all o f these exam ples we have loves, but in som e sense they
are “false" loves, or at least m istaken loves. Why? Once again, what
are the norm s or criteria by w hich we can judge a love to be “true"
and good, ju st and even wise? If we look a t the three examples I have
ju st given, there are m ore clues for an answer to this question.
Regarding th e first example: T h ere are lots of ways in w hich ro
m antic love can be wonderful, life-enhancing, a gift to be celebrated
and treasured. But there arc also lots of ways in w hich it can be inad
equate, inaccurate, and harm ful both to the beloved and to the lover.
At the very least we expect it to be a response to and affirm ation of
the beloved as a person — w hich is em inently m ore th an a token for
one's own prestige.43 In the second example: T h e fundam ental rea
son why it is im portant w hen loving a child to take account of the
fact that she is a child is because she is more than a projection of
our own needs and m ore th an a “little adult." She is unique, vulner
able, and in need of relationships that affirm her; she is destined to
becom e m ore autonom ous, worthy of respect as a hum an being who
can grow in to wholeness. To affirm her w ithout attention to what
she needs in order to grow from a five-year old to an adult can be to
disrespect and to harm her. Regarding the third and last example: A
spousal love ca n truthfully include w hat the spouse can be and do
for the other, but if it is only this, it m isses the reality of the spouse
w here th e e x p e cta tio n s fo r m arriag e are d ifferen t fro m o th er so cieties, th e n th e s e ex

p ecta tio n s have to be tak en in to a c c o u n t w h en we are co n sid erin g w h at w ill h a rm o r
h elp p erson s, a n d w h a t th e m e a n in g i s o f th e ir c o m m itm e n ts.
43. It m ig h t b e o b jecte d in rela tio n to m y exam p le h ere th a t "ro m a n tic " love is
never a s ca lcu la tin g a s a ssessin g so m e o n e 's v alu e in prestige fo r t h e o n e w h o loves.
I d o te n d to a g re e w ith t h is o b je c tio n , a lth o u g h th e e x a m p le is a t le a st c le a re r th a n
so m e o th ers o n e m ig h t create. It m ig h t b e b e tte r to in s ta n c e a ro m a n tic love th a t is so
ov erw helm in g th a t i t d oes m is ta k e th e ch a ra cte ristics of th e o n e loved — se e in g him
(or her) a s m o re in te llig e n t, m o re so p h isticated , m o re talen ted th a t h e really is. I n this
ca se , ro m a n tic lov e w ould be indeed " ro m a n tic ," y et m is s th e real person b y reaso n of
m is ta k e n p e rce p tio n o f th e p erso n 's c h a ra cte ristics. I d o n o t, how ever, th in k th a t being
a ttra cted t o and fa llin g in love w ith so m eo n e b ecau se of h is o r h e r g en u in e intellig en ce,
o r so m e o th e r a ttra ctiv e featu re, need u ltim a te ly be a m ista k en love. It m ig h t be an
in s ta n ce w h ere th e r e is a n accu rate p ercep tio n o f c h a ra cte ristics, and alth ou g h the
ch a ra cte ristics a r e n o t th e w hole o f th e p erson , th ey c a n be t h e c o n d itio n s o f falling in
love. M oreover, t h is d oes n o t p reclu de th a t s u c h a lov e c a n grow in to an u n con d ition al
love.
200 TUST LOVE
as person, w ith all that makes her or h im lovable, and with all that
has been m utually pledged in m arital union.
M oral N o rm s fo r a Just Love

W hat begins to emerge from these considerations is th at the norm
or criterion fo r a true and good love is th e co n crete reality o f the
b elo v ed — of whoever or whatever is loved.44 Ju st as in regard to
knowledge we identify the possibilities of ignorance, m istakes, and
lies, so in regard to love we can simply fail to love the other at all,
or we can love with a m istaken love, affirm ing som e aspect of the
beloved's reality in a way th at unintentionally distorts the w hole or
m isses an im portant part of it. We can also love w ith a "lying" love,
intentionally ignoring and distorting aspects of th e reality of th e one
loved. A love is right and good insofar as it aim s to affirm truthfully
the concrete reality of the beloved. T h is is in large part w hat I m ean
by a "ju st love."45
I say "in p art" because n ot only m ust love respond to, u nite with,
and affirm th e one loved in her or his concrete reality, but it m ust
also be "tru e " to the o n e loving and to the nature o f th e relationship
between lover and loved. A love will n ot be true or just if there is an
affirm ation o f the beloved that involves destruction of the one who
loves. I do n o t refer to a justifiable "laying down of one's life" for
the beloved, but rather to a letting oneself be destroyed as a person
4 4 . O n e c la rifica tio n m ay be usefu l here: to su ggest t h a t rig h t loving d epends o n ou r

affirm in g th e co n cre te re ality o f a p erso n d oes n o t m e a n th a t w e a ffirm , fo r exam p le,
th e fa ct th a t th e p e rso n i s a thief. N o r d oes it m ean th a t w e a b s tra c t fro m th is a sp e ct of
th e p erso n . It m e a n s, rather, th a t w c recognize th e p erso n a s a p erson , and w is h fo r the
person to be w h o le a s a p erso n and a s th e ind ivid ual p erso n sh e is o r c a n be. H e n ce, love
m ay inclu de a n g u ish over an individual’s thievery, and a y e a rn in g for th is individual to
ch ange in so fa r a s th is is p o ssible. Sim ilarly, right loving d ocs n o t m e a n affirm in g th a t
a p erso n w h o is d esp erately poor, ev en starv in g to d eath , re m a in in th is situ a tio n ju s t
a s i t is. T o a ffirm th e a ctu ality a n d p o te n tia lity o f p erso n s in clu d es w a n tin g fo r th em
w h a t th ey need f o r w ell-being.
4 5 . S e c Farley, P erson al C o m m itm e n ts , 8 1 - 8 2 . M y p o sitio n i s n o t th a t, given a c c u
r a te k n o w le d g e o f its o b je c t, love w ill alw ays be ju s t and tru e. T h is w ould perhap s fit
w ith a So cra tic v ie w o f love and m orality, b u t n o t w ith m in e. T h i s i s w hy I sa y th a t love
m ay in te n tio n a lly a s w ell a s u n in te n tio n a lly ignore o r m is s its o b ject. M y co m m e n ts
abo u t b o th know led ge and love m ay, how ever, e lic it sco rn a s y e t an o th er v ersio n o f a
"co rre sp o n d en ce '' th eo ry of tru th . 1 do n o t and c a n n o t h ere tak e o n q u estio n s raised
by th e w h o le of ep istem olog y . N o n e th e le ss, w h a t I sa y abo u t " ju s t " lov e d o es require a
m oral ep istem o lo g y th a t a t le a s t in co rp o rates a fo rm o f m itig ated o r hu m bled realism .
bccause of th e way in w hich one loves another. T h is will be clcar if

we rem em ber th at love is an "affective" affirm ation— w hich means
that th e lover affirm s the beloved w ith h e r o r h is ow n being. As I
have indicated before, if I love you, in addition to knowing you, I
do n ot say sim ply "You arc," but rather, "I w ant you to be, and to
be full and firm in being." I say this w ith m y very being. Loving,
therefore, involves placing one's affective self-affirm ation in affective
affirm ation o f th e beloved. It involves, in other words, placing my
love of m yself in loving affirm ation of the one that I love.46
Similarly, love is false or m istaken w hen it does n ot accord with the
nature of th e relationship between lover and loved. O ur relationships
are part of our reality. They are part of who we are, but precisely
bccausc they arc "relationships" they do not reside in the one and
the other separately; they are "betw een" u s; they are in us and be
yond us, in u s but transcendent of each toward th e other; for we are
transcendent embodied beings. Love, of course, m a k e s and shapes re
lationships, and love can change relationships. Yet love cannot, and
ought not to try to, m ake som e relationships be whatever we want
th em to be. T h u s, for example, a parent-child relationship requires
that love on eith er side be qualified in som e way by reason of this
relationship, w ithout denying the genuine equality that is its u lti
m ate aim or th e necessary role-reversals that m ay com e in tim e or
by reason of specific circum stances. T h u s, also, if I love som eone as
m y spouse w hen the other is espoused to som eone else, it means
I do n ot take account of the o th er's com m itm ents, w hich are part
of his or her concrete reality; I falsify the nature of the relationship
46. I do n o t h ere m ea n , a s s o m e p eople in s is t, th a t u n le ss w e love ou rselv es first

w e c a n n o t lov e an o th er. W h e th e r o r n o t th is is tru e, p sy ch olo gical d ev elo p m en t is no t
w h a t I a m ta lk in g a b o u t h ere. I m e a n , rath er, t h a t th e n a tu r e o f love fo r a n o th e r (or
for w hatever) in v o lv es sim u lta n e o u s a ffirm a tio n of ou rselv es in a n d (o r affirm in g the
other. By th is I d o n o t m e a n to im p ly th a t it is "s e lf love" in th e ord in ary se n se o f this
te rm th a t is affirm ed first a n d above a ll, and on ly secon d arily affirm ed for an o th er. T h e
se lf-a ffirm a tio n th a t is involved in an y love o f e ith e r o n e se lf o r an y o n e o r a n y th in g else
is sim p ly th e fo rm th a t affective a ffirm a tio n tak es. U sin g o th e r language, w e m ig h t say
th a t to w ill is to a ffirm o n e se lf w illin g . T h e r e are fu rth e r co m p lex ities th a t I w ill no t
go in to here, b u t th e y sh ou ld be k ep t in m in d . T h a t is, I c a n love a n o th e r u ltim ately
for h is o r h e r o w n sak e, o r fo r th e sa k e o f m yself. I n t h e la tte r c a se , I c a n tru ly lov e the
o th er, b u t w ith a lov e th a t is relative to (perhaps ev en in s tru m e n ta l to , co n d itio n a l on)
m y love of m y self. M o s t w ould agree th a t th is is n o t th e h eig h t o f in terp erso n al love
w h ich involves o th c r-c c n tc re d n c ss, b u t i t is n o n e th e le ss love.
202 TUST LOVE
between us. Realizing contingencies in these examples, they none

theless reflect w hat I m ean when I say th at love m u st be appropriate
to th e nature of the relationship between lover and loved.47
I am arguing that it is the concrete reality of the beloved that m ust
be attended to if love is to be just. T h is will be shorthand, however,
for my conclusion here that love is ju st and true, in the sense of "ac
curate," ( 11 w hen it does n ot falsify or "m iss" the reality of th e person
loved (either as hum an or as unique individual), (2) w hen it docs not
falsify or "m iss " the reality of th e one loving, and (3) w hen it does
n ot violate, d isto n , or ignore the nature of the relationship between
them . W ith this shorthand, I shall always be including the whole of
w hat love descriptively involves, but with primary attention given
to the beloved. I also do not leave behind the correlative conclusion
that love is m ore or less ju st in th e sense of "adequate" insofar as it
is more or less fitting, appropriate, to the relationship, and insofar
as it more or less adequately reaches the full com plex reality of the
one loving and the one loved. T here are n ot only com plexities in the
objects of love but degrees of loving and of loving justly.
All of w hat I have said about "ju st love" tells us th at love as an
em otion (as a n affective internal responsive act) is n ot blind (al
though it ca n be m istaken, and it can ignore or abstract from what
it does not w ant to see or is incapable of seeing). As I have argued
and held in all of m y writings, em otions contain n ot only an affec
tive elem ent but a cognitive one. (u st as desire, anger, compassion,
and fear are dependent upon the beliefs we have about their objects,
so it is with love. As M artha N ussbaum puts it, we may deceive
ourselves about w hat is given in love, "about who; and how; and
when; and w hether."48 But th e possibilities of error, of illusion or
delusion, do n ot elim inate the possibilities of accuracy, of receiving
4 7 . In th e fir s t exam p le, I in no se n se w a n t to rigidity th e n a tu re of a ch ild -p aren t

relationship,· I o n ly w a n t to acknow led ge th a t i t is a rela tio n th a t is im p o rta n t to the love
of b o th ch ild and p a re n t. R egarding th e seco n d e xam p le, it is d ifficu lt w ith o u t providing
fu ller d etail to ta k e a c c o u n t of m a rita l s itu a tio n s of ab an d o n m en t, o r s itu a tio n s in
w h ich legal m a rria g e is n o lon ger viable, o r w here th e d eath o f o n e spouse c a n n o t be
d eterm in ed , and so fo rth . It is p o ssible, too , th a t o n e m ig h t u n d erstan d "sp o u sa l" love
in rela tio n sh ip s th a t c a n n o t be "in s titu tio n a liz e d " fo r o n e reason o r another.
4 8 . M a rth a C . N u ssb au m , L ove's K n o w led g e: E ssays o n P lu lo so p h y a n d Literatu re
(N ew York: O xford U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 9 0 ), 2 6 1 .
and responding to w hat is real. "W c also discover and correct our
self-deceptions."49 At least som etim es we do.
Despite th e utter im portance of knowledge in relation to love, our
loves need n o t be lim ited by our understanding of their objects. As
T h o m as Aquinas noted, love goes more directly to its object than
does knowledge.50 We can love som eone beyond w hat we can know
of him or her. T h is is true even of our love for God. For the union that
is possible in love can cxcccd our knowledge of the beloved, although
its direction and form rem ain subject to the knowledge we have.
We can, for exam ple, love som eone utterly, in a way that any new
knowledge w e gain (even if it is "disappointing") will n ot dim inish
our love. T h is is, indeed, w hat it m eans to love "unconditionally."
In summary, then, the em otion of love is n ot the sam e as "feel
ings" that co m e and go, whether we like it or not, in th e mode of
physiological disturbances and sensations, and th at m ay importantly
accom pany em otions but are n ot required for th em .51 Love is sponta
neously rcccptivc but not a passive reaction; it is active in response,
constituted in union, shaped by perceptions and understandings, and
engaging of m yself in affirm ation of w hat I love. It is true and just
w hen and insofar as it accords w ith the concrete reality of w hat is
loved, th e one loving, and th e nature of the relationship between
them . T h is does n ot m ean th at we have perfect knowledge of any
created realities. And it certainly is com patible w ith th e social con
struction of our perceptions and our loves in the contexts in which
4 9 . Ibid.
5 0 . T h o m a s A q u in as, S u m m a T h e o lo g ia e I-II. 2 7 . 2 ad 2 ; I- II. 6 6 . 6 ; II. 2 3 . 6.
5 1 . S e e R o b ert C . S o lo m o n , "E m o tio n s and C h o ic e ," in E xplaining E m otion s, ed.
A m e lie O . R o rty {Berkeley: U n iv ersity o f C a lifo rn ia P ress, 1 9 8 0 ), 2 5 4 : O n e c a n be
a n g ry w ith o u t fe e lin g a n g ry : o n e c a n b e a n g ry fo r th re e d a y s o r five y e a rs a n d n o t feel
a n y th in g id en tifia b le a s a feelin g of a n g er co n tin u o u sly th ro u g h t h a t prolonged p eriod."
Yet a s M a rth a N u ssb a u m h as observed, "w c sh ou ld d istin g u ish 'feelin g s' o f tw o so rts.
O n th e o n e h an d , there are feelin g s w ith a rich in te n tio n a l c o n te n t — feelin gs o f the
e m p tin e ss o f o n e 's life w ith o u t a c e r ta in p e rso n — S u c h feelin gs m ay e n te r th e id en
tity co n d itio n s o£ so m e e m o tio n ___ O n th e o th er h an d , th ere are feelin gs w ith o u t rich
in te n tio n a lity o r co g n itiv e c o n te n t, fo r in sta n ce, feelin gs o f fatigue, o f e xtra energy. As
w ith bodily s ta te s , th ey m ay acco m p an y e m o tio n o r th ey m a y n o t — b u t th e y a rc no t
n c ccssa ry fo r i t . " M a rth a N u ssb a u m , "E m o tio n s a s Ju d g em en ts o f Value and Im p or
ta n c e ," in R ela tiv ism , Suffering, a n d B ey o n d : Essays in M em o r y o f H im al K. M atilal
(D elh i: O xford U n iv e rsity Press, 1 9 9 7 ), 2 4 7 . S e e a lso S o lo m o n , T h e Passions (N otre
D a m e , IN : U n iv e r sity o f N o tre D a m e P ress, 1 9 8 3 ).
204 TUST LOVE
wc live. Insofar as our perceptions and convictions about any realities

are socially constructed, so will our em otions be socially constructed.
D econstruction, one hopes, is about getting clearer about the realities
we love, w an t to love, and choose to love.
Love a n d Freedom
T h ere is one m ore observation th at m ust be made about love if we
cxpcct the norm s of love (the criteria for right and ju st loving) ever
to govern our actions. T h a t is, love can b e su bject to ch oice. In its
first instance, its first awakening, love is n ot a m atter of free choice.
It is, as I have already said, receptive, but actively receptive as a
spontaneous response to w hat is perceived as lovable.52 Still, w c can
influence our loves even in their beginning by choosing to pay at
tention to certain realities or not, putting ourselves in a position to
discover lovableness insofar as it is there, choosing to believe in (even
if w c do n ot y e t "se c ," since faith is a form of knowledge) the value of
52. A s I have said before, it is co m m o n , esp ecially am o n g C h ris tia n s , to sp e ak of

love fo r th e "u n lo v a b le ," a n d to co n sid er th e h e ig h t o f C h ris tia n love, a g a p e , to be c ith e r
m o tiv ated by d uty, o r to be G o d 's love flow ing through u s and n o t really ou r lov e a t
all. F ro m th is p o in t o f view, lov e w ould b e w h o lly a ctiv e, a n d n o t in th e fir s t in s ta n ce
resp on sive to b e a u ty o r lovab leness. T h is s e e m s o n ly partly tru e to o u r exp erien ce.
T h e r e a rc a n u m b e r o f th in g s w ron g w ith th is co n stru a l o f C h ris tia n love. F irst, if it
im p lie s t h a t o u r lo v e s are alw ays, only, and in every w ay " c re a tiv e ," b esto w in g goodness
and b e au ty {"lo v a b le n e ss") o n the other, th is is to m ak e c la im s fo r h u m a n love th a t
belong on ly to G o d 's lov e — w h ich is a lov in g -in to-bein g , a lov e e x n ih ilo . W h atev er
o r w h o m ev er w c c o m e to love, however, is already lovable in so m e se n se , by reaso n of
G o d 's cre a tiv e love. It is tru e (and we k n o w th is fro m exp erien ce) th a t h u m a n loves
a r e o r c a n be cre a tiv e , b u t o n ly partially. A lth ou gh o u r loves are in th e first in s ta n ce
resp o n se s to w h a t is already lovable, n o n e th e le ss p erso n s c a n b lo sso m u n d er any one's
love, in clu d in g o u r ow n.
Secon d , to sa y th a t w e sh o u ld love w h at is in every resp ect "u n lo v a b le" o r " n o t able
to be loved " is lite ra lly a co n tra d ictio n , th o u g h it is su rely p o ssible to d o th e d eeds of
lo v e o u t o f d u ty o r o n c o m m a n d . W h e n w c a rc th e o n e s b e in g loved , a n e x p re ssio n o f
love fo r u s th a t ris e s o n ly fro m duty, o r th a t d oes n o t really c o m e in an y s e n s e from
th e person w h o ex p re sse s it, is hardly a love in w h ich we co u ld rejo ice. O n th e o th er
h an d , th e b e lief th a t G o d lo v es th ro u g h u s, w h e t h e r o r n o t w e lo v e a t a ll , is n o t on ly
plausible b u t co n so lin g . It ju s t d oes n o t se e m t h e k ind of lov e to w h ich C h ris tia n s o r
a n y o th e r h u m a n s are u ltim a te ly called.
I n o u r e x p e rie n ce , love is aw akened and specified by w h at w e d iscover t o b e beautiful
o r good o r lo v ab le. E v en if w e a rc n o t tou ch ed , aw akened in love, by so m e o n e w ho
acco rd in g to s o m e stan d ard s appears to be q u ite u n lovab le, th e v ie w o f lov e th a t I am
su ggesting yield s an o b lig atio n to try to d iscover t h e b eau ty o f th e o th e r; and sh o rt of
th is, to b e lie v e t h a t all p erso n s are lovable (loved a t le a st by G od) ev en th o u g h w e do
n o t " s e c " it, a t le a s t n o t a t first.
persons or of anything in création. Insofar as love is like a judgment

of value (or at least is in response to and informed by a judgment of
value), we can , as Robert Solom on says, open ourselves "to argument,
persuasion, and evidence."33
Even m ore importantly, once a love is awakened, it can offer itself
to freed o m . I t can give rise to the need and the desire to affirm itself,
and to affirm its object, by our free choice. (I do n ot m ean to speak
of love as if it is a "th in g ," It is I w ho am awakened in love; it is I
who can cxpcricncc and understand m y love as worthy or n ot worthy
of m y freely ch osen ratification.) A t the center of ourselves where
freedom is a possibility, we can iden tify with our loves and freely
ratify them — this love or that, this form of loving or that, this or
that action to express love. We take responsibility for our loves, or at
least we can do so. We can also repudiate, or defer, som e of our loves
by choosing n ot to iden tify w ith them . We do n ot have direct control
over our loves, so th at our choice is hardly ever a choice to "turn
o ff" a love; but we can choose not to identify our deepest selves with
som e of our spontaneous loves and n ot to let som e loves flow into
action. Moreover, I repeat, we can shape our loves by our choiccs.
We can choose to believe in , pay attention to, w hat we love — even
if the feelings that accom pany love com e and go. We can choose to
try to modify our em otions and feelings w hen they conflict w ith our
chosen loves — by ignoring them , focusing them , giving th em "free
play" or n ot in our im aginations. We can choose to do love's actions,
and order our lives in ways th at are conducive to the continuance
and growth of our chosen, ratified loves.
D esire
Desire, as I have dcscribcd it earlier, is grounded in a more funda

m ental affective activity; it is grounded in and rises from love —
ultim ately for myself or another or in som e m ixture of love of self
53. S o lo m o n , "E m o tio n s and C h o ic e ," 2 7 0 . S e e a lso m y tre a tm e n t o f lov e in relation

to c h o ice and to c o m m itm e n t in Farley, P erson al C o m m itm e n ts , ch ap . 3 . W h a t I am
say in g h e re sh o u ld n o t be c o n s tm c d a s m e a n in g th a t w e a rc in cap ab le o f C h ristia n
a g a p e , th a t w e "a p p ra is e " and "ju d g e " th e lo v ab le n ess o f w ho and w h a t w e love and
re stric t o u r lo v es to o b je cts o f w h ich w e approve. It d oes m e a n th a t love involves — a s
I have said a g a in and ag ain — a resp on se to w h at is perceived a s lovable.
206 TUST LOVE
and other.54 D esire grounded in love o f ourselves is the form love

takes w hen it w ants (or rather, w e want) greater self-affirm ation, or
well-being, or acquisition of som e sort, or even developed virtue. D e
sire grounded in lov e o f a n o th er is the form love takes w hen we are
not fully u nited with the object of our love — whether because we
w ant greater u nion , or possession, or mutuality, or presence; or be
cause we w ant our love to be greater, better, m ore true, for the sake of
our beloved. D esire will be ju st and true if the love that is its source
is ju st and true, but it can also be constructed in ways that influence,
for good or ill, th e love out of which it rises. D esire for another may
outrun our love for another, so that our love becom es love primarily
for ourselves. All of this m eans that desire, too, can have norm s; and
the norm s, n o t surprisingly, have a lot to do w ith the concrete reality
of w hat is loved.
In th e previous chapter I spoke of rom antic love, sexual love, and
the corresponding rom antic and sexual desires. W hen we turn to
sexual eth ical norm s, w hat w c arc looking for, ultimately, arc the
norm s for sexual love and desire. From all that I have said thus far, I
hope it is now clear why I am looking for th e norm s of ju stice that will
"norm " th e loves and desires, relationships and activities, associated
with hum an sexuality. W hat, then, will a ju stice ethic look like in
the sexual sphere of our lives?
54. S e e m y tre a tm e n t o f d esire in general and a s p art of an y o b je ct fo r free ch oice:

Farley, "F reed om and D e s ir e ," in T h e P apers o f t h e H en r y L u c e III F ello w s in T h eo lo g y
v o l. 3 (A tlan ta: S ch o la rs, 1 9 9 9 ), 5 7 - 7 4
C hapter 6
FRAMEWORK
FOR A SEXUAL ETHIC
Just Sex
I
T is n o s u r p r is e that the ethical framework I propose for the
sexual sphere of hum an life has to do with justice and with love.
I have been moving steadily to this all along. It is also no surprise
that I propose, finally, a framework that is n ot ju stice an d love, but
ju stice in loving and in the actions w hich flow from that love. T h e
m ost difficult question to be asked in developing a sexual ethic is
not w hether th is or that sexual act in the abstract is morally good,
but rather, w hen is sexual expression appropriate, morally good and
just, in a relationship of any kind. W ith w hat kinds of motives, under
w hat sorts of circum stances, in w hat form s of relationships, do we
render our sexual selves to one another in ways that are good, true,
right, and just?
Arguing th a t ju stice and love should be put together in th e ways
I suggest m ay be counterintuitive. Indeed, strong objections could
be raised: m any w'ill say that to m ake justice a requirem ent for love
underm ines too m any understandings of love, especially rom antic
and sexual love. It introduces a kind of "tyranny" of justice into the
glory of love. I t rcduccs sex to a contract or to som e kind of measure
that is unsuited to w hat sexuality is. It is too harsh a discipline for the
spontaneity o f love, the passion of sexual desire, and the intim acies
marked by jo y while safeguarded by privacy. Wc do not need one
m ore way for heavy-handed socially constructed norm s to shape and
to control personal relations, to the advantage of som e but perhaps
the detrim ent of all.
207
208 TUST LOVE
Yet the underm ining of sex and love is not a necessary conse
quence of a "la w " of justice. Like W. H. Auden we m ight demur:
"Law is th e o n e all gardeners observe___Law is the wisdom of the
old, T h e im potent grandfathers shrilly sco ld . . . Law, says the priest
with a priestly lo o k . . . is th e words in my priestly book— Law, says
the judge. . . is T h e Law." B u t lovers shyly propose that the law is
"Like love I s a y . . . Like love we can 't com pel or fly, Like love we often
weep, Like love we seldom keep."1 T h e law of justice need carry none
of these m eanings, however, as I hope to show.
Ju stice
Justice, of course, can m ean m any things. M y use of the term is
based sim ply on the classic fundam ental "form al" m eaning: to ren
der to each h er or h is due. T h is is a m ore general n otion of justice
th an our usual focus on certain kinds of justice — for example, dis
tributive justice, legal justice, retributive justice. But it is at the heart
of all forms o f justice, and w hen it com es to sexual justice, this basic
m eaning rem ains relevant.
"Form al" m eanings, however, do not go very far in telling us w hat
really is just. T h ey provide direction, but not sufficiently specific
content to be of m uch help in guiding our behaviors. They do not,
in short, tell us w hat is "d u e." T h is is why whole system s of ju s
tice have, in fact, been unjust. W ithout critical spécification of what
"due" m eans, there can be — in the nam e of justice — system s in
which slavery is endorsed, certain groups of persons are m arginal
ized, and w om en and m en are "legitim ately" treated unequally It
is presumed and som etim es theoretically defended that it is "due"
som e individuals to be treated as m asters and "due" others to be
treated as slaves; it is right and just to place som e persons on the
m argins of society because this affirm s what is due th em and what
is due others; it is due w om en to be assigned certain roles and places
in social hierarchies because this accords with w hat they are.
Although I am aware that there arc m any ways to spccify the
requirem ents of ju stice — through social contracts, longstanding
1. W. H . A u d en , "L a w L ike L ov e," in S e le c te d P oetry o f W. H. A u d en , 2 n d ed. (New

York: V in tag e B o o k s , 1 9 7 0 ), 6 2 - 6 4 .
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex 209
custom s, certain kinds of noncontradictory reasoning— I move for

ward here w ith th e perspective I have already introduced. I begin,
then, by translating the formal m eaning of ju stice (render to each
w hat is due) in to the following basic form al ethical principle: Persons
an d groups o f p erson s ought to h e affirm ed according to th eir con crete
reality, a ctu a l an d p o te n tia l Depending on their circum stances and
the nature of their relationships, the concrete reality of persons can
include som e particularly relevant aspect of their reality — as, for
example, buyer or lender, parent or child, professional caregiver or
patient, com m itted m em ber of a voluntary association, and so on.
But even a form al principle like this one is insufficient for discerning
w hat really is ju st. We therefore need to go on to determ ine ''m ate
rial" ethical principles of justice — that is, principles that do specify
and substantiate w hat is "due/ ' that do give substantive content to a
form al principle. If, as I have argued in the previous chapter, a formal
principle for ju stice in loving is to love in accord w ith the concrete
reality of persons, then m aterial principles of ju stice will depend on
our interpretation of the realities of persons — their needs, capacities,
relational claim s, vulnerabilities, possibilities.
T h e C o n crete Reality o f Persons
O ur knowledge of hum an persons generally, as well as of individual

persons, differs and changes, sin cc our interpretations of hum an ex
perience are historical and social. Moreover, there are differences (not
ju st perceptions of differences) in the experienced concrete realities
of individuals and groups — differences that are or ought to be of
trem endous im portance to us. And who can n ot notice th e myriad
nuances of h um anity that appear in so m any ways in the searching
eyes of the lover?
. . . H ow m any loved your m om ents of glad grace,

And loved your beauty with love false or true,
But one m an loved the pilgrim soul in you,
And loved the sorrows of your changing face___2
2. W. B . Y eats, "W h e n You A re O ld ," in T h e C o lle c te d P o e m s o fW . B. Yeats (New

York: M a c m illa n , 1 9 5 6 ), 4 0 - 4 1 .
210 TUST LOVE
To acknowledge all of these difficulties and possibilities should make

u s cautious in our interpretations of the concrete reality of persons,
but it does n o t contradict the requirem ent of discerning as best we
can the reality that is part of w hat every person is or shares in some
form , the reality of persons as persons. Love itself may lead us to
exam ine our interpretations of th e realities of persons and to test
these interpretations with w hat is available to us in th e sources of
m oral in sigh t that w c saw in chapter 5. In this way w c can correct
or em brace th em again.
In general, what 1 propose is an inductive understanding of the
sh ared co n crete reality o f h u m an persons that includes the following:
Each person is constituted with a co m p lex structure — embodied,
inspirited, with n eed s for food, clothing, and shelter, and at some
point usually a capacity for procréation; but also with a capacity for
free c h o ic e and the ability to thin k an d to fe e l.3 H um an persons are
also essentially rela tio n a l — w ith interpersonal and social needs and
capacities to open to others, including God, in knowledge, love, and
desire, as w ell as all the em otional capacities that we experience,
such as fear, anger, sorrow, hope, joy. Persons exist in th e world, so
that their reality includes their particular history and their location
in social, political, econom ic, and cultural contexts. Further, persons
have som e so rt of relationship to institutions — without total iden
tification or lim itatio n to system s and institutions, and som etim es
3. H ow w e in te rp re t th is co m p le x s tru ctu re w ill m ak e a g reat deal o f d ifferen ce in

w h a t w e affirm f o r ou rselv es and o th e rs. A s 1 no ted in P erson al C o m m itm e n ts , 141
n . 2 : If, fo r ex a m p le , w c th in k th a t e m o tio n s a rc th e p rim ary ele m e n t in the h u m an
personality, w c w ill have a d ifferen t view o f h u m a n w ell-bein g th a n if w e th in k th a t
e a ch o n e ’s rea so n o r ra tio n a lity is prim ary . Sim ilarly , if w e th in k th a t free c h o ic e is o f
c e n tr a l im p o rta n c e to every p erson , w e w ill w a n t fo r p erso n s so m e th in g q u ite different
th a n if w c th in k t h a t p e rso n s h a v e a p la c e in a n o rg a n ic so c ie ty w h e re th e ir ro le s a rc
p rescribed and t h e im p o rtan ce of freed om is negligible. I c a n n o t resolve s u c h d ifferences
here, th o u g h m y overall th e o ry in th is b o o k n o t o n ly ra ise s t h e q u e stio n s b u t a tte m p ts
to offer a co h e re n t view o f so m e m oral req u irem en ts based o n an in terp retatio n o f the
re a lity o f p erso n s. I sh ou ld add, also, th a t I am n o t addressing h ere th e q u estio n o f w h o
sh ou ld be tre a ted a s p erso n s if n o t everyo ne w e th in k of a s a p erso n h a s th e p o ssib ility
o f exercisin g th e ca p a cities I a m d escrib in g (su ch a s th in k in g , ch o o sin g , procreating,
e tc .). T o d escribe w h a t b elong s to "p erso n h o o d " is a d ifferen t ta s k from id en tifyin g the
pool o f e n titie s th a t are t o be treated a s p erso n s. For th e latter, all th o se b o rn o f person s
c a n b e inclu d ed , w hatever th e ir p re se n t ca p a cities o r ca p a cities fo r d evelo p m en t. B ut
th is in v o lv es a d iscu ssio n of a n o th e r s e t o f issu e s th a n th e o n e s th a t I a m addressing
in th is volum e.
w ith only a rejecting relationship. And the reality of persons includes

n ot only their present actuality but their positive potentiality for de
velopment, for h um an and individual flourishing; as well as their
vulnerability to dim inishm ent. Finally, every person is unique as
well as a com m on sharer in humanity. A ju st love of persons will
take all of these aspects of persons into account, though som e will
be m ore im portant th an others, depending on th e context and the
nature of a relationship.
O bligating Features o f Personhood

Contem porary understandings of th e hum an person lead us to a
special focus on at least two basic features of hum an personhood:
features that ca n be called au ton om y and relationality.4 "B asic" here
does n ot im ply th at we can understand fully w hat the "essence" of
the hum an person is. T here is a wariness in contem porary W est
ern thought about even acknowledging that there are "essences" to
be known, le t alone essences that w e can k n o w My attem pt to de
lineate features of w hat it m eans to be a hum an person recognizes
the partiality o f our knowledge, the historical changeability of knowl
edge and the variations of hum an self-understandings from culture to
culture and across tim e. N onetheless, it seem s to m e th at we cannot
reasonably assert either that we know nothing at all about the human
person as person, or that we have nothing of a shared knowledge in
this regard.
It is not necessarily to abstract from the concrete reality of indi
vidual persons to consider w hat is central to the h um an personality.
4. M y a p p ro ach m ig h t a t le a st m e e t th e p rag m atic level o f "stra te g ic e ss e n tia lis m ,"

in t h e s e n s e in w h ic h S eren e Jo n e s and o th ers u s e th is te rm . S e e S e re n e Jon es, Fem
inism an d Christian Theology: Cartographies o f G race (M in n e a p o lis: F o rtre ss, 2 0 0 0 } .
Y et m y co n c e rn is n o t p rim arily w ith sp e cu lativ e know ledge; it is w ith th e k in d of
know ledge th a t w ill te ll u s w h a t is h a rm fu l and w h at helpful in h u m a n life. T o so m e
e x te n t, th is co rresp o n d s w ith Beverly H a rriso n 's v iew o f ju s tic e a s a p rim ary m etap h o r
o f rig h t re la tio n sh ip , o n e th a t sh ap es th e telo s o f a good co m m u n ity and a n im a te s
C h ris tia n m oral se n sib ilitie s. S e e B everly W ild u n g F la rriso n , Ju s tice in t h e M aking:
F em in ist S o c ia l E th ics (L ouisville: W e stm in ste r Jo h n K no x, 2 0 0 4 } , 1 6 . I m ay b e even
c lo s e r to M a rth a N u ssb a u m 's d elin eatio n o f h u m a n "fu n c tio n a l c a p a b ilitie s " approach,
sin c e N u ssb a u m and I sh a re n o t o n ly a so cial e th ical a im b u t a b e lief in s o m e rock-
b o tto m ca p a b ilitie s and n e ed s fo r h u m a n bein g s th a t d em an d resp ect and affirm atio n .
S e e M a rth a C . N u ssb a u m , S e x a n d S o c ia l Ju s tice (N ew York: O xford U n iv e rsity P ress,
1 9 9 9 ), 4 1 - 4 2 .
212 TUST LOVE
Indeed, such considérations may illum inate each one's concrete in
dividual reality and m ay reveal som e of the central requirem ents of
love, and sexual love, of any person as a person. O b lig a tin g features"
of persons constitu te th e basis of requirem ent to respect persons,
in whatever way wc relate to them , sexually or otherwise. Auton
omy and relationality in particular are "obligating features" because
they ground an obligation to respect persons as ends in them selves
and forbid, therefore, the use of persons as m ere m eans.5 T h is claim
bears exploration. I could argue here that persons arc of uncondi
tional value, ends in them selves, because they are created so and
loved so by G od, who reveals to us a com m and and a call to treat
one another as ends, and not only as m eans. M y approach is in an
im portant sense warranted by this belief, and I am attem pting to
provide a way of understanding it. Yet I also think that a plausible
elaboration of w hat characterizes hum ans — created and beloved as
we are — is also accessible to those w ho stand in diverse faith tra
ditions or no faith tradition at all. So I continue to explore and to
argue on the basis of experience and our system atic understandings
of experience: First, persons are ends in them selves because they are
autonom ous in the sense that they have a capacity for free ch oice.
Why? Bccausc freedom of choice as w c cxpcricncc it is a capacity for
self-determ in ation as embodied, inspirited beings, w hich m eans a ca
pacity to choose n ot only our own actions but our ends and our loves.
It is a capacity therefore to determ ine the m eaning of our own lives
and, w ithin lim its, our destiny. It is a capacity to set our own agenda,
w hether it is o n e that is good for us and others or not. H ence, for me
to treat another hum an person as a mere m eans is to violate her in
sofar as she is autonom ous; it is to attem pt to absorb her completely
into my agenda, rather than rcspccting the one that is her own.
Secondly, a hum an capacity for relationship (or relationality) also
grounds an obligation to respect persons as ends in them selves. Why
5. B y id en tify in g p e rso n s a s "e n d s in th e m se lv e s" I do n o t a ssu m e th a t th ey are

su fficien t in th e m se lv e s o r th a t w e c a n u n d erstand th e m in a v acu u m , a ll b y th em selv es.
M y seco n d o b lig a tin g featu re sh o w s th is explicitly. M o re th a n th is, how ever, I co n sid er
it q u ite p o ssible t o e x is t a s a b ein g t h a t is an en d it its e lf and y et t o e x is t relativ e t o G od.
S e c Farley, "A F e m in is t V ersio n o f R esp ect fo r P e rso n s," fo u r n a l o f F em in ist S tu dies in
R eligion 9 (Spring/Fall 1 9 9 3 ): 1 8 3 - 9 8 ; also , Farley, C o m p a s s io n a te R es p ect: A F em im st
A p p r o a ch t o M e d ic a l E th ics a n d O th er Q u es tio n s (N ew York: P au list, 2 0 0 2 ) , 3 6 - 3 9 .
again? It is generally acknowledged that individuals do not ju st sur

vive or thrive in relations to others; they cannot exist without some
form of fundam ental relatedness to others/’ T h is generally implies
dependence o n others, yet the capacity for relation is a capacity to
reach beyond ourselves to other beings, especially to other persons.
We are who we are n ot only because we can to som e degree determine
ourselves to be so by our freedom but because we are transcendent of
ourselves through our capacities to know and to love. T h e relational
aspect of persons is not finally only extrinsic but intrinsic, the radi
cal possibility of com ing into relation, into union, w ith all that can
be known and loved — and especially with other persons, including
God, where u nion can take the form of com m union, knowing and
being known, loving and being loved. A s such, we are n ot bounded,
not com plete in ourselves once and for all, as if our world could be
closed upon itself. We rem ain radically open to u nion with others,
through knowledge and love; our interior world is transcendent of
itself, though w c hold also a whole world w ithin ourselves. To re
spect the world that we are and the world we are becoming requires
respecting ourselves and other persons as ends, n ot only as means.
W hether or n ot pre-modern, modern, or postm odern philosophies
find settled selves or unsettled selves (a series of selves with n o con
tinuity or anchor), it is awe before the world of the self that can
generate respect and even reverence, if only we see it.7
A nother way to say all of th is is th at as persons we are term in al
cen ters , ends in ourselves, b ec a u se in s o m e w ay w e both transcend
ourselves a n d y et belon g to ourselves. It is by our freedom that we
transcend ourselves, introduce som ething new, beyond our past and
present. By our freedom, w c also possess ourselves; our selves and
our actions are in som e sense our own. Besides the place of freedom
in self-transcendence and self-possession, it is also in and through
our relationality that we as hum ans both transcend and possess our
selves; we belong to ourselves yet we belong to others to whom we
6 . A lth o u g h I a m in terp retin g rela tio n a lity to refer to rela tio n by know ledge and
love, I d o n o t th ereb y d eny t h e n e ce ssa ry rela ted n css th a t in clu d es d epend ence o n God
for o n e 's very e x iste n ce .
7. S e e Farley, "H o w S h a ll W e Love in a P o stm o d ern W orld ?" A n n u al o f t h e S ociety
o f C h ristian E th ic s {S o ciety of C h ris tia n E th ic s, 1 9 9 4 ) , 3 - 1 9 .
214 IUST LOVE
have stretched our being through our knowing love and our loving
knowledge. In knowledge and love, and in being known and being
loved, w c arc centered both w ithin and w ithout — both in w hat
we love and in ourselves, as we hold w hat we love in our hearts.
T h e capacity to love one another and all things, and to love w hat
is sacredly transcendent and im m anent (that is, the divine), makes
persons w orthy of respect. Each and every person is of unconditional
value. Each person is a whole world in herself, yet her world is in
w hat she loves. T h is is w hat interiority m eans for hum an persons,
and w hat it m eans in our relationships one w ith another.8
Freedom and relationality, then, are the obligating features that
ground any norm s we articulate for general ethics or sexual ethics.
Beings with these features ought n ot be completely scooped up into
som eone else's agenda. T h ey ought not be treated as mere means
but a lso as ends in them selves. Moreover, freedom and relational
ity as features of hum an persons are profoundly co n n ected w ith one
another: we can n ot grow' in freedom except in som e nurturing rela
tionships; and freedom ultim ately is for the sake of relationships —
the loves, th e relationships we finally choose to identify with in our
deepest selves. Together autonom y (or freedom) and relationality also
provide th e co n ten t for m ost of the basic norm s for right loving and
the basic m oral norm s for sexual ethics. N orm s for a general sexual
ethic, then, m ust n ot only satisfy th e demands of these two features
of personhood; they m ust serve to specify more clearly the meaning
of the features.
Despite all that I have said above, it m ay n ot be superfluous to
draw one general conclusion here regarding norm s for sexuality. In
chapter 4 I spoke of the m ultiple m eanings and aim s, or motivations,
that are possible for hum an sexual activity and relationships — some
distortivc and destructive, som e accurate and creative. Now, given
our explorations of just love and desire, ju st sexual love and desire,
wc can say that the aim s of sexuality ought to accord w ith, or at the
very least, n o t violate the concrete reality of hum an persons. If they
8. I do n o t d e n y a k ind of in te rio rity in all b e in g s, o r ce rta in ly in higher level

a n im a ls o th e r th a n h u m a n s. I a m here, however, ta lk in g abo u t h u m a n p erso n s, for
w h ich th ere is a k in d o f in terio rity th a t appears to be d istin c tiv e to th e species.
do so accord, they will n ot be destructive or distortivc. Also in chap

ter 4 I identified elem ents th at characterize and can belong to m uch
of hum an sexual experience. T h ese included n ot only em bodim ent
and em otions, but pleasure, desire and love, language and com m uni
cation, procréation, and power. Pleasure, com m unication, the union
of love and its intim acy, em powerm ent, and a desire for offspring
are each great hum an goods. If sex is an expression of love th at is
just, then each and all of these can be the aim or part of the aim
of sexual desire and activity.9 W hether they are so in a way that is
ju st will be clearer w hen we identify m ore specific ethical norm s for
sexual activities and relationships. Power, especially in interpersonal
relationships can be, but need n ot be, a great hum an good. W hether
and w hen it is good in sexual relations m ust also be determined by
m ore specific norms.
N orm s for Ju st Sex
Som e prelim inary clarifications are im portant for understanding the

specific n orm s for a sexual ethic. First, the norm s that I have in mind
are not m erely ideals; they are bottom -line requirem ents. Second, and
as a qualification of th e first, all of these norm s adm it of degrees. T h is
m eans that there is a sense in w hich they are stringent requirements,
but they are also ideals. In both senses, they are all part of justice.
T h a t is, they can be understood in different contexts as norm s of
w hat I shall call "m in im al" or "m axim al" justice. W hile m inim al
justice is always required, m axim al ju stice can go beyond this to
w hat is "fittin g ." M axim al ju stice may, in fact, point to an ideal that
exceeds th e exacting requirem ent of m inim al ju stice.10 Third, the
9. I a m n o t esp o u sin g th e view th a t sex u al activ ity c a n be ju stified o n ly w h en it

a im s a t o r is a t le a s t op en to th e p o ssib ility o f p ro creation . I d iscu ss th is ag ain in the
c o n te x t o f o n e o f th e sp ecific n o rm s th a t follow s.
10. W h a t I m e a n by "fittin g " m a y n o t be co m p letely clear. B o th m in im a l and m a x
im a l ju s tic e have to do w ith t h e co n cre te rea lities o f p e rso n s and w h a t is "d u e " th em .
W ith m in im a l ju s tic e , w h at is d ue is a b o tto m -lin e strin g en t req u irem en t; m a x im a l ju s
tic e in co rp o ra tes m in im a l ju stice b u t goes beyond it. How ever, sim p ly "g o in g beyond"
m ay n o t m e a n g rea ter ju s tic e . T h e r e a rc w a y s in w h ich w c c a n th in k w c a rc exceeding
th e d e m a n d s o f ju s tic e , b u t rendering " m o r e " m ay n o lon ger be ju s tic e a t a ll; it m ay be
in ju s tic e if it is n o t fittin g o r appropriate fo r an ind ivid ual o r group. It m a y in fa ct be
d estru ctiv e. T h u s , fo r e xam p le, a te a ch e r m ay g o beyond w h at is ord in arily required by
216 TUST LOVE
specific norm s arc not m utually exclusive. Although each of them

em phasizes som ething the others do not, they nonetheless overlap
enough that, as we shall see, som e sexual behaviors and relationships
are governed by m ore th an one norm . Fourth, since hum ans are em
bodied spirits., inspirited bodies, theirs is an embodied autonom y and
an embodied relationality. T h e norm s that I will lay out, therefore,
are to be understood as requiring respect for an embodied as well as
inspirited reality. I turn now to the specific norm s that I propose for
a contem porary hum an and C hristian sexual ethic.
1. D o N o U njust H arm
T h e first general ethical norm we m ay identify is th e obligation not
to harm persons unjustly.11 T h is is grounded in both of the obligat
ing features of personhood, for it is because persons are persons that
we experience awe of one another and the obligation of respect. "Do
n ot h arm " echoes through the experience of "do n ot kill" the other.
T o harm persons m ay be to violate who they arc as ends in th em
selves.12 But th ere are m any form s that h arm can take — physical,
so m e o f h e r s tu d e n ts in te rm s o f a ssista n ce ; b u t h e r "g o in g b ey o n d " m a y o r m a y n o t be

ju st. E v ery th in g d ep end s o n t h e co n cre te rea lities o f th e stu d en ts, w h a t is appropriate
in a p ro fessio n a l/stu d en t re latio n sh ip , and w h a t th e tc a c h c r c a n reason ab ly do, taking
in to a cco u n t th e leg itim ate d em an d s o f o th er stu d en ts. S h e m ay, if sh e provides "to o
m u c h " a s s is ta n c e , be h a rm in g her stu d en ts b ecau se s h e d o es n o t en cou rag e th e ir ow n
cre a tiv ity and d e v e lo p m en t o f sk ills. H e n ce, "m a x im a l" ju stice "g o es beyo n d " in ways
th a t a rc ap p rop riate o r fittin g — a s w h en so m e o n e is in terrib le need, w ith n o p articu lar
fu rth e r c la im o n so m eo n e else to m e e t th a t n eed , b u t so m e o n e h elp s o u t anyway. He
g o es t h e " e x tra m ile " b ecau se it is b o th needed and appropriate; it is fittin g fo r the
p e rso n s involved, th e situ a tio n , and h is ca p a b ilities. S o m e m ig h t c a ll th is "su p ererog a
to ry ," above and beyond an y real m o ra l ob lig atio n ; b u t th ere are so m e in s ta n c e s |for
e xa m p le, in th e d e m a n d s o f friend sh ip a s opposed to ord in ary d em an d s in relation to
anyone) w here t h e r e really is a n o th e r level o f ob lig atio n , th o u g h n o t a s s tr ic t a s th e
o b lig a tio n in v o lv ed in m in im a l ju stic e .
11. H a rm " u n ju s t ly " helps to clarify th a t t h e in ju n c tio n "d o n o h a r m " is n o t a
g en era l a b so lu te p ro h ib itio n . W e do h a rm p erso n s w h en th e h a rm i s n e ce ssa ry t o bring
abo u t a g reater good. A n exam p le o f th is is in t h e p ra ctice o f m ed icin e. A lm o st every
m ed ica l tre a tm e n t (especially surgery) involves s o m e h a rm to a p a tie n t, b u t it is a harm
th a t is "ju s tifie d " for a sig n ifican t g reater good.
12. O f co u rs e , w e a lso have o b lig atio n s n o t to h a rm o th e r beings besid es p erson s.
W c co n sid e r s o m e of th e m to have in trin s ic w orth — as, for exam p le, n o n h u m a n a n i
m a ls and the w h o le n etw o rk o f b ein g s th a t co n stitu te ou r "n atu ral e n v iro n m e n t." I do
n o t w a n t h ere t o engage th e d iscu ssio n o f w h eth e r so m e o f th e s e bein g s a rc o f " u n
co n d itio n a l" w o rth , th o u g h w h en th e liv es o f h u m a n p e rso n s co n flict w ith th e liv es of
n o n h u m a n b e in g s, I a m ready to sa y t h a t th e w o rth o f person s ta k e s priority. T h is is a
psychological, spiritual, relational. It can also take the form of failure

to support, to assist, to care for, to honor, in ways that are required
by reason of context and relationship. I include all of these form s in
this norm .
In the sexual sphere, "do no u njust h arm " takes on particular
significance. Here each person is vulnerable in ways that go deep
within. As Karen Lebacqz has said, "Sexuality has to do w ith vul
nerability. Eros, the desire for another, the passion that accompanies
the w ish for sexual expression, m akes one vulnerable___capable of
being wounded.13 And how m ay we be wounded or harmed? We know
the myriad ways. Precisely because sexuality is so in tim ate to per
sons, vulnerability exists in our em bodim ent and in the depths of
our spirits. D esires for pleasure and for power can become bludgeons
in sexual relations. As inspirited bodies we are vulnerable to sexual
exploitation, battering, rape, enslavem ent, and negligence regarding
w hat wc know w c m ust do for sex to be "safe sex." As embodied
spirits we are vulnerable to deceit, betrayal, disparity in com m itted
loves, debilitating "bonds" of desire,14 seduction, the pain of unfulfill
m ent. We have seen in previous chapters the role sex can play in
conflict, the ways in w hich it is connected w ith sham e, the poten
tial it has for instrum entalization and objectification. We have also
seen hum an vulnerability in the context of gender exclusionary prac
tices and gender judgments: "Terrible things arc done to those who
deviate."15
A ctions and social arrangem ents that are typically thought to
be harmful in th e sexual sphere include all form s of violence, as
to p ic tor a n o th e r day, how ever. W h a t I a m co n cern ed w ith h ere is n o t o n ly th a t h u m an s

are en d s in th e m se lv e s, b u t th a t th ey are so b e ca u se o f th e o b lig atin g featu res o f th eir
p e rso n h o o d . I t is th e re fo re p re c ise ly b e c a u s e h u m a n s a re s e lf-tra n s c e n d e n t y e t b elon g
to th em selv es th a t I id en tify and g round m y n o rm th a t p ro h ib its u n ju s t h a rm in g of
th em .
13. Lebacqz, "A ppropriate V u ln erab ility ," 4 3 6 .
14. S e c ic s s ic a B e n ja m in , T h e B on d s o f L o v e: P sychoan alysis. F em in ism , a n d th e
P ro blem o f D o m in a tio n (N ew York: P an th eo n B o o k s, 1 9 8 8 ); and B e n ja m in , " T h e Bonds
of Love: R a tio n a l V io len ce and E ro tic D o m in a tio n ," in T h e Fu ture o f D iffere n c e , ed.
H e ste r E is e n ste in and A lic e Jard in e (N ew B ru n sw ick , N J: Rutgers U n iv ersity Press,
1 9 8 5 ), 4 1 - 7 0 .
15. C h ristin e M . Korsgaard, "A N o te o n th e Value of G c n d e r-Id cn tifica tio n ," in
W om en , C u ltu re a n d D e v e lo p m e n t, ed. M a rth a C . N u ssb a u m and Jo n a th a n G lov er
(O xford : C la re n d o n P ress, 1 9 9 5 ), 4 0 1 - 3 .
218 TUST LOVE
well as pornography, prostitution, sexual harassm ent, pedophilia,

sadom asochism . M ost of these are controversial today, so that they
cannot be rejected out of hand, judged without assessm ent of their
in ju stice or justice. M any of these are governed by other principles
for a sexual e th ic th at we have yet to explore. I will therefore return
to th em again, though all too briefly, placing th em in the whole of
the framework for sexual ethics th at I am proposing.
"D o no u n ju st h arm " goes a long way toward specifying a sex
ual ethic, but n ot far enough. It is necessary to identify additional
principles for a sexual ethic th at aim s to take account of th e co m
plex concrete realities of persons. I said above that autonom y and
relationality, two equally primordial features of hum an persons, pro
vide th e ground and th e content for sexual ethics. They provide a
ground or basis, as we have seen, for the principle that forbids u n
justifiable harm . Together they yield six m ore specific and positive
norm s: a requirem ent of free choice, based on th e requirem ent to re
spect persons-' autonomy, and five further norm s that derive from the
requirem ent o f respect for persons' relationality.16 H ence, wc move
from our first norm , "do no u n ju st h arm " to a second norm for a
sexual ethic: freedom of choice.
2. F ree C on sen t
We have already seen the im portance of freedom (autonomy, or a
capacity for self-determ ination) as a ground for a general obliga
tion to respect persons as ends in them selves. T h is capacity for
self-determ ination, however, also undergirds a more specific norm.
T h e requirem ent articulated in this norm is all the m ore grave be
cause it directly safeguards the autonom y of persons as embodied
and inspirited, as transcendent and free.171 refer here to the partic
ular obligation to respect th e right of hum an persons to determine
16. S e e b e lo w th e d iagram o f all the n o rm s o n p age 2 3 1 .

17. I n s o m e a p p ro ach es to m ed ical e th ic s , fo r exam p le, th e p rin cip le req u iring re
sp e ct fo r p e rso n s red uces to respect for a p erso n ’s au to n om y , and th e p rim ary specific
ru le b e co m e s th e req u irem en t for in form ed c o n s e n t in rela tio n to m ed ical trea tm en t.
It is a m is ta k e , how ever; to e q u a te rcsp cct fo r p erso n s w ith resp ect fo r au to n om y . T h is
need n o t lessen t h e im p o rtan ce o f respect fo r au to n o m y a s a n esse n tia l p art o f w h at
resp ect fo r p e rso n s a s p e rso n s req uires. S e e Farley, C o m p a s s io n a te R es p ect: A F em in ist
A p p r o a ch t o M e d ic a l E th ics a n d O th er Q u estio n s (N ew York: P au list, 2 0 0 2 ) , 2 2 - 4 4 .
their own actions and their relationships in the sexual sphere of their
lives. 18 T h is right or this obligation to respect individual autonomy
sets a m in im u m but absolute requirem ent for the free consent of
sexual partners. T h is m eans, of course, that rape, violence, or any
harm ful use of power against unwilling victim s is never justified.
Moreover, seduction and m anipulation of persons who have limited
capacity for choice because of immaturity, special dependency, or loss
of ordinary power, are ruled out. T h e requirem ent of free consent,
then, opposes sexual harassm ent, pedophilia, and other instances of
disrcspcct for persons' capacity for, and right to, freedom of choice.
Derivative from the obligation to respect free consent on the part of
sexual partners are also other ethical norm s such as a requirem ent
for truth-telling, promise-keeping, and respect for privacy. Privacy ,
despite contentions over its legal m eanings, requires respect for what
today is nam ed "bodily integrity." "D o not touch, invade, or use" is
the requirem ent unless an individual freely co n sen ts.19 W hat this
recognizes is th at respect for embodied freedom is necessary if there
is to be respect for th e intim acy of the sexual self.
W hatever other rationales can be given for principles of truth-
telling and prom ise-keep in g , their violation lim its and hence hinders
the freedom o f choice of the other person: deception and betrayal are
ultim ately coercive. If I lie to you, or dissem ble when it com es to
com m unicating m y in tention s and desires, and you act on the basis
of w hat I have told you, I have limited your options and hence in an
18. I realize 1 a m in tro d u cin g y e t a n o th e r e th ic a l te rm here: "rig h t." It goes beyond

th e sco p e of th is v o lu m e to try to clarify th is. I a m th erefo re going to a ssu m e so m e
general u n d e rsta n d in g o f a "rig h t" a s a c la im — w h e th e r legal o r m o ral, grounded in
th e law, in a so c ia l co n tra c t, o r in w h at h u m a n person s are. In m y c o n te x t h ere I
acknow ledge m o ra l rig h ts, c la im s th a t p lace m o ra l o b lig atio n s o n o th e rs to respect,
sccu re, and p ro tc c t. S o m e o f th ese c la im s c a n and ou g h t to be secured a lso by law.
19. A "d o n o t to u c h " ru le h o ld s d ifferen tly in th e sex u al sp h ere th a n in th e m ed
ical (alth ough th e y so m e tim e s c o m e together, o f co u rse}. I n th e latter, it undergirds
th e re q u ire m e n t of in form ed c o n se n t for tre a tm e n t, th o u g h it a d m its o f excep tion s
in e a se s o f em erg ency, p u blic h e a lth th re a t, and so fo rth . A s far a s I know, th e term
"b o d ily in te g rity " w as first u sed in re la tio n t o a u to n o m y (to e sta b lish p erson al physical
boundaries) by B ev erly W ild u n g H a rriso n . S e e h e r "T h e o lo g y o f P ro -C h o ice : A F em in ist
P ersp ectiv e," T h e W itn ess 6 4 (Sep tem ber 1 9 8 1 ): 2 0 ; also , A Right to C h o o s e : T ow ard a
N e w E th ic o f A b o r tio n (B o ston : B eacon , 1 9 8 3 ); M akin g t h e C o n n ectio n s, cd . C aro l S.
R obb (B o ston : B e a co n , 1 9 8 5 ), 1 2 9 - 3 1 . N eed less to say, w hile H a rriso n 's appeal to th e
c o n ce p t w as fre q u e n tly in th e c o n te x t of ab o rtio n , it h as m u ch broad er m e a n in g — for
h e r and for o th ers.
220 TUST LOVE
im portant sense coerced you. Similarly, if I m ake a prom ise to you

w ith no in ten tion of keeping the promise, and you m ake decisions
on the basis o f this promise, I have deceived, coerced, and betrayed
you.20 Along with the requirem ent of free consent, then, these other
obligations belong to a sexual ethic as well.
Relationality, I have argued, is cquiprimordial with autonom y as
an essential feature of h um an personhood, and along w ith auton
omy grounds th e obligation to respect persons as ends in them selves.
Like autonomy, relationality does m ore than ground obligations to re
spect persons as persons; it specifies the con tent of this obligation.
To treat persons as ends and n ot as mere m eans includes respecting
their capacities and needs for relationship. Sexual activity and sexual
pleasure are instru m ents and modes of relation; they can enhance
relationships or hinder them , contribute to th em and express them .
Sexual activity and pleasure are optional goods for hum an persons in
the sense th a t they arc n ot absolute, peremptory goods w hich could
never be subordinated to other goods, or for th e sake of other goods
be let go; but th ey are, or certainly can be, very great goods, mediating
relationality and the general well-being of persons.
H ence, insofar as one person is sexually active in relation to an
other, sex m u st n ot violate relationality, but serve it. A nother way of
saying this is th at it is n ot sufficient to respect the free choice of sex
ual partners. In addition to "do no h arm " and th e requirem ent of free
consent, relationality as a characteristic of hum an persons yields five
specific norm s for sexual activity and sexual relationships: m utual
ity, equality, com m itm ent, fruitfulness, and w hat I w ill designate in
general term s, "social ju stice." For an adequate contem porary sexual
ethic, we need to explore th e m eaning and im plications of each of
these norms.
3. M utuality
Respect for persons together in sexual activity requires m utuality
of participation. It is easy for u s today to sing the songs of m u
tuality in celebration of sexual love. We are in disbelief w hen we
20. T h is is d ifferen t from m a k in g a p ro m ise and th e n b e in g u n ab le to fulfill it,

e ith e r b e ca u se o f ch an g e in circu m sta n ces, w eak n ess o n the p a rt of th e prom isor, o r
w hatever.
learn that it h as n ot always been so. Yet traditional interpretations

of heterosexual sex are steeped in images of the m ale as active
and the fem ale passive, th e wom an as receptacle and th e m an as
fulfillcr, the w om an as ground and the m an as seed. No other in
terpretation o f the polarity between the sexes has had so long and
deep-seated a n influence on m en's and w om en's self-understandings.
Today w c th in k such descriptions quaint or appalling, and wc rec
ognize th e danger in them . For despite the seem ing contradiction
between the active/passive model of sexual relations and the som e
tim e interpretations of w om en's sexuality as insatiable, the model
formed im aginations, actions, and roles w hich in turn determined
that he who embodied the active principle was greater than she who
sim ply waited — for sex, for gestation, for birthing w hich was not of
her doing and n ot under her control.
Today we believe we have a completely different view. We have
learned that m ale and fem ale reproductive organs do n ot signal ac
tivity only for one and passivity for the other; nor do universalizable
m ale and fem ale character traits signal this. We can even appreci
ate all the ways in which, even at the physical level, m en's bodies
receive, encircle, embrace, and all the ways w om en's bodies are ac
tive, giving, penetrating. Today we also know that th e possibilities
of m utuality ex ist for m any form s of relationship— w hether hetero
sexual or g ay w hether w ith genital sex or the multiple other ways
of em bodying our desires and our loves. T h e key for us has become
not activity/passivity but active receptivity and receptive activity —
cach partner active, each one reccptivc. Activity and rcccptivity par
take of one another, so that activity can be a response to som ething
received (like loveliness), and receptivity can be a kind of activity, as
in "rccciving" a guest.21
U nderlying the norm of m utuality is a view of sexual desire that
does n ot see i t as a search only for the pleasure to be found in the
relief of libidinal tension, although it may includc this. H um an sex
uality, rather, because it is fundam entally relational, seeks ultim ately
21. S e e G a b rie l M arcel, C reativ e Fidelity, tra n s. R obert R o sen th a l |New York:
N oonday, 1 9 6 4 ), 8 9 - 9 1 .
222 TUST LOVE
w hat contem porary philosophers have called a "double reciprocal in

carnation," o r m utuality of desire and embodied union.22 N o one can
deny that sex m ay in fact, serve m any functions and be motivated by
m any kinds o f desire. N onetheless, central to its meaning, necessary
for its fulfillm ent, and norm ative for its m orality w hen it is within
an interpersonal relation is som e form and degree of mutuality.
Yet we have learned to be cautious before too high a rhetoric of
mutuality, too m any songs in praise of it. Like active/passive rela
tions, m utuality, too, has its dangers. Insofar as, for example, we
assum e it requires total and utter self-disclosure, we know that harm
lurks unless sexual relations have matured into justifiable and m u
tual tru st.23 Insofar as we th in k th at sex is just and good only if
m utuality is p erfected , we know that personal incapacities large and
sm all can undercut it. We know that patience, as well as trust, and
perhaps unconditional love arc all needed for m utuality to become
what we dream it can be. But w hat is asked of us, demanded of us,
for the m utuality of a one night stand, or of a short-term affair, or of
a lifetim e of com m itted love, differs in kind and degree.
Indeed, th e m utuality that makes sexual love and activity just
(and, one m u st add, that m akes for "good sex" in the colloquial sense
of the term) ca n be expressed in m any ways; and it does adm it of de
grees. No m atter what, however, it entails som e degree of m utuality
in the attitudes and actions of both partners. It entails som e form
of activity and receptivity, giving and receiving — two sides of one
shared reality on the part of and w ithin both persons. It requires, to
som e degree, m utuality of desire, action, and response. Tw o liberties
m eet, two bodies m eet, two hearts com e together — metaphorical
and real descriptions of sexual mutuality. Part of each person's ethi
cal task, or th e shared task in each relationship, is to determ ine the
2 2 . T h e c o n c e p t w as orig in ally S a rtre 's, alth ou g h h e used it to refer m o re to the

aro u sal o f se x u a l a ttra c tio n and d esire. S e e Je a n P aul Sartre, B ein g a n d N oth in g n ess,
tra n s. H azel E . B a rn e s (N ew York: P h ilo so p h ical Library, 1 9 6 6 ). For m o re co n tem p o rary
u s e s and a d a p ta tio n s o f th is, see T h o m a s N agel, "S e x u a l P erv ersio n ," in P hilosophy
o f Sex: C o n te m p o r a r y R eadin gs , ed. A la n So ble (T otow a, N J: L ittlefield A dam s, 1 9 8 0 ),
7 6 - 8 8 ; S o lo m o n , "S e x u a l P arad ig m s," ibid., 8 9 - 9 8 ; Jan ice M o u lto n , "S e x u a l Behavior:
A n o th e r P o s itio n ," ibid ., 1 1 0 - 1 8 .
2 3 . For a d is c u ss io n of th is d anger in a w id er co n te x t, s e e R ich ard S e n n ett,
"D e stru ctiv e G e m e in s c h a ft," ibid ., 2 9 9 - 3 2 1 .
threshold at w hich this norm m ust be rcspcctcd, and below w hich it

is violated.
4. Equality
O ur considerations of m utuality lead to yet another norm th at is
based on respect for relationality. Free choice and m utuality arc not
sufficient to respect persons in sexual relations. A condition for real
freedom and a necessary qualification of m utuality is equality. T h e
equality that is a t stake here is equality of power. M ajor inequalities
in social and econom ic status, age and maturity, professional iden
tity, interpretations of gender roles, and so forth, can render sexual
relations inappropriate and unethical prim arily bccausc they entail
power inequalities — and hence, unequal vulnerability, dependence,
and lim itatio n of options. T h e requirement of equality, like th e re
quirem ent of free consent, rules out treating a partner as property, a
commodity, o r an elem ent in m arket exchange. Jean-Paul Sartre de
scribes, for exam ple, a supposedly free and m utual exchange between
persons, but an exchange marked by unacknowledged dom ination
and subordination: "It is ju st that one of them p retends. . . n ot to n o
tice th a t th e O ther is forced by the constraint o f needs to sell him self
as a m aterial o bject."24
O f course here, too, equality need n ot be, may seldom be, perfect
equality. N onetheless, it has to be close enough, balanced enough,
for each to appreciate the uniqueness and difference of the other, and
for each to respect one another as ends in themselves. If the power
differential is too great, dependency will lim it freedom, and m utuality
will go awry. T h is norm , like the others, can illum inate the injury or
evil th a t characterizes situations of sexual harassm ent, psychological
and physical abuse, at least som e form s of prostitution, and loss of
self in a process that m ight have led to genuine love.
5. C o m m itm en t
Strong argum ents can be made for a fifth norm in sexual ethics,
also derivative of a responsibility for relationality. At the heart of
24. Sa rtre, C ritiq u e o f D ia lec tic a l R ea so n , tra n s. A . S h e rid a n -S m ith (Lond on: N LB,
1 9 7 6 ), 1 1 0 .
224 TUST LOVE
the C hristian com m unity's understanding of the placc of sexuality

in hum an and C hristian life has been the notion that som e form
of co m m itm en t, som e form of covenant or at least contract, m ust
characterize relations that include a sexual dim ension. In the past,
this com m itm ent, of course, was largely identified with heterosexual
marriage. It was tied to the need for a procreative order and a dis
cipline of unruly sexual desire. It was valued more for the sake of
family arrangem ents than for the sake of the individuals themselves.
Even w hen it was valued in itself as a realization of the life of the
church in relation to Jesus C hrist, it carricd w hat today arc unwanted
connotations of inequality in relations between men and wom en. It
is possible, nonetheless, th at when all m eanings of com m itm ent in
sexual relations arc sifted, wc arc left with powerful reasons to retain
it as an ethical norm.
As we have already noted, contem porary understandings of sexual
ity point to different possibilities for sex than were seen in the p a st—
possibilities o f growth in the hum an person, personal garnering of
creative power with sexuality as a dim ension not an obstacle, and the
m ediation of h um an relationship. O n the other hand, no one argues
that sex n ecessarily leads to creative power in the individual or depth
of u nion between persons. Sexual desire left to itself does n ot seem
able even to sustain its own ardor. In the past, persons feared that
sexual desire would be too great; in the present, the rise of im potency
and sexual boredom m akes persons m ore likely to fear th at sexual de
sire will be too little.25 T h ere is growing cvidcnce that sex is neither
the indom itable drive th at early C hristians (and others) thought it
was nor th e prim ordial im pulse of early psychoanalytic theory. W hen
it was culturally repressed, it seemed an inexhaustible power, under
lying other m otivations, always struggling to express itself in one
way or another. Now th at it is less repressed, more and m ore free
25. I a m n o t g ain say in g Fou cau lt’s critiq u e o f th e "repressive p rin cip le " here. In
fa ct, I m ay be re in fo rcin g it, sin c e so -called "rep ressio n " m ay co n stru c t th e s o r t of
se x u a lity th a t is th e op p o site of w h a t rep ressio n a im s to do. M oreover, th e so rts of
w a n in g sex u al d esire th a t I d escrib e fo r today m ay signal a d ifferen t k ind o f social
co n stru ctio n of se x u a l d esire a n d se x u a l p o ssib ility : i t m ay be t h e re su lt n o t o f too
m u ch se x b u t o f so cial and cu ltu ra l e m p h a s is o n orgasm a s th e sig n o f accep tab le
and valued sex. O rg a s m ic a n d o th e r e x p e cta tio n s o f sex u al p erfo rm an ce m a y actually
u n d ercu t th e pow er o f sex.
and in the open, it is easier to sec other com plex m otivations behind
it, and to recognize its inability in and of itself to satisfy the affective
yearning of persons. M ore and more readily com es th e conclusion
drawn by m any that sexual desire w ithout interpersonal love leads
to disappointm ent and a growing disillusionm ent. T h e other side of
this conclusion is that sexuality is an expression of som ething be
yond itself. Its power is a power for union, and its desire is a desire
for intimacy.
One of th e central insights from contem porary ethical reflection
on sexuality is that norm s of justice cannot have as their whole goal
to set lim its to th e power and expression of hum an sexuality. Sexual
ity is of such im portance in hum an life that it needs to be nurtured,
sustained, as w ell as disciplined, channeled, controlled. T here appear
to be at least two ways w hich persons have found to keep alive the
power of sexual desire w ithin them . One is through novelty of per
sons with w hom they are in sexual relation. Moving from one partner
to another prevents boredom, sustains sexual interest and the pos
sibility of pleasure. A second way is through relationship extended
sufficiently through tim e to allow the incorporation of sexuality into
a shared life and an enduring love. T h e second way seem s possible
only through com m itm ent.
Both sobering evidence of the inability of persons to blend their
lives together, and weariness with the high rhetoric that has tradition
ally surrounded hum an covenants, yield a contem porary reluctance
to evaluate th e two ways of sustaining sexual desire and living sexual
union. At th e very least it may be said, however, that although brief
encounters open a lover to relation, they cannot m ediate the kind of
union — of knowing and being known, loving and being loved — for
w hich h um an relationality offers the potential. Moreover, the pur
suit of m ultiple relations precisely for the sake of sustaining sexual
desire risks violating the norm s of free consent and mutuality, risks
m easuring others as apt m eans to our own ends, and risks inner dis
connection from any kind of life-process of our own or in relation
w ith others. D iscrete m om ents of union are n o t valueless (though
they may be so, and m ay even be disvalucs), but they can serve to
isolate us from others and from ourselves.
226 TUST LOVE
O n the other hand, there is reason to believe that sexuality can be

the object of com m itm ent, that sexual desire can be incorporated into
a covenanted love w ithout distortion or loss, but rather, w ith gain,
with enhancem ent. Given all the caution learned from contemporary
experience, w e may still hope that our freedom is sufficiently power
ful to gather u p our love and give it a future; that thereby our sexual
desire can be nurtured into a tenderness that has n ot forgotten pas
sion. We m ay still believe th at to try to use our freedom in this way
is to be faithful to the love that arises in us or even the yearning that
rises from us. R hetoric should be lim ited regarding com m itm ent,
however, for particular forms of com m itm ent are themselves only
m eans, n ot ends. As Robin M organ notes regarding the possibility of
process only w ith an enduring relation, "C om m itm en t gives you the
leverage to bring about change — and th e tim e in w hich to do it."26
A C hristian sexual ethic, then, m ay well identify com m itm ent as
a norm for sexual relations and activity. Even if com m itm ent is only
required in th e form of a com m itm ent not to harm one's partner, and
a com m itm ent to free consent, mutuality, and equality (as I have de
scribed these above), it is reasonable and necessary. M ore th an this,
however, is necessary if our concerns are for the wholeness of the
hum an person — for a way of living that is conducive to th e integra
tion of all of life's im portant aspects, and for the fulfillm ent of sexual
desire in the highest form s of friendship. G iven these concerns, the
norm m ust be a com m itted love.
6. Fruitfulness
A sixth norm derivative from the obligating feature of relationality is
what I call "fruitfu lness." Although the traditional procreative norm
of sexual relations and activity no longer holds absolute sway in
C hristian sexual ethics in either Protestant or Rom an C atholic tradi
tions, there rem ain s a special concern for responsible reproduction of
the h um an species. Traditional arguments th at if there is sex it m ust
26. R o b in M o rg a n , "A M arriag e M a p ," Ms. M ag a zin e 11 (Ju ly -A u g u st 1 9 8 2 ): 2 0 4 .

For fu rth e r ela b o ra tio n o n th e m e a n in g o f in terp erso n al c o m m itm e n ts , s e c Farley, Per
s o n a l C o m m itm e n ts . In th is b o ok , th ere a rc w ay s o f d escrib in g c o m m itm e n t its e lf th a t
co u ld allow it to be th o u g h t of a s a t le a st p art of an en d — fo r e x a m p le th e en d o f love
and friend sh ip. I t h as o r c a n have in trin s ic v alu e in th a t it is c o n stitu te d by th e on e
g ivin g t o th e o th e r h e r "w o rd ," w ith a n e w fo rm of rela tio n sh ip no w establish ed.
be procrcativc have changed to arguments that if sex is procrcativc it

m ust be w ithin a context that assures responsible care of offspring.
T h e connection between sex and reproduction is a powerful one, for
it allows individuals to reproduce and to build fam ilies; it allows a
sharing of life full enough to issue in new lives; and it allows the
hum an spccics to perpetuate itself. Relationality in the form of sex
ual reproduction, moreover, does n ot end w ith the birth of children,·
it stretches to include th e rearing of children, th e initiation of new
generations in to a culture and civilization, and th e ongoing building
of th e h um an community.
At first glance, it appears that "procreation" belongs only to, is
only possible for, som e persons; and even for them , it has com e to
seem quite optional. How, then, can it constitu te a norm for sexual
activity and relations? Even if it were recognized as a norm for fertile
heterosexual couples, w hat would this m ean for infertile heterosexual
couples or for heterosexual couples who choose not to have children,
for gays and lesbians, for single persons, for ambiguously gendered
persons? For these other individuals and partners, would it signal,
as it has in th e past, a lesser form of sex and lesser form s of sexual
relationships? Or is it possible that a norm of fruitfulness can and
ought to characterize all sexual relationships?
It is ccrtainly true that all persons can participate in the rearing
of new generations; and som e of those w ho cannot reproduce in tra
ditional ways do even have their own biological children by m eans
of th e growing array of reproductive technologies — from infertility
treatm ents to artificial insem ination to in vitro fertilization to sur
rogate m othering. All of this is not only true but significant. Yet an
ethically norm ative claim on sexual partners to reproduce in any of
these ways seem s unwarranted.
Som ething m ore is at stake. Beyond the kind of fruitfulness that
brings forth biological children, there is a kind of fruitfulness that is
a measure, perhaps, of all interpersonal love. Love between persons
violates relationality if it closes in upon itself and refuses to open to
a wider com m unity of persons. W ithout fruitfulness of som e kind,
any significant interpersonal love (not only sexual love) becom es an
ég oism e à deux. If it is completely sterile in every way, it threatens
the love and th e relationship itself. But love brings new life to those
228 TUST LOVE
who love. T h e new life w ithin the relationship of those who share it
may move beyond itself in countless ways: nourishing other relation
ships; providing goods, services, and beauty for others; inform ing the
fruitful work lives of th e partners in relation; helping to raise other
people's children; and on and on. All of these ways and m ore may
constitute th e fruit of a love for w hich persons in relation arc respon
sible. A ju st love requires the recognition of this as the potentiality
of lovers; and it affirms it, each for the other, both together in the
fecundity of their love. Interpersonal love, then, and perhaps in a
special way, sexual love insofar as it is just, m ust be fruitful.
T h e articulation of this norm , however, m oves us to another per
spective in th e development of a sexual ethic. T h ere are obligations
in justice th a t the wider com m unity owes to those who choose sexual
relationships. H ence, our final norm is of a different kind.
7. S o cia l Ju s tice
T h is norm derives from our obligation to respect relationality, but
n ot only from this. It derives more generally from the obligation to
respect all persons as ends in them selves, to respect their autonomy
and relationality, and thus not to harm th em but to support them . A
social justice norm in th e context of sexual ethics relates n ot specif
ically to the ju stice between sexual partners. It points to the kind of
justice th a t everyone in a com m unity or society is obligated to af
firm for its m em bers as sexual beings. W hether persons are single
or married, gay or straight, bisexual or ambiguously gendered, old or
young, abled or challenged in the ordinär)' form s of sexual expres
sion, they have claim s to respect from the C hristian com m unity as
well as th e wider society. T h ese are claim s to freedom from u njust
harm , equal protection under th e law, an equitable share in the goods
and services available to others, and freedom of choice in their sex
ual lives — w ithin the lim its of n ot harm ing or infringing on the
ju st claim s of the concrete realities of others. W hatever the sexual
status of persons, their needs for incorporation into the community,
for psychic security and basic well-being, m ake the sam e claim s for
social cooperation am ong us as do those of us all. T h is is why I call
the final norm "social ju stice." If our loves for one another are to be
just, then this norm obligates us all.
T h ere is o n e way in which, of coursc, this norm qualifies sexual

relationships them selves, obligating sexual partners as well as the
com m unity around them . T h a t is, sexual partners have always to
be concerned about n ot harm ing "third parties." As A nnette Baier
observes, "in love there are always third parties, future lovers, ch il
dren who m ay be born to one of the lovers, their lovers and their
children."27 A t th e very least, a form of "social ju stice" requires of
sexual partners th at they take responsibility for the consequences of
their love and their sexual activity— w hether the consequences are
pregnancy and children, violation of the claim s that others may have
on each of them , public health concerns, and so forth. No love, or at
least no great love, is just for "th e two of u s,"28 so that even failure
to share in so m e way beyond the two of us the fruits of love may be
a failure in justice.
My focus in articulating this norm , however, is primarily on the
larger social world in w hich sexual relationships arc formed and sus
tained. It includes, therefore, the sorts of concerns I identified above,
but larger concerns as well. A case in point is the struggle for gender
equality and (in particular) w om en's rights in our own society and
around th e world. T h is is relevant to the sexual ethic I am proposing
because it h as a great deal to do w ith respect for gender and sexuality
as it is lived in concrete contexts of sexual and gender injustice.
Here we could identify num erous other issues of utm ost impor
tance. Sexual and dom estic violence m ight head the list, both at
hom e and abroad.29 But it would include also racial violence that is
perpetrated on m en and wom en and that all too often has to do with
false sexual stereotypes.30 Developm ent, globalization, and gender
2 7 . A n n e tte C . Baier, M oral P reju d ices: E ssays o n E th ics (C am brid ge, M A : H arvard
U n iv e rsity P re ss , 1 9 9 4 ), 147.
2 8 . M a ry M c D e rm o tt Sh ideler, T h e T h eo lo g y o f R o m a n tic L o v e : A Stu dy in th e
Writings o f C h a r le s W illiam s (G ran d R ap id s, M I: E erd m an s, 1 9 6 2 ), 1 1 5 .
2 9 . T h e m a n y w ritin g s o f M a rie F ortu n e provide d escriptive a n d n o rm ativ e analyses
of th e s e issu es. S e e esp ecially th e new v ersio n o f h e r ea rliest w o rk o n sex u al violen ce
a s " t h e u n m e n tio n a b le s in ," in M a rie M a rsh a ll Fortu ne, S ex u a l V io len ce: T h e Sin R e
v isited (C lev ela n d : P ilg rim , 2 0 0 5 ) . For co n sid era tio n s o f th ese issu es in tern atio n ally,
se c M ary Jo h n M a n a n z a n e t al., ed s., W om en R esistin g V io len ce: S pirituality fo r Life
(M a ry k n o ll, N Y: O rb is, 1 9 9 6 ).
3 0 . See, for ex a m p le , th e diverse essay s in E m ilie M . T o w n es, ed ., A T rou blin g in
m y S o u l (M a ry k n o ll, N Y: O rb is, 1 9 9 3 ).
230 TUST LOVE
bias would b e high on the list of the issues I have in m ind.31 T h e

m yths and doctrines of religious and cultural traditions th at reinforce
gender bias and u njust constriction of gender roles becom e im portant
here as w ell.32 Included, too, m ust be the disproportionate burden
that w om en bear in the world-wide A ID S pandem ic.33
We have already seen in the previous chapter the kinds of injustices
inflicted on persons whose gender and sexuality do n ot fall into the
usual categories. We should add issues surrounding the explosion
of reproductive technologies — many of which have proven to offer a
great benefit for individuals, but m any of w hich rem ain questionable,
such as technologies for sex-selection.34 Other issues also require
m oral assessm ent, such as the availability (or not) of contraceptives,
and the repercussions for som e wom en of the m arketing of male
remedies for im potence. It is neither possible nor necessary to detail
all of these issues here. M y point is only that they, too, fall within
the concerns of an adequate hum an and C hristian sexual ethic. They
signal social and com m unal obligations n ot to harm one another
unjustly and to support one another in w hat is necessary for basic
well-being and a reasonable level of hum an flourishing for all. T h ese
obligations stretch to a com m on good — one that encom passes the
sexual sphere along with the other significant spheres of hum an life.
In summary, w hat I have tried to offer here is a framework for sex
ual ethics based on norm s of justice — those norm s w hich govern all
3 1 . See, for exa m p le: N u ssb au m , S e x a n d S o c ia l Justice·, N u ssb a u m and Glover,

W om en , C ulture, a n d H u m a n D ev elo p m e n t; A m arty a S e n , "O v e r 1 0 0 M illio n W om en
A re M iss in g ," N e w York R e v ie w o f B o o k s (D ecem b er 2 0 , 1 9 9 0 ): 6 1 - 6 6 .
3 2 . T h e r e a re co u n tle ss w orks by th eo lo g ian s o n th e s e issu es now , b u t se c , in par
ticular, H ow ard E ilb erg -S ch w artz a n d W endy D onig er, ed s., O ff w ith H er H ea d ! T h e
D en ia l o f W o m e n ’s Id en tity in M yth, R eligion , a n d C u ltu re (Berkeley: U n iv ersity of
C a lifo r n ia P re ss , 1 9 9 5 ).
3 3 . S e e Farley, C o m p a s s io n a te R es p ect, 3 - 2 0 ; s e c also L in d a Singer, "R egu latin g
W o m e n in th e A g e o f S e x u al E p id e m ic," in E rotic W elfare: S ex u a l T h e o r y a n d Politics
in t h e A ge o f t h e E p id em ic, ed. Ju d ith B u tle r and M au reen M acG ro g an (N ew York:
R outledge, 1 9 9 3 ).
3 4 . S e e C o m m itte e o n E th ic s, " S e x S e le ctio n " (W ashington, D C : A m e rican C o l
lege o f O b s te tr ic ia n s and G y n eco lo g ists, N o v em b er 1 9 9 6 ). F o r a carefu l probin g of
rep rod uctive te ch n o lo g ies m o re generally, s e c M au ra A. Ryan, E thics a n d E con om ics
o f A ssisted R ep rod u ctio n : T h e C o st o f Longin g (W ashington, D C : G eorgeto w n U n iv er
sity P ress, 2 0 0 1 ). S e e a lso L isa So w ie C a h ill, " T h e N ew B irth T ech n o lo g ies and P ublic
M o ra l A rg u m e n t," in C a h ill, Sex, G e n d e r a n d C h ristian E th ics (C am brid ge: C am brid ge
U n iv e rsity P re ss , 1 9 9 6 ), 2 1 7 - 5 4 .
Fram ew ork fo r a Sexual Ethic: fu st Sex 231
Norms for Sexual Justice

B a s is N o rm
R e s p e c t f o r t h e a u t o n o m y a n d r e la t io n a lit y
t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e p e r s o n s a s e n d s i n t h e m s e lv e s ,
a n d h e n c e r e s p e c t f o r t h e i r w e ll- b e in g : 1 . D o n o u n ju s t h a rm
R esp ect fo r a u to n o m y : 2 . F ree c o n s e n t o f p a rtn e rs
R e s p e c t f o r r e la t io n a lit y : 3 . M u t u a li t y
4 . E q u a lit y
5 . C o m m itm e n t
6 . F r u it f u ln e s s
R e s p e c t f o r p e r s o n s a s s e x u a l b e in g s i n s o c ie t y : 7 . S o c ia l ju s t ic e
hum an relationships and those w hich are particular to the intim acy
of sexual relations. M ost generally, th e norm s derive from the con
crete reality o f persons and are focused on respect for their autonomy
and relationality. T h is is to respect persons as ends in them selves. It
yields an in ju nction to do no u njust harm to persons. It also yields
spécifications both of w hat it m eans to respect autonom y and re
lational! ty and what it m eans to do n o harm . Autonom y is to be
respected through a requirem ent of free consent from sexual part
ners, w ith related requirem ents for truthtclling, promise-keeping,
and respect for privacy. Relationality is to be respected through re
quirem ents o f mutuality, equality, com m itm ent, fruitfulness, and
social justice.
Even m ore specifically, we m ay in term s of this framework say
things like: sex should not be used in ways th at exploit, objectify, or
dom inate; rape, violence, and harmful uses of power in sexual rela
tionships arc ruled out; freedom, wholeness, intim acy, pleasure arc
values to be affirmed in relationships marked by mutuality, equality,
and som e form of com m itm ent; sexual relations like other profound
interpersonal relations can and ought to be fruitful both w ithin and
beyond th e relationship; the affections of desire and love that bring
about and sustain sexual relationships are all in all genuinely to
affirm both lover and beloved.
232 TUST LOVE
I rccognizc full well that it is n ot an easy task to introduce con

siderations o f ju stice into every sexual relation and the evaluation of
every sexual activity C ritical questions rem ain unanswered, and seri
ous disagreem ents are all too frequent, regarding th e concrete reality
of persons and th e m eanings of sexuality. W hat can be normative
and w hat exceptional — that is, w hat is governed by the norm s I have
identified and w hat can be exceptions to these norm s — is som etim es
a m atter of all too delicate judgment. But if sexuality is to be creative
and n ot destructive in personal and social relationships, then there is
no substitute for discerning ever m ore carefully the norm s whereby
it will be just.
Sp ecial Q u estions
I hope th a t w hat I have delineated above as a justice eth ic for the

sphere of sexuality in hum an life already speaks of th e practice of this
ethic. It is n o t intended to be merely an abstract outline of ethical
principles and rules. T h e chapter that follows will attem pt to show
w hat this e th ic m eans in response to particular aspects of our lives.
T h ere are further questions that bear consideration, however, before I
leave the substance of this chapter. Som e of these questions challenge
the ethic I have proposed; som e of th em expand it in ways that may
be particularly im portant to the C hristian com m unity
A n E thic O nly fo r Adults*
Insofar as a ju stice ethic m akes sense at all, can it m ake any dif
ference to teenagers whose reported sexual practices today appear
untouchable by traditional or new ethical frameworks? I am not here
referring to th e exploitation of the young by adults in th e multiple
form s that sexual harm is perpetrated. T h e ethical norm s I have
outlined are clearly intended to protect the young in special ways
from the violence and m anipulation of adults who would use the
vulnerable sexuality of children and adolescents for their own (that
is, the adults1') pleasure or m onetary gain. I am , rather, referring to
the practices o f teenagers am ong them selves. M y focus is, of course,
on practices th a t arc no doubt tim e-bound and culture-bound, but I
suspcct there are analogues that will emerge again and again, at least
in W estern culture.
T h e phenom enon of "hooking up" is an exam ple of a practice
am ong teenagers that seem s to elude any norm s other than ac
ceptance am ong peers.33 "H ooking up" is precisely w hat it depicts:
sex w ithout any relationship and w ithout any strings. "Friends with
benefits" differs in that there is som e form of friendship prior to
sexual activity, but still, no strings. D ating still exists, but at least
according to som e reports, appears n ot to be the sexual relationship
of choice. "W e m ight date— I don't know. It's just that guys can get
so annoying w hen you start dating th em ."36 "Now that it's easy to get
sex outside o f relationships, guys don't need relationships."37 Many
teenagers, according to these reports, are looking for anything but
com m itm ent — or even m utuality in any sense other than physical.
T h ere m ay be a growing concern am ong teen-agers for "safe sex,"
in the sense o f protection especially against sexually transm itted dis
eases. W hether or n ot this fuels the reported wide-spread practice of
oral sex is hard to determ ine. W h at is clcar, however, is that ado
lescents are m isinform ed about the h ealth consequences of oral sex
and other sexual practices, so that it is hard to believe th at "concrete
realities" of persons arc m uch taken into account. If a justice cth ic is
to make any difference a t all in th e choices that young people make
regarding th eir sexuality, th e first step will have to be education about
sex and its dangers as well as sexuality and the ways it may be not
only harm less but good.
W hether o r not published reports about the sexual lives of teen
agers and even of pre-teen children actually reflect the m ajority of
teenage experiences (and I do n ot assum e that they do), it is clear
3 5 . See, for exa m p le, B en o it D en izet-L ew is, "F rien d s, F rien d s w ith B en efits, and
th e B en e fits o f t h e L ocal M a ll/ ’ N e w York T im e s M ag a zin e {M ay 3 0 , 2 0 0 4 ) : 3 0 - 3 5 ,
5 4 - 5 6 ; D o n n a F re ita s, "L e t’s T a lk A b o u t S e x ," C h ristian C en tu ry (Ju ne 1 4 , 2 0 0 5 | : 2 9 -
3 1 ; L au ren F. W in n er, R ea l S ex : T h e N a k e d T ru th a b o u t C h a stity (G ran d R apids, M I:
B razos, 2 0 0 5 ) ; C a it lin F lan ag an , "A re You T h e r e G o d ’ I t 's M e M o n ica : H ow N ic e G irls
G o t S o C a su a l a b o u t O ra l S e x ," A tlan tic (Jan u ary -F eb ru ary 2 0 0 6 1 : 1 6 7 - 8 2 . S e e also
th e m u ltip le s tu d ie s reported b y Barbara I. Blodgett in C o n stru ctin g t h e E rotic: S exu al
E thics a n d A d o le s c e n t G irls (C leveland : P ilgrim , 2 0 0 2 ) , ch a p ter 4.
3 6 . Q u o ted in B e n o it D cn iz ct-L ew is, "F rien d s, Friends w ith B e n e fits, a n d th e
B en e fits o f th e L o ca l M a ll," 3 2 .
3 7 . Ib id , 3 4 .
234 TUST LOVE
that they represent some. W hat can a ju stice eth ic say to these par
ticular practices and experiences? W hat can it say to adolescents for
whom these practiccs arc not part of their experience? W hat have wc
to offer young girls who, in th e m idst of this kind of sexual activ
ity, or on the outside looking in, say that they do this or w ant this
because their lives are boring? O r because they want relationships,
though they seek them in vain in the practices that aim to m ake re
lationships unnecessary? And w hat can we say to young boys, who
appear to enjoy these practices m ore th an girls; who find in them a
way to stay uncom m itted yet have access to sexual partners alm ost
w ithout lim it?38
I do n ot here, as I have said, attem pt to assess how widespread
these practices may be. Nor do I attem pt to judge th e practices th em
selves — at least n ot w ithout longer term em pirical studies of the
consequences and n ot w ithout a careful consideration of the total sit
uation in w hich W estern teenagers find themselves today. I do w ant
to raise the m odest but urgent question: Suppose these practices are
harm ful to young people. Suppose som e of th em enjoy these prac
tices, but som e do not. Suppose som e of th em feel used, but their
partners have no understanding of this. Would sexual taboo morality
change the situation? Perhaps so, perhaps not, but its lasting effect
m ight have to do with developing sham e and guilt m ore th an wisdom
and prudence about hum an sexuality.39
3 8 . F o r so m e in sig h ts in to th ese ex p e rien ces, s e e B lodgett, C on stru ctin g t h e E rotic,

e sp ecia lly c h a p te rs 4 - 5 .
3 9 . In 1 9 9 4 t h e S e x u a lity In fo rm a tio n and E d u cation C o u n c il o f th e U n ited States
(SIE C U S1 co n v en ed th e N a tio n a l C o m m is s io n o n A d o lescen t Sexu al H e a lth . T h is
C o m m is s io n developed a c o n se n su s s ta te m e n t th a t high lighted t h e need fo r adults
to en co u ra g e a d o le scen t sex u al h e a lth by providing accu ra tc in fo rm a tio n and éd uca
tio n , fo sterin g re sp o n sib le d ecisio n -m a k in g sk ills, offering su p p ort and g u id an ce in the
e x p lo ra tio n o f y o u n g p eo p le's ow n v alu es, and m od elin g h e a lth y se x u a l attitu d es and
b e haviors. It en cou rag ed a d o lescen ts to "d elay se x u a l beh av iors u n til th ey are ready
physically, cognitively, and em o tio n a lly fo r m a tu re sex u al rela tio n sh ip s and th e ir c o n
se q u e n ce s." It su p p orted ed u catio n a b o u t in tim acy , sex u al lim it se ttin g , resistin g peer,
partner, so cia l, a n d m ed ia p ressu res, and co n sid era tio n o f th e b e n efits o f a b stin en ce
of g en ital in te rco u rse , a s w ell a s p rev en tion o f p regn ancy and sex u ally tran sm itted
d iseases. In a b a la n ced p u b licatio n elab o ratin g o n th e s e issu es, it a lso provided p o s
itiv e a ss e s s m e n ts o f ad o lescen t beh av iors in rc c c n t years. See D eb ra W. H affncr, ed.,
F acin g Facts: S e x u a l F lealth fo r A m erica 's A d o le s c e n ts (N ew York: S IE C U S N atio n al
C o m m is s io n o n A d o lescen t S e x u al H e a lth , 1 9 9 5 ).
T h e real question here may be w hether young people are capable

of ju stice — w hether their socially constructed interests and desires,
and their still largely hidden and unrecognized (by themselves) de
sires and hopes, can respond to the challenge and call of justice.
If justice m atters to them at all in their other relationships (and I
believe there is plenty of evidence that it does), can it com e to m at
ter in their sexual relationships as well? If and insofar as they w ant
it to matter, o r are even intrigued by w hat this would mean, then
questions of respect — self-respect as well as respect for another —
and questions of freedom, mutuality, equality, and benefit or harm,
will n ot be u ninteresting questions. We know the dangers as well as
ineffectiveness of m oralism , and the potential dangers of narrowly
construed m oral system s and rules. We do not yet know whether
an ethic of ju s t love and just sex will transform any young person's
understanding or action. Insofar as we care about our children, it is
worth a try.
Sexual Relations with O neself

M ost of the ju stice norm s that I have delineated in this chapter de
rive at least in part from "relationality," one of the basic obligating
features of h um an persons. T h e norm s as I have presented th em are
clearly relevant to sexual relationships between persons, but it is not
so clear how this ju stice ethic relates to sexual relations with one's
self. I do n ot thereby w ant to dism iss the im portance of questions
about "self-pleasuring" (or m asturbation), especially since general
perceptions and attitudes regarding this form of sexual expression
have changed radically in the latter part of the tw entieth century.
Perhaps the m ost im portant insight we need in this regard is that
it, like other sexual activities, needs to be moved out of the realm of
taboo morality.
Through centuries of W estern thought m asturbation was judged
to be n ot only an im m oral sexual practice, but one that should be
particularly repugnant to hum an individuals and the hum an com m u
nity. As Im m anuel Kant insisted, it places hum ans "below the level
of an im als."40 C hristian traditions looked upon it as the "solitary
40. Im m a n u e l K an t, L e ctu res in E th ics , tra n s. L ou is In field (N ew York: H arp er &

Row, 19631, 1 7 0 .
236 TUST LOVE
sin/ ' "on anism ," "sclf-abusc," and judged it harshly until the tw enti
eth century, although perhaps n ot so harshly in every prior century.
Traditions of professional m edical opinion undergirded and joined
in the negative judgments made by religious authorities. Although
there are theologians and church traditions that continue to consider
m asturbation im m oral, m any others (m ost, as far as I can tell, along
w ith m ost m edical practitioners) do n o t assess it in this m anner any
m ore. M asturbation is m ore likely to be considered morally neutral,
w hich could m ean th at it is either good or bad, depending on the
circum stances and the individual. It could also m ean that, while the
practice may raise psychological questions (if it becom es obsessive,
for example), it usually docs n ot raise any m oral questions at all.
Ever since the Kinsey studies, it has been im possible to claim
with any credibility that m asturbation is a practice of only a very
few, or that past dire predictions about dangerous physical or psy
chological inju ry from the practice are accurate. Anecdotal reports
today tend to show that any evil or injury involved is the result of
m isinform ation, unsubstantiated m yths, and experiences of defile
m ent and guilt in w hat is perceived to be the breaking of religious
or cultural taboos. It is surely the case that m any wom en, follow
ing the "our bodies our selves" m ovem ent in th e fourth quarter of
the tw entieth ccntury, have found great good in self-pleasuring —
perhaps especially in the discovery of their own possibilities for plea
sure — som ething m any had not experienced or even known about
in their ordinary sexual relations with husbands or lovers. In this
way, it could be said that m asturbation actually serves relationships
rather than hindering them.
M y final observation is, then, that the norm s of justice as I have
presented th em would seem to apply to the choice of sexual self-
pleasuring only insofar as this activity may help or harm, only
insofar as it supports or lim its, well-being and liberty of spirit.41 T h is
rem ains largely an em pirical question, n ot a m oral one.
41. F o r a tra d itio n a l view , s e e G e rm a in G rise z , T h e Way o f th e L o rd Jesu s, v o l. 3:

D ifficult M oral Q u es tio n s (Q uincy, 1L: F ran ciscan , 1 9 9 7 ), 1 3 4 , 2 4 7 . For critic a l c o n te m
porary a n aly sis, in clu d in g co n cep tu al a n aly sis and b ib lical a n d trad itio n v iew p oints, sec
A n th o n y K o sn ik c t a !., "M a s tu r b a tio n /' in R eadin gs in M oral T h eo lo g y N o. 8 : D ialogu e
a b o u t C a th o h c S e x u a l T eaclm ig, ed. C h a rle s E . C u rra n and R ich ard A. M c C o rm ick
(N ew York: P a u list, 1 9 9 3 ), 3 4 9 - 6 0 ; R onald Lawler, Josep h M . Boyle, and W illia m E.
T h e N egative Potential o f S ex
I have tried throughout this chapter and previous chapters to em

phasize the positive m eanings and values of sexuality. I have not,
however, ignored its negative potential. Along the way I have noted
serious in stan ces of the injurious use of sexuality (such as rape) as
well as problem atic practices that have traditionally been challenged
as more evil th an good (such as prostitution and pornography). I
have left som e questions hanging, promising to return to them . I do
so here, but w ith brief observations, less th an the questions deserve,
yet im portant to probing them more fully.
T h e fram ew ork for sexual ethics that I have presented clearly does
not treat sex as evil in som e in trin sic way — not evil because of an
uncontrollable biological drive, n ot evil becausc pleasure-seeking is
inevitably self-centered, n ot evil because th e hum an body is a burden
to the h um an soul. M y proposed framework, as a way of thinking
about sexual ethical questions, does n ot yield conclusions such as:
Sex without openness to biological reproduction is evil because it
involves unjustified "venereal pleasure."42 It cannot yield conclusions
such as: All s e x as sex requires divine forgiveness, since it is inevitably
tainted by a previous cataclysm ic hum an "Fall."43 It cannot yield
conclusions such as: All sex is defiling and sham eful if it is expressed
May, "M a s tu r b a tio n ," ibid ., 3 6 1 - 7 1 ; A lan Soble, "M a s tu rb a tio n : C o n cep tu a l a n d E th
ical M a tte rs," in T h e P h ilo so p h y o f S ex : C o n tem p o ra ry R eadin gs, cd . A lan S o b le, 4 th
ed. (N ew Y ork: R o w m a n & L ittlefield , 2 0 0 2 ) , 6 7 - 9 4 . For a c ritic a l e ssa y fro m th e s ta n d
p o in t of w o m e n 's exp erien ce, s e c Jacq u elin e F ortu nata, "M a s tu rb a tio n and W om en 's
S e x u a lity ," in T h e P h ilo so p h y o f S ex , ed. A la n Soble, 1 st ed. (N ew York: Littlefield
A dam s, 1 9 8 0 ), 3 8 9 - 4 0 8 .
4 2 . I am co n v in ced th a t th is ratio n ale is th e u n su b sta n tia ted p o sitio n b e h in d , for
e xa m p le, t h e d ire ctio n s given by R o m a n C a th o lic h ierarch ical leaders forbidding the
p ra ctice o f tubal lig a tio n in C a th o lic h o s p ita ls — ev en in c irc u m s ta n c e s w h ere a w om an
m ay already h a v e m u ltip le ch ild ren and, b c ca u se o f se rio u s h e a rt d isease, be a t risk of
d ea th sh ou ld s h e h a v e to su sta in a n o th e r pregnancy. S e e M argaret A . Farley, "P ow er
and P ow erlessn ess: A C a s e in P o in t," P ro ceed in g s o f th e C a th o lic T h e o lo g ic a l S o ciety
o f A m e r ic a 3 7 ( 1 9 8 2 ) : 1 1 6 - 1 9 ; R ich ard A . M c C o rm ic k , "S te riliz a tio n : th e D ile m m a
o f C a th o lic H o s p ita ls ," in T h e C ritical C a llin g R eflection s o n iMoral D ilem m a s sin c e
V atican 11 (W ashin g to n, D C : G eorgeto w n U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 8 9 ), 2 7 3 - 8 8 .
4 3 . I do n o t h ereby q u arrel co m p letely o r o n ly w ith M a rtin L u th e r's p o sitio n th a t
orig in al s in h a s le f t all h u m a n s still sin fu l in a w ay th a t goes beyond sin fu l action s
o f th e ir o w n . In so fa r a s L u th er held th e A u g u stin ian p o sitio n th a t i t is s e x th a t bears
p ara d ig m a tica lly ev il co n seq u en ces o f orig in al sin , I oppose th is, a s I h o p e m y no rm s
im p ly and w h a t I have said abo u t C h ristia n p erspectives o n s e x articu lates.
238 TUST LOVE
in forms outside of traditional categories of acceptability. It cannot

yield conclusions such as: Sex is always an expression of human
conflict, and inevitably contains som e degree of violence.
Yet there are characteristics of som e hum an relationships that,
w hen expressed sexually, do wreak havoc on th e vulnerable individ
ual and disrupt the hum an community. Moreover, the harm that
is done, for exam ple, in sexual assault seem s to be m ore poten
tially deadly th an the harm s of nonsexual assault, em otional abuse,
exploitation. T h is may be so because of the lingering cultural con
notations of defilem ent of w hich Ricoeur spoke. It m ay also be so
because sexuality is uniquely in tim ate to hum an persons as embod
ied spirits, inspirited bodies. For whatever reasons, it does appear
that to be violated so intim ately in our bodied selves can entail harm
in a distinctively terrible way. H ence, for example, the traum a of sus
tained sexual abuse of children is more injurious than other forms
of physical and em otional abuse. It is perhaps here th at we should
at least note th e significant difference in gravity between w hat have
been called "sin s of w eakness" and "sin s of m alice."
Although there is som e reticence to judge the use of sex in ways
that involve violence and exploitation, there are n ot m any w ho think
positively about th e stories that appear daily in newspapers regarding
practices in our own and other parts of the world. T h e reticence is
due largely to fear of critiquing practices from the standpoint of one
culture against another. Yet these practices appear to occur across
cultures, and a kind of m oral repugnance seem s fully justified. I refer
here, for exam ple, to the use of rape as an accepted form of modern
warfare, or at least an accepted side-effect of it; the widespread traf
ficking of w om en and children for purposes of prostitution or sexual
slavery,· the m illions of children used in prostitution w hether traf
ficked from or sim ply used w ithin their own lands; and on and on.
A fall-out from som e practices produces an u njust stigm atization of
innocent victim s — as, for example, in th e som etim es lethal pun
ishm en t of wives, but not husbands, for adultery; th e stigm atization
of w om en w ho have been raped and of children born from rape; the
shunning and stigm atization of wives w ho have been infected with
H IV by unfaithful husbands. I do n ot w ant or need to discuss these
crim es or even these terrible but unwarranted stigm as in further de

tail, since studies of th em are plentiful and readily available.44 W hat
is clear, however, is that they violate all of the sexual ethical norm s I
have identified above.
Pornography and traditional form s of prostitution are, as T have
indicated, two issues th at have becom e highly contested in the
past twenty-five years. Fem inists have found them selves on oppos
ing sides of both of these issues, though often the debates are less
about the practices them selves th an about related issues. In re
gard to pornography, th e debate is about freedom of speech versus
censorship, although it inevitably involves som e assessm ent of the
conscqucnccs of pornography for gender relations, children used in
pornographic film s, the psychological outcom e of sustained use of
pornography over tim e, and w hat counts or does n ot cou nt as pornog
raphy.45 T h e se are serious issues, and m ust be weighed carefully. Not
all use of pornography is harmful to individuals, no doubt, and it is
all too easy for zealots to lump even great literature and art into the
category of pornography. N onetheless, I have through the years been
unable to forget the poignant story of a young m an w ho told m e of
4 4 . In a d d itio n to on going new sp ap er rep orts, see, (o r exam p le, B rian M . W illis and
B arry S . Levy, " C h ild P ro s titu tio n : G lo b a l H e a lth B urd en, R esea rch N eed s, and In ter
v e n tio n s ," T h e L a n c e t 3 5 9 (A pril 2 0 , 2 0 0 2 ) : 1 4 1 7 - 2 1 ; C a th e r in e P an ter-B rick , "S tree t
C h ild re n , H u m a n R ig h ts, a n d P u b lic H ealth : A C ritiq u e a n d Future D ire c tio n s ," A n
n u a l R e v ie w o f A n th ro p o lo g y 3 1 (2 0 0 2 ): 1 4 7 - 7 1 ; G ra ce W am u c, "G en d er V iolence
and E xp lo ita tio n : T h e W id o w 's D ile m m a ," in V io len ce A gainst W o m en : R eflection s
b y K en y an W o m en T h eo lo g ia n s , ed. G race W am ue and M a ry G e tu i (N airobi, Kenya:
A cton , 1 9 9 6 ), 4 0 - 4 8 ; Jade C h ristin e A ngelica, A M oral E m erg en cy : B rea k in g th e C y cle
o f C h ild S ex u a l A b u s e (K an sas C ity, M O : S liced & W ard, 1 9 9 3 ). I sh o u ld n o te also
th a t th e re are m u ltip le o th e r issu es regarding em o tio n a l and p h ysical v io len ce a s s o
c ia te d w ith se x , su c h a s sex u al h a ra ssm e n t, d a te rape, and so fo rth . T h e literatu re
is v o lu m in o u s o n th e form er. O n th e latter, see K risten T. L eslie, W h en V io len ce is
N o Stran ger: P astoral C o u n selin g w ith Survivors o f A c q u a in ta n c e R a p e (M in n eap o lis:
F ortress, 2 0 0 3 ) .
4 5 . See, for e xa m p le, C a th e r in e A . M a cK in n o n , "P orn og rap h y L eft and R ig h t," in
Sex, P referen ce, a n d Fam ily , cd . D avid M . E stlu n d and M a rth a C . N u ssb a u m (O xford:
O xford U n iv e r sity P ress, 1 9 9 7 ), 1 0 2 - 2 5 ; M a cK in n o n , T ow ard a F em in ist T h e o r y o f
t h e S ta te (C am brid ge, M A : H arvard U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 8 9 ), ch a p ter 1 1 ; A lan Soble,
"P orn ograph y a n d th e S o cia l S c ie n c e s ," in T h e P h ilo so p h y o f S ex : C o n tem p o ra ry R ea d
ings , cd . A la n S o b lc (N ew York: R o w m an & L ittlefield , 2 0 0 2 1 , 4 2 1 - 3 4 ; M a rth a C .
N u ssb a u m , " O b je c tific a tio n ," P h ilo so p h y a n d P ublic A ffairs 2 4 ( 1 9 9 5 ): 2 4 9 - 9 1 ; Jeffrey
R ose a n d D av id B . H art, "P orn ograph y a n d th e In te rn e t: A n E x ch a n g e," N e w A tlantis
n o . 6 (S u m m er 2 0 0 4 ) : 7 5 - 8 9 .
240 TUST LOVE
his own introduction to an addictivc use of pornography by h is father

and older brother, and who upon reflection bemoaned the distortions
in his own abilities to relate to wom en as a result. N orm s of justice
are clearly relevant here, but the m ajor task is to sort out w hat is
harm ful or not, w hat conditions people to distorted gender relations,
w hether and how pornography eroticizes sexual violence, and who is
being exploited or coerced am ong those who work in th e sex industry
itself.
Regarding prostitution, the debate tends to be about situational
issues — that is, the difference between, on th e one hand, sex work
ers who argue that they are situationally free to choose this work for
reasons related to their own interests and, on the other hand, sex
workers who are coerced physically or econom ically into prostitu
tion. T h is debate also incorporates assessm ents of the right or good
of anyone's trading of bodily sexual favors for money. In a balanced
m oral evaluation of claim s and counterclaim s in these regards, Karen
Peterson-Iyer has acknowledged the freedom of at least som e prosti
tutes, but freedom w ithin limited options. Calling for a fair hearing of
the voices of prostitutes them selves, Peterson-Iyer nonetheless raises
questions about the possibilities of genuine m utuality or equality in
contexts that are all too conducive to the subjection of one sexual
partner to another, objectification of both parties, com m odification
of sex, and th e separation of sex from self-identity.46 Wc arc left not
only w ith questions about the justification of prostitution as a prac
tice but with a challenge to our own discernm ent of obligations in
social justice to prostitutes and the world around them.
C h aracter, F aith , and Sexual Ju stice
T h e ju stice fram ew ork for sexual ethics outlined in this chapter is,
as I have said, for a C hristian and a hum an sexual ethic. W h at is dis
tinctive about a C hristian sexual ethic is n ot that it offers som ething
other th an a ju stice ethic but that it is contextualized differently and,
46. K aren P eterson -Iy er, "P ro s titu tio n : A F e m in is t E th ic a l A n a ly sis," Jo u rn al o f

F em in ist S tu d ies in Religion 14 (Fall 19981: 1 9 - 4 4 . S e e a lso th e e x ce lle n t diverse set
o f e ssa y s in R onald W eitzer, ed ., S ex fo r S a le: P rostitu tion , P ornography, a n d t h e S ex
In d u stry (N ew York: R ou tled g e, 2 0 0 0 ) .
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex 24 1
like other religious traditions, it will no doubt give significance to ad

ditional norm s. For example, norm s and ideals of faithfulness, loving
kindness, forgiveness, patience, and hope that are im portant for any
relationships w ithin the C hristian com m unity will surely be relevant
to sexual relationships as well. Insofar as any sexual ethic requires
taking account of the person as a whole, a C hristian sexual ethic will
surely hold a t its center an understanding of the person before God.
C hristian traditions share an affirm ation of the goodness of cré
ation, the central significance of the incarnation of God in Jesus
C hrist, th e redemption of hum anity and all creation by th e saving
action of G od through Jesus C hrist, the com m and and the call of
hum ans to love God with all their heart and soul and strength and
to love their neighbors as themselves.
C hristians affirm also the call of hum an persons to a destiny of
friendship and ultim ate com m union with God and all persons in
God. C hristian s (at least m any C hristians) affirm beliefs in the role
of hum an persons as agents in cooperation w ith the ongoing cre
ative activity of God; the im portance of n ot only the individual but
the com m unity; the responsibilities of h um an persons to promote
the health and well-being of one another; the shared task of work
ing for ju stice in th e world and the healing of creation; the equality
of persons n ot only before God but before one another. Christians
believe, too, in loves that, like the love of Jesus C hrist, are stronger
than death; and in th e possibility that tragedy is n ot th e last word
in th e m eaning of hum an lives. To som e persons, the whole world
m anifests som ething sacred — that is, the presence of God — so that
hum an sexuality, too, has a sacram ental dim ension. A C hristian sex
ual ju stice eth ic is informed and sustained in the context of these
beliefs.
Moreover, for C hristians to love neighbors, near and far, as th em
selves is to love them justly, to love them on th e model given by a God
of com passionate justice. T h e questions of m orality that Christians
m ust address are, therefore, questions not only of w hat we m ust do,
but w hat we m u st be and becom e. A hum an justice ethic, and surely
a C hristian ju stice ethic, m ust attend n ot only to action guides but
to the kinds o f persons wc arc called to be. In the sphere of sexual
242 TUST LOVE
morality, for exam ple, w hat possible cffect can norm s for ju st rela
tionships have in our lives if we do n ot attend to th e "sort of person"
we w ant to be?47
W hen ethics addresses questions of w hat we ought to be, it is in the
realm of w hat is standardly referred to as "virtue eth ics," or "ethics
of character." T h ese questions presum e that, in addition to all the
factors that go in to m aking us "who we are" — such as genetic in
heritance, tem peram ent, environm ent, socialization, nurturance (or
lack thereof) — we ourselves have som e sort of influence on w hat
we becom e. For C hristians, these questions presum e that in addi
tion to divine grace — or better, w ith the power of divine grace— wc
shape ourselves significantly by our freedom. O ur capacity for free
choice, however limited or expanded, is after all a capacity for "self-
determ ination." T o som e degree, in som e respect, we are responsible
not only for our actions, but for the kind of person we com e to be.
In a C h ristian sexual ethic, therefore, w c should n ot be surprised
to find guidance n ot only from norm s of strict justice but from the
ideals and th e challenge of th e Serm on on the M ount.
Part of our concrete reality is that we live out our lives in time;
hence, our lives and our loves are in process. We are, as we say,
"developing." We develop physically and intellectually, culturally and
socially, but also spiritually and m orally We becom e generally kind
or unkind, h on est or dishonest, com passionate or callous. In other
words, we m ay develop well or badly, in every dim ension of our being.
Even w hen w e develop well, however, a little reflection tells us how
complicated we are. Being a certain sort of person does n ot m ean
that we are w ithout contradictions in our selves, or that we have no
weaknesses to bear or faults over w hich w c break our hearts.
Although religion in whatever tradition can function primarily as
a harsh rem inder of duty, a source of sham e and guilt, a producer
of tim idity or zealous m oralism s; it can also free us from the sort of
fear that keeps us away from God and fractures our selves. C h ris
tianity, like other religious traditions, has endured in part because
it helps people to m ake sense of their lives. It offers som e response
47. T h is p h ra se is Ja m es G u s ta fso n 's in " T h e 'S o r t o f ' P erso n O n e I s ," C a n E thics

B e C h ristian f : A n In q u iry (C h icag o : U n iv ersity o f C h icag o Press, 1 9 7 5 ), ch ap . 2.
to the large h um an questions of yearning and love, of suffering and

death, hope and transcendence. C hristianity itself offers hope in for
giveness, liberation from too narrow a view of hum an possibility, and
the promise o f a covenanted relationship w ith God that will n ot be
broken. We know th e partiality of our loves and th e incapacities of
our hearts. We know the fragility of all hum an relationships. Yet we
arc able to believe that som e loves can be blessed w ith inexhaustible
life, that som e relationships can hold no m atter w hat the forces of
evil may threaten against them , that sexuality can becom e part of
the highest form s of friendship, and that a call to ju stice rem ains.
T h e ideals of virtue th at m ay m otivate as well as shape our efforts
to becom e ju s t in our sexual expressions and relationships can be
described in term s of wisdom, integrity, freedom, and great love. We
need refined capacities of self-knowledge and knowledge of the other;
wc need capabilities for reverent discernm ent of w hat is ju st in every
relationship. We can hope that the development of such capacities
and abilities will m ake u s m ore and m ore wise, though there are
clearly degrees and lim its to whatever wisdom we accrue. In turn,
we hope that whatever th e wisdom we attain or receive will make
our discernm ents m ore thoughtful, m ore sensitive, and more just.
Wc who m ay begin with undisciplined loves, or find our desires
in conflict along the way, can rccognizc our needs for wholeness.
W holeness in this sense m ay bring unity and peace for ourselves,
but it will also allow us m ore and more to bring an undivided love
to every beloved. For C hristians, the ideal is to integrate our loves
som ehow in an utter love of God. O ur desire is for an integration
that destroys no desire but transform s it, that ignores no love but
makes it ju st, that harm s no one, not even ourselves. T h is is the
kind of integrity that nourishes our sexuality and makes it just.
Little by little, wisdom and integrity bring freedom. T h ey m ake lib
erty of spirit possible, and the creative use of free choice consistent.
Virtue in its classical meaning, after all, has to do with the refinem ent
of our capacities so that we exercise th em w ith consistency, greater
ease, and delight. T h is virtue is n ot the pinch-faced virtue of either
the fearful or the self-righteous; nor is it the scm blancc of "purity"
that is the enem y of generosity, humility, and full-hearted care. It is
244 TUST LOVE
not the kind of freedom that is finally attained only by experim en
tation, keeping all options open, all form s of genuine relationship at
bay. T h is freedom is, rather, the freedom of courage in th e face of real
risk and fear; perseverance in the face of weakness and distraction,·
trust in the face of self-doubt; faithfulness in the face of th e furies
or dem ons th a t would divert us both from the searches to w hich wc
are called and from our chosen and already anchored loves. It is a
freedom that not only protects us from exploitation and harm , but
that positively affirm s and lifts our loves w ith the whole of ourselves.
T h is, then, is th e freedom that unleashes ju st love, desire, and sex.
Finally, wisdom , integrity, and freedom serve great love. Insofar as
they all together approximate the conceptual core of the traditional
"cardinal" virtues — prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice —
they serve a ju st love. I m yself prefer these alternate nam es for cen
tral, com prehensive, and pivotal virtues (that is, alternate to the
traditional concepts of prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice);
they garner th e best of the traditional theories but jettiso n culturc-
bound connotations that do not serve well our new understandings
of hum an sexuality. Great love is a love that is right, ju st, true, and
good. It does n ot contradict th e concrete reality of either lover or
beloved; it is true to the nature of the relationship between them ; it
is whole and w ise and brave and also humble, non-grasping, able to
laugh and to m ourn; it integrates multiple loves, even m ultiple great
loves, in harm ony w ith an utter love of God.
T h ese virtues, or characteristics of persons, are adm ittedly ideals.
Yet they, too, have a kind of bottom -line aspect. W ithout any degree
of virtue, it is hard to im agine sex that is good; w ithout growing
m aturity in virtue, it is difficult to im agine sex that is great. So faith,
character, and m oral growth belong to an ethics of sexual justice just
as m uch as n orm s that guide our actions. Each illum inate th e other,
and each m akes the other more possible.
C hapter 7
PATTERNS OF RELATIONSHIP
Contexts for Just Love
I
throughout this book th at m y in tention is
h a v e s a id r e p e a t e d l y
not to address, certainly n ot to resolve, all of the pressing questions

for sexual eth ics. Rather, my aim has been to propose a fram ew ork for
thinking about these questions. In this chapter, however, I do turn to
particular patterns of relationship in the sexual sphere of our lives pre
cisely in order to reflect on th em in th e light of the framework outlined
in the previous chapter. T h e patterns to be addressed arc marriage and
family, sam e-sex relationships, divorce and remarriage. T h is means
that I will not be focusing on alternative patterns such as cohabitation,
bisexuality, celibacy, singleness, kinship (though they arc all extremely
im portant), except insofar as these relate in som e way to marriage
and family, sam e-sex relations, and divorce and second marriages.
Although each of these three patterns requires m uch m ore attention
than I offer in this one chapter, m y hope is that they have enough in
com m on to ju stify m y bringing them together here. They arc, in fact,
interrelated in significant ways: they overlap considerably, so it may be
that treating th em together can provide insights n ot otherwise obvious
w hen they are studied separately; they are all patterns that promise
happiness and hum an flourishing, although each of th em m ay also
yield experiences of pain; they arc all patterns that arc complex; and
they are all lived out in contexts that call for both justice and mercy.
M arriage and Fam ily
Studies regarding marriage and fam ily have m ultiplied astonishingly

in recent years. N o doubt this is in large part bccausc form s of family
245
246 TUST LOVE
have proliferated and changed, producing confusion and concern —

to the point w here the situation is called a crisis. My own approach,
however, to form s of family and to the possibilities for marriage wall
not be in term s of response to "crisis," since I am persuaded by h is
torians that "fo r thousands of years people have been proclaiming
a crisis in m arriage [and family] and pointing backward to better
d ays."1 For m e, this relativizes the significance of "crisis," although
there are serious and new challenges for contemporary institutions
of marriage and family. Indeed, even those like Stephanie Coontz
and N ancy C o tt w ho have looked long and hard at the sweep of h is
torical developments have been inclined to observe that around the
globe "th e current rearrangement of both married and single life is
in fact w ithout historical precedent,"2 and in the U nited States there
has occurred in recent years a "seism ic shift" in marriage practiccs
which, of course, has had im plications also for fam ilies.3
In response to current experiences of marriage and family, a
"tu rn to the fam ily" has preoccupied not only sccular historians,
philosophers, and social scientists but also religious historians and
theologians. T h e latter have engaged in interfaith studies as well
as m ajor works on particular religious traditions. For example, the
m assive projects on "Religion, Culture, and Fam ily" and "Religion,
M arriage, and Family," led by D on Browning at the U niversity of C h i
cago, have produced or in som e way influenced nearly twenty books,
with m ore o n the way.4 Writings by Rosem ary Radford Ruether, Lisa
Sowie C ahill, C hristine Gudorf, and others have added significant in
sights into past and present C hristian perspectives on marriage and
family.5 M y primary goal here is not to repeat w hat scholars have
already said, although I will surely draw on their work; it is, rather,
1. S te p h a n ie C o o n tz , M arriage, a H istory: From O b e d ie n c e t o In tim a c y o r H ow

L o v e C o n q u e r e d M arriage (N ew York: V iking, 2 0 0 5 ) , 1.
2 . Ib id , 2.
3 . N a n cy F. C o tt , P u blic V ow s: A H istory o f M arriage a n d th e N ation (C am bridge,
M A : H arv ard U n iv e r sity Press, 2 0 0 0 ) , 2 0 1 .
4 . For an ov erview o f th ese p u b lica tio n s a s o f 2 0 0 5 s e e th e W eb site:
h ttp ://m a rty -cen ter.u ch ica g o.ed u /resea rch /rcfp /.
5 . S e e R o se m a ry Radford R u cthcr, C h ristian ity a n d t h e M akin g o f t h e M odern
F am ily: Ruling Id eo lo g ies, D iverse R ea lities (B o sto n : B eaco n , 2 0 0 0 ) ; L isa So w ie C a h ill,
F am ily: A C h ristia n S o cial P ersp ectiv e (M in n eap o lis: A ugsburg F ortress, 2 0 0 0 ) ; Lisa
So w ie C a h ill a n d D ie tm a r M ic th , ed s., T h e F am ily, 1 9 9 5 sp écial issu e of C o n ciliu m
Patterns o f R elationship: Contexts for Just Love 247
to see w hether there arc specific additional elem ents to be discovered

or reinforced in a sexual ethic that takes seriously these patterns of
relationship.
H istorical a n d Cultural Contexts

T h e in stitution s of marriage and family have always been signifi
cant for socicty and for religious traditions. As Ruether observes,
"B o th the church and the state have a stake in stable, com m itted
partnerships th at provide the framework for child-raising, sustain
ing the well-being of related people over tim e, and caring for others
in crisis, illness, and old age."6 And N ancy C o tt notes that even to
day, "N o m odern nation-state can ignore marriage form s, because of
their direct im pact on reproducing and com posing the population."7
Throughout history, of course, marriage and fam ily have taken di
verse form s and fulfilled diverse functions suited to the social and
cultural contexts in w hich they were lived out. In m any of these
contexts, m arriage functioned to determ ine relationships between
fam ilies, establish inheritance lines, create and reinforce gender roles,
circum scribe sexual activity, determ ine rights and duties in sexual
relations, and provide for the legitimacy and rearing of children. A
primary determ inant of marriage was the need of fam ilies to gain in
laws, to establish or secure political and econom ic alliances between
and am ong fam ilies.8 Yet the history of the functions of marriage is
a com plex o n e that cautions us against too hasty interpretations of
the past or its relation to the present.
(Lond on: S C M , a n d M ary k n o ll, N Y: O rbis|; A drian T h a tch e r, ed ., C eleb ra tin g C h ris
tian M arriage (N ew York: T . & T. C lark , 2 0 0 1 ) ; C h ristin e E. G u d orf, "W e ste rn Religion
and th e P a tria rch a l F am ily ," in F em in ist E th ics a n d t h e C a th o lic M oral T rad ition , ed.
C h a rle s E. C u rra n , M arg aret A . Farley, and R ich ard A . M c C o r m ic k (N ew York: P au list,
1 9 9 6 ). S e e also t h e review essay by So n d ra W heeler, "F in d in g O u r W ay H o m e: T h e o lo
g ia n s’ R e-e n g a g e m e n t w ith th e E th ic s of F am ily ," R eligiou s S tu dies R esd ew 2 9 (O cto ber
2 0 0 3 ): 3 3 7 - 4 1 .
6 . R uether, C h ristia n ity a n d th e M akin g o f t h e M od ern Fam ily, 2 1 3 .
7 . C o tt, Ih ib lic Vow s, 5.
8 . C o o n tz , M arriage, a H istory , 3 2 - 3 3 . C o o n tz ob serves th a t th e r e h as b e e n on ly
o n e s o c ic ty w h e re m arriag e h as n o t b een a s ig n ifica n t in stitu tio n , and th is w as a so cicty
w ith o n ly 3 0 ,0 0 0 m em b ers in w h ich sib lin g rela tio n s w ere m u ch m o re im p o rta n t than
m arriage. M oreover, am o n g all th e p o ssible fu n ctio n s o f m arriage, C o o n tz sees th e
acq u iring o f in -la w s a s th e m o s t d istin ctiv e. T h i s is th e o n ly fu n ctio n th a t c a n n o t be
perform ed , s h e c o n clu d e s, b y groups of b ro th ers and sisters.
248 TUST LOVE
According to Coontz, polygyny has been the marriage institution

of choice across more tim e and m ore cultures th an any other.9 In
the West, m onogam y becam e th e preferred form of marriage, but
m ore gradually than contem porary C hristians m ight suspect. When
C hristianity spread beyond Palestine it encountered different laws
and custom s fo r marriage than it had inherited from either Jewish or
G reco-R om an traditions. T h e practice of polygyny in som e Western
eth nic groups such as th e Franks, Teutons, and G erm ans co n tin
ued through th e early Middle Ages.10 Since then, however, wherever
W estern eulture has encountered polygyny it has tended to judge it to
be "p rim itiv e/' "uncivilized," and needing to be changed.11 T h is has
been true w hether these encounters were w ithin W estern nations or
in other parts of the world. In the U nited States, for example, this has
been the response to Native Am ericans, M orm ons, and immigrants
w ith polygynous cultural backgrounds.
T h e narratives of marriage and fam ily in W estern civilization have
been marked by particular trajectories that have changed the land
scape of relationships in profound ways. M ajor shifts have taken
placc, for exam ple, in the m otivations for marriage, in who makes
choices about marriage and w ho regulates its form s, and in the pat
terns of gender relations w ithin both marriage and family. These
shifts do n ot happen in a vacuum, however; they becom e possible and
are in som e sense driven by changes in the political and econom ic
contexts in w hich they take place.12 Although I turn now to those
trajectories in W estern history, there is plenty of evidence that what
has happened in the West is now also happening around th e world.
In the beginning of W estern civilization and for a long part of its
h istory m arriage was undertaken primarily to m eet the needs of fam
ilies and kinship groups — econom ic, political, and social needs. T h e
9. C o o n tz , M arriage, a H istory , 10, 2 7 . C o o n tz cite s in su p p ort of th is G eorge

P eter M u rd ock , E th n o g ra p h ic A tlas (P ittsbu rg h: U n iv e rsity o f P ittsb u rg h P ress, 1967).
10. R u cthcr, C h ristia n ity a n d t h e M akin g o f t h e M od ern Fam ily, 5 1 - 5 2 . Sec also
M argaret M . M itc h e ll, "W h y F am ily M a tters fo r E arly C h ris tia n L itera tu re," in E arly
C hristian F a m ilies in C o n tex t, ed. D avid L. B alch and C aro ly n O s ie k (G ran d Rapids,
M I: W illia m B . E crd m an s, 2 0 0 3 ) , 3 5 3 - 5 4 . It sh ou ld be said th a t th e w e ste rn G e rm a n ic
tribes w ere b a re ly C h ristia n before th e fifth century.
1 1 . S e e C o tt, P u blic Vow s, 1 0 5 - 3 0 .
12. S o m e o f th e s e ch an g es have been ch arted in h is to ric a l overview s I have already
no ted in ch a p te r 2.
historical trajectory of the control of marriage — that is, the control

shifting from fam ilies to church to m onarchies to dem ocratic states
to individuals — is long and com plex, but from our present vantage
point, the m ost visible strand w ithin this shift appears to be the
gradual move to marriages chosen by individuals on the basis of the
experience of love and the hope of personal happiness. As Coontz
notes, in the past "som e people fell in love, som etim es even with
their own sp o u ses/'13 but th e functions of marriage were too im
portant to leave to the private determ ination of two individuals on
the basis of private affections. H istorians date differently th e evo
lution of W estern marriage from family-dominated arrangem ents to
a choice of interpersonal love, but the m ajor shift appears to have
taken place in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. T h is pro
cess was therefore under way by th e beginning of the history of the
U nited States. C o tt picks up the narrative in this new and expanding
country with a deconstructive focus on the continuing roles of the
nation, the state, and local com m unities in controlling the forms
and fu nctions of marriage. However m uch it looked to be otherwise,
marriage was n ot a private but a public institution, a vehicle whereby
the state attem pted to organize, govern, and shape th e populace in
ways driven b y religious, political, and econom ic concerns. W hether
in spite of or bccause of governm ent control, the narrative nonethe
less proceeds through four centuries, ultim ately to transform ations
of marriage into private choices, and the family into a haven apart
from th e world.
Changes in gender relations were ineluctably tied to changes in
the functions and m eanings of marriage. "In the beginning" it may
13. C o o n tz , M arriage, a H istory , 7 . C o o n tz la te r n o te s th a t ind iv id uals m ig h t hope

to fin d lov e, o r a t le a s t "tra n q u il a ffe c tio n " in m a rria g e, a n d a e o n c c rn fo r th e w ell-b ein g
o f co u p les w as n o t ignored in m a n y fam ily a rran g em en ts. S till, th is w a s n o t w h at m ar
riage w as p rim a rily for. C o n tra ry to C o o n tz 's co n clu sio n s, a t le a s t o n e h is to ria n is
sk ep tica l o f th e in te rp re ta tio n of arranged m arriag es a s "u n e m o tio n a l" o r "lo v e le ss."
S u z a n n e D ix o n h a s suggested th a t sch o la rly in s is te n ce o n sep aratin g love fro m th ese
k in d s o f m a rria g e s " m a y reflect co n tem p o rary W estern revu lsion a t th e idea o f arranged
m a rria g e s .. . . B u t it is a log ical leap fro m th e m od e of arran g em en t to th e exp ectatio n s
and c o n te n t of a m a rria g e ." S u zan n e D ix o n , " S e x and th e M arried W o m an in A n
c ie n t R o m e ," in E arly C h ristian F a m ilies in C o n tex t: An In terd iscip lin ary D ialogu e , ed.
D avid L. B a lch a n d C aro ly n O s ie k (G ran d Rapids, M I: W illia m B . E erd m a n s, 2 0 0 3 ) ,
1 1 5 . D ix o n a d d u ces literary evid en ce th ro u g h th e s e ce n tu rie s o f "lo v e s ick hu sb an d s"
and o th er ero tic m o tifs.
250 TUST LOVE
be sim ply that "flexible, gender-based division of labor w ithin a mated

p a ir" was im portant for hum an survival.14 G ender roles and relation
ships, therefore, were functional, based on w hat needed to be done.
T h e history o f gender after this is also com plex, as we have already
seen in previous chapters. But it moves along a line that includes
the subordination of w om en to m en, the som etim e consideration of
wom en's bodies as the property of m en, and the ongoing unequal
partnership between women and m en w ithin marriage and family.
C o tt's sobering depiction of the way in w hich marriage has been a
public in stitu tio n in U .S. history includes the claim and strong evi
dence that, as such, marriage has been the instrum ent through which
the state could and does shape gender roles.15 Her argument is that
in this nation's history there has been a "seam less" adaptation of
C hristian doctrine to Anglo-Am erican law. C entral to C hristian u n
derstandings o f marriage, as C o tt interprets them , are th e notions of
m utu al co n sen t for the establishm ent of a marriage (more im portant
than anything else in the gradual evolution of C hristian thought be
tween the seventh and the twelfth centuries) and “tw o in o n e flesh. ”16
T h ese n otion s blended well with Anglo-Am erican ideas of contract
and of th e leg a l on en ess of husband and wife. In addition, C hris
tian understandings of the husband as the "head" of h is wife and
his fam ily were in accord with English com m on law 's conception of
the legal, political, and econom ical "oneness" of husband and wife.
Husbands, as the only full citizens in early A m erican households,
were their w ives' political as well as legal representatives. And since
a w ife's dom estic labor as well as her assets belonged to or were ad
m inistered by her husband, she also becam e econom ically one with
him . M arital u n ity m eant enlargement of a husband's identity, but it
m ore often th a n n ot required of a wife the relinquishm ent of h ers.17
In C o tt's analysis, the nature of th e relationship between husband
and wife was to m irror the relationship between the state and the
14. C o o n tz , M arriage , a H istory , 3 8 . C o o n tz actu ally gives tw o p o ssible ren d itions

o f th e story o f t h e b e g in n in g o f m arriage. T h e seco n d o n e is t h a t m arriag e began sim p ly
a s a w ay for m e n to have a cccss to w om en in a m a n n e r th a t fit th e needs fo r exch ange.
Ibid ., 4 1 .
15. C o tt, P u blic V ow s, 3.
16. Ib id , 1 0 - 1 1 .
1 7 . Ib id ., 1 1 - 1 2 .
people. W hen in the eighteenth century the latter relationship was

challenged in term s of its patriarchal model, a new way was sought to
understand th e analogy between the social contract that established
the state and the m arital contract that founded the relationship be
tween husband and wife. Therefore, in the institution of marriage
there were new concerns for equality between husband and w ife.18
T h e authority of th e husband rem ained in place but only or primarily
because the marriage contract was "rewritten econom ically."19 T h is
allowed for th e equality gradually gained by wives' achieving legal
and political agency, but at th e sam e tim e, it strengthened beliefs
that husbands were to be providers, and wives were thereby econom
ically dependent upon them . T h e contract was still one to which both
parties consented, but it rem ained a contract th e term s of w hich they
did n ot get to choose.20
Coontz traces som ething of a sim ilar trajectory in W estern Europe
from the seventeenth century to the tw entieth. As she sees it, the
new m arital econom ic contract was here closely tied to the devel
oping notion th at marriage is for love. W hat emerged, she argues,
was the com bination of th e "love m atch " with th e "m ale provider
m arriage."21 For the first tim e marriage belonged to a private sphere
in w hich the husband was the sole breadwinner, and the wife was
responsible n o t only for dom estic tasks and child rearing but for
sustaining th e em otional core of th e marriage and the affective ties
w ithin the family. Gender relations indeed changed; they were now
n ot based on supposed natural m ale superiority but on (again sup
posed) n atural m ale/fem ale complementarity. M arital love, it was
presumed, could be nurtured through an em phasis on th e differences
between w om en and m en.
Marriage as a "love m atch" was nonetheless destabilizing, since it
began to challenge also the econom ic dependency of wives. W hether
in Europe or the U nited States, som ething new began to emerge.
18. Ibid., 1 6 - 1 7 .
19. Ibid., 1 5 7 . C o t t traces th is d ev elo p m en t fro m th e eig h tee n th to th e tw e n tie th
century.
2 0 . C o tt refers th ro u g h ou t h e r stu d y to th is anom aly, b u t in clu d es n o t o n ly the
gend er re la tio n s h ip assu m ed and ev en stip u lated fo r th e c o n tra c t b u t th e additional
fa ct th a t s o m e p e r so n s w ere refused the right to m arry a t all (for exam p le, slaves).
2 1 . C o o n tz , M arriage, a H istory, ch a p ter 9.
252 TUST LOVE
G ender relations, the structure of marriage and family, and identifi

cation of w ho controls the theory and practice of these institutions,
were now all problematized.
Christianity a n d Its In flu en ces22
Woven through these histories is the substantial role of Christianity

in shaping political and cultural understandings of marriage and fam
ily, especially in the West. Needless to say, the history of C hristianity
in regard to m arriage is, like all histories of marriage, complicated
and subject to the pcrspcctival interpretations of particular histori
ans. We may begin by asking why, for example, did early Christians
adopt a co m m itm en t to monogamy? T h e reason closest to hand
is that this was w hat C hristianity inherited. After all, as Theodore
M ackin notes, in its early years alm ost all married C hristians were
adult converts who were m arried before becom ing C hristian. "As
long as the démographie ccntcr of early C hristianity was Palestine,
the m arriages of early C hristians would be Jewish in social struc
ture and m otivation ."23 Christianity, as m ost scholars agree, was in
its beginnings a m ovem ent w ithin Judaism . N onetheless, the cul
tural context in w hich early C hristian and Jewish fam ilies were
located included the larger Greco-Rom an world. In the first cen
tury of the com m on era the preferred model for both Jewish and
Rom an m arriage was monogamy, although some, apparently atypi
cal, polygynous marriages and households still existed for Jews and
others in this context.24
2 2 . S o m e o f w h a t I d iscu ss h ere c a n be fou n d in M arg aret Λ . Farley, " T h e C h u rch

and th e F am ily : A n E th ica l T a s k ," H oriz on s 10 (1 9 8 3 ): 5 0 - 7 1 , and "F a m ily ," in T h e
N e w D iction ary o f C a th o lic S o cial T h ou g h t, ed. Ju d ith A . D w yer (C ollegeville, M N :
Liturgical, 1 9 9 4 )r 3 7 1 - 8 1 .
2 3 . T h e o d o re M ack in , W h at is M arriage! (N ew York: P au list, 1 9 8 2 ), 7 6 .
2 4 . S e e R o ss S . K raem cr, " T y p ic a l and A typ ical Jew ish F a m ily D y n a m ics: T h e C ases
o f B a b a th a and B e re n ic e ," in E arly C h ristian F a m ilies in C o n tex t: A n In terdisciplin ary
D ia log u e (G ran d R ap id s, M I: W illia m B . E erd m ans, 2 0 0 3 ) , 1 4 9 . K ra cm cr observes:
" . . . w h eth e r [polygynous m arriage] w as m o re co m m o n th a n w e realize is cu rren tly
im p o ssib le to sa y ," sin c e "w e k n o w little abo u t th e actu al fa m ily p ra ctices o f relatively
ord inary p e o p le." K raem cr and o th ers also n o te th a t th e r e s e e m s n o t to be m u ch th a t
is d istin ctiv e ly Je w ish in Jew ish fa m ilie s in an tiqu ity . C itin g S h a y c C o h e n , sh e reports
th a t Jew ish fa m ilie s in th e ir " stru c tu re , id eals, and d yn am ics se e m to have b e e n v irtu
ally id e n tica l w ith th o se o f i t s a m b ie n t cu ltu re(s)"; S h a y e J. D . C o h e n , "In tro d u ctio n ,"
T h e Jew is h F a m ily in A n tiqu ity, ed. S h ay e J. D . C o h e n (A tlan ta: Sch o lars, 1 9 9 3 ), 2.
It is n ot enough to say, however, that monogam ous marriage was

embraced by early C hristians simply because it was "th ere." After all,
C hristians considered them selves "converts" in the sense of turning
to a new w ay of life that marked th em as disciples of Jesus C hrist
and that carried with it significant m oral com m itm ents. Concern
for the avoidance of "passionate lu st," while not unique to C hris
tians of the tim e, made monogam ous relations m ore suitable than
polygynous ones for C hristians.25 Moreover, monogam y was incor
porated m ore broadly into early C hristian beliefs and theologies — in
term s of its potential symbolic significance for understanding the re
lation of fesus C hrist and th e church, and in term s of its am enability
to C hristian understandings of neighbor-love. W hether Christianity
could have adapted to other patterns of marriage rem ains, in m y view,
an open but largely m oot question — although n ot m oot in intcrfaith
and cross-cultural dynamics.
Roman law and custom regarding marriage, fashioned on m u
tual consent, also proved easily adaptable to C hristian beliefs and
co m m itm ents. C hristians, like others in th e culture in which they
lived, thought marriage was a fam ily m atter — although the mutual
consent of spouses established th e marriage. T h e practice of having
C hristian pastors present at weddings grew only gradually and infor
mally. C hristian s brought to marriage som e new attitudes, however.
As M ackin notes, the eschatological expectations of the early C hris
tians m ade m arriage appear som ewhat irrelevant, though a m ajor
reason for marrying would continue to be the need of individuals for
a context in w hich they could be sexually active. Marriage as such
was n ot so im portant to the spreading of the good new s.26
T h is, however, brings us to another im portant question regarding
the place of m arriage in the C hristian church from its beginnings
and through m any centuries of its growth. Despite the fact that m ar
riage could be structured and established in ways consonant both
2 5 . S e e W ay n e A . M ee k s, T h e First U rban C h ristian s: T h e S o c ia l W orld o f th e

A p o stle Paul (N ew H av en, C T : Yale U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 8 3 ) , 1 0 2 .
2 6 . T h is d o cs n o t m e a n th a t m arriag e and fa m ily w ere n o t in so m e w ays u tterly
im p o rta n t to t h e C h ris tia n c h u rch e s, fro m t h e early c h u rc h o n . A s orig in al places
of w orsh ip , site s o f hosp itality , ce n te rs fo r m o ra l grow th and ed u cation , i t is h ard to
im a g in e th a t C h ris tia n ity could have grow n w ith o u t th em .
254 TUST LOVE
with the culture in w hich it grew and w ith its own faith co m m it
m ents, the place of marriage and fam ily in the C hristian com m unity
was ambiguous. T h ere were a num ber of reasons for th is. One was
the belief th a t C hristians lived in the "end tim es," w hen marrying
was relativized by hope in the eschaton. A nother was a skeptical
view of h um an sexuality that made sexual renunciation a reason
able choice fo r som e. Christianity, as wc saw in chapter 2, emerged
in the late H ellenistic Age w hen even Judaism was influenced by
p essim istic attitudes toward sex. As Ruether observes, "both the
G reco-Rom an and the Jewish worlds of th e first century knew of
m ovem ents and ideologies th at were antifam ily"27 and, one might
add, in som e sense anti-sex. Philosophies were abroad th at chal
lenged persons to live celibate lives in order to keep their minds free
for thought and their hearts unencumbered, especially by the burdens
of a household. T here were even organized com m unities for celibates
am ong Jews. But in no other rapidly growing group did the notion
of leaving m arriage and fam ily behind in order to m ake a whole
hearted com m itm ent to God and to the service of the gospel take
hold so strongly as it did in the C hristian com m unities. Although
early C h ristian w riters and preachers affirmed sex as good, a part of
creation, th ey also believed it to be paradigmatically injured by the
destructive forces of a m oral Fall. Hence, taking a lead from Paul,
those who could rem ain unm arried for th e sake of the reign of God
were encouraged to do so.
Peter Brown's study of the practice of "perm anent sexual renun
ciation" am ong m en and wom en in C hristian circles from 40 C .E.
to 4 3 0 C .E. provides a m ultifaceted view of this phenom enon.28 One
thing is clear: not all choices of celibacy in this period were based on
a negative valuation of sex. Even Paul's rationale focused on freedom
to spread the gospel; h is was a pragm atic m otivation, n ot one that
2 7 . R u cthcr, C h ristia n ity a n d th e M akin g o f t h e M od ern Fam ily, 2 1 .

2 8 . P ete r B ro w n , T h e B od y a n d S ociety : M en , W o m en , a n d S e x u a l R en u n ciation
in E arly C h ristia n ity (N ew York: C o lu m b ia U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 8 8 ). S e e a lso E lizabeth
A bb ott, A H istory o f C e lib a c y (T o ro n to : H arp erC o llin s, 19991; E lizabeth C a s te lli, "V ir
g in ity a n d its M e a n in g for W o m en 's S exu ality in E arly C h ristia n ity ," Jo u r n a l o f F em in ist
S tu d ies in R eligion 2 (Sp rin g 1 9 8 6 ): 6 1 - 8 8 ; R o ss S . Kraem er, ed ., M aen ads, Martyrs,
M atrons, M o n a stics: A S o u r c e b o o k o n W om en 's R elig ion s in t h e G reco -R o m a n W orld
(P h ilad elp hia: F o rtre ss, 1 9 8 8 ).
depended on a negation of sex. Beyond this, people chose cclibacy on

the basis of diverse and m ultiple reasons: th e soul can transform the
body; conversion of heart is helped by celibate integration of affec
tions in relation to God; sexual nonavailability of women to m en can
overturn gendered expectations; friendship can be greater if it tran
scends sexual intim acy; rigorous asceticism includes the repudiation
of sex; sexual renunciation provides what martyrdom once offered:
a total self-gift to God; the death and resurrection of Jesus can be
entered into in a way that makes sex irrelevant. Brown finds all of
these form s and m otivations for perm anent celibacy— emerging, de
veloping, com peting am ong themselves and com peting with a view
of m arried chastity. N one of th em were lived in a social vacuum , and
m ost of th em were intensely debated.29 Options for celibacy do not,
however, by them selves account for the ambiguity surrounding the
status of m arriage for th e early Christians.
Rowan G reer has argued that the church in late antiquity m an
ifested at least three attitudes toward marriage and family, the
com bination o f w hich yielded a deep am bivalence.30 First, there was
a seeming rejection of fam ily ties, som etim es even open hostility
toward the family. T h e C hristian message was a sword of division,
setting fam ily m em bers against one another (M att. 1 0 :3 4 -3 9 ; Luke
1 2 :5 1 -5 3 ). A ll C hristians were asked in som e sense to leave all
things, including father, m other, spouse, and children (M att. 12:25,
2 2 :3 0 ; Luke 2 0 :3 5 ). Believers lived in anticipation of a new age which
would exclude marrying and giving in marriage. C hristian attitudes
toward m artyrdom som etim es m anifested extrem e form s of rejec
tion of fam ily responsibilities. W om en left husbands and children to
2 9 . S e e M arg aret A. Farley, "C clib a cy U n d er th e Sign o f th e C r o s s ," in S exu ality

a n d th e U.S. C a th o lic C h u rch : C risis a n d R e n e w a l , ed. L isa Sow ie C a h ill, Jo h n G arvey,
and T. F ran k K en n ed y (R o w m an & L ittlefield , 2 0 0 6 ) , fo rth co m in g . S e e also Farley, " T h e
C h u rc h and the F a m ily : A n E th ica l T a s k "; “F am ily ," in T h e N e w D iction ary o f C a th olic
S o c ia l T hought.
3 0 . R ow an A . G reer, B r o k e n Lights a n d M en d ed L iv es: T h eo lo g y a n d C o m m o n Life
in t h e E arly C h u r c h (U n iv ersity Park: U n iv ersity o f P en n sy lvan ia Press, 1 9 8 6 ), 7 7 -
1 0 0 . I a m ind ebted to G re e r fo r w h at follow s in regard to early C h ris tia n s a n d th eir
p ercep tio n o f e a rly C h ris tia n a ss e s s m e n ts o f fam ily life. S o m e th in g c lo se to , o r a t least
in large a g re e m e n t w ith , G r e e r 's a n aly sis is fu rth e r elab o rated in Ruether, C hristian ity
a n d t h e M akin g o f th e M odern F am ily, 2 5 - 3 5 , and in C a h ill, F am ily, 1 8 - 4 7 .
256 TUST LOVE
"run to m artyrdom /' and m en were som etim es encouraged to for

sake wealth, wife and children, brothers and sisters, w ith assurances
that the renunciation of hum an ties would bring the achievem ent of
spiritual ties and freedom to spread the gospel.
Second, and closely related to this, early C hristians saw the church
itself as a substitute for traditional fam ilies; the church was their
new family.31 For those who were previously w ithout a fam ily (for
example, widows and orphans), now there was the protection of the
church. For those who had to leave their form er fam ilies because
of the call o f the gospel and the fam ilial divisions it created, the
church itself could be their new hom e (M att. 1 0 :2 9 -3 0 ). T h e C h ris
tian com m unity offered a kind of m em bership, way of belonging, that
promised to abolish all barriers of nation, gender, or econom ic status.
It offered a shared life and a com m unal identity that superseded any
other groupings, even family units.
Finally, in tension with the first and second attitudes, Christians
also believed th at marriage and fam ily in the ordinary sense could
be affirmed, n ot abolished, w ithin their new life of faith.32 "Leaving
all things" could have a different m eaning for those called to live
in traditional family households (Acts 10:2; 1 1 :1 4 ; 16:15). It could
m ean the kind of unselfish love that is required in familial relations,
the obligation for fam ilies to extend their goods to others in need,
or a form of engagem ent-w ith-detachm ent on th e part of Christians
for a significant framework of life that was nonetheless part of a
fleeting world.
Marriage w as, of course, the choice of the m ajority of Christians.
As such, it w as a way of life in w hich the church had a stake. T h e
household, for C hristians as for Jews, Greeks, and Romans, was es
sential to early urban C hristianity. It is n ot surprising, therefore, that
som e C hristian leaders becam e alarmed a t the real and potential con
séquences of fam ily rejcctionist attitudes that disrupted households
and occasioned slanderous criticism s from outside observers. In order
to moderate or prevent these consequences, Pauline leaders began to
promote household codes in their churches (Col. 3 :1 8 - 4 :1 ; 1 T im .
3 1 . G reer, B r o k e n Lights a n d M e n d e d L iv es , 9 7 - 9 9 .
3 2 . Ib id ., 9 9 - 1 0 0 .
2 :8 - 1 5 ; Eph. 5 :2 2 -3 3 ; 1 Pet. 2 :1 1 -1 6 ; T itu s 2 :2 -1 0 ). Based on an

imperial m odel for th e subordination of all in a household to the
p aterfam ilias , 33 the codes supported slavery and reinforced patterns
of the dom ination of husbands over wives. Although the household
codes are som etim es interpreted as an affirm ation of marriage and
fam ily their im position held none of the vision of a "new order" that
was also im portant to the early C hristians. T h e legacy of the codes
was th a t C hristian fam ilies were to adapt to the social order that was
around them.
Overall, however, the message of the early Christians remains
ambiguous and am bivalent. Attitudes of rejection, substitution, and
affirm ation regarding marriage and fam ily continued in tension. In
the third century all three attitudes contributed to a C hristian stance
that was in opposition both to th e anti-m arriage and an ti-sex of some
G nostic groups as the church fathers presented them , and to the
supposed libertine practices of others. Through m any centuries, the
C hristian church continued to affirm marriage as good, although celi
bacy was considered better. A ffirm ation of the fam ily was invariably
based on its functional roles in socializing children or in keeping
order in society.
It has been argued that C hristian am bivalence toward marriage
and family through so m any centuries served as a critique of th e gen
eral practices in the Rom an Empire, and even worked to transform
som e traditionally limited versions of these institutions.34 Apart
from th e household codes C hristianity constituted an im plicit judg
m ent of the fam ily as an expression of worldly power. Nonetheless,
on one hand, the results of C hristian teaching left the general stan
dards and structure of Greco-Rom an marriages and fam ilies little
changed. T h e p aterfam ilias by and large still reigned, and the house
hold remained ordered as the culture required. O n the other hand,
m uch of the eschatological relativization of marriage and family
3 3 . S e e M a ry R o se D 'A n g clo , " C o lo s s ia n s ," in A F em in ist C o m m en ta r y , v o l. 2 of

S earch in g t h e S criptu res , cd. E lisab eth S c h ü sslcr F ioren za |New York: C rossroad , 1 9 9 4 ),
3 1 3 -2 4 .
3 4 . S e e G reer, B ro k en Lights a n d M e n d e d L iv es, 1 1 1 - 1 6 ; R uether, C h ristian ity a n d
t h e M akin g o f t h e M od ern F am ily, 5 - 6 .
258 TUST LOVE
established in the early chureh also remained in place. Although mar

riage was given the dignity of a sacram ent am ong other sacram ents in
the twelfth century, it was still seen as a lesser calling— still relatively
less significant th an celibacy— and still primarily instrum ental in re
lation to church and society. Even key developments in the theology
of marriage and fam ily tended not to alter the basic assessm ent of
its place in C hristian life, even though they affected particular issues
such as th e nature of th e m arital bond and the purpose of sexual
activity.
O nly in th e fourteenth century did there begin a significant enough
shift in C hristian self-understanding to allow a new evaluation of
marriage and fam ily life.33 Subsequently, Renaissance hum anists
introduced a m assive change in focus from otherworldliness to so
cial responsibility, from sexual renunciation to self-discipline and
achievem ent in a world where fam ily and productive labor began
to be com bined. It was the Protestant Reform ation that completed
this m ovem ent and dramatically articulated a new understanding
of the place o f the fam ily in C hristian life. Marriage and fam ily re
placed celibacy as the center of sexual gravity and the primary unit
of C hristian life. As we saw in chapter 2, M artin Luther and John
Calvin did n ot change the traditional C hristian suspicion of sexual
ity, but they acccptcd whatever was wrong w ith sexuality sim ply as
a part of h u m an nature after the Fall.36 Sex could n ot be "justified"
by procreation or anything else, but only forgiven; and the context
of forgiveness was heterosexual marriage. T h e cure for unruly de
sire was to be its dom estication, its tam ing, through th e burdens
of m aintaining a household and the rearing of children. M ore than
this, for Luther the primary ethical demand made on C hristians was
love of neighbor. It was in the in stitution s of marriage and family
that individuals would learn obedience to C.od, patience, and the re
quired form s of neighbor-love. Through marriage, sexuality could be
channeled in to the m eaning of the whole of life.
3 5 . S e e Jo h n K . Y ost, " T h e T ra d itio n a l W estern C o n ce p t of M arriag e and t h e F am

ily: R ed isco v erin g its R cn a issa n cc-R c fo rm a tio n R o o ts," A n d ov er N ew to n Q u arterly 20
(M a rch 1 9 8 0 ): 1 6 9 - 8 0 .
3 6 . S e c re le v a n t w ritin g s o f L u th er: T w o Kinds o f R ig h teo u sn ess (1 5 1 9 ); S erm o n
o n t h e E sta te o f M arriag e (1 5 1 9 ); T rea tise o n G o o d W orks (1 5 2 0 ); E sta te o f M arriage
( 1 5 2 2 ) ; H o w G ocI R e s c u e d a n H o n o r a b le N u n ( 1 5 2 4 ); and O n M arriage M atters ( 1 5 3 0 ).
In the Reform ation traditions thereafter, the early C hristian am

bivalence toward marriage and family disappeared. In and through
the in stitu tio n s of marriage and of family, C hristians (with rare ex
ception) were now believed to be called to holiness and to the service
of their neighbor — the near neighbors of spouse and children and
the far neighbors of the wider society. T h e removal of am bivalence
was so effective th at, for example, w om en were left with few alter
natives to th e life-style of wife and mother, Once the cultural shift
of the nineteenth century led to the separation between the private
world of the fam ily and the public world of productive work, C hris
tian interpretations of "fem ale nature" were locked into the private,
dom estic sphere.37
T h e history of C hristian marriage docs not, of course, stop with
the Reform ation. But the beliefs and attitudes of th e m ajor C hris
tian traditions were set. Although significant differences continued
in Rom an C atholic and Protestant beliefs and attitudes about m ar
riage and fam ily up until th e last half of the tw entieth century,
both of their histories show a close parallel and interaction with the
secular cultural shifts from th e seventeenth century to the twenty-
first. Hence, C hristian fam ilies arc now like alm ost all others in the
West, with sim ilar issues of gender relationships, diversity of familial
form s, structural changes, and destabilization in a culture of ongoing
change. I tu rn, then, from this thum bnail sketch of historical experi
ences of marriage and fam ily to considerations of these institutions
as wc know th em today.
D escriptive a n d N orm ative Q uestions
As in every tim e and placc, no doubt, today som e marriages arc

happy, and som e are not. Som etim es relative levels of happiness
or unhappiness correlate with beliefs about the nature of marriage,
and som etim es they do not. Som etim es they have clearly to do with
structural issu es w ithin fam ilies, but n ot always. Anyone who thinks
carcfully about experiences in fam ilies is in favor of transforming
37. S e e B ev erly H arriso n , " T h e E ffect o f In d u stria liz a tio n o n th e R ole of W om en

in S o cie ty ," in M akin g t h e C o n n e c tio n s : E ssays in F em in ist S o c ia l E tiu cs, ed. C aro l S.
R obb (B o ston : B e a co n P ress, 1 9 8 5 ), 4 2 - 5 3 .
260 TUST LOVE
practiccs that arc oppressive, although there is n ot always a consen

sus about w hat counts as oppression or w hat transform ation should
look like. Both marriage and family have been caught in the so-called
"culture w ars" of today and they sit in the middle of som e volatile po
litical battles. Just about everyone wants both m arriages and families
to generate h um an well-being and flourishing; C hristians w ant the
shape and th e context of these institutions ultim ately to be conducive
to relationships with God.
Marriage, it is generally agreed, involves com m itm ent; it in
volves undertaking particular kinds of obligations that we would
not otherwise have. Life in a family also involves com m itm ents and
obligations, m an y of th em "givens," as in obligations of children to
parents and siblings to siblings. "G iven" obligations like these are not
initiated by a free choice, but they ultim ately call for ratification by
free choice and com m itm ent. Both marriage and family entail co m
m itm ents to persons — to love and to care for, to challenge and to
support. Insofar as these com m itm ents are understood and shaped
by recognized expectations of society, the com m itm ents are n ot just
to love or to care. For th e sake of love and the ones we love, we co m
m it ourselves to institutional frameworks th at will hold us faithful to
our love. Wc therefore com m it ourselves or ratify our obligations to
whatever we understand to constitute these frameworks. As an in sti
tutional framework for love, marriage involves n ot only a framework
for sex but fo r a whole fabric of life to be shared together — herein
lie its glory and its troubles. As a framework for love, chosen or rat
ified, family involves relationships n ot ju st of loyalty but of growing
together in a shared life that is intrinsically good in itself, even as
it bridges generations and opens to the wider world — herein lie its
treasures and its potential disasters.
Just as hum an relationships are or ought to be governed by cer
tain norm s o r ethical principles — in particular, norm s of justice; so
also, institu tion al frameworks for com m itm ent in hum an relation
ships ought to be subject to norm s of justice. If they are not, we
challenge th em or forsake them , or we shrivel up w ithin them . W hat
can all of this m ean for our understandings of and living w ithin the
frameworks o f our marriages and our families?
Diversity in Fam ily Forms
If there has never been only one form of family in the past, and
if we ourselves live in a tim e of m ultiple form s of family, how are
we to think about the diversity of form s in a way that recognizes
th em w ithin th e concept and the framework of "fam ily"? C an we,
for example, th in k of single-parent as well as two-parent fam ilies as
"fam ily"? Heterosexual marriages with children as "fam ily"? Same-
sex individuals, partners or spouses, w ith children? Blended fam ilies
following divorce and remarriage? Fam ilies with parents whose ch il
dren are n ot genetically related but also n ot legally adopted? Families
where parents arc n ot legally married but who raise children to
gether? Fam ilies where there is m ultiple "m othering" or "fathering"
of children n ot only by biological m others and fathers but also by
grandparents or aunts or uncles or cousins or close friends? Fam i
lies th a t do n o t live together at all? N uclear fam ilies and extended
families? And on and on, in a wide diversity of fam ilies as "fam ily"?
T h e general tendency am ong ethicists today is to advocate in
clusiveness in th e understanding and acceptance of w hat counts as
"fam ily." And despite som e strong opposition n ot only from th e reli
gious right but from moderates as well, there is a growing tendency
on the part o f m ore and m ore people in th e U nited States to ac
cept diverse configurations of family. Lisa Sowie C ahill, for example,
identifies th e basic cross-cultural form of family as "a n organized
network of socioeconom ic and reproductive interdependence and
support grounded in biological kinship and m arriage."38 She none
theless takes seriously other form s of "hu m an allian ce. . . for mutual
econom ic and dom estic support, as for reproduction and child-
rearing" as analogous to the basic kin- and marriage-based fam ilies.39
She concludes that it is probably n ot possible to identify the outer
boundaries o f family, and moreover not prudent to do so. Similarly,
Rosem ary Radford Ruether insists that a genuine clue to "fam ily
value" today involves "acceptance of and support for a diversity of
family fo rm s. . . and household patterns" w hich wc arc to honor and
3 8 . C a h ill, F a m ily , x-xi.

3 9 . Ib id ., xi.
262 TUST LOVE
support.40 M arifć Ramos Gonzalez argues that "T h ere is no such

thing as ‘t h e ’ C hristian fam ily.. . . T h e C hristian 'fam ily' has been
over-simplified and excessively idealized. Unfortunately, each fam
ily's particular circum stances, w hich affect its m oral decisions for
better or worse, are often ignored."41
T h ese views are extrem ely im portant. We do need n ot only to sup
port but to celebrate every configuration that "w orks," th at functions
reasonably w ell in facilitating and undergirding a life for people to
gether in m utual affection and flourishing, perhaps especially w hen it
com es to th e rearing of children. T h ere is no one model that guaran
tees happiness and flourishing, a t least n ot in our tim e. T h e range of
possible m odels is wide, although perhaps not unlim ited. W hat lim
its there are have to do less with our preferences for, or idealization
of, a "best" m odel, than with the justice and love that a model makes
possible. For exam ple, Jean-Paul Sartre and Sim one de Beauvoir de
veloped an entourage of admirers, sexual partners, and protégées
w hom they liked to call "T h e Family." T h e fabric of this "fam ily's"
life, however, was apparently marked by deception, seduction, ex
ploitation, prurient exchanges, and held together by a "pact" on the
part of the two of th em that intentionally included these ways of liv
ing together.42 If the descriptions we have of this agreement and its
consequences are accurate, it would be easy for m e n ot to include the
Sartre/Beauvoir model of "fam ily " w ithin m y understanding of fam
ily. T h is does not m ean that other form s or m odels of family, w hich
may be included in the range of genuine fam ilies, do not som etim es
have sim ilar problem s with intrigue, jealousy, com petition, decep
tion, and the like; they are, however, not models th at are constructed
and designed precisely to include, even savor, these negative forms
of relationship. Models may m iss or fall short of their goals, but as
models they m ay still count as genuine "family."
4 0 . R uether, C h ristian ity a n d th e M akin g o f t h e M od ern fa m ily , 2 1 2 .

4 1 . M a rife R a m o s G o n zale z, " T h e F am ily and M o ral D e c is io n s : I lo w Sh ou ld the
C h ris tia n F a m ily R espond to th e N ew M o ra l C h a llen g es o f T o d ay ?" in T h e Fam ily , cd.
L isa So w ie C a h ill and D ie tm a r M ic th , C o n ciliu m (M ary k n o ll, N Y: O rb is, 1 9 9 5 ), 6 6 .
4 2 . L ou is M c n a n d , "S ta n d by Y our M a n : T h e Stran ge L iaiso n o f Sartre and B ea u
v o ir/’ N e w Y orker (Sep tem ber 2 6 , 2 0 0 5 ) : 1 4 0 - 4 6 . M e n a n d is critiq u in g th e four
v o lu m es o f B e a u v o ir's m em o irs p u blished b etw een 1 9 5 8 and 1 9 7 2 .
Yet I, like others, will n ot attem pt finally to define "fam ily." W hat
I will do is consider the nature of the relationships that are within
a model of family, the goal of th e model as a social institutional
framework for com m itm ent, and the possibilities it holds for a way
to its goal.
Structures a n d N orm s o f R elationship

If marriage and fam ily are to function in ways that contribute to
the well-being and the flourishing of those w ho em brace and live
w ithin them , then their structures need to be ju st. T h is applies to
the relationships between spouses, parents and children, siblings,
and any others who belong to a "fam ily," w hether intcrgcncrationally
or horizontally extended to "relatives" of whatever kind. I begin with
the relationship between spouses.
T o "enter in to " marriage is like any other com m itm ent in that it
m eans to yield to another a claim over oneself; it is to give one's word
in a way th a t the word now exists in the other but rem ains within
one's self.43 B u t w hat is the word, the promise, the claim given, the
obligation undertaken, in marrying? It is to love — in whatever de
gree, w ith whatever understanding of w hat love m eans, and with
whatever capacity for love. It is to give love a past by giving love a
future. It is also to enter into a framework for loving and for sharing
a life.
If m arrying is itself to be done justly, it m u st be done in freedom,
with som e degree of knowledge, and with an intention — again, in
som e degree — to share a life marked by mutuality, equality, and
fruitfulness in the senses of these term s I have described in the pre
vious chapter. Traditionally, th e framework of C hristian marriage
has been m arked by three elem ents: monogamy, sexual exclusivity,
and perm anence. W hether it has to continue to include ju st these ele
m ents is n ot quite the question I am addressing here. I have suggested
already that polygyny m ight have been accom m odated by C hristian
ity but there are good reasons for it n ot to be a considered choice in
our tim e and place. Even where it continues to exist as a m ajority
43. W h a t I g iv e in b rie f fo rm h ere is elaborated in m y ea rlier w ork P erson al

C o m m itm e n ts : B eginn in g, K eepin g, C h a n g in g (San F ran cisco : H arp er & Row, 1 9 8 6 ).
264 TUST LOVE
pattern for m arriage, the critiques it receives, especially from women

w ithin it, grow louder and clearer.44 Exclusivity, in term s of fidelity as
a sexual partner to one's spouse, has been violated, of course, through
tim e, but not w ithout conséquences and not w ithout negative judg
m ent. In th e 1970s there were proposals for "open" m arriages, in
which the very marriage com m itm ent, the agreed upon term s of the
marriage, would allow for m ultiple sexual partners apart from the
marriage relationship. Th ose who made these proposals abrogated
them som e years later on the grounds that they had proved unre
alistic and unw orkable.45 As for perm anence, marriage as a lifelong
com m itm ent has obviously com e upon hard tim es, though it rem ains
as an ideal and as the actual intention of m ost individuals who marry.
Reasons for each of these three elem ents have changed somewhat
over the centuries, but they rem ain concerns both for spouses and
for children. M onogam y is the model of choice for m ost persons in
our culture, and certainly for com m itted C hristians. It is thought to
be the model that best serves marriage based on love, especially ro
m antic love; it is a model that offers the possibility of intim acy and
com panionship as goods in them selves; it is a model that can provide
the kind of affection that children need; it is a model that can nurture
both sex and love in ways that lead to th e highest form s of friendship;
it is a model th a t can incorporate understandings of transcendent em
bodim ent and a com m union between spouses that partakes of and
leads to com m union w ith God. T h is is its rationale; this is what
monogam y as a "fram ework" can promise. W hat monogam y prom
ises is n ot always fulfilled, of course; even the lim ited degrees of
fulfillm ent th a t are achieved are n ot always w hat was hoped for in
the beginning. But institutional "fram eworks" arc like that, in every
sphere of life's com m itm ents. They never guarantee w hat they are
designed for; they only shape, or can shape, the possibilities.
Sexual exclusivity is also both an ideal and a com m itted obliga
tion in C hristian understandings of marriage. It is w hat is presumed
4 4 . S e e m y re p o rts o f th is in ch a p ter 3.
4 5 . F o r th e m o s t fam o u s p rop osal, s e c N o n a M c N c il and G eorge M c N c il, O pen
M arriage: A N e w L ife Style fo r C o u p les |New York: M . E vans, 1 9 7 2 ). F o r a report
o f changed m in d s, s e e A rlen e S k o ln ick , E m b a ttle d P aradise (N ew York: B a sic B ooks,
1 9 9 1 ), 1 3 9 .
ncccssary for th e goals of monogam ous marriage just described. How

ever blasé we have becom e about adultery in our culture, it rem ains
a form of betrayal and alm ost always an experience, on th e part of
the one betrayed, of deep pain. It may n ot be th e unforgivable sin —
a marriage so injured can som etim es be restored — but it is n ot an
insignificant breach in the com m itm ent and framework of marriage.
I do not need to detail the reasons why sexual exclusivity and fi
delity are im portant to spouses. T h e reasons are myriad, having to
do w ith embodied sexual bonding, intimacy, and the m eanings of sex
ual exclusivity for all the other aspects o f marriage and family. But
I rem em ber a w om an student of m ine once saying that the reason
she thought sexual exclusivity belonged essentially to h er marriage
was that it represented one sphere of her life — a sphere of the u t
m ost intim acy and im portance — in w hich she did n ot have to be
com petitive.
Lifelong com m itm ents appear m uch more difficult to sustain in
our tim e and placc for reasons th at wc all know: longevity in human
life spans, m ultiple options in alm ost every sphere, inability to con
tinue on paths once chosen w ithout traditional structures in place,
and so on. In regard to marriage, it is clear that unrealistic expec
tations and sheer unwillingness to put up w ith situations that are
harm ful, not life-giving, or destructive of others constitute the m ajor
reasons why perm anence is an ideal but one that m any cannot reach.
Yet if perm anence — lifelong faithfulness in love, in sex, in sharing of
the m ultiple dim ensions and circum stances of life — can be achieved,
it is the path toward the goals of marriage th at are m ost desired. As
I have said in regard to the norm of com m itm ent in the previous
chapter, it h as the possibility of nurturing love and sexual desire; and
as I have suggested above, it h as the possibility of bringing embodied
and inspirited love to its greatest joy.
All of the goals and the realities of marriage as a social framework
for love and for life depend, however, on w hether the relationship it
frames is ju st. T h is in turn depends to a great extent on w hether the
structures of th e framework are just. Free choice, mutuality, equality,
com m itm ent, fruitfulness, and a responsibility for the wider world
can be the m easures of this justice. Structures of marriage, for ex
ample, that retain inequality between husband and wife — the one
266 TUST LOVE
the "head" or leader, the other the "help er"; the one by stipulation
the breadwinner, the other econom ically dependent; the one the rep
resentative o f the fam ily to society and church, the other only the
"represented" — these are structures that can severely lim it or pro
hibit the full functioning of marriage and the attain m ent of its goals.
O f coursc, every marriage partnership is unique in som e respects,
so even breadwinner/domestic m anagem ent roles can work however
they are shared or divided. Role choices can be embraced in ways
that are n ot universal, and depending on how they are lived, they
m ay serve th e needs and goals of marriage as long as the relationship
between spouses rem ains just.
T h e structures of a marriage reflect to an im portant extent what
the individuals believe they are doing when they enter into marriage.
For example, a lot of the rhetoric surrounding marriage signals that
w hat is called for in th e com m itm ent of marriage is the "to tal gift" of
one to the other. T h is language is misleading if it m eans, first, that
it is even possible for one person to give h im or her self totally to
another — except perhaps in form s of slavery where both actions and
affections are subm itted to the governance of another. If it suggests
the theory I have noted before regarding individuals being like two
halves w ho need to becom e one whole, it carries all of the inaccurate
and harm ful corollaries of one becom ing m ore whole than the other,
or of those w ho do n ot m arry never being sufficiently complemented
in love and in life to becom e whole.
Moreover, if th is language is to be taken literally, it suggests a
form of self-sacrifice that has never been good, especially for wom en.
T here arc, at least for C hristians, lim its to the sacrifice that is re
quired or even morally allowed for one person in relation to another.
Self-sacrifice ca n destroy as well as contribute to true and ju st rela
tionships. Som e m oral obligations are grounded in one's own reality
as a hum an person like other hum an persons. H ence, one can give
one's self in a ju st and true love, but one ought n ot obliterate one's
self in the giving. Having said this, I do recognize the kinds of u n
folding sacrifices — great and sm all, in the everydayness of ongoing
married life and family — and the kind of crucified love, that any
great love demands. To lay down one's life for another is perhaps the
vocation of every C hristian, but if it m eans genuine destruction of
self — of the person whose deepest truth is still com ing to be — it is

not the kind of love that will build a marriage or a fam ily that are
filled with th e signs of ju stice and life.
A just m arital love and a just framework for marriage and family
will go a long way toward facing one of th e m ost distressing problems
in fam ilies today — that is, the problem of dom estic violence. It is
difficult for u s to comprehend the size of the problem w hen some
form of violence, physical or em otional, is estim ated to exist in up
to sixty percent of m arriages, and thousands of children are n ot only
abused but die from family violence each year. Everyone can see the
problem with harm ing one another, especially in the elose situations
of fam ily relationships. But n ot everyone sees the relevance of power
differentials in fam ilies, or how violence can rise from a sense of
powerlessness effected by religiously inspired but unrealistic expec
tations placed on persons in fam ily roles. We all face th e task today —
w hether in socicty or in C hristian com m unity — of critically evalu
ating the im port of beliefs regarding power in family relationships
and the tolerance of physical and psychological violence as long as it
is "contained " w ithin the family. We all need to be concerned about
modes of conflict resolution in in tim ate relations and the rights of
persons to reciprocity of care as dependency roles change through a
lifetim e. I need not elaborate on these m atters here, but only signal
them as part of a sexual ethic for marriage and family.
One scholar who has taken seriously the need for justice in fam il
ial and m arital relations is Susan M oller O kin.46 Her starting point
is the co n ten tio n that contem porary theories of ju stice invariably as
sum e the fam ily as a social institution and assum e th at it is just.
She argues, on the contrary, that all too often the family is not a just
society, and its in ju stice has negative effects on every other form of
society, as w ell as on the individuals in th e family. It is a mistake,
she says, to th in k of the fam ily as a natural "given," anterior to so
ciety and w ith an internal m eaning th at needs no critiquing as to
its justice or in ju stice. To move beyond this m ythical account of the
family, O kin proposes to use the strategy of John Rawls in h is now
46. S u sa n M o lle r O k in , Ju stice, G en der, a n d d i e F am ily (N ew Y ork: B a sic B ooks,

1 9 8 9 ).
268 TUST LOVE
classic theory of ju stice for societies;47 that is, to assum e a "veil of

ignorance" over each m em ber of a fam ily such th at no one knows
w hat her or h is role will be in th e family. Cxiven th at one could be in
any of the fam ilial or m arital roles, w hat would everyone w ant justice
to look like once they are actually assigned a role? T h is is a form of
"standing in o n e an oth er's sh o es/' and it is a prom ising thought ex
perim ent or heuristic dcvicc for gaining critical distance in assessing
marriage and fam ily as frameworks for hum an relationships.
T he G oals o f M arriage a n d Family

So m uch is a t stake in th e spheres of marriage and family because
they arc the spheres in w hich so m uch of interpersonal love is lived
and worked out. T h e goals of marriage are to som e extent the goals
of love: embodied and inspirited union, com panionship, com m u
nion, fruitfulness, caring and being cared for, opening to the world
of others, and lives made sacred in faithfulness to one another and
to God. I do not w ant rhetoric here to exceed reality, but it is im
portant to ponder w hat we are doing in our marriages and in our
fam ilies. C hristian ity has not always been a good articulator of this.
As wc have seen, in the early centuries of the church, there were
worries that a com m itm ent to these social in stitution s would leave
one with little tim e for spreading th e gospel or doing the deeds of a
m ore universal love; worries that the heart m ight be divided between
love of spouse and love of God; worries that preoccupation w ith the
"things of th is world" would distract from th e "th in gs of G od." T o
day, in the light of Reform ation insights as w ell as tw entieth-century
C atholic insights, these worries are n ot so m uch w ith us. Reminded
that to love an oth er hum an being with C hristian love is to love that
other in lesus C h rist and Jesus C h rist in that other, we recognize
that hum an love and divine love need not divide the heart. Although
love of God and love of neighbor are not com pletely equatable, they
can be significantly integrated, one w ith the other. Moreover, w ith a
sacram ental view of creation th e "things of this world" are n ot sepa
rable from th e "things of G od," and all persons can be called to share
47. Jo h n R a w ls, A T h e o r y o f Ju s tic e (C am bridge, M A : H arvard U n iv ersity Press,

1 9 7 2 ).
in the m ission of Jesus C hrist, the mending of the world, the struggle
to m ake the world a place where justice and neighbor-love flourish.
Preferential love for spouse and family, although in danger of co m
peting with larger loyalties to com m unity and society can expand to
a great-hearted love and a sacrificial effort to care for the world and
to build the reign of God. Finally, there is a universal call to holiness,
one th a t is p a n of every C hristian way of life,· the challenge is to dis
cern the m eaning of this call in the context of marriage and family.
It begins by discerning how this way of life can be lived ju stly
Along th e W ay
I have said several tim es that rhetoric about marriage and family
needs to be realistic and cautious — neither too high-flying nor too
skeptical. Practically speaking, no one in this world has already a t
tained the goal of their marriage or even of their family. We are all
011 the w ay Issu es of monogamy, sexual exclusivity, and permanence
are issues of learning the ways of a faithful and enduring love. T h e
story of com m itm ents is n ot only in their beginning and their end;
it is in their "in betw een."48 O ur lives arc stretched out in tim e; they
are n ot lived all at once. And hum an tim e is n ot like a clock; it is
m ore like the rings in a tree; it is w ithin us. Hence, in the everyday,
our choices to ratify our com m itm ents, our efforts to grow in simple
patience, kindness, form s of presence, forgiveness, and the "little by
little" of w elcom ing love: these can be part and parcel of the "in be
tween" of lives marked n ot ju st by success and joy but by failure,
irritation, confusion, and the need for radical hope. Every way of life
is lived under the sign of the cross, but every way of life can also grow
in its light.
A bou t Children
So m uch has been w ritten about parenting, about w hether our culture
loves children or is indifferent to them , about the needs of children
and everyone's responsibility for future generations, that I can add
little to this literature. Wc do have special questions about children
today: about th e size of fam ilies, childless m arriages, reproductive
4 8 . S e e m y tre a tm e n t o f th is in P erson al C o m m itm e n ts , ch a p ters 4 - 5 .

270 TUST LOVE
technologies as ways to have children, population concerns, stages

of parenting, raising children in a culture fraught w ith danger for
them . In regard to every question, the issue of justice — to children,
to parents, to society, to the world — is th e central issue.
We live in an oddly conflicted tim e, especially w hen it com es
to the use of reproductive technologies. T h ese arc the technologies
that allow alm ost anyone to have children, w hether w om en or men,
w hether fertile or infertile, w hether single or married. Tw o things
drive our pursuit of these technologies, and they exist at least in
paradox. First, som e reproductive technologies are used in ways that
disconnect biological contributions to children from parenting them.
H ence, for exam ple, donor sperm, donor eggs, donor embryos, arc
often used w ith only m inor concerns about the disconnection be
tween donor and the child to be conceived. Second, reproductive
technologies are also used in ways that express an alm ost insatiable
desire to have one's own biological children. T h a t is, a billion-dollar
industry has arisen to insure genetically related offspring. I m ake this
observation n o t to critique reproductive technologies, but as a way
to provoke reflection on how it is we want to reproduce ourselves as
hum ans. T h e re are raging debates about all of th is, but it may bear
m ore reflection at this point than debate.
T h ere arc related questions. For example, w hen children arc born,
whose obligation is it to rear them ? We now quite readily divide par
enting roles in to biological parenting, birthing, and social parenting.
Even in w hat is still considered a "standard" form of parenting —
that is, heterosexual conception, bearing, and rearing of a ch ild — we
debate about w ho should actually bear the m ajor responsibility and
burden of raising a child. Is it best for the child if a parent rem ains at
home? Is it better if a parent rem ains at hom e for years, including in
his or her tasks hom e-schooling? Or is it better to offer children more
than one model and experience of m othering and fathering? Is it op
pressive to children to be without m uch active presence on the part
of parents? Is it oppressive for th em to have too m uch active pres
ence in term s of children n ot having the nurturing of grandparents
and other fam ily m em bers, or o f child care professionals and social
situations in w hich they are m utually nurtured both by m entors and
by peers?
I do n ot propose specific answers to all these questions. However,

I do w ant to identify a principle to guide us in this area of hum an
responsibility, a principle th at incorporates the norm s of a sexual
ethic and th a t can perhaps be extended to the consequences of sex.
I have already said enough about autonom y and relationality that it
will n ot be surprising if I add th e following: no children should be
conceived w ho will be born in a context unconducive to their growth
and development in relationships, or unconducive to their ultim ately
becom ing autonom ous, morally responsible for themselves. There
is, of course, no real way to predict which of m any contexts can
provide w hat children need to experience relationality and to grow
in freedom and the possibility of self-determ ination. Yet w c can say
that choices regarding the various form s of reproduction, and various
configurations of parents, can be evaluated in term s of whether or not
som eone is sufficiently com m itted to each child to provide for the
child's nurturance w ithin an in tim ate relationship; and to provide
for whatever the child needs to grow in the possibility of personal
freedom. In other words, form s of reproduction and configurations
of parenting c a n be assessed in term s of w hether or n ot a child will
be affirmed in her relationality and her development of a capacity
for self-determ ination — w hether or n ot she will be respected and
nurtured in th e features of her being that constitu te the core of her
humanity.
Sam e-Sex R elation sh ip s
Questions surrounding the ethics of sam c-scx relationships arc in

C hristian com m unities as in W estern society at large marked by on
going controversy and, for many, ongoing anguish and anger. T h ese
questions are am ong the m ost volatile issues in churches and syna
gogues across the U nited States. T h ey are ethical questions that must
be addressed because they rem ain, for many, the heart of the m atter
regarding h om osexu ality— a m ajor issue for church unity, a central
factor in gay and lesbian individuals' continuing journey of faith, a
challenge to a society that all too frequently tolerates discrim ination
and even violence against its gay and lesbian people. T h ey are ethi
cal questions that m ust be addressed also because they arc questions
272 TUST LOVE
about real persons — questions about identity, place in community,

relationships, and callings.
T h e fundam ental question pressed throughout this volum e has
been: when is sexual activity appropriate in hum an relationships? It
is this sam e question that m u st be asked w hen we turn explicitly to
sam c-scx relationships. T h is m eans that the key question here is not
w hether sam e-sex relationships can be ethically justified, but w hat
m ust characterize these relationships w hen they are justified. To an
ticipate a conclusion regarding sam e-sex relationships that follows
from the work of previous chapters: the ethical framework for sex
ual relationships and actions de\^eloped in chapter 6 is not different
for heterosexual and hom osexual relationships. Given the intensity
of the debates regarding sam e-sex relationships, however, it is not
sufficient to start and end with this conclusion.
T h e literature on hom osexuality in recent years appears to be even
m ore volum inous th an publications on marriage and family. Multiple
aspects of hom osexual orientation and sexual activity have been ex
am ined — its history in W estern societies, cross-cultural experiences
of hom osexuality, its etiology, religious assessm ents, social contexts,
and more. Because of the rich resources for understanding sam e-sex
relationships today, especially in W estern culture and in C hristian
contexts and theologies, I attem pt only three things here: first, a
consideration of C hristian sources used or available for use in the
C hristian com m unity; second, an exploration of ways in w hich the
fram ew ork for sexual ethics th at I have proposed may open up pos
sibilities for an ethics for sam e-sex relationships; and third, some
reflection on w hether or not it m atters if a preference for sam c-scx
relationships is a "given" for som e people, but chosen by others.
Theological a n d Ethical Sources

In the C h ristian churches, debates about sam e-sex relationships tend
to focus on th e interpretation and use of the sources for C hristian
theology and eth ics: Scripture, tradition, secular disciplines, and con
temporary experience, as discussed in chapter 5. Insofar as debates
have taken place n ot only in C hristian circles but in th e public forum,
m any of the argum ents are surprisingly similar. In particular, argu
m ents from natural law perspectives — or better, argum ents about
the concrete reality of sam e-sex orientation — overlap in secular and

religious debates. It is therefore to som e extent possible to co m
bine an exam ination of C hristian sources w ith an exam ination of
arguments th a t appear in secular, especially political, contexts.
M y own \iew is that none of the sources for C hristian sexual ethics
provides m u ch light on the m oral status of sam e-sex relationships if
the question rem ains simply w hether they are perm itted or prohib
ited. For exam ple, we have seen in previous chapters just how difficult
it is to get answers to specific perm ission/prohibition questions in
sexual ethics from Scripture. Similarly, historical studies of C hris
tian traditions yield ambiguous results. Secular disciplines, too, have
not offered sufficient evidence to settle the questions of the moral
status of sam e-sex relationships and actions. Contem porary experi
ence is m ore promising as a guide, but we need to look at it more
carefully.
Scripture
In general, th e very few biblical texts that deal explicitly w ith hom o
sexuality m u st be read against the whole of the biblical w itness.49 As
we have seen, there are two elem ents in Hebrew Bible perspectives
on sexual conduct that influence alm ost all of its texts on sexual
m orality— namely, the obligation to m arry and to procreate, and the
patriarchal m odel upon w hich ideas of marriage and socicty were in
stitutionally based. G iven these perspectives, there is understandably
little room for sam e-sex relationships. A third elem ent influential in
shaping the sexual rules of the Hebrew Bible is the concern to distin
guish practices of the Israelites from w hat was considered the idolatry
of neighboring nations. T h e Leviticus prohibition against m ales ly
ing "w ith a m ale as with a wom an" is associated with this concern
(Lev. 1 8 :2 2 ; 2 0 :1 3 ). It is only later that interpretations tend to esca
late specific prohibitions into paradigms of moral evil, thus obscuring
the original in tent of the laws.
49. It is a d isputed q u estio n w h eth e r so m e of ev en th e s e few te x ts a rc referrin g to

a n y th in g lik e w h a t is m e a n t by "h o m o s e x u a lity " today. T h e te rm a s su ch d oes no t
a ctu a lly appear in a n y o f th e orig in al langu ages of th e B ib le , a n d th e c o n ce p t appears
to h a v e d ifferent, o r a t le a st m o re narrow , c o n tc n t th a n is g en erally g iven to it today.
274 TUST LOVE
T h e story o f Sodom and G om orrah (Gen. 1 9 :1 -2 9 ), today popu

larly thought to present a threatened crim e of hom osexual rape at
the heart of th e sins of the cities (Gen. 1 -1 1 ), has no such m ean
ing w hen looked a t m ore carefully. In its earliest interpretations —
that is, in other Hebrew Bible and apocryphal texts — the extreme
m oral depravity of the citizens of Sodom and other cities of the
plain was identified n ot w ith hom osexuality but w ith violations of
m oral requirem ents of hospitality, as well as with injustice, arro
gance, and hatred of foreigners (Ezek. 16:49; Sirach 16:8; Wisd. of
Sol. 1 0 :6 - 8 ; 1 9 :1 3 -1 5 ). In th e C hristian Testam ent, where Sodom is
referenced, again there is no m ention of hom osexuality (Luke 10:12;
M att. 10:151. W hat influenced later C hristians to introduce an iden
tification of hom osexual sins as central to this story was probably
the interpretation of first century C .E. Jewish writers, in particular
the historian Josephus and the H ellenistic philosopher Philo.50
T h e C hristian T estam ent, like th e Hebrew Bible, is also n ot a
very helpful source if our question has to do with moral prohibi
tions or perm issions regarding sam e-sex relationships. As we have
seen before, it offers no system atic code of sexual ethics. T h e few
texts that appear to refer to hom osexuality offer problems of inter
pretation — w hether because of ambiguity in th e use of rhetorical
devices and specific term s, or disparity between the m eaning of same-
sex relationships in the historical context of Paul (Rom. 1 :2 6 -2 7 ;
1 Cor. 6 :9 ; 1 T im . 1:10) and the m eaning we assum e for sam e-sex
relationships today.
Contested interpretations of Rom ans 1 :2 6 - 2 7 provide an in terest
ing and im portant case in point. T h e contem porary debate about this
text has gone on for years, and it can be tracked w ithin, for example,
the writings of John Boswell, Richard Hays, and D ale M artin. Boswell
argues first th a t Paul's intention was n ot to stigm atize any particu
lar sexual behavior, but rather to "condem n the G entiles for their
general infidelity."51 Boswell adds that Paul's reference to sam e-sex
50. S ee M a r tti N is sin e n , H o m o ero tic is m in t h e B ib lica l W orld: A H istorica l P ersp ec
tive (M in n ea p o lis: Fortress, 1998), esp e cia lly 9 3 - 9 5 .
5 1 . John B o sw ell, C hristianity, S o cial T oleran ce, a n d H om o sex u ality : G a y P eople
in W estern E u r o p e fr o m d i e B egin n in g o f th e C h ristian E ra to t h e F o u rteen th C en tu ry
(C h icago : U n iv e rs ity o f C h ic a g o Press, 1980), 108.
relationships had to do w ith heterosexuals, filled with passion, act

ing against w h at was natural to them . T h is argument Boswell bases
on th e observation that sam e-sex "orientation" would n ot have been
a recognized concept in the tim e of th e early church. Hays rejects
Boswell's interpretation, arguing instead that Paul would have held a
notion of m ale/fem ale com plem entarity as part of the crcatcd nature
of hum an beings, and would therefore have judged any homosexual
behavior as unnatural and a result of the Fall of Adam and Eve. Hays
further charges, against Boswell, that it is anachronistic to argue for
any interpretation of Paul's text in the light of m ore recent insights
into hom osexuality.52 M artin counters th at to place Rom ans 1 in the
context of a reading of G enesis, whereby heterosexual desire is n a t
ural, ordained in creation, and hom osexual desire is unnatural and
disordered because of th e Fall, is to m iss and even distort Paul's point
regarding not creation and fall but, rather, the invention of idolatry.53
W ith this latter interpretation, M artin argues th at Paul was referring
not to "un natu ral" desires but to the unleashing of excessive, out-of
control desires. "Degree of passion, rather than object of choice, was
the defining factor of desire."54
Although in Paul's historical context the degree of passion did not
m ake passionate desire unnatural, actions that violated convictions
about gender hierarchy m ight indeed yield a judgm ent of "un natu
ral."55 In th e Greco-Rom an world, any notion of a m an taking on
the lower role of a wom an, choosing to demean him self by becoming
5 2 . R ich a rd B . H ays, "R e la tio n s N a tu ra l and U n n a tu ra l: A R esp on se to Joh n

B osw ell's E x eg esis o f R o m a n s { " J o u r n a l o f R elig iou s E th ics 1 4 ( 1 9 8 6 ) : 1 8 4 - 2 1 5 ; H ays,
T h e M oral V ision o f th e N e w T esta m en t: C o m m u n ity , C ross, N e w C rea tio n : A C o n
tem p o ra ry In trod u ctio n t o N e w T esta m en t E th ics (San F ran cisco : H arp erS an F ran cisco ,
1 9 9 6 ), ch a p te r 1 6 . T h e ch arg e o f a n a ch ro n ism h ere is a cu rio u s o n e, sin c e B osw ell's
p o in t is p re cisely th a t o n e c a n n o t read b a c k in to P au l's w ritin g s a m o d ern n o tio n o f sex
ual o rie n ta tio n . H e n c e , w h a t is im p o rta n t is th a t th is n o tio n w as n o t th ere. O n th e o th er
h an d , B e rn a d e tte B ro o ten argues, w ith H ays, th a t P aul w ould have had so m e id ea o f
"n a tu ra l" sex u al ex p ressio n s in te rm s o f g en d er d is tin c tio n s and o rie n ta tio n s, b u t th ese
w ould have been based o n cu ltu ra l assu m p tio n s o f fem ale in ferio rity — so m eth in g of
w h ich H ay s ta k e s no a cco u n t. See B ern a d e tte J. B ro o ten , L o v e B etw e en W o m en : E arly
C hristian R es p o n se s t o F e m a le H o m o ero tic is m (C h icag o : U n iv ersity o f C h icag o Press,
1 9 9 6 ), 2 4 5 n. 8 6 .
5 3 . D a le B . M a r tin , "H e tc ro sc x ism and t h e In te rp re ta tio n o f R o m a n s 1 :1 8 - 3 1 ,"
B ib lical In terp reta tio n 3 (1 9 9 5 ): 3 3 2 - 5 5 .
5 4 . Ib id ., 3 4 2 ,
5 5 . Ib id ., 3 4 4 .
276 TUST LOVE
"effem in ate," engaging in sexual activity where the m ale is passive

as a w om an w as thought to be, could be considered, "unnatural."
In this case, however, the issue was m ale superiority, n ot the direc
tion of erotic desire for m ale or fem ale. M artin's concern for this
elem ent in a m ore adequate interpretation of Rom ans 1 is shared by
other scholars whose focus is on the social construction of hetero
sexuality as th e norm for sexual relationships. M ary Rose D'Angelo,
for example, argues that "th e biblical texts that have been read as
condem nations of hom osexuality originated in part as guardians of
the kinds of sexual hierarchy t h a t . . . is \iolated w hen a m ale is 're
duced' to th e statu s of a w om an ."56 Judith Plaskow observes that "we
can read biblical prohibitions of hom osexual behavior n ot as isolated
injunctions but as part of the process of the construction of hetero
sexual m arriage as norm ative."57 And D iana Sw ancutt proposes a
reading of Paul th at subverts gender hierarchy by transform ing it
w ithin the Body of C hrist.58
If w ork on one text, such as Rom ans 1 :2 6 -2 7 , can produce not
only diverse interpretations but im portant insights into historical
understandings of sam e-sex relationships, a continuing return to
m ultiple texts m ay be warranted.59 If w c do n ot gain a final answer to
questions of perm ission/proscription in this regard, this is important
in itself. At th e very least, it should keep us from entering th e battle
of proof-tcxting. Standing before the biblical w itness as a whole, a
5 6 . M ary R o s e D 'A n g elo , "P e rfe ct Fear C a s te th O u t Love: R eading, C itin g , and
R a p e,” in S ex u a l D iversity a n J C a th o lic is m : T ow ard t h e D e v e lo p m e n t o f M oral T h e o l
ogy, ed. P atricia B e a ttie lung, w ith Josep h A nd rew C o ray (C o llcg cv illc, M N : Liturgical,
2 0 0 1 ) , 1 7 5 - 9 7 , a t 1 81 and p a ssim . S e e a lso Jo h n J. W inkler, T h e C o n strain ts o f D esire:
T h e A n th ro p o lo g y o f S e x a n d G e n d e r in A n cien t G r e e c e (N ew York: R ou tled g e, 1 9 9 0 );
B ro o ten , L o v e B e tw e e n W om en , 2 3 9 - 5 3 .
5 7 . Ju d ith P lask ow , " L e s b ia n a n d G a y R ig h ts: A s k in g th e R ig h t Q u e s tio n s ," Tikkun
9 (1 9 9 2 ): 3 2 .
5 8 . D ia n a Sw a n cu tt, "S e x in g th e P au lin e Body of C h rist: Scrip tu ral 'S e x ' in the
C o n te x t of th e A m e ric a n C h ris tia n C u ltu re W ar/' in T ow ard a T h eo lo g y o f E ros: T ran s
figu ring P assion a t t h e L im its o f t h e D iscip lin es, cd . V irg in ia B u rru s and C a th e rin e
K eller (N ew Y ork: F ord h am U n iv ersity P ress, 2 0 0 6 1 , fo rth co m in g .
5 9 . I n a d d itio n to th e w ork s cited above, o th er stu d ies of im p o rtan ce to th e u se of
scrip tu re in d isce rn in g a C h ris tia n sta n ce regarding sa m e -se x rela tio n s in clu d e: Robin
Scroggs, T h e N e w T esta m en t a n d H o m o sex u a lity (P h ilad elp hia: F o rtress, 1 9 8 3 ); Jef
frey Siker, ed ., H o m o sex u a lity in t h e C h u r ch : B oth S id es o f t h e D eb a te (Louisville:
W e stm in ste r Jo h n K no x, 1 9 9 4 ); C h o o n -L eo n g Seow, ed ., H o m o sex u a lity a n d C hristian
C o m m u n ity (L o u isv ille: W e stm in ste r Jo h n K nox, 1 9 9 6 ).
m odest conclusion to be drawn is that there exists no solid ground

for an absolute prohibition or a com prehensive unquestionable bless
ing for sam e-sex relationships and actions today, not in the Hebrew
Bible or the C hristian Scriptures. Rather, discernm ent of the meaning
and im port o f the scriptures them selves in relation to this particular
ethical issue, as others, is part of th e unfolding history of C hristian
understanding regarding hum an sexuality. But whatever th e results
of ongoing exegesis and interpretation, the C hristian com m unity
m ust still discern, in the light of its other sources, just how relevant
and useful are any isolated texts to th e life of th e com m unity today.
Tradition
As far as I know, no one today is trying to argue that homosexual
relationships or actions should be condemned simply because the
C hristian tradition has always thought about hom osexuality in a
certain way. T o argue from this standpoint, in any case, would mean
encountering problems w ith the view of tradition that I identified
in chapter 5. Moreover, it is by no m eans certain that it is accurate
to say th a t C hristian s have always judged hom osexuality negatively.
T h e historical studies of scholars like Boswell have uncovered a much
less univocal teaching and understanding through the centuries.60
As I have said before, if today's C hristians are to discern how
to use the record of faith in the teachings, practices, theology, and
prayer of the C hristian com m unity through tim e, it is necessary to
engage in a process of exegesis and interpretation of this record, this
tradition — n o less than of Scripture. Even where in the C hristian
tradition hom osexuality has been negatively judged — or positively
judged, for th a t m atter— we m ust com e to understand and evaluate
the reasons for these judgments, their social and cultural context,
and the consequences of the judgments for C hristians in the past
and the present.
As noted in chapter 2, in th e C hristian tradition of sexual ethics
there have been two dom inant m otifs: procreation as the fundam en
tal purpose o f sexual intercourse and m ale/fem ale com plem entarity
as the essential basis and framework for sexual activity. T h e former
6 0 . B osw ell, C hristianity, S o c ia l T oleran ce, a n d H om osexu ality.

278 TUST LOVE
was predom inant in the Roman C atholic tradition, and the latter
cam e to particular prom inence in m ainline Protestant traditions with
the insistence that the ordinary remedy for sexuality, disordered by
original sin, m ust be heterosexual marriage. Both of these m otifs are
extrem ely relevant to the m oral evaluation of homosexuality. So long
as the tradition continued to justify sex primarily and even solely as
a m eans for the procreation of children, or sex in heterosexual m ar
riage primarily as a corrective to a disordered and indomitable sexual
drive, there was, of course, little or no room for any positive valua
tion of sam e-sex relationships. Heterosexual marriage had to be not
only the general norm for C hristian life but, along w ith celibacy for
those who could m anage it, the only acceptable choice for Christians
regarding sexuality.
Despite th is longstanding general sexual ethical tradition, the
tw entieth century has seen dram atic developments in both Roman
C atholic and Protestant sexual ethics. T h e dom inant m otifs have
each undergone significant changes. In much of C atholic moral
theology and eth ics, th e procreative norm as the sole or primary jus
tification of sexual activity is gone. As we have seen, procreation is
still extrem ely im portant as a goal for som e sexual intercourse, and as
giving m eaning to som e sexual relationships; but new understand
ings of the totality of the person support a radically new concern
for sexuality as an expression and a cause of love. T h e values of
sexual intim acy, pleasure, and com panionship are lauded as impor
tant elem en ts in hum an and C hristian flourishing. T h is m eans that,
above all, the kind of deep suspicion of sexual desire and sexual plea
sure that characterized both C atholic and Protestant traditions for so
long has largely disappeared. T h a t is, th e view of sexuality as funda
m entally disordered is gone from a great deal of C hristian thought.
Moreover, in both Protestant and C atholic traditions, rigid stereo
types of m ale/fem ale com plem entarity have been softened, so that
equality and shared possibilities and responsibilities now appear in
m ost C h ristian theologies of marriage and family.
All of th ese changes have made a significant difference for many
C hristians' evaluations of sam e-sex relationships. Still, however, the
m otifs of a procreative norm and gender com plem entarity continue
to appear in, for example, evangelical Protestant views of marriage
and family, and in official Rom an C atholic negative assessm ents

of hom osexual activity In the latter, the procreative norm is rel
ativized for heterosexual relationships (following the acceptance of
som e form s o f contraception such as "natural fam ily planning"), but
it is absolutized once again when hom osexual relationships are at
issue. For m an y C atholics and Protestants, the view of sexuality as
an indom itable and chaotic drive needing above all to be tam ed is
gone for heterosexual sex, but it appears alive and well in judgments
made about gay and lesbian sex. C onstruals of m ale/fem ale gender h i
erarchy and com plem entarity are moderated for general social roles,
but the im portance of gender com plem entarity undergirds the final
barrier against an acceptance of sam e-sex relationships/>!
N onetheless, im portant shifts have taken place regarding the
m oral assessm ent of hom osexuality as well as heterosexuality D e
spite ongoing tensions in the traditions, and intense debates, some
Protestant m ainline churches — notably the U nited C hu rch of
C hrist — have developed positive statem ents and attitudes toward
sam e-sex relationships. And despite what I have said about offi
cial positions in the Roman C atholic church, there are changes that
should n ot be underestim ated. Although hom osexual genital actions
are still judged to be intrinsically disordered, and hence "objectively"
im moral, they can be "subjectively" m oral depending on the state
of m ind and intentions of an individual person. Also, homosexual
orientation in persons is n ot condemned; it is even accepted. M ore
over, pastoral recom m endations for welcoming gays and lesbians into
the w orshiping com m unity are generally positive, although tensions
rem ain.62
6 1 . A s in s ta n c e s o f th e s e su sta in ed official R o m a n C a th o lic p o sitio n s, s e e for ex

am ple, C o n g reg a tio n for th e D o ctrin e o f th e F aith , D eclaration o n C ertain Q u estion s
C o n cern in g S e x u a l E th ics (1 9 7 5 ), # 8 ; C a te c h is m o f th e C a th o lic C h u rch (Liberia Ed
itric e V aticana, 1 9 9 4 ) , # 2 3 5 7 . For an u n official b u t sig n ifica n t P ro te sta n t sta te m e n t
su pportin g tra d itio n a l fo rm s o f gend er co m p lem en tarity , see Jo h n Piper and Wayne
G ru d e m , "A n O v erv iew o f C e n tra l C o n ce rn s: Q u e stio n s and A n sw e rs," in R ec o v er
in g B ib lical M a n h o o d a n d W om a n h o o d : A R es p o n se to E v an g elical F em in ists, ed. Joh n
Piper and W ayne G ru d em (W h eato n , IL : C ro ssw ay B ooks, 1 9 9 1 ), 6 0 - 9 2 ; T h e D an vers
S ta tem en t (C o u n c il o n B ib lical M an h o o d and W om an h o o d , 1 9 9 0 ).
6 2 . See, fo r e x a m p le , U .S . C o n feren ce o f C a th o lic B ish o p s, A lw ays O ur C h ild ren : A
P astoral M essag e to P arents o f H o m o sex u a l C h ild ren (W ashin g to n, D C : 1 9 7 3 ); B a l
tim o re A rch d io cesa n T a s k Force, A M in istry to L e sb ia n a n d C a y C a th o lic P ersons
280 TUST LOVE
W hat is d e a r is that the C hristian tradition regarding homosexual

persons and behavior is, at least in Western strands of the tradition,
in a state of flux. T h is would be denied by many, but key develop
m ents are difficult to ignore. W ithout offering the last word for the
tradition, another m odest conclusion may be drawn: that is, just as
it is certainly n ot possible to draw from th e tradition at this point a
com prehensive blessing for sam e-sex relationships, so it is also not
possible to draw an absolute prohibition. T h e resources of the tradi
tion require m ore exam ination if its best insights arc to be brought
to bear on contem porary questions of homosexuality.
Secular D isciplines
Various h um an sciences have contributed to contem porary u n
derstandings of homosexuality. Chrom osom es and horm ones, be
havioral patterns and psychological adjustm ents, social forces and
cultural differences have all been studied to som e extent. As a result
of such studies, there exists today a variety of theories regarding the
etiology of hom osexuality (genetic, biological, psychological, social,
developmental, cultural) and its statu s as a possibility for hum an
flourishing. T h o se who attem pt to assess the history of biological
and psychological research on hom osexuality raise serious questions
about the goals and results of m uch of this research.63 From its se
rious beginnings in the nineteenth century, it has long been marked
by a bias against hom osexuality as a legitim ate hum an variant.
T h e goals of research were frequently based on the assum ption that
sam e-sex desires or orientation are pathological, and the research
was therefore ultim ately aimed at th e development of therapies or
(B a ltim o re: A rch d io ccsc o f B altim o re, 1 9 8 1 ). S e e a lso th e e x te n siv e bibliography p ro
vided in H o m o sex u a lity : A P ositive C a th o lic P ersp ectiv e |Mt. R ain ier, M D : N ew Ways
M in istry , 2 0 0 3 ) . R e cen t co n ce rn s by ch u rch lead ers abo u t th e o rd in a tio n of gay m en
is d istu rb in g b u t perhap s tem porary, sin c e th ese co n ce rn s a rc v o iccd in the c o n tc x t of
p a st failu res in in s titu tio n a l re sp o n sib ilities regarding th e sex u al m isco n d u ct of clergy,
heterosex u al o r gay.
63. S e c T im o th y F. M urphy, G a y S c ien c e: T h e E thics o f S ex u a l O rien ta tion R e
s e a r c h (N ew Y ork: C o lu m b ia U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 9 7 ); S im o n LcVay, Q u e e r S c ie n c e : T h e
U se a n d A b u se o f R es ea rch In to H om o sex u ality (C am brid ge, M A : M I T P ress, 1 9 9 6 ).
In ad d itio n to o th e r b ia se s in th is research , b o th o f th e s e a u th o rs n o te th e m a le bias
v isib le in th e fa c t th a t m o s t stu d ies of sex u al o rie n ta tio n h a v e b e e n o n m a le su b jects.
disciplinary strategies. Philosopher of m cdicinc T im othy Murphy ob

serves that " T h e stigm atizing effects of sexual orientation science in
the n in eteen th and tw entieth centuries are n ot to be denied insofar
as som e people did adopt views of hom oeroticism as inferior sexual
ity precisely because of m edicine's assertions to th at effect."64 T h is
remained true even after medical organizations rejected the view of
hom osexuality as pathological.65
Yet ongoing research on hom osexuality has to som e extent served
to correct th e bias brought to research protocols and their social
consequences. In recent years it has clearly contributed to the de-
pathologizing of sam e-sex erotic orientation. For example, studies
have provided significant cvidencc that gay m en do n ot differ in fu n
dam ental psychological ways from heterosexually oriented m en; that
the children o f gay parents are n ot more likely than other children to
be gay them selves; that the inclusion of hom osexuals in th e m ilitary
does n ot indicate that hom osexuality is "contagious" or disruptive
of the ordinary work and lives of m ilitary m en.66 Em pirical research
plays an im portant role in destroying m yths regarding child m olesters
(the m ajority of w hom are heterosexual married m en); long-term
studies are extrem ely im portant regarding th e parenting success of
gay or lesbian partners. W hile these studies do n ot by themselves
settle the questions about the moral status of hom oeroticism , they
6 4 . M urphy, G a y S c ien c e, 5 3 .
6 5 . S e e A m e ric a n P sy ch iatric A sso ciatio n , D iagnostic a n d S ta tistical M an u al: M en
tal D isorders , 4 t h cd . (W ashin g to n, D C : A m e rican P sy ch ia tric A sso cia tio n , 1 9 9 4 ). In
1 9 5 2 , th e A m e ric a n P sy ch iatric A ss o cia tio n co n sid ered h o m o se x u a lity to be a so cio -
p a th ic p erso n a lity d istu rb an ce. In 1 9 6 8 , it changed th is to a sim p le m e n ta l disorder.
B u t in 1 9 7 4 it d eclassified h o m o se x u a lity a s n ecessarily a d isord er o f a n y kind , re ta in
in g o n ly th e sp e cific in s ta n c e o f eg o-d y sto n ic ho m osex u ality . L ater ev en th is d iagnosis
w as d iscard ed, th o u g h th e A.P.A. d oes c o n tin u e to recognize "se x u a l o rie n ta tio n d is
tre ss " in th o se w h o exp erien ce c o n flic t w ith th e ir h o m o e ro tic d esires. T h e ch arg e th a t
th e ch a n g es in t h e A.P.A. p o sitio n are m erely p o litica l, no t based o n sou n d m edical
o p in io n , ten d to c o m e o n ly fro m th o se w h o oppose the ch an g e.
6 6 . See, a s cite d in M urphy, G a y S c ien c e, 5 7 , 2 3 8 - 3 9 n n . 2 5 - 2 9 : E velyn Hooker,
" T h e A d ju stm e n t o f th e M ale O v ert H o m o se x u a l/' Jo u rn a l o f P rojectiv e T ech n iq u es
2 1 (1 9 5 7 ): 1 8 - 3 1 ; " M a le H o m o sex u a lity in t h e R o rs c h a c h ," ibid ., 2 2 (1 9 5 8 ): 3 3 - 5 4 ;
" W h a t Is a C r ite r io n ? " ibid., 2 3 (1 9 5 9 ): 2 7 8 - 8 1 ; D av id W. D u n lap , "H o m o se x u a l Par
e n ts R aisin g C h ild re n : Su pport fo r P ro and C o n / ’ N e w York T im e s (Jan u ary 7 , 1 9 9 6 ):
A : 13; R and y S h ilts , C o n d u ct U n b eco m in g : L e s b ia n s a n d G ay s in t h e U .S. M ilitary,
V ietn am t o th e P ersian G u lf (N ew York: St. M a rtin 's, 1 9 9 3 ), 2 8 1 - 8 3 , 6 4 7 a n d passim,·
F. D . Jo n es and R . J. K o sh es, "H o m o se x u a lity and th e M ilita r y /’ A m er ica n Jo u rn a l o f
P sychiatry 1 5 2 ( 1 9 9 5 ) : 1 6 - 2 1 .
282 TUST LOVE
help to counter social bias and to provide significant input in future

societal legislation. T h ey should also give pause to those religious
thinkers who continue to insist that hom osexuality is both unnatural
and a danger to socicty.67
T h e question of w hat is or is not "natural" continues to sit in the
middle of debates about the value of the biological and social sci
ences for understanding homosexuality. Murphy, reflecting on the
im portance of ideas of nature for questions of th e m orality of hom o
sexuality, asks what light can be shed on these questions by sexual
orientation research.6S A nim al research shows that in th e world of
nature m ost anim als engage in som e sam e-sex behavior. Research on
hum an sexual orientation shows the falsity of som e popular beliefs
as well as erroneous findings in previous research. Cross-cultural re
search provides evidence of sam e-sex relationships in virtually every
culture and acceptance of it in m any cultures. W hen it com es to
biological research, however, M urphy observes th at it is of "lim ited
value in rebutting claim s that hom oeroticism is 'unnatural· in the
usual sense o f the term ."69 M y own response to the search for bio
logical factors undergirding sexual orientation is skeptical as well. If,
for example, a "hom osexuality" gene is identified, m any people will
n ot conclude from this that hom osexuality is "natural" for those who
have the gene. T h ey will instead conclude that the gene is like a gene
for alcoholism ; that is, it is a genetic anom aly in the person who
has it, and th e response to it should be genetic or som e other kind
of therapy, or even the elim ination of the gene altogether from the
hum an gene pool. But we shall have to return to th e issue of what
is natural because it is "given," and what difference this m akes in
assessing the m orality of sam e-sex relationships.
6 7 . S o m e C h r is tia n p sy ch olo gists argue th a t th ere is n o th in g in th e c o n c lu s io n s o f

sc ie n tific and m e d ica l research th a t w arran ts a ch an g e in trad itio n al C h ris tia n view s
o f h o m o sex u a lity , nam ely, trad itio n al v iew s th a t h o m o se x u a lity is a v io la tio n o f G od 's
w ill, co n tra ry to rev elatio n abo u t t h e created m e a n in g of sexuality, and cau sed p ri
m a rily by h u m a n b ro k en n ess and sin . S e c S ta n to n J. Jo n e s a n d M a rk A . Y arhousc,
H om o sex u ality : T h e U se o f S cien tific R es ea rch in th e C h u rch 's M oral D eb a te (D ow n ers
G rove, IL: In terV arsity, 2 0 0 0 ) .
6 8 . M urphy, G a y S c ien c e, 1 6 6 .
6 9 . Ibid.
M uch scientific research on hom osexuality has focused on its de

term inants o r causes. It may be asked, then, why research has not
also addressed such questions as: W hat are the reasons that hom o
sexuality has been seen as a danger to religion and society? Why
has it been constructed as an object of m oral opprobrium? How did
it becom e a m etaphor for degradation and lack of dignity?70 T h ese
questions bring us once again to th e issue of th e social and cul
tural construction of the meanings of homosexuality. T h ey arc the
questions raised by sociologist David Greenberg in his pursuit of the
reasons for th e intensity of feeling behind prohibitions against same-
sex relationships.71 It has been variously construed as a crim e against
nature, a sin against God, inherited physiological degeneration, and
psychological illness; but also — at som e points in tim e, including the
late tw entieth and early twenty-first centuries — as a special gift, or as
simply an alternative orientation of hum an sexual desire. Depending
011 the favored constm ction, responses have ranged from recom m en
dations for repentance, genetic therapy, psychoanalysis, or political
advocacy for th e rights and general welfare of gays and lesbians.
Greenberg traces the social and cultural influences on negative
attitudes toward hom osexuality in term s that he believes are not
unique to hom osexuality but com m on to the social construction
of other form s of "deviance."72 Social groups arc labeled deviant by
reason of social norm s and devices th at label th em "outsiders," dif
ferent in a way that is im portant to a given society for a variety of
reasons. Tracin g the patterns of response to particular outsiders in
cludes taking account of m ultiple factors: w hat there is about the
"offenders" th a t is considered deviant (for example, race, ethnicity,
geographical origin, sexual orientation); the social and cultural con
text in w hich attitudes to these differences are formed (for example,
increasing or decreasing population, econom ics, concern for fam il
ial conform ity and cohesion); particular prom otion of ideas about
w hat counts as full humanity, qualities of leadership, acceptable be
havior (as in those put forth by religious leaders, philosophers, or
7 0 . S e e M urphy, G a y S c ien c e, 7 3 .
7 1 . D av id F. G reen berg, T h e C o n stru ction o f H o m o sex u a lity (C h icag o : U niv ersity
of C h ica g o Press, 1 9 8 8 ).
7 2 . Ib id ., 4 9 9 .
284 TUST LOVE
other professionals). Greenberg's sociological analysis of the history

of W estern civilization attends to these kinds of factors, providing dif
ferent but plausible reasons in different tim es and situations for the
sustaining, and th e waxing and waning, of negative attitudes about
hom osexuality.73 From kinship-structured societies to feudalism, and
from the m cdicalization of hom osexuality to "fam ily values" politics,
the reasons for identifying hom osexuals as deviants changed, but one
is tempted to conclude: once on the outside, for a long tim e on the
outside. T h e interm ingled factors are not predictable and n ot neces
sarily conspiratorial. Hence, for example, "T h e nineteenth-century
inverts w ho argued that hom osexuality was in nate did n ot anticipate
what th e degeneracy theorists would m ake of their claim ."74
Adrienne R ich 's now classic essay on "Com pulsory Heterosexu
ality and Lesbian Existence" reinforces and sheds new light on the
social construction of homosexuality, especially lesbian experience.7:5
She, too, focuses on the negative judgments about homosexuality,
but in order to call for change. A poet and scholar in gender studies,
R ich's aim and approach, therefore, differ from Greenberg's. M ajor
goals for th e essay arc "to encourage heterosexual fem inists to ex
am ine heterosexuality as a political institution w hich disempowers
women — and to change it," and also to allow lesbian w om en to "feel
the depth and breadth of wom an identification and wom an bond
in g."76 T h is, she believes, can be a way to change and transform
perceptions o f lesbians as deviant. H er argument is th at an initial
tendency in w om en to identify with other "w om en as passionate
comrades, life partners, co-workers, lovers, com m unity," has been
historically invalidated and forced into "hiding and disguise" by the
social enforcem ent of heterosexuality.7 W hether in the family, the
workplace, or wider society, w om en are segregated into roles that are
7 3 . F o r h is su m m a ry o f so ciolog ical m eth od olog y a s it applies to h is h is to ric a l a n a l

y sis th ro u g h o u t h is bo ok , s e e esp ecially G reen berg, ibid ., "E p ilogu e: U nd er th e Sig n of
So ciolog y /' 4 8 2 - 9 9 .
7 4 . G re en b erg , T h e C o n stru ction o f H o m o sex u a lity , 4 9 9 .
7 5 . A d rie n n e R ich , "C o m p u lso ry H e tero sex u ality and L esb ian E x iste n c e ," in T h e
L e sb ia n a n d G a y S tu d ies R ea d er, ed. H e n ry A belove, M ich ele A in a B aralc, and D av id M .
H a lp crin (New’ Y ork: R outledge, 1 9 9 3 ), 2 2 7 - 5 3 . T h is p u b licatio n ad ds a la te r Forward
(1 9 8 2 ) and A fterw ard (1 9 8 6 ) to th e orig in al e ssa y p u blished in Signs, 5 (1 9 8 0 ): 6 3 1 - 6 0 .
7 6 . R ich , in L e s b ia n a n d G a y S tu d ies R ea d er, 2 2 7 .
7 7 . Ib id ., 2 2 9 .
"scxualizcd" in relation to m en. Drawing on the work of Catherine

M acKinnon as well as Kathleen Barry, Rich m aintains that wom en
in general are all conditioned to focus on m en — for rom ance, secu
rity leadership, and even their identity as the female "other."78 T h e
distortion in this is that they are prevented from establishing and
sustaining th e bonds between th em that should have begun with
their m others and continued in som e form in relation to all women.
Rich is not proposing that every w om an should or even can be in
genital sexual relationships w ith another w om an, but th at there is a
continuum o f wom en-identified ways of existing — som e lesbian in
the usual erotic sense, but m ost a form of bonding that belongs to
women in m any kinds of relationships.
"Secular disciplines" as sources for theology and ethics include, of
course, more than the biological and behavioral sciences and more
th an the kind of historical perspectives that R ich offers.79 N onethe
less, at this point we can ask whether it is possible to draw any
conclusions from w hat is available to us from the biological and be
havioral sciences. In the interest of continuing, for now at least, only
m odest claim s, here are som e m inim al conclusions: (1) T h e em piri
cal sciences have n ot determ ined that hom osexuality is of itself, in a
culture-free w ay harmful to hum an persons. W hether it is less con
ducive to h um an happiness is n ot a question that can be answered
without an agreed upon idea of what happiness is. (2) Som e ratio
nales for religious and philosophical negative judgments of sam e-sex
relationships — as well as popular beliefs that derive from these —
have been show n to be false by em pirical research. (3) Sam e-sex ori
entation may be natural for som e persons if by "natural" is m eant a
given characteristic, im possible to change w ithout doing violence to
7 8 . S e e C a th e r in e A. M acK in n o n S ex u a l H a ra ssm en t o f W orking W o m en : A C a s e o f

S ex u a l D iscrim in ation (N ew H av en , C T . Yale U n iv e rsity P ress, 1 9 7 9 ); K a th leen Barry,
F e m a le S e x u a l S la v ery (Englew ood C liffs, N J: P ren ticc-H a ll, 1 9 7 9 ).
7 9 . M y c o n sid e ra tio n o f th e s e so u rces d raw s a lso o n su ch h isto rica l w ork s a s th a t by
p sy ch ia trist F ra n cis M a rk M o n d im o re, A N atu ral H istory o f H o m o sex u a lity (B altim ore:
Jo h n s H o p k in s U n iv e r sity Press, 1 9 9 6 ). I have fou n d im p o rta n t and usefu l h isto rical,
sociolog ical, and an th rop olog ical in fo rm atio n a lso in c o lle ctio n s su ch a s: M a r tin D u-
b crm a n , M a rth a V icin u s, and G eorge C h an ccy , ed s., H idden fr o m History': R ecla im in g
t h e G a y a n d L e s b ia n Past (N ew York: M erid ian , 1 9 9 0 ). In a d d itio n , I a ssu m e in th is sec
tio n o n se cu la r d iscip lin es a ll t h a t w e have alread y s e e n o f co n tem p o rary p h ilosop h ical
in te rp re ta tio n s o f sex u ality in g eneral.
286 TUST LOVE
the nature of a person as a whole. (4) Sam e-sex preference in sexual

relations m ay be an option for m any persons since hum an persons
have generally a greater or lesser capacity to respond em otionally and
sexually to persons of both the opposite or sam e sex. I return to all
of these below.
T h e last word is n ot in from reason's efforts to understand sex
uality or hom osexuality. At this point, however, it is difficult to see
how on the basis of sheer hum an rationality alone, and all of its disci
plines, an absolute prohibition of sam e-sex relationships or activities
can be m aintained. O n the other hand, the ambiguity of sex rem ains,
so that it is equally difficult to argue th at all sexual expressions are
for the benefit of hum an persons. We are still pressed to the task of
discerning w hat m ust characterize sam e-sex relationships if they are
to conduce to h um an flourishing.
C on tem porary Experience
T h e fourth source for C hristian ethical insight is contemporary

experience. Scripture, tradition, and secular disciplines all reflect
on experiences, past and present. As I have said before, w hat dif
ferentiates "contem porary experience" as a discrete source is the
unsystem atic way we have access to it. In this context, I am referring
primarily to th e testim ony of w om en and m en w hose sexual prefer
ence is for others of the sam e sex. A ssum ing all of the cautions I
articulated in chapter 5 regarding cxpcricncc as a source of m oral in
sight, we can n ot expect that experience alone will put to rest all of our
questions regarding the status of sam e-sex relationships. We do, how
ever, have som e clear and profound testim onies — written, spoken,
visibly lived — to th e life-enhancing possibilities of sam e-sex rela
tionships and the integrating possibilities of sexual activity within
these relationships. We have the w itness that hom osexuality can be
a way of embodying responsible hum an love and sustaining hum an
and C h ristian friendship. We also have w itness that obstacles raised
to sam e-sex relationships and loves can bring deep and unnecessary
suffering to th e lives of hom osexual persons and partnerships.
T o understand th e significance of concrete experience for theolog
ical ethics, le t m e point again to not one but two issues regarding
specific m oral rules where experience appears to be an indispens

able source. T h e first is the practice of "artificial contraception" in
heterosexual m arital intercourse; the second is the issue of sam e-sex
relationships. I point to both issues in order to put the la tte r— which
is our direct concern here — in a broader perspective. T h e issue of
contraception is alm ost wholly particular to th e Rom an C atholic tra
dition today. O ne of the arguments currently offered in support of a
continued official prohibition of contraception is based on the sup
posed selfishness of married partners who use "artificial" m eans of
contraception. T h e claim is made th at employing contraceptive tech
nology to prevent pregnancy m eans that th e love of the partners is
intrinsically selfish, even exploitative on the part of at least one of
them ; it is a love that refuses to give or receive the "to tal gift" of
self. T h is description and claim , however, cannot stand in th e face of
the reported experience of countless m arried persons. T h e counter
descriptions from these spouses constitu te genuine testim ony from
persons who by their whole lives bear w itness to a high degree of u n
selfishness — w hether in raising the children they have or in serving
the church and society in other ways.
T h e sam e is true w hen it com es to hom osexual persons and
sam e-sex relationships. Indeed, given the arguable inconclusiveness
of Scripture, tradition, and secular disciplines, concrete experience
becom es a determ ining source on this issue. And we do, as I have
said above, have clear and profound testim onies to the in trin sic good
ness of sam e-sex loves and sam e-sex relationships. We do have strong
w itnesses to the role of such loves and relationships in sustaining
hum an well-being and opening to h um an flourishing. T h is sam e w it
ness extends to the contributions th at individuals and partners make
to fam ilies, th e church, and society as a whole.
I have acknowledged above in chapter 5 th at experience is not a
"deposit" of truth that requires no criteria for its interpretation. For
it to m atter in com m unal, institutional, or societal ethical discern
m ent, it m u st cohere w ith general norm s of justice, even though it
challenges specific rules as inapplicable or unjust. T h e reports of, or
the m anifest visibility of, direct experiences need to be shared in ways
that m ake these experiences som ehow intelligible in the light o f cen
tral beliefs, even if they challenge less central and possibly erroneous
288 TUST LOVE
beliefs. Interpretations of experience need to take account of helpful

and harm ful consequences of the interpretations them selves, so that
the good of som e is n ot unfairly subordinated to the purported good
of all. In the light of these criteria, we do have testim ony and witness
from w om en and m en of integrity that should m atter in hum an and
C hristian eth ical discernm ent.80 At th e very least, without grounds
in Scripture, tradition, or any discipline of hum an knowledge for an
absolute prohibition of sam e-sex relationships, the w itness of experi
ence is enough to demand of the C hristian com m unity that it reflect
anew on the norm s for hom osexual love.
S am e-Sex Relationships a n d Justice

Early in m y discussion of the ethical questions surrounding hom o
sexuality I stated th at th e key question is n ot whether sam e-sex
relationships can be ethically justified but w hat m ust characterize
these relationships w hen they are justified. I anticipated a conclusion
in this regard based on previous chapters, namely, that the justice
ethic appropriate to heterosexual relationships is th e sam e justice
ethic appropriate to sam e-sex relationships. T h is sexual justice ethic
is, in other words, an ethic for C hristian — and perhaps all h um an —
sexual relationships. G iven m y m odest conclusions from the sources
of a C hristian sam e-sex ethic, we are now at a point where we can
transcend th e general question of perm ission/prohibition and look
at specific norm s for sam e-sex relationships. In doing so, I assume
all th a t has been said in previous chapters about sexuality, love, and
justice, and about the central features of hum an persons that ground
and give direction for ethical norm s in the sexual sphere. H ence, it
com es as no surprise th at an ethic applicable to and illum inative of
80. A s h a s b e e n p o in ted o u t b y a n u m b e r o f p erson s, it is n o t n e cessary to dem and

th a t th o se w h o se exp erien ce is im p o rta n t to in d iv id u al and c o m m u n a l d iscern m en t
m a n ife st ex em p la ry liv es in every way, p lacin g u p on th e m a g reater bu rd en th a n we
do o n o th e rs w h o se v o ice of cx p cricn cc w c liste n to w ith o u t q u estio n . A s D 'A n g elo
says, m a n y o f th o s e w h o se te stim o n y w e m u st h ear are p erso n s w h o have suffered
deeply fro m h o m o p h o b ia , and w h o se vo ices have b e e n silen ced to o long. "F ro m th ese
th e C h ris tia n co m m u n ity sh o u ld n o t a sk o r n eed th e added te stim o n y o f an exem plary
life o r o f C h r is tia n fidelity. T o o o ften th e ir in a b ility to p re sen t su ch cre d en tia ls is the
first te stim o n y t o th e ir trib u la tio n s ." D ’A ngclo, "P e rfe ct F ear C a s te th O u t L ov e," 1 9 3 .
I co m p le tely ag ree w ith th is, alth ou g h I w ould n o t n e cessa rily co n sid er th is a sig n of
so m e o n e 's la ck o f integrity.
sam e-sex relationships is based on an obligation to respect persons.

T o respect persons requires respecting their autonom y and their re
lationality— th eir capacity for self-determ ination by free choice and
their capacity for relationships through knowledge and love. Since
autonom y and relationality com bine to m ake hum an persons ends
in them selves, the first requirem ent in the sexual sphere as in any
other sphere o f h um an life is the requirem ent n ot to harm persons
unjustly — w hether they happen to be heterosexual or gay or lesbian.
Essential to relating to persons as ends in them selves, especially
w hen their embodied selves are w hat is at stake, is a m inim um
but absolute requirem ent for the free consent of sexual partners.
Everything th a t is ruled out for heterosexual relationships — rape,
violence, harm ful use of power, seduction and m anipulation of
individuals w ho have lim ited capacities of choice by reason of im
maturity, intellectual disability, or special dependency — is ruled out
for sam e-sex relationships as well. Derivately, truth-telling is re
quired in sam e-sex relationships as well as an in ten t to keep any
promises made.
In order to respect the relationality of hom osexual persons, same-
sex relationships ought also to be characterized by a significant degree
of m utuality — of desire, action, and response. Similarly, reasonable
equality is required in order to m ake free choice possible and to in
troduce an im portant qualification to mutuality. In addition, some
form of com m itm ent is expected and required by a C hristian same-
sex ethic, as is som e form of fruitfulness. T h ese latter two norm s bear
further consideration as they characterize sam e-sex relationships.
M any gay m en and lesbians, like m any heterosexual m en and
wom en, n ot only desire but consider necessary som e form of co m
m itm ent to relationships in w hich they are sexually active. C om
m itm ent today, of course, has becom e problem atic, as m uch for
hom osexuals as for heterosexuals. If it is seen as a shutting down
of one's life, a dampening of the possibilities of sexual expression,
or as som ething that is alm ost im possible in today's world, it can
hardly take th e form of an obligation for sexual relationships. M ore
over, if it is construed in term s identified with traditional form s of
heterosexual m arriage, with accompanying concerns for the procre
ation and rearing of children and for the dom estication of sexuality,
290 TUST LOVE
it can hardly be w hat gays and lesbians are obligated to embrace. C u l

turally conditioned expectations regarding gender roles, and assumed
inequality in the power relations in trin sic to marriage, are n ot what
either hom osexuals or m any heterosexuals find tolerable or just.
Yet com m itm ent in sexual relationships that are ju st need not
stifle cither life or sexual love and desire; it may instead nurture,
sustain, anchor, and transform sexuality. Its aim , at least, is to give
a future to love and to a shared life, holding in continually rati
fied free choice w hat is otherw ise fleeting and fragile. C om m itm ent,
or especially frameworks for com m itm ent, are m eans, n ot ends in
them selves. B u t they arc m eans to the affirm ation of persons as ends
in them selves and the endurance of love th at is an end in itself for
those who w ant their relationships to hold. At its best, this is why
the C hristian com m unity still recognizes com m itm ent at th e heart
of an ethic for sexual activities and relationships. It prevents the use
of sexual partners as m ere m eans (for sustaining one's sexual desire
and providing sexual pleasure), and it offers the possibility for the
integration o f sexuality into the whole of one's loves and one's life. It
alone offers th e possibility of sexuality as expression of transcendent
em bodim ent in the highest form s of friendship.
Fruitfulness as a norm for sexual relations need not, as I said in
chapter 6, refer only to the conceiving of children. It can refer to m ul
tiple form s o f fruitfulness in love of others, care for others, making
the world a b etter place for others than ju st the "tw o of u s." It is the
opposite of the sterility of an ég oism e à deux. For those w ho object
to sam e-sex relationships because they cannot be procreative, their
objections represent either a failure of im agination or a narrowness
of experience that disallows an appreciation of all the ways in which
hum ans bring life into the world, and all the ways that the world
needs new life from those to w hom the gift of love has been given.81
In th e C h ristian com m unity, the gift of love constitutes a calling,
and it is a divine gift and divine call to lesbians and gay m en, as it
is to heterosexual wom en and m en. Hence, fruitfulness is both an
obligation and an appeal, a requirem ent and a graced opportunity.
81. It sh ou ld a lso n o t be overlooked th a t m an y gay m e n and lesb ia n s d o con ceiv e

and raise th e ir o w n b io lo g ical children,· ju s t a s m a n y raise th e ch ild ren o f th e ir partners
o r th e ch ild ren o f oth ers.
T h e final norm for sam e-sex relationships, as for heterosexual re

lationships, is social justice. Here, too, som e things m ust be added
to w hat I have already said about this norm , for the social and ec
clesiastical contexts in which hom osexuals try to live faithfully in
their relationships with one another and in th e integrity of their own
identity arc still drastically different from the contexts that hetero
sexuals are used to and can expect. Social justice is the norm that
identifies obligations in ju stice w hich others in the C hristian co m
m unity and th e wider society have toward persons as sexual beings,
and in this case, th e obligations they have toward those persons who
choose sam e-sex relationships. Ju st as gay m en and lesbian wom en
m ust affirm o n e another and them selves in term s of autonomy and
relationality, so they have claim s to respect from the wider society
and th e C hristian churches. Hom osexual persons, in other words,
have th e sam e rights as others to equal protection under the law,
to self-determ ination, to a share in the goods and services available
to all. T h e ir needs for incorporation into the wider com m unity, for
physical safety, psychic and econom ic security, and basic well-being,
m ake the sam e claim s for social cooperation am ong us as do those of
us all. T h e C hristian community, in particular, is faced with serious
questions in this regard. If, for example, a norm of com m itm ent is
appropriate for sexual relationships am ong C hristians, and if such a
norm belongs to a sam e-sex ethic as m uch as to a heterosexual ethic,
then the problem s of institutional support m ust be addressed anew.
Perhaps th e first requirem ent under a social justice norm is to al
leviate the social attitudinal consequences of m aintaining a strong
negative evaluation of hom osexual activities and relationships.82 For
this negative evaluation, undergirded and proliferated through re
ligious teachings and attitudes, constitutes in itself a social and
political force. Though it is true, for example, th at som e and perhaps
m any church leaders have been persuaded at least not to oppose leg
islation that secures th e basic civil rights of lesbians and gay men,
the continuing significant societal resistance to this legislation and
even more so to legislation regarding dom estic partnerships is lodged
82. I have argued th is p o in t in "R e sp o n se to Ja m es H an ig an and C h a rle s C u rra n ,"

in S ex u a l O rien ta tion a n d H u m a n Rights in A m er ica n R elig iou s D iscou rse, ed. S au l M .
O ly a n and M a r th a C . N u ssb a u m (N ew York: O xford U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 9 8 ) , 1 0 1 - 9 .
292 TUST LOVE
in the vehem ence of the negative judgment that continues to be

made regarding hom osexual activity and relationships. T h is judg
m ent is seldom a reasoned one, and its power as a social force is
the power of an unreasoned taboo, lodged in and reinforcing the
kind of unreflective repulsion that m u st be addressed if we are to
move forward socially and politically on these issues.83 As far as I
can see, the primary way to address this unreflective negative re
sponse is for C hristians and others to look again m ore critically (in
the light of w hat has been learned regarding the sources for m oral
insight) at w hatever reasons have been considered valid for prohibit
ing sam e-sex relations. Following this, education programs can be
developed w hich will help to demythologize popular beliefs that cre
ate false fears regarding sam e-sex behaviors. Such programs can also
exam ine the unsatisfactory yet in som e ways helpful distinction be
tween hom osexual orientation and hom osexual acts.84 Finally, they
can clarify w hat civil and welfare rights actually m ean in the U .S.
political tradition.85
8 3 . A n e x a m p le o f a p h ilo sop h er w ho fuels th e v eh em en ce o f n egative jud gm en ts

w ith in fla m m a to ry langu age is J o h n F in n is . A rg u in g th a t se x u a l a c ts c a n n o t b e u n itiv e
u n le ss th e y a rc m a rita l, and n o t m a rita l u n le s s th ey h a v e an o p en n ess to p ro creation ,
F in n is n o tes w ith approval w h a t h e tak es t o be a G re e k a ss e ssm e n t (m u ch co n te ste d by
G re e k sch o la rs) o f h o m o sex u al a cts a s hav in g " a sp ecial s im ila rity t o so lita ry m a stu rb a
tio n , and b o th ty p es o f rad ically n o n -m a rita l a cts are m a n ife stly u n w orth y o f th e hu m an
b ein g and im m o r a l." S e e Jo h n M . F in n is, "Law , M orality, and th e 'S ex u a l O r ie n ta tio n / "
N oire D a m e Jo u r n a l o f Law . Ethics, a n d P ublic P olicy 9 (1 9 9 5 ): 3 0 . Like co p u latio n of
h u m a n s w ith a n im a ls, F in n is in s is ts th a t g e n ita l co u p lin g betw een h u m a n s w ith the
sa m e sex u al o rg a n s m u s t b e rep ud iated a s n o t o n ly o ffen siv e b u t d estru ctiv e o f hu m an
c h a ra c te r and re la tio n sh ip s. F earfu l, th erefo re, o f th e so c ia l in flu e n ce o f an y seem in g
approval o r ev en to le ra tio n o f th e s e activ ities, F in n is op poses an y n o n d iscrim in a tio n
leg isla tio n beyo n d th e d e crim in a liz a tio n o f to ta lly p riv ate actio n s.
8 4 . A lth ou gh e m p h asizin g th is d is tin c tio n is u n sa tisfa cto ry b ecau se it sep arates
id en tity fro m a c tio n , and b e ca u se it c o n tin u e s t h e a ss e ssm e n t o f h o m o sex u als a s
so m eh o w d isadvantaged in th e ir p o ssib ilities for full h u m an flo u rish in g , it is n o n e
th e le ss a first s te p fo r m a n y p erso n s to reco n sid er th e ir previous negative ju d g m en ts o f
h o m o sex u a l p e rso n s a s persons.
8 5 . A lth ou gh ed u catio n so u n d s like an u n co n tro v crsial reco m m en d a tio n , G re e n
berg m ay be rig h t w h en h e p o in ts o u t th a t w h a t fu els th e a n ti-g ay rights m o v em en t is
a fe a r o f c e r ta in id eas in flu en cin g fa m ilie s and esp ecially ch ild ren . It is harder to co m
m u n ica te o n e 's v a lu e s to ch ild ren if th ey are perceived to be u n d erm in ed by teach ers,
th e m ed ia , a n d so fo rth . "F o r co n serv ativ es th e co rc c o n c e rn is n o t p ro tectin g ch ild ren
fro m m o le sta tio n . . . b u t sh ield in g th e m fro m th e know ledge t h a t h o m o sex u ality exists
and th a t i t is n o t in co m p a tib le w ith in tellig en ce and resp ectab ility ." G reen berg, T h e
C on stru ction o f H o m o sex u a lity , 4 7 1 .
Legislation for nondiscrim ination against hom osexuals, b u t also

for dom estic partnerships, civil unions, and gay marriage, can also
be im portant in transform ing the hatred, rejection, and stigm atiza
tion of gays and lesbians that is still being reinforced by teachings of
"unnatural" sex, disordered desire, and dangerous love. G ay bashing,
as both church leaders and ethicists agree, is not a trivial m atter; nor
does it exist alone without attachm ent to m ultiple form s of avoidance
as well as m ultiple form s of violence. Lodged in taboos and myths,
the physical and verbal bashing of hom osexuals is a greater danger
to society — both as a violation of individuals' deep-seated human
rights and a threat to hum an decency and the com m on good —
th an any feared approval or encouragem ent of hom osexual lifestyles.
A com m unity's process toward a willingness to legislate regarding
dom estic partnerships of whatever form begins with, is premised
on, and becom es the gradual extension of a stance against violence
toward gays and lesbians. Its goal is th e rendering of justice, a pro
tection that is hardly separable from a provision for the m eeting of
basic needs.
Presently o n e of the m ost urgent issues before the U .S . public
is marriage for sam e-sex partners — that is, th e granting of social
recognition and legal standing to unions between lesbians and gays
comparable to unions between heterosexuals. T h is issue in some
ways focuses th e difficulties entailed in achieving respect for hom o
sexual persons and for their incorporation into the ordinary life of
the churches, while at th e sam e tim e denying th em com m unal and
societal supports that are available to heterosexuals. T h e m ajor argu
m ent against sam e-sex marriage has tended to be that it will weaken
support for traditional heterosexual marriage and traditional notions
of family. It is difficult to m ake sense of this reasoning, especially
since the churches do n ot m ount campaigns against laws that rec
ognize divorce — arguably a greater threat to heterosexual marriage
than gay m arriages m ight be.86 A m ore persuasive position is that
86. T h is is a i l arg u m en t t h a t C h a rle s C u rra n m ak e s w ith p a rticu lar a tte n tio n to the
R om an C a th o lic tra d itio n . See C h a rle s E . C u rra n , "S e x u a l O rie n ta tio n and H u m an
R ig h ts in A m e ric a n R elig iou s D isc o u rse : A R o m a n C a th o lic P ersp ectiv e," in S exu al
O rien tation a n d H u m a n Rights, cd . O ly an and N u ssb au m , 8 5 - 1 0 0 .
294 TUST LOVE
the possibility of gay marriage would actually reinforce the value of

com m itm ent for heterosexuals as well as for hom osexuals.
M any gay m en and lesbians themselves oppose the idea of gay
marriage on th e grounds that the institution of marriage is already
so frayed, so inadequate, and so rejecting of gays that it would be a
m istake to m im ic it in any way through legalization of gay or lesbian
unions. Still, th e im portant questions to be asked include whether or
not those gays who w ish to m arry should be denied this possibility
They include also, as I have already said, questions for C hristian
churches: how do gay m en and lesbians want to be incorporated as
full participants in their faith com m unities, and how can practices
be structured that will support them in the holiness of their own
vocations w ithin and beyond the com m unity of faith?
Sexual O rientation: G iven o r Chosen

Understanding hom osexuality as an inborn characteristic of some
persons h as been im portant to the achievem ent of tolerance and civil
rights. T h u s far science has n ot found the exact key to this inborn
characteristic, but there can be no doubt that for m any individuals
who identify them selves as hom osexual, there is their own clear ex
perience of being attracted to those of the sam e sex from the tim e
of their earliest m em ories. T h e inborn character of being gay would
not have to depend on a biological cause; for even if it is the result
of social and cultural construction, it may be as "un ch osen," as u n
changeable, and as basic to one's continuing identity as if it were
biological. However we understand the givenness of homosexuality,
this insight and conviction have helped religious traditions to accept
the gay m en and lesbians am ong them . As Judith Plaskow notes,
this allows th e view th at "sin ce hom osexuality is n ot chosen, it can
n ot be im m o ra l. . . [since] God would not demand of hum an beings
som ething th ey cannot possibly obey."87 Moreover, there is strength
in recognizing oneself as a m em ber of a group whose identity is clear,
inborn, God-given.
Yet there are reasons to worry about the "givenness" of hom o
sexuality as th e primary or sole justification for the acceptance of
8 7 . Plaskow , "L e sb ia n and G a y R ig h ts ," 31

gays and lesbians.88 For one thing, m any lesbians do not report
the sam e experience as m ost gay m en — that is, that they always
knew they w ere lesbian. Som e wom en may consider them selves co m
pletely heterosexual, m arry and raise children, and then fall in love
with a wom an. O r they m ay choose to self-identify as lesbian for
political reasons in ways suggested by Adrienne Rich. Similarly, ac
cording to the sexual continuum theory (whether from Kinsey, other
researchers, or Rich), som e persons m ay be capable of em otional and
sexual relationships only with those of the so-called opposite sex,
others capable of em otional and sexual relationship only with those
of the sam e-sex, and there m ay be m any others at som e point in
between th ese poles on the continuum who are capable of relating
to either th e opposite or the sam e sex, the latter depending on how
they encounter another of whichever sex, actualized and expressive
in one or another gender. Moreover, the requirem ent of finding some
biological explanation for in nate hom osexuality risks highlighting it
as an anom aly — since we don't keep searching for the gene that
explains heterosexuality. Finally if the givenness of hom osexuality
is the m ainstay of an ethic for sam e-sex relationships, there will al
ways be the objection that no one needs to act on this tendency, and
sam e-sex activity thus rem ains still outside the pale of justifiable sex.
M y own view, as should be clear by now, is th at sam e-sex rela
tionships and activities can be justified according to th e sam e sexual
ethic as heterosexual relationships and activities. Therefore, same-
sex oriented persons as well as their activities can and should be
respected w hether or n ot they have a choice to be otherwise. Insofar
as this is true, it still m atters a great deal to individuals how they
com e to realize their sam e-sex orientation or preference; but this is
not w hat determ ines w hether they themselves arc whole hum an be
ings w hose sexuality is justifiable w hen it accords w ith the norm s of
sexual justice. Everyone should look forward to the day w hen it will
not m atter in the course of hum an and C hristian affairs w hether one
88. T h e s e w o rries are su ccin ctly exp ressed b y Plaskow , ibid ., 3 1 - 3 2 , and M a r
g aret R . M iles, "B e y o n d B io lo g ical D e te rm in a tio n ," A n glican T h eo lo g ic a l R e v ie w 72
(Sp rin g 1 9 9 0 ): 1 6 1 - 6 5 . T h e p o ssib ilitie s o f h o m o se x u a lity b e in g b o th given and c h o
se n (being b o th a n "o rie n ta tio n " and a "p refere n ce") a rc no ted in M urphy, C a y S c ien c e,
2 3 3 n. 14; G reen berg, T h e C o n stru ction o f H o m o sex u a lity , 4 8 1 , 4 8 7 - 9 2 ; M o n d im o re,
A N atu ral H istory o f H om o sex u ality , 8 4 - 8 7 .
296 TUST LOVE
is hom osexual or heterosexual, and w hen one sexual ethic will help
u s discern th e m orality of all sexual relationships and activities.
D ivorce and Rem arriage
I turn now to the third pattern of relationship to be considered in

the light of th e sexual ju stice ethic I have p ro p o s e d .Q u e s tio n s
of divorce and remarriage arc n ot so easily seen to be questions re
garding sexuality and its ethical determ inants. Understanding them,
however, does lead us into considerations of com m itm ents and the
breakdown! of com m itm ents in the sexual sphere. Moreover, issues
addressed in previous chapters, including an understanding of sexual
ity, freedom, m arriage, and com m itm ent, have clear relevance for any
probing of th e questions of divorce and second marriages following
divorce.
T h ere is hardly a C hristian fam ily that has n ot been touched in
som e way in recen t years by issues surrounding divorce. T h e reality
or the possibility of the breakdown and loss of a m arital relation
ship is elose to hand in one way or another for alm ost everyone,
w hether for relatives, friends, or one's own self. Both divorce and re
marriage have preoccupied theologians and church leaders frequently
enough throughout the centuries that were we n ot faced with new
and urgent situations wc would weary of addressing them yet again.
Perhaps contem porary experience is sharp enough, and history long
enough, for u s to gain a perspective not heretofore accessible regard
ing these questions. Yet the obstacles to new and needed insights
rem ain formidable, especially but n ot only in the Rom an C atholic
tradition.90 It is not easy to know even whether we are asking the
8 9 . W h a t follow s is a revised v ersio n of a previous essay: M argaret A. Farley, "M a r

riage, D iv o rce, a n d P erso n al C o m m itm e n ts ," i n C eleb ra tin g C h ristian M arriage , ed.
A drian T h a tc h e r (Edinburgh: T. & T . C lark , 2 0 0 1 ) , 3 5 5 - 7 2 . R ev isio n s in clu d e so m e
ad d itio n s fro m m y earlier essay s: "D iv o rce and R em arriag e," P roceedin gs o f t h e C a t h o
lic T h eo lo g ic a l S o c ie ty o f A m erica 3 0 (1 9 7 5 ), 1 1 1 - 1 9 ; “D iv o rce and R em arriage: A
M o ral P e rsp ectiv e ," in D iv orce a n d R em a rria g e , ed. W illia m P. R ob erts (K an sas City,
M O : S h ccd and W ard, 1 9 9 0 ), 1 0 7 - 2 7 ; a n d "D iv o rce, R em arriage, and P asto ral P rac
tic e ," in M oral T h eo lo g y : C h a llen g es fo r th e Fu ture , cd . C h a rle s E . C u rra n (N ew York:
P au list, 19901, 2 1 3 - 3 9 .
9 0 . S e e Farley, "D iv o rce, R em arriage, a n d P astoral P ra ctic e ," for a c lo s e a n aly sis of
tw e n tie th c e n tu ry ch an g es in th e o p in io n s o f C a th o lic m oral th eo lo g ian s, d evelo p m ents
right questions. Life seem s to have moved beyond issues of simply

w hether th e churches should recognize divorce and accept rem ar
riage, or even w hether marriage can be in som e sense indestructible
no m atter w hat. O ur questions seem rather to be w hat are we to do
about the fragility of contemporary marriages and the traum a and
som etim es tragedy of their collapse, and w hat clarifying and healing
words has th e church to speak and what empowering grace to offer.
D ebates u n til now have tended to focus on juridical, m oral, and
ontological interpretations of the bond th a t marriage entails. All of
these dim ensions are in trin sic to the problem, and they m ust con
tinue to be addressed. Suppose wc ask first, however, why the problem
as a whole is so im portant to us. W hy do we care so m uch that m ar
riages are fragile, or that divorce and remarriage seem inevitable, even
though they m ay not be our best remedy for the vulnerability of m ar
riage itself? A num ber of answers can be given to this question, and
their rich com plexity is n ot captured by sim ple statem ents that som e
thing is right or wrong, or that certain patterns of behavior fit or do
not fit an assum ed pattern of C hristian life. For example, Christians
by and large believe that it is G od's in tention that marriage should
be "for life." We also recognize that it is not only G od's desire and
in tention th a t arc at stake, but our own. W hen wc reach a point in
a relationship where we w ant to share our life with another individ
ual, marriage, at least in som e form, looks like our best option. T h e
very nature o f this love m oves us to w ant to sustain it forever,· our
happiness seem s to lie in this direction. And m any of us still think
that building a fam ily is am ong the greatest of hum an enterprises.
We also recognize the need for stability not only in our own lives but
also in th e societies on w hich we depend. And we still believe in the
distinctiveness and im portance of the bond of marriage as part of the
fabric of th e life of th e church. M arriage, then, with perm anence as
one of its essential elem ents, is w hat God w ants and we w ant and
need — w hether for ourselves or for others.
in c h u rc h te a c h in g and p astoral p racticc, and a d escrip tion o f th e te n sio n s betw een

m oral th eo lo g ia n s and t h e h ierarch ical teach in g ch u rch o n th e s e issu es. For a brief
d escrip tion (n o t in clu d ed below ) o f th e c u rre n t situ a tio n see Farley, "M a rria g e, D ivorce,
and P erso n al C o m m itm e n ts ."
298 TUST LOVE
And yet it docs n ot seem to work. T h e promises w c m ake do not

always hold; th e desires we experience are n ot always fulfilled; the
wholeness our love seeks is often elusive; the fam ilies we try to build
are often fragmented and troubled; the stability we count on all too
often disappears under our feet; and there is am ong us too m uch
suffering and pain. Som e analysts tell us that this is because ours is
an era of radical individualism; wc arc n ot able to take responsibility
for one another in the way past generations have done. O r ours is
a hopelessly hedonistic culture, lost to th e form s of discipline that
hum an life requires. Or we belong to a sadly anxious and alienated
set of generations, disturbed by too m uch war and death, too much
ambiguous progress and change, too m uch expectation w ith too little
wisdom about how to achieve w hat we yearn for and expect.
But maybe the explanation is both simpler th an all of this, and at
the sam e tim e more complex. W hat if our troubles regarding mar
riage and fam ily are the consequence of real incapacities — not all
of our own m aking, but part of our share in th e "hu m an condition"?
T h e kinds of incapacities we experience are n ot lack of control of dis
ordered lust, as m any of our C hristian predecessors thought, but our
"alm ost in ab ility " to live together. W hether because of som e general
hum an lim itatio n or brokenncss, or because in our social con tcxt wc
arc weakened by one another's failings as m uch as w c arc strength
ened by one an oth er's virtue, the struggle "to live together" goes on,
century after century am ong peoples, nations, religions, classes. It
goes on, too, in our m ost in tim ate lives, our m ost intim ate relation
ships, especially w hen w hat is a t stake is genuinely sharing our lives
together on a day to day basis.
O ur incapacities to sustain marriage and fam ily arc dramatically
revealed at th is point in our history for particular reasons. In the past,
as we have seen, th e institution of marriage sustained th e relation
ship between partners in a marriage, and when necessary, it covered
over the fragility and som etim es even terror of the relationship. It
did n ot appear to m atter so m uch w hether husbands and wives loved
one another o r got along well w ith one another. If they did not, they
could spend their tim e in other circles of m en or wom en in which
each could find strength, com panionship, and even solacc. Socicty,
the church, culture, alm ost every other institution worked to m ain
tain the in stitu tio n of marriage because it served their aim s. T h e
goal was largely social utility, w hether for the sake of th e empire, the
tribe, the n ation, or the church. In turn, marriage as a social in sti
tution could for centuries on end sustain or circum vent marriage as
relationship, and it could stabilize the intergenerational fam ily that
was m ost frequently formed. Today there is, in a sense, n o sim ilarly
recognizable in stitu tio n of m arriage,91 no institution that can be as
sumed to do for intim ate relations w hat the marriage institution of
the past could do.
W hat, then, can hold marriage as a relationship? W hat will hold
the relationships that form our marriages? N ot presently a strong
and unquestioned institution, n ot the love itself, not the sanctioned
"law s" of m arriage, not even the children born of marriage. Love
is notoriously fickle, waxing and waning in ways we cannot always
control. And all the laws proclaimed, even reinforced by sanctions,
do n ot save u s from our inabilities to live together in peace and in
joy. Children do hold us to one another and to them , but wc have
m assive evidence that they alone cannot save our marriages.
We need n ot appeal to doctrines of original sin in the sense of
"brokenness" or "fall" to understand all of this. We can appeal to our
understanding of th e concrete reality of hum an persons and a theol
ogy of hum an possibilities and lim itations. O ne of the things revealed
to us in the present experience of so m uch powerlessness in th e face
of the unraveling of a given marriage is that the efficaciousness of our
free choice is lim ited. If freedom is our power of self-determination,·
if it is our capacity to take hold of ourselves by ratifying or refusing
to identify w ith our own spontaneous desires, loves, judgments, obli
gations; then it is indeed the capacity to fashion ourselves according
to th e self we choose. Yet sheer free ch o ice— the "grit your teeth and
do it" sort of choice — is so limited. We w ant to rem ain loving and
faithful, peaceful and strong, utterly self-forgetful and devoted, in a
relationship o f marriage. T h is may be easily said, but n ot so easily
done. If life w ith a particular other becom es intolerable — as it can
91. I a m n o t im plying th a t th e sea-ch an g es in fam ily stru ctu re s are alw ays a bad
thing.
300 TUST LOVE
becom e — it w ill n ot be made tolerable simply by choosing it so —

n ot by controlling the other or even by controlling one's own self.
Freedom, along w ith relationality, may be our noblest feature, that
by w hich we determ ine our own destiny in som e kind of ultim ate
sense. Yet it h as limited power to shape our own in ner selves or our
relationships w ith others.
In the face of lim itatio n and powerlessness, w hat is there in the
C hristian tradition to strengthen us, to help us fashion our free
dom and love ? We have symbols and images, beliefs and convictions,
m em ories and hopes,- and w hat do they yield? Understandings of
"covenant," o f "sacram ent," of C hristian agape and unconditional fi
delity; m etaphors of C hrist in relation to the church, and "tw o in one
flesh"; interpretations of gender com plem entarity and the church as
fam ily Insofar as we m ake all of these resources our own — elem ents
in our faith, inform ers of our hope, reinforcem ents of our love — they
do help us to sustain our choices and to rem ain loyal to our in ten
tions. Yet these particular elem ents in our tradition have themselves
com e upon hard tim es, and n ot only because of our infidelities. As
ideas, im ages, theological construals, they no longer offer sure rem e
dies for our weaknesses of m ind and heart, or sure bridges for our
limited freedom. Even when lodged in genuinely sacram ental reali
ties, they do n ot by themselves solve our present inability to sustain
our m arriages in the ways we have wanted to sustain them.
A justifiable skepticism has undercut for us, as well it should,
the past power of m any of these notions in our traditions. We have
learned, for exam ple, that covenants were all too often, in the bibli
cal tradition, between unequals; C h rist's relation to the church has
been all too often translated into gender assigned roles; "tw o in one
flesh " covered over the frecjuent loss of identity and violation of an
individual's, usually a wom an's, own hum anhood; th e church's h is
tory regarding sexuality is so greatly flawed; and so on. All of these
images and ideas m aybe retrievable, but n ot w ithout passing through
a clarifying critique.
So, where sh all we go? W here is grace in all of this? How does grace
"w ork" in th ese aspects of our lives? How does sacram ental grace
function, and how can it be recognized and nurtured? O ne place we
m ight look is to the nature of the com m itm ent that is a t the heart of
marriage. Probing its experience and its m eaning may shed light on
the ways of sustaining marriage as well as the ways of letting it go.
T h e M a rria ge C om m itm ent: M aking, K eep in g , C h an gin g
Like any o th er explicit, expressed, interpersonal com m itm ent, m ar

riage involves the giving of one's word.92 Blit w hat do we give when
wc give our word, and why do wc give it? First, we do something,
or aim to do som ething, that relates to th e future. We prom ise to
do som ething or be som ething in relation to som eone in the future.
Giving our word has to do with an intention of action n ot only in the
present but in the future. In the case of marriage, we give our word
regarding in terior actions (of respect, love, trust, and so forth) and
exterior actions (regarding a way of sharing a life together) — prom is
ing these actions on into the future, indeed (at least in the C hristian
tradition) until we die. We do n ot simply predict our actions in the
future, nor only resolve to do them . T o give our word m eans, funda
mentally, to give to another a claim over our selves — a claim on our
doing and being w hat we have promised.
W hat happens, then, w hen wc make a com m itm ent, including a
com m itm ent in marriage, is that we enter a new form of relation
ship. Wc "sen d " (from the Latin, m ittere ) our word into another; wc
"place" ourselves in the other to whom we give our word. Frequently
in hum an affairs we try to concretize, "in carn ate," this, express it
and sym bolize it, by m aking the "word" tangible. For example, we
sign our nam e on contracts; we give rings as signs of our word and
ourselves; w c exchange gifts to signal the exchange of our prom ises.
And why do we do this? Precisely because our loves, our intentions,
are fragile. C om m itm ent in the hum an com m unity implies a state
of affairs in w hich there is doubt about our future actions; it implies
the possibility of failure to do in the future w hat we intend in the
present; it is our way of transcending th e lim its of our freedom in
order to determ ine, in som e way, our own future. T h e primary pur
pose, then, of interpersonal and social com m itm ents is to provide
92. I ad ap t h e re a n a n aly sis of " c o m m itm e n t" m ad e a t m u ch g reater len g th in

P erson al C o m m itm e n ts , csp ccially ch ap . 2.
302 TUST LOVE
som e reliability of expectation regarding the actions of free persons

whose wills are shakable.93
C om m itm ents give u s grounds for counting on one another, even
on ourselves. T h e purpose of prom ising is both to assure th e other of
the future we prom ise and to strengthen ourselves in our intentions
for the future. It docs so bccausc to give our word is to undertake
a new obligation for w hich there will be sanctions should we fail in
fulfilling it (we stand to lose the "word" we have given, to lose our
reputation or our goods, even our happiness and som etim es perhaps
even our salvation). By com m itting ourselves w c give, as it were, a
new law to ourselves? we bind ourselves by the claim we give to an
other. We m ake m ost of our com m itm ents n ot because we m ust, but
because this is w hat we w ant to do. We want to be held to what
we m ost tru ly w ant to do and be. In som e com m itm ents, we want,
against the threats of tim e, to m ake our loves whole. T h e "word" wc
give now calls to u s from the one who holds it, th e one to whom
we have entrusted it. W hat com m itm ent m eans, then, and w hat it
entails, is a new relationship in the p resen t — a relationship of bind
ing and being bound, giving and being claim ed; but the com m itm ent
points to the future. In the present, a new relationship begins, and
the relationship is w hat moves into the future.94
T h is is tru e of all hum an com m itm ents, but there are elem ents
specific to th e com m itm ent to m arry that are extrem ely important
to our understanding of it and to our gaining any light on w hat it
m eans and how it can be lived. For example, the com m itm ent to
m arry is essentially m utual: two liberties m eet, two words are given,
two claim s are yielded and held. Moreover, marriage involves a co m
m itm ent to m ore than one person. At least in a C hristian construal
of w hat marriage is, a com m itm ent is made n ot only to one's partner
9 3 . W h e n G o d m ak e s p ro m ises to us, en ters in to c o v en a n t w ith u s, it i s n o t b ecau se

G o d 's w ill is sh a k a b le , b u t b c ca u sc G o d w a n ts to g ive u s a c la im o n G od , and w an ts u s
to k n o w and b e a ssu red thereby (as b e s t w c c a n u n d erstan d ) o f th e s o r t o f u n co n d itio n al
love th a t is G o d ’s fo r us.
9 4 . O u r free c h o ic e c a n n o t " s e ttle " ahead o f tim e o u r fu tu re. B u t th ro u g h c o m m it
m e n t it c a n in flu c n c c ou r fu tu re. C o m m itm e n t, o r p ro m ise-m ak in g , is a d cv icc w hereby
w c m ove in to t h e fu tu re, ch ang cd b c ca u sc w c a rc no w obligated, n o t b cca u sc w c arc
n e cessita te d . H e n c e , c o m m itm e n t ch an g es o u r reality in th e p resen t, o u r relatio n sh ip s
in th e p re se n t, s o th a t w h a t w e d o in th e fu tu re c a n — depending o n w h a t w e d o and
u n d er w h at c irc u m s ta n c e s — be a ccu ra tcly d escribed a s fa ith fu ln e ss, o r betrayal.
but to God and to a com m unity of persons (to the church and to the
wider society). In addition, while a com m itm ent to m arry is made
to persons, its content includes a com m itm ent to a certain fram e
work of life in relation to persons. T h a t is, while those who m arry
com m it them selves to love one another, they do so by com m itting
them selves to whatever is still understood as the "in stitu tio n " of mar
riage.95 "Fram ew ork," of course, has m ore th an one level of meaning
in this context. T h ere is a level at w hich "m arriage" is a framework
that structures a relationship into som e generic form — for example,
m ost generic understandings of marriage include the elem ent of per
m anence. T h ere is also a level where framework m eans a certain
cultural or religious model of marriage — as, for example, w hen it
includes sexual exclusivity, and either a hierarchical structure or one
of equality between spouses. And finally there is a level of fram e
work which is the particular structure implied or already worked out
by particular participants in a given relationship of marriage — as, for
example, th e ways in w hich they will share their possessions, relate
to one an oth er's fam ilies, and educate their children.
In our own culture, as we have seen above, and certainly in
the C hristian tradition, an intention of perm anence is included in
the m arital com m itm ent. Given m assive historical changes in so
cial contexts, som e of the reasons for incorporating th e elem ent of
perm anence in the framework of marriage have changed, though
m any rem ain the sam e. T h e im portance of interpersonal reasons has
grown, and institutional reasons have receded. Yet there have always
been reasons for perm anence that are in trin sic to the m arital rela
tionship itself and reasons of social utility beyond th e relationship.
Love itself ca n w ant to give its whole future, to bind itself as irrevo
cably as possible to the one loved and to express itself in this way.
I have also argued in chapter 6 that sexuality m ay be best served
in a context o f perm anent com m itm ent, where it has a chance of
being nurtured and integrated into th e whole of one's personality
and one's prim ary relationship. Further, an intention of and co m
m itm ent to perm anence is in the present as in the past considered
95. D e sp ite th e fa ct th a t w e have so little o f th e " in s titu tio n " left, th ere rem ain s
so m e c o n tc n t to w h a t "m a rria g e " m ean s.
304 TUST LOVE
to be for the good of children and also for the good of the church —
in w hich marriage can function as a way of C hristian life and a sign
of G od's presence.
Yet here w c m eet the heart of a problem. If an in tention of per
m anence is in trin sic to the m eaning of C hristian marriage, and if
marriage as a com m itm ent is self-obligating, is it ever justifiable to
end a m arriage short of the death of one's spouse? C an the claim
given to an oth er in the com m itm ent of marriage ever be released?
T h is is the cen tral m oral question for both divorce and remarriage.
And behind this, perhaps, lies the further question: If a marital
com m itm ent to perm anence cannot be released, should such a co m
m itm ent reasonably be made in a tim e when our ability to sustain
it seem s so com prom ised?96 Or if w c com e to understand more fully
w hat is needed in order to live our com m itm ents "to the end," will
we thereby learn better not only how to sustain th em but also how,
if finally necessary, to let th em go?
D ivorce
We are used to acknowledging release from a marriage obligation
w hen it can be determ ined that som e basic flaw marked the orig
inal m arrying — a flaw in the procedure, a lack of full consent, a
situation of unfreedom of any kind (whether physical, psycholog
ical, or m oral).97 T h is kind of "release" is, of course, n ot really a
release from a n obligation but a recognition that no marriage obliga
tion was ever truly undertaken; th e marriage did n ot really, validly,
take place. T h e m uch m ore difficult question is w hether the obliga
tion intrinsic to a genuinely valid C hristian marriage, especially a
sacram ental C hristian marriage, can ever be ended w ithout betrayal,
without the unjustified and unjustifiable violation of a claim that
was oncc yielded to another.
M y own position is that a marriage com m itm ent is subject to
release on th e sam e ultim ate grounds th at any extrem ely serious,
9 6 . I here ca ll a tte n tio n to , b u t do n o t d iscu ss, proposals fo r "te m p o ra ry " m ar

riage trials, o r grad uated c c r c m o n ic s in stages o f m arriage, o r a retu rn perhap s to older
n o tio n s o f " b e tr o th a l." S e c, for exam p le, R eg H arcu s, “T h e C a se for B e tr o th a l," in
C eleb ra tin g C h ristia n M arriag e, 4 1 - 5 4 .
9 7 . T h is is a t t h e b a s is o f th e R o m a n C a th o lic p ra ctice of a n n u lm en ts.
nearly unconditional, perm anent com m itm ent m ay cease to bind.98

T h is im plies th at there can indeed be situations in w hich too m uch
has changed — one or both partners have changed, th e relationship
has changed, the original reason for the com m itm ent seem s alto
gether gone. T h e point of a perm anent com m itm ent, of course, is
to bind those who m ake it in spite of any changes th at may come.
But can it always hold? C an it hold absolutely, in the face of radical
and unexpected change? M y answer: som etim es it cannot. Som e
tim es the obligation m ust be released, and the com m itm ent can be
justifiably changed.
T o understand situations such as these, it is useful to look at the
generic grounds for discerning w hen a com m itm ent 110 longer obli
gates.99 T h re e grounds are defensible, it seem s to me, and they can
be applied in th e context of marriage and divorce. A com m itm ent no
longer binds w hen (1) it becom es im p ossib le to keep; (2) it no longer
fulfills any o f th e purposes it was m eant to serve; (3) another obli
gation com es into con flict w ith the first obligation, and the second
is judged to override the first. O nly one of these conditions needs to
be in place — although often m ore than one characterizes the situa
tio n — in order to justify a release from the com m itm cnt-obligation.
It is som etim es extrem ely difficult to discern w hen such conditions
actually co m e to be, but that they do and that they can be identi
fied, even in relation to marriage, seem s to m e to be w ithout doubt.
Som e brief observations regarding each of these conditions may help
to make this clear.
First, then, w hen it truly becom es im p ossib le to sustain a marriage
relationship, the obligation to do so is released. Im possibility — es
pecially physical im possibility— h as long been accepted as a general
justifying reason for release from the obligation of a promise, as when
in the Middle Ages a broken leg made it impossible to continue on a
pilgrimage to w hich one had com m itted oneself. T h e kind of im pos
sibility that is relevant for marriage com m itm ents is not, of course,
9 8 . S e e Farley, P erson al C o m m itm e n ts , ch ap . 7 . I d o n o t w a n t to im p ly th a t there

c a n be no a b so lu te c o m m itm e n ts , u n co n d itio n ally bin d in g n o m a tte r w hat.
9 9 . I provide a fu ller d escrip tion o f th e s e g eneric reason s o r co n d itio n s in ch a p ter 7
of P erson al C o m m itm e n ts . I have a lso d iscu ssed in d etail th e a d ap tatio n o f th e s e in the
c o n te x t o f m a r ita l c o m m itm e n t and divorce in th e essay s cited in n o te 8 6 above.
306 TUST LOVE
physical but psychological and m oral.100 H ence, recognizing it is less

like perceiving an incontrovertible fact th an like m aking a judgment
or even a decision. Still, exam ples can be given— of irremediable and
irreconcilable rupture in a relationship, or utter helplessness in the
face o f violence, or inability to go on in a relationship that threatens
one's very identity as a person; and it seem s true that a threshold
of genuine im possibility does exist. We all do know of situations in
w hich w hat was once love is now seemingly irreversible bitterness
and hatred, so that to rem ain together threatens utter destruction to
the partners them selves and to others. We know of situations where
som e aspects of the relationship m ay still survive but others prove
so contradictory to marriage that at least one partner can no longer
sustain it — as, for example, in a situation of relentless dom estic vio
lence. Or apathy and despair can burden a person and a relationship
to a degree th at, without drastic change, one is convinced one will,
as a person, die. O r it m ay even happen that a new love arises, and it
becom es too late to "tu rn back" (regardless of w hat one should have
done about refusing this path in the first instance).
Second, a m arriage com m itm ent m ay reach a point where it has
co m p letely lost its pu rpose, its whole raison d ’être, its in trin sic m ean
ing. It is m eant, for example, to serve love and life for spouses, for
family, for society, for God. In order to do this it includes a com
m itm ent, as we have seen, to a "fram ework" for loving. But if the
framework becom es a threat to the very love it is to serve, if it weak
ens it or contradicts it or blocks it, then the very com m itm ent to
love may require that the com m itm ent to marriage as a framework
m ust com e to an end. O f course, marriage has m ultiple meanings
and purposes, but it m ay be, in som e circum stances, th at all of
these are underm ined by the marriage itself— or som e are so gravely
100. T h e r e is n o t sp ace in th is co n clu d in g ch a p ter to in clu d e a d iscu ssio n o f w h at

I have elsew here called th e "w ay o f fidelity'," alth ou g h I have referred to it in te rm s of
th e "b e tw e e n " in t h e s e c tio n o n m arriag e and fam ily above. I c a n o n ly a ssu m e here
th e k ind o f e ffo rt and w isdom th a t is n e ccssa ry to prevent t h e p o in t o f "im p o ss ib ility "
b ein g rcach cd . F o r th is m o re p o sitiv e tre a tm e n t, sec P erson al C o m m itm e n ts , ch ap . 4.
T h e r e a s here, how ever, I acknow led ge t h a t c irc u m s ta n c e s can em erg e — w h eth e r w ith
o r w ith o u t a n y o n e ’s cu lp a b ility — w h en n o n e th e le ss it b e co m es g en u in ely im p o ssib le
to s u s ta in a co m m itm cn t-o b lig a tio n .
underm ined a s to jeopardize them all. If so, the obligation to the

marriage com m itm ent is released.
Third, if an oth er obligation conflicts w ith and tak es priority over
the com m itm ent to marriage, then the marriage bond may be re
leased. Given the seriousness of the com m itm ent to marry, there are
not m any other obligations that can supersede it. It is, after all, made
w ith the kind of unconditionality that is m eant to override other
claim s alm ost w ithout exception. Yet there may be tim es w hen other
fundam ental obligations do take priority — fundam ental obligations
to God, to children, to society, even to one's spouse — when, for
example, com m itm ent to the well-being of the spouse conflicts with
continued com m itm ent to relationship w ithin the fram ew ork of m ar
riage. It is also possible for a fundamental obligation to one's own self
to justify ending a marriage — n ot because love of self takes priority
over love of another, but because n o relationship should be sustained
that entails th e com plete physical or psychological destruction of a
person — including oneself.
W hen under certain conditions a marriage com m itm ent ceases to
bind, are there no obligations, h um an and C hristian, that rem ain
in relation to one's spouse? Clearly there are. Though com m itm ent
to a fram ew ork for loving is n ot com pletely unconditional or abso
lute, there arc unconditional requirem ents w ithin it. For example,
there is never any justification to stop loving som eone altogether —
not a m arriage partner or form er marriage partner, any m ore than a
stranger or even an enemy. W hen it is no longer possible or morally
good to love som eone w ithin the framework of marriage, it is still
possible to love that individual at least w ith the love that is univer
sally due all persons. It may even be that an obligation to a particular
love is required, one that is in s o m e way faithful to the relationship
that once existed. But let m e turn briefly to w hat rem ains for some
the m ost difficult question of all. T h a t is, w hen the com m itm ent
to marriage n o longer binds as such, w hen a true divorce is morally
justified, is it also justifiable to remarry?
R em arriage
D espite the fact that a prohibition against remarriage after a valid
marriage has ended in divorce is alm ost unique to the Roman C atholic
308 TUST LOVE
tradition, there arc m any other C hristians who are at least cautious
about this possibility. H ence, it may be im portant to look to the
arguments th a t have held sway in the C atholic com m unity. T h e tra
ditional Rom an C atholic position has been and is that even if an end
m ust com e to a marriage in the sense of separation from shared "bed
and board," there rem ains nonetheless an obligation n ot to remarry.
T h e reason for this, of course, lies ultim ately in a conviction that
the original marriage in som e sense continues to exist. Against the
position I have ju st outlined wherein the original marriage may no
longer exist, are serious argum ents such as: ( 1 ) C hristian sacram ental
marriage, unlike other com m itm ents, is under the com m and of God
and the interpretation of th at com m and by fesus C hrist. H ence, the
indissolubility of marriage rem ains absolute. (2) T h e "framework"
or institution of marriage is under th e governance of th e church.
T h ere is, therefore, a special stipulation included in the marriage
com m itm ent whereby there will always be a juridical "remainder."
Even if every other aspect of the com m itm ent becom es im possible or
m eaningless o r in conflict with a greater obligation, this m uch of the
marriage com m itm ent still holds. (3) A com m itm ent to marriage,
w ith valid con sen t and sexual consum m ation, changes th e partners
in their very being. N o longer are they bound only legally or morally,
but they arc ontologically bound in an irreversible way.
I have elsewhere addressed these argum ents, and I can here only
sum m arize m y responses to th e m .101 Regarding th e first, biblical
scholars have shown effectively the cxcgctical difficulties of using
New T estam en t texts to settle the question of an absolute require
m ent of indissolubility in marriage. In particular, the divergences
am ong the com m and attributed to Paul in 1 C orinthians 7 :1 0 -1 1 ,
and the various sayings about divorce in M ark 1 0 :1 -1 2 , M atthew
1 9 :1 -1 2 , and Luke 1 6 :1 8 , indicate th at the early church was strug
gling with th is issue. Hence, none of these texts can be used as the
only basis for a C hristian regarding divorce and rem arriage.102 T h is is
why the R om an C atholic tradition has n ot argued that the issue can
1 0 1 . S e e e ssa y s cited in n o te 86.

1 0 2 . Se e, e.g ., M a ry R o se D 'A n g clo , "R em arriag e and t h e D iv o rce Say in gs A ttributed
to Je s u s ," in D iv o rc e a n d R em a rria g e: R elig iou s a n d P sy ch o lo g ical P ersp ectiv es, ed.
W illia m P. R o b e rts (K an sas C ity : Sh eed & Ward, 1 9 9 0 1 , 7 8 - 1 0 6 .
be settled only on biblical grounds. Regarding the second, a purely ec

clesiastical juridical basis has never been given as the incontestable
and absolute ground for the indissolubility of marriage; h um an laws
can be changed, or exceptions can be developed.103 Moreover, were
the church to demand an obligation not to remarry as a stipulation
for marrying, this would make marriages that have ended in divorce
a countersign in the symbol system th at appeals to the relationship
of C hrist to th e church. If the object of such a law were to secure a
form of social stability, or the good of children, it would raise serious
questions regarding the effectiveness of th e law.
T rad itional C atholic reasons for prohibiting remarriage after di
vorce rest prim arily on som e version of the third argum ent.104 But
even this argum ent, regarding the ontological union of spouses, is
difficult to m ain tain with traditional warrants. Despite escalating
language regarding the "tw o in one flesh " image — in term s, as we
have seen, of a n "ultim ate gift" of spouses to one an oth er" or the "nup
tial m eaning" of th e body105 — any concept of fusion between persons
risks ignoring the realities of individual persons, and rests too often on
symbols of purity/defilement (defilement if there is sexual union out
side of the first marriage) that can no longer be sustained. Moreover,
appeals to ontological union fail to acknowledge the lim its of human
freedom (as I have tried to articulate them earlier in this chapter).
T h is said, I am nonetheless inclined to acknowledge that some
kind of bond of being is effected through marriage, and even that it
rem ains in so m e form w hen the marriage com m itm ent has com e to
an end. W h en two persons co m m it them selves to one another in the
profound form of marrying; w hen they share their lives together for
whatever period of tim e; they are som ehow changed, united, in their
beings. T h e re are m any ways in w hich this change continues, no
m atter what. After the marriage has ended, w hat rem ains may even
include a "bodily" bonding — now experienced positively or nega
tively— as a result of the sexual relationship that once was part of
1 0 3 . Se e, for e x a m p le , Jo h n T. N o o n a n , P ow er to D issolv e (C am brid ge, M A : B elk n ap

P ress o f H arvard U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 7 2 ).
1 0 4 . S e e T h e o d o re M ack in , D iv o rce a n d R em a rria g e (N ew York: P au list, 1 9 8 4 ), 5 1 6f.
1 0 5 . Se e, fo r e xa m p le, th e m a n y w ritin g s of lo h n P aul II o n m arriage, in clu d in g Orig
in a l U nity o f M a n a n d W om an : C a te c h e s is o n t h e B (X )k o f G e n e s is (B o sto n : D au g h ters
o f S t. Paul, 19811.
310 TUST LOVE
the marriage. T here m ay also rem ain a spiritual bonding — positively

or negatively experienced — as a result of m onths or years of shared
history. If th e marriage resulted in children, form er spouses w ill be
held together for years, perhaps a lifetim e, in th e ongoing project of
parenting. In any case, the lives of two persons once married to one
another are forever qualified by the experience of that marriage. T h e
depth of w hat rem ains adm its of degrees, but som ething rem ains.
But does w hat rem ains disallow a second marriage? My own view is
that it does not. W hatever ongoing obligation a residual bond entails,
it need not include a prohibition of remarriage — any m ore than the
ongoing u nion between spouses after one of th em has died prohibits
a second marriage on the part of th e one who still lives.106
T h e sexual ethic I have proposed in this book is relevant to ques
tions of divorce and second marriages. Divorce som etim es follows
upon the failure of at least one partner to respect the other as an end;
or it becom es inevitable w hen freedom, equality, and m utuality are
nonexistent o r in such low degree th at the relationship is distorted.
Som etim es it com es because there are failures in com m unal and
societal support, so that the C hristian concern for this dim ension of
marriage is played out in its absence. But as I have suggested, som e
tim es divorcc does n ot follow from culpablc failures on the part of
either or both partners in a marriage. Som etim es it eventuates because
of hum an lim itation in the faces of the challenges of blending lives
together. And w hen the com m itm ent th at establishes a marriage rela
tionship can n o longer hold w ithout self-destm ction or serious harm
to another; o r w hen the very purpose of the marriage in regard to all
106. I a m aw are o f th e resp o n ses g iven to th is reason in g by th o se w h o argue th a t

th e re is a critic a l d ifferen ce betw een m arriag e after th e d eath o f a spouse and m arriag e
a fte r th e " d e a th " o f a p re v io u s m a rria g e . O n e re sp o n se is th a t th e o rig in a l c o m m itm e n t
w as o n ly "u n til d e a th do u s p a rt," so a new m arriag e a fte r th e d eath o f a spouse does
n o t v io la te th is p ro m ise. Y et clearly th e in te n tio n o f th e p ro m ise is im p licitly "forever,"
if th e re is a b e lie f in th e p o ssib ility of u n io n a fte r d eath . A nd in an y c a se , if th o se w h o
die do rem a in aliv e, b u t in a n o th e r w orld, the o n to lo g ica l bond betw een m arriag e p art
n ers re m a in s. A se c o n d resp on se is th a t m arriag e is o n ly intend ed by G o d t o be for this
w orld. H e n ce , t h e orig in al m arriag e is dissolved w h en o n e o f th e sp o u ses is no longer
in th is w orld. T h i s is a d ifficu lt m a tte r to so rt ou t, however, given an y b e lief regarding
life a fte r d e a th a n d th e on going fu lfillm e n t o f relatio n sh ip s begu n o n e a rth . It is u n cer
ta in a s to w h a t t h e d ifferen ces w ill be b etw een " th is w orld" and th e " n e x t." H e n cc, it
se em s u n ju stifia b le t o treat th e p ro h ib itio n a g a in st rem arriag e a fte r divorce a s if it w ere
co m p lete ly d iffe re n t fro m th e allow ance o f rem arriag e a fte r t h e d eath o f o n e 's spouse.
those affcctcd by it is seriously compromised or lost; or w hen another

com m itm ent justifiably supersedes th e marriage com m itm ent; then
the way in w hich a marriage ends should also be m arked by m utual
respect insofar as this is possible — m utual respect and all that this
entails. New m arriages, too, are subject to concerns of justice.
C hristians believe that the grace of God is available in and through
C hristian m arriage. T h e evidence of failed marriages suggests th at
this grace is n o t autom atically effective. O ur questions expand, then,
to an exploration of how grace works in our loves, our incapacities,
our prom ises, our ordinary efforts to live out our lives together, and
even in our failures. I have not here probed the question of the "ways
of fidelity," though this is of the utm ost, indeed primary, im portance. I
have tried only to ask about the faithful ways of ending marriages and
the faithful possibilities of beginning again. Insofar as we gain wisdom
on all of th ese questions we shall find a healing word which may both
strengthen m arriages and, w hen it is necessary, ease the pain of their
ending. G racc, I w ant to argue, can extend in all of these directions.
•
In the end, I have with this book attem pted to contextualize and
illum inate o u r understandings of sexuality and its possibilities for
hum an fulfillm ent. Looking to the past and the present, to cultures
far and near, I have tried to sort out the m ultiple m eanings and goals
of sexuality, sex, gender, and em bodim ent. Above all, I have asked and
tried to respond to th e question of when sexuality and its expressions
are appropriate in hum an relationships. I have proposed a sexual
ethic grounded in and specified by concerns for justice. Justice, I have
tried to show, is n ot a cold notion apart from love; it is w hat guides,
protects, nourishes, and form s love, and what m akes love ju st and
true. It concerns our loves and our actions; it concerns th e sort or
persons we w ant to be. I repeat w hat I have said before: it is not
an easy task to introduce considerations of justice into evciy sexual
relation and th e evaluation of every sexual activity. But if sexuality
is to be creative and n ot destructive, then there is no substitute for
discerning ever m ore carefully whether our expressions of it are just.
INDEX
A c t s o f t h e A p o s tle s , 2 5 6 A u g u stin e , S t ., 4 0 - 4 1 , 1 2 3 n 2 3 , 1 3 9
a d o le s c e n ts o n t h e body, 1 1 2 , 131
s e x u a lity of, 7 2 - 7 3 , 7 5 - 7 7 , 2 3 2 - 3 5 a u to n o m y
s e x u a l e t h i c s for, 2 3 2 - 3 5 an d p erson h o od , 2 1 1 - 1 2 , 2 1 4 - 1 5
a d u ltery , 3 6 , 4 7 , 7 3 a n d s e x u a l e t h ic s , 2 1 8 - 2 0
A fr ic a n c u lt u r e s , 7 7 - 8 9 a n d v ir tu e , 2 4 2 - 4 3
d iv o rce in , 8 2 S e e a l s o freed o m
f e m a le c ir c u m c is io n in , 8 8 - 8 9
f e m in is t v o ic e s in , 8 3 - 8 9 B â , M a r ia m a , 1 0 5
g e n d e r in , 8 0 - 8 2 , 8 4 - 8 9 B a ic r, A n n e t te , 2 2 9
g e n d e r v io le n c e in , 8 7 - 8 8 B ak er, L y n n R udd er, 1 2 7 n 2 8
H IV /A ID S in , 8 4 , 8 7 - 8 8 B arry , K a th le e n , 2 8 5
h o m o s e x u a lit y i n , 8 3 B a rth , K arl, 5 0
la y e rs o f e x p e r ie n c e in , 7 8 - 7 9 o n t h e body, 1 3 1 - 3 2
m a rria g e in , 7 9 - 8 3 , 8 5 - 8 7 o n g end er, 1 3 3 , 1 4 0 - 4 1
p o ly g y n y in , 8 1 - 8 3 , 8 5 - 8 7 berd ach es, 1 5 2 -5 3
s e x u a lity in , 7 9 - 8 9 B ia lc , D a v id , 1 8 3
w o m e n in , 7 9 - 8 2 , 8 3 - 8 9 B ib le
aging o n h o m o s e x u a lity , 2 7 3 - 7 7
e m b o d im e n t a n d , 1 2 3 - 2 5 a n d ju s tic e , 1 8 5 - 8 6 , 1 9 4 - 9 6
s o c ia l c o n s t r u c t io n of, 1 2 4 - 2 5 o n re m a rr ia g e , 3 0 8 - 9
A I D S . S e e H I V /A ID S a n d s e x u a l e t h ic s , 1 8 3 - 8 6 , 1 9 4 - 9 6
a l-G h a z a li, A b u H a m id , 9 9 o n se x u a lity , 3 4 - 3 8
A n d o ls c n , B a r b a r a , 1 7 9 S e e a l s o in d iv id u a l b o o k n a m e s
a n th ro p o lo g y , o n se x u a lity , 5 9 - 6 0 , biology, g e n d e r a n d , 1 4 4 - 5 1 , 1 5 3 - 5 6
7 0 -7 7 B lo d g e tt, B a rb a ra , 1 7 9
A q u in a s , S t . T h o m a s bod y
o n t h e body, 1 1 2 - 1 3 , 1 3 1 - 3 2 A q u in a s o n , 1 1 2 - 1 3 , 1 3 1 - 3 2
o n g end er, 1 3 9 B a r th o n , 1 3 1 - 3 2
o n lo v e, 2 0 3 f e m in is ts o n , 1 1 4 - 1 5
o n m a rria g e , 4 4 a s g en d ered , 1 1 4 - 1 6 , 1 3 3 - 3 4 ,
o n sexu al c th ic s , 4 3 - 4 5 1 4 4 -5 1
o n s e x u a l p le a s u re , 4 4 G od and, 1 3 1 -3 2
A r b u th n o t, F o r s te r F itz g e ra ld , 9 0 , m e a n in g o f, 1 1 0 - 3 2
9 1 -9 2 s o c ia l c o n s t r u c t io n o f, 1 1 1 , 1 1 4 - 1 5 ,
A ris to tle , 3 2 , 1 1 2 13 0 n 3 2
A rm s tro n g , K a r e n , 101 t h e o r ie s o f, 1 1 1 - 1 6
A u d en , W . H .r 2 0 8 S e e a l s o e m b o d im e n t
313
314 TUST LOVE
B o ro w itz , E u g e n e , 1 8 0 C h r is tia n ity , R e fo r m a tio n , 4 5 - 4 7

B o sw e ll, J o h n , 2 7 4 - 7 5 o n ce lib a c y , 4 5
B o y la n , J e n n ife r F in n e y , 1 5 5 n 9 0 d o c trin e o f m o r a l fa ll in , 2 5 8
B ro w n , L yn M ik e l, 1 4 8 o n m a rria g e , 4 5 - 4 7 , 2 5 8 - 5 9
B ro w n , P eter, 4 3 , 2 5 4 - 5 5 s e x u a l e t h ic s o f, 4 5 - 4 7
B u jo , B é n é z e t, 8 2 - 8 3 , 8 6 C o a k le y , S a r a h , 1 1 3 n 6 , 1 3 0 n 3 2
B u r to n , R ic h a r d F r a n c is , 9 0 , 9 1 - 9 2 C o la p in to , Jo h n , 1 5 1 n 7 6
B u tle r, Ju d ith , 1 2 9 n 3 0 , 1 3 0 n 3 2 f c o lo n ia lis m
136n45 a n d K a m a s u tr a , 9 1 - 9 2
B y n u m , C a r o lin e W alker, 1 1 4 n 7 , a n d se x u a lity , 6 0 , 6 3 - 6 9
1 1 5 n l2 , 1 1 6 n l3 , 1 5 5n 90 C o lo s s ia n s , 2 5 6
c o m m it m e n t
C a h ill, L is a S o w ie , 1 6 3 , 1 7 9 , 2 6 1 d iv o rce a n d , 3 0 1 - 7
C a lv in , J o h n , 4 5 , 4 6 - 4 7 , 2 5 8 m a rria g e a n d , 2 6 0 , 2 6 3 - 6 6 , 3 0 1 - 7
c e lib a c y s a m e - s e x r e la tio n s h ip s a n d , 2 8 9 - 9 0
in e a r ly C h r is tia n ity , 3 8 , 4 3 , 2 5 4 - 5 5 a s s e x u a l e t h ic a l n o r m , 2 2 3 - 2 6
in Is la m , 9 8 c o n s e n t , a s s e x u a l e t h ic a l n o rm ,
in R e fo r m a tio n C h r is tia n ity , 4 5 2 1 8 -2 0
C h e n , S o p h ia , 6 7 - 6 8 c o n tr a c e p tio n
C h r is tia n ity , e a rly , 3 7 - 4 3 , 2 5 2 - 5 8 m é d ic a l p e r sp e c tiv e s o n , 5 4
c e lib a c y in , 3 8 , 4 3 , 2 5 4 - 5 5 m o d e r n P r o t e s t a n t is m o n , 5 0
d o c tr in e o f m o r a l fa ll in , 3 9 , 4 1 - 4 2 , m o d e r n R o m a n C a t h o lic is m o n ,
254 4 7 -4 9
fa m ily in , 2 5 5 - 5 8 s e x u a l e t h ic s a n d , 2 3 0
a n d G n o s t ic is m , 3 8 , 3 9 C o o n tz , S te p h a n ie , 2 4 8 , 2 4 9
a n d h o m o s e x u a lity , 4 3 C o u , N a n cy , 2 4 7 , 2 5 0 - 5 1
h o u s e h o ld c o d e s in , 2 5 6 - 5 8 c r o s s -c u ltu r a l p e rsp e c tiv e s, c o n t r ib u
a n d Ju d a is m , 3 8 - 3 9 , 2 5 2 t io n s to s e x u a l e t h ic s o f, 5 , 5 8 - 7 0 ,
m a rria g e in , 3 8 , 4 0 - 4 1 , 2 5 2 - 5 8 1 0 3 -8
sex u al e th ic s o f, 3 7 - 4 3 C u r r a n , C h a r le s , 1 8 1
s e x u a lity a s s y m b o lic in , 3 8
a n d S to ic is m , 3 8 , 3 9 D a n g a rc m b g a , T s i t s i , 1 0 5
w o m e n in , 3 H - 3 9 , 4 2 , 4 3 D 'A n g e lo , M a r y R o s e , 1 4 2 - 4 4 , 2 7 6 ,
C h r is tia n ity , m o d e m P ro te s ta n t, 4 9 - 5 0 288n80
o n c o n tr a c e p tio n , 5 0 D a n ie l, B o o k o f, 1 8 5
o n g end er, 5 0 d e a th
o n h o m o s e x u a lity , 5 0 , 2 7 9 a n d e m b o d im e n t, 1 2 3 , 1 2 5 - 2 6
o n m a rria g e , 4 9 - 5 0 o f J e s u s C h r is t , 1 2 6
sex u al e th ic s o f, 1 8 0 - 8 1 D 'E m ilio , J o h n , 2 4 , 2 5
C h r is tia n ity , m o d e r n R o m a n C a t h o lic , D e m o s th e n e s , 31
4 7 -4 9 D e s ca rte s, R en é, 1 1 2
o n c o n tr a c e p tio n , 4 7 - 4 9 d e sire , se x u a l
o n h o m o s e x u a lity , 2 7 9 d is tr u s t o f, 3 1 - 3 3 , 3 7 - 4 1 , 1 0 3 - 4
o n m a rria g e , 4 7 - 4 9 F o u c a u lt o n , 1 8 - 2 2 , 31
s e x u a l e t h ic s o f , 181 F reu d o n , 5 4 - 5 5
Index 315
d e sire , s e x u a l [c o n tin u e d ] e q u a lity

a s good, 3 4 - 3 5 , 3 7 , 3 9 s a m e - s e x r e la tio n s h ip s a n d , 2 8 9
a n d lo v e, 1 7 1 - 7 2 , 2 0 5 - 6 a s s e x u a l e t h ic a l n o rm , 2 2 3
p ro c re a tio n a n d , 3 3 , 3 9 , 4 1 , 4 4 , E s te s s , S y b il P., 1 6 6 - 6 7
4 7 -4 8 e t h ic s , s e x u a l. S e e s e x u a l e t h ic s
p s y c h o a n a ly tic th e o r y o n , 5 4 - 5 5 e x p e rie n c e
D e u te ro n o m y , 3 4 a n d s e x u a l e t h ic s , 1 9 0 - 9 6
d iv o rce a n d h o m o s e x u a lity , 2 8 6 - 8 8
i n A fr ic a n c u lt u r e s , 8 2 E z e k ie l, 2 7 4
i n G r e c o - R o m a n so ciety , 3 0
in Is la m , 1 0 0 fa ith fu ln e s s . S e e c o m m it m e n t
in Ju d a is m , 3 5 , 3 6 fa ll, d o c tr in e o f
s e x u a l e t h ic s a n d , 2 9 6 - 3 0 7 i n e a rly C h r is tia n ity , 3 9 , 4 1 - 4 2 , 2 5 4
in S o u t h S e a Is la n d s , 7 3 in R e fo r m a tio n C h r is tia n ity , 2 5 8
D ix o n , S u z a n n e , 2 4 9 n l 3 a n d se x u a lity , 3 9 , 4 1 - 4 5 , 9 8 , 1 2 6 ,
D o n ig e r, W e n d y , 9 1 - 9 3 237
d u a lis m . S e e u n d e r e m b o d im e n t fa m ily
D u be, M u sa, 6 8 - 6 9 d iv e r sity of, 2 6 1 - 6 3
i n e a rly C h r is tia n ity , 2 5 5 - 5 8
E llis o n , M a r v in , 1 7 8 h is to r y of, 2 4 , 2 4 7 - 5 2 , 2 5 5 - 5 9
e m b o d im e n t, 1 1 1 , 1 1 2 - 1 4 , 1 1 6 - 2 7 ju s tic e a n d , 2 6 5 - 6 8
a g in g a n d , 1 2 3 - 2 5 R e fo r m a tio n C h r is t ia n ity o n , 2 5 8 -
A q u in a s o n , 1 1 2 - 1 3 59
A u g u s tin e o n , 1 1 2 s e x u a l e t h ic s a n d , 2 6 3 - 6 9
d e a th a n d , 1 2 3 , 1 2 5 - 2 6 v io le n c e i n , 2 6 7
D e s c a r te s o n , 1 1 2 F a u s to -S te r lin g , A n n e , 1 4 9 n 7 3 ,
d is u n ity a n d , 1 1 8 - 2 7 150n74
d u a lis m in , 1 1 2 - 1 4 , 1 1 8 - 1 9 f e m a le c ir c u m c is io n , 5 9 , 8 8 - 8 9 , 1 0 2
e x p e rie n c e d a s d ivid ed , 1 2 6 - 2 7 f e m in is ts
fre e d o m a n d , 1 2 8 - 2 9 i n A fric a n c u ltu r e s , 8 3 - 8 9
gend er and, 1 1 4 - 1 6 , 1 3 3 - 3 4 , 1 4 4 - o n t h e body, 1 1 4 - 1 5
51 d e fin itio n of, 1 3 4 n 4 2
G o d a n d , 1 3 1 —3 2 o n g end er, 1 3 4 - 3 6
o b je c t i f i c a t i o n a n d , 1 2 1 - 2 3 o n h o m o s e x u a lity , 2 8 4 - 8 5
r e la tio n s h ip a n d , 1 2 9 - 3 0 o n p o rn o g rap h y , 2 3 9
s e x u a lity a n d , 1 6 1 o n s e x u a l e t h ic s , 1 7 8 - 7 9
s u ffe rin g a n d , 1 2 0 - 2 1 S e e a ls o w om en
to rtu r e a n d , 1 2 3 F e m in is t T h e o r y a n d C h ristia n
tra n sc e n d e n c c and , 1 1 7 - 1 8 , 1 2 8 - 3 2 T h e o lo g y (Tones), 1 4 0
S e e a ls o bod y F ic h te , J o h a n n G o t t lie b , 5 1 , 5 2
e m o tio n s F in n is , J o h n , 2 9 2 n 8 3
s e x u a lity a n d , 1 6 1 1 C o r in t h ia n s , 4 1 , 1 4 1 , 3 0 8
a n d s e x u a l lo v e , 1 6 8 - 6 9 1 P eter, 2 5 7
E n g e ls, F rie d r ic h , 5 1 , 5 2 1 T im o th y , 2 5 6 - 5 7
E p h e s ia n s , 2 5 7 F o r tu n e , M a r ie M a r s h a ll, 2 2 9 n 2 9
316 TUST LOVE
F o u c a u lt, M ic h e l g en d e r (c o n t i n u e d )
o n d e sire , 1 8 - 2 2 , 3 1 J o h n P au l II o n , 1 3 3 - 3 4 , 1 4 0 ,
o n pow er, 1 9 - 2 0 , 2 2 , 6 4 , 1 6 4 1 4 1 -4 2 , 3 0 9 n 105
o n se x u a lity , 1 8 - 2 2 , 3 1 , 3 3 , 1 5 9 , K a m a s u tr a o n , 9 2
164 a n d m a rria g e , 2 4 9 - 5 2 , 2 6 5 - 6 7
F re e d m a n , E s t e lle , 2 4 , 2 5 m e d ic a l p e r sp e c tiv e s o n , 5 4 , 5 5
fre e d o m m o d e rn P r o te s ta n tis m o n , 5 0
a n d e m b o d im e n t , 1 2 8 - 2 9 M u h a m m e d o n , 101
a n d lo v e, 2 0 4 - 5 p o w er a n d , 2 2 - 2 3 , 31
a n d p e r s o n h o o d , 2 1 1 - 12 , 2 1 4 - 1 5 p sy ch o lo g y a n d , 1 4 8
and sex u al e th ic s , 2 1 8 - 2 0 s e x u a l e t h ic s a n d , 1 5 6 - 5 8
a n d v ir tu e , 2 4 2 - 4 3 s e x u a lity a n d , 2 2 - 2 3
F re e m a n , D c r c k , 7 6 - 7 7 s o c ia l c o n s t r u c t io n o f, 1 3 4 , 1 3 7 - 3 8
F reu d , S ig m u n d , 6 , 5 4 - 5 5 , 1 4 5 , 1 7 2 a n d s o c ia l ju s tic e , 2 2 9 - 3 0
F r ie n d s o f G o d a n d P r o p h e ts (Jo h n so n ), i n vSouth S e a Is la n d s , 7 1 - 7 2 , 7 5
1 3 9 -4 0 tra n s g e n d e re d p e r s o n s a n d , 1 5 3 - 5 6
fr u itfu ln e s s W o lls to n e c r a ft o n , 5 2
s a m e - s e x r e la t io n s h ip s a n d , 2 8 9 , G e n e s is , 1 4 1 - 4 3 , 2 7 4
290 A d a m /E v e s t o r y in , 4 1 - 4 2 , 1 4 3 , 2 7 5
a s s e x u a l e t h ic a l n o r m , 2 2 6 - 2 8 G e r m o n , Jc n z , 1 5 0 n 7 4
S e e a ls o p ro c re a tio n G illig a n , C a r o l, 1 4 8
G n o s t ic is m , e a r ly C h r is t ia n ity a n d , 3 8 ,
G a la tia n s , 4 3 , 1 4 0 , 1 4 2 - 4 4 39
G a le n , 5 3 - 5 4 G od
gend er e m b o d im e n t an d , 1 3 1 - 3 2
i n A fr ic a n c u lt u r e s , 8 0 - 8 2 , 8 4 - 8 9 r e la tio n s h ip to , 2 1 3 , 2 4 1 - 4 4
B a r th o n , 1 3 3 , 1 4 0 - 4 1 se x u a l c th ic s and , 2 4 1 - 4 4 , 2 6 8 - 6 9
b erd ach es and, 1 5 2 -5 3 G o n z a le z , M a r if ć R a m o s , 2 6 2
a n d t h e B ib le , 1 4 0 - 4 4 G r a t ia n , 41
b io lo g y a n d , 1 4 4 - 5 1 , 1 5 3 - 5 6 G r e c o -R o m a n so c ie ty , 2 7 - 3 4 , 2 7 5 - 7 6
a n d b o d ie s , 1 1 4 - 1 6 , 1 3 3 - 3 4 , 1 4 4 - g en d e r in , 2 8 - 2 9
51 h o m o s e x u a lity in , 2 9 - 3 0 , 2 7 5 - 7 6
C h r i s t i a n t h e o r ie s o f, 1 3 8 - 4 4 m a rr ia g e in , 2 8 - 2 9 , 2 5 2 - 5 3
c o m p le m e n ta r ity , 1 3 3 - 3 4 , 1 4 0 - 4 2 , m o n o g a m y in , 2 8
2 7 8 -7 9 p h ilo s o p h y o f, 3 1 - 3 3
D 'A n g e lo o n , 1 4 2 - 4 4 s e x u a l e t h ic s o f, 2 1 , 2 7 - 3 4
f e m in is ts o n , 1 3 4 - 3 6 w o m e n in , 2 8 - 2 9
in G r e c o -R o m a n so ciety , 2 8 - 2 9 G re e n b e r g , D a v id , 2 8 3 - 8 4 , 2 9 2 n 8 5
F ic h t e o n , 5 2 G reer, Rowra n , 2 5 5 - 5 6
g u ev ed o ce and, 152, 53 G r is e z , G e r m a in , 2 3 6 n 4 1
h ijr a s a n d , 1 5 2 G u d o rf, C h r is t in e , 1 0 4 , 1 7 9
a n d h o m o s e x u a lity , 3 1 , 2 7 5 - 7 6 , gu ev ed oce, 152, 153
2 7 8 -7 9 , 2 8 4 -8 5 G u in d o n , A n d re , 181
in t c r s c x u a lit y a n d , 1 4 9 - 5 3 G u p ta , L in a , 1 0 4
in Is la m , 9 8 - 9 9 , 1 0 0 - 1 0 3 G u s ta f s o n , Ja m e s , 1 8 0 , 2 4 2 n 4 7
Index 317
H a lle t t, Ju d ith P., 2 8 n 2 4 , 2 9 n 2 7 h o u s e h o ld co d e s , in e a r ly C h r is tia n ity ,

h a r a s s m e n t, s e x u a l, 2 1 8 , 2 1 9 , 2 2 3 2 5 6 -5 8
H a r r is o n , B e v e rly W ild u n g , 1 7 9 , H u m a n S e x u a lity : N e w D ir e c tio n s in
211 n 4, 2 1 9 n l9 A m e r ic a n C a t h o lic T h o u g h t, 181
H a s tin g s , A d r ia n , 8 6 n 8 2 H u m e , D a v id , 5 1 , 5 2
H a u c rw a s , S ta n le y , 1 8 0
H a y s , R ic h a rd , 2 7 5 im a g e o f G o d , w o m e n a s, 4 2 , 1 3 9 - 4 0 ,
H e rd t, G ilb e r t, 7 4 , 1 5 3 141
H ey w ard , C a r te r , 1 7 8 I m a m , A y c sh a , 9 8 - 9 9
h ijr a s , 1 5 2 in tc r s e x u a lity , 1 4 9 - 5 3
H illm a n , E u g e n e , 8 6 I n t im a t e M a tter s ( D 'E m ilio and
H in d u is m , s e x u a lity in , 9 0 , 9 3 - 9 4 , F re e d m a n ), 2 5
103, 104 Is la m , 9 5 - 1 0 3
H ird , M y r a J., 1 5 0 n 7 4 c e lib a c y in , 9 8
H is to r y o f S e x u a lity (F o u c a u lt), 21 d iv o rce in , 1 0 0
H IV /A ID S g en d e r in , 9 8 - 9 9 , 1 0 0 - 1 0 3
in A frica , 8 4 , 8 7 - 8 8 h o m o s e x u a lity in , 9 8
w om en and, 2 3 0 , 2 3 8 m a rria g e in , 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 1 0 2
H o a g la n d , S a r a h , 1 7 9 n l 4 m a s tu r b a tio n in , 9 8
h o m o s e x u a lity p o ly g y n y in , 1 0 0
in A fr ic a n c u lt u r e s , 8 3 s e x u a lity in , 9 7 - 1 0 3
B ib le o n , 2 7 3 - 7 7 w o m e n in , 9 8 - 9 9 , 1 0 0 - 1 0 3
in e a r ly C h r is t ia n ity , 4 3
a n d e x p e r ie n c e , 2 8 6 - 8 8 J a n s e n is m , 4 7
f e m in is ts o n , 2 8 4 - 8 5 Je r e m ia h , 1 2 0
a n d g end er, 3 1 , 2 7 5 - 7 6 , 2 7 8 - 7 9 , J e s u s C h r is t
2 8 4 -8 5 d e a th o f, 1 2 6
a s g iv en , 2 9 4 - 9 6 e m b o d im e n t an d , 1 2 6 , 1 3 1 - 3 2
in G r e c o -R o m a n so ciety , 2 9 - 3 0 , a n d ju s tic e , 1 8 5 - 8 6
2 7 5 -7 6 lo v e o f G o d in , 2 4 1
i n I s la m , 9 8 J o h n , G o s p e l o f, 1 8 6
in Ju d a is m , 3 6 - 3 7 J o h n C h r y s o s to m , 41
a n d ju s tic e , 2 8 8 - 9 4 J o h n P au l II, P o p e, o n g end er, 1 3 3 - 3 4 ,
m e d ic a l p e r s p e c tiv e s o n , 5 4 , 5 5 - 5 6 , 140, 1 4 1 -4 2 , 3 0 9 n l0 5
2 8 0 -8 2 J o h n s o n , E liz a b e th , 1 3 9 - 4 0
m o d e rn C a t h o lic is m o n , 2 7 9 J o h n s o n , V irg in ia , 5 , 1 6 2
m o d e rn P r o t e s t a n t is m o n , 5 0 , 2 7 9 Jolly, M a r g a re t, 6 8
a s n a tu r a l, 2 8 2 - 8 3 , 2 8 5 - 8 6 Jo n e s , S e r e n e , 1 4 0
p sy ch o lo g y a n d , 2 8 0 - 8 2 Jo rg e n s e n , C h r is t in e , 1 5 5 n 9 0
R om ans on, 2 7 4 -7 7 Ju d a is m , 3 4 - 3 7 , 2 5 2 , 2 5 4
s e c u la r d is c ip lin e s o n , 2 8 0 - 8 6 d iv o rc e in , 3 5 , 3 6
in S o u t h S e a Is la n d s , 7 3 , 7 4 a n d e a rly C h r is tia n ity , 3 8 - 3 9 , 2 5 2
tr a d itio n o n , 2 7 7 - 8 0 m a rr ia g e in , 3 5 - 3 6 , 2 5 2 , 2 5 4
S e e a ls o s a m e - s e x r e la tio n s h ip s and m onogam y, 3 5
h o o k s , b e ll, 1 7 9 n l 4 a n d polygyny, 3 5
318 TUST LOVE
Ju d a is m [c o n tin u e d ) lo v e (c o n t i n u e d I
s e x u a l e t h ic s o f , 3 4 - 3 7 , 1 8 0 o f n e ig h b o r, 1 8 4 , 2 4 1 - 4 3 , 2 5 3 ,
a n d S t o ic is m , 3 7 , 3 8 2 5 8 -5 9 , 2 6 8 -6 9
w o m en in , 3 5 - 3 6 n o r m s for, 2 0 0 - 2 0 4
Ju d g es, 1 8 5 r o m a n tic , 1 6 8 - 7 0 , 1 7 2 - 7 3
Ju n g , K arl, 6 6 s e x u a l, 1 6 8 - 7 3
ju s tic e a n d s e x u a l d e sire , 1 7 1 - 7 2 , 2 0 5 - 6
a n d t h e B ib le , 1 8 5 - 8 6 , 1 9 4 - 9 6 s e x u a lity a n d , 1 6 4 - 7 3
d e fin it io n s of, 2 0 8 - 9 L uke, G o s p e l o f, 2 5 5 , 2 7 4 , 3 0 8
h o m o s e x u a lit y a n d , 2 8 8 - 9 4 L u th er, M a r tin , 4 5 - 4 7 , 2 5 8
a n d lo v e, 1 9 6 - 2 0 4 , 2 0 7 - 8
a n d m a rria g e , 2 6 5 - 6 8 M a c c o b y , E le a n o r E ., 1 4 8 n 7 1
and p erso n h o o d , 2 0 9 - 1 5 M a c k in , T h e o d o r e , 2 5 2 , 2 5 3
p ro c re a tio n a n d , 2 6 9 - 7 1 M a c K in n o n , C a t h e r in e , 2 2 - 2 3 , 5 6 ,
re p ro d u ctiv e te c h n o lo g ie s a n d , 2 7 0 192, 285
s a m e - s e x r e la tio n s h ip s a n d , 2 8 8 - 9 4 M a k in g o f t h e M o d e rn F a m ily , T h e
and sex u al e th ic s , 2 1 5 - 3 2 (S h o rte r), 2 4
s o c ia l, 2 2 8 - 3 0 M a lin o w s k i, B ro n is la w , 7 0 - 7 6
M an d crso n , L cn o rc, 68
M a n ic h a e a n is m , 3 9 - 4 0
K akar, S u d h ir, 9 1 - 9 3
M a r c e l, G a b r ie l, 1 1 6 n l 4
K a li, 1 0 3 , 1 0 4
M a r k , G o s p e l o f, 3 0 8
K a m a s u tr a (V a ts y a y a n a ), 9 0 - 9 5
m a rria g e
c o lo n ia lis m a n d , 9 1 - 9 2
i n A f r ic a n c u ltu r e s , 7 9 - 8 3 , 8 5 - 8 7
o n g end er, 9 2
A q u in a s o n , 4 4
o n s e x u a l p le a s u re , 9 0 - 9 5
a rra n g e d , 7 9 - 8 0 , 8 5 , 1 0 0
K a n t, I m m a n u e l, 5 1 , 5 2 , 2 3 5
A u g u s tin e o n , 4 0 - 4 1
K a n y o ro , M u s im b i, 1 3 7
c o m m it m e n t a n d , 2 6 0 , 2 6 3 - 6 6 ,
K e e n a n , Ja m e s , 1 8 1
3 0 1 -7
K elsey , D a v id , 1 3 1 - 3 2 , 1 8 7 n 3 0
in e a r ly C h r is tia n ity , 3 8 , 4 0 - 4 1 ,
K ilroy 's C a r n iv a l (S ch w a rtz ), 1 6 5
2 5 2 -5 8
K in sey , A lfred , 4 , 236, 295
a n d g end er, 2 4 9 - 5 2 , 2 6 5 - 6 7
K n a u ft, B r u c e , 7 4
G r e c o -R o m a n , 2 8 - 2 9 , 2 5 2 - 5 3
K ra e m cr, R o s s , 3 5 , 2 5 2 n 2 4
h is to r y of, 2 5 , 2 4 7 - 5 9
H um e on, 52
L a q u eu r, T h o m a s , 1 4 4 - 4 6 i n Is la m , 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 1 0 2
L eb a cq z , K a re n , 1 7 9 , 2 1 7 i n Ju d a is m , 3 5 - 3 6 , 2 5 2 , 2 5 4
L e v itic u s , 2 7 3 ju s tic e an d , 2 6 5 - 6 8
L ig u o ri, A lp h o n s u s , 4 7 K ant on, 5 2
L o rd c, A u d rc, 1 7 8 a n d lo v e, 2 5 1 - 5 2 , 2 7 8 - 7 9
love M a r x a n d E n g e ls o n , 5 2
a n d fre e d o m , 2 0 4 - 5 i n m o d e r n P r o t e s t a n t is m , 4 9 - 5 0
o f G od, 1 8 4 , 2 4 1 , 2 4 3 , 2 6 8 - 6 9 i n m o d e rn R o m a n C a t h o lic is m ,
a n d ju s tic e , 1 9 6 - 2 0 4 , 2 0 7 - 8 4 7 -4 9
a n d m a r r ia g e , 2 5 1 - 5 2 , 2 7 8 - 7 9 m onogam y and, 2 8 , 3 5 , 2 4 8 , 2 6 3 - 6 4
Index 319
m a rria g e [c o n tin u e d ) M u h a m m e d ib n A b d a lla h , 9 5 - 9 7

M uham m ed o n , 9 8 o n g end er, 101
p ro c re a tio n a n d , 3 3 , 3 5 , 3 9 , 4 1 , o n m a rria g e , 9 8
4 7 -4 8 , 2 7 7 -7 9 M u rp h y , T im o th y , 2 8 1 , 2 8 2
R e fo r m a tio n C h r i s t i a n i t y o n , 4 5 - 4 7 , m u tu a lity
2 5 8 -5 9 s a m c - s c x r e la tio n s h ip s a n d , 2 8 9
a s re m e d y fo r lu s t, 4 1 , 4 5 - 4 6 , 4 7 , a s s e x u a l e t h ic a l n o r m , 2 2 0 - 2 2
99
R ou sseau o n , 5 2 N ag , M o n i, 9 0 n 9 2
a n d s a m e - s e x r e la tio n s h ip s , 2 9 3 - 9 4 N ie tz s c h e , F rie d r ic h , 5 1 , 5 3
Schopenhauer on , 5 2 -5 3 N o o n a n , J o h n T ., Jr., 6 n 5 , 3 3 n 3 7
and sex u al e th ic s , 3 3 , 2 2 4 , 2 6 3 - 6 9 , N u s s b a u m , M a r th a , 6 2 n l 4 , 1 3 5 n 4 3 ,
2 9 6 -3 0 6 2 0 2 -3 , 2 1 ln 4
s e x u a l e x c lu s iv ity in , 2 6 4 - 6 5
in S o u t h S e a Is la n d s , 7 2 - 7 3 , 7 6 - 7 7 o b je c tif ic a tio n , a n d e m b o d im e n t,
v io le n c e in , 2 6 7 1 2 1 -2 3
S e e a ls o m o n o g a m y ; p o ly g y n y O k in , S u s a n M o lle r, 1 3 4 n 4 2 , 2 6 7 - 6 8
M a r tin , D a le , 2 7 5 - 7 6
O r ie n ta lis m (S aid ), 6 4 - 6 5
o r ie n ta tio n , s e x u a l. S e e h o m o s e x u a lity ;
M a r x , K a rl, 5 1 , 5 2
s a m c - s c x r e la tio n s h ip s
M a s te r s , W illia m , 5 , 1 6 2
o rig in a l s in . S e e fa ll, d o c tr in e o f
m a s tu r b a tio n
in Is la m , 9 8
P a rso n s, S u s a n , 1 3 6
m e d ic a l p e r s p e c tiv e s o n , 5 4 , 2 3 6
P a u l, S t ., 1 3 2 , 1 4 0 - 4 4 , 2 7 4 - 7 7
s e x u a l e t h ic s a n d , 2 3 5 - 3 6
P au l V I , P o p e, 4 8 - 4 9
w om en and, 2 3 6
p e d o p h ilia , 2 1 8
M a tth e w , G o s p e l o f, 2 5 5 , 2 5 6 , 2 7 4 ,
p e rso n h o o d
308
a u to n o m y a n d , 2 1 1 - 1 2 , 2 1 4 - 1 5 ,
M c C o r m ic k , R ic h a rd , 181
2 1 8 -2 0
M e a d , M a r g a re t, 7 6 - 7 7
c o n c r c te re a lity of, 2 0 9 - 1 1
m e d ic in e , 5 3 - 5 6 , 1 8 9 , 2 8 0 - 8 2
a n d ju s tic e , 2 0 9 - 1 5
o n c o n tr a c e p tio n , 5 4
r e la tio n a lity a n d , 2 1 2 - 1 5 , 2 1 8
o n g end er, 5 4 , 5 5
P e te rso n -Iy e r, K a re n , 2 4 0
o n h o m o s e x u a lity , 5 4 , 5 5 - 5 6 ,
p h ilo so p h y
2 8 0 -8 2
G r e c o -R o m a n , 3 1 - 3 3
o n m a s t u r b a tio n , 5 4 , 2 3 6
o n s e x u a l e t h ic s , 5 1 - 5 3
M e r le a u -P o n ty , M a u r ic e , I 1 6 n l 4 P h ir i, Is a b e l A p aw o , 81
M ill, J o h n S t u a r t , 5 1 , 5 2 P iu s X I , P o p e, 4 7 - 4 8
M ir -H o s s e in i, Z ib a , 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 , 1 0 4 P iu s X I I , P op e, 4 8
M oney, Jo h n , 1 5 1 n 7 7 , 1 5 4 n 8 9 P lask o w , Ju d ith , 1 0 4 , 1 7 9 n l 4 , 2 7 6 ,
m onogam y 294
G r e c o -R o m a n , 2 8 P la to , 3 1 , 3 2 , 1 7 2 - 7 3
a n d Ju d a is m , 3 5 p le a su re , s e x u a l
a n d m a rria g e 2 8 , 3 5 , 2 4 8 , 2 6 3 - 6 4 A r is to tle o n , 3 2
M o rg a n , R o b in , 2 2 6 K a m a s u tr a o n , 9 1 - 9 5
320 TUST LOVE
p le a s u re , s e x u a l (c o n t i n u e d ) re la tio n a lity
L u th e r o n , 4 6 a n d e m b o d im e n t, 1 2 9 - 3 0
P la to o n , 3 2 an d p erson h o od , 2 1 2 - 1 5
P lu ta r c h , 3 3 a n d s e x u a l e t h ic s , 2 2 0 - 2 8
p o lygyny re m a rria g e
in A fric a n c u lt u r e s , 8 1 - 8 3 , 8 5 - 8 7 B ib le o n , 3 0 8 - 9
G r e c o -R o m a n , 2 8 s e x u a l e t h ic s a n d , 3 0 7 - 1 1
H u m e on, 5 2 tr a d itio n o n , 3 0 8 - 9
in Is la m , 1 0 0 rep ro d u ctiv e te c h n o lo g ie s , 7 , 1 0 0 , 2 3 0 ,
a n d Ju d a is m , 3 5 2 7 0 -7 1
a n d R e fo r m a tio n C h r is tia n ity , 4 7 R ic h , A d r ie n n e , 2 8 4 - 8 5 , 2 9 5
Schopenhauer on , 5 2 -5 3 R ic h a rd s , R e n e e , 1 5 5 n 9 0
sex u al e th ic s a n d , 2 4 8 , 2 6 3 - 6 4 R ic o e u r, P a u l, 1 2 9 n 3 0 , 1 7 5 - 7 8 , 1 9 5
p o rn o g ra p h y , 2 1 8 , 2 3 9 - 4 0 R ilk e , R a in e r M a r ia , 1 5 7
P o sn er, R ic h a rd , 2 4 , 2 5 - 2 6 R o m a n C a t h o lic is m . S e e C h r is tia n ity ,
p o s tc o lo n ia lis t th e o ry , 6 4 , 6 8 - 6 9 m o d e rn R o m a n C a t h o lic
pow er R om an s, 1 3 2 , 2 7 4 - 7 7
F o u c a u lt o n , 1 9 - 2 0 , 2 2 , 6 4 , 1 6 4 R o u s s e a u , Jc a n -Ja c q u c s , 5 1 , 5 2
a n d se x u a lity , 1 9 - 2 0 , 2 2 - 2 3 , 3 1 , R u e th e r, R o s e m a ry R ad fo rd , 2 4 7 , 2 5 4 ,
1 6 3 -6 4 2 6 1 -6 2
p re fe re n c e , s e x u a l. S e e h o m o s e x u a lity ;
s a m e - s e x r e la tio n s h ip s S a id , E dw ard , 6 4 - 6 5
p ro c re a tio n s a m e - s e x r e la tio n s h ip s , 2 7 1 - 9 6
ju s tic e a n d , 2 6 9 - 7 1 a n d c o m m it m e n t , 2 8 9 - 9 0
a n d m a rria g e , 3 3 , 3 5 , 3 9 , 4 1 , 4 7 - 4 8 , a n d e q u a lity , 2 8 9
2 7 7 -7 9 a n d fr u itfu ln e s s , 2 8 9 , 2 9 0
and sex u al e th ic s , 2 2 6 - 2 8 a n d ju s tic e , 2 8 8 - 9 4
a n d s e x u a lity , 3 3 , 3 9 , 4 1 , 4 4 , 4 7 - 4 8 , a n d m a rria g e , 2 9 3 - 9 4
163 a n d m u tu a lity , 2 8 9
S e e a ls o fr u itfu ln e s s a n d s o c ia l ju s tic e , 2 9 1 - 9 4
p r o s titu tio n , 5 9 n 3 , 2 1 8 , 2 2 3 , 2 3 8 , 2 3 9 , S e e a l s o h o m o s e x u a lity
240 S a m o a , 7 6 - 7 7 . S e e a l s o S o u t h Sea
P r o t e s t a n t is m . S e e C h r is tia n ity , m o d Is la n d s
e r n P r o t e s t a n t ; C h ris tia n ity , S a r tr e , Je a n -P a u l, 1 2 1 - 2 2 , 1 2 9 n 3 0 ,
R e fo r m a tio n 162, 222n22, 223, 262
p s y c h o a n a ly tic th e o ry , 5 4 - 5 5 S c a rry , E la in e , 1 2 3
P y th a g o re a n s , 3 2 S c h c m o , D ia n a Je a n , 6 0 n 8
S c h o p e n h a u e r , A rth u r, 5 1 , 5 2 - 5 3
Q u r 'a n , 9 5 - 9 6 S c h w a rtz , D c lm o r c , 1 6 5 - 6 6
2 S a m u e l, 1 8 5
R a h n e r, K arl, 4 2 , n 5 3 , 1 2 4 - 2 5 S e x a n d R e a s o n (P o sn e r), 2 5 - 2 6
rap e, 1 3 , 2 3 , 8 7 - 8 8 , 2 1 7 , 2 1 9 , 2 3 8 - 3 9 . s e x u a l e th ic s
S e e a ls o v io le n c e f o r a d o le s c e n ts , 2 3 2 - 3 5
R a tz in g e r, Jo s e p h , 1 8 6 A q u in a s o n , 4 3 - 4 5
R a w ls, Jo h n , 2 6 7 - 6 8 a u to n o m y a n d , 2 1 8 - 2 0
Index 321
s e x u a l c t h i c s (c o n t i n u e d ) s e x u a lity ! c o n tin u e d ]
B ib le a n d , 1 8 3 - 8 6 , 1 9 4 - 9 6 a n d d o c trin e o f m o r a l fa ll, 3 9 , 4 1 - 4 5 ,
c o lo n ia lis m a n d , 6 6 - 6 9 98, 126, 237
c o m m it m e n t a n d , 2 2 3 - 2 6 e a rly C h r is t ia n , 21
co n sen t and, 2 1 8 - 2 0 a n d e m b o d im e n t, 161
c r o s s -c u ltu r a l p e r sp e c tiv e s o n , 5, e m o t io n s a n d , 161
5 8 -7 0 , 1 0 3 -8 F o u c a u lt o n , 1 8 - 2 2 , 3 1 , 3 3 , 1 5 9 ,
a n d d iv o rce, 2 9 6 - 3 0 7 164
e a r ly C h r i s t i a n , 3 7 - 4 3 a s good, 3 4 - 3 5 , 3 7 , 3 9
e q u a lity a n d , 2 2 3 G r e c o -R o m a n , 2 1 , 2 7 - 3 4
e x p e r ie n c e a n d , 1 9 0 - 9 6 i n H in d u is m , 9 0 , 9 3 - 9 4
a n d fa m ily , 2 6 3 - 6 9 h is to rio g ra p h y o f, 1 8 - 2 6
fe m in is t, 1 7 8 - 7 9 in te rs e x u a lity , 1 4 9 - 5 3
fr u itfu ln e s s a n d , 2 2 6 - 2 8 i n Is la m , 9 7 - 1 0 3
gend er and, 1 5 6 - 5 8 , 221
K a m a s u tr a o n , 9 0 - 9 5
G od and, 2 4 1 - 4 4 , 2 6 8 - 6 9
a n d lo v e, 1 6 4 - 7 3
G r e c o -R o m a n , 2 7 - 3 4
a n d p le a su re , 1 6 2
h is to r y o f, 2 6 - 5 6
a n d p r o c r e a tio n , 3 3 , 3 9 , 4 1 , 4 4 ,
Je w is h , 3 4 - 3 7 , 1 8 0
4 7 - 4 8 , 163
a n d ju s tic e , 2 1 5 - 3 2
a n d pow er, 1 9 - 2 0 , 2 2 - 2 3 , 3 1 ,
a n d m a r r ia g e , 3 3 , 2 2 4 , 2 6 3 - 6 9 ,
1 6 3 -6 4
2 9 6 -3 0 6
p s y c h o a n a ly tic th e o r y o n , 5 4 - 5 5
a n d m a s tu r b a tio n , 2 3 5 - 3 6
s o c ia l c o n s t r u c t io n o f, 6 2 - 6 3
m e d ic a l p e r s p e c tiv e s o n , 5 3 - 5 6 , 1 8 9
in S o u t h S e a Is la n d s , 7 0 - 7 7
m u tu a lity a n d , 2 2 0 - 2 3
tra n s g e n d c r, 1 5 3 - 5 6
p h ilo s o p h ic a l p e r sp e c tiv e s o n , 5 1 - 5 3
tra n s s e x u a lity , 1 5 3 - 5 6
a n d polygyny, 2 6 3 - 6 4
V ic to r ia n , 2 0 , 2 2
a n d p r o c r e a tio n , 2 2 6 - 2 8
S h e W h o Is (Jo h n s o n ), 1 3 9 - 4 0
r e la tio n a lity a n d , 2 2 0 - 2 8
S h o r te r , E dw ard , 2 4
re m a rr ia g e a n d , 3 0 7 - 1 1
S ir a c h , 2 7 4
a n d re p ro d u c tiv e te c h n o lo g ie s , 2 7 0
s o c ia l c o n s tr u c tio n
s e c u la r d is c ip lin e s a n d , 1 8 8 - 8 9 ,
1 9 4 -9 6 o f t h e body, 1 1 1 , 1 1 4 - 1 5 , 1 3 0 n 3 2
s o c ia l ju s tic e a n d , 2 2 8 - 3 0 o f g end er, 1 3 4 , 1 3 7 - 3 8
s o u r c e s for, 1 8 2 - 9 6 o f se x u a lity , 6 2 - 6 3
t r a d it io n a n d , 1 8 6 - 8 8 , 1 9 4 - 9 6 s o c ia l ju s tic e
s e x u a lity g en d e r a n d , 2 2 9 - 3 0
o f a d o le s c e n ts , 7 2 - 7 3 , 7 5 - 7 7 , a n d s a m e - s e x r e la tio n s h ip s an d ,
2 3 2 -3 5 2 9 1 -9 4
in A fr ic a n c u lt u r e s , 7 9 - 8 9 a s s e x u a l e t h ic a l n o r m , 2 2 8 - 3 0
a n th ro p o lo g y o n , 5 9 - 6 0 , 7 0 - 7 7 S o lo m o n , R o b e r t, 2 0 3 n 5 1 , 2 0 5
B ib le o n , 3 4 - 3 8 So n g o f Songs, 3 4 , 1 8 3
a n d c o lo n ia lis m , 6 0 , 6 3 - 6 9 S o u t h S e a Is la n d s
a s c o m m u n ic a tio n , 1 6 2 a d o le s c e n ts o f, 7 2 - 7 3 , 7 5 - 7 7
d e fin itio n o f, 1 5 9 d iv o rce in , 7 3
322 TUST LOVE
S o u t h S e a Is la n d s (c o n t i n u e d ) T r o b r ia n d Is la n d s , 7 0 - 7 6 . S e e a ls o
gend er and, 7 1 - 7 2 , 75 S o u t h S e a Is la n d s
h o m o s e x u a lit y in , 7 3 , 7 4 T w is s , S u m n e r B ., 6 9 n 3 3
m a rria g e in , 7 2 - 7 3 , 7 6 - 7 7
s e x u a lity in , 7 0 - 7 7 V a tic a n C o u n c il II, 4 8
S t o ic is m , 3 3 V a tsy a y a n a M a lla n a g a , 9 0 - 9 5
a n d e a r ly C h r is tia n ity , 3 8 , 3 9 v io le n c e
a n d Ju d a is m , 3 7 , 3 8 d o m e s tic , 2 6 7
w o m e n in , 7 1 - 7 2 , 7 5 , 7 6 - 7 7 ra p e , 1 3 , 2 3 , 8 7 - 8 8 , 2 1 7 , 2 1 9 ,
S t r a t h e r n , M a r ily n , 7 5 2 3 8 -3 9
su ffe rin g , e m b o d im e n t a n d , 1 2 0 - 2 1 s e x u a l, 2 3 , 8 7 - 8 8 , 2 1 7 - 1 9 , 2 2 9 ,
S w a n c u tt, D i a n a , 2 7 6 2 3 8 -3 9
S y m b o lis m o f E v il, T h e (R ico e u r), to w a rd w o m e n , 2 3 , 5 6 , 8 7 - 8 8
1 7 5 -7 8 v o n B a lth a s a r, H a n s U r s , 1 3 3
S y m p o s iu m (P la to ), 1 7 2 - 7 3
W e il, S im o n e , 1 2 0
ta b o o , 1 7 5 , 1 7 7 - 7 8 , 2 3 5 - 3 6 , 2 9 3 W is d o m , B o o k o f, 2 7 4
T e ilh a r d d e C h a r d in , P ie r re , 1 2 7 n 2 8 W o lls to n e c ra ft, M ary , 5 1 , 5 2
T h ie l, Jo h n , 1 8 6 n 2 7 , 1 8 7 n 3 1 w om en
T h i c l i c k c , H e lm u t , 5 0 i n A f r ic a n c u ltu r e s , 7 9 - 8 2 , 8 3 - 8 9
T h o m a s , D y la n , 1 2 5 i n e a rly C h r is tia n ity , 3 8 - 3 9 , 4 2 , 4 3
T i l l i c h , P a u l, 5 0 F ic h t e o n , 5 2
T itu s , 2 5 7 i n G r e c o -R o m a n s o c ic ty , 2 8 - 2 9
to r tu r e , e m b o d im e n t a n d , 1 2 3 a n d H IV /A I D S , 2 3 0 , 2 3 8
T r a c y , D a v id , 1 8 9 n 3 4 a s im a g e o f G o d , 4 2 , 1 3 9 - 4 0 , 141
tr a d itio n , C h r i s t i a n in Is la m , 9 8 - 9 9 , 1 0 0 - 1 0 3
o n h o m o s e x u a lity , 2 7 7 - 8 0 i n Ju d a is m , 3 5 - 3 6
o n r e m a r r ia g e , 3 0 8 - 9 a n d m a rria g e , 2 5 - 2 6
a n d s e x u a l e t h ic s , 1 8 6 - 8 8 , 1 9 4 - 9 6 a n d m a s tu r b a tio n , 2 3 6
t r a n s c c n d c n c c , a n d e m b o d im e n t, N ie t z s c h e o n , 5 3
1 1 7 -1 8 , 1 2 8 -3 2 p o w er a n d , 2 2 - 2 3
tra n s g e n d e re d p e r s o n s , 1 5 3 - 5 6 in S o u th S e a Is la n d s , 7 1 - 7 2 , 7 5 ,
tra n s s e x u a lity , 1 5 3 - 5 6 7 6 -7 7
T r e n t , C o u n c il o f, 4 7 v io le n c e to w a rd , 2 3 , 5 6 , 8 7 - 8 8
T r i b l e , P h y llis , 1 2 0 n l 8 S e e a l s o fe m in is ts
Just Love
A F r a m e w o r k f o r C h r is tia n S e x u a l E th ics
M a rg a re t A. Farley
" I n a w o r ld w h e re ju s tic e a n d lo v e a r e o fte n d is c o n n e c te d fr o m

s e x u a lity , M a r g a r e t F a rle y h o ld s t h e m t o g e t h e r w it h a v o ic e
o f c a re a n d w is d o m — c a re f o r p e r s o n s s e e k in g t o b e fa ith fu l
in r e la tio n s h ip s , a n d w is d o m f r o m y e a r s o f w o r k in g th r o u g h
d if f ic u lt e th ic a l is s u e s . T h e fe m in is t e t h ic a l fr a m e w o r k o f
h e r b o o k is b o th d e e p ly c o n n e c te d t o C h ris tia n t r a d it io n a n d
c r itic a lly a w a re o f c o n t e m p o r a r y c h a lle n g e s . Ju st Love is
s u re t o b e c o m e a c la s s ic in th e f ie ld o f s e x u a l e th ic s ."
L e t t y R u s s e ll, Y a le U n iv e r s ity D iv in it y S c h o o l
" Ju st Love is a tr u e b r e a k th r o u g h — t h e b e s t b o o k o n s e x u a l
e th ic s in m a n y d e c a d e s . F a rle y s h o w s h o w ju s tic e c a n g u id e
s e x u a l lo v e a lo n g lib e r a tin g p a th s t h a t le a d t o g e n u in e
f u lf illm e n t , w h ile a ls o p a y in g a t t e n t io n t o t h e b ro k e n n e s s th a t
to u c h e s a ll liv e s . S h e m a k e s a n in d is p e n s a b le c o n t r ib u tio n
l o th e life o f th e C h r is tia n c o m m u n it y a n d t o e th ic a l th e o r y in
o u r p lu r a lis t c u ltu r a l s e ttin g . T h is is m u s t re a d in g ."
D a v id H o lle n b a c h , S .J ., B o s to n C o lle g e
In a w o r ld o f m o r a l c o n fu s io n a n d e th ic a l c o m p r o m is e , th e
p r in c ip le s f o r w h ic h M a r g a r e t F a rle y s ta n d s h a v e s h o n e as a
lo d e s ta r o f h o p e . O r p e r h a p s lik e a b e a c o n , f o r h e r life a n d
w o r k g u id e u s t h r o u g h th e h a ze o f u n c e r t a in ty in w h ic h w e
n o w a d a y s p e r fo rc e liv e , le a d in g a lw a y s t o w a r d th e g o o d a n d
th e re a l."
S h e r w in N u la n d . Y a le S c h o o l o f M e d ic in e
C o n tin u u m
N e w Y o rk · L o n d o n
w w w .c o n tin u u m b o o k s .c o m
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ß L O O M S ß U R Y

First published 2006

Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library' of Congress.

ISBN: 978-0-8264-2924-7 (PB}

a n d th eir ch erish ed children an d grandchildren

2. T H E Q U EST IO N S AND T H E IR PA ST........................................17

Sex, M orality, a n d History: T heories o f Interpretation 18

Sexual Ethics in th e West: H istorical Perspective 26

From th e Past to th e Present 56

3. D IFFIC U L T CROSSINGS: Diverse T r a d itio n s ...................... 57

Cross-C ultural Perspectives: Im p ortan ce fo r Sexual Ethics 58

C olonialist R esearch a n d Its P ostcolonial Critics 63

P re-m odern Islands o f th e South Seas 70

K am asu tra: Hindu T extbook on Erotic L ov e 90

4. SEXU A LITY AND ITS M E A N IN G S .............................................. 1 0 9

H ow the B ody M atters 110

W hether G en d er M atters 133

Sexuality an d Its M eanings 159

5. JU ST LOVE AND JU ST SEX:

Sexuality an d Ju stice 175

Sources fo r Christian Sexual Ethics 182

Love a n d fu st Love 196

6. FRAM EW O RK FO R A SEXUAL E T H IC : Just S e x ............... 2 0 7

N orm s f o r fu st Sex 215

S pecial Q uestion s 232

Character, Faith, an d Sexual Ju stice 240

M arriage a n d Fam ily 245

S am e-S ex R elationships 271

D ivorce a n d R em arriage 296

I never intended or planned to write a book on sexual ethics. W hen

understanding, discernm ent and deliberation, arc essential for sort­

be avoided. T h e text should stand on its own — w ith appropriate

OPENING THE QUESTIONS

i s n o t h i n g n e w about questioning the m eaning of

hum an sexuality or the criteria for its incorporation into a

T h e history o f ethical standards for sexual behavior in W estern soci­

of children. W c arc concerned as never before about the conse­

T h ere is, for example, th e quite astonishing (relative to past igno­

in turn supported a view of the m ale as essentially active and the

1. T h e p re d o m in a n t trad itio n u n til th e n in e te e n th cen tu ry w as based o n A ris­

previously thought or at least proclaimed). And insofar as William

4. Se e, for e x a m p le , C le lla n S . Ford and F ran k A . B each , P atterns o f S ex u a l B eh a v io r

of different tim es and places.s In an effort to m ake sense of present

5 . Se e, for e x a m p le , th e w ork o f lo h n T . N o o n a n Jr., C o n tra c ep tio n : A H istory o f

7 . W h a t I m e a n by th is is th a t m o v em en ts b e co m e pow erful w h en th e y are n o t

in hum an awareness or in practical options. T h ey have all held an im ­

is a d iscip lin e th a t tries to u n d erstan d th e m o ra l life. N o n e th e le ss, " e t h ic s " c a n be

social m ovem ents. Indeed, there is widespread (if n ot unanimous)

9 . S e e Je a n -P a u l Sartre, B ein g a n d N oth in g n ess: A n E ssay o n P h en o m en o lo g ic a l

debate on artificial contraception.13 Soon after, significant publica­

1 3 . Se e, for ex a m p le , C h a rle s E. C u rra n , cd ., C o n tra cep tio n a n d H olin ess: T h e

as Eugene Borowitz, David Feldman, David Novak, Judith Plaskow,

17. S e e E ugene B . B orow itz, C h o o s in g a S ex E th ic: A Jew is h In q u iry (N ew York:

progress. O n som e issues dissension still rages in the churches and

P roblem s w ith th e T errain

focus of w hole generations of persons. Everything about the "sexual"

questions abound. T h e very idea of ethical standards for sexual re­

conclude finally that our sexual lives should n ot be informed and

understanding, discernm ent and deliberation, arc essential for sort

T h e history o f ethical standards for sexual behavior in W estern soci

of children. W c arc concerned as never before about the conse

T h ere is, for example, th e quite astonishing (relative to past igno

1. T h e p re d o m in a n t trad itio n u n til th e n in e te e n th cen tu ry w as based o n A ris

in hum an awareness or in practical options. T h ey have all held an im

debate on artificial contraception.13 Soon after, significant publica

questions abound. T h e very idea of ethical standards for sexual re

T h is book docs n ot aim to provide a com plete or specifically co m

makes a difference, for example, if one is looking for historical eval

M ore radically, neither is sex a concrete natural given, a biological ref

that his unacknowledged desiring subject is m ale.11 A history of sex

of m en. In A thens, for example, the only clear proscriptions appli

som etim es described as a form of epileptic seizure), and in its ex

3 3 . S e e F o u ca u lt, T h e History' o f SexuaUty, 2 :1 2 6 - 3 9 . F o u cau lt draw s th ese gen

O f all G reco-Rom an philosophies, Stoicism probably had the great

regarding h um an relationships. W hether such an integration is pos

4 0 . I d raw h e re o n su ch k ey (th ou gh n o t alw ays u n iv ocal in th e ir a ss e ssm e n ts ! stu d

46. N o o n a n , C o n tra cep tio n , ch ap . 3 . B u t s e c a lso K aren L. K ing, W hat Is G n o s ti

the fourth century, M anichaeanism emerged. It was largely in re

Overall, then, the C hristian tradition in its early centuries devel

72. Se e, fo r e x a m p le , Paul T illic h , S y stem atic T h eo lo g y 2 . 4 4 - 5 9 (C h icag o : U n i

echoed and reinforced the am bivalence of G reek and Rom an philoso