Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research

University Ali Lounici – Blida 2

Faculty of Arts and Languages
Department of English

‫“ بقمل اايد طارق العلواين‬1964 – 1954 ‫”س ياسة الاحتاد السوفيييت اخلارجية‬
Translation and Commentary of a passage (Page 37 - 71)
With reference to “Translation and Historical Analysis”

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment

of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Translation
Arabic – English – Arabic

Submitted by: Supervised by:

GUELMINE Yacine Abdelrahmane Mrs. Ibtissem BOUANIKA
BARCA Mohammed Islam
DJEMIA Merouane

Academic Year 2021/2022

 Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research
University Ali Lounici – Blida 2
Faculty of Arts and Languages
Department of English

‫“ بقمل اايد طارق العلواين‬1964 – 1954 ‫”س ياسة الاحتاد السوفيييت اخلارجية‬
Translation and Commentary of a passage (Page 37 - 71)
With reference to “Translation and Historical Analysis”

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment

of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Translation
Arabic – English – Arabic

Submitted by:
GUELMINE Yacine Abdelrahmane
BARCA Mohammed Islam
DJEMIA Merouane
To:
Supervisor Mrs Ibtissem BOUANIKA
Examiner 01 Mr. FARAH
Examiner 02 Mr. BENABDELAZIZ

Academic Year 2021/2022

II
 Declaration

We hereby declare that the substance of this dissertation is entirely the

result of our investigation and that due reference or acknowledgement is
made, whenever necessary, to the work of other researchers.

May 16th, 2022

GUELMINE Yacine BARCA Mohamed DJEMIA

Abdelrahmane Islam Merouane

III
 Dedication

The production and accomplishment of this research has taught us to

appreciate the fields of history and translation even further as well as the
people around us. Herein, we would like to praise all of the people who
provided us the appropriate, positive and comfortable atmosphere to
accomplish our research successfully.

Firstly, our immense and sincere appreciation is to our parents for their
continuous support and care towards our education and also to their faith in
our approach and capabilities to achieve our current and future
accomplishments.

Secondly, we would like to extend our gratitude to our close colleagues in

our Master’s translation class. Those whom we shared similar challenges and
experiences and hopefully witness future success together as well. Special
regards to Bahaadine KHELIFI, Wassim TCHEKIKEN and Youcef
DEBICHI for their positive moral support.

Without your support, this project could not have been be accomplished, so
from the bottom of our heart, Thank You!

IV
 Acknowledgement

Throughout the production of this research, we have been blessed to be in

our highest standards and to have the best professional work environment.
Therefore, we would like to appreciate and acknowledge all the contributors
to that environment.

First and foremost, all hails to God, the Almighty, the Gracious and the
Merciful for the blessings, opportunities and capabilities bestowed upon us.

Secondly, our sincere gratitude is towards our glorious country Algeria, the
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, the university Ali
Lounici – Blida 2 and the English Department for the free education and the
opportunity to study and succeed at the highest levels possible.

Thirdly, we would like to express our deep and sincere gratitude to our
research supervisor Mrs BOUANIKA for her indispensable advisory
guidance derived from her vast knowledge in the field of Translation and for
her unwavering patience, empowering motivation and inspiring work ethic
throughout the whole process. Furthermore, this dissertation would not have
been possible without her flexible approach, clear of any restrictions and full
of acceptance to our preferences and abilities which resulted in an immense
creative output.

Fourthly, we would also like to thank the examining committee, Mr.

BENABDELAZIZ and Mr. FARAH for their time, efforts and the much-
appreciated feedback on our research.

Lastly, special thanks to every correct, accurate and reliable source in this
research. We made sure to mention your valid works when quoted or inspired
from in the references section of the thesis in order to fully attest to your
contribution and credibility.

V
 List of Abbreviations:

ST: Source Text

TT: Target Text

PS: Primary Source

SS: Secondary Source

SA: Source Author

USA: The United States of America

NATO: The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

SEATO: The South East Asian Treaty Organisation

PRC: People’s Republic of China

VI
 Abstract

The translation of History is complicated, a field which encompasses the

never-ending changes and the depredation of evidence collected from past
events throughout time. The primary source documents contain sensitive
information and the interpretations and the evaluation conclusions of such
sensitive material do not tolerate errors. Instances of incompetence from
historians can be detrimental to the accuracy and correctness of historical
realities in historical writing, as they are capable of leading into errors in the
writing of the historical material which confuses or misleads the readership.
The study aims at identifying the common mistakes in historical works and
their possible alternatives in the target text during the process of translation,
assimilating the readers with the necessity of factuality and impartiality in
historical research and supporting the significant notion of the inclusion and
classification of history text translators as qualified historians. In addition to
reiterating the responsibilities of both historians and history text translators
towards the scientific integrity and their readership as well as their work’s
reliability. Moreover, the study illustrates the process of historical analysis
and use of translation and linguistic competence through practical
application which consists of the translation of a passage from a historical
secondary source material and the commentary of certain questionable
instances in the source text in comparison with historical realities represented
in our translation. We identified through the practical examination of the
source text (historical analysis, translation and commentary) the common
errors committed by source authors regarding historical writing and acquired
a practical perspective of the process. The latter facilitated the deduction of
the common errors in historical secondary sources theoretically and their
category which include ambiguity-based, superficial perception and
perspective-based, incapability and indolence-based and bias-based errors,

VII
‫‪all of which derive from incompetence and violation of scientific integrity.‬‬
‫‪Thereafter, the theoretical identification clarified and assisted the research‬‬
‫‪for the appropriate theoretical alternatives in the process of translation. These‬‬
‫)‪results also demonstrated that depending on the historian’s (Source author‬‬
‫‪imperfections, the identification process of incompetency becomes more‬‬
‫‪apparent by the increasing presence of false information whether that is‬‬
‫‪incorrect, inaccurate and inconsistent in the source text.‬‬

‫الملخص‪:‬‬

‫تعتبر ترجمة النصوص التاريخية في غاية التعقيد‪ ،‬حيث تضم تلك النصوص معلومات حساسة وقيمة‬
‫التي ال تتقبل أي مجال للخطأ وستصطحب أيضا أضرار على مستوى األدلة الناجمة عن التغييرات‬
‫الالمتناهية السابقة عبر الزمن‪ ،‬بإمكان بعض األخطاء المتركبة عن قلة الكفاءة في المجال من طرف‬
‫بعض المؤرخين أن تلقي ضررا جسيما بنصوصهم التاريخية سواء من ناحية صحة ودقة المعلومات‬
‫أو مصداقية وحتى نزاهة الكاتب من ناحية أخرى‪ ،‬واألخير يعتمد على نوع األخطاء المرتكبة في‬
‫حق النص التاريخي وقارئيه‪ ،‬ومنه يهدف هذا البحث العلمي إلى تحديد وإبراز مختلف أنواع األخطاء‬
‫األكثر ارتكابا في النصوص التاريخية عبر التحليل التاريخي الدقيق للنص المصدر وتقديم الحلول‬
‫والبدائل المناسبة في النص الهدف عبر الترجمة الكفؤة‪ ،‬كما نناشد القارئين إلى استوعاب المعلومات‬
‫الموجودة في كال المصادر األولية والثانوية التاريخية بكل مصداقية ونزاهة وانفتاح بهدف استخالص‬
‫واستنتاج النتائج ألقصى درجة من الدقة والصحة‪ ،‬ونسعى أيضا في بحثنا أن نقدم تأييدنا إلى مسألة‬
‫ادراج وتصنيف مترجمين النصوص التاريخية كمؤرخين كفؤين بإمكانيات وقدرات عالية في مجال‬
‫التاريخ قد تتجاوز بعض المؤرخين المحترفين‪ ،‬نشير أيضا إلى المسؤوليات الضرورية القيام بها‬
‫اتجه النزاهة العلمية وحماية القارئ من المعلومات المضللة و الغير صحيحة وأيضا الكفاءات‬
‫الجوهرية والمستحسنة أن تكون في كال من كاتب النص التاريخي المصدر ومترجم النصوص‬
‫التاريخية‪ ،‬عالوة على ذلك نقدم إلى متصفحين هذا البحث العلمي تحليل نظري للنتائج التي تم‬
‫استخالصها من المثال العملي المتمثل في ترجمة جزء (ص‪ 37‬إلى ص‪ )71‬من كتاب الدكتور إياد‬
‫طارق العلواني (سياسة اإلتحاد السوفييتي الخارجية ‪ )1964 – 1954‬وبإضافة إلى التعليق الدقيق‬
‫حول بعض الحاالت المثيرة للجدل المنتقاة عبر تطبيق التحليل التاريخي وكفاءتنا في الترجمة لغويا‬
‫وعلميا للنص المعني والمصادر المتعلقة بالجدال ومنه تثبت وتأييد وجهة نظرنا وصحة البدائل‬
‫المذكورة سابقا‪ ،‬ومن هذا الباب يثبت ويشرح البحث بالتفصيل العوامل المتكتلة والشائعة حصولها‬

‫‪VIII‬‬
‫في بعض النصوص التاريخية (األخطاء الناجمة عن الغموض أو المنظور السطحي أو قلة القدرات‬
‫والعجز أو الكسل أو االنحياز) المضرة بدقة وصحة المعلومات والبدائل والحلول الترجمية المناسبة‬
‫لها‪ ،‬فضال عن استنتاج العالقة بين كفاءة المؤرخ وتحديد عدد كبير من األخطاء في النصوص‬
‫التاريخية ومنه اكتشاف عدد مؤسف للمعلومات المضللة الغير صحيحة سواء كانت تعاني من نقص‬
‫في الدقة أو الصحة أو التوافق أو كل ما سبق في النص المصدر‪.‬‬

‫‪IX‬‬
Table of Contents:
DECLARATION ............................................................................ III
DEDICATION ................................................................................ IV
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ............................................................... V
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................... VI
ABSTRACT .................................................................................... VII
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................. X
GENERAL INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 13
METHODOLOGY ........................................................................... 21

THE THEORITICAL SECTION (CHAPTER ONE) ............. 25

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 26
INTRODUCTION INTO HISTORICAL STUDIES AND
RESEARCH ..................................................................................... 26
1.1. What is History? .................................................................... 26
1.2. Historical Sources ................................................................... 28
1.3. Historians ............................................................................... 29
1.3.1. The Qualifications of Historians ............................................ 30
1.3.2. The Inclusion of History Text Translators as Historians ........ 31
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS ............................................................. 33
THE RELIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHOR
AND TRANSLATOR .................................................................................. 36
1.4. The Reliability of the Source Author (Historian) ................. 36
1.5. The Reliability and Responsibility of the Translator (History
Text Translator) .............................................................................. 37
THE EVALUATION OF ERRORS IN HISTORICAL
SECONDARY SOURCES AND THEIR ALTERNATIVES IN
THE TRANSLATION PROCESS .................................................. 39
1.6. Ambiguity-Based Errors ........................................................ 41

X
 1.7. Superficial Perspective and Perception-Based Errors .......... 44
1.8. Incapability and Indolence-Based Errors ............................. 46
1.9. Bias-Based Errors .................................................................. 53
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 57

THE TEXT AND TRANSLATION (CHAPTER TWO) .......... 60

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 61
1. THE BOOK AND THE AUTHOR ............................................ 61
1.1. The Book ............................................................................... 61
1.2. The Author ........................................................................... 62
2. THE TRANSLATION ................................................................ 63
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 85

THE COMMENTARY (CHAPTER THREE) .............................. 86

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 87
THE COMMENTARY ............................................................... 87
1.1. Incapability & Indolence-based Errors ................................ 87
1.2. Ambiguity-based Errors ..................................................... 106
1.3. Perception and Perspective- based Errors .......................... 111
CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 116
GENERAL CONSLUSION .......................................................... 117
REFERENCES .............................................................................. 121
APPENDIX ..................................................................................... 123

XI
 GENERAL
INTRODUCTION

13
Historical studies are a vast field encompassing the never-ending changes,
depredations and the events which have occurred throughout time. The field
focuses on the collection of evidence or primary sources in order to
comprehend and prove the existence of those events and changes. Thereafter,
according to the aforementioned primary sources historians provide their
interpretations, descriptions and evaluations of those realities which then
will be considered as secondary sources. The process is simple in theory but
it is considered a huge task practically due to several factors such as the
quality and robustness of the primary sources and the level of expertise and
knowledge of the historian. Historians ought to collect data for their specific
research by investigating and analysing primary sources utilising their
expertise as specialised historians on enquiries in their specific subfield of
expertise in historical studies. The process includes all the theories, strategies
and procedures of conducting scientific research on the primary source.
Furthermore, historians are able to rely on available and accessible
secondary sources on the topic under research with acute consideration to
the reliability and validity of those sources, due to the responsibility of
historians to check the reliability of sources before use, as any undetected
inaccurate or false information in their work would severely impact the
credibility of their research.

The interrelationship between the field of history and translation is so

significant as specialists of both fields cooperate in analysing and studying
works which predate the translation of the bible until one of the oldest
translations known to specialists now which is the translation of Sumerian
poem, Gilgamesh, into Asian languages during the Mesopotamian era
approximately 2000BC (The History of Translation, s.d.). The interrelation
between translation and history as well as the dynamic between translators
and historians evolved through the translation of countless historical

14
documents through time. Simply, historians are required to be well-versed in
their field of speciality and in the appropriate methodology of conducting
scientific research and with time, to be experienced enough to delve into
more complicated analyses. Meanwhile, historical text translators are
obligated to be capable linguistically with competently speaking two or more
languages including their native language as well as also be well-versed in
the field of history specifically in certain specialised historical subfields and
the knowledge of the appropriate scientific research and historical writing
methodology. Furthermore, historical text translators and historians hold a
responsibility towards scientific research, the fields of translation and history
and their target readership in regards to the reliability of the information
conveyed. Thereafter, we discover through analysis that historical text
translators are in fact also historians, writers and editors in their own right
and that it is appropriate to technically categorise them as historians.

The previously mentioned process of secondary sources production requires

thorough and proper research. Therefore, it conducted on scientific bases
which does not tolerate any inaccuracies and errors which potentially could
result in the misleadingness of its readers. Similar to the latter, the translation
of secondary history sources requires acute analysis of the original work in
order to detect any inaccuracies or errors, to evaluate the task at hand and to
recognise the appropriate approach and procedures to translate the ST. The
detection of inaccuracies or errors is based on similar research done by
historians and includes checking the accuracy and correctness of the
information in question by analysing the available and accessible primary
sources provided by the author, their interpretations of those sources and
their writing of those interpretations.

This dissertation briefly introduces the readers to the field of history by

exploring its theoretical description and its academical aspects, thereafter

15
profoundly exploring the correlation and interrelation of history and
translation with specific focus on Historical Analysis and translation
interventions of historical text translators on secondary sources in the TT.
Subsequently, historical text translators ought to analyse historians’
interpretations and information gathered from primary sources and other
secondary sources presented in their works then execute translation
interventions in the process of translation of those secondary sources
intending to correct historical inaccuracies and forms of incompetence in
order to provide factual and accurate historical realities which do not pander
neither to the source author’s convictions nor to the target readership’s.
Speaking of the latter, the TR could potentially consist of casual readers or
young historians consuming the content in the target language.

Several studies in the fields of translation and history have covered relevant
aspects towards our topic. Theorists in translation provided several theories,
procedures and methods to answer ambiguous enquiries or to demonstrate
appropriate translation methodologies. All of which analysed effectively
certain aspects but neglected others.

Firstly, Lawrence Venuti and Antoine Berman concentrated on the clash

between societies and the concepts of foreignizing and domesticating in
literary works, however such concepts does not apply in the translation of
other fields and contradicts the necessity of factuality and neutrality in the
translation of scientific aspects. Venuti presented an interesting theory of
translation, demonstrating significant insights on the clash between the
values of societies such as cultural or religious values and thus introducing
two translation strategies named foreignization and domestication which
depicts the clash. Furthermore, Berman’s theory addresses similar points to
Venuti, mostly exuding his source-oriented notions by presenting several
theories mostly concerning literary translation. Venuti and Berman

16
concentrated on literary translation and their theories should not apply in the
translation of scientific materials as it damages the scientific integrity of
fields such as historical studies. In addition, Venuti and Berman’s theories
contradicts the factuality and neutrality aspects as they support source-
oriented approaches and similar to the last point, such approaches should not
be tolerated in scientific frameworks. To reiterate, Venuti and Berman’s
theories concerns the clash between cultures and religions and concepts of
foreignization and domestication in literary works, however their theories do
not properly apply in scientific fields due to the bias encompassing it.

Secondly, Andrea Rizzi, Birgit Lang and Anthony Pym’s study on

translation history from a trust-based approach illustrate similar and
significant aspects to our view on the matter, however the study delves more
into analysing the cultural aspect of translation history. The study addresses
the element of trust in translation history as an interdisciplinarity (translation
history and history writing) as well as between history translators and
historians. These aspects are similar and are heavily present in our thesis as
we explored similar points and shared similar views on certain situations.
However, although there are similarities in the approach and views on the
topic, their study concentrates on the cultural and social encounters between
historians and translation rather than the informative and factual aspects of
historical events and they heavily disregarded the role of historical analysis
in the translation process of historical materials.

To conclude, it seems apparent that certain translation theories only provided

general introductions, strategies and procedures which deal with the most
reoccurring cases in translation. These translation theories and studies
concentrates on the cultural, religious, social and ideological aspects with a
two-sided approach (Either source-oriented or target-oriented approach).
Meanwhile, the majority of the introductions and guides to historical studies

17
and historical writing reiterate the repercussions of unreliable sources use
and incompetence regarding to the interpretations and description of
historians.

The studies and theories mentioned above accompanied with their

highlighted positives and negatives should clarify or at least give a general
idea on the direction of this thesis. Both translation and historical theories
attest to the complexity of the fields both in theory and reality, especially
when we examine those theories with new perspectives and different
contexts and situations. Unfortunately, it is not humanly possible to examine
all perspectives and angles of all related fields, however, it is possible to
analyse specific interrelated fields with translation such as Historical Studies
and present an analysis under a new perspective.

Therefore, the main question that comes to mind when presented with the
aforementioned dilemma is how can history text translators identify and
rectify the various errors in secondary historical sources through translation?

Before indulging into answering such question, it is necessary to halt due to

several ambiguities which are all accompanied with questions as well still
waiting for an answer. Enquiries and problematics such as:

1. What are primary and secondary historical sources?

2. What are the qualifications and credentials necessary in a translator in
order to execute these translation decisions?
3. What are the various errors in secondary historical sources (history
writing)?
4. What are the solutions and alternatives to these errors?
5. What are the responsibilities of translators and historians towards their
readership?
6. How does the proposed theories apply practically?

18
Throughout reading the thesis you would discover the answers to these
questions and subsequently remove any ambiguities that there might be in
your minds. The knowledge gained from the answers delivered in this thesis
about these questions would assists young historians as well as fresh
historical text translators. This would thereafter would lead us into discuss
the thesis’ objectives in further details.

Both of the aforementioned questions and the coming answers have specific
purposes and planned strategies. All of these objectives are closely related to
the topic at hand and the theoretical frameworks of the thesis. Every
objective herein will serve their own secondary purpose, the main purpose
of the thesis and the questions at hand through removing several underlaying
ambiguities. The objectives are as follows:

1. The clarification of the various common flaws in poor historical works

and the methods necessary to locate and rectify or refine them during
the process of translation in order to accomplish a reliable version of
the original work in another language which protects the target
readership.
2. The reaffirmation of the responsibility that both translators and
historians hold towards their readership.
3. The disproval of the foreignization vs domestication theory in
historical and informative works. The theory persuades translators to
choose either biased side to accommodate either the original or the
target readership by entangling with culture, ideology, politics,
nationalism …etc, through following and accommodating the
historical truths and the scientific bases and methodology of
conducting research.
4. The illustration of the process through the translation of a passage
from a historical secondary source and the commentary of the said

19
 translation which analyse, evaluate, interpret, criticise and provide
appropriate alternatives found in the mentioned translation of the
passage. The purpose of such initiative is to demonstrate the proper
methodology to process and translate historical secondary source
texts.
5. The presentation of a valuable addition and contribution to the
scientific community including the fields of History, Linguistics and
Translation.
6. The indication towards the recognition of historical text translators as
historians.

These objectives will be met and become quite clear to the reader throughout
reading the content of the thesis.

Throughout the shrewd observation and analysis of other studies and works
of multiple experts in both fields of History and Translation, certain
hypotheses have been noted as a result. These notes and results will form the
summary of findings and assist the reader in fully grasping the problematic
and later the proposed solutions. The analysis of numerous translation
theories and historical works made certain aspects quite clear.

Regarding translation, numerous factors leave much to be desired both in the

impartiality aspect of translation generally, the neutrality in historical
material translation specifically and the responsibility of historical text
translators to deliver factual information. Firstly, the generalisation and
simplicity of certain translation theories simply does not offer much depth to
tackle complicated situations. Secondly, the focus of certain translation
theories such as Lawrence Venuti and Antoine Berman on the literary field
and literary translation which are not compatible enough with historical
studies. In our humble opinion, the concept of foreignization vs
domestication is exactly what should every translator try to avoid during

20
translating historical material. The latter concepts are a representation to
what is a realistic issue which neglects the neutral and factual bases of
presenting information during the process of translation in favour to
convictions.

In regards to historical studies, historical writing encompasses several

imperfections which knowledgeable and experienced historians exude
caution to avoid. Geoffrey Barraclough described historical studies and the
imperfect and fragmentary nature of primary sources, as he said ’the attempt
to recreate the significant features of the past on the basis of imperfect and
fragmentary evidence’ (Barraclough, 1955, p. 2). In the latter statement,
Barraclough’s statement demonstrates the caution which experienced
historians exude in regards to “evidence” and the additional and
accompanied inconsistences that interpretations, descriptions and
evaluations may result during the production of historical works which as
Barraclough described attempts to recreate the significant features of the
past.

Through these findings accompanied with the significant notion that

historical text translators are historians as well, a competent translator could
therefore analyse historical secondary sources especially books and articles
by detecting the errors in the ST and correcting them according to factual
bases during the process of translation.

Methodology

The importance of this research stands as the first problematic that will have
to be addressed. We have an obligation and a responsibility for this research
to be a meaningful and purposeful inquiry and the answer needs to deliver a
significant result which benefits the field and our fellow translators and
historians. The validity of this process can only be achieved by the process

21
which encompasses dozens of attempts, errors and trials, in addition to a
certain quality and adequacy in conducting the research and conveying the
ideas and examples presented for the purpose of realising a valuable
contribution and a breakthrough in the interrelation of the two fields. The
ethical considerations that we bare in our mind towards the scientific
integrity and the passion towards the field of History and Translation is a
huge urge in the field of history which motivate us to explore uncharted
territory and dare to investigate unanswered questions which hopefully
provide new perspectives and variables for every reader. Furthermore, we
aspire at accomplishing our objectives and solving problematics according
to the appropriate methodology of scientific research. Therefore, it is
necessary to shortly clarify the methodological characteristics of the thesis.

The thesis follows a qualitative approach as the notions, interpretations and

data are mostly expressed by words and nonnumerical through thorough
observation. Although the expression of the ideas is done through words,
there is an instance which encompass data in a form of polls presented as
primary source evidence. This leads us to discuss the collection of data
(ideas, primary and secondary sources). The thesis includes a mixture of
ideas from different contributors. Firstly, certain notions are deducted by our
observation, comprehension and analysis of the available literature in the
field. Secondly, reformulations are ideas brought to strengthen our
arguments and demonstrate examples. Lastly, quoted primary and secondary
sources which are also incorporated in the thesis in order to support and
illustrate certain points. Both reformations and quotations are credited
appropriately in quotations and in the references section. On another note,
the dissertation is an applied research designed to address practical issues in
historical writing and its translation.

22
We manipulated the variables through analysing a historical secondary
source material “1964 – 1956 ‫ ”سياسة االتحاد السوفيتي الخارجية‬written by Dr Iyad
Tariq Al-Alwani )2016 ،‫(العلواني‬, then translating a passage from the book
and extracting instances containing inconsistencies and inaccuracies during
the process of translation. Thereafter, we provided a detailed commentary on
the aforementioned instances and proposed translation alternatives in the TT
accompanied with detailed explanation as justification. Through the
extensive research including further readings of the available literature in the
two fields on the topic as well as the conclusions drawn from the analysis,
translation and the commentary, we identified the deficiencies found as well
as more common errors which were not found in the book but are commonly
committed in historical writing. Several instruments were utilised throughout
the research such as books, articles, polls and historical documents which are
all referenced in the references section.

Readers might question the validity and suitability of our approach in this
thesis and as a result a clarification is due. This thesis is an analytical study
which is conducted on scientific bases. Furthermore, the thesis is supported
by theories, translation of a passage as an example and commentary on
instances of the said translation which provides alternatives in the TT,
primary sources as proof and thorough explanations of those instances,
evidence and alternatives which encompass the aforementioned theories. In
regards to the suitability of the approach to the topic, the previously
explained approach analyses historical secondary source material and
exposes any fallacies utilising translation theories and the notions in this
thesis in the process of translation. In addition, the accompanied illustration
of a translation of a passage from a historical secondary source material as
well as a commentary which explains in details certain instances would
undoubtable assist the reader to comprehend the entire process. Hopefully,

23
the clarification provided above is sufficient to answer the readers’ enquiry
in regards to the approach taken herein.

24
 Chapter One
Theoretical Part

25
Introduction

The concept of History and its continuous change throughout time which
causes the depredation of certain primary sources calls for History as a field
of study in order to examine and collect these primary sources by historians
and thereafter produce interpretations and descriptions which translators will
in turn translate the notions and results into other languages. Speaking of
history text translators, their inclusion as qualified historians is very
significant and such recognition insinuates on the capability of these
translators to historically analyse historical materials. Both have a
responsibility and credibility to maintain regarding the scientific integrity
and reliability of their input and influence in historical texts and the
protection of the readership from misinformation. The reliability should be
present in historical analysis and the prevention of errors in historical
material made by violations of the scientific integrity and incompetency
regarding knowledge and style. Ambiguity, superficial perception and
perspective, incompetence and indolence, bias are all potential flaws which
could be present in a source author and such flaws must not follow suit in
the target text, hence certain alternatives must be applied in the translation
in order to prevent errors.

1. Introduction into Historical Studies

1.1. What is History?

Everything in our universe is exposed to change through time, no matter how

slow or fast (McDowell, 2002, p. 3). This fact was apparent to humans from
multiple different periods. It is significant to comprehend the sheer breadth
of the elements changed throughout time in our universe which are
considered both to our current technological level and to the human brain

26
impossible to process. Subsequently, many great minds throughout history
have attempted to describe History theoretically and practically.

History is a difficult concept to describe or define theoretically. From

Buddha which said “Nothing is permanent, everything is subject to change,
being is always becoming” and the great thinkers throughout history to the
brilliant scientists of our era. History has been a complicated concept to
describe, let alone to define it. Considering the limitations of our knowledge
and expertise in comparison to the best minds in their time including the
modern era, we humbly present a befitting theoretical description of history.
History is everything that happened in the universe due to the continuous
change caused by time, including significant or trivial events, people,
concepts and objects and all of the accompanied interpretations, discoveries,
reactions and records. Again, history is a complicated concept to describe
and although there is no universal description, some are better others
depending the accuracy, correctness and detail of the description.

Historians have also attempted at presenting practical and educative

descriptions of historical studies. Descriptions and definitions such as the
aforementioned Geoffrey Barraclough description provide a simple yet
balanced depiction of historical studies. According to our understanding
which is derived from the research and our previous knowledge, historical
studies are the thorough documentation and interpretation of all human
existence and experience such as social, political, religious, cultural,
intellectual, economic, military and scientific evolution, stagnation or
regression throughout time. Moreover, due to the complexity and immensity
of the field and the human limitation, historians can only specialise in
particular aspects of the field which could be periods of time, geographical
areas or specific living organisms and their various intricacies.

27
 1.2. Historical Sources

History is the outcome of constant change throughout time; however, the

irony is that although the change through time never halts, history provided
historians in most cases static data (McDowell, 2002, p. 3). Nevertheless,
those sources represent the raw materials in the disposal of historians to
conduct historical research of past events (McDowell, 2002, p. 3). Therefore,
historians and historical text translators depend on the validity, availability
and correct use of source materials to deliver a correct and accurate work.
Sources in History consist of two types which are academically known as
primary and secondary sources and historians distinguish between them by
categorising the source according to a set of features.

Firstly, historical primary sources are the first-hand artifacts complied during
the occurrence of a specific event. Historical primary Sources are considered
the raw materials which is collected by experts in historical subfields and the
evidence which determine facts from myths. The undeniability of a primary
source is contingent on its availability, validity, originality, accessibility, the
nature of the event, the contexts surrounding it and the era of occurrence.
Some primary sources comprise of testimonies which are the written, oral
and audio-visual source material, while other primary sources consist of
relics or remains made and left by humans in the past (Howell & Prevenier,
2001, p. 17). Examples of testimonies are newspapers and articles written by
journalists and freelancers, speeches or interviews made by pundits,
eyewitnesses or public figures and official statements and government
records made by authorities and government officials during the occurrence
of an event. In addition to all audio, visual or audio-visual content which
covered the event such as televised coverage, videos, audio recordings or
photos. Furthermore, Relics are the objects made by our ancestors which still
exist to this day such as buildings, tools, pottery vessels, weapons and

28
jewellery. Some of latter examples of primary sources such as articles and
official statements are materials made “intentionally” to convey information
regarding an event, whereas some others in some specific cases could have
occurred “unintentionally” such as accidental audio recordings. As we
previously mentioned, Primary sources are contingent on a set of
requirements to form a strong and undisputable evidence. Therefore, if those
requirements are not met or in a case in which another undeniable primary
source happen to contradict a questionable previous primary source, it would
be classified as inaccurate or unreliable source.

Secondly, historical secondary Sources are the accounts produced by

historians with no involvement or presence during the events discussed in
their work. Secondary sources consist mostly of books, articles, studies and
documentaries about general or specific historical topics, containing
analyses and interpretations. Secondary sources though often include
portions which could potentially be considered as primary sources such as
data or evidence in books and articles as well as photos or videos in
documentaries. Historical secondary sources are considered the
interpretations and perspective of historians and are commonly read by
students or casual readers which do not possess the sufficient expertise to
analyse the complexities of primary sources.

1.3. Historians

History is an established and significant field of study due to the reliance on

scientific bases in order to achieve results. All historical studies are
conducted by historians and as simple and correct as it may seem, there is
still ambiguity in that statement. An ordinary reader may not identify a
historian or a historical text translator correctly due to the blurry margins and
the various factors which constitute the categorisation of an individual.
Therefore, what are the recommended set of qualifications to categorically
29
identify a historian which acquire professionalism and credibility and are
historical text translators included?

1.3.1.Qualifications of a historian:

Firstly, education is a fundamental aspect regarding aspirations or

qualifications to be an established historian. Education not only provides the
tangible proof of an individual qualification in the field in the form of a
degree but also installs the required historical knowledge which is considered
the main instrument of historians in their profession. Although there is no
comprehensive agreement on what degree is required to be considered a
historian, it is highly recommended for an aspired historian to acquire at least
a master’s degree in history in order to be considered a professional historian
(UniversityHQ, s.d.). Postgraduate and additional studies would facilitate the
transition from learning comprehensive historical knowledge into
specialising in a historical subfield.

Secondly, the significance of specialising in a specific subfield, period,

region or event contributes to the credibility and professionalism of
historians. Historians cannot specialise in every subfield and topic in the field
of History due to the immensity of the field, encompassing a huge amount
of data which only modern computing power can process and document. In
addition, historians are not capable of producing maximum and adequate
output without specialising in a certain topic or subfield. There would be a
clear difference of quality between the insights presented by a specialised
historian and a regular historian. For instance, writing about major events of
the Second World War does not require neither the expertise of specialised
historian nor extensive research as they are previously discussed in
abundance, whereas specifically conducting studies about unexplored or
barely discussed topics definitely requires the mastery of a specialist in the
topic. For instance, attempting to answer inquiries such as “Was the fuel
30
crisis and scarcity the main catalyst of the German army’s failure in the
Eastern Front?” definitely requires a specialised historian which is well-
versed in similar specific topics as well as substantial research. Furthermore,
the studies conducted by specialists would be considered more meaningful
contribution to the field due to its ground-breaking revelations and insights.

Thirdly, certain set of tightly related skills to education and profession in the
field of History are a requirement in a professional historian. Certain traits
and skills are necessary in order to be a successful historian such as
comprehensive knowledge of history, analytical skills, academic writing
skills, research skills amongst many other skills which consolidate to shape
a brilliant mind which is capable of offering meaningful contributions to the
field. Furthermore, according to Bill McDowell historians have an insatiable
curiosity about the past (McDowell, 2002, p. 9) and we completely concur
and consider it a very beneficial trait aiming at accumulating historical
knowledge, encouraging analysis and criticism and refining other skills in
due time. Most of the aforementioned skills are partially adopted and learnt
through education, specialisation and additional intellectual and educational
activities.

To recapitulate, education and continuous learning, specialisation in a

specific aspect in history and acquisition of certain skills are all significant
aspects in order to achieve the proper qualification to be a historian.

1.3.2. The Inclusion of Historical Text Translators as

Historians:

The question over the inclusion of historical text translators as historians is

valid and reasonable. They acquire an important role and present valuable
contributions in the field of History. Although their evident and valiant input
is clear to see, many refrain from addressing historical text translators as

31
historians. Evidently, in order to categorise historical text translators as
historians, they to need to match the aforementioned requirements and
recommendations that historians seek themselves. Therefore, do historical
text translators possess the necessary qualifications to be considered
historians and what are the factors which support this narrative?

Firstly, through consideration towards certain educational and intellectual

choices and activities, translators could be identified as historians. Naturally,
foreign language learners and linguists who aspire to be translators study
translation in undergraduate then postgraduate programs in colleges and
universities or an equivalent educational program. These students would
have the opportunity to specialise in a specific interrelated field such as
historical studies through devoting their studies and dissertations into
exploring the translation of historical materials in postgraduate terms and/or
by opting to obtain a proper degree in historical studies. Learning continues
beyond educational institutions, as it is similar to historians, historical text
translators can further improve their skills such as analytical and academic
writing skills through various ventures. Certain activities and the degree of
their involvement in a certain speciality can define their categorisation.

Secondly, translation encourages interdisciplinary studies with other fields

and requires specialisation in certain subfields and topics in order to deliver
adequate output. Putting into consideration the nature of the interrelationship
of Translation with many other fields including history and the specialisation
of these translators in the field of history, the picture become much clearer
and the identification of translators of history texts as historian does not seem
farfetched anymore. The case becomes much more justifiable when we
mention the contributions of translators in historical studies such as the
translation of significant works and primary sources. The translation of such
materials in certain cases could prove complicated and subsequently it

32
requires experienced and well-versed translators in historical studies which
some potentially possess more historical knowledge than some proper
historians. The contributions of history text translators are indispensable and
mainly for this reason, they should be at least partially recognised as
historians.

2. Historical Analysis

According to McDowell, history regards societies and civilisations as similar

to living organisms which are never expected to remain static or stable and
is also bounded to the constant change through time (McDowell, 2002, p. 8).
Subsequently, past events and their aftermath utterly shape the present and
future throughout limitless chronological chain of consequential events. The
historical analysis and documentation of the remaining evidence from such
times are a vital process to the extent of human knowledge of the past.
Therefore, what is Historical Analysis and how reliable is the process and its
conductors and how are each these concepts relevant to history text
translators?

Firstly, the definition of historical analysis is almost always present in

introductory educational materials regarding History in order to establish a
comprehensive understanding of the process. For instance, Arthur Marwick
in his book “The Nature of History” described historical research in a simple
yet informative way, encompassing the methodology and purpose of
historical analysis and research, he stated “diligent and systematic
investigation in all potentially relevant primary and secondary sources,
including research for hitherto unknown primary sources, conducted with
the aim not merely of ‘making a book’ but in order to address precise
problems and extend human knowledge in a particular area” (Marwick,
1989, p. 199). Moreover, he added a description of the process of historical
writing which also require historical analysis and research “They have to find
33
their sources; to these sources they have to apply both their existing expertise
in the society being studied and the techniques of source criticism; out of this
they have to produce an interpretation; and finally, they have to
communicate this interpretation in the form of a piece of written history”
(Marwick, 1989, p. 236). We present you another brilliant and simplified
description of historical analysis made by Martha Howell and Walter
Prevenier in their book “From Reliable Sources: Introduction to Historical
Methods”, in which they said “the historian’s basic task is to choose reliable
sources, to read them reliably, and to put them together in ways that pro¬
vide reliable narratives about the past” (Howell & Prevenier, 2001). The
general consensus gathered from these descriptions and more is that
Historical Analysis is the combination of the thorough examination of the
collected primary source materials and the historian’s interpretations of those
sources in order to discover unknown aspects of the past. Moreover, the
purpose of such introductory and comprehensive presentation and
illustration of such process is the establishment of a certain level of
understanding before delving into more detailed information regarding the
topic, especially directed at new readers of historical material.

Secondly, Historical Criticism or Source Criticism is an indispensable

instrument of historical analysis with the purpose of verifying the validity of
sources. Naturally, every analysis or investigation accompanies criticism and
historical analysis is no different and such process includes both types of
sources (Primary and secondary sources). Throughout historical analysis and
with consideration to their knowledge, historians are encouraged to verify
every detail reliably including the various aspects of primary sources such as
genealogy (More of these aspects are further discussed in the primary source
section) and the accompanied interpretations made by other historians. For
instance, Howell & Prevenier insist on the significance of thorough

34
evaluation of sources, they express that by saying “Sources must be
evaluated not only in terms of those external characteristics on which we
have been focusing, the questions of where, when, and by whom a source
was created and whether it is “genuine” or not. Traditionally, they have also
been evaluated in terms of what historians have thought of as internal
criteria. These include questions about the in¬ tended meaning of a source—
was the author of the text in a position to know what he reported? Did he
intend an accurate report? Are his interpretations “reliable”? These are the
kinds of questions on which nineteenth-century historians concentrated, and
these scholars developed very sophisticated tools for addressing them. All of
them concentrated on the source itself—essentially on a written source, the
text, and especially on those sources considered the queens of sources,
charters or Urkunden” (Howell & Prevenier, 2001, p. 60). Howell &
Prevenier encourage their readers to investigate and question the historical
materials they gaze their eyes on in order to not to be misled and to be reliable
themselves. Source Criticism is an important part of source analysis and a
required skill in the disposal of historians and history text translators alike.

Thirdly, with consideration to the notion that history text translators are
qualified historians, historical analysis is significantly relevant to the
translation of historical material. The combination of translators’
responsibility of towards protecting their target readership and the scientific
integrity of those history text translators towards both fields of translation
and history encourages inquiry of historical source materials. According to
Antony Pym & Birgit Lang & Andrea Rizzi, trust is produced through
cultural and linguistic mediation and such mediation is required to be reliable
and factual in order that such trust flourishes (Pym , Lang, & Rizzi, 2019).
They stated “Specifically with reference to translation and interpreting, by
‘trust’ we mean not only who was entrusted to produce the texts we can

35
access and study today, but also how trustworthy the authors of these texts
were considered to be by their contemporaries.” (Pym , Lang, & Rizzi, 2019,
p. 10).

3. The Reliability and Responsibility of the Author and

Translator
3.1. The Reliability of the Source Author (Historian)

The reliability of the source author is a significant aspect in the success of

the main objective of every historian which is the conveyance of a factual
information. Although, it is impossible to achieve a perfect historical work
due to human fallibility, certain standards have to be maintained. Throughout
some historical works, intellectual and well-versed individuals and peers
such as historians or historical text translators could recognise certain flaws.
Therefore, what are the main factors to the reliability or unreliability of the
source author?

Naturally, the main influence over the source material is the source author
himself. The reliability of their work directly corresponds to the quality and
accuracy of their interpretation of reliable sources. In addition, the quality,
experience, knowledge and any traits of the source author will reflect directly
in their work. Furthermore, the methodology and approach relied upon in the
source material is totally the decision of the source author. Considering the
qualifications and experience of the historian, research methodology is
mostly not the issue in historical material. Therefore, the responsibility of
the material’s success and impact as a valid and meaningful contribution to
the field is mainly reliant on the source author.

Secondly, the reliability of sources is a significant aspect in the overall

reliability of the historian’s interpretations in the source material (Howell &
Prevenier, 2001). Although the responsibility of inspecting the reliability of

36
the sources is on the shoulders of the source author, the unreliability of
sources remains a serious issue which could mislead the historian and
thereafter the readers of the material. Furthermore, regardless of whether the
sources are primary or secondary sources, historians need to examine their
sources before utilising them in their material. Generally, the examination of
newly discovered evidence is complicated, whereas the inspection of
previously analysed primary source which have further interpretations and
descriptions in secondary sources is much less challenging task. Importantly,
methods of primary source examination would be discussed further in the
examination of primary sources’ section. The reliability of the sources is a
fundamental aspect in the production of a valid historical material.

To reiterate, the reliability of the source author and by association the source
material is reliant on the capabilities and competency of the source author
himself and the validity of the sources they interpret from. The success of
the material in the field is contingent on the factual conveyance of
information. Consequently, the presence of false information would result
into the confusion and misleadingness of the readers.

3.2. The Reliability and Responsibility of the Translator

(History Text Translator)

The sense of responsibility is strongly present in the back of every honest

researcher’s mind which morally compels them to maintain scientific
integrity. Regarding translators, their integrity is upheld through their honest
and reliable work of transferring information from one language into another
while considering elements of factuality of the translated material and the
protection of target readership from misinformation. So, what constitute the
reliability and capability of a history text translator and what are measure
needed to assure the scientific integrity and factuality of information and the
protection of the target readership from misinformation.
37
Certain qualifications, capabilities and qualities are required to be presence
in a history text translator. Firstly, a formal education in the field translation
and/or history is a requirement in order to legitimise the proceedings and
acquire the necessary credentials to conduct translations of historical texts in
official circumstances. Secondly, history text translators are desired to be
well-versed in comprehensive historical topics and preferably have an
extensive knowledge in certain special areas of study or specific topics in the
field. In addition to the mastery of two or more languages including
substantial knowledge of historical terminologies and details in both
languages. Furthermore, history text translators must have certain qualities
in regards to appropriate conduct and scientific integrity encompassing
providing honest, impartial, factual and objective service to the scientific and
historical institution. These requirements and recommendations are the
fundamental factors which mould successful history text translators.

Translation faithfulness to the ST and SA should not be the catalyse to

neglect factuality, scientific integrity and the validity of the information
conveyed to the readers. Certain deficiencies seriously violate the scientific
integrity of all partis involved, the field of history and consequently the field
of translation as well if no reconsideration is regarded to the issue. Ideally,
the affirmation of the factuality and reliability of the information before the
process of translation should eclipse the blind faithfulness to the source
author. In our honest opinion, the field and community of translation should
reconsider their professional priorities in regards to the dynamic of
faithfulness and factuality.

The successful conveyance of information in the TL and the protection of

the target readership from misinformation are considered the primary
responsibility of translators. Firstly, the target readership’s rationale behind
reading translations is due to the incapability to comprehend the language of

38
the ST. Secondly, history text translators should consider and protect the
interests and necessities of the target readership and attempt to successfully
achieve them. For instance, the target readership is mostly interested in the
information of the historical material and not the source author. Certain
readership to a varying degree commonly engaged in reading historical
material and their interests are to nourish their knowledge on specific aspects
for different purposes. While some readers are casuals and their objectives
lay in enriching their comprehensive knowledge in History and that
inexperience and incapability render them susceptible to consume
misinformation. Consequently, historical text translators should concentrate
primarily on ensuring the factuality and validity of the information and
protecting the target readership from potential misinformation or
incompetence in the source material.

4. The Evaluation of Errors in Historical Secondary

Sources and Their Alternatives in the Translation
Process:

Similar to Linguistics, Translation is present in most other field due to the

continuous reliance on language as a medium of communication and the
cultural and language diversity in the world. Specialisation is one of the
products of the interrelation of translation with other fields and history is one
of them as history text translators translate historical documents (Primary
and secondary sources) from one language into another. With consideration
to the specialisation and qualifications of history text translators to be
historians themselves, historical analysis is undoubtably one of the
instruments utilised to conduct their job. Throughout such analysis of
historical secondary sources, especially books and articles made by
historians or under-qualified individuals, history text translator might
discover certain inconsistencies and deficiencies. So, why are the documents
39
in question secondary sources and not primary sources, what are these
inconsistencies and deficiencies and how should history text translators
resolve them?

According to Howell & Prevenier, the discovery of errors in primary source

materials is considered as significant historical evidence. They note “These
“errors”—misspellings, grammatical faults, transpositions, even apparent
omissions—can be significant his¬ torical evidence” (Howell & Prevenier,
2001, p. 62). Meaning, such errors can provide valuable insights about the
world at a certain period and thus they are considered as evidence. In the
other hand, secondary source materials are considered the interpretations of
those primary sources and on the contrary to primary sources, inaccuracies
and errors are not considered as evidence nor indispensable to rectify.
Consequently, history text translators approach the two types of historical
sources differently both in the process of historical analysis and translation.

The discovery and identification of certain deficiencies in historical writing

through historical analysis would provide clarification of their nature, factors
and necessary alternatives in its translation. With consideration to the
research that we have conducted such as analysing several previous historical
secondary sources, reading the available literature on the topic and most
importantly thoroughly analysing, diligently translating and deconstructing
a passage from the historical material in question in this dissertation “ ‫سياسة‬
1964-1956 ‫”االتحاد السوفيتي الخارجية‬, we have identified several common types
of errors in historical writing which are Ambiguity-based errors, Superficial
Perception and Perspective-based errors, Incapability and Indolence-based
errors and finally Bias-based errors. Importantly to note, although there was
little to no bias in the material, we felt obligated to include bias-based errors
due to their frequent presence in other historical secondary sources. These
different types of flaws are responsible for numerous issues which plague

40
some historical works with inaccurate or incorrect interpretations. Evidently,
there are many underlying deficiencies associated to them which we will not
mention in this thesis due to their insignificance in comparison and the
volume limitations of a master thesis. Overall, the awareness to such
inadequacies is considered to be steps into the right direction.

Following the conduction of the aforementioned due diligences by history

text translators, translation alternatives could be provided in order to rectify
those flaws. Rita Scotti Jurić & Sarah Zancovich illustrate our point simply
and effectively as they noted “the translator of history texts acts as a real
mediator between cultures. The complexity of such an activity is often
undervalued, which leads to results that reveal both cultural and linguistic
incompetence.” (Jurić & Zancovich , 2009, p. 32). Hence, history text
translators are only historians in their own right but also indeed mediators
between people from different cultures. Consequently, they are able to
provide translation alternatives on the condition that the alternative
information is compiled from primary sources preferably or other reliable
secondary sources. Obviously, every error has a different alternative in its
translation and that is further discussed in the sections below but all of the
alternatives serve to provide the reader with accurate, coherent, reliable and
non-biased information.

4.1. Ambiguity-Based Errors:

Literary materials encourage the presence of ambiguity due to its incentive

to excite readers and let their minds wonder on the endless possibilities
through creating an air of mystery and events which could have different
interpretations. However, historical materials advocate for coherence of
accounts and organised presentation of factual and logical descriptions and
interpretations. Consequently, the presence of ambiguity damages the

41
readability of the material and could manifest in different cases and history
text translators should be wary not to transfer that effect into the TT.

The presentation of speculative statements and undetermined conclusions

without notice about the nature of those statements or the exposition of
unproven statements or inaccurate sources as factual information in an
ambiguous manner is unacceptable. Unintentional neglect to mention the
speculative nature of certain statements during source analysis is sign of lack
of revision regarding the material before publishing it which we will further
discussed in the Indolence section. Furthermore, the intentional
pretermission to mention the conjectural nature of some statements or
intentionally presenting inaccurate sources as factual information is serious
violation of scientific integrity and is extremely unprofessional. Such cases
require translators to disclose the speculative nature of the statements in their
TT through additions which insinuate the uncertainty or inaccuracy of the
statements. Obviously, the purpose of such an initiative is the prevention of
confusion and misinformation amongst the target readership. Honesty and
factuality are fundamental elements in historical writing and its translation.

The implementation of ambiguity with the purpose of suppressing or

deflecting from an opposing or unsupportive narrative due to a bias is
intolerable. The suppression of factual and relevant information through
ambiguity and neglect due to certain convictions result in misinformation
and wrong depiction of the matter in question. Certain historians could
attempt such methods in order to protect their arguments from valid rebuttals
and serve certain agendas which correspond with their convictions. Such
method and more will be further discussed in the Bias section. History text
translators ought to expose the suppression and deflection of relevant factual
information through the reintroduction of the obscured vital historical
realities. The latter would restore the balance and revert the effects of

42
ambiguity and bias in the statement into coherent, factual and impartial
information and therefore protect the target readership. This process could
be done through multiple translation procedures such as Newmark’s
Paraphrase (Newmark, 1981) or Davies’ Addition (Davies, 2003) for
example. Turning a blind eye to an opposing factual and relevant information
due to its unsuitability to one’s agenda is frowned upon.

The utilisation of ambiguity with the purpose of conceal the scarcity of

information damages the quality of the material. According to Marwick,
historians encounter a lack of evidence to answer certain questions and
consequently they would extrapolate their interpretations in indirect ways
“Frequently this can mean that historians concerned with such problems
have to deduce their interpretations in very indirect ways” (Marwick, 1989,
p. 233). Certain genius historians would think outside the box by utilising
creative strategies in order to provide evidence which in turn answer their
questions and remove ambiguities (Marwick, 1989, p. 233). In the other
hand, certain historians would instead deduce their interpretations which
supposedly support and answer certain arguments and questions with the
scarce sources they have and utilise ambiguity and speculation in order to
conceal and compensate the lack of proven evidence. History text translators
will act according to the degree of the factuality of the interpretations and
validity of the methods used to support or disprove an argument. Scarcity of
sources is not considered a deficiency from the part of historians; however,
the presentation of ambiguous and speculative interpretations is indeed a
grey area.

To conclude, historical secondary sources are interpretations which should

provide coherence and assistance in order to comprehend primary sources.
Translators have a responsibility towards their target readership which

43
compel them to deliver reliable and coherent translations of the original clear
of misleading and ambiguous statements.

4.2. Superficial Perception and Perspective-Based Errors:

Historical writing is concerned with all contributors and factors to the events
transpiring throughout time and not solely on the acts themselves. The
accurate depiction of the Perception and Perspective of relevant individuals
and entities regarding certain historical events provides profundity and
abundance of valuable information. Certainly, the neglect of certain
contributors not only undermines the quality of the work, expose the
inexperience or limitations of the author and also deprive the readers from
enriching their knowledge by missing substantial details to the events.

Firstly, the presence or absence of an appropriate representation of

individuals’ and entities’ perception and perspective demonstrates the degree
of the author’s experience and capabilities in historical studies and writing
and the quality of their work (McDowell, 2002, p. 75). The accurate portrayal
of the perception and perspective of the most significant partis in historical
events speaks very highly of the author and highlights their profound
comprehension of the matters discussed and experience in historical writing.
Meanwhile, the absence or lack of perception and perspective depiction in a
historical work clearly shows the inexperience or incompetence of the
author. The latter ought to include such feature due to the significant depth,
order of events and narrative through time it provides. Furthermore, the
absence of important elements and key details dispossess the readers from
the opportunity to enrich their historical knowledge. Importantly, the
presence of such deficiency calls for alternations in the process of the work’s
translation by the hands of a more capable and well-versed mind in historical
studies which happens to be also a translator. Certain additions can further
clarify statements in the original text. Such additions do not necessarily
44
target inaccurate or incorrect aspects in the source text but rather provide
additional factual information which clarify the context behind certain
statements and provide an atmosphere, background and depth and therefore
present a better version in the TL. Such process could require certain
translation procedures such as Davies’s Addition (Davies, 2003) and Vinay
& Darbelnet’s Explicitation (Vinay & Darbelnet, 1958, 1995) and
Newmark’s Expansion and Paraphrase (Newmark, 1981). For instance,
George Bernard Shaw stated “Patriotism is your conviction that this country
is superior to all others because you were born in it.” Would be translated as
( ‫قال جورج برناردشو ساخرا "الوطنية هي القناعة بأن هذا البلد هو أعلى منزلة من جميع البلدان‬
‫)“ األخرى لمجرد أنك ولدت فيه‬. The addition of "‫ "ساخرا‬which means
“Sarcastically” which helps the reader understand the intention and tone the
original source author when found in a secondary source, as this quote is
from a comic one act play. Such translation interventions contribute in
creating a better understanding of certain situations for the reader.

Secondly, the failure at demonstrating the documented and true reactions and
standpoints of individuals and entities towards other significant matters
during the events confuses and even could mislead the readers. The
inaccuracy or incorrect depiction of significant aspects and details misleads
the readers into a false understanding about significant information such as
nature of relations, opinions and awareness between the concerning
individuals and entities and overall context of the event as well as adjacent
and upcoming events. If such detail is inaccurate or incorrect in the ST,
history text translators have the responsibility to provide alternations in the
TT. Certain situations could require completely different alternatives in
order to depict the accurate and correct perspective and perception. For
instance, (“ ‫ وفي بيان شديد‬١٩٥٨ ‫أعلنت حكومة ألمانيا الغربية في الثالث عشر من تشرين الثاني‬
‫ )”اللهجة رفضها دعوة خروتشوف إلنهاء الحكم الرباعي لبرلين‬would be translated as “On

45
the 13th of November 1958, the West German government announced their
rejection to Khrushchev’s ultimatum to end the joint occupation of Berlin in
a strongly worded statement.” The alternative in the last example is the
translation of the word “‫ ”دعوة‬into “Ultimatum”. Based on factual
information and historical records (reference to his doc), we deemed
“Ultimatum” a more suitable and accurate description to the historical reality
of the situation. Through these sort of interventions, historical text translators
could rectify the incorrect or inaccurate perspective and perception
descriptions of historical events through several available translation
procedures such as Davies’s Omission (Davies, 2003), Newmark’s
Paraphrase (Newmark, 1981) or Vinay & Darbelnet’s Explicitation (Vinay
& Darbelnet, 1958, 1995) for instance depending on the specific situation at
hand.

Perception and Perspective of individuals and entities of other matters is a

significant and indispensable feature in historical writing. Its presence
demonstrates the experience and capabilities of the author and the quality of
their work, meanwhile its absence, inaccuracy or lack seriously undermines
the quality of the work as well as shows the inexperience or incompetence
of its author. The Latter severely deprive the readership of significant
information in their quest of enriching their knowledge or collecting data for
research purposes. Translation could provide more accurate and appropriate
alternatives and subsequently better versions for the target readership
through translation interventions or alternatives.

4.3. Incapability and Indolence-Based Errors:

Human fallibility and imperfection render the prospect of producing a perfect

historical work impossible for any historical author. However, it is possible
to the distinguish between a significant, coherent and well written secondary
source material with accurate interpretations to form a reliable source in the
46
future and in the other hand an unimpactful and unreliable source of
information which culminates in misleading the readers. Similar to all
scientific fields, historical studies and writing do not tolerate any the form of
incompetence which mostly originate from inexperience and indolence.
Therefore, it is significant to comprehend the impact of inexperience and
indolence to the quality of historical secondary sources, the different forms
of incompetence in various cases and the necessary countermeasures to
implement in the TT.

Firstly, the possession of vast historical knowledge is a fundamental

requirement in the process of limiting any ignorance-based incompetence in
order to offer a reliable contribution to the historical and scientific institution
and community. Whether certain historians possess considerable knowledge
or yet are in process of attaining a much higher level through further readings
and studies, the process surely is heading towards an upward trajectory
which ensures the likelihood of committing errors and inaccuracies based on
inexperience is diminishing. Crucially, the prevention of such incompetence
through the aforementioned process is significant due to their severe impact
on the quality of materials and the readership.

Secondly, close inspections, revisions and intended efforts are a necessity in

process of restricting all indolence-based incompetence and their severe
impacts to the quality of works. Historians are required to acutely assess and
reflect on their work during its production, as revisions and close
observations facilitate the process of refinement which include recognising
errors or inaccuracies that the author brushed passed then providing better
alternatives. Furthermore, historians ought to acquire the ability to criticise
their work and conduct revisions which could potentially result in the
production of several drafts, and such extensive inspections would ensure
the removal of most errors and inaccuracies. However, the presence of

47
numerous instances of incompetence would insinuate lack of revisions and
therefore presence of indolence during the production of the material. Such
materials could have grave impacts on the credibility of all contributors and
the misleadingness of its readership. The significance and effectiveness of
inspections and revisions should not be underestimated, as they are
considered a fundamental requirement in the methodology of conducting
scientific research.

Thirdly, although incapability and indolence are two interrelated factors of

errors, often in some cases the two do not intertwine. Excusable incapability
such as historian not knowing a certain language to decipher its content has
nothing to do with Indolence for example. In addition, Incompetence in the
form of incoherence such as repetition has no correlation to incapability
regarding a qualified historian or mentioning the correct information in one
part and relaying the same information in false manner in another part has
nothing to do with incapability due to the fact the knowledge is present in
the mind of the historian as it is a matter of lack of revisions before
publication.

The presentation of incorrect, inaccurate or insufficient information

regarding the date, location or chronological order of a historical event is
considered a blunder in historical writing. The nature of historical studies
generally and matters such as dates, locations specifically are highly
sensitive and do not tolerate any sort of mistakes. These errors distort the
chronological order of adjacent events, create confusion amongst readers
then negatively impact the credibility of the source author. For instance,
providing outrightly incorrect information about such matter is the less
common case as several revisions by multiple partis are normally conducted.
Therefore, serious questions regarding the capabilities and commitment of
the source author deserve to be asked when such blunders remain in their

48
work. Secondly, the inaccurate statement of an event’s date and location is
more common than the latter. Nevertheless, due to the sensitivity of the
information, no such errors are tolerated. Thirdly, the presentation of
insufficient information reflects negatively on the source author primarily as
indolent. Evidently, the third case is dependent on context such as the role
and value of the information to the objective set by the author. Evidently,
history text translators would have to execute the needed adjustments
through research of reliable sources and extracting the correct information
and applying it in the TT. An example would be for an author to
incompetently state that the Black Plague occurred in 1349 instead of
conveying the accurate and correct information that the Black Plague
occurred in the period between 1346 and 1353. The translator would insert
an alternative in their translation in the target text which contains the correct
information which is that the Black Plague occurred in the said period. Exact
dates and locations are a sensitive matter in historical studies and translation
of historical material.

The incompetent application of terminology negatively impacts historical

materials. Firstly, inadequate application of such includes ignorance of the
proper terminology of a specific aspect and indolent and incompetent
research. Now, ignorance of the terminology is evidently due to the
inexperience of the historian whether by completely stating the wrong
terminology or by misunderstanding the details regarding the correlation of
the terminology and concept or event referring to it and consequently
committing an error. Regarding the indolence and inadequacy of the
research, the latter issue could be resolved by thorough research of the
available literature about the topic of discussion or by acute revisions
throughout the several drafts of the work and the edition process. It is
significant to note that describing events or concepts is not sufficient without

49
direct reference to the appropriate terminology. Secondly, the
aforementioned issues impede coherence and conveyance of information as
well as deprive readers from valuable knowledge (Fathi, 2017). Evidently,
incompetent use of terminology would distort the consistency and coherence
of the text through stating an unfitting or incorrect term which then confuse
or even mislead readers and thus depriving them from obtaining valuable
knowledge. In such predicaments, translator would have to take matters into
their own hands and think of alternatives in order to refine the work in the
target text. The presentation of appropriate terminology and additional
information is similar to Newmark’s translation procedures, Recognised
Translation, Notes, Additions and Glosses (Newmark, 1981), Vinay &
Darbelnet’s Equivalence (Vinay & Darbelnet, 1958, 1995) and Davies’s
Addition (Davies, 2003). In the case of the author providing a description
instead of the actual terminology, it is recommended for the translator to add
the event or concept’s terminology derived from previous knowledge and/or
thorough research. Thereafter, the translator would have the option to either
maintain the description as an additional piece of information accompanying
the terminology with the evident condition that it has to be historical correct
and accurate, or omit the description and be satisfied only with the added
terminology. Historical terminology is quite delicate and thus it is important
to recognise the accurate terminology to events.

The reliance of certain historians on outdated sources in their historical

material most definitely would cause some issues. The references,
interpretations and descriptions of outdated sources which either have been
proven wrong or provide inaccurate information about certain aspects would
definitely mislead or confuse the reader. Subsequently, in order to prevent
such consequences, active historians are required to remain updated on the
discoveries made in the field in order to rely on recent reliable sources which

50
provide the most accurate information. Furthermore, although the criticism
does not befall on old historical materials which were made in times which
certain discoveries were not made yet and thus certain information was
considered as facts, history text translators possibly have the option to enact
certain alternatives in order to correct the outdated information. History text
translators just as historians have an obligation to remain updated on the
latest discoveries and information in their field in order to acquire the
sufficient knowledge and the confidence to disprove an irregularity in the
process of translation such as outdated information. For instance,
archaeologists have made a ground-breaking discovery which proves that the
Vikings or the indigenous people of the Scandinavian region were actually
first Europeans to sail and explore the New World. Therefore, on the basis
of this discovery, the old fact that states that the expedition of Christopher
Columbus is the first European expedition into the New World has now
become an incorrect and outdated information. Depending on the date of
publication and production of the work, history text translators would
attempt at provide the correct information accordingly. For instance, if the
date of publication is before the discovery, then it is not considered an act of
incompetence and thus, the alternative would consist of an addition between
brackets in order to clarify the new developments. Whereas, if the date of
production is after the discovery, the translator could feel fairly assured to
omit the incorrect information and provide the alternative with the correct
one.

Linguistic capabilities are considered a huge factor in historical writing and

conveying historical interpretations in historical materials and lack of such
is detrimental. The abundance of ideas and discoveries are all well and truly
remarkable, but such valuable information and insights require excellence
yet simplicity of expression in order to convey it coherently and accurately

51
(Jurić & Zancovich , 2009, p. 33). In regards to historical writing and the
production of secondary historical sources, expert knowledge in the field
must be accompanied by mastery of written expression and effective
language use including concrete, specific, concise, familiar, precise, clear,
constructive and formal language (University of Washington) Moreover,
although linguistic errors are rare especially in certain level of expertise,
unfortunately they do exist due to human fallibility, inexperience or
indolence mostly amongst young and inexperienced historians. Linguistics
errors exist in different forms such as grammatical errors (punctuation, word
order, conjugation) and vocabulary errors (misspellings and typographical
errors). These mistakes are capable of confusing and frustrating the reader
and labelling a negative reputation on the author of the material.
Consequently, it is the responsibility of history text translators not to transfer
such errors in their translation of the material. This instance is actually the
simplest challenge in comparison with other complication in the perspective
of translators as it is quite straightforward and easy to resolve in the target
text. Most knowledgeable history text translators in historical studies,
language and academic writing would recognise the meaning through
understanding the context of the word. Translators would have to opt for the
various translation procedures available such as Newmark’s Recognised
Translation, Paraphrase, Reduction and Expansion, Notes, Additions,
Glosses and Synonymy (Newmark, 1981) in order to provide appropriate
alternatives in the TT. Language is so significant in the process of conveying
specific information and its mastery is so crucial in delivering excellent work
by historians and history text translators alike.

The located incompetent errors in inadequate historical works such as

unreliable dates or locations, incorrect historical terminologies, utilisation of
outdated sources and linguistic errors, all of which originate from

52
incapability or indolence should not follow suit in their translation. The
translation alternatives serve to ensure the reliability of the information
presented to the target readership. Source text faithfulness should not subdue
history text translators from providing a better version in another language
clear of the aforementioned flaws.

4.4. Bias-Based Errors:

Theorists along history discussed the necessity of exasperating resources in

order to influence individuals, situations and whole societies without
necessarily undertaking risky and costly acts of aggressions such as wars.
Such a world would not be hard to imagine as it is the present and those acts
of aggression are limited compared to the past while the concept of influence
became a different process which is heavily reliant on persuasion rather than
brute force. Indeed, attempts of exuding control or influence on any
individual or entity are done through materialistic aspects or moral
convictions (religion, culture, ideology). Subsequently, historians with such
motivations in mind exhibit bias in their interpretation and description of past
events resulting in subjectivity and subsequent distortion of historical
realities. Bias is a human trait which exists in every field and is not exclusive
to historical studies and therefore, generalisations in regards to
characteristics of impartial and biased authors are applicable in the study of
History. So, what are these characteristics and situations and in what form
does bias take shape in historical studies and how does a history text
translator counteract it?

A guide published by the Ohio State University “Choosing & Using Sources:
A Guide to Academic Research”, it identified the common characteristics of
biased and impartial academics in different aspects of academic research
which are coverage, citing sources, evidence, vested interest, imperative
language and multiple viewpoints (University Libraries, The Ohio State
53
University, 2015). It is very significant to mention that the characteristics
mentioned in this study apply perfectly on our situation, as the biased
academics represent the biased historians which provide various misleading
interpretations and misinformation, whereas the impartial academics
represent perfectly what an impartial historian and an unbiased history text
translator and this study describes the characteristics of both sides including
their acts and evidently counteracts. Firstly, biased authors would make
numerous alterations such as omissions and additions as well as overstate or
understate certain information in order to suit the narrative wanted. Whereas,
an impartial author’s interpretations of the topic are close to the information
found in the source document and therefore render them factual and
objective. Secondly, in regards to citing sources, a biased mind usually refers
to other documents which portray the narrative suited to their agenda. In the
other hand, an impartial author’s cited sources directly refer to the documents
(primary sources). Thirdly and speaking of evidence, the subjective author
could provide numerous inaccurate interpretations and speculative
statements based on little to no evidence, intended for persuasion.
Meanwhile, the neutral academic presents statements and interpretations
based on evidence and documentation. Fourthly, biased authors demonstrate
vested interest in the success of a certain narrative due to the presence of
various motivations and commitments attached to it. While on the contrary,
unbiased authors are the representation of neutrality and factuality which
does not capitalise nor sense vulnerability from the results of scientific
research. Fifthly and in regards to imperative language, one-sided
individuals demonstrate passion and subjectivity through the speculative
statements, whereas the fair-minded individuals utilise an objective and non-
provocative language. Lastly, in reference to exploring multiple perspectives
of a topic, authors with vested interests support the narrative which they
consider as the one and only and any rebuttals or criticism would be met with

54
outrage. Meanwhile, unbiased academics present the topic through multiple
perspectives in order to explore all the variables (University Libraries, The
Ohio State University, 2015). This interesting quote serves to reflect on the
latter information and describes the biased human nature and the valid and
necessary effort to distance ourselves from it, “Most of us have biases, and
we can easily fool ourselves if we don’t make a conscious effort to keep our
minds open to new information. Psychologists have shown over and over
again that humans naturally tend to accept any information that supports
what they already believe, even if the information isn’t very reliable. And
humans also naturally tend to reject information that conflicts with those
beliefs, even if the information is solid. These predilections are powerful.
Unless we make an active effort to listen to all sides, we can become trapped
into believing something that isn’t so, and won’t even know it.” — A Process
for Avoiding Deception, Annenberg Classroom (A Process for Avoiding
Deception, s.d.).

Significantly to note, bias and impartiality scale stretch through different

levels. Depending on the topic, the nature of the author and their convictions
and opinions towards the topic of discussion, the level of bias or impartiality
fluctuate differently. For instance, authors could be completely impartial and
open minded, fair minded and willing to consider evidence over personal
convictions, marginally biased due to attachments or finally fully biased and
one-sided and even close-minded which counter any rebuttals with
speculative statements and provocative language (Holland, 2007). A good
hypothetical example for the gravity of bias’s influence on primary source
interpretations was made by Howell & Prevenier by stating “For example,
how “reliable” are the reports of such privileged eyewitnesses as the Israeli
minister for foreign affairs Shimon Peres, the PLO leader Yasser Arafat, or
the American president Clinton during the secret negotiations between Israel

55
and Pales¬ tine in 1993? What can a westernjournalist in Tel Aviv, an Arab
intellectual from Jericho, or a Hassidic youth from Mea Sharim in Jerusalem
tell us about what is “really” going on in that land at any particular time?
Each has his or her own perspective—a limited, distorted, partial view of
events.” (Howell & Prevenier, 2001, p. 66). Therefore, bias in historical
materials could be present implicitly or explicitly, strongly or mildly and
offensively or defensively.

The presence of bias in historical materials is intolerable due to its purposes

and ramifications. Simply, bias taint the scientific integrity of the field,
works and authors themselves due to prioritising their convictions and
commitments (religious, cultural, political, ideological, personal,
nationalistic convictions) over the duty and responsibility of an academic
and the scientific integrity which encompass the values of factuality and
validity. This deprioritisation is considered to be an unfair act of persuasion
to serve certain agendas and which has unforgiving ramifications including
massive discrepancies and inconsistencies between primary sources and
their true intentions and interpretations as well as the presentation and
promotion of false information. For instance, C. Behan Mccullagh published
a fascinating article with the title “Bias in Historical Description,
Interpretation and Explanation” in which he stated “Debates among
historians show that they expect descriptions of past people and events,
interpretations of historical subjects, and genetic explanations of historical
changes to be fair and not misleading. Sometimes unfair accounts of the past
are the result of historians’ bias, of their preferring one account over others
because it accords with their interests.” (Mccullagh, 2000). Furthermore,
Mccullagh emphasises on the significance of distinguishing between other
damaging factors contributing to misinformation and bias, in which he stated
“It is useful to distinguish history that is misleading by accident from that

56
which is the result of personal bias; and to distinguish personal bias from
cultural bias and general cultural relativity” (Mccullagh, 2000). In addition,
with consideration towards the notion that history text translators are
qualified historians, these translators are capable of acknowledging bias
during initial readings of the statements in the ST. Thereafter, regardless of
the translators’ beliefs, the right approach to such situation is to protect the
target readership from misinformation and misleading propaganda. Such
process includes the use of previous knowledge and diligent research based
on actual evidence in order to determine the factuality of statements,
accompanied by all the aforementioned characteristics and actions of
impartial academics. Alternatives in the translation process would include
translation procedures such as Newmark’s Descriptive or Functional
Equivalence, Paraphrase and Modulation (Newmark, 1981) as well as
Davies’s Globalisation, Omission and Additions (Davies, 2003). On another
note, in our opinion, the reason why bias is especially frowned upon in
historical studies is its spiteful, malice, ignorant and petty nature and such
conduct is absolutely intolerable regardless of the degree of significance or
triviality of the impact and intention of misinformation have on the accuracy
of the historical realities and historical evidence.

Conclusion

The information and notions presented in chapter one illustrates the

significance of competence in the translation of historical materials and the
writing of history. Such illustration will benefit the readers who are
interested in both fields and young historians and history text translators due
to the informative value it provides as well as our perspective on the matters
considering we are also young translators. In this chapter we discussed

57
several important points which will be crucial to comprehend in the next two
chapters.

Conceptually, History and the damages it causes to elements such as primary

sources through the continuous flow of time are fascinating to historians and
translators of such materials alike. Practically, Historical studies and
research include the collection of primary sources by historians and the
production of interpretations and descriptions through examinations which
history text translators of secondary source materials translate the
information in their historical works into other languages. Furthermore, the
inclusion, classification and recognition of history translators as qualified
historians illustrate the argument over the capability and reliability of these
translators compared to professional historians in the process of both
historical analysis and translation of historical materials. Historical text
translators and historians alike have a responsibility towards the validity and
reliability of their information (Sources & previous knowledge) and
approach and style of which they write and translate historical texts and the
prevention of misinformation in order to protect the readership. The
information conveyed in the source material is required to be valid and
reliable and through historical analysis and research of the available
literature and knowledge in the field, history text translators are capable of
protecting the target readership from errors discovered in historical material
during the process of translation which are caused by incompetence in
knowledge and style and violations of scientific integrity by the source
author. It is imperative that errors derived from ambiguity, superficial
perception and perspective, incompetence and indolence, bias do not
continue to exist in the target text through the diligent analysis of the content
of the source text and the alternatives presented in the translation in order to

58
minimise the number of errors as much as possible and hopefully down to
no errors at all.

The matters discussed in chapter one have a significant connections to

insights of the next two chapters. Chapter one provided the theories and
notions derived from the analysis of the source material and the translation
and commentary which followed suit in chapter two and three. Furthermore,
the information and instructions provided in chapter one will also be a
valuable guide throughout the translation and commentary and both our and
the readers’ future analysis and translation of historical materials.

59
 Chapter Two
“Text & Translation”

60
Introduction:

This chapter will encompass the translation of a passage from a historical

secondary source material called “1964-1956 ‫”سياسة اإلتحاد السوفيتي الخارجية‬
written by ‫ إياد طارق العلواني‬.‫د‬. The translation below competently conveys the
information provided by the author in the passage which is located from the
page 37 to page 71 of the book. The translation will be an application of the
theories and notions discussed in chapter one in order to provide an
illustration of practical solutions to the various potential errors discovered in
the passage. Furthermore, alternatives would be provided in case of any
mistake spotted through stating factual and accurate historical realities which
are supported by reliable sources. The process of translation does not disrupt
or distort any factual information but only targets historical or linguistic
mistakes in order to guarantee the factuality of the data conveyed to the
readers which we hold a responsibility towards.

1. The Book and Author:

1.1. The Book:

The Book is called ”1964-1956 ‫"سياسة اإلتحاد السوفيتي الخارجية‬written by ‫ إياد‬.‫د‬

‫ طارق العلواني‬in which he discusses mainly the Soviet Union’s foreign policy
from 1953 to 1964, including the Soviet foreign strategies, position and
policies in regards to the Eastern Bloc, The Western Bloc, the arms race and
international crises during the Cold War era. The book consists of four
chapters, the first of which contains two subsections. In the first subsection
of the first chapter the author introduces the readers into the topic by
elucidating the pretexts to the upcoming conflict, the Soviet perspective, the
foreign policy strategies executed with distinct focus on Soviet role in the
United Nations and the major events that occurred between 1945 and 1953.
Thereafter, he discusses in second subsection on the clear shift in the Soviet

61
foreign policy after the death of Joseph Stalin and the rise of Nikita
Khrushchev as well as the Soviet support of liberation movements, the rising
tension between East and West and the international alliances and crises
which transpired between 1953 and 1956. The second chapter encompasses
the Soviet foreign policy towards “The Socialist Bloc” literally translated as
it is stated in the title, this chapter discusses the Soviet strategies in regards
to Germany, Poland and Hungary by examining the Berlin Crisis, the Poznan
Protests of 1956 (Stated as the Polish Crisis of 1956 in the book) and the
Hungarian Revolution of 1956, as well as the Soviet foreign policy towards
Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania between 1956 and 1964. The third chapter
finds the author only recapitulating the aforementioned military pacts in the
first chapter and instead discussing much more the Eisenhower Doctrine, in
addition to exploring the space race and the arms race between the two
superpowers as well as nuclear test cessation and disarmament and military
rescale. The fourth and last chapter discusses the Soviet foreign strategies
and stance regarding the Suez Crisis or the Tripartite Aggression of 1956
(Egypt), the Lebanese Crisis or the Lebanese Civil War of 1958 (Lebanon),
the Congo Crisis (Congo, 1960 – 1965) and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962
(Cuba) as well as the Soviet foreign policy towards China and Iraq between
1956 and 1964 and also the United Arab Emirates between 1958 and 1961.

Evidently, the book targets casual readers which are not well-versed in the
field of history nor possess vast historical knowledge as the author provides
those readers with general information and an introduction of the Cold War
without going into much details.

1.2. The Author:

The author is called ‫إياد طارق العلواني‬. From cumulative evaluations of his
previous works, the author specialises specifically in the Middle Eastern

62
affairs in the 20th century. The book is considered as the author’s doctorate
dissertation in the field History and specifically in the Cold War period.

2. The Translation:

Section Two / The Soviet Union’s Foreign Policy from 1953 –

1956

1. The Shift of the Soviet Union’s Foreign Policy:

After Stalin’s death, the Soviet foreign policy concentrated primarily on

deescalating the tension of the Cold War and shifting towards the (Peaceful
coexistence) approach, while closely abiding by the principles of the Marxist
Ideology which favours the best interests of the Soviet Union. Those are
considered the primary principles which has always dictated the Soviet
foreign policy and its stance on multiple international events.

Following Stalin’s death, Khrushchev eliminated his political opponents,

prime example being Lavrentiy Beria and proceeded to start the process of
De-Stalinization which included shutting the prison camps and finding new
ways to coexist and compete with the west. He took an interest into newly
independent countries as he seeked to change the Bolshevik slogan which it
says “Whoever is not with us, is against us” into “Whoever is not against us,
he is with us.”

The Middle East region was increasingly in the scope of Soviet interest, such
policy shift is a natural reaction which originates from Stalin’s negligence of
the region’s affairs between the 1940’s the late 1950’s. Soviet interest in such
a vital region stems from its pivotal significance in the conflict between East
and West and the death of Stalin was the decisive catalyst to the shift in
Soviet foreign policy towards world politics and consequently represented a
new chapter.

63
The close geographical proximity made the Middle East a strategically
significant region to the Soviet Union, as it represented the soft underbelly
of the Soviet Union militarily. The Soviet strategy shifted drastically after
the death of Stalin and the rise of Khrushchev which altered the Soviet
foreign policy more open towards the rest of the world, especially the Third
World countries. Case proved by the Soviet involvement in multiple
international affairs of several regions of the world such as the Middle East
which became since the mid 1950’s a major stage in the competition and the
conflict of the two blocs.

The Soviet government focused on establishing and improving relations with

the neighbouring countries between 1953 and 1956. On May 1953, the
Soviet Union informed the Turkish government that it renounced all
territorial claims on Turkish lands proposed after the war and suggested on
rekindling relations between the two countries. In 1953, Vyacheslav
Molotov suggested to the Turkish ambassador in Moscow the necessity of
deescalating tensions between the two countries and resolve the pretexts
behind them, which included convincing the Georgian and Armenian Soviet
Socialist Republics on renouncing their territorial claims on Turkish lands
and reaching an acceptable agreement for both sides. The Soviet Union
expressed an interest in improving relations with Iran and opening
discussions on crucial points of disagreement between the two countries,
such as fishing rights in the Caspian Sea, border adjustments, the
reimbursement of the Iranian gold lent to the Soviet Union during the war
and the Soviet investment issue regarding the oil which is located in the north
of Iran by a Soviet-Iranian oil company.

The Soviet leaders made huge progress in improving relations with

Afghanistan and India. On November 1955, the Soviet Union reached an
agreement with Afghanistan which consists of three main articles. The first

64
article states that the Soviet Union will grant Afghanistan a loan of a million
dollars for predetermined utilities listed on another agreement. The second
article encompass a combined Soviet and Afghan statement advocating for
peaceful coexistence, independence, world peace and the People’s Republic
of China’s entry into the United Nations. The third article is a protocol
extension of the Soviet Afghan neutrality and non-aggression pact
previously signed in 1931 for an additional 10 years. In late 1955,
Khrushchev accompanied with Bulganin, visited Indonesia as well as India
and Pakistan and soon realised that the Asian countries’ policies do not clash
with the interests of the Soviet Union.

Regarding the Arab World, the region gained a new strategical perspective.
The tensions with the United States of America and the Arab-Israeli conflict
imposed on the Soviet Union certain political and military commitments
towards the Arab world. Despite those commitments, the Soviet command
was extremely cautious not to prompt a full-scale war against the United
States of America, which was fully committed to its Israeli ally.

In 1955, the Soviet Union attempted to befriend the Arab states with the
Egyptian and Syrian-Czechoslovak arms deal. Meanwhile, the Arab
defensive strategies in the Middle East caught the interest of the Soviet
command in the region as they fully capitalised on the western powers’
blunders, which many Arab nationalists accused them of establishing and
maintaining support to Israel and consequently they were considered by the
Arabs as unacceptable as allies. The latter resulted in the events that followed
which included Gamal Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt inviting Soviet
influence in Middle-Eastern politics through the renown arms deal. The
Soviets exploited the issue in order to extend their influence in the Middle
East.

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Up until the mid-50’s, the Soviet Union’s policy towards Arab regimes was
characterised by untruthfulness and the refusal to indulge into the region’s
crises, as well as by the soviet stereotypical impression of the region.
According to Stalinist ideology, the region was characterised as socially and
economically regressive, consisting of Feudalist kingdoms closely tied to
western colonialism. Therefore, the region was considered as backward and
an enemy to the democratic and the socialist ideology. The Stalinists deemed
it as an unsuitable environment to incur ideologically. However, since the
mid-50’s the Soviet and Arab relations saw a dramatical turn, as the Soviet
foreign policy considered supporting Arab regimes as one of its top
priorities. The latter aligned with Soviet interests of eliminating foreign
hegemony in the region due to its proximity of to the Soviet southern borders.

At that stage, the Soviets regarded the world to be divided into three worlds
or main blocs; the socialist bloc, the capitalist bloc and the third world
countries. The latter received Soviet economic and military assistance in an
attempt to sway them into communism. The interest shown in the Arabian
Gulf and Indian Ocean regions after Stalin’s death represents one of the signs
of the shift in Soviet strategy and foreign policy. The Soviet Union showed
huge ambition towards the Indian Ocean which was considered as a security
flank and a significant connection between its eastern portion on the Pacific
and its western portion in Central Europe. Furthermore, a Soviet presence
would facilitate the assessment of the West’s strategies and capabilities. The
Soviet Union have always expressed their ambition to progress past frozen
waters and into Warm-Waters of the Mediterranean Sea through the
Bosporus and Dardanelles straits leading into the Red Sea and then into the
Indian Ocean. Despite the geographical immensity of the Soviet Union, it
lacked navigable waters all year round, thus finding sea lanes to open-waters
was a difficult task, which is a recurring strategical obstacle for Soviet

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strategists. Consequently, the Soviet Union sought to improve its relations
with the countries controlling the Turkish and the Arab straits.

The Soviet Union wanted to reaffirm its involvement as an active parti in the
occurring developments in the Arabian Gulf, especially on the international
scale due to their direct correlations with Soviet national security and its
market depth. The region also represents a jumping point to the heart of the
Arab World and the Soviet Union and due to the region’s significant
economic value boosted by the active role that petroleum started to have in
international relations and politics. Therefore, the region turned into one of
the strategically significant centres of conflicts between the great powers.
Due to the almost non-existent Soviet political, social and economic
intelligence concerning Africa, the Soviet Union initiated several African
data studies by forming groups of specialists in different scientific fields in
order to provide the Soviet Politburo with sufficient data to analyse the
situation in Africa. Thereafter, it was deemed that the political vacuum in
Africa is clearly suitable for a soviet incursion.

In 1955, the tensions between the US and the Soviet Union started to ease
after obtaining nuclear weapons. Both sides expressed a desire of
deescalating tensions throughout the intense Korean and Vietnam Wars, and
due to the clear shift in the hostile Soviet foreign policy towards the US and
Soviet reconciliation with Yugoslavia, which accused Stalin of deviating
from the principles of the Communist ideology. Furthermore, on May 15th
1955 an agreement was made between the Big Four for a complete
withdrawal from Austria and recognise its neutrality, thus in the summer of
1955 the Red Army stationed in Austria officially withdrew. Considering the
previously mentioned segments, we can summarise the Soviet political
objectives from 1953 to 1956 as such:

1. The southern expansion towards warm-waters.

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 2. The deterrence of Western security threat from the Soviet southern
and western borders and breaking through the Containment Policy
imposed by the Western alliances on Soviet Union to counter the
spread of its influence.
3. The proliferation of the communist ideology, considering it was the
main Soviet foreign strategy for international polarization.

2. The Soviet Union’s Stance towards International Crises

and Alliances from 1953 to 1956:

The German crisis was one of many significant international crises which
witnessed huge Soviet involvement. Specifically, the Berlin Crisis was also
one of many crises that escalated the Cold War after the Second World War,
increased the tensions and deteriorated the relations between the Capitalist
West and the Communist East. On June 1953, an uprising occurred by
construction workers in East Berlin and several cities across the country.
However, the uprising soon collapsed and the arrested suspected instigators
of the uprising were thrown to prisons and concentration camps in East
Berlin. The events increasingly called for a European summit to discuss the
German crisis. The East Berlin Uprising was the first of many continuous
implosions against the Soviet satellite regimes installed through the presence
of Red Army in eastern Europe.

Consequently, in late 1953 Winston Churchill suggested convening in an

international conference to discuss the German crisis. From the 25th of
January until the 18th of February 1954, the conference was held between
“The Big Four” in Berlin and only made limited progress after the western
powers refused the Soviet propositions, which encompass organising an
internationally supervised free elections in Germany and a complete military

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withdraw before it. More importantly, all sides agreed on convening another
conference in Geneva. The tension over the German Crisis resulted in the
Soviet Union rearming the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) as
a retaliation to the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany (West
Germany) by the western powers, which consequently resulted in affiliating
East and West Germany into two opposing military pacts.

The Indochinese regional crisis also caught the interest of Moscow, as France
lost its hold in the region, especially after the Geneva Conference 1954, when
an agreement was reached to partition Vietnam into two countries at the 17th
parallel. North Vietnam under the rule of Hồ Chí Minh who was communist-
oriented and supported by the Soviet Union and China and South Vietnam
supported by the United States of America, which replaced the power
vacuum that France left. The Geneva Accord had promised elections in two
years to unify Vietnam and soon the US made efforts to establish a strong
government in South Vietnam, as both parties agreed on Washington to seize
the responsibility over South Vietnam in order to contain the Soviet
supported communist expansion in the north. As for the Korean War, the
Geneva Conference in 1954 failed at reaching a resolution to the Korean
question, as reunifications was not an option in the negotiations, due to North
Korea similar to East Germany were demanding to be treated equally to their
counterparts and also due to South Korea requesting a United Nations
supervised free elections and thus negotiations broke down. The Soviet
Union contributed significantly in the discussions and negotiations over the
Korean Crisis in the United Nations General Assembly.

During the Geneva Conference of 1955, Soviet leaders suggested on signing

a European security accord that included a condition imposing the complete
military withdraw of foreign armed forces from Europe. The suggestion was
followed by Bulganin forwarding questions regarding European security

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which irritated Eisenhower to the point that he almost marked his exit back
to Washington DC, and thus the conference ended in a debacle.

Therefore, the attendees seemingly did not reach any satisfactory results
regarding the matter discussed except for the Austrian Crisis. They could not
mount a solution regarding the Korean, the German and the Vietnamese
Crises as they remained pending and thus resulted in two Germanys, two
Koreas, two Vietnams, two Chinas, a western and an eastern Europe.

In addition, the Post-Stalinist Soviet foreign policy regarding military pacts

was strongly defensive, as the west successfully contained the Soviet Union
by establishing multiple military pacts. One of the aforesaid pacts is the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or SEATO, established in September
1954 for the purpose of mainly containing the communist threat, protecting
the Indochinese countries despite not being a part of the pact and reinforcing
South Vietnam to be a stronghold against Communism. The pact schemed to
contain the Soviet Union from the south and the southeast and halt the
communist expansion in Southeast Asia, as well as confronting the ambitions
of the People’s Republic of China, which grew in power and influence in the
Far East.

Following the West’s successes in containing the Soviet Union from the west
through NATO and from the south and the southeast through SEATO, the
US seeked to bridge the strategical and geographical divide between the two
pacts in the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact, an initiative taken by the US
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles as a “Northern Tier”, which means a
pro-western defensive pact which includes the countries located in the north
of the Middle East. In addition, despite the American initiative role in the
establishment of the pact, the US rejected the notion of seizing command of
the pact and rather was content being an observing member and left it for
Great Britain. The purpose of the pact was to reinforce the pacts’ network

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around the Soviet Union and its allies to paralyse a communist expansion
outside of the eastern bloc. On the 16th of April 1955, the Soviet Union issued
as retaliation a statement condemning the establishment of the pact and a
warning amid the situation in the Middle East and the South East, indicating
that the formation of the pact directly threatens the national security of the
Soviet Union.

Evidently, the Soviet Union deciphered the purpose of the pact as the
succession of Great Britain’s hold on the Middle East by the United States.
The Soviets considered it worse for the stability of the region and rathered
the presence of the three western powers (Great Britain, France, United
States), due to the subsequent partitions between the three which the Soviet
Union could exploit to its advantage. As a whole, the Soviet Union regarded
the Baghdad Pact as a western scheme with the purpose of issuing hegemony
over the region’s countries, a threat to Soviet national security and an
escalation of tensions between the two blocs.

Importantly, the Baghdad Pact was the last case of absolute western
domination over the Middle East, as it prompted the Soviet Union to
revaluate and shift its foreign policy towards the region. The Soviets were
also becoming increasingly aware of the region’s strategical value and the
threat of the Baghdad Pact which represents the western containment policy
to its southern borders. Therefore, it elicited the Soviet Union to bypass the
containment pacts towards the Middle East in order to establish good
relations and offer military and economic assistance to the region’s
countries. The historian views the Baghdad Pact’s consequent ripple effect
regarding the division of the Arab World into two separate directions as the
pivotal factor that weakened Arab Nationalism. Furthermore, it is feasible to
state that the western containment policy which was devised to repel Soviet
influence in the Middle East has led to counterproductive results and acted

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more as an invitation for Soviet presence for the first time in the region’s
history.

As for the pretexts of the Warsaw Pact, officially titled the Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, the pact was not a direct
retaliation for the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or
NATO, but rather from the western powers determination on integrating
West Germany into NATO in 1955. Thereafter, the Soviet Union and its
Eastern European allies felt compelled to take combined defensive measures
to counter the new threat. Therefore, the Warsaw Pact represents a direct
retaliation to the re-militarization of West Germany as a capable military
power in Central Europe and also as an integral member of western military
strategy. The Soviet interpreted the act as a threat to its nation security, which
prompted it to revaluate its defence strategy.

Significantly, the main pretext of the Warsaw Pact’s establishment is the

integration of West Germany into NATO in 1955, as well as other underlying
causes such as the Soviets’ awareness of the military incapability of its
eastern European allies to defend the eastern bloc. Therefore, the Soviet
Union seeked to enforce a military access and presence in its eastern
European allies’ territories in order to compensate for the military
incapability of these countries as well as mainly to defend the Soviet borders.

3. The Escalation between the West and East:

The peace mission abruptly ended after the Second World War, as the two
blocs (East and West) started condemning and plotting against each other.
Furthermore, the US accused the Soviet Union of initiating the conflict by
pursuing a hostile foreign policy towards the US and its allies and by
participating in several events to kindle communist revolutions in Europe

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and supporting multiple communist parties in the Middle East to stir disorder
and confusion in countries such as Iran and prompting a civil war in Greece.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union accused the United States of America
of blind hostility by continuously attempting to isolate and contain the Soviet
Union.

Therefore shortly, the western powers assume that the roots of this conflict
are due to the communist ideology and the Soviet threat and ambition for
world domination after defeating Capitalism. Whereas the eastern powers
attribute the conflict to the western powers’ imperialist and hostile policies,
especially the ambitions of the US to dominate the modern world politically,
economically and ideologically.

Some claim the original date of the conflict between east and west to be in
1848, some believe that 1917 is the start of the conflict, some attribute it to
1945 and others state 1947 as the realistic starting date of the historical
conflict between the east and west. Therefore since 1947, each bloc regarded
every policy and action taken by the other bloc as an offensive act which
necessitate an immediate response, and regarded every response as a threat
which requires defensive measures. In addition, both blocs utilised their
propaganda machines such as newspapers, radio, magazines and several
other publication forms to support their ideology and vision and to utilise it
as an instrument of political and economic pressure to persuade countries to
join their cause.

The conflict between East and West made the Soviet Union aware of the that
Soviet and American strategical interests do not intertwine. Consequently,
the Soviets fixated their foreign policy on the US and from this we
comprehend the urgency of the Soviets to establish their presence wherever
the US presence is located, especially in significant and sensitive strategical
regions to its national security. The conflict between the two superpowers

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 proceeded in accordance to that strategy and certain regional conflicts were
a subsequent extension of the conflict between the two blocs.

According to the western perspective, the Soviet Union was the source of all
evil and was ambitious to achieve world domination and establish its law
according to the communist ideology. Therefore, the Soviet Union was a
global threat which the west deemed it necessary to counter and contain its
ideological expansion by establishing a political, economic and military
containment policy. Meanwhile, according to the eastern bloc, the roots of
this conflict laid in the west’s imperialist aggression and expansion policies,
which seeked to establish a capitalist hegemony over the natural resources
rich regions. The eastern bloc considered the United States of America as the
biggest capitalist threat which the Soviet Union is expected to assume the
responsibility of retaliation against it.

The two blocs exuded an increasingly ideological radicalism diplomatically

during the course of the Cold War. Subsequently, it intensified the twisted
propaganda campaigns and the arms race, as the strategical balance at that
stage hanged on the military destructive capabilities of an initial strike. The
Cold War belligerents increasingly utilised the political polarization policy
to persuade most third world countries to their side after successfully
partitioning Europe, as well as perpetuated their tensions and hostility to the
United Nations.

4. The Soviet Union’s policy towards communist parties and

Liberation Movements:

The Soviet Union foreign strategy and objectives encompassed combatting

colonialism and supporting national liberation movements as it aimed to weaken
the western bloc by dismantling and depriving the west of their strategical and

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economical depth derived from their colonies on the international stage. In
addition, the Soviet Union conformed to the Marxist ideology, which
fundamentally rejects human exploitation and colonialism. Subsequently, the
Soviets strove consistently to support liberation movements as future prospects in
order to expand their influence and alliances outside of the Warsaw Pact. The US
concentrated at maintaining the western bloc’s unity while also constricting the
Soviet Union of foreign power vacuum to exploit.

According to the Soviet Politburo, the Soviet Union’s support to liberation

movements for the purpose of gaining their independence would accelerate the
collapse of the capitalist west. Therefore, the objective was to instigate a change
in those countries to become politically neutral and independent countries, clear
of any foreign military forces and bases as well as to be politically and
economically friendly to the Soviet Union.

The Kremlin considered the publicity and the proliferation of Marxist and
Communist ideologies as one of its key strategical objectives. The Soviet Union
promoted the two ideologies through two methods. First, directly utilising anti-
colonialism and anti-imperialism banners to convey the message and indirectly
discredit the west. Second, direct support to communist and politically left-
oriented parties for the purpose of seizing power.

Internationally, Communism progressed actively at that stage as many communist

figures emerged such as Sukarno and Hồ Chí Minh and many others which shifted
the political landscape of the Far East and subsequently influenced Middle Eastern
leaders. Meanwhile, the west considered these new realities as significant threats
which necessitated countermeasures.

Khrushchev’s politically acumen contributed in executing the right decisions

regarding the situations in the Middle East and the Far East, which met success.
Realistically, the Middle East and especially the Arab region was a blank page,
which Khrushchev started to dictate his policies and ideology in it. Notably,
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before 1955 the Soviet Union were much more interested in the affairs of the Far
East than the Middle East. For instance, a conference was held in 1954 in Moscow
for historians and economists, in which a certain attendee highlighted that the Far
Eastern nationalist movements have a much higher estimation of success than the
Middle Eastern movements, due to the working class being the driving force of
the movements and not a nationalist bourgeoisie. Therefore, such evaluations
explain the Soviet special interest to the Far East and the South East Asian regions.

Amidst western competition over the Middle East, the Soviet Union opted to
utilise economic assistance as a primary instrument to manage situations in the
region. The Soviet Union’s purpose from assisting Middle Eastern countries
economically is to weaken the West’s political and military alliances with the
region’s countries which were established in order to deter them from Soviet
economic assistance. In addition, the purpose of such Soviet initiative is to counter
the western presence and thereafter eliminating it from the region.

In order to achieve those objectives, the Soviet Politburo decided that the
best course of action is to assist the Third World countries economically,
including the Arab World and thus, detaching them from the West’s sphere
of influence. The Czech arms deal established the foundations of a new
Soviet-Egyptian alliance, amongst Soviet doubts over the Egyptian
commitment to the Socialist system. The Soviets considered the Czech arms
deal as a huge victory which represented a pivotal turning point and a start
of a new era in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the Egyptian leaders insisted
that the arms deal was only a trade transaction in which, Egypt receives arms
and ammunition from the Soviet Union and not political and ideological
ideas.

Notably, the shift in the Soviet foreign policy towards Middle Eastern
nationalist movements from hostility into friendly mutual cooperation was
gradual, as any notable and realistic change occurred after the death of Stalin.

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The Soviets ridiculed and criticised the Arab nationalist movement.
Regarding the Arab League, the Soviets perceived it as a British agency
which hampered the progress of the national liberation movements in the
Middle east, and described it as a political card in the hands of the British
and American colonialism. Notably in the mid 1950’s, the Soviet Union
considered supporting the Middle Eastern countries as one of its top
priorities, as it served the Soviet Union’s best interests in eliminating western
presence and hegemony over the region which is close to the Soviet southern
borders. The Soviet Union continued its support to Middle Eastern countries
to maintain its independence and prevent it from being in the western sphere
of influence again.

The Soviet Union held a significant role in international relations whether by

pressuring the capitalists in order to achieve balance or by supporting
liberation movements in the Third World for the purpose of eliminating
colonialism. The Soviet Union’s firm belief in the inevitable victory of the
Marxist ideology was a fundamental aspect in the firm Soviet stance leading
into the Cold War and the tensions of international relations between the
Socialist and Capitalist countries of the world.

Economic and social crises in certain nations were significant factors in

creating the perfect political habitat for spread of communism and the
Soviets relied on the local communist parties in those countries to achieve
their objectives. However, the clash between the local communist parties and
the ruling regimes around the world generally caused tensions between those
countries and the Soviet Union. The Soviets still possessed other measures
of spreading communism besides the parties such as cultural agencies,
scholarships, translated Soviet books and magazines, experts exchange and
youth’s and workers’ camps to assemble communist gatherings which could
lead by example.

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“Socialism” became a familiar term in multiple countries in the world,
meanwhile the term “Capitalism” embodied the western economic, political
and social hegemony. Subsequently, the Soviet Union approached Third
World countries by establishing diplomatic relations with the newly
independent countries in Africa and Asia. Khrushchev realized that
eliminating colonialism in the Third World could possibly benefits the
Soviet Union’s political, strategical and economic interests. Therefore, the
Soviet Union announced its support towards liberation movements to obtain
their independence. In addition, the Soviet Union evaluated its economical
capabilities as a potential instrument to economically support countries
outside the socialist bloc and thus improving their relations. Such cases
occurred to India and Afghanistan, as the Soviet Union granted economic
assistance to India in the form of loans in 1953 and 1955, and the provided
Afghanistan the same in 1954. The Soviet Union also contributed to the
United Nations Development Programme for technical aids to developing
countries and through such political, economic and military support, the
Soviets started to significantly impact regional conflicts and international
crises.

With consideration to the latter in regards to the Soviet methods of support

to the liberation movements around the globe, the purpose was evidently to
debilitate the western alliances made in order to contain it. Consequently, the
Soviet Politburo decided that the best approach in order to deter countries
from accepting US assistance is to offer economic and military assistance
themselves in order to detach those countries from the western sphere of
influence. Such initiative truly and significantly came into fruition after the
death of Stalin and the rise of Khrushchev. Furthermore, the Soviet Union
was adamant on eliminating the western and American threat on its western
and southern borders, shattering the Containment Policy implemented by the

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western alliances, devised in order to contain the Soviet Union in its geo-
political borders and to combat the spread of communism and finally
ensuring the proliferation of communism as it was regarded as a potent and
persuasive political polarisation instrument in the disposal of the Soviet
foreign policy.

Chapter Two: The Perspective of the Soviet Foreign Policy

towards the Socialist Bloc 1956 – 1964

The Soviet Policy on the Berlin Crisis 1958 – 1964:

The East Berlin civil unrest of 1948 was the first of numerous uprisings
against the pro-soviet governments which were established through the grip
of the Soviet red army in eastern Europe. Subsequently, in late 1953 Winston
Churchill suggested holding an international convention in order to discuss
the Crisis in Germany. The conference was held from January 25th until
February 18th between the four great powers in Berlin, which made little
progress after the western powers’ rejection of the Soviet suggestions which
included the official recognition of the communist People’s Republic of
China, the organization of a general election under international supervision
and the military withdraw of the four powers occupation of Berlin before the
elections. Significantly, all sides concurred on holding another convention
in Geneva with the attendance of Communist China to discuss peace
negotiations for Korea and Indochina. The failure to resolve the German
Crisis led the Soviet Union to also rearm the German Democratic Republic
(East Germany) as a retaliation to the rearmament of the Federal Republic of
Germany (West Germany) by the western powers, the latter resulted in
affiliating each country into two opposing military pacts.

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The Chancellor of West Germany visited Moscow in July 1955 to discuss
points of view after the overwhelmingly negative Soviet stance towards West
Germany. Konrad Adenauer succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations
between the two countries and exchanging ambassadors. Khrushchev wrote
in his memoirs about this visitation that Adenauer offered him several
payments consisting of loans and war reparations in exchange of a complete
political and military withdrawal from the German Democratic Republic,
which Khrushchev refused and considered it as completely unacceptable.
Chancellor Adenauer only managed to get the release of some German
prisoners of war in the Soviet Union in exchange for diplomatic relations
between Moscow and Bonn.

During his speech in the East Berlin Parliament on the 16th of August 1957,
Khrushchev denounced West Germany’s Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
policies, stating that he is paving the way for an atomic war. Khrushchev
supported the GDR prime minister’s proposition that the two Germanys
should form an alliance as a first step towards reunifications. Furthermore,
Khrushchev issued a warning to France, Britain, West Germany and the
United States of America that they will be all under huge jeopardy in case of
a nuclear war.

Peace did not last long as the Berlin dilemma embroiled once again on
November 1958 as Khrushchev threatened to dismantle the Allied Supreme
Authority over the city and to make Berlin a free and a demilitarized city. In
addition, Khrushchev made an ultimatum to the western powers to either
issue an official recognition of the GDR or face the consequences of losing
their rights in East Germany which they have gained in the Potsdam
conference. The Pravda newspaper noted on the 19th of November 1958 that
the Soviet Union will force the dismantle of the Supreme Authority over
Berlin without the western powers’ approval. The newspaper also stated that

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the western powers had made a wrong assessment if they thought that the
Soviet plans to end the Berlin occupation depends on their approval.

On the 27th of November 1958, The Soviet Union abrogated the Berlin
occupation statute due to the West’s violation of the Potsdam agreements by
militarising West Germany, thus attempting at securing Berlin as the capital
of East Berlin. On the 13th of November 1958, the West German government
announced in a strongly worded statement on their rejection to Khrushchev's
ultimatum to end the joint occupation of Berlin. On the other hand, the Prime
Minister of East Germany stated that his government will conduct
negotiations with the Soviet Union on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from
East Germany.

On the twenty-fourth of the same month, East Germany demanded the

annexation of the entire city of Berlin as well as the withdrawal of the
Western countries from it. East German officials indicated that they would
assume responsibility on the supervision of all air and ground transportation
utilised by the Western countries to reach the western sector of Berlin,
furthermore they stated that Berlin should be a city of peace. The German
Democratic leaders declared that the new weapons in the Soviet arsenal have
the capability to destroy and erase the United States of America in 90
minutes if the war breaks out because of Berlin. These statements were
instigated by the Soviets which were the primary driving force of that crisis,
a fact which was confirmed by Khrushchev in his memoirs, as he stated “The
new arrangement should affirm the status quo, so that both parts of Germany
would be recognized as independent, the capitalist part and the socialist part.
As for West Berlin, let it exist separately with the special status of a “free
city.”

On November 30, 1958, Khrushchev issued an ultimatum to the Western

countries in which he gave them six months to demilitarize Berlin, however

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if the West rejected the demands issued in the ultimatum, the Soviets would
be obligated to execute the following two course of actions:

1. The signature of a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic

2. The severance of communication with the military representatives of

the United States, Britain, and France in Germany as Khrushchev was using
Berlin’s crisis to pressure the United States by severing Western
communications with the city which go through GDR territory. quadripartite

On November 23 of 1958, The Supreme Allied Commander issued orders to

its forces in West Berlin not to comply to the inspection procedures
implemented by GDR border checkpoints of West Berlin. Such order would
only apply in the event that the East German forces took these measures
instead of the Soviet forces. The Berlin crisis reached a critical stage when
the Western countries announced that a Third World War would issue if the
Soviets entered West Berlin. The US issued a potentially provision of 600
planes at the disposal of West Germany as a contingency in case of a Soviet
or East German blockade on Berlin.

When the Western countries felt that East Berlin had come under the control
of the Soviet Union, they refused to recognize the legitimacy of this act. On
the 13th of December, 1958, Khrushchev declared through the Telegraph
Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) that the Soviet Union will defend the
borders of East Germany in the event of western aggression and that the
USSR would fulfil its commitments according to the Warsaw Pact. He added
that there would be no further bases for negotiations with the West over
Berlin if the they rejected the Soviet ultimatum to make West Berlin a free
city. Later on the same day, the US State Department responded saying that
the United States would not be deterred by the soviet threats and they are
willing to maintain their rights in Berlin. The West German government also
dismissed the Soviet threats and as for France, it refused to issue any
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comment on the Soviet threat, however a French government spokesman
stated that France fully supports its allies regarding Berlin. On the 19 th of
December, 1958, the commander of the Soviet forces in East Germany,
General Matvei Zakharov warned the commander of the American forces in
Europe, that the Soviet army is “Prepared to give a devastating answer” to
NATO forces if they tried to force their way into West Berlin as he Stated:
"The 22 divisions of the Soviet Army in East Germany will thwart any
attempt to prevent the implementation of the Soviet ultimatum for Berlin.".
On December 31, 1958, the governments of three Western countries, the
United States, Britain and France, responded to the Soviet Union by
declaring their rejection of Khrushchev's ultimatum regarding Berlin and
asserting their determination to maintain their legal rights in the city. In
January 1959, the Soviet Union presented a proposal consisting of 48 articles
that demanded both Democratic Germany and West Germany avoid
affiliating with any military pacts. The Soviets demanded the exit of both
parts of the country from NATO and Warsaw Pact, but the Western countries
rejected the proposal. On May 11th 1959, a conference was convened in
Geneva between the foreign ministers of the quadripartite countries involved
in the joint occupation to discuss the Berlin Crisis, however despite their
efforts to find a solution to the problem they did not reach an agreement on
the subject. Subsequently, they agreed to hold another conference in Paris in
1960, which coincided the political and media escalation between the United
States and the Soviet Union in the wake of the Soviets shooting down an
American spy plane (U2). At the public session, Khrushchev asked
Eisenhower to apologize, but Eisenhower refused Khrushchev's request and
despite De Gaulle's efforts to reconcile between the two parties. The
conference ended without any productive and successful negotiations nor
resolutions to the issues at hand. In fact, Khrushchev believed that his
national and personal prestige depended on solving the German Crisis, he

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also believed that Berlin was a huge problematic in the heart of Europe that
must be eradicated to ensure the continuation of peace in the world.

The Vienna Conference was held at June 4th 1961 in which various issues on
the international scene were discussed, and the Berlin Crisis was at the
forefront of the issues discussed. The Soviet position was evidently the desire
to sign a sperate treaty with the Democratic Republic of Germany before the
end of the year, but the Soviet position was met with a rejection by the United
States of America. The failure of the Vienna Conference to resolve to the
West Berlin crisis resulted in the increase of the number of immigrants from
the Democratic Republic of Germany to West Germany, during the last week
of July, ten thousand East German refugees arrived in West Berlin and
because of this mass exodus, a debate arose among the leaders of the socialist
countries about closing the borders as The prime minister of Democratic
Germany confirmed at the Warsaw Pact Heads of Government Conference
on 3, 1961, that the situation in his country is about to explode, and that the
number of fugitives is constantly rising and threatening the country’s
economy.

The Soviet Union suggested stationing forces from neutral countries or the
United Nations in West Berlin, temporarily instead of the Western countries'
forces and members of NATO, however, the Western countries rejected all
proposals without exception.

On August 5, 1961, during dialogue sessions with the Warsaw Pact

countries, Ulbricht announced his plan to build a solid wall, in addition to a
barbed wire barrier facing the western borders of Berlin, which provoked a
strong reaction from the Western bloc, and they condemned this step.

84
Conclusion:

The translation of the passage provided the appropriate manner of conveying

information to the best of our abilities. The presence of neutrality and
especially factuality is strongly illustrated in the translation through
historical analysis of the material and its consistency with the available and
reliable historical sources and our previous knowledge in history. Certain
instances containing various errors derived from various aspects such as
ambiguity, superficial perception and perspective, incapability and indolence
and bias present in the source author were discovered and replaced by
translation decisions as alternatives. These mistakes and alternatives will be
further discussed in the third chapter.

85
 Chapter Three
“The Commentary”

86
Introduction:

The second chapter encompasses a demonstration on the theoretical aspects

discussed in the first chapter. Such illustration will offer a practical example
which is accompanied with abundance of information about the application
of the discussed theoretical aspects, the process of translation, the analysis
on certain instances which contain different types of errors and the insights
regarding the topic of the selected book. Throughout producing this chapter,
we manipulated the variable by analysing the source text again and
extracting certain instances which included errors, demonstrating their
alternative in the TT and most importantly providing detailed explanation
and justification for such alternatives in our translation. The categorisation
of the nature of certain errors assisted the analysis and showed interesting
results. Firstly, the mistakes discovered in the passage were mainly derived
from Incompetence and Indolence. Secondly, mistakes derived from
Ambiguity and Superficial Perception and Perspective were present in the
ST but significantly less than Incompetence and Indolence-based errors.
Thirdly, there were some instances of bias but due to their insignificance and
also due to the benefit of the doubt which should be given when there is a
rare occurrence of an aspect, we would like to commend the author for
conveying the information in a neutral manner.

The Commentary

1. Incapability and Indolence-based Errors:

1.1. Instance 1:

Target Text Source Text

Therefore, the region ّ
was ‫فإن تلك األقطار رجعية ومعادية‬ ‫وبالتالي‬
considered as backward and an ‫ وهو وضع ال‬،‫للدمقراطية واألفكار االشتراكية‬
enemy to the democratic and the ‫يسمح بالتوغل أيدلوجيا على وفق القناعات‬

87
socialist ideology. The Stalinists ‫ وقد شهدت منذ منتصف الخمسينات‬.‫السوفيتية‬
deemed it as an unsuitable ‫وما يليها نمو وتطور العالقات السوفيتية‬
environment to incur ideologically. ‫ إذ أصبحت مسألة دعم األقطار العربية‬،‫العربية‬
However, since the mid-50’s the ‫ومساعدتها من أولويات أهداف السياسة‬
Soviet and Arab relations saw a ‫ فقد كان من مصلحة‬،‫الخارجية السوفيتية‬
dramatical turn, as the Soviet ‫االتحاد السوفيتي ولقرب هذه المنطقة من حدوده‬
foreign policy considered ‫ أن تتخلص جميع أقطار المنطقة من‬،‫الجنوبية‬
supporting Arab regimes as one of (Page 41) .‫السيطرة األجنبية‬
its top priorities. The latter aligned
with Soviet interests of eliminating
foreign hegemony in the region due
to its proximity of to the Soviet
southern borders. (Page 66)
The Middle East region was ‫وقعت ضمن اهتمامات القيادة السوفيتية منطقة‬
increasingly in the scope of Soviet ‫ فاالهتمام الزائد بهذه المنطقة‬،‫الشرق األوسط‬
interest, such policy shift is a natural ‫بعد وفاة ستالين هو ردّة فعل طبيعية إلهمال‬
reaction which originates from ‫المنطقة إهماالً یكاد یكون تاما ً من قبل‬
Stalin’s negligence of the region’s ‫السوفييت منذ أواخر األربعينات حتى مستهل‬
affairs between the 1940’s the late (Page 38) .‫الخمسينات‬
1950’s. Soviet interest also stems
from the region’s vitality and
significance in the conflict between
East and West. Stalin’s death was
the catalyst in the shift of Soviet
politics and represented a new
chapter in Soviet foreign policy.
(Page 63)

88
Stalinism: Stalinism, the method of rule, or policies, of Joseph Stalin, Soviet
Communist Party and state leader from 1929 until his death in 1953.
Stalinism is associated with a regime of terror and totalitarian rule.
(Britannica, Stalinism, s.d.)

In this instance, we utilised Vinay & Darbelnet’s “Adaptation” (Vinay &

Darbelnet, 1958, 1995) in the translation of the term “‫ ”السوفيتية‬into
“Stalinists” and the phrase “‫ ”إلهمال المنطقة إهماالً يكاد يكون تاما ً من قبل السوفييت‬into
“Stalin’s negligence” in order to depict accurately the reality of the situation
in the statement above. Following our historical knowledge and capabilities,
historical reality and accuracy and historical documents we executed
translation interventions on the two instances in question which showcase
the author’s neglect to acknowledge the responsibility of Stalin and
Stalinism in dismissing initiatives to establish good relations with Arab
States.

Initially, the interpretations of the author regarding the political decisions of

the Soviet Union are wrong. The author assumes that the decision of
dismissing an ideological incursion and an initiative to establish relations
with Arab regimes are reached through a collective and democratic approval
based on discussions involving open criticism by stating "‫”القناعات السوفيتية‬
in the first example and “‫ ”من قبل السوفيت‬in the second example. However,
numerous historical records suggest otherwise and it is well documented that
Joseph Stalin is an authoritarian dictator, known for his large-scale
repression of political opponents, activists, minorities, military leadership
and anyone who was deemed untrustworthy. The mass-oppression was
intensively present in the two-year period from 1936 to 1938 known as The
Great Purge or The Great Terror. In addition, the fact that the Soviet Union
and Stalin after the second world war took a more discreet methods to
eliminate political opponents does not change neither the mechanism of the

89
regime nor its main focal point which is Joseph Stalin. Furthermore,
members of the Soviet Politburo were historically recorded to be terrified to
oppose him or even correct him. Regarding the Soviet-Arab relations, Joseph
Stalin decided not to significantly exude influence in the Middle East during
his era due to several ideological grounds which it severely hampered future
initiatives to engage in an arm-wrestle against the West over the region.
Those ideological grounds were Stalin’s rigid approach towards national
bourgeoisie leaders leading Arab nationalism and unwillingness to cast that
approach aside in order to establish a new sphere of influence and considered
it as the author mentioned “ً ‫“ ”وهو وضع ال یسمح بالتوغل أیدلوجيا‬An unacceptable
situation to incur ideologically”. The Soviet-Arab relations improved after
the death of Joseph Stalin and the rise of Nikita Khrushchev which proves
the fact that Stalin was the one dictating Soviet foreign policy, as the author
stated ‫وقد شهدت منذ منتصف الخمسينات وما یليها نمو وتطور العالقات السوفيتية العربية‬.
Therefore, we find ourselves to the one conclusion which is that the decisions
ware solely Stalin’s, hence the proposed translation alternative and the
choice of words are most definitely historically correct and accurate.

Secondly, comprehending the amount of damage that Stalinism inflicted on

the Soviet Union in various aspects is significant to the justification and
validation of the proposed translation alternative. As we mentioned, Joseph
Stalin was a communist dictator who led the Soviet Union with an iron fist
and consequently guided the Soviet Union with individual ideological-
oriented (Stalinist Communism) decisions which dictated the Soviet foreign
policy through his reign. There are a lot of instances when Joseph Stalin
either neglected essential opportunities for Soviet interests or outright made
decision which put the country in a severe disadvantage afterwards such as
refusing to establishing relations with Arab states. There are several
researchers and historical records which explain in details the Soviet-Arab

90
relation in the Stalinist era and that further supports our commentary such as
Middle Eastern Studies published by Frank Cass. Internally, the Great Purge
policy which crippled the country due to the elimination or imprisonment of
the country’s best assets and minds such as scientists, artists, intellectuals,
politicians and military experts as they were accused of being “Anti-Soviets”
in order to eliminate potential competition and maintain power.

Instance 2:

Target Text Source Text

caught the interest of the Soviet ‫ الذي غدا غير‬،‫واستغل الروس أخطاء الغرب‬
command in the region as they fully ‫مقبول كحليف بسبب اتّهامه من قبل القوميين‬
capitalised on the western powers’ ‫العرب بخلق إسرائيل واالستمرار في‬
blunders, which many Arab ‫ وكان من النتائج النهائية لسير‬،‫مساعدتها‬
nationalists accused them ّ ‫األحداث‬
of ‫أن عبد الناصر جلب الروس إلى‬
establishing and maintaining ‫المنطقة للمشاركة في سياسات الشرق األوسط‬
support to Israel and consequently ‫ إذ شكل هذا‬،‫من خالل صفقة األسلحة الشهيرة‬
they were considered by the Arabs ‫الموضوع بالنسبة للروس وسيلة لكسب النفوذ‬
as unacceptable as allies. The latter (Page 40) .‫في الشرق األوسط‬
resulted in the events that followed
which included Gamal Abdel
Nasser, the president of Egypt
inviting Soviet influence in Middle-
Eastern politics through the renown
arms deal. The Soviets exploited the
issue in order to extend their
influence in the Middle East. (Page
65)

91
 The Berlin crisis reached a critical ‫وقد بلغت أزمة برلين مرحلة خطرة عندما‬
ّ ‫أعلنت الدول الغربية‬
stage when the Western countries ‫إن الحرب العالمية الثالثة‬
announced that a Third World War ‫ستبدأ إذا دخل الروس برلين الغربية‬
would issue if the Soviets entered (Page 67)
West Berlin. (Page 82)
that the USSR would fulfil its ‫وأن روسيا ستنفذ التزامها بموجب حلف وارشو‬
commitments according to the (Page 68)
Warsaw Pact (Page 82)

The term "‫ "الروس‬or “Russians” are by definition the native inhabitants of
Russia which is a country located in Eastern Europe and Asia. The term
“Soviets” refer to by definition to the people and political figures of the
USSR or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Translation procedure we opted for Newmark’s “Recognised

Translation” (Newmark, 1981) in order to translate the term “‫ ”الروس‬into
“Soviets or Soviet” and the term “‫ ”روسيا‬into “USSR” consequently to
provide the historically known name and demonym of the nation and its
people. History is considered an influential factor in political discourse and
its translation. Linguists, historians, politicians, history text translators and
intellectuals in general all comprehend the significance of appropriate word
choice due to the meanings they carry including very sensitive and
controversial historical and political topics to certain groups of people. The
highlighted word choice made by the author in this instance may seem
insignificant, but there is fundamental misunderstanding of the Soviet
Union’s structure and the controversy of such word choice.

The author in this instance opted to use the term "‫ "الروس‬which means
«The Russians », the demonym of Russia and its people. Now, one may say
“why is this word choice wrong?”, the answer is that addressing Soviets as

92
Russians is a controversial topic which some of the non-Russians might find
it offensive. These Non-Russians consisted of more than 90 indigenous
ethnic groups in the territory of the Soviet Union and interestingly, Russians
represented only 50,8% of the population of the Soviet Union in 1989
(Silver, Barbara A. Anderson, Brian D., 1990, p. 510). Evidently, we correct
this inaccuracy in our translation of the passage, supported by historical facts
and documentation. Firstly, using “The Russians” mainly to address the
Soviets could be perceived as offensive and a provoking act due to its ties to
potential Russian supremacy in the Soviet Union and centuries of Russian
Tsar rule over countries which were included equally as Soviet Republics in
the Soviet Union. Firstly, the Tsar rule under the Tsarist Russia or under the
Russian Empire era was an autocratic oppressive rule to Russians themselves
and more extreme towards the non-Russians such as the Polish, Ukrainians,
Georgians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians through
secret police and preserving power through loyal landowners, the nobility
and the Orthodox church. Secondly, the Soviet Union was the union of all
Soviet Socialist Republics as equals principally which ideologically stood
against imperialism and colonialism which were policies of the Russian
Empire and a mark of Russian Supremacy on Eastern Europe and Eurasia.
Now, whether there was still some form of Russian supremacy in the Soviet
Union due to Russia being the strongest state in the union, it is up for debate.
However, the correct historical terminology and demonym of the people of
the Soviet Union is Soviets and addressing Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Georgians
or Estonians as Russians would wrong by all regards.

Through thorough observation and research into the situation, two

possibilities came to our mind in regards to the reasoning behind such word
choice. The first possibility encompasses deflecting imperial characteristics
from the Soviet Union which principally oppose imperialism, into Russia

93
and specifically Tsarist Russia which has been an imperialist power for many
centuries before the communist revolution. The second possibility could be
that we are reading way too deep into his interpretations and the reality is
that he utilised an unfitting terminology without fully understanding the
weight and controversy of utilising the term Russians instead of Soviets.

Instance 3:
Target Text Source Text
Following Stalin’s death, ‫عندما تسلم ورثة ستالين مقاليد حكم البالد‬
Khrushchev eliminated his political ‫بدأوا بالتخلي عن أبشع أشكال حكم سابقه‬
opponents, prime example being (Page 37)
Lavrentiy Beria and proceeded to
start the process of De-Stalinization
which included shutting the prison
camps and finding new ways to
coexist and compete with the west.
(Page 63)

De-Stalinization is a series of political reforms in the Soviet Union after the

death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, introduced by his successor to power Nikita
Khrushchev during his famous secret speech at the 20th party congress in
February 1956, in which he condemned his predecessor’s acts. These
reforms aimed at eliminating Stalinism which included purges and
executions, deportation of Anti-Soviet minorities, cult of personality, the
totalitarian system and the Gulags.
The translation procedure that we opted for in this case is Newmark’s
translation procedure “Recognised Translation” (Newmark, 1981) as we

94
translated “‫ ”بدأوا بالتخلي عن أبشع أشكال حكم سابقه‬into “De-Stalinization” due to
the availability of the historically recognised terminology for the event.
The author’s choice of words is not necessarily false, however the
availability of the historical terminology which represent the event and
summarise the description mentioned in source text. Moreover, after you
fully grasp and comprehend the definition of the terminology “De-
Stalinisation”, we doubt that anyone would use a description in the future in
order to mention the event. Therefore, the accurate use of historical
terminology not only present additional information to the historical martial
and its translation but also enriches and expands the readership’s knowledge.
Obviously, the description is not fundamentally wrong and one may prefer
reading a description rather than a terminology, however, utilising a
historical terminology is a more suitable and academically correct option.

Instance 4:
Target Text Source Text
the West German government ‫وقد أعلنت حكومة ألمانيا الغربية في الثالث‬
announced in a strongly worded ‫ وفي بيان شديد‬١٩٥٨ ‫عشر من تشرين الثاني‬
statement on their rejection to ‫اللهجة رفضها دعوة خروتشوف إلنهاء الحكم‬
Khrushchev's ultimatum to end the .‫الرباعي لبرلين‬
joint occupation of Berlin (Page 81) (Page 65)

The precise illustration of the general perception and perspective of the

world towards a situation is significant during documentation and recording
information in historical materials which serve at conveying the right
information to the current and future readership of historical works.
Regarding this instance, we translated “‫ ”دعوة‬into “ultimatum” in order to
accurately describe the nature and the intentions of the action. We disagree

95
to an extent with the word choice of the author and felt that there are better
alternatives which depict the situation more precisely. The author’s word
choice was not sufficiently precise due to the meaning of “‫ ”دعوة‬is more
suited to a suggestion, an initiative and more inclined to refer to a friendly or
neutral proposal. In regards to the event, the Soviet/ Khrushchev Berlin
ultimatum of 1958 is a well-known historical event in the Berlin Crisis and
the Cold War. The matter of fact, it is well-known to be an ultimatum due to
it being worded as such. According to multiple reliable historical sources
including the US Department of State, Khrushchev’s strong worded speech
on the 10th of November 1958 (Office of the Historian, s.d.) which preluded
the official ultimatum on the 27th of November 1958 by the Soviet Union
demanded the withdrawal of all Western forces including France, Great
Britain and the United States of America from Western Berlin within six
months due to multiple ideological, political and strategical reasons which
we will not delve into here. (United States Department of State)

Instance 5:
Target Text Source Text
On May 15th 1955 an agreement ‫كذلك حدث اتفاق في مؤتمر جنيف بين الدول‬
was made between the Big Four for ‫ على الجالء‬١٩٥٥ ‫األربع في الخامس من آیار‬
a complete withdrawal from Austria. (Page 43) ‫عن النمسا‬
(Page 67)

The statement contains false information and hence we deem it necessary to

intervene by ensuring the factuality of the information conveyed in the
translation, maintaining the main point of the statement (The Austrian
Agreement) and protecting the target readership from misinformation. The
process consists of applying Davies’s Omission (Davies, 2003) on “ ‫مؤتمر‬

96
‫ ”جنيف‬due to its irrelevance to the event and correcting “‫ ”الخامس من آيار‬to
the actual date of the event in the TT, which is the 15th of May 1955.

The disconnection between events and their dates or location can seriously
harm the material and cause confusion amongst the readership. The
confusion is clear to see in the writing of the author in this instance as it
seems that he failed to distinguish between two separate events as well as
state the wrong date which does correspond to any relevant event to the
Austrian agreement. Regarding the event, the Austrian agreement which the
author wanted to address and relay its information is the Austrian State
Treaty. According to several historical documents and archives including the
US department of State archive, the Austrian State Treaty, occurred on May
15th 1955 and granted Austria’s independence and arranged for the
withdrawal of all occupation forces (The US Department of State, 2001-
2009). The author wrongfully stated that the Geneva Conference 1954 which
occurred between April 26th and July 20th 1954 or the other Geneva Summit
which occurred on July the 18th 1955 encompassed the official Austrian
agreement. Furthermore, the author made another mistake in stating the
wrong date of the event as the Austrian agreement or the Austrian State treaty
occurred on the 15th of May 1955 and not on the 5th of May 1955.

Instance 6:
Target Text Source Text
In 1953, Vyacheslav ّ ‫ويذكر‬
Molotov ‫إن مولوتوف أبلغ السفير التركي في‬
suggested to the Turkish ‫ بأنّه يجب إزالة‬١٩٥٣ ‫موسكو في حزیران‬
ambassador in Moscow the ‫التوتر وأسباب بين البلدين وإقناع جمهوريتي‬
necessity of deescalating tensions ‫جورجيا وأرمينيا السوفيتيتين بالتخلي عن‬
between the two countries and (Page 39) ‫مطالبهما اإلقليمية في تركيا‬

97
 resolve the pretexts behind them,
which included convincing the
Georgian and Armenian Soviet
Socialist Republics on renouncing
their territorial claims on Turkish
lands. (Page 64)

We utilised Davies’s Omission (Davies, 2003) by translating “١٩٥٣ ‫”حزيران‬

into “1953” in order to avoid translating misinformation found in the ST
made through indolence in regards to conducting sufficient research or
reliance on false information from unreliable sources. As previously
mentioned, historical studies require conveying information accurately,
especially dates, names and locations due to its sensitivity and intolerability
to errors. The flaws in this instance are the inconsistency between the date
and the event.

The author states that in June 1953, Vyacheslav Molotov informed or

suggested to the Turkish ambassador in Moscow on the necessity of
deescalating tensions and convincing Georgia and Armenia to renounce their
claims on Turkish lands. In the latter statement we found two errors. First,
the suggestion of deescalating tensions and the “necessity” of convincing
Georgia and Armenia happened months ago (Özkan, 2010, p. 78) .Secondly,
the official statement of the renunciation of Georgian and Armenian claims
on Turkish lands by the Soviet government happened with immediate effect
on the 30th of May 1953 (Özkan, 2010, p. 100). The statement is furthermore
confusing due to the unclarity regarding which event is the author trying to
refer to. Whether is it the official announcement or is it the suggestion? If we
consider the action mentioned by the historian then it is the suggestion and
thus the date is incorrect and if we regard the date mentioned by the author

98
which is wrong anyway, then it is the official announcement of the Soviet
Union relinquishment of Georgian and Armenian claims on Turkish lands.

Instance 7:
Target Text Source Text
One of the aforesaid pacts is the ‫ومن تلك األحالف هو حلف جنوب آسيا أو حلف‬
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (South East treaty )‫(سياتو‬
or SEATO, established in ١٩٥٤ ‫تأسس في أیلول‬organization)
September 1954. (Page 70) (Page 47)

We translated “١٩٥٤ ‫ ”أيلول‬into “September 1954” in order to prevent

misinformation and distortion of chronological order to the events in the
translation of the material. Such mistake is due to lack of historical
knowledge and the indolence in regards to conduction sufficient research on
topic and certain information. The author committed an error regarding the
date of the event as he stated that the establishment of the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization or SEATO is on July 1954 whereas the correct date is
the 8th of September 1954 (Britannica, s.d.). The error is quite unexplainable
and we could not find any reasons or reliable sources which supports the
historian’s statement which mentions July 1954 as the date of the SEATO’s
establishment. The only significant political, diplomatic or military action
that happened in July 1954 regarding the Far East is the deployment of
French troops in South Vietnam according to the Geneva Conference and the
establishment of the Japanese self-defence forces. Therefore, with
consideration to the information and sources regarding the event, we
conclude that it is a plain and simple mistake by the author due to indolence
or ignorance on the topic.

99
Instance 8:
Target Text Source Text
Following the West’s successes in ‫وفي أعقاب نجاح الغرب في تطويق االتحاد‬
containing the Soviet Union from )‫السوفيتي من الغرب (من خالل حلف األطلسي‬
the west through NATO and from ‫ومن الجنوب والجنوب الشرقي (من خالل‬
the south and the southeast through ‫حلف جنوب شرق آسيا) سعت الواليات المتحدة‬
SEATO, the US seeked to bridge the ‫إلى سدّ الثغرة التي تمثلها المناطق الواقعة‬
strategical and geographical divide .‫جنوب شرق آسيا بين نطاق هذين الحلفين‬
between the two pacts in the Middle (Page 48)
East. (Page 70)
As well as confronting the ambitions ‫فضالً عن الوقوف بوجه طموحات الصين‬
of the People’s Republic of China, ‫الشعبية والتي بدأت تتعاظم قوتها في منطقة‬
which grew in power and influence (Page 48) .‫الشرق األوسط‬
in the Far East. (Page 70)

We opted to translate “‫ ”جنوب شرق آسيا‬as “The Middle East” and “ ‫منطقة الشرق‬
‫ ”األوسط‬as “The Far East” due to an error committed by the historian in a form
of wrong selection and utilisation of terminology and the relevant location
to the events. Moreover, these types of errors are caused by indolence in a
form of lack of revisions and an indication of lack of concentration. Such
details in historical materials are significant and the littlest flaws are able to
cause distortion and confusion and as a result it might misinform some
readers which do not possess considerable historical knowledge. Throughout
the observation and analysis of the source text we found these two bizarre
inconsistencies which mentions entirely irrelevant regions to the situations
discussed in the statement.

Firstly, the source author contradicts himself in the first instance by claiming
that the strategical and geographical gap between the western alliances is

100
located in the Far East, whereas in fact it is was in the Middle East. The
western alliances containing the Soviet Union at the time consisted of
SEATO in the Far East (Britannica, s.d.) and NATO in Western Europe
(Haglund, 2022), hence it is weird decision by the author to consider that the
strategical and geographical gap of the Western powers is in the Far East.
The Policy of Containment the Soviet Union was introduced during the term
of the American president Harry Truman to counteract the Communist
expansion and the Soviet Union’s ambitions (Britannica, s.d.). One of the
main measures of the Containment Policy was forming alliances around the
Soviet Union’s borders and thus the NATO and SEATO alliances were
introduced. However, the West seeked to bridge the strategical and
geographical gap presented between the two alliances in the Middle East
which threatened the Containment Policy and subsequently the Baghdad
Pact was formed in 1955 (Britannica, s.d.). The intervention in our
translation is necessary in order to correct the error by mentioning the
appropriate and factual location of the strategical and geographical gap
between the Western alliances.

Secondly, the historian states an incorrect information concerning the

ambitions and sphere of influence of the People’s Republic of China in the
Middle East. The People’s Republic of China in the 1950’s factually
possessed little to no influence in the Middle East and its affairs were quite
irrelevant regarding the PRC’s interests as the Chinese were only
concentrating on the affairs of the Far East. Since 1953, the PRC have always
followed a non-intervention policy towards domestic affairs of foreign
sovereignties, especially the Middle East. Furthermore, the Chinese are
historically recorded to have a neutral position towards Middle Eastern
affairs such as the Israeli-Arab crisis in the 1960’s and 1970’s which saw a
series of wars between the two sides. Through the information gathered from

101
the analysis, we conclude that source author has made an error by stating that
the PRC had ambitions and influence in the Middle East as the author
probably meant to write the Far East instead.

Instance 9:
Target Text Source Text
On November 23 of 1958, The ‫أصدرت قيادة الجيش األمريكي في برلين‬
Supreme Allied Commander issued ١٩٥٨ ‫الغربية في الخامس والعشرین من‬
orders to its forces in West Berlin (Page 67) ‫أوامرها إلى القوات التابعة لها‬
(Page 82)

We translated the statement above with an alternative to the date “ ‫الخامس‬

١٩٥٨ ‫ ”والعشرين من‬in the source text into “November 23 of 1958” in the target
text. This decision is driven by historical accuracy and reality, reliable
historical sources and the conducted historical analysis. Through the
analysis, we discovered a slight mistake in the date of the event.
The author stated that on the 25th of November 1958, the US army command
issued orders to its forces in West Berlin not to comply to the inspection
procedures implemented by GDR border checkpoints in West Berlin.
Whereas in reality, the order is issued 2 days before the date stated by the
author and it is actually on the 23rd of November 1958, according to the US
Department of State Archive, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe
sent a telegram to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding
multiple military orders and procedures about the situation in West Berlin
including the refusing any control by the GDR over their movements in West
Berlin (Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute). The Supreme
Allied Commander in Europe stated “In my view it is essential to inform the
Soviet immediately and preferably without public announcement that we do
not intend to recognize or deal with GDR; that we will not allow the GDR to
102
impede the exercise of any right we presently hold; that we will not accept
any control by the GDR over our movements to and from Berlin; and that we
will use force if necessary to enforce our rights.” (Office of the Historian,
Foreign Service Institute).
The error committed by the author in this instance is not the worse kind of
mistakes possible, especially when compared to other forms of errors.
However, regardless of the insignificance of the detail to the overall point
conveyed by the author, such information does still require precision due to
the sensitive nature of the field, the trust of reader in the accuracy of the
information conveyed, the credibility of the producers of the material and the
sources and finally preservation of the chronological order of events.

Instance 10:
Target Text Source Text
ّ ‫إذ‬
The East Berlin Uprising was the ‫إن انتفاضة برلين الشرقية كانت أولى حلقات‬
first of many continuous implosions ‫سلسلة االنفجارات المتتالية ضد األنظمة التي‬
against the Soviet satellite regimes ‫نصبت نفسها في أوربا الشرقية بمساعدة الجيش‬
installed through the presence of ‫األحمر‬
Red Army in eastern Europe. ‫ فكرة عقد‬١٩٥٣ ‫لذلك طرح تشرشل أواخر عام‬
Consequently, in late 1953 Winston ،‫مؤتمر على مستوى عا ٍل لمناقشة مشكلة ألمانيا‬
Churchill suggested convening in an ‫ الواليات‬،‫إذ انعقد مؤتمر ض ّم األطراف األربعة‬
international conference to discuss ‫المتحدة واإلتحاد السوفيتي وفرنسا وبريطانيا‬
the German crisis. From the 25th of ‫ وكان‬1954 ‫) شباط‬28 – 25( ‫في برلين‬
January until the 18th of February ‫مؤتمر مخيبا ً لآلمال وذلك بعد رفض الدول‬
ً
1954, the conference was held ‫الغربية المقترحات السوفيتية والمتضمنة‬
between “The Big Four” in Berlin ‫الموافقة على إجراء انتخابات حرة في ألمانيا‬
and only made limited progress after ‫ وأن تسحب الدول األربعة‬،‫تحت إشراف دولي‬
the western powers refused the ‫ والنقطة األهم التي‬.‫جيوشها قبل االنتخابات‬

103
Soviet propositions, which ‫توصل إليها المؤتمرون هو تنظيم مؤتمر جديد‬
encompass organising an ‫ وكردّ فعل على تسليح ألمانيا‬.‫ينعقد في جنيف‬
internationally supervised free ‫االتحادية من قبل الدول الغربية تم تسليح ألمانيا‬
elections in Germany and a ‫ وأصبحت الدولتان األلمانيتان‬،‫الدمقراطية‬
complete military withdraw before (Page 45) .‫تابعتين كل منهما لكتلة‬
it. More importantly, all sides agreed
on convening another conference in
Geneva. The tension over the
German Crisis resulted in the Soviet
Union rearming the German
Democratic Republic (East
Germany) as a retaliation to the
rearmament of the Federal Republic
of Germany (West Germany) by the
western powers, which consequently
resulted in affiliating East and West
Germany into two opposing military
pacts. (Page 68)
The East Berlin civil unrest of 1948 ‫إ ّن انتفاضة برلين الشرقية كانت أولى حلقات‬
was the first of numerous uprisings ‫سلسلة االنفجارات المتتالية ضد األنظمة التي‬
against the pro-soviet governments ‫نصبت نفسها في أوربا الشرقية بمساعدة الجيش‬
which were established through the ‫ لذلك طرح تشرشل أواخر‬.‫األحمر السوفيتي‬
grip of the Soviet red army in eastern ‫ فكرة عقد مؤتمر على مستوى‬١٩٥٣ ‫عام‬
Europe. Subsequently, in late 1953 ‫ فانعقد مؤتمر‬،‫عالمي لمناقشة مشكلة ألمانيا‬
Winston Churchill suggested ‫يضم األطراف األربعة في برلين من الخامس‬
holding an international convention ،١٩٥٤ ‫والعشرين من كانون الثاني إلى شباط‬
in order to discuss the Crisis in ‫وكان المؤتمر مخيبا ً لآلمال وذلك بعد رفض‬
Germany. The conference was held ‫الدول الغربية المقترحات السوفيتية والمتضمنة‬

104
from January 25th until February 18th ‫االعتراف بالحكومة الشيوعية الصينية واجراء‬
between the four great powers in ،‫انتخابات حرة في ألمانيا تحت إشراف دولي‬
Berlin, which made little progress ‫وأن تسحب الدول األربع جيوشها قبل‬
after the western powers’ rejection ‫ والنقطة األهم التي توصل إليها‬،‫االنتخابات‬
of the Soviet suggestions which ‫المؤتمرون هو تنظيم مؤتمر جديد على أن ينعقد‬
included the official recognition of ‫في جنيف بمساهمة الصين الشيوعية وتناقَش‬
the communist People’s Republic of ‫فيه معاهدة الصلح الكورية والصلح في الهند‬
China, the organization of a general ‫ وكردّ فعل على تسليح ألمانيا االتحادية‬،‫الصينية‬
election under international ‫من جانب الدول الغربية عمل السوفييت على‬
supervision and the military ‫ وأصبحت الدولتان‬،‫تسليح ألمانيا الدمقراطية‬
withdraw of the four powers .‫األلمانيتان تابعتين كل منهما لحلف‬
occupation of Berlin before the (Page 63)
elections. Significantly, all sides
concurred on holding another
convention in Geneva with the
attendance of Communist China to
discuss peace negotiations for Korea
and Indochina. The failure to resolve
the German Crisis led the Soviet
Union to also rearm the German
Democratic Republic (East
Germany) as a retaliation to the
rearmament of the Federal Republic
of Germany (West Germany) by the
western powers, the latter resulted in
affiliating each country into two
opposing military pacts. (Page 79)

105
In this instance, we opted for Newmark’s translation procedure “Paraphrase”
(Newmark, 1981) in order to minimise the damage of repetition on the TT.
We also opted for Davies’s Addition (Davies, 2003) in order to add several
important correlating information intending to remove the ambiguity of the
statement in relation to the previous information.
The repetition is also one of the few instances which Incapability and
Indolence do not intertwine as the repetition was not a result of lack of
knowledge but a product of incompetence in a form of lack of revision of the
material before publication. Although the distance between the two
paragraphs was 18 pages, the repetition or rather the duplication is quite
staggering. Furthermore, in spite of the presentation of factual information
in the source text apart from the date of the Berlin conference in the first
example, the text seems unappealing, incoherent and confusing to whether
the reader had just read this part of the book. The lack of coherence is also
an ambiguity-based error and it is especially apparent when the author
jumped from discussing the Geneva Conference straight to the Soviet
retaliation to the armament of West Germany. The Rearmament did occur as
an initiative based on the tension and escalation of the two blocs in the Cold
War and the failure to find a solution to the German Crisis in the international
conferences. However, the author should have presented a link to connect
the two events in order to avoid confusion and incoherence. In the other
hand, we have tried to minimise the damage of repetition and incoherence in
the target text by paraphrasing the information provided in the source text
and including additional details in order to expand the view which clarifies
the situation to the readers for the purpose of avoiding confusion.

106
 2. Ambiguity-based Errors:
Instance 1:
Target Text Source Text
ّ ‫إذ‬
The East Berlin Uprising was the ‫إن انتفاضة برلين الشرقية كانت أولى حلقات‬
first of many continuous implosions ‫سلسلة االنفجارات المتتالية ضد األنظمة التي‬
against the Soviet satellite regimes ‫نصبت نفسها في أوربا الشرقية بمساعدة‬
installed through the presence of (Page 45) .‫الجيش األحمر‬
Red Army in eastern Europe
(Page 68)

The Red Army: The military force of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.

We opted for Newmark’s translation procedure “Paraphrase” (Newmark,

1981) in order to provide clarification and improvements on the ambiguous
part of ST in the TT. Corresponding with the previous information in the
Ambiguity section, an ambiguous and uncoherent statements are not
tolerated in historical writing. The author opted for a vague and an implicit
approach to define the situation of the Eastern European countries in the Cold
War era. Such approach could leave the reader confused and with plenty of
questions in mind and thus, we took it upon ourselves as translators to paint
a clearer picture which offers a simple answer to their questions without
disorienting the point that the author wanted to address.

There are parts of this instance which do not accurately fit the historical
reality of the events. The statement says that the Communism Eastern
European regimes under the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet Union ‫"نصبت‬
"‫ نفسها‬which translates into “established themselves” and that is simply not
the truth. Those regimes were undemocratically installed by the Soviet
Union through the sphere of influence based on the agreements reached in

107
the Yalta Conference as well as the presence of the Soviet Red Army
stationed in the region. Many historical records prove the undemocratic
transition of communism and socialism in Eastern Europe such as the quote
from Walter Ulbricht, the East German First Secretary of the Socialist Unity
Party on the transition of socialism in East Germany “It's quite clear—it's
got to look democratic, but we must have everything in our control.”
(Leonhard, 1958) . In addition, an election was held in May 1949 in East
Germany and instead of providing multiple candidates for the people to
choose, voters were given the choice of either approving or rejecting a list of
candidates and representatives which were predominately communists and
characters with popular traits to attract voters, thus becoming a one-party
state in the process. Furthermore, another proof that these regimes were mere
satellites with only an illusion of freedom, both reform attempts by the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic were
crushed by the Soviet Union. The Hungarian Revolution in 1956 was
abruptly extinguished by the Red Army and the Prague Spring in 1968 which
sought to liberalise the socialist and communist government was also halted
in place by the Warsaw Pact via military intervention and forcing Alexander
Dubček to resign. David Remnick, a journalist perfectly depicts the situation
by stating “The last time Alexander Dubcek came to Moscow, he was flown
here as a prisoner and interrogated by the Kremlin leadership on why he had
dared lead Czechoslovakia astray with his heresy of "socialism with a human
face." (Remnick, 1990). Regarding the Red Army, the statement was
ambiguous about the role of the red army in Eastern Europe by stating and
with literal translation “with the help of the Red Army”. The Ambiguous
nature of the statement confuses the readers and impedes them from reaching
any conclusions about the role of the Red Army in that context, whether it is
an insinuation regarding the liberation of the Eastern Europe from Nazi
occupation or the iron fist which Stalin laid to maintain communist order

108
over Eastern Europe. Therefore, we clarified the latter with an accurate
translation of the original “Through the presence of Red Army in eastern
Europe” which perfectly depicts the reality of the situation at the time and
provides the reader with a clear idea on the role of the Red Army in Eastern
Europe which is maintaining the Iron Curtain and the political stability of the
satellite regimes as well as defending the borders from the West.

Instance 2:
Target Text Source Text
Consequently, in late 1953 Winston ‫ الواليات‬،‫إذ انعقد مؤتمر ض ّم األطراف األربعة‬
Churchill suggested convening in an ‫المتحدة واإلتحاد السوفيتي وفرنسا وبريطانيا‬
international conference to discuss ‫ وكان‬،١٩٥٤ ‫) شباط‬٢٨ - ٢٥( ‫في برلين‬
the German crisis. From the 25th of ‫مؤتمرا مخيبا ً لآلمال وذلك بعد رفض الدول‬
ً
January until the 18th of (Page 45) .‫الغربية المقترحات السوفيتية‬
February 1954, the conference was
held between “The Big Four” in
Berlin and only made limited
progress after the western powers
refused the Soviet propositions.
(Page 68)

The Berlin Conference 1954 was a meeting between the foreign ministers of
the Soviet Union, United States of America, France and Britain from the 25 th
of January until the 18th of February 1954.

We opted for Newmark’s “Modulation” “Descriptive Equivalence”

(Newmark, 1981) translation procedure in the translation of “‫ ”مخيبا ً لآلمال‬into
“Limited progress” and we utilised Davies’s Omission (Davies, 2003) to
remove the wrong date of the event and Addition to introduce the right

109
information in the translation of “١٩٥٤ ‫) شباط‬٢٨ - ٢٥(” into “From the 25th
of January until the 18th of February 1954”. Every author’s fortune is the
fact that in every language some more than others, there is an abundance of
words to describe a specific situation including the action, the manner, the
intent and the reaction. The author described the Berlin Conference as a
disappointment which in our opinion is an unfitting and an exaggerated
description in consideration to the situation at the time and might give the
wrong interpretations to readers, hence we opted for a more suited expression
to the situation “Limited progress”. The historian also provided the wrong
date of the event as seen in the Source text. whereas in actuality, the Berlin
conference was held between January 25th and February 18th 1954. In the
following paragraph we will provide the reasoning behind our translation
and the author’s inaccuracy in discussing the event.

The author in this instance described the Berlin Conference as a

disappointment due to the Western powers’ rejection of the Soviet Union’s
propositions regarding the German and Austrian Crisis, whereas in reality it
was far from that. The author failed at comprehending the political realities
and landscapes of the situation at that era. The complexity of the crises
including protecting interests, imposing influence and the geographical
proportions of the occupied territories and geographical proximity of the two
blocs’ spheres of influence proved strenuous obstacles to any agreement.
Despite the complications, the Berlin Conference made progress, whether it
was limited or significant progress it is up for debate, however it was a
productive conference which presented at the end two important outcomes.
First, the Soviet Union agreed on a potential withdraw from Austria
contingent upon the establishment of Austria as a neutral country. The
agreement laid the foundations for the Austria State Treaty which occurred
a year later in the 15th of May 1955 which later on in 1955 officially enacted

110
Austrian independence and neutrality and the withdraw of foreign forces
from the country. Secondly, the Berlin Conference which occurred from
January 25th and February 18th 1954 opened a flow of discussion and
encouraged the superpowers to resolve situations through diplomacy, which
prompted the Geneva Conference two months later.

The author attributed the wrong date to the event by saying that it lasted 3
days (25th to 28th of February) which is incorrect due to the fact it occurred
between the 25th of January and the 18th of February. The author in another
instance in the text actually mentions the right information by stating “ ‫فانعقد‬
‫مؤتمر يضم األطراف األربعة في برلين من الخامس والعشرین من كانون الثاني إلى شباط‬
١٩٥٤”, which leads us to believe that the errors was committed due to
Indolence and not due to Incapability as the knowledge was present in the
mind of the historian and a revision of the material before publication would
have resolved the issue. This is one of the few cases in the source text which
incapability and indolence do not intertwine. The disconnection between the
date and the event truly damages the text and the credibility of the author and
every historian should be cautious from making such mistakes through
conducting several revisions.

3. Superficial Perception and Perspective-based Errors

Target Text Source Text

According to the ّ ‫لقد تصور الغرب‬
western ‫أن االتحاد السوفيتي هو‬
ّ
perspective, the Soviet Union was ‫وأن له رغبة مؤكدة في‬ ‫مصدر كل متاعبه‬
the source of all evil and was (Page 52) ‫السيطرة على العالم‬
ambitious to achieve world
domination. (Page 74)

111
We opted for Newmark’s “Cultural Equivalence” (Newmark, 1981) in order
to translate “‫ ”كل متاعبه‬as “all evil” which depicts the situation better. The
perception and perspective of a certain side is significant to comprehend the
situation at a point in the past. Historical accuracy is very important in the
documentation of events for the next generations, hence the interpretations
of certain individuals and entities regarding other individuals, entities and
concepts are important details. The presented alternative in the translation
was deemed by us as recommended and justified in order to depict the reality
of the situation at that period much accurately and such interpretation is
based on reliable information from a credible primary source as well as
historical knowledge possession. Generally, throughout the majority of the
Cold War and the Soviet Union’s existence, the West and its people
genuinely perceived the Soviet Union and communism as “Evil” and as a
very serious threat to all the western countries’ national security and western
democracy. In addition, the western public opinion considered Socialism as
a fantasy which will inevitably be doomed to fail in the future.
In more details, the public opinion of western nations regarding the Soviet
Union’s level of threat varied throughout the Cold War and considering that
the United States of America is the major western power, it would be an
appropriate place to analyse the public’s perception of the Soviet Union
during different parts of the Cold War. According to a study published in
1983 by Tom W. Smith, the Senior Study Director at the National Opinion
Research Centre, University of Chicago at the time, he recorded several polls
in order to collect sufficient data to indicate the American public opinion
towards the Soviet Union in different times throughout the Cold War. We
will focus on the first poll with much details and briefly glance over the

112
second poll mentioned in the page 280 of his book. (Smith, 1983, pp. 277-
292)
The table below shows a collection of data in form of a poll, which unveils
the American general opinion towards the Soviet Union.

Russia Sep Dec Dec Apr Jun Feb Jan

1954 1956 1966 1973 1976 1979 1980
Favorable 0.4% 1.9% 16.6% 15.7% 8.0% 13.5% 4%

Mixed
8.5% 11.7% 30% 43.9% 33.9% 37.6% 23%

Unfavora
91.1% 86.4% 63.4% 40.4% 58.1% 48.9% 73%
ble

The first poll gathered the answers of American people regarding their
opinion of the Soviet Union and it showed that the American have negative
opinion about the Soviet Union, especially during the 1950’s and the 1980’s
(Smith, 1983, p. 280). Furthermore, a remarkable improvement of the
American public opinion towards the Soviet Union was due to the Détente
era of the Cold War, the period which the two sides held talks about de-
escalation and most notably nuclear armament rescale. The data clearly
shows a spike of unfavourable opinion towards the Soviet Union by the start
of 1980 as it accompanied major events such as the election of Ronald
Reagan as US president, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the
American boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics.

The Détente era improved the American public opinion on the Soviet Union.
However, firstly an improvement did not mean an end to all differences as
the majority of the American people during the Détente era still viewed the
Soviet Union as a threat. Military rescale might ease the fear of the people

113
of both superpowers but the capabilities available even after a large military
rescale was still enough to wipe life off planet earth. Secondly, the latter did
not affect the American people’s core dislike to Communism, which they
still considered it as a huge threat to western democracy and the world in all
aspects. To further demonstrate that fact we present to you the second and
the third poll from the aforesaid study, which clearly highlights the
Americans’ dislike to Communism and distrust towards the Soviet Union
during the 1970’s (Smith, 1983).
The 1972 1974 1976 The 1972 1974 1976
Problem of Problem of
The Soviet Communism
Union

Great deal 24% 32% 50% Great deal 41% 46% 50%

Fair amount 38% 36% 25% Fair amount 29% 21% 18%

Not very 27% 20% 18% Not very 19% 21% 18%
much much

Not at all 6% 8% 5% Not at all 7% 9% 5%

Don’t know 5% 4% 3% Don’t know 4% 3% 2%

The second poll contains the American people’s opinion on the level of a
national security threat that the Soviet Union described in the poll as “The
Problem of Soviet Russia” and Communism also presented as “The threat of
Communism at home and abroad” (Smith, 1983, p. 280). The data showed a

114
consistent public dislike of Communism alongside caution and distrust
towards the Soviet Union from 1972 to 1976 which coincided with the
Détente era of the Cold War. The statistics in the poll above clearly
demonstrates a consistently growing distrust of the Soviet Union from 1972
to 1976. The poll shows also that the majority of the American people in
1976 with a whopping 50% in 1976 described the Soviet Union problem as
a “Great Deal” while 25% chose the expression “Fair amount”. The data
above shows a difference between the people’s perception of the Soviet
Union and Communism, as the dislike towards Communism is more
consistent. In 1972, 24% of the American people opted to choose the
expression “Great Deal” to depict the problem of the Soviet Union while
41% opted for the same expression to describe Communism. Thereafter, the
percentage became equal in 1976 due to the rising tension between the
superpowers. Therefore, we gather that the Détente era did not significantly
affect the American people’s perception towards Communism as much it did
for the Soviet Union. Communism is the ideology adopted by the Soviet
Union and the core of its policies and thus the distrust and dislike of this
ideology is also the detest and loathe of the Soviet Union by association. The
word “Evil” is derived from the true perception of the western nations due
to the dislike and loathe we mentioned before but also due to the fear they
bore to the Soviet Union’s military capabilities and the high level of threat it
presented.
Communism Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar
as a Form of 1973 1974 1976 1977 1980 1982
Government

It is the worst 44.2% 50.5% 52.3% 53.6% 58.6% 61%

kind of all

115
 It is bad but 27.5% 27.1% 26.4% 24.9% 27.1% 25.3%
no worse
than some
others

It is alright 25.1% 19.3% 20.1% 20.1% 13.3% 12.2%

for some
countries

It is a good 3.1% 3.1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.1% 1.5%

form of
government

The third poll highlights the American people’s opinion towards

Communism as a form of government (Smith, 1983, p. 281). The American
and western people’s dislike of Communism in general is firm and the poll
clearly unravel the same conclusions. According to the data presented, a
mere 3.1% in 1973 is considered the highest percentage of Americans who
answered that Communism is a good form of government while 44.2%
described it as the worst. The latter percentage drops to a mere 1.5% in 1982
while 61% depicted communism as the worst kind of government. The
Choice of word “Evil” is perfectly weighted for this situation also due to the
American people’s past knowledge of arguably worst forms of government
such as fascism.

116
Conclusion:

The application of notions and theories is an indispensable part of scientific

research, historical studies and translation studies due to the lessons and
discoveries which can only be learnt and discovered that way. Every part
including the abundance of information, the alternatives in the translation,
the justifications and explanations and the presentation of reliable sources all
played an important role in the process which proved many aspects in the
theoretical and translation part of the thesis and disproved many statements
in the selected book. The presence of neutrality in conveying information in
the source text is quite commendable from us to the source author as it is one
of the main attributes of a competent academic. However, the mistakes found
in the ST, especially regarding dates and locations were quite harmful to the
book and to the readership which might not possess the historical knowledge
to realise the error.

117
 GENERAL
CONCLUSION

118
Based on the qualitative research and through the methods and the
manipulated variables in this study, we have established that the method to
identify and rectify errors in historical secondary source materials in
translation is the use historical analysis and translation skills effectively.
Moreover, we highlighted the most common errors committed in the
historical secondary sources derived from the deficiencies in the source
author’s capabilities and integrity. The study also voiced its support to the
notion of the classification of history text translators as qualified historians,
its disproval of the cultural clash in the translation of historical materials and
the concept of foreignization and domestication in scientific fields such as
historical studies as it taints the factuality, neutrality and even the integrity
of the field. There are more profound results gathered through the production
and reading of every chapter.

In chapter one, we established the theoretical aspect of the study and

proposed our information according to previous knowledge, analysis of the
available literature and direct quotations from multiple historians in order to
support our arguments and we reached in chapter one to these conclusions.
Firstly, we concurred and supported the validity of the notion of history text
translators’ classification as qualified historians. Secondly, we identified the
common errors in historical secondary sources and their category which
include ambiguity-based, superficial perception and perspective-based,
incapability and indolence-based and bias-based errors, all of which derive
from incompetence and violation of scientific integrity. Thirdly, we
recognised the necessary and available alternatives in the process of
translation made by history text translators in the case of discovering errors
in the source text. Fourthly, we acknowledged the responsibility of history
text translators towards their target readership to deliver factual and coherent
information. Fifthly, we proved that the process of identification and

119
rectification of errors in the translation of historical materials can only be
achieved through conducting historical analysis by history text translators.

In chapter two, the translation illustrated the appropriate approach and

methods and the information in the chapter one regarding translating a
historical secondary source to the best of our abilities. The process of the
passage’s translation indicated to several aspects. Firstly, the necessity and
effectiveness of the use of historical analysis in the translation of historical
secondary sources. Secondly, the successful practical application of the
theories discussed in chapter one such factuality, neutrality and coherence
which indicates towards the validity of our theories. Thirdly, the translation
proved that the application of the theories discussed in chapter one does not
disrupt nor distort the content of the source text in any way or shape and
instead actually improve and enriches it in the target text.

In Chapter three, the commentary demonstrated the process of identification

and rectification of the source text with translation through the process of
historical analysis. The work done in the commentary bared several results.
Firstly, the content of the commentary through the use of historical analysis
and translation skills proved that historical secondary sources could contain
an abundance of errors in at all levels which some readers would recognise
instantly due to their gravity and others would escape the eye of an ordinary
reader but not academics, especially experienced historians. Secondly, we
demonstrated that some sources are not reliable through automatically
disproving the author sources by association as we disproved the author’s
instances of false information. Thirdly, the commentary proved that even
young history text translators if capable are able to debunk false information
through historical analysis.

Although historical and translation studies in both their theoretical and

practical aspects are huge and what is covered in this study is only a small

120
portion, we hope that we have accomplished a significant contribution which
is beneficial to our fellow historians and translators.

Multiple remarkable works are available in both the fields of translation and
history about similar topics such as “Translation History Culture” by André
Lefevere, “Translation Theory and Practice – A Historical Reader” by Daniel
Weissbort & Astradur Eysteinsson, “Translation and Conflict – A Narrative
Account” by Mona Baker, “Translation and the Intersection of Texts and
Contexts and Politics – Historical and Socio-Cultural Perspectives” edited
by Mohammed Albakry. Future recommendation on potential contributions
on the topic could be studies regarding incompetence and bias in historical
analysis of primary sources.

121
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123
 ‫‪Appendix‬‬

‫المحور الثاني ‪/‬سياسة االتحاد السوفيتي الخارجية من ‪١٩٥٣‬‬

‫أوالً ‪ -‬انعطاف السياسة الخارجية السوفيتية‬
‫اتّسمت سياسة االتحاد السوفيتي الخارجية بعد وفاة ستالين بتخفيف حدة التوتر بالدرجة األولى‬
‫والتحول إلى مبدأ (التعايش السلمي)‪ ،‬مع استمرار العمل على المبادئ األساسية المستوحاة من العقيدة‬
‫الماركسية المتأثرة بمصالح الدولة السوفيتية‪ ،‬إذ ّ‬
‫إن تلك المبادئ األساسية كانت هي الموجه لرسم‬
‫السياسة السوفيتية الخارجية وتحديد مواقفها من األحداث العالمية عندما تسلم ورثة ستالين مقاليد حكم‬
‫البالد بدأوا بالتخلي عن أبشع أشكال حكم سابقه‪ ،‬وخصوصا ً بعد أن تخلص خروتشوف من مناوئيه‬
‫وفي مقدمتهم بيريا إذ تم إغالق المعتقالت والبحث عن أشكال جديدة للتعايش والصراع مع الغرب‬
‫وكانت الدول المستقلة حديثا ً تدخل بالتدريج في مجال اهتمامه ‪ ،‬إذ جاء خروتشوف ليبدل الشعار‬
‫البلشفي القائل‪( :‬من ليس معنا فهو ضدنا) بشعار جديد يقول ‪ ( :‬من ليس ضدنا فهو معنا ) وقعت‬
‫ضمن اهتمامات القيادة السوفيتية منطقة الشرق األوسط ‪ ،‬فاالهتمام الزائد بهذه المنطقة بعد وفاة‬
‫ستالين هو ردّة فعل طبيعية إلهمال المنطقة إهماالً يكاد يكون تاما ً من قبل السوفيت منذ أواخر‬
‫محورا‬
‫ً‬ ‫األربعينات حتى مستهل الخمسينات ‪ ،‬وقد جاء االهتمام بهذه المنطقة الحيوية نتيجة لكونه‬
‫ً‬
‫بارزا في الصراع بين الشرق والغرب وكان لوفاة ستالين أثر حاسم في التغييرات‬ ‫مهما ً يحتل مكانا ً‬
‫التي طرأت على مظاهر السياسة السوفيتية ‪ ،‬إذ كانت بمثابة بداية لعهد جديد في التوجه السوفيتي‬
‫للتعامل مع المتغيرات الدولية أدّى الجوار الجغرافي لمنطقة الشرق األوسط مع االتحاد السوفيتي‬
‫إلى جعل هذه المنطقة بالغة األهمية بالنسبة لإلستراتيجية السوفيتية ‪ ،‬وشكل الشرق األوسط من الناحية‬
‫العسكرية المنطقة الرخوة في الجسد السوفيتي وقد شهدت اإلستراتيجية السوفيتية تحوالً كبي ًرا بعد‬
‫وفاة ستالين ‪ ،‬فقد أدى مجئ خروشوف إلى السلطة في جعل السياسة الخارجية السوفيتية أكثر انفتاحا ً‬
‫على العالم الخارجي والسيما العالم الثالث ‪ ،‬وتزايد انخراط السوفيت الفعلي في الشؤون الدولية في‬
‫العديد من مناطق العالم المختلفة ومن بينها منطقة الشرق األوسط والتي أصبحت منذ منتصف‬
‫الخمسينات مسرحا ً للصراع والتنافس بين القطبين‪.‬‬
‫وقد اهتمت الحكومة السوفيتية بين سنتي ‪ ١٩٥٦ - ١٩٥٣‬بتحسين عالقاتها مع الدول المجاورة‬
‫وترسيخها‪ ،‬وأبلغت الحكومة التركية في آيار ‪ ١٩٥٣‬إنها قد تخلت عن جميع مطالبها اإلقليمية التي‬
‫قُدمت إلى تركيا بعد الحرب واقترحت أن تبادر الحكومتان إلى اتخاذ إجراءات مشتركة من شأنها‬
‫إقامة عالقات حسن جوار بين البلدين‪ ،‬ويذكر ّ‬
‫إن مولوتوف أبلغ السفير التركي في موسكو في حزيران‬
‫‪ ١٩٥٣‬بأنّه يجب إزالة التوتر وأسبابه بين البلدين وإقناع جمهوريتي جورجيا وأرمينيا السوفيتيتين‬
‫‪124‬‬
‫بالتخلي عن مطالبهما اإلقليمية في تركيا والتوصل إلى اتفاق مقنع للطرفين بشأن المضائق ‪ ،‬وقدم‬
‫االتحاد السوفيتي اقتراحا ً إلى إيران بتحسين العالقات بينهما وبدأت مفاوضات تناولت بعض أهم نقاط‬
‫الخالف بين البلدين‪ ،‬مثل قضية الصيد في بحر قزوين وقضية تعديل الحدود ومسألة الذهب اإليراني‬
‫المحفوظ في االتحاد السوفيتي وقضية استثمار بترول الشمال من قبل شركة بترولية إيرانية سوفيتية‪.‬‬
‫بدأ القادة السوفيت التقرب من أفغانستان والهند‪ ،‬إذ وقّع السوفيت مع أفغانستان على اتفاق في تشرين‬
‫الثاني ‪ ١٩٥٥‬يتألف من ثالث وثائق األولى تتضمن منح أفغانستان قرضا ً بمبلغ مليون دوالر تحدد‬
‫أوجه صرفه بموجب أتفاق الحق‪ ،‬والثانية تتضمن تصريحا ً سوفيتيا ً أفغانيا ً مشتركا ً يؤيد مبادئ‬
‫التعايش السلمي‪ ،‬والحكم الذاتي والسلم العالمي وإدخال الصين إلى األمم المتحدة ‪ ،‬أ ّما الثالثة فهي‬
‫بروتوكوالً يمدد معاهدة ‪ ١٩٣١‬السوفيتية األفغانية في الحياد وعدم االعتداء إلى عشرة أعوام قادمة‬
‫تجدد تلقائيا ً‪ ،‬كذلك زار خروشوف مع بولغانين دولة اندونيسيا فضالً عن الهند وباكستان وذلك أواخر‬
‫عام ‪ ١٩٥٥‬وأدرك أن نهج دول آسيا لم يتعارض مع مصالح االتحاد السوفيتي‪.‬‬
‫أ ّما بالنسبة للمنطقة العربية فإنّها اكتسبت بعدا ً استراتيجيا ً جديداً‪ ،‬إذ فرضت أوضاع المجابهة مع‬
‫الواليات المتحدة األمريكية وحقائق الصراع العربي اإلسرائيلي على االتحاد السوفيتي التزامات‬
‫إن هذا االلتزام كان محكوما ً هو اآلخر بانضباطية عالية خشية أن ال‬
‫سياسية وأخرى عسكرية‪ ،‬برغم ّ‬
‫يقود السوفيت إلى مواجهة عسكرية مع الواليات المتحدة األمريكية التي كانت تلتزم الجانب‬
‫اإلسرائيلي‬
‫وقد حاول السوفيت التقرب من العرب من خالل صفقات األسلحة التشيكية إلى مصر وسوريا عام‬
‫‪ ،١٩٥٥‬كما أيقظت خطط العرب الدفاعية في الشرق العربي اهتمام السوفيت بالمنطقة واستغل‬
‫الروس أخطاء الغرب‪ ،‬الذي غدا غير مقبول كحليف بسبب اتّهامه من قبل القوميين العرب بخلق‬
‫إسرائيل واالستمرار في مساعدتها‪ ،‬وكان من النتائج النهائية لسير األحداث ّ‬
‫أن عبد الناصر جلب‬
‫الروس إلى المنطقة للمشاركة في سياسات الشرق األوسط من خالل صفقة األسلحة الشهيرة‪ ،‬إذ شكل‬
‫هذا الموضوع بالنسبة للروس وسيلة لكسب النفوذ في الشرق األوسط‪.‬‬
‫ويذكر ّ‬
‫أن سياسة اإلتحاد السوفيتي تجاه العرب حتى منتصف الخمسينات تتسم بعدم الثقة بالحكومات‬
‫العربية ورفضها االنغماس في مشاكل المنطقة‪ ،‬فضالً عن عامل آخر يرتبط بطبيعة النظرة السوفيتية‪،‬‬
‫وفق النهج الستاليني إلى أقطار المنطقة من أنها تتصف بالتخلف االقتصادي واالجتماعي‪ ،‬وهي تمثل‬
‫ممالك إقطاعية وثيقة االرتباط باالستعمار الغربي‪ ،‬وبالتالي ّ‬
‫فإن تلك األقطار رجعية ومعادية‬
‫للديمقراطية واألفكار االشتراكية‪ ،‬وهو وضع ال يسمح بالتوغل أيدلوجيا ً على وفق القناعات السوفيتية‪.‬‬
‫وقد شهدت منذ منتصف الخمسينات وما يليها نمو وتطور العالقات السوفيتية العربية‪ ،‬إذ أصبحت‬
‫مسألة دعم األقطار العربية ومساعدتها من أولويات أهداف السياسة الخارجية السوفيتية‪ ،‬فقد كان من‬

‫‪125‬‬
‫مصلحة االتحاد السوفيتي ولقرب هذه المنطقة من حدوده الجنوبية‪ ،‬أن تتخلص جميع‪ .‬أقطار المنطقة‬
‫من السيطرة األجنبية‪.‬‬
‫لقد نظر السوفيت في هذه المرحلة إلى العالم على أنه منقسم إلى ثالث مناطق أو كتل رئيسية هي‬
‫الكتلة االشتراكية‪ ،‬والكتلة األرسمالية‪ ،‬والدول النامية والتي حاول السوفيت كسبها إلى جانب الشيوعية‬
‫عن طريق مدّها بالمعونات االقتصادية والعسكرية‪ .‬ومن المظاهر األخرى الدالة على انعطاف سياسته‬
‫الخارجية وإستراتيجيته بعد وفاة ستالين هي اهتمامه بمنطقتي الخليج العربي والمحيط الهندي‪،‬‬
‫فالمحيط الهندي يمثل أحد الطموحات الكبيرة لالتحاد السوفيتي بوصفه الظهير األمني لالتحاد‬
‫السوفيتي وكونه حلقة وصل مهمة بين أطرافه الشرقية على الهادي والغربية وسط أوربا‪ ،‬كما وا ّٕن‬
‫التواجد فيه يم ّكن السوفيت من تقويض قوة واستراتيجية الغرب‪ .‬لقد ناضل االتحاد السوفيتي طويالً‬
‫لكي يخرج من حصار المياه الباردة والمحيطات المتجمدة‪ ،‬ولكي يصل إلى البحار الدافئة عبر مضيقي‬
‫البوسفور والدردنيل إلى البحر األبيض المتوسط‪ ،‬فالبحر األحمر وصوالً إلى المحيط الهندي‪ ،‬ومن‬
‫المعروف ّ‬
‫فإن اإلتحاد السوفيتي رغم اتساع رقعته الجغرافية يفتقر إلى المنافذ المطلة على البحار‬
‫الصالحة للمالحة على مدار العام‪ ،‬ولذا فقد كانت العقبة اإلستراتيجية التقليدية التي تواجه المخططين‬
‫السوفيت هي كيفية الوصول إلى البحار المفتوحة‪ ،‬وفي هذا الجانب سعى اإلتحاد السوفيتي إلى تحسين‬
‫عالقاته بالدول المتحكمة في المضائق التركية والمضائق العربية‪.‬‬
‫فإن اإلتحاد السوفيتي على ما يبدو وفي إطار اهتمامه بالمنطقة فإنّه أراد‬
‫أ ّما ما يخص الخليج العربي ّ‬
‫أن يؤكد على أنّه طرف معني بالتطورات التي تجري فيه السيما على الصعيد الدولي ‪ ،‬لصلة تلك‬
‫التطورات المباشرة بأمنه القومي وذلك بفعل قُربها من ُ‬
‫عمقه السوقي‪ ،‬ولكونها تمثل نقطة وثوب إلى‬
‫قلب الوطن العربي واإلتحاد السوفيتي ‪ ،‬وألهميتها االقتصادية بفعل الدور الحيوي الذي أخذ البترول‬
‫محورا مهما ً من محاور الصراع بين‬
‫ً‬ ‫يلعبه في السياسة والعالقات الدولية ‪ ،‬األمر الذي جعل المنطقة‬
‫فنظرا ّ‬
‫ألن المعلومات عن هذه القارة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫القوى العظمى من الناحية اإلستراتيجية‪ .‬أ ّما فيما يتعلق بأفريقيا‬
‫كانت سابقا ً شبه معدومة في اإلتحاد السوفيتي وكذلك المعطيات السياسية واالقتصادية واالجتماعية ‪،‬‬
‫فقد بدأت عملية تخطيط حقيقي للدراسات األفريقية وقد ش ّكلت فرق من كل الميادين العلمية من أجل‬
‫أن تقدم للسلطة السياسية أدوات تحليل للواقع األفريقي‪ ،‬فكانت النتيجة ترتكز على اليقين ّ‬
‫بأن الفراغ‬
‫مالئم للتغلغل السوفيتي‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬
‫إن توتر العالقات الذي كان على أشدّه بين الواليات المتحدة واإلتحاد السوفيتي بدأ يخف في عام‬
‫‪ ،١٩٥٥‬بعد أن توصلت القوتان إلى امتالك األسلحة النووية‪ ،‬وعندما اشتدّت الحرب الكورية‬
‫والفيتنامية ظهر في جو العالقات السوفيتية ‪ -‬األمريكية نوع من الرغبة في تخفيف حدّة التوتر بين‬
‫الدولتين والسيما ّ‬
‫إن اإلتحاد السوفيتي غيّر سياسته العدائية المتطرفة تجاه الواليات المتحدة وكذلك‬

‫‪126‬‬
‫أصبح يميل إلى مصالحة يوغسالفيا التي سبق وأن اتُهمت من قبل ستالين بأنّها كفرت بالمبادئ‬
‫الشيوعية‪ .‬كذلك حدث اتفاق في مؤتمر جنيف بين الدول األربع في الخامس من آيار ‪ ١٩٥٥‬على‬
‫سحبت‬ ‫الجالء عن النمسا واعتبارها دولة محايدة‪ ،‬ويُذكر ّ‬
‫أن القوات السوفيتية المرابطة في النمسا قد ُ‬
‫خالل صيف ‪ .١٩٥٥‬وانطالقا ً مما سبق يمكننا أن نخلص إلى ّ‬
‫أن هدف السياسة السوفيتية خالل‬
‫األعوام ‪ ١٩٥٦ - ١٩٥٣‬على النحو التالي‪:‬‬
‫‪ -١‬سعي السوفيت إلى التوسع تجاه الجنوب بهدف الوصول إلى المياه الدافئة‪.‬‬
‫‪ -٢‬محاولة السوفييت إبعاد مصادر التهديد األمريكي والغربي عن حدودهم الجنوبية والغربية‬
‫واختراق جدار األحالف الذي حاول الغرب إقامته لتطويق اإلتحاد السوفيتي واحتوائه داخل‬
‫حدوده اإلقليمية‪.‬‬
‫‪ -٣‬العمل على نشر النظرية الشيوعية باعتبارها أداة رئيسية من أدوات االستقطاب الدولي‬
‫في السياسة الخارجية السوفيتية‪.‬‬

‫ثانيًا – موقف اإلتحاد السوفيتي من األزمات واألحالف الدولية ‪١٩٥٦ - ١٩٥٣‬‬

‫من المشاكل الدولية المهمة التي كان لالتحاد السوفيتي دور كبير في التدخل فيها هي المشكلة األلمانية‬
‫‪ ،‬وقد اعتبرت أزمة برلين من أخطر األزمات التي أجّجت الحرب الباردة بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية‬
‫شقّة الخالف بين الغرب والشرق الشيوعي‪.‬‬
‫‪ ،‬األمر الذي زاد من حدّة التوتر وتوسع ُ‬
‫فخالل شهر حزيران ‪ ١٩٥٣‬جرت انتفاضة عمالية في منطقة برلين الشرقية وعدد من البلدات ّإال ّ‬
‫أن‬
‫االنتفاضة انهارت بسرعة‪ ،‬وامتألت معسكرات االعتقال والسجون في ألمانيا الشرقية بمحرضي تلك‬
‫االنتفاضة‪ ،‬مما زاد من دعوات عقد ق ّمة أوربية لمناقشة قضية ألمانيا‪ ،‬إذ ّ‬
‫إن انتفاضة برلين الشرقية‬
‫كانت أولى حلقات سلسلة االنفجارات المتتالية ضد األنظمة التي نصبت نفسها في أوربا الشرقية‬
‫بمساعدة الجيش األحمر‪.‬‬
‫لذلك طرح تشرشل أواخر عام ‪ ١٩٥٣‬فكرة عقد مؤتمر على مستوى عا ٍل لمناقشة مشكلة ألمانيا ‪ ،‬إذ‬
‫انعقد مؤتمر ض ّم األطراف األربعة ‪ ،‬الواليات المتحدة واإلتحاد السوفيتي وفرنسا وبريطانيا في برلين‬
‫مؤتمرا مخيبا ً لآلمال وذلك بعد رفض الدول الغربية المقترحات‬
‫ً‬ ‫(‪ )٢٨ - ٢٥‬شباط ‪ ،١٩٥٤‬وكان‬
‫السوفيتية والمتضمنة الموافقة على إجراء انتخابات حرة في ألمانيا تحت إشراف دولي ‪ ،‬وأن تسحب‬
‫الدول األربعة جيوشها قبل االنتخابات‪ .‬والنقطة األهم التي توصل إليها المؤتمرون هو تنظيم مؤتمر‬
‫جديد ينعقد في جنيف‪ .‬وكردّ فعل على تسليح ألمانيا االتحادية من قبل الدول الغربية تم تسليح ألمانيا‬
‫الديمقراطية‪ ،‬وأصبحت الدولتان األلمانيتان تابعتين كل منهما لكتلة‪.‬‬

‫‪127‬‬
‫ومن المشكالت األخرى التي كانت ضمن اهتمامات السوفيت‪ .‬هي منطقة الهند الصينية‪ ،‬إذ خسرت‬
‫فرنسا مواقعها في هذه المنطقة السيما في فيتنام بعد مؤتمر جنيف ‪ ١٩٥٤‬حينما توصل إلى اتفاق‬
‫ينص على تقسيم فيتنام على خط العرض ْ‪ ،17‬جزء شمالي يحكمه (هوشي منه) وهو ذو توجه شيوعي‬
‫ومدعوم من قبل االتحاد السوفيتي والصين‪ ،‬والجزء الجنوبي مدعوم من قبل الواليات المتحدة التي‬
‫بدأ نفوذها يحل محل النفوذ الفرنسي‪ .‬كما نص االتفاق على أن تجري االنتخابات بعد عامين لتوحيد‬
‫البالد‪ ،‬وسرعان ما أخذت الواليات المتحدة تعمل على خلق حكومة قوية في فيتنام الجنوبية‪ ،‬إذ اتفقت‬
‫الواليات المتحدة مع حكومة سايجون الجنوبية أن تضطلع الواليات المتحدة بكامل المسؤولية في‬
‫فيتنام الجنوبية ‪ ،‬للحدّ من التوسع الشيوعي في الشمال المدعوم من السوفيت فكان ذلك أساس التورط‬
‫األمريكي في فيتنام‪ ،‬وفيما يخص الحرب بين الكوريتين فقد أخفق مؤتمر جنيف ‪ ١٩٥٤‬في التوصل‬
‫إلى حل نهائي بشأن كوريا ‪ّ ،‬‬
‫ألن القصد لم يكن إعادة توحيد الكوريتين ‪ ،‬إذ كانت كوريا الشمالية‬
‫كألمانيا الشرقية تطالب بمفاوضات على أساس المساواة‪ ،‬أ ّما كوريا الجنوبية فإنّها تطالب بإجراء‬
‫حرة بإشراف األمم المتحدة ‪ ،‬ولم يُتوصل إلى اتفاق ‪ ،‬وقام االتحاد السوفيتي بدور كبير أثناء‬
‫انتخابات ّ‬
‫المناقشات حول مسألة كوريا داخل الجمعية العامة لألمم المتحدة‪.‬‬
‫خالل مؤتمر جنيف عام ‪ ١٩٥٥‬اقترح الزعماء السوفيت التوقيع على معاهدة لألمن األوربي تتطابق‬
‫مع شرط ينص على انسحاب جميع القوات األجنبية من أوربا‪ ،‬وقد بدأ بولغانين يوجه العديد من‬
‫وأحس إيزنهاور باالنزعاج حتى كاد‪ .‬أن يغادر جنيف عائدا ً لواشنطن‪،‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫األسئلة حول األمن األوربي‬
‫وهكذا انتهى المؤتمر إلى فشل ذريع‪.‬‬
‫ويبدو ّ‬
‫أن المؤتمرين لم يتوصلوا في مؤتمر جنيف إلى أيّة نتيجة فيما يخص القضايا التي ناقشها‬
‫باستثناء مشكلة النمسا‪ ،‬ومن تلك القضايا التي لم يتوصل المؤتمرون إلى حلها‪ ،‬أزمات كوريا وألمانيا‬
‫وفيتنام‪ ،‬ويمكن القول إنّه وصل إلى حالة من الجمود‪ ،‬فأصبح هناك حكومتان ألمانيتان وحكومتان‬
‫كوريتان‪ ،‬وحكومتان فيتناميتان وحكومتان صينيتان‪ ،‬وأوربا شرقية وأخرى غربية‪.‬‬
‫أ ّما بالنسبة لموقف اإلتحاد السوفيتي من األحالف العسكرية في المدّة التي أعقبت وفاة ستالين فإنّه‬
‫تصدى بكل قوة تجاه األحالف‪ ،‬إذ نجح الغرب في تطويق االتحاد السوفيتي بعدد من األحالف‬
‫العسكرية ومن تلك األحالف هو حلف جنوب آسيا أو حلف تأسس في أيلول ‪ ،١٩٥٤‬وكان الهدف‬
‫)‪) (South East treaty organization‬سياتو( من إنشائه هو التصدي للخطر الشيوعي إذ كانت‬
‫مهمته وضع دول الهند الصينية تحت حمايته وإن لم تكن أعضاء في ذلك الحلف ‪ ،‬وجعل فيتنام‬
‫الجنوبية قاعدة متينة مناهضة للشيوعية‪ .‬ويبدو ّ‬
‫أن الحلف كان الهدف منه تطويق اإلتحاد السوفيتي‬
‫من الجنوب والجنوب الشرقي والحدّ من انتشار المدّ الشيوعي في جنوب شرق آسيا‪ ،‬فضالً عن‬
‫الوقوف بوجه طموحات الصين الشعبية والتي بدأت تتعاظم قوتها في منطقة الشرق األوسط‪.‬‬

‫‪128‬‬
‫وفي أعقاب نجاح الغرب في تطويق االتحاد السوفيتي من الغرب (من خالل حلف األطلسي) ومن‬
‫الجنوب والجنوب الشرقي (من خالل حلف جنوب شرق آسيا) سعت الواليات المتحدة إلى سدّ الثغرة‬
‫التي تمثلها المناطق الواقعة جنوب شرق آسيا بين نطاق هذين الحلفين‪ ،‬وقد مثّل حلف بغداد تطبيقا ً‬
‫للفكرة التي تبناها (جون فوستر داالس) وزير الخارجية األمريكية وهي فكرة (الحزام الشمالي)‪،‬‬
‫والتي مفادها قيام حلف دفاعي موا ٍل للغرب يضم الدول الواقعة في شمال منطقة الشرق األوسط‪.‬‬
‫وعلى الرغم من ان الدور القيادي في تشكيل الحلف كان للواليات المتحدة اال انها لم ترغب بتبني‬
‫رئاسة الحلف وتركت قيادتها لبريطانيا واكتفت بان تكون عضوا ً مراقباً‪ ،‬وكانت الغاية من الحلف‬
‫كذلك هو تقوية شبكة األحالف حول االتحاد السوفيتي وحلفائه لمنع تسرب الشيوعية إلى أبعد من‬
‫فإن االتحاد السوفيتي أصدر بيانا ً في ‪ ١٦‬نيسان ‪١٩٥٥‬‬
‫المعسكر الشرقي‪ .‬وردّا ً على تشكيل الحلف ّ‬
‫استنكر فيه إقامة ذلك الحلف وأعرب االتحاد السوفيتي من خالل ذلك البيان بأنّه ال يمكن أن يقف‬
‫موقف الالمباالة إزاء الوضع الناشئ في الشرقين األدنى واألوسط‪ ،‬وا ّٕن تلك األحالف لها صلة مباشرة‬
‫بأمن االتحاد السوفيتي‪.‬‬
‫أن االتحاد السوفيتي كان ينظر إلى الحلف على إنّه يمثل خطوة نحو إحالل الواليات‬
‫ومن الواضح ّ‬
‫المتحدة محل بريطانيا في الشرق األوسط وهذا في نظرهم أكثر خطورة لهم من ناحية التوازن في‬
‫المنطقة والذي كان قائما ً ضمن النفوذ الثالثي الغربي (األمريكي والفرنسي والبريطاني)‪ ،‬إذ ّ‬
‫إن هذا‬
‫الوجود الثالثي كان ينطوي على انقسامات يمكن لالتحاد السوفيتي أن يستخدمها لصالحه‪ ،‬ويمكننا أن‬
‫بأن االتحاد السوفيتي كان ينظر إلى حلف بغداد بأنّه أحد المخططات التي تستهدف‬
‫نخلص إلى القول ّ‬
‫سيطرة الدول الغربية على دول المنطقة‪ ،‬كما يرى فيه تهديدا ً ألمن االتحاد السوفيتي وتصعيدا ً للتوتر‬
‫بين القطبين‪.‬‬
‫وتجدر اإلشارة ّ‬
‫بأن حلف بغداد أصبح آخر حلقات انفراد الغرب بالسيطرة على الشرق األوسط فهو‬
‫الذي دفع السوفيت إلى إعادة تقييم سياستهم الخارجية تجاه الشرق األوسط‪ ،‬وذلك بسبب شعوره بأهمية‬
‫المنطقة وبخطورة التهديد الذي يمثله التطويق الغربي لحدوده الجنوبية من خالل ذلك الحلف وهو‬
‫أيضا ً ما دفعه بعد ذلك لتجاوز ستار األحالف إلى قلب الشرق األوسط عن طريق تقربه إلى دول‬
‫المنطقة وإغرائها بالمساعدات العسكرية واالقتصادية‪ ،‬ويرى الباحث ّ‬
‫إن حلف بغداد وما ترتب عليه‬
‫من انقسام العالم العربي إلى اتجاهين معارضين قد أدّى إلى إضعاف التيار القومي ويمكن القول أيضا ً‬
‫إن السياسة الغربية التي قصد بها إبقاء السوفيت بعيدا ً عن المنطقة قد أتت بنتائج عكسية إذ أسفرت‬
‫ّ‬
‫عن استدعاء الوجود السوفيتي الفعلي إلى الشرق األوسط ألول مرة في التاريخ‪.‬‬
‫أ ّما مبررات قيام حلف وارشو‪ ،‬أو ما يعرف رسميا ً باسم معاهدة الصداقة والتعاون والمساعدة المتبادلة‬
‫فهو ليس ردّ فعل سوفيتي مباشر على قيام حلف شمال األطلسي‪ ،‬و ٕانّما المبرر الجوهري يكمن في‬

‫‪129‬‬
‫إصرار الدول الغربية على ضم ألمانيا الغربية إلى عضوية حلف شمال األطلسي سنة ‪ ، ١٩٥٥‬لذلك‬
‫وجد االتحاد السوفيتي والدول الشرقية أنفسهم مضطرين التخاذ تدابير دفاعية جماعية لمواجهة تهديد‬
‫يأتي من جهة ألمانيا الغربية‪ ،‬وهكذا يبدو حلف وارشو ردّة الفعل المباشر النبعاث ألمانيا الغربية‬
‫كدولة عسكرية قوية في قلب أوربا‪ ،‬ودمجها في الترتيبات العسكرية الغربية ‪ ،‬وقد كان التفسير‬
‫السوفيتي لهذا اإلجراء هو أنّه يتضمن تهديدا ً ألمنه القومي األمر الذي تطلب منه إعادة تقويم‬
‫استراتيجياته الدفاعية‪.‬‬
‫يالحظ ّ‬
‫أن السبب الرئيسي لتأسيس الحلف هو انضمام ألمانيا الغربية للحلف األطلسي سنة ‪،١٩٥٥‬‬
‫فضالً عن شعور السوفيت ّ‬
‫بأن قوات دول أوربا الشرقية غير قادرة لوحدها على الدفاع عن الكتلة‬
‫الشرقية‪ ،‬لذلك سعى السوفيت إلى إلزام الدول الشرقية بالسماح للجيوش السوفيتية بالتمركز على‬
‫أراضيها لكي يتسنى لتلك الجيوش الدفاع عن حدود االتحاد السوفيتي بالدرجة األساس‪.‬‬
‫ثالثًا‪ :‬تصاعد الصراع بين الشرق والغرب‪.‬‬
‫انتهت الحرب العالمية الثانية وانتهت رحلة السالم وبدأ كل من الطرفين (الشرق والغرب) يكيل‬
‫االتهامات للطرف اآلخر ويتيح الفرصة لإليقاع به ‪ ،‬إذ ادّعت الواليات المتحدة ّ‬
‫بأن االتحاد السوفيتي‬
‫هو الذي بدأ الصراع بإتباعه سياسة عدائية للواليات المتحدة وحلفائها وبافتعاله أو مشاركته في بعض‬
‫الحوادث منها إشعال الثورات الشيوعية في أوربا الشرقية ‪ ،‬ومساندة بعض األحزاب الشيوعية في‬
‫منطقة الشرق األوسط إلحداث البلبلة ‪ ،‬وكما في إيران وتشجيع الحرب األهلية في اليونان وغيرها‬
‫من األحداث التي اتُهم السوفيت بإثارتها ‪ ،‬أ ّما االتحاد السوفيتي فقد اتّهم الواليات المتحدة بالعداء‬
‫األعمى ومحاولتها الدائمة لعزله وتطويقه‪.‬‬
‫فإن الغرب يتصور ّ‬
‫أن أصل الصراع بين الشرق والغرب يرجع إلى النظرية الشيوعية‬ ‫وباختصار ّ‬
‫والتهديد السوفيتي بالسيطرة على العالم بعد تحطيم األنظمة الرأسمالية‪ ،‬أ ّما الشرق فإنّه يتصور ّ‬
‫أن‬
‫الصراع بينه وبين الغرب يرجع في األساس إلى النزعة العدوانية واالمبريالية المتأصلة في ممارسات‬
‫الدول الغربية الرأسمالية‪ ،‬وخصوصا ً الرغبة األمريكية في بسط هيمنتها السياسية واالقتصادية‬
‫واأليدلوجية على العالم المعاصر‪.‬‬
‫وتجدر اإلشارة إلى ّ‬
‫أن البعض يُرجع أصل الص ا رع بين الشرق والغرب إلى سنة ‪ ١٨٤٨‬والبعض‬
‫أن البعض األخير يرى ّ‬
‫أن‬ ‫يرجعه إلى سنة ‪ ،١٩١٧‬والبعض اآلخر يرجعه إلى سنة ‪ ١٩٤٥‬في حين ّ‬
‫سنة ‪ ١٩٤٧‬هي سنة الميالد الفعلية للمواجهة التاريخية الراهنة بين الشرق والغرب‪ .‬ومنذ ذلك التاريخ‬
‫‪ ١٩٤٧‬راحت كل من الكتلتين تنظر إلى كل قرار تتخذه الكتلة األخرى وكأنه عمل هجومي يستلزم‬
‫جوابا ً واعتبر كل جواب على قرار تهديدا ً يجب أن يتبعه استعدادات دفاعية بحته‪ّ ،‬‬
‫وأن أعمال الطرف‬
‫اآلخر هجومية‪ ،‬كما وظف كل طرف طاقاته الدعائية من صحف وإذاعات ومجالت ومطبوعات‬
‫‪130‬‬
‫مختلفة في سبيل تدعيم نظريته ورأيه‪ ،‬هذا إلى جانب استعمالها الضغوطات السياسية واالقتصادية‬
‫التي مورست لكسب الدول األخرى واستمالتها إلى صفها‪.‬‬
‫إن ص ا رع الشرق مع الغرب جعل االتحاد السوفيتي يدرك آنذاك ّ‬
‫أن مصالحه اإلست ا رتيجية‬ ‫ّ‬
‫تتقاطع مع المصالح األمريكية‪ ،‬لذلك جعل عالقته مع الواليات المتحدة المحور األساس لسياسته‬
‫الخارجية‪ ،‬ومن هنا نفهم لماذا كان االتحاد السوفيتي يحرص على أن يكون موجودا ً حيثما تكون‬
‫الواليات المتحدة وخصوصا ً في المناطق الحيوية بالنسبة ألمنه القومي‪ ،‬فالصا رع بين الدولتين‬
‫اقتضى ذلك وتبعا ً لذلك نستطيع أن نفهم لماذا كانت الص ا رعات اإلقليمية في بعض‬
‫َ‬ ‫العظيمتين‬
‫جوانبها األساسية امتدادا ً للص ا رع بين الشرق والغرب‪.‬‬
‫أن االتحاد السوفيتي هو مصدر كل متاعبه ّ‬
‫وأن له رغبة مؤكدة في السيطرة على‬ ‫لقد تصور الغرب ّ‬
‫العالم‪ ،‬ولديه طموح بتغيير العالم وبما يتناسب مع النظرية الشيوعية‪ .‬فاالتحاد السوفيتي في نظر‬
‫الغرب خطر على العالم وينبغي التصدي لهذا الخطر والحد من التوسع األيدلوجي لالتحاد السوفيتي‬
‫وفرض حصار سياسي ودبلوماسي وعسكري عليه‪ .‬أ ّما الشرق فإنّه يُرجع أصل الصراع مع الغرب‬
‫إلى الطبيعة العدوانية والتوسعية الرأسمالية والتي تسعى إلى نهب المناطق الغنية بالمواد األولية‬
‫وتُخضعها لهيمنة النظام الرأسمالي العالمي‪ ،‬ويتصور الشرق ّ‬
‫أن الواليات المتحدة هي أخطر الدول‬
‫الرأسمالية ّ‬
‫وأن من واجب االتحاد السوفيتي الردّ على هذا التهديد الغربي لوجوده‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬
‫إن مرحلة الصراع بين الشرق والغرب يُظهر تزايد التشدد والتصلب في مواقف القطبين تجاه بعضهما‬
‫البعض على المستوى الدبلوماسي ‪ ،‬وتزايد حدّة الحمالت الدعائية وحمالت التشهير المتبادلة بين‬
‫دول المعسكرين وتزايد حدّة سباق التسلح ‪ ،‬إذ ارتكز التوازن االستراتيجي بين القطبين خالل هذه‬
‫المرحلة على مبدأ القدرة على التدمير بالضربة األولى ‪ ،‬كذلك شهدت تلك المرحلة تزايد سياسات‬
‫االستقطاب الدولي ‪ ،‬إذ سعى كل قطب الجتذاب أكبر عدد من دول العالم الثالث إلى جانبه بعد أن‬
‫نجحا في اقتسام القارة األوربية بينهما‪ ،‬فضالً عن انتقال حالة العداء والتوتر الشديد في عالقات‬
‫القطبين إلى منظمة األمم المتحدة‪.‬‬

‫رابعًا‪ -‬سياسة االتحاد السوفيتي تجاه األحزاب الشيوعية وحركات التحرر في العالم‬
‫كان من ضمن أهداف وإستراتيجية االتحاد السوفيتي مناهضة االستعمار ودعم حركات التحرر‬
‫الوطني سياسيا ً إذ سعى السوفيت إلى إضعاف المعسكر الغربي وتفتيته وحرمانه من عمقه‬
‫االستراتيجي واالقتصادي على الساحة الدولية‪ ،‬ممثالً في المستعمرات‪ ،‬ويتفق مع األيدلوجية‬
‫الماركسية الرافضة من حيث المبدأ الستغالل اإلنسان لإلنسان أو شعب لشعب آخر‪ ،‬فاالتحاد السوفيتي‬
‫جسرا لبناء النفوذ خارج منطقة حلف‬
‫ً‬ ‫يحاول جاهدا ً في مساندة حركات التحرر على أمل أن تصبح‬
‫‪131‬‬
‫وارشو‪ .‬والواليات المتحدة على الرغم من حرصها على وحدة المعسكر الغربي تحاول جاهدة أن ال‬
‫تترك هذه الساحة للنفوذ السوفيتي‪.‬‬
‫ووفقا ً لرؤية القادة السوفيت ّ‬
‫فإن االتحاد السوفيتي بمساعدته لحركات التحرر في الحصول على‬
‫استقاللها كان يساهم في تسريع هالك الغرب الرأسمالي‪ ،‬وهكذا ّ‬
‫فإن المهمة تكمن في تحويل تلك‬
‫الدول إلى مجموعة محايدة ومستقلة سياسياً‪ ،‬ال تكون على أراضيها قوات وقواعد أجنبية ‪ ،‬بل تكون‬
‫بينها وبين االتحاد السوفيتي عالقات ودية اقتصادية وسياسية‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬
‫إن نشر األفكار الماركسية والترويج للفكر االشتراكي يُعد من األهداف اإلستراتيجية األساسية لموسكو‬
‫واتبعت في نشره أسلوبين ‪ ،‬إذ استخدمت شعارات التحرر والتخلص من االستعمار والتبعية لتعبّر‬
‫عن أولى هذه األساليب والوسائل غير المباشرة من اجل تشويه سمعة الغرب ‪ ،‬أ ّما األسلوب الثاني‬
‫فذلك الذي جرى اتباعه من خالل الدعم المباشر لألحزاب الشيوعية وذات الفكر اليساري ودفعها من‬
‫اجل االستيالء على السلطة‪.‬‬
‫وقد كانت الشيوعية العالمية تتقدم بخطى حثيثة آنذاك من خالل ظهور عدد من الشخصيات المؤمنة‬
‫بهذا الفكر مثل (سوكارنو)‪ ،‬و(وهوشي منه) وغيرهم والتي أحدثت تغييرات كبيرة في الشرق‬
‫األقصى‪ ،‬ويبدو ّ‬
‫أن لهاتين الشخصيتين تأثي ًرا على بعض زعماء الشرق األوسط‪ ،‬إذ عدّ الغرب تلك‬
‫التغييرات تحديا ً كبي ًرا له وتطلع إلى مواجهتها‪.‬‬
‫وساعدت الحنكة السياسية خروشوف في اتخاذ موقف سليم من منطقتي الشرقين األوسط واألقصى‬
‫م ّما أسفرعن نجاحات كبيرة‪ ،‬والحقيقة ّ‬
‫أن هذه المنطقة والسيما المنطقة العربيةكانت عبارة عن ورقة‬
‫بيضاء بالنسبة لالتحاد السوفيتي‪ ،‬وبدأ خروشوف في كتابة سياسته على هذه الورقة‪ .‬ومن الجدير‬
‫بالذكر ّ‬
‫فإن اإلتحاد السوفيتي وكما يبدو كان يهتم بمنطقة الشرق األقصى أكثر من اهتمامه بالشرق‬
‫األوسط قبل عام ‪ ،١٩٥٥‬فعندما انعقد مؤتمر في موسكو عام ‪ ١٩٥٤‬للمؤرخين واالقتصاديين‬
‫أن الحركة الوطنية في الشرق األقصى هي أكثر نجاحا ً منها في‬
‫السوفيت لفت أحدهم األنظار إلى ّ‬
‫الشرق األوسط ‪ّ ،‬‬
‫ألن العناصر التي تقودها هي الطبقة العاملة وليست البرجوازية الوطنية وهذا م ّما‬
‫قد يفسر االهتمام الكبير الذي أبداه السوفيت تجاه الشرق األقصى وجنوب شرق آسيا وقد كانت‬
‫المساعدات االقتصادية السوفيتية من أهم الوسائل التي اعتمدها صانع القرار السوفيتي في تعامله مع‬
‫الشرق األوسط في فترة اشتداد المنافسة بين الكتلتين ‪ ،‬ويمكن القول عموما ً ّ‬
‫أن الهدف من جراء تقديم‬
‫المساعدات االقتصادية للدول الشرق أوسطية ‪ ،‬هو إضعاف نظام المحالفات السياسية والعسكرية التي‬
‫عقدها الغرب مع تلك الدول للحيلولة دون استجابتها لإلغراءات االقتصادية ‪ ،‬هذا باإلضافة إلى‬
‫منافسة الوجود الغربي ‪ ،‬ومن ثم الحدّ منه‪.‬‬

‫‪132‬‬
‫ولتحقيق ما تقدم فقد اعتقد الساسة السوفيت بأنّه أفضل وسيلة لتحقيق ذلك تتركز في تقديم المساعدات‬
‫االقتصادية للدول النامية عموما ً وبضمها الوطن العربي وإلبعادها عن دائرة النفوذ الغربي‪ .‬وكانت‬
‫صفقة األسلحة التشيكية بمثابة األساس لتحالف جديد بين االتحاد السوفيتي ومصر إذ حتى ذلك الوقت‬
‫كان االتحاد السوفيتي ال يزال يشك في مدى إخالص مصر للنظام االشتراكي‪ .‬وقد عدّت صفقة‬
‫عدّت نهاية عهد قديم‬
‫األسلحة التشيكية ‪ ١٩٥٥‬في حينها نقطة التحول العظمى في الشرق األوسط و ُ‬
‫نصرا كبي ًرا للسوفيت وبالمقابل أ ّكد الساسة المصريون ّ‬
‫بأن‬ ‫ً‬ ‫وبداية عهد جديد ‪ ،‬إذ كانت الصفقة‬
‫االتفاقية إنّما هي عملية تجارية تستورد بموجبها مصر من االتحاد السوفيتي األسلحة والذخائر وليس‬
‫المبادئ واألفكار السياسية‪.‬‬
‫ويذكر ّ‬
‫أن التحول السوفيتي من موقف العداء للحركة القومية في الشرق األوسط إلى موقف التعاون‬
‫أن التحول الحقيقي لم يحدث ّإال بعد وفاة ستالين‪ ،‬فقد ظ ّل الروس‬
‫معها تحول تحوالً تدريجياً‪ ،‬إذ ّ‬
‫يكتبون بروح انتقادية عن الحركة القومية العربية‪ ،‬أ ّما الجامعة العربية ّ‬
‫فإن الروس نظروا إليها على‬
‫أنّها عميلة بريطانية وجبهة رجعية وأداة في محاربة حركة التحرر الوطني في الشرق األوسط‪،‬‬
‫ووصفت بأنّها آلة في يد االستعمار االنكليزي واألمريكي‪ .‬وتجدر اإلشارة إلى ّ‬
‫أن السوفيت منتصف‬
‫الخمسينات كان من ضمن أولوياته دعم األقطار العربية ومساعدتها‪ ،‬إذ كان من مصلحته أن تتخلص‬
‫تلك األقطار من السيطرة الغربية وذلك لقربها من حدوده الجنوبية ولم يتردد االتحاد السوفيتي في‬
‫مساعدة تلك األقطار من اجل الحفاظ على استقاللها والمضي بها قدما ً للحيلولة دون وقوع تلك األقطار‬
‫تحت سيطرة القوى الغربية ثانيةً‪.‬‬
‫قام االتحاد السوفيتي بدور مهم وكبير في العالقات الدولية سواء عبر الضغط على النظام ال أ رسمالي‬
‫لتحقيق التوازن أو من خالل دعم حركات التحرر الوطني في العالم الثالث لتصفية االستعمار‪ّ ،‬‬
‫وأن‬
‫إيمان السوفيت بحتمية انتصار الماركسية من األسباب الجوهرية إلبقاء حالة التوتر في العالم وظهور‬
‫الحرب الباردة‪ ،‬على صعيد العالقات بين الدول االشتراكية والرأسمالية‪.‬‬
‫وقد كان من بين العوامل التي ساعدت على نشر أفكاره والمبادئ الشيوعية‪ ،‬معاناة العديد من الشعوب‬
‫من المشكالت االقتصادية واالجتماعية وهو ما شكل بيئة مالئمة للترويج لتلك األفكار الشيوعية‪ ،‬إذ‬
‫اعتمد السوفيت على األحزاب الشيوعية المحلية في تحقيق أهدافه‪ ،‬إال ّ‬
‫أن التناقضات بين األح ا زب‬
‫الشيوعية وبين أنظمة الحكم في العديد من دول العالم قد أدت في كثير من األحيان إلى توتر العالقات‬
‫السوفيتية مع تلك الدول‪ ،‬والى جانب األحزاب الشيوعية المحلية لجأ االتحاد السوفيتي في نشر أفكاره‬
‫الشيوعية إلى عدّة وسائل أخرى كالمكاتب الثقافية ‪ ،‬وتقديم المنح التعليمية ونشر الكتب والمجالت‬
‫السوفيتية وترجمتها‪ ،‬فضالً عن تبادل الخبراء وتنظيم المعسكرات الشبابية والعمالية بهدف خلق‬
‫مالكات تعتنق الفكر الشيوعي وتعمل على ترويجه‪.‬‬

‫‪133‬‬
‫أصبحت كلمة (االشتراكية) مستقطبة لعدد من دول العالم‪ ،‬أ ّما كلمة (الرأسمالية) فكانت تجسيدا ً‬
‫لسيطرة الغرب السياسية واالقتصادية واالجتماعية‪ .‬وفي هذا اإلطار بدأ اإلتحاد السوفيتي في التقرب‬
‫إلى دول العالم الثالث مستهدفا ً إقامة عالقات دبلوماسية مع الدول حديثة االستقالل في إفريقيا وآسيا‪،‬‬
‫إذ أدركت القيادة السوفيتية الجديدة ّ‬
‫أن تصفية االستعمار في العالم الثالث يمكن أن يحقق لها مكاسب‬
‫سياسية وإستراتيجية واقتصادية فأعلنت استعدادها لمساندة حركات التحرر ومناصرتها من أجل‬
‫تقرير مصيرها‪ ،‬كما بدأ اإلتحاد السوفيتي كذلك في االهتمام باإلدارة االقتصادية لدعم عالقاته مع‬
‫دول من خارج المعسكر االشت ا ركي حيث قدم مساعدات اقتصادية لكل من الهند عندما قدموا له‬
‫قرضا ً عامي ‪ ١٩٥٣‬و ‪ ، ١٩٥٥‬ثم أفغانستان عام ‪ ١٩٥٤‬كذلك ساهم السوفيت في برنامج األمم‬
‫المتحدة للمساعدات الفنية للدول النامية ‪ ،‬وهكذا بدأ اإلتحاد السوفيتي يؤدي دو ًرا ملموسا ً في‬
‫الصراعات اإلقليمية والمشكالت الدولية من خالل ما قدمه لعمالئه من دعم سياسي أو اقتصادي أو‬
‫عسكري‪.‬‬
‫ويبدو من خالل ما تقدم فيما يخص أساليب اإلتحاد السوفيتي في دعم حركات التحرر العالمي أنّه كان‬
‫يهدف من جراء تقديم المساعدات هو إضعاف نظام المحالفات التي أقامها الغرب مع تلك الدول بهدف‬
‫تطويقه‪ ،‬إذ اعتقد صناع القرار في اإلتحاد السوفيتي ّ‬
‫بأن أفضل حل للحيلولة دون استجابة تلك الدول‬
‫لإلغراءات األمريكية هو تقديم المساعدات االقتصادية والعسكرية بغية إبعادها عن دائرة النفوذ‬
‫الغربي وقد تأكدت هذه القناعة فعالً بعد وفاة ستالين ومجئ خروشوف ‪ ،‬وكان من ضمن أهداف‬
‫اإلتحاد السوفيتي أيضا ً هو إبعاد التهديد األمريكي والغربي عن حدوده الجنوبية والغربية واختراق‬
‫ستار األحالف الذي حاول الغرب إقامته لتطويق االتحاد السوفيتي واحتوائه داخل حدوده اإلقليمية ‪،‬‬
‫فضالً عن نشر النظرية الشيوعية باعتبارها أداة مهمة من أدوات االستقطاب الدولي في سياسة اإلتحاد‬
‫السوفيتي الخارجية‪.‬‬
‫الفصل الثاني ‪ -‬أبعاد السياسة الخارجية السوفيتية تجاه الكتلة االشتراكية ‪– ١٩٦٤‬‬
‫‪١٩٥٦‬‬
‫أوالً‪ :‬موقف السوفيت من أزمة برلين ‪١٩٦٤ -١٩٥٨‬‬
‫إنّ انتفاضة برلين الشرقية كانت أولى حلقات سلسلة االنفجا ا رت المتتالية ضد‬
‫األنظمة التي نصبت نفسها في أوربا الشرقية بمساعدة الجيش األحمر السوفيتي‪ .‬لذلك طرح تشرشل‬
‫أواخر عام ‪ ١٩٥٣‬فكرة عقد مؤتمر على مستوى عالمي لمناقشة مشكلة ألمانيا‪ ،‬فانعقد مؤتمر يضم‬
‫األطراف األربعة في برلين من الخامس والعشرين من كانون الثاني إلى شباط ‪ ، ١٩٥٤‬وكان المؤتمر‬
‫مخيبا ً لآلمال وذلك بعد رفض الدول الغربية المقترحات السوفيتية والمتضمنة االعت ا رف بالحكومة‬

‫‪134‬‬
‫الشيوعية الصينية وإجراء انتخابات حرة في ألمانيا تحت إشراف دولي ‪ ،‬وأن تسحب الدول األربع‬
‫جيوشها قبل االنتخابات‪ ،‬والنقطة األهم التي توصل إليها المؤتمرون هو تنظيم مؤتمر جديد على أن‬
‫ينعقد في جنيف بمساهمة الصين الشيوعية وتناقَش فيه معاهدة الصلح الكورية والصلح في الهند‬
‫الصينية‪ ،‬وكردّ فعل على تسليح ألمانيا االتحادية من جانب الدول الغربية عمل السوفيت على تسليح‬
‫ألمانيا الديمقراطية‪ ،‬وأصبحت الدولتان األلمانيتان تابعتين كل منهما لحلف أثناء مؤتمر جنيف الذي‬
‫انعقد في تموز ‪ ١٩٥٥‬اجتمع األطراف األربعة الكبار وتدارس المجتمعون المشكلة األلمانية ‪ ،‬وقدمت‬
‫الحكومة السوفيتية من جديد عرضها بعقد اتفاقية أوربية عامة لألمن الجماعي بمشاركة شطري‬
‫ألمانيا‪.‬‬
‫وبسبب الموقف السلبي السوفيتي تجاه ألمانيا الغربية قرر المستشار األلماني زيارة موسكو في أيلول‬
‫‪ ١٩٥٥‬لتبادل وجهات النظر فيما يخص شطري ألمانيا ‪ ،‬والنتيجة التي حصل عليها اديناور هي إقامة‬
‫عالقات دبلوماسية بين البلدين ‪ ،‬وتبادل السفراء ‪ ،‬و يبدو مما ذكره خروشوف في مذكراته من تلك‬
‫أن اديناور عرض عليه قروضا ً ودفع التعويضات المستحقة على ألمانيا لالتحاد السوفيتي‬
‫الزيارة ّ‬
‫مقابل تخلي السوفيت عن ألمانيا الديمقراطية ‪ ،‬ومن ثم رفض خروشوف تلك المساومة وعدّها غير‬
‫مقبولة كليا ً‪ ،‬ولم يحصل اديناور من السوفيت إال على إطالق سراح بعض السجناء األلمان في سجون‬
‫االتحاد السوفيتي‪ ،‬مقابل إقامة عالقات دبلوماسية بين موسكو وبون‪.‬‬
‫هاجم خروشوف في أثناء خطابه الذي ألقاه في برلمان ألمانيا الشرقية في السادس عشر من آب ‪١٩٥٧‬‬
‫عدة مرات سياسة أديناور مستشار ألمانيا الغربية وقال ّ‬
‫إن سياسة ألمانيا الغربية تعبّد الطريق للحرب‬
‫الذرية‪ ،‬وقد أيّد خروشوف في خطابه اقتراحا ً تقدم به (الهر غروترل) رئيس الوزراء في ألمانيا ّ‬
‫بأن‬
‫إنذارا إلى كل من فرنسا‬
‫ً‬ ‫األلمانيتين يجب أن تتحالفا في خطوة أولى نحو الوحدة وقد وجه في خطابه‬
‫وبريطانيا وألمانيا الغربية والواليات المتحدة بأنها ستكون في خطر إذا ما نشبت حرب ذرية‬
‫واستعملت فيها أسلحة التدمير الشامل‪.‬‬
‫عادت المشكلة في تشرين الثاني ‪ ١٩٥٨‬مرة أخرى لتكون واجهة للصراع في الحرب الباردة ‪ ،‬فقد‬
‫أثار خروشوف وضع برلين عندما اقترح إلغاء اإلشراف الرباعي على المدينة وجعلها مدينة حرة‬
‫منزوعة السالح‪ ،‬وقد هدد خروشوف في حينها الدول الغربية بأنها إذا لم تعترف بجمهورية ألمانيا‬
‫الديمقراطية فإنّه سيلغي جميع حقوق الدول الغربية على وفق معاهدة بوتسدام‪ ،‬وقد ذكرت صحيفة‬
‫البرافدا في التاسع عشر من تشرين الثاني ‪ّ ١٩٥٨‬‬
‫إن االتحاد السوفيتي سيعلن قراره بإنهاء االحتالل‬
‫الرباعي لبرلين دون الحصول على موافقة الدول الغربية‪ ،‬وقالت الصحيفة إن الزعماء الغربيين‬
‫مخطئون إذا اعتقدوا ّ‬
‫أن تنفيذ مشروع الحكومة السوفيتية الخاص بإنهاء حالة االحتالل في برلين‬
‫يتوقف على موافقتهم‪.‬‬

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‫صرح أولبراخت في السابع والعشرين من تشرين الثاني عام ‪ ١٩٥٨‬بأن الغربيين انتهكوا اتفاقات‬
‫بوتسدام بتسليح ألمانيا الغربية وبنا ًء عليه ليس لهم أي حق في البقاء في برلين‪ ،‬متى توحدت وأصبحت‬
‫عاصمة أللمانيا الشرقية‪ ،‬وقد أعلنت حكومة ألمانيا الغربية في الثالث عشر من تشرين الثاني ‪١٩٥٨‬‬
‫وفي بيان شديد اللهجة رفضها دعوة خروشوف إلنهاء الحكم الرباعي لبرلين‪ ،‬ومن ناحية أخرى فقد‬
‫صرح رئيس وزراء ألمانيا الشرقية‪ :‬إن حكومته ستجري مفاوضات مع االتحاد السوفيتي حول‬
‫انسحاب القوات السوفيتية من ألمانيا الشرقية‪.‬‬
‫في الرابع والعشرين من الشهر نفسه طالبت ألمانيا الشرقية بمدينة برلين كلها‪ ،‬وطلبت من الدول‬
‫الغربية أن تخرج منها‪ ،‬وأشار المسؤولون في ألمانيا الشرقية إلى أنهم سيحاولون اإلشراف التام على‬
‫طرق المواصالت الجوية والبرية التي تستخدمها الدول الغربية في الوصول إلى القطاع الغربي من‬
‫برلين وقال هؤالء المسؤولون ّ‬
‫إن برلين يجب أن تكون مدينة يسودها السالم‪ ،‬وقد صرح زعماء‬
‫ألمانيا الديمقراطية ّ‬
‫بأن األسلحة السوفيتية‪ ،‬الحديثة تستطيع أن تدمر أمريكا وتمحوها في ‪ ٩٠‬دقيقة‬
‫أن تلك التصريحات يقف وراءها التحريض السوفيتي ألنّه هو‬
‫إذا قامت الحرب بسبب برلين ويبدو ّ‬
‫المحرك األساس لتلك األزمة ‪ ،‬وهذا ما أكده خروشوف في مذكراته ‪ ،‬إذ جاء فيها ‪(( :‬كان أقصى ما‬
‫نطلبه من الطرف اآلخر أن يعترف بوجود نظامين اجتماعيين سياسيين مختلفين في ألمانيا‪:‬‬
‫االشتراكية في ألمانيا الشرقية والرأسمالية في ألمانيا الغربية‪ ،‬وبموجب اقتراحنا يكون لبرلين الغربية‬
‫وضع خاص كمدينة حرة ))‪.‬‬
‫أنذر خروشوف الدول الغربية في الثالثين من تشرين الثاني ‪ ١٩٥٨‬وأمهلهم مدّة ستة أشهر لجعل‬
‫مدينة برلين منزوعة السالح‪ ،‬أ ّما إذا رفض الغربيون هذا العرض فسيلجأ السوفيت بعد انقضاء المهلة‬
‫إلى خطوتين‪:‬‬
‫‪ -١‬توقيع معاهدة صلح مع جمهورية ألمانيا الديمقراطية‪.‬‬
‫‪ -٢‬إيقاف كل اتصال في ألمانيا مع ممثلي القوات المسلحة لكل من الواليات المتحدة وبريطانيا وفرنسا‪،‬‬
‫ويبدو ّ‬
‫أن خروشوف كان يستخدم مشكلة برلين ورقة للضغط على الواليات المتحدة بقطع المواصالت‬
‫الغربية بالمدينة عبر أرض ألمانيا الديمقراطية‪.‬‬
‫أصدرت قيادة الجيش األمريكي في برلين الغربية في الخامس والعشرين من ‪ ١٩٥٨‬أوامرها إلى‬
‫القوات التابعة لها بعدم الخضوع إلجراءات التفتيش التي تتخذ عند نقاط المراقبة على حدود برلين‬
‫الغربية ‪ ،‬وذلك في حالة قيام قوات ألمانيا الشرقية باتخاذ هذه اإلجراءات بدالً من القوات السوفيتية‪،‬‬
‫وقد بلغت أزمة برلين مرحلة خطرة عندما أعلنت الدول الغربية ّ‬
‫إن الحرب العالمية الثالثة ستبدأ إذا‬
‫دخل الروس برلين الغربية‪ ،‬وقد تقرر وضع )‪ ٦٠٠‬طائرة( تحت تصرف ألمانيا الغربية إذا فرض‬

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 ‫حصارا على برلين وعندما شعرت الدول الغربية ّ‬
‫أن برلين الشرقية أصبحت‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الروس أو ألمانيا الشرقية‬
‫تحت سيطرة االتحاد السوفيتي رفضت‬
‫االعتراف بشرعية هذا العمل‪ ،‬وفي الثالث عشر من كانون األول ‪ ١٩٥٨‬صرح خروشوف عبر‬
‫وكالة تاس السوفيتية ّ‬
‫إن االتحاد السوفيتي سيدافع عن حدود ألمانيا الشرقية في حالة وقوع عدوان‬
‫عليها وأن روسيا ستنفذ التزامها بموجب حلف وارشو ‪ ،‬كما ذكر إنّه إذا رفضت الدول الغربية‬
‫االقتراح السوفيتي لجعل برلين الغربية مدينة حرة فلن يبقَ هناك أي أساس آخر للتفاوض مع الغرب‬
‫بشأن برلين‪ ،‬وقد ردّت وزارة الخارجية األمريكية في اليوم نفسه ّ‬
‫إن الواليات المتحدة لن تثنيها‬
‫التهديدات من المحافظة على حقوقها في برلين‪ ،‬كذلك رفضت حكومة ألمانيا الغربية التهديد السوفيتي‬
‫أن ناطقا ً بلسان الحكومة الفرنسية قال ّ‬
‫إن‬ ‫‪ ،‬أ ّما فرنسا فقد رفضت التعليق على التهديد السوفيتي بَيد ّ‬
‫فرنسا متضامنة مع حلفائها فيما يتعلق ببرلين‪.‬‬
‫حذر الجنرال ا زخاروف قائد القوات السوفيتية في ألمانيا الشرقية في التاسع عشر من كانون األول‬
‫‪ ١٩٥٨‬قائد القوات األمريكية في أوربا‪ :‬بأن الجيش السوفيتي سيُنزل بقوات الدول الغربية هزيمة‬
‫نكراء إذا ما حاولت شق طريقها بالقوة إلى برلين‪ ،‬وجاء في البيان‪ )):‬إن فرق الجيش السوفيتي في‬
‫ألمانيا الشرقية والبالغ عددها ‪ ٢٢‬فرقة ستصد أي محاولة لمنع تنفيذ المقترحات السوفيتية الخاصة‬
‫ببرلين ))‪ ،‬وفي الحادي والثالثين من كانون األول ‪ ١٩٥٨‬أرسلت حكومات الدول الغربية الثالث‬
‫الواليات المتحدة وبريطانيا وفرنسا مذكرة موجهة لالتحاد السوفيتي يعلنون رفضهم القاطع لمقترحات‬
‫خروشوف بصدد برلين‪ ،‬ويؤكدون تصميمهم على الدفاع عن حقوق الغرب في هذه المدينة‪.‬‬
‫قدم االتحاد السوفيتي في كانون الثاني ‪ ١٩٥٩‬مشروعا ً يتألف من (‪ )٤٨‬مادة طالبت بامتناع كل من‬
‫ألمانيا الديمقراطية وألمانيا الغربية عن االنتساب إلى أي تكتل عسكري‪ ،‬كما طالبت بخروج كل من‬
‫شطري البالد من حلفي األطلسي ووارشو‪َ ،‬بيد ّ‬
‫أن الدول الغربية رفضت ذلك المشروع‪ ،‬وعندما‬
‫اجتمع وزراء خارجية الدول األربعة المشرفة على برلين في مايس ‪ ١٩٥٩‬لم يتوصلوا التفاق حول‬
‫الموضوع على الرغم من سعيهم إليجاد حل لتسوية المشكلة‪ ،‬لذا اتفقوا على عقد مؤتمر آخر في‬
‫باريس عام ‪ .١٩٦٠‬وعند انعقاد المؤتمر تصاعدت المواجهة السياسية واإلعالمية بين الواليات‬
‫المتحدة واالتحاد السوفيتي على أثر تمكن السوفيت من إسقاط طائرة التجسس األمريكية )‪ (U2‬ففي‬
‫الجلسة العلنية طلب خروشوف من إيزنهاور االعتذار ّإال ّ‬
‫أن إيزنهاور رفض طلب خروشوف‪ ،‬وعلى‬
‫أن المؤتمر فشل قبل أن يبدأ عمليا ً‪،‬‬
‫الرغم من جهود ديغول إلجر‪h‬ء المصالحة بين الطرفين َبيد ّ‬
‫وافترق المؤتمرون من دون حسم أي قضية‪.‬‬

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 ‫أن خروشوف كان يعتقد ّ‬
‫بأن (هيبته القومية والشخصية متوقفة على حل مشكلة‬ ‫وفي واقع األمر ّ‬
‫ألمانيا)‪ ،‬كما كان يعتقد ّ‬
‫بأن برلين ليست سوى سرطان في قلب أوربا يجب استئصاله لضمان استمرار‬
‫السالم في العالم‪.‬‬
‫انعقد مؤتمر فينّا في مطلع حزيران ‪ ١٩٦١‬وجرى بحث مختلف القضايا المطروحة على الساحة‬
‫الدولية وكانت قضية برلين في مقدمة القضايا التي ناقشها المؤتمر‪ ،‬فكان موقف السوفيت واضحاً‪،‬‬
‫وهو الرغبة في توقيع معاهدة مع جمهورية ألمانيا الديمقراطية قبل نهاية العام‪ ،‬بَيد ّ‬
‫أن الموقف‬
‫السوفيتي جوبه برفض من جانب الواليات المتحدة ألمريكية‪.‬‬
‫بعد فشل مؤتمر فينا في إيجاد حل الزمة برلين الغربية ازداد عدد المهاجرين من ألمانيا الديمقراطية‬
‫إلى ألمانيا الغربية‪ ،‬فخالل األسبوع األخير من تموز وصل عشرة آالف الجئ ألماني شرقي إلى‬
‫غرب برلين‪ ،‬وبسبب هذا النزوح الجماعي ثار جدل بين زعماء البلدان االشتراكية بشأن إغالق‬
‫الحدود‪ ،‬إذ أكد رئيس حكومة ألمانيا الديمقراطية في مؤتمر رؤساء حكومات حلف وارشو في الثالث‬
‫أن الوضع في بلده على وشك أن يتفجر‪ ،‬وا ّٕن عدد الهاربين يتصاعد باستمرار ويهدد‬
‫من آب ‪ّ ١٩٦١‬‬
‫اقتصاد البلد‪ ،‬وقد أقترح االتحاد السوفيتي مرابطة قوات من بلدان محايدة أو من األمم المتحدة في‬
‫برلين الغربية وبشكل مؤقت مكان قوات الدول الغربية وأعضاء حلف شمالي األطلسي وقد رفضت‬
‫الدول الغربية جميع االقتراحات بدون استثناء‪.‬‬
‫أعلن أولبراخت في الخامس من آب ‪ ١٩٦١‬أثناء جلسات حوار لدول حلف وارشو خطته ببناء جدار‬
‫متين‪ ،‬إضافة إلى حاجز أسالك شائكة في مواجهة حدود برلين الغربية‪ ،‬مما أثار ردّة فعل قوية من‬
‫الكتلة الغربية وأعلنوا تنديدهم بهذه الخطوة‪.‬‬

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