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Strategic Consensus in Operations Strategy

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 Journal of Operations Management 17 Ž1999. 289–305

Strategic consensus in operations strategy

a,) b,1
Kenneth K. Boyer , Christopher McDermott
a
Department of Management, DePaul UniÕersity, 1 E. Jackson BouleÕard, Chicago, IL 60604-2287, USA
b
The Lally School of Management and Technology, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12180-3590, USA
Received 11 September 1997; accepted 22 May 1998

Abstract

Many companies’ operations strategies resemble roadmaps: they are very detailed, yet poorly communicated across the
organization and inflexible in reacting to environmental changes. In contrast, an operations strategy which is clearly
outlined, widely understood and allows flexibility to adapt to changes in the environment more closely resembles a compass.
For a strategy to be effective it must not only be appropriate Ži.e., be well-fitted to its competitive environment. but it also
must be communicated and widely understood throughout the organization. This research examines the theoretical arguments
regarding why such strategic consensus is important and presents an exploratory analysis of data from seven manufacturing
plants. One of the weaknesses of the extant literature on operations strategy is that the majority of studies rely on responses
provided by a single informant per company. This study employs a combination of survey and case study methods to gather
data from seven manufacturing plants within the metalworking industry. The results of the study suggest that there are
strategic areas where there is substantial disagreement between levels of the firm. Across the sample, operators tended to rate
investments in technology disproportionately higher than managers. In addition to this systematic variation, individual case
studies revealed that operators and managers in some firms exhibited significant inconsistencies in their manufacturing
priorities, indicating a lack of strategic consensus. Furthermore, the methodology employed in this study illustrates one
approach to obtaining more holistic, multiple respondent research on operations strategy. q 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All
rights reserved.

Keywords: Empirical research; Operations strategy; Triangulation research methods; Strategic consensus

1. Introduction Recent studies have examined the published litera-

Research in the area of operations strategy has
made significant progress during the past decade, in
terms of quantity and quality of articles published.
) veloping and employing a set of reliable, valid and
Corresponding author. Tel.: q1-312-362-8113; fax: q1-312-
362-6973; e-mail: kboyer@wppost.depaul.edu
1
Tel.: q1-518-276-4861; fax: q1-518-276-8661; e-mail:
mcderc@rpi.edu.
ture base and argued that the field has progressed
beyond an exploratory stage to a point where there is
a core set of basic terminology and models ŽSwink
and Way, 1995; Speier and Swink, 1995.. Concur-
rent with the formation and solidification of a core
terminology, there is an increasing emphasis on de-
reproducible methods for conducting research on
operations strategy ŽVickery et al., 1994; Verma and
Goodale, 1995; Speier and Swink, 1995..

0272-6963r99r$ - see front matter q 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 2 7 2 - 6 9 6 3 Ž 9 8 . 0 0 0 4 2 - 4
290 K.K. Boyer, C. McDermottr Journal of Operations Management 17 (1999) 289–305
The notion of equifinality suggests that there are
multiple strategies which can lead to superior perfor-
mance in a given industry or market niche ŽMiles
and Snow, 1978; Porter, 1980; Doty et al., 1993;
McDermott et al., 1995.. For example, Southwest
Airlines has been very successful following a strat-
egy that focuses on providing low cost flights. In
contrast, full service airlines such as United or Delta
have achieved success by following slightly different
strategies that place greater emphasis on flexibility
Žnumber of available destinations and flights.. Yet,
America West uses a low cost strategy similar to
Southwest’s, but has not operationalized it well and
has drastically worse performance. Thus, the critical
factor determining the success of a strategy is not
necessarily which competitive priorities are stressed
Ži.e., cost or flexibility., but rather how these priori-
ties are translated into a consistent set of decisions
which support the particular priority that the organi-
zation stresses most.
Since operating decisions are made thousands of
times per day by virtually every individual in the
organization, a crucial prerequisite to effective deci-
sion making is that everyone have a shared under-
standing of the organization’s operations strategy.
Thus, operations strategy should provide a frame-
work for individuals throughout a given organization
to make decisions on how to best provide the trans-
formations that produce a product or service ŽHayes
and Wheelwright, 1984.. A critical factor for devel-
oping strategic consensus is a clear definition of
strategic objectives Ža roadmap. and how they are
measured. Poor alignment of priorities between
groups of individuals within an organization may
result in a realized Ži.e., resulting. strategy that is
quite different from that which was intended. This is
because these groups may work to pull the organiza-
tion in different directions. In this way, one could
argue that strategic consensus in effect acts as a
prerequisite to realized fit: for a firm to achieve
strategic fit between competitive priorities, struc-
tural, and infrastructural investments, the members
of the firm who can act on these strategies all need
to be pulling in the same direction. While consensus
within constructs is not the same as fit between
constructs, it is difficult to envision how a firm could
achieve a high degree of fit without a high degree of
consensus. The primary goal of this study is to
examine the need for strategic consensus within op-
erations. Strategic consensus occurs when numerous
people within an organization possess similar views
regarding what is most important for the organiza-
tion to succeed. We offer the following definition for
further exploration:
Strategic consensus is the level of agreement within
an organization regarding the relative importance of
cost, quality, delivery and flexibility to the organiza-
tion’s operational goals, as well as the relationships
between these competitive priorities and operational
policies.
We seek to motivate the need for manufacturing
organizations to develop strategic consistency within
their various constituents. In addition, we offer some
basic, exploratory tests regarding the degree of
strategic consensus within seven manufacturing
plants.
The research presented in this paper addresses
strategic consensus by measuring the level of strate-
gic consistency in manufacturing organizations
through the analysis of survey responses of multiple
individuals at different levels of the organization.
These data are combined with a case analysis for
each firm to provide a more holistic view than would
be possible through survey responses alone. The
basic proposition that we seek to address concerns
the homogeneity of responses: we examine whether
managers and operational level employees perceive
their work environment in the same way and seek to
identify the ways in which these two groups differ.
2. Strategic consensus
There is general consensus regarding the composi-
tion of the key competitive priorities Žcost, quality,
flexibility and delivery. which comprise the content
of a corporation’s operations strategy ŽAdam and
Swamidass, 1989; Anderson et al., 1989; Leong et
al., 1990.. Similarly, it is commonly agreed that the
effectiveness of a company’s operations strategy can
be measured by assessing the degree of linkage or
consistency between the competitive priorities which
are emphasized and the corresponding decisions re-
garding the structure and infrastructure of operations
ŽHayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Adam and Swami-
 K.K. Boyer, C. McDermottr Journal of Operations Management 17 (1999) 289–305
dass, 1989; Anderson et al., 1989; Leong et al.,
1990; Hill, 1994.. Specifically, Hayes and Wheel-
wright Ž1984. define manufacturing strategy as ‘‘ . . . a
sequence of decisions that, over time, enables a
business unit to achieve a desired manufacturing
structure, infrastructure, and set of specific capabili-
ties’’ Žp. 32.. While initiated at the top, these deci-
sions are made at all levels of the organization.
The degree of fit between an organization’s com-
petitive priorities and its key decisions regarding
structural and infrastructural investment provides the
key to developing the full potential of operations as a
competitive weapon. Fig. 1A provides a graphical
model of the generally accepted model of operations
strategy content.
While the linkages between competitive priorities
and resulting decisions are clearly important, it is
equally important that there be widespread agree-
ment within the company regarding the overall strat-
egy. Skinner Ž1974. suggested that factory focus was
critical for manufacturing success. Although Skinner
explicitly suggested that a factory as a whole should
focus on a ‘narrow product mix’ Žp. 114., he also
implicitly suggested that a high degree of strategic
consensus throughout the organization is necessary
to achieve such focus. Wheelwright Ž1978. builds on
the need for strategic consensus in writing ‘‘the
ability of a company’s manufacturing function to
reinforce corporate strategy is determined by a num-
Fig. 1. Operations strategy model.
291
ber of decisions over an extended period of time.
Understanding these decisions is the first step in
using them to accomplish corporate goals’’ Žp. 60..
Although relatively few authors have explicitly
discussed the need for strategic consensus, the major-
ity of studies on operations strategy implicitly as-
sume that there should be some level of agreement
within the organization regarding strategic objec-
tives. As an example, consider a manufacturing plant
manager who has been trying to improve the deliv-
ery performance of the plant. She continually stresses
the importance of timely delivery. Yet, on the plant
floor, the environment is such that workers are forced
to maintain rigid schedules that do not allow them to
work overtime when demand is high—often result-
ing in delays in shipment! There is a fundamental
conflict in this plant between the plant manager’s
emphasis on delivery and the message the workers
get that controlling cost is more important. Whether
such lack of consensus is due to poor communica-
tion, faulty measurement systems, lack of trust, or
simply management talking out of both sides of their
mouth, the results are the same: the stated goals are
undermined because decisions made throughout the
firm are not in alignment.
Despite the implicitly accepted need for strategic
consensus, there has been relatively little empirical
appraisal of consensus within manufacturing organi-
zations. Schroeder et al. Ž1986. presented an ex-
ploratory study of 39 manufacturing managers and
concluded that manufacturing strategy was generally
consistent with business strategy in the organizations
studied. Menda and Dilts Ž1997. examined a single
company using multiple respondents in order to cap-
ture differences in how managers from various func-
tional areas viewed that company’s strategy. They
found that functional affiliations were a determinant
of differences in managers’ opinions regarding order
winning criteria. Thus, Menda and Dilts Ž1997. sug-
gest that ‘‘consensus may be a prerequisite for con-
tinuation of the strategy development process’’
Žp.17.. While both of these studies offer important
insights, there is a need for further examination. In
particular, we focus our examination on differences
between managers and operators at different levels
of a company.
Fig. 1 illustrates the importance of clear commu-
nication and alignment of strategic goals and priori-
292 K.K. Boyer, C. McDermottr Journal of Operations Management 17 (1999) 289–305
ties by contrasting a company with a well-aligned
strategy with one with a poorly aligned strategy. The
company in Fig. 1A exhibits a high degree of con-
sensus regarding how managers and operators view
the company’s competitive priorities, structural deci-
sions and infrastructural decisions. This high degree
of consensus, along with an appropriate strategy,
leads to superior performance. In contrast, the com-
pany in Fig. 1B exhibits poor alignment between
managerial and operator views of these same com-
petitive priorities, structural and infrastructural deci-
sions. Regardless of strategic fit, this misalignment
results in poor financial performance. This situation
is similar to two employees putting the same bicycle
together using two different sets of instructions: both
sets of instructions work Ži.e., there is equifinality.
but the combination of the two sets most likely leads
to incorrect assembly of the bicycle. Assuming that
companies can follow different strategies and achieve
comparable financial results, i.e., equifinality exists
ŽMiles and Snow, 1978; Doty et al., 1993., then Fig.
1 illustrates the idea that how well the chosen strat-
egy is communicated to and understood by all mem-
bers of the organization is a critical determinant of
financial performance.
Hayes Ž1985. uses the analogy of a roadmap vs. a
compass to illustrate this point. A highly structured,
largely written strategy provides a detailed roadmap
for employees to follow, yet is often inflexible in
reacting to environmental changes and may not be
truly understood or felt by all employees. In contrast,
a strategy whose basic elements are widely dissemi-
nated and deeply felt by all individuals in the organi-
zation is more like a compass. This more holistic
strategy or compass is able to adapt to environmental
changes and is better understood by all employees,
and should thus facilitate better performance.
A detailed plan or roadmap is certainly a critical
component of a successful operations strategy due to
its ability to guide high level, long term and expen-
sive decisions. However, no plan can possibly be
detailed enough to provide clear direction for every
decision an organization must make. The sheer num-
ber of operating decisions that must be made on a
daily basis precludes the ability of a company to
definitively specify a roadmap or method of making
every decision. A more holistic compass provides
more general direction for numerous ‘fuzzy’ deci-
sions where the organization’s detailed strategy can-
not possibly provide a definitive course of action in
thousands of different situations. We seek to exam-
ine strategy as part of a compass that provides a
general framework for employees at all levels of the
organization to make operating decisions. While or-
ganizations certainly need some combination of a
detailed strategic plan Žroadmap. and a more general
framework Žcompass., we focus our research on the
idea of a strategic compass. We examine the devel-
opment of strategic consensus as a core component
of this strategic compass.
3. Research propositions
Given the theoretical arguments concerning the
need for strategic consensus, the remainder of this
paper will be devoted to conducting an exploratory
empirical examination of strategic consensus. Since
there has been little empirical study of this area, our
goal is to develop some basic measures and offer an
experimental method for assessing strategic consen-
sus. In particular, we seek to examine the views of
managers and operational level Žoperators. employ-
ees for three of the four boxes shown in Fig. 1:
competitive priorities, structural decisions and infras-
tructural decisions. For each of these areas, we ex-
amine whether perceptual differences exist between
managers and operators. Performance is not included
because this study is an initial effort at evaluating
strategic consensus and its inclusion would add too
much complexity. Following the suggestions of
Menda and Dilts Ž1997. and Speier and Swink Ž1995.,
we use multiple respondents from each of these
groups. We choose approximately 10 managers and
10 operators for each company because this provides
a reasonable amount of variety without placing an
undue burden on the participating plants. In addition,
we use a multiple case study approach ŽEisenhardt,
1989. to learn more about each plant. We administer
a semi-structured standard survey instrument at each
plant. This approach allows us to not only collect
generalizable, quantitative data via the survey instru-
ment, but also provides the capability to effectively
interpret these data and make more descriptive, fine-
grained observations based on our visits to each
plant.
 K.K. Boyer, C. McDermottr Journal of Operations Management 17 (1999) 289–305
We first examine competitive priorities. We ex-
plore whether managers’ and operators’ views differ
regarding the relative importance of cost, quality,
flexibility and delivery to the company’s objectives.
Specifically, we examine the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Responses regarding the relatiÕe im-
portance of competitiÕe priorities (cost, quality, flex-
ibility and deliÕery) do not differ based on the
organizational leÕel of the respondent.
A second area that we examine in this study
involves policies relating to the manufacturing in-
frastructure of the company. Hayes and Wheelwright
Ž1984. and Hill Ž1994. describe the term manufactur-
ing infrastructure as including workforce and organi-
zational policies, as well as procedural systems such
as manufacturing planning and control, and quality
assurance. Studies have shown that decisions compa-
nies make in developing their manufacturing infras-
tructure via training, worker empowerment, and soft
integration Žnon-technical methods of improving
communication. are positively associated with finan-
cial performance ŽWard et al., 1994; Flynn et al.,
1994.. Yet, none of these studies has examined
whether there are differences in the perceptions of
workers regarding these types of infrastructural deci-
sions. For example, it is quite conceivable that mid-
dle to upper level managers might have a very
different opinion regarding the level of worker em-
powerment within a firm than operational level em-
ployees due to their relative vantage point of the
process. For example, workers may not truly feel
empowered if managers pay lip service to the con-
cept without ever really sharing any decision-making
authority. We therefore examine the following
proposition Žnote: the infrastructural policies tested
in this study are not intended to represent the com-
plete spectrum as portrayed by Hayes and Wheel-
wright, 1984; We select the policies tested to repre-
sent an important subset of the population.:
Proposition 2: Responses regarding a company’s
commitment to infrastructural improÕement pro-
grams such as worker empowerment, quality leader-
ship and the use of teams do not differ based on the
organizational leÕel of the respondent.
The third area to be examined involves the types
of structural investments a company makes. Specifi-
293
cally, we examine technological investments in the
area of advanced manufacturing technology ŽAMT..
AMTs are generally considered to support a competi-
tive emphasis on flexibility andror quality ŽGoldhar
and Jelinek, 1983; Meredith, 1987.. In addition,
AMTs have been shown to be associated with im-
proved financial performance ŽBoyer et al., 1997..
Many studies have examined AMTs via data col-
lected from a mail survey of managers, yet little
effort has been made to examine technological in-
vestment from the operator’s point of view. Again,
differences between operators and managers may
vary systematically. We therefore explore the follow-
ing proposition:
Proposition 3: Responses regarding a company’s
inÕestment in adÕanced manufacturing technologies
do not differ based upon organizational leÕel of the
respondent.
4. Data collection
Seven manufacturing plants were studied via a
combination of plant visits and the completion of a
common survey instrument. The plants under study
are manufacturing firms in standard industrial classi-
fication codes 33–37, the metalworking industries.
These industries were selected because of the au-
thors’ prior experience and because these industries
have been widely studied in terms of operations
strategy. Each of the seven manufacturing plants was
selected for study based on prior experience of the
authors in working with that plant. The unit of
analysis is at the plant level.
This research utilizes a combination of case study
and survey-based research methods. The use of mul-
tiple sources of data can provide insight from a
variety of different research ‘angles’, each yielding
data that provide valuable information. By using a
combination of sources Ži.e., triangulation. the over-
all results show greater validity than could be
achieved by any single source ŽCook and Campbell,
1979; Jick, 1979; Meredith et al., 1989; Yin, 1989;
McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993.. These resulting
data provide a rich foundation for the issues studied,
together with a quantifiable basis for comparison
among firms.
294 K.K. Boyer, C. McDermottr Journal of Operations Management 17 (1999) 289–305
The surveys used in this study allow for numeri-
cal comparison of differences among firms. The
survey has been adapted from a variety of published
articles. The questions on the survey are designed to
assess the key competitive priorities of the plant, as
well as the infrastructural and structural investments
used to support this strategy.
The survey was administered to two different
groups of respondents in each plant. The first group
consisted of middle and upper level managers who
had authority over operational decisions. The exact
titles of these managers varied somewhat because we
had a limited ability to pre-select participants in the
study. The second group consisted of operational
level employees. The targeted size of each group was
approximately 10 respondents. The purpose of multi-
ple respondents in each group was to gather a rela-
tively comprehensive sample of distinct organiza-
tional strata within each plant. While our goal was to
collect surveys from 10 managers and 10 operational
level employees in each plant, two of the smaller
plants in the study were unable to provide that many
respondents due to the size of their management
team and extreme demands on their time. Table 1
provides an overview of the size of each plant and
the number of responses gathered from the manage-
rial and operational level groups.
The use of case study research in the field of
operations provides a richer and more thorough un-
derstanding and analysis of the relevant issues than
is possible through surveys alone ŽFlynn et al., 1990;
McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993.. To develop the
cases, semi-structured interviews were performed
on-site with either the Plant Manager, Vice President
of Operations or President of each firm. Issues relat-
Table 1
Overview of plants participating in study
Plant Location Plant size Number of respondents
Total employees Managers Operators
A midwest 60 3 6
B midwest 250 10 10
C midwest 500 11 8 ity and delivery ŽAdam and Swamidass, 1989; Leong
D midwest 327 9 10
E northeast 75 10 10
F northeast 350 11 11
G southeast 75 6 8
ing to the historical development of the firm, its
main competition, main markets, structural Že.g.,
AMT. and infrastructural Že.g., worker training. in-
vestments were explored in these discussions. Inter-
views typically ranged from one to 2 h in duration.
In addition, the survey questions were discussed and
elaborated upon, and any questions relating to the
content of the survey were answered. Discrepancies
between survey responses and interview discussion
were noted and clarified.
To augment the on-site interviews and surveys,
tours of the manufacturing facility were arranged.
These tours allowed for a visual check and compari-
son of each firm’s efforts in areas such as AMT
adoption, layout, degree of worker empowerment
and training, and level of technology relative to
others in the industry. In general, these plant tours
provided an opportunity for verification and clarifi-
cation of survey and interview responses, as well as
providing the researchers with a feel for the overall
work environment and systems. A brief description
of each of the seven participating plants is provided
in Appendix B.
5. Operational constructs
The survey questions and scales used to measure
the various components of Fig. 1 are provided in
Appendix A. The original source, intended purpose
and reliability of each scale is briefly addressed
below.
5.1. CompetitiÕe priorities
Despite some confusion regarding the naming of
different competitive priorities, there does tend to be
general agreement in the literature regarding their
composition ŽAdam and Swamidass, 1989.. Re-
searchers agree on the essential composition of four
primary competitive priorities: cost, quality, flexibil-
et al., 1990.. The scales used to measure each of
these four priorities are based on those used by the
Boston University Manufacturing Futures Survey
ŽMiller and Vollmann, 1984.. These scales have
 K.K. Boyer, C. McDermottr Journal of Operations Management 17 (1999) 289–305
previously been shown to be reliable in several
studies. Values for each scale are calculated by
averaging the items comprising the scale and are
labeled COST, QUALITY, FLEXIBILITY and DE-
LIVERY.
5.2. Infrastructural policies
A variety of measures of investment in manufac-
turing infrastructure have been developed and re-
ported. Often these measures are used to measure
aspects of improvement programs such as just-in-
time, total quality management, design for manufac-
ture, and concurrent engineering. Regardless of their
specific focus, successful improvement programs
such as these share an emphasis on the underlying
capabilities that they help build rather than the spe-
cific mechanics involved in each particular program.
In other words, the aspect of these programs with
which we are concerned is their attention to strength-
ening manufacturing infrastructure. Three scales are
drawn from three different sources in order to mea-
sure investments in infrastructure: worker empower-
ment, quality leadership and the use of small teams.
Worker empowerment is defined as giving work-
ers more responsibility and control of the manufac-
turing process, as well as increased levels of training
to build the skills needed to effectively exercise
increased responsibility. As such, it directly relates
to the workforce element of infrastructure as de-
scribed by Hayes and Wheelwright Ž1984.. The scale
used to measure worker empowerment is adapted
from Ward et al. Ž1994., which was shown to be a
reliable measure. The scale is labeled WEMP and
consists of the average of the seven items shown in
Appendix A.
Quality leadership models where the responsibil-
ity for quality lies in the firm and directly relates to
organizational aspects of infrastructure as described
by both Hayes and Wheelwright Ž1984. and Hill
Ž1994.. This scale was originally developed to mea-
sure the role of management in providing quality
leadership within a TQM context by Flynn et al.
Ž1994.. Flynn et al. demonstrated the reliability of
this measure in their original work and we adopt it
without modification. The scale is labeled as QLEAD
and consists of the average of the items shown in
Appendix A.
295
Another aspect of infrastructural capability devel-
opment which has been investigated by researchers
in operations strategy, total quality management and
just-in-time is the use of small teams for various
projects ŽSakakibara et al., 1993; Flynn et al., 1994..
Small teams help foster a cooperative atmosphere
and encourage the generation of new ideas and ap-
proaches. Thus, we adopt the scale originally devel-
oped by Flynn et al. Ž1994. to measure the use of
small teams in a manufacturing environment. This
scale has previously been shown to be reliable and
valid. The scale is labeled TEAM and consists of the
average of the three items shown in Appendix A.
5.3. Structural inÕestments
Three scales are used to measure structural invest-
ments in three types of advanced manufacturing
technologies ŽAMTs.. AMTs are chosen as the type
of structural investment measured because of the
numerous studies which have examined these tech-
nologies and because reliable scales exist which have
been previously validated. Design-based AMTs
Žlabeled DESIGN. focus on the design of products
and processes. Manufacturing-based AMTs Žlabeled
MANUFACTURING. focus on the actual manufac-
turing and physical transformation of the product.
Administrative-based AMTs Žlabeled ADMINIS-
TRATIVE. are used primarily to track operations
inputs and outputs. The scales used to measure these
AMT types are drawn from Boyer et al. Ž1996. and
are shown in Appendix A.
6. Results
This section presents the results of our compari-
son of managers and operators for three of the areas
shown in Fig. 1: competitive priorities, structural
investments and infrastructural investments. Each
will be discussed separately below. In each section,
we use our multiple sources of data to present the
results. We begin each section with a discussion of
the survey responses. Our analysis of the survey data
includes both ANOVA and rank ordering. The
ANOVA analysis considers two factors ŽLEVELs
manager or operator, COMPANYs one of the seven
plants. as well as the interaction between the two. A
significant F score indicates that there are either
differences between managers and operators ŽLevel.,
296 K.K. Boyer, C. McDermottr Journal of Operations Management 17 (1999) 289–305

between companies ŽCompany ID., or differences
between managers and operators which vary on a
plant-by-plant basis ŽInteraction.. An examination of
the data for non-normality does not reveal any prob-
lems.
We then use our findings from the case analysis
and plant tours to interpret these quantifiable data.
This structure of survey, then case analysis provides
a finer-grained level of understanding than would be
otherwise possible through interpreting survey data
alone.
6.1. CompetitiÕe priorities
Table 2 shows the average for each of the four
competitive priority scales ŽCOST, DELIVERY,
FLEXIBILITY and QUALITY. calculated separately
for managers and operators within each company.
Plants where there is a difference of 0.60 or more
between managers and operators are highlighted.
This subjective choice is used to clearly show where
substantial disagreement exists. Table 2 also shows
the results of ANOVA calculations to test for main
effects Žcompany and level—operational vs. man-
agerial. and interaction effects.
We employ several different methods to interpret
the data presented in Table 2. We start by examining
the ANOVA results that test for main and interaction
effects. Each of the four competitive priorities has a
statistically significant company effect. This result
simply indicates that the seven plants place different
weights on the various individual priorities. In con-
trast, a comparison across firms indicates that the
only competitive priority that consistently exhibits a
significant difference between managers and opera-
tors is delivery. As a whole, the managers placed a
great deal more importance Žsample average s 6.06.
on delivery than did operators Žsample average s
5.33.. The F value is significant Ž p - 0.01.. Al-
though operators placed a great deal of emphasis on
delivery Žranking it the most important priority 3
times and second most important 3 times., their
absolute rating was dramatically lower than the man-
agers’. This difference could be due to the subjectiv-
ity of the ratings, or, alternatively, this difference
could indicate that the critical nature of delivery is
not being clearly communicated throughout all of
these companies. Finally, there are no interaction
effects for any of the competitive priorities.
An alternative way to examine the data in Table 2
is to rank order the competitive priorities within each
company and respondent group. The highest rated
priority within each group, for each company is
marked with an asterisk, while the lowest rated
priority is marked with a diamond Žl.. These mark-
ings clearly show that managers uniformly rated

Table 2
Competitive priorities
Plant COST DELIVERY FLEXIBILITY QUALITY
Managers Operators Managers Operators Managers Operators Managers Operators
A 5.22 5.67 5.67) 5.83 5.00l 4.51l 5.22 5.94)
B 4.97 4.20 6.60) 5.30) 4.00l 3.94l 5.13 4.83
C 5.30 5.29 6.67) 5.92) 5.08l 4.67l 5.70 5.04
D 5.48 5.72 6.22) 5.95) 5.35l 5.32l 5.63 5.92
E 5.43 5.12l 6.33) 5.33 5.36l 5.40 6.17 5.80)
F 5.33 5.30 5.55) 5.30 5.11l 4.73l 5.48 5.36)
G 4.17 4.21) 5.39) 3.67 3.79l 3.42l 4.81 3.67
Total 5.13 5.07 6.06 5.33 4.81 4.57 5.45 5.22

ANOVA F p F p F p F p
Company ID 3.79 - 0.01 5.05 - 0.01 5.92 - 0.01 4.23 - 0.01
Level 0.08 0.77 14.46 - 0.01 1.27 0.26 1.10 0.29
Interaction 0.57 0.75 1.51 0.18 0.16 0.98 0.92 0.48

Competitive priorities where managers and operators differ by 0.60 or more are underlined.
lIndicates competitive priority which received lowest ranking for the given group of respondents Žmanagers or operators..
)Indicates competitive priority which received highest ranking for the given group of respondents Žmanagers or operators..
 K.K. Boyer, C. McDermottr Journal of Operations Management 17 (1999) 289–305
delivery as the most important priority and flexibility
as the least. In contrast, the operators generally
agreed that flexibility was least important Ž6 of 7
cases., but were not as clear about the importance of
delivery Žranked first in three cases.. The operators
ranked quality first in three cases and cost first in
one case. This suggests that there may be communi-
cation gaps in several companies that hinder the
effective implementation and operationalization of
operations strategy. To examine this issue in more
depth, we will focus our analysis on observations
within individual plants.
The plants which exhibit consistent rankings of
priorities between managers and operators can be
presumed to have relatively well-communicated
strategies, thus the process of developing a strategy
has worked well to develop consensus. However,
this does not mean that the strategy chosen is the
most appropriate for that company’s situation Ži.e.,
the content of the strategy may be ill chosen.. Plants
A, B, C and D have similar rankings for both groups
of respondents. Plants B–D had identical relative
rankings Ži.e., what was most and least important.. In
plant A, both groups agreed that flexibility was least
important, and placed a high importance on delivery
Žalthough the operators ranked quality as the most
important priority, it was essentially tied in absolute
terms with delivery ŽMQUALs 5.94 vs. MDELs
5.83..
While plants A–D appear to have reached a rela-
tive consensus regarding their strategies, plants E, F
and G are more muddled regarding their strategies.
While the managers and operators in plant F agreed
that flexibility was the least important priority, they
disagreed regarding what was most important, with
managers ranking delivery first and operators rank-
ing quality first. Given the relative similarity of the
ratings provided by the operators for delivery Ž5.30.
and quality Ž5.36., the discordance regarding key
priorities is minimal. Yet, compared to plants A–D,
plant F does not appear to have reached clear con-
sensus regarding its strategy and should be aware of
the potential for inappropriate decisions to be made
given the conflicting views of what is ‘most’ impor-
tant.
Plants E and G are much further from strategic
consensus than plant F. The managers in plant E rate
delivery as the most important priority while the
297
operators rate quality as most important. The man-
agers think flexibility is least important, while the
operators think cost is the least important. Plant G
exhibits a similar pattern of discordance: managers
rate delivery as most important and operators put
cost in first place. Furthermore, the numerical differ-
ences in ratings are quite large for both delivery and
quality. Clearly, there are large communication gaps
in both of these plants. Perhaps location may explain
some of these differences—plants E and G are lo-
cated in the northeast and the southeast, respectively.
Certainly, plant G had a much different cultural
‘feel’ than any of the midwestern plants in the study.
Mis-communication regarding the importance of
competitive priorities is similar to a cocktail party in
which someone whispers a rumor in someone else’s
ear. This process is repeated until everyone at the
party has heard the rumor, often people at the begin-
ning and end of the line get very different messages.
When this happens in manufacturing, our expectation
would be that there would be little consistency in the
decisions made to support these conflicting strategic
objectives.
Combining multiple methods often yields insights
that are not available when a single method is used
ŽJick, 1979; Cook and Campbell, 1979.. The exami-
nation of the data gathered by the survey of man-
agers and operators reveals that plants E and G have
relatively severe communications problems with re-
gard to their operations strategies. Our interviews
and discussions with the personnel at these two
plants help to shed light on why these problems
occur. The president of plant G is relatively new to
the plant Ž1 year. and has an extensive background
in manufacturing with several large corporations over
the course of 20–30 years. He is conversant with the
most modern management techniques and theories,
and is currently trying to change the atmosphere at
plant G from a very reactive mindset where a great
deal of maintenance was deferred and product qual-
ity was allowed to slip, to an atmosphere in which
quality is much more competitive. In other words,
the current President was hired as a turnaround
agent. Clearly, such a change in mindset takes time
to take root throughout the company. The current
discord may well be a transitory situation.
Plant E presents a different scenario. This firm is
a privately held, family run business that experienced
298 K.K. Boyer, C. McDermottr Journal of Operations Management 17 (1999) 289–305

significant growth over the last decade. The Presi-
dent of the firm is also its founder. As a result of this
growth, the plant recently moved to a new, much
larger facility. As the plant grew, the Presidentr
Founder maintained his relatively prominent position
in shop floor activities and throughout the firm.
During the plant tour, all of the hourly workers
appeared to know the President well, and he hur-
riedly spoke with many about topics ranging from
details of their families to turkey hunting over the
weekend. Unfortunately, the plant seemed to be suf-
fering from ‘growing pains’ in that their organiza-
tional structure with its informal control from the top
was being stressed by their increase in size and the
rising volume of orders. As a result of their new
growth, the survey results suggest that management
at Plant E is having difficulty effectively communi-
cating their priorities to their newly hired hourly
workers. Hopefully, this too will be a temporary
situation.
6.2. Infrastructural inÕestments
Table 3 presents the averages for our three infras-
tructural investment scales, separated by company
and respondent level, as well as the ANOVA results.
The main effect for company is significant for both
WEMP and TEAM, but not for QLEAD. This sug-
gests that the companies have different levels of
investment for these programs, but that quality lead-
ership gets relatively the same emphasis across the
seven plants. There are no main effects for level:
none of the F values is significant. This indicates that
managers and operators Žwith responses aggregated
across plants for these two groups. generally agree
regarding the relative levels of worker empower-
ment, quality leadership and the use of small teams.
Thus, there is no evidence to reject proposition 2.
There is, however, an interaction effect for each of
the three scales. This indicates that there are signifi-
cant variations between managers and operators on a
plant by plant basis.
Fig. 2 visually demonstrates the interaction effect
for worker empowerment. Several plants have higher
ratings for WEMP for the operators, while others
have higher ratings for the managers. This is trou-
bling and provides some evidence to reject proposi-
tion 2. Clearly, there are large variations in percep-
tions of the degree of worker empowerment. For
example, the operators in plant C think they are
much more empowered than the managers believe.
This result is strange, particularly because of the
large gap in perceptions Ž5.76 y 4.25 s a 1.51 differ-
ence.. Do workers think they have greater ability to
make decisions and take responsibility, only to find
that managers do not act on these decisions? Our
interviews with managers at plant C suggest a clear
reason for this dramatic difference in perceptions.

Table 3
Infrastructural improvement programs
Plant WEMP QLEAD TEAM
Managers Operators Managers Operators Managers Operators
A 4.43 5.05 4.47 5.19 3.78 4.87
B 4.28 3.62 4.50 3.55 4.87 2.85
C 4.25 5.76 3.95 5.41 3.97 5.58
D 4.59 4.79 4.69 5.33 5.04 4.98
E 4.70 4.00 4.69 4.42 4.33 3.13
F 4.44 4.26 4.56 4.54 4.30 3.83
G 3.65 2.96 3.67 4.72 3.11 3.38
Total 4.33 4.35 4.36 4.74 4.20 4.09

ANOVA F p F p F p
Company ID 4.09 - 0.01 1.27 0.27 2.52 0.03
Level 0.00 0.93 2.40 0.12 0.13 0.72
Interaction 2.49 0.02 2.00 0.07 2.70 0.02

Improvement programs where managers and operators differ by 0.60 or more are underlined.
 K.K. Boyer, C. McDermottr Journal of Operations Management 17 (1999) 289–305 299

ment style, combined with its ‘new school’ managers

Fig. 2. Bar chart of worker empowerment ratings.
Plant C is heavily unionized and has historically had
a very traditional management–labor relationship.
Considerable effort has been focused on developing
a more cooperativerempowered relationship during
the past 2 years. The operators now have some voice
in decision making, whereas 2 years ago they were
only expected to ‘punch the clock and do what they
were told’. Thus, small changes can be perceived as
a major improvement. In contrast, the managers we
interviewed were all quite young Ž25–35 years old.,
collegerMBA graduates who are quite familiar with
current ‘world class’ management principles. They
viewed the efforts to empower and develop the
workforce as crude and relatively slow moving, thus
leading to the lower rating of WEMP. This explana-
tion is further backed up by the fact that plant C
exhibits a similar pattern for both QLEAD and TEAM
Žoperators rate both of these much higher than man-
agers.. Thus, the plant’s previous traditional manage-
may help explain this interesting discrepancy.
In contrast to plant C, plant E shows an opposite
effect: here the managers rate WEMP higher than the
employees. This demonstrates a dangerous situation:
managers saying ‘yes, we empower and trust work-
ers’ and operators saying ‘no, they don’t!’. As was
noted earlier, this too might be an artifact of the
family run, hierarchical Plant E’s difficulty in deal-
ing with rapid growth. Everything else being equal,
we surmise that plants where operators and managers
rate the commitment to worker empowerment simi-
larly should be better off than plants such as plants C
or E.
6.3. Structural (AdÕanced Manufacturing Technol-
ogy) inÕestments
Table 4 presents the averages for our three struc-
tural ŽAdvanced Manufacturing Technology. invest-
ment scales, separated by company and respondent
level, as well as the ANOVA results. As expected,
the companies do differ significantly inter company
Žcompany effect, p - 0.01, for ADMIN and DE-
SIGN and p s 0.11 for MANUFACTURING.. Yet,
the intra company differences are more interesting,
providing evidence to reject proposition 3. Managers
and operators provide similar responses regarding
the level of investment in administrative technolo-

Table 4
Advanced manufacturing technology
Plant ADMIN DESIGN MANUFACTURING
Managers Operators Managers Operators Managers Operators
A 2.71 2.34 4.22 5.08 3.02 3.06
B 3.92 4.20 3.44 4.53 2.88 3.97
C 3.87 4.92 4.45 4.71 2.79 4.79
D 4.43 4.53 5.21 5.15 3.86 4.19
E 4.91 3.46 3.38 2.41 4.81 3.57
F 3.75 4.28 3.59 4.33 3.42 3.90
G 2.45 3.66 3.40 4.92 2.33 3.92
Total 3.72 3.91 3.96 4.45 3.30 3.91

ANOVA F p F p F p
Company ID 3.98 - 0.01 6.00 - 0.01 1.80 0.11
Level 0.65 0.42 3.83 0.05 6.61 - 0.01
Interaction 2.44 0.03 1.70 0.13 3.86 - 0.01

Technologies where managers and operators differ by 0.60 or more are underlined.
300 K.K. Boyer, C. McDermottr Journal of Operations Management 17 (1999) 289–305
gies such as MRP. In contrast, operators consistently
rate the investment in both design and manufacturing
technologies much higher than managers. The over-
all average rating of MANUFACTURING for all
plants is 3.91 for operators and 3.30 for managers.
This substantial difference suggests that one of the
two groups is either misinformed or possesses a
biased view. Furthermore, there are significant inter-
action effects for both ADMIN and MANUFAC-
TURING.
The insights gained via our site visits to the seven
plants help us to further interpret the data in Table 4.
For example, both authors agreed that Plant G was
clearly the least technologically advanced of the
seven plants studied. This plant makes a relatively
simple product with very basic, largely manually
operated technology. Yet, the workers gave high
ratings to each of the three AMT types Ž3.66 for
ADMIN, 4.92 for DESIGN and 3.92 for MANU-
FACTURING.. The technology level of this plant is
much more accurately modeled by the managers’
responses. It seems logical that technology should be
measured using managerial responses since these are
the people typically making decisions regarding in-
vestments and are thus better informed.
In comparison to plant G, plant D appears to have
much better communication regarding its technologi-
cal profile and investment plans. The ratings pro-
vided by managers and operators are nearly identical
for all three AMT types. Despite the relative objec-
tivity of AMT investment Ži.e., a certain amount is
invested and is easily measurable., the use of the
subjective type of measures reported here clearly
illustrated that there can be perceptual problems with
something as straightforward as technology. If a
plant has widely different perceptions on the part of
operators and managers, this exhibits a lack of com-
munication that is ultimately harmful to the com-
pany. Alternatively, such perceptual differences may
be due to a lower level of education and training on
the part of operators. This lower level of education
could adversely effect a company if workers are not
aware of the full capabilities of existing equipment
or the best methods to maximize these capabilities.
Plant E demonstrated a dangerously high gap
between manager and operator perceptions. Clearly,
managers in this plant felt that they were much more
technologically advanced than the operators. While
the interviews did not reveal a clear reason for this
difference in perception, this too may have been an
artifact of the plant’s history. As was noted earlier,
Plant E was a family run business. As such, man-
agers Žmany of whom are family members. might
have been reticent to rate their firm as below average
in terms of technology investment, given their status
as a supplier to high tech firms Žsee Plant E descrip-
tion, Appendix B.. Operators in Plant E, many of
whom were recent hires from other firms, were less
likely to be biased in their response. Again, regard-
less of the root cause, this difference in perception
indicates a potentially dangerous situation for Plant
E. Regarding AMT investments, managers in this
plant would clearly benefit by understanding the
reasons behind the low ratings given by their hourly
workers.
7. Discussion
This study sheds new light on perceived intra-plant
differences in operations strategy between various
organizational levels through the use of a multiple
respondent, multiple plant approach. The findings
provide insight in two key ways. First, our examina-
tion of strategic consensus within seven manufactur-
ing plants indicates that, while high levels of agree-
ment between managers and operators are common,
there are important and systematic differences re-
garding fundamental issues including competitive
priorities, infrastructural and structural investments.
This implies there is a need for firms to focus more
attention on effective communication of goals
throughout all levels of the firm. Second, these
findings support the notion that caution should be
taken in research that interprets the survey results of
just one respondent in a firm. Multiple responses
within some firms indicate a substantial amount of
variation between organizational levels.
The general level of agreement regarding compet-
itive priorities is relatively high, but a close examina-
tion on a company by company basis indicates that
communication problems existed in some of the
plants. Managerroperator priority differences may
indeed be a cause for concern: such lack of strategic
consensus can limit a company’s ability to focus its
efforts on achieving a unified set of goals. Three of
 K.K. Boyer, C. McDermottr Journal of Operations Management 17 (1999) 289–305
the seven plants examined in this study lacked a high
level of strategic consensus. Managers and operators
in these firms were not in agreement as to what were
the most andror least important objectives for their
plant. As a result, these plants are faced with the risk
that their operating decisions will not demonstrate an
adequate level of consistency to properly support the
company’s objectives. In other words, the study
showed evidence that managers and operators in
these plants each have numerous ‘strategic com-
passes’ pointing in different directions. As a result, it
is quite possible that operators and managers in these
firms will move in different directions, each accord-
ing to their own perceived set of goals.
As was noted above, a second valuable insight
from this study relates to the apparent observation
that research that relies on only a single respondent
may not capture an accurate, holistic picture of the
organization being studied. The data concerning
competitive priorities, as well as structural and in-
frastructural decisions, underscores the importance of
using multiple respondents to provide a more holistic
picture of the organization. The majority of extant
studies rely on only a single respondent ŽSpeier and
Swink, 1995; Menda and Dilts, 1997. and are thus
vulnerable to biases inflicted by that respondent.
Furthermore, strategic consensus can by definition
only be assessed by collecting data from numerous
individuals within an organization. Therefore, there
is a strong need for more research of this type that
seeks to examine operations strategy in both an intra
and inter-plant basis. The specific multi-method de-
sign utilized in this research provided a level of
analysis and understanding of the underlying issues
that would not be possible through the use of surveys
alone. As has been suggested in the literature ŽFlynn
et al., 1990; McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993. using
case-base research provides insight into the ex-
ploratory ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions relating to op-
erations management. By combining in-depth inter-
views with survey data and plant tours, this study
provides unique insight into both ‘how’ and ‘why’
managers and operators differ in terms of the way
they view the firm.
Examination of infrastructural investments such
as quality leadership indicates significant discrepan-
cies in views. There was an interaction effect for
worker empowerment, quality leadership and the use
301
of small teams. This is an area in which organiza-
tional level effects must be carefully monitored. For
example, it is possible that managers believe that
they are empowering the work force, but that the
workers do not rate their level of empowerment as
highly. This is the situation that occurred in three
plants: B, E and G. The concern in this situation is
that managers ‘talk the talk but do not walk the
walk’. In other words, true empowerment ought to
be reflected by operator perceptions rather than just
management’s words. Researchers and managers
should carefully test for such divergent viewpoints in
order to form a complete and holistic view of the
firm’s infrastructure. The findings of this study sug-
gest that using managers’ perceptions alone might be
misleading.
Structural investments in AMTs showed the great-
est perceptual differences between managers and op-
erators. Operators tended to have inflated perceptions
of their plant’s level of technological investment,
with higher ratings overall for manufacturing, design
and administrative technologies. Unlike our findings
in infrastructural areas, our observations during inter-
views and plant visits suggest that, indeed, managers
provide much more accurate assessments of the rela-
tive level of technological investment. The plant that
was considered by both authors as by far the least
technologically advanced had the lowest managerial
ratings of all seven plants for each technology type,
but was consistently rated in the middle of the pack
by operators. Thus, within this sample of firms,
operators’ perceptions regarding technology are bi-
ased. While this is not surprising, given the relative
access to financial information and the fact that
managers are the decision makers, it does underscore
the need for researchers to use managers as the key
information providers regarding technology.
The guiding theme for this research was to study
strategic consensus. This is an important concept that
has been ignored by much of the established litera-
ture in operations. The results indicate that the de-
gree of strategic consensus varies considerably from
company to company. Since strategy should offer a
compass to guide decisions throughout the firm, it is
important that everyone understands and agrees on
one common strategy. Clearly, companies differ sub-
stantially in how much agreement there is between
managers and operators. The results of this study
302 K.K. Boyer, C. McDermottr Journal of Operations Management 17 (1999) 289–305
were shared with the participating plants, and our
contacts within each firm found the results to be
beneficial as a means to highlight areas of disagree-
ment between managers and operators. It is our hope
that these results will serve to focus discussions
within the firms involved. While we have shed some
light on this area, there is a great deal of room for
further examination. Future research should strive to
link strategic consensus directly with performance,
and also to examine the perceptions of different
functional areas within the same company.
Appendix A. Operational constructs
A.1. CompetitiÕe priorities
For your manufacturing plant, how important is
the ability to ŽLikert scale ranging from 1 s Not
Important, to 4 s Very Important, to 7 s Absolutely
Critical.:
COST
Ža. reduce inventory
Žb. increase capacity utilization
Žc. reduce production costs
Žd. increase labor productivity
QUALITY
Ža. provide high performance products
Žb. offer consistent, reliable quality
Žc. improve conformance to design specifications
DELIVERY
Ža. provide fast deliveries
Žb. meet delivery promises
Žc. reduce production lead time
FLEXIBILITY
Ža. make rapid design changes
Žb. adjust capacity quickly
Žc. make rapid volume changes
Žd. offer a large number of product features
Že. offer a large degree of product variety
Žf. adjust product mix
A.2. Infrastructural inÕestments
A.2.1. WEMP
Indicate the degree of emphasis which your man-
ufacturing plant places on the following activities.
ŽLikert scale ranging from 1 s No Emphasis, to 4 s
Moderate Emphasis, to 7 s Extreme Emphasis..
Ža. Giving workers a broader range of tasks.
Žb. Giving workers more planning responsibility.
Žc. Giving workers more inspectionrquality re-
sponsibility.
Žd. Changing laborrmanagement relationships.
Že. Improving direct labor motivation.
Žf. Improving supervisor training.
Žg. Improving direct labor training.
A.2.2. QLEAD
Please indicate your level of agreement or dis-
agreement with the following statements. ŽLikert
scale ranging from 1 s Strongly Disagree, to 4 s
Neither Agree nor Disagree, to 7 s Strongly Agree..
Ža. All major department heads within our plant
accept responsibility for quality.
Žb. Plant management provides personal leader-
ship for quality improvement.
Žc. The top priority in evaluating plant manage-
ment is quality performance.
Žd. All major department heads within our plant
work to encourage just-in-time production.
Že. Our top management strongly encourages em-
ployee involvement in the production process.
A.2.3. TEAM
Please answer the following questions regarding
production teams in your manufacturing plant ŽLikert
scale ranging from 1 s Strongly Disagree, to 4 s
Neither Agree nor Disagree, to 7 s Strongly Agree..
Ža. Our plant forms teams to solve problems.
Žb. In the past 3 years, many problems have been
solved through team efforts.
Žc. During problem solving sessions, all team
members’ opinions and ideas are considered be-
fore making a decision.
A.3. Structural (AdÕanced Manufacturing Technol-
ogy) inÕestments
Indicate the amount of investment your manufac-
turing plant has in the following activities. ŽLikert
scale ranging from 1 s No Investment, to 4 s
Moderate Investment, to 7 s Heavy Investment..
DESIGN
Ža. Computer-Aided Design ŽCAD.
Žb. Computer-Aided Engineering ŽCAE.
Žc. Computer-Aided Process Planning ŽCAPP.
 K.K. Boyer, C. McDermottr Journal of Operations Management 17 (1999) 289–305
MANUFACTURING
Ža. Computer-Aided Manufacturing ŽCAM.
Žb. Robotics
Žc. Real-time process control systems
Žd. Group Technology ŽGT.
Že. Flexible Manufacturing Systems ŽFMS.
Žf. Computerized Numerical Control machines
ŽCNC.
Žg. Automated material handling systems
Žh. Environmental Control systems
Ži. Bar CodingrAutomatic Identification
ADMINISTRATIVE
Ža. Electronic Mail
Žb. Electronic Data Interchange ŽEDI.
Žc. Office automation
Žd. Knowledge-based systems
Že. Decision support systems
Žf. Material Requirements Planning ŽMRP.
Žg. Manufacturing Resource Planning ŽMRP II,
including capacity requirements planning.
Žh. Activity-based accounting systems
Appendix B. Participating plants
B.1. Plant A
This plant is a small Midwestern job-shop manu-
facturer of parts for companies such as Allison En-
gine, Caterpillar-Mitsubishi and other OEMs. Plant
A employs 60 people. Plant A is not currently ISO-
certified but is seeking to obtain certification. The
authors agreed that this plant was one of the least
advanced plants, both in terms of the commitment to
developing worker skills and the level of investment
in equipment and facilities. Management at plant A
admitted that there was a strong need to make
changes, but stated that there ‘‘never seemed to be
enough time’’.
B.2. Plant B
Plant B is a Midwestern manufacturer of pumps
and is a SBU of a larger business unit. Employment
in plant B is 250, 100 of which are direct production
workers. New management was installed in plant B
in 1994 and there have been a series of major
changes, including a new US$2 million information
303
system and the successful pursuit of ISO certifica-
tion. The plantrmaterials manager repeatedly noted
that manufacturing did not have enough ‘pull’ with
corporate, and that several major manufacturing-re-
lated decisions had been made in the past 2 years
which were not in manufacturing’s best interest.
B.3. Plant C
This unionized plant manufactures electric motors
for a wide variety of end products including medical
equipment, copying machines and packaging equip-
ment. This plant is located in a large Midwestern city
and employs approximately 500. Major efforts have
been undertaken over the past 2 to 3 years to involve
the workforce in decision making, but such efforts
have met with resistance. The manufacturing facili-
ties are fairly modern, while the equipment and
workforce management policies are more dated.
B.4. Plant D
Plant D employs 325 people, with roughly 150
directly tied to production. They manufacture small,
precision, cold-formed metal components such as
driveshafts for electric drills ŽSkil., fuel injection
components ŽCaterpillar., printer components ŽHP.,
etc. The plant produces a wide variety of parts,
ranging in volumes from 2000–10,000 to as many as
a million per year. The plant is organized with a
process focus for batch manufacturing with similar
machines grouped together.
B.5. Plant E
Plant E employs approximately 75 workers, 10 in
management positions, and 65 hourly. This family
run business is a non-union, make-to-order job shop,
where they grind, mill and lathe medium sized prod-
ucts for their customers. The original founder is still
president. Their work consists of approximately 40%
prototyping work Žwith typical volumes of less than
five per batch. and 60% ‘production’ Žwith volumes
running up to the thousands. for large firms such as
General Electric and Boeing. They have recently
been in a growth period, having moved into their
current facility 3 years ago. At the time of the
interview, they were working with a customer to
become ISO 9000 certified.
304 K.K. Boyer, C. McDermottr Journal of Operations Management 17 (1999) 289–305
B.6. Plant F
Plant F employs approximately 1000 workers Ž300
hourly. in its plant in the northeastern US. They
manufacture a relatively small line of products Žless
than 100. in a process-based layout. Because the
market they serve has a high level of demand sea-
sonality, they have historically hired upward of 25%
of their workforce as temporary employees. On the
shop floor, their equipment includes robotics, NC,
and CNC equipment. Recent shifts in the market-
place have had a negative effect on demand for their
product.
B.7. Plant G
This plant is located in the southeastern US and
employs 75 people, with 65 direct production work-
ers. They produce both standard and custom sheet
metal components for a wide variety of housing and
industrial applications. The plant has come under
new ownership within the last 2 years and efforts are
underway to improve inventory tracking and lessen
worker turnover. Efficient production is currently
hampered in part by the existing manufacturing facil-
ities, which consist of two separate buildings which
have been expanded in a somewhat haphazard man-
ner over the last 10–15 years as the business grew.
A single, larger facility would improve operations,
but the cost associated with such a move is pro-
hibitively high at this time.
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