MV Sea Success I Vs Liverpool and London SteamshipM010824COM19951

MANU/MH/0842/2001
Equivalent Citation: AIR2002Bom151, 2002(2)BomC R537
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal No. 226 of 2001 in Notice of Motion No. 2455 of 2000 in Admiralty Suit No. 32
of 2000 along with Appeal No. 739 of 2000 in Notice of Motion No. 1376 of 1998 in
Admiralty Suit No. 30 of 1998
Decided On: 05.11.2001
Decided On: 28.11.2001
Appellants: M.V. "Sea Success I"
Vs.
Respondent: Liverpool and London Steamship Protection and Indemnity
Association Ltd. and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.M. Lodha and N.N. Mhatre, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Z.P. Bharucha and P.D. Kadam, Advs. in Appl. No.
226/2001 in Notice of Motion No. 2455/2000 in Admiralty Suit No. 32/2000 and G.A.
Rebello and E. Markar, Advs. in Appl. No. 739/2000 in Notice of Motion No. 1376/1998
in Admiralty Suit No. 30/1998
For Respondents/Defendant: P.S. Pratap, Adv. in Appl. No. 226/2001 in Notice of Motion
No. 2455/2000 in Admiralty Suit No. 32/2000, for respondent No. 1 and Rahul
Narichania, Adv., i/b., Mulla & Mulla in Appl. No. 739/2000 in Notice of Motion No.
1376/1998 in Admiralty Suit No. 30/1998
For Intervenor: V.C. Kotwal and V.R. Dhond, Advs. in Appl. No. 226/2001 in Notice of
Motion No. 2455/2000 in Admiralty Suit No. 32/2000
Case Note:
Civil - Maintainability of Suit - Section 5 of Admiralty Courts Act, 1861 and
Order 7 Rule 11 of - Whether claim for unpaid insurance premia in respect of
ship amounts to necessary supplies within meaning of Section 5 of Act
constitute maritime claim? - Held, allegations made in plaint did not prove
factum of Appellant no 1 Sea Success I being sister ship of vessels Sea Glory
and Sea Ranger in respect of whom claim has been raised in suit - It cannot
be overlooked that ship was valuable commercial chattel and her arrest
prejudices third parties innocently as well as affect interest of owner -
Therefore it was necessary to analyse plaint meaningfully to find out that it
discloses cause of action or not and not on technical and formal reading that
it discloses cause of action and wait for trial - There was not find any legal
bar under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC in rejected plaint against some of
Appellants - Therefore plaint did not disclose cause of action against
Appellant no 1 vessel and plaint in its entirety deserves to be rejected against
Appellant no 1 - Claim towards unpaid insurance premium of maritime vessel
was necessary as contemplated under section 5 of Act to constitute maritime
claim - Consequently question answered in affirmative and appeal
11-07-2023 (Page 1 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

maintainable
JUDGMENT
R.M. Lodha, J.
1 . The learned Single Judge while dismissing Notice of Motion No. 2455/2000 with
regard to prayer (a) taken out by the Vessel m.v. "Sea Success I" and her owners S.S.
Shipping Corporation Inc. in Admiralty Suit No. 32/2000 has referred to the Division
Bench the following question for its decision:
"Whether a claim for unpaid insurance premia in respect of a ship amounts to
"necessary supplies" within the meaning of section 5 of the Admiralty Courts
Act, 1861 so as to constitute maritime claim?
2. The aforesaid question is also involved in Appeal No. 739/2000 arising out of Notice
of Motion No. 1376/1998 in Admiralty Suit No. 30/1998 and, therefore, both the
aforesaid appeals were heard together and are being disposed of by this common
judgment. Besides the aforesaid question common to both appeals, there are distinct
and separate issues involved which we shall deal with at an appropriate stage.
3 . At the outset, we may observe that we afforded extensive hearing to the learned
Counsel appearing in the matter not because it was so required but the research done
and the labour put by the learned Counsel justified such indulgence.
4. As the aforesaid question has been referred in Admiralty Suit No. 32/2000, we shall
refer to the facts obtaining in that suit before we proceed to discuss the aforesaid
question. The plaintiff in Admiralty Suit No. 32/2000 is a Protection & Indemnity
Association incorporated under the laws of the United Kingdom which carries on
business through its Managers, Liverpool & London P & I Management Ltd. at Liverpool,
U.K. The plaintiff is mutual association of ship owners and offers insurance cover in
respect of the vessels entered with it for diverse third party risks associated with the
operation and trading of vessels. The defendant No. 1 vessel m.v. "Sea Success I" is
allegedly a sistership of vessels "Sea Ranger and "Sea Glory" which were entered for
Protection & Indemnity (P & I) risks to the plaintiff Association. The said two vessels
were entered into the plaintiff-Association for the policy year 1998-99 and 1999-2000
by defendant No. 2 viz. Singapore Soviet Shipping Co. Pte. According to the plaintiff
Association, the defendant No. 1 vessel is owned and/or controlled by the defendant
No. 2 through its wholly owned 100% subsidiary of S.S. Shipping Corporation Inc.,
Monrovia. The plaintiff's claim is in respect of insurance premium due and payable by
the defendant No. 2 in respect of various P & I risks for which the defendant No. 2's
vessels "Sea Glory" and "Sea Ranger" were insured by the plaintiff Association which
according to them falls in the category of necessaries within the scope and ambit of
section 5 of Admiralty Courts Act, 1861 (for short Act of 1861). The plaintiff has also
averred that the defendant No. 1 vessel 'Sea Success I' is sistership of the two vessel
"Sea Glory" and "Sea Ranger" in view of the beneficial ownership, management and
control of all three vessels having vested in defendant No. 2. The averments made in
the plaint are that pursuant to the request received by the plaintiff from defendant No. 2
as operators of the vessels "Sea Glory" and "Sea Ranger" for P & I as well as Freight,
Demurrage and Defence (FDD) insurance cover for the said vessels, the plaintiff-
Association accepted the said two vessels and covered them for P & I risks for the
period 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 and plaintiff also accepted defendant No. 2 as
member of plaintiff-Association. Pursuant to the insurance cover provided by the
plaintiff to the two vessels-Sea Glory and "Sea Ranger", certificates of entry of the said

vessels into the plaintiff Association in accordance with its rules were issued. The cover
commenced from 20th February of each policy year which is as per the practice of all P
& I Associations worldwide. Upon the entry of the two vessels "Sea Glory" and "Sea
Ranger" into the plaintiff Association defendant No. 2 became liable to pay all calls or
premium levied by the plaintiff Association from time to time. It is the plaintiff's case
that as per the rules of the Association the member is liable to contribute by way of
calls such amounts as may be called upon by the directors of the plaintiff-Association.
The insurance premium or calls that a member/owner is liable to pay to the plaintiff
are:
(a) advance calls during the policy year:
(b) supplementary calls as may be determined by the Association after the
closing of the policy year:
(c) release calls as may be determined by the Association on termination of the
cover and
(d) overspill calls in respect of any overspill claim incurred by the Association.
For the policy year commencing on 20-2-2000 the plaintiff decided to stop offering
insurance cover to all vessels entered with them and made arrangements for its existing
members to obtain similar cover with other Associations. However, all existing members
were liable to pay the premium as determined by the plaintiff for the previous policy
years for which insurance cover had been effected. It is plaintiff's case that accordingly
as per the rules of the Association, release calls which are part of the premium payable
by the members after the expiry of the policy year were assessed and demanded by the
plaintiff in respect of the vessels "Sea Glory" and "Sea Ranger" from defendant No. 2.
The amount due in respect of "Sea Glory" and "Sea Ranger" aggregated to US $
1,58,228.95 and debit notes dated 20-2-2000 were sent to defendant No. 2 in respect
of the said amounts which were payable within 28 days from the date of debit notes but
no payments were made and, therefore, plaintiff-Association by their fax dated 15-5-
2000 conveyed to the intervening brokers that unless the outstanding amount of US $
1,64,087,43 (increased for interest) was paid within that week, the Association shall
take steps to obtain security and payment by arrest of defendant No. 2's vessel. Two
payments of US $ 40,882.62 and US $ 2519.33 were made on 23-5-2000 and 31-5-
2000 respectively leaving balance of US $ 1,13,394.22. As the balance remained unpaid
by defendant No. 2 who were liable to make payments, the plaintiff-Association filed the
present Admiralty suit praying for decree against defendant No. 1 vessel in the sum of
US $ 1,18,194.89 together with interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the sum of US
$ 1,13,394.20 from the date of the filing of the suit till the date of the decree and
further interest on the said sum till payment and/or realisation. The plaintiff also has
prayed for arrest of defendant No. 1 vessel m.v. "Sea Success I" and her sale towards
the satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim in the suit. The plaintiff-Association prayed for
interim relief for arrest of defendant No. 1 vessel 'Sea Success I' along with her hull,
engines, gears, tackle, machinery, bunkers, apparel, plant, furniture, fixtures,
equipment and all other appurtenances. By way of ad interim order passed by this
Court, defendant No. 1 vessel 'Sea Success I' was arrested. The defendant No. 2 viz.
Singapore Soviet Shipping Co. Pvt. Ltd. initially appeared before this Court and
undertook not to sell the vessel until posting of back/security. It appears that thereafter
on 31-7-2000 the owners of the defendant No. 1 vessel viz. S.S. Shipping Corporation
Inc. Monrovia, Liberia appeared before this Court and agreed to honour the undertaking
of defendant No. 2 to furnish security and, accordingly, they were permitted to furnish

security in the form of Bank Guarantee to be issued by Standard Chartered Bank,
Bombay. On 1-8-2000 the learned Single Judge permitted the owners of defendant No.
1 vessel to furnish a rupee denominated Pay Order to be substituted by Bank Guarantee
within two weeks and thus the Pay Order was furnished by the owners of the defendant
No. 1 vessel 'Sea Success I' and defendant No. 1 vessel was thereafter free to sail. The
owners of defendant No. 1 vessel on 11-8-2000 furnished a Bank Guarantee on the
requisite terms placed on the Pay Order. On 22-8-2000 the defendant No. 1 vessel and
her owners took out Notice of Motion No. 2455/2000 seeking rejection of the plaint for
failure to disclose cause of action and/or dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction.
The crux of the contentions raised by the owners of the defendant No. 1 vessel for
rejection of the plaint for failure to disclose cause of action and dismissal of suit for
want of jurisdiction is based on two grounds viz., (a) that a claim for unpaid release
calls described by plaintiff as insurance premia does not constitute a 'necessary' within
the meaning of section 5 of Act of 1861 and (b) that the vessel "Sea Success I" is not a
sistership of the vessel "Sea Ranger" or "Sea Glory". The learned Single Judge by his
order dated 1st/2nd February 2001 dismissed the notice of motion in so far as prayer
Clause (a) viz. rejected of plaint for want of cause of action and/or non-disclosure of
cause of action was concerned and referred the question which we have noted above for
decision by Division Bench. In so far as alternative prayers made in prayer Clauses (b),
(c) and (d) of the Notice of Motion were concerned, the learned Single Judge held that
no order was necessary with regard to those prayers in view of the reference made by
him to the Division Bench. Dissatisfied with the dismissal of Notice of Motion to the
extent the learned Single Judge refused to reject the plaint for want of cause of action
and/or non-disclosure of cause of action, defendant No. 1 vessel and her owners have
preferred Appeal No. 226/2001.
5 . Mr. Z.P. Bharucha, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants in Appeal No.
226/2001 vehemently contended that a claim for unpaid insurance premium in respect
of the ship does not constitute a "necessary" as understood in maritime law. He
submitted that insurance is meant primarily as a means of indemnifying and protecting
the vessel owner against loss of his vessel and/or claims that may arise as a result of
damage or loss caused by the vessel; an insurance is more concerned and connected
with the financial operations and interest of the owner as distinct from that of a ship.
The submission of Mr. Bharucha is that a perusal of maritime claim enumerated in
Admiralty Court Act, 1840 and 1861, section 22 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act,
1925, the 1952 Brussels Arrest Convention and the Administration of Justice Act, 1956
disclose one uniform feature viz. that if monetary claim qualifies for and is recognised
as a maritime claim the same must bear a close and intimate connection with the ship in
question and not its owner and, therefore, conceptually claim for unpaid insurance
premia cannot be recognised as giving rise to maritime claim. The learned Counsel
referred to section 5 of Act of 1861 and submitted that though the expression
"necessaries supplied" to any ship has not been defined statutorily but the expression
"necessaries" is a term of art and is used in the limited context of monetary claims
made for goods or services supplied to a particular ship for her operation and
maintenance. He submitted that claim for unpaid insurance premia cannot be regarded
as "necessaries" as a vessel may and indeed can operate and trade without insurance
though it may be imprudent even to attempt it; in general on high seas no national law
or conventional obliges a vessel owner to take out comprehensive P & I insurance. The
learned Counsel heavily relied upon (The Heinrich Bjorn), 1883 (8) P.D. 151, (The
Andre Theodore), 10, Aspinall 94, Stokes v. The Conference, (1887) 8 NSWR 10, (The
Emrald Transporter), 1985 (2) SALR 152. (The River "Rima"), 1988 (2) LLR 193, (The
Golden Petroleum), 1994 (1) SLR 92 and the provisions of aforesaid statutes and 1952
Brussels Arrest Convention and the Administration of Justice Act, 1956. Mr. Bharucha,

the learned Counsel for the appellants also urged that amounts due towards unpaid
insurance premia cannot be said to arise out of an agreement relating to the use or hire
of a ship or an agreement relating to the carriage of goods in any ship and, also not a
maritime claim under that head. In this connection, the learned Counsel referred to
(Aifanourious), 1980 (2) LLR 403 and Gatoil International Inc. v. Arkwright-Boston
Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. and others, 1985 (1) All E.R.129. He would also
urge that the amounts due towards insurance premia is not a maritime claim in respect
of the disbursements made on account of a ship. He sought support from Bain Clarkson
Ltd. v. The Owners of the Ship "Sea Friends", 1991 2 LLR 322. By extensively referring
to the judgment of the Apex Court in m.v. "Elisabeth" & others v. Harwan Investment
and Trading Pvt. Ltd. Hanoekar House, Swatontapeth, Vasco-de-Gama, Goa
MANU/SC/0685/1993 : [1992]1SCR1003 the learned Counsel urged that the entire
endeavour of the Apex Court in m.v. "Elisabeth" was to align and modernise the law by
inter alia introducing into admiralty jurisprudence, the principles underlying the 1952
Brussels Arrest Convention. According to him, application of the Supreme Court
judgment in m.v. "Elisabeth" to the present case makes clear that amount allegedly due
for unpaid insurance premia is not recognised as a maritime claim under Article 1 of
1952 Brussels Arrest Convention. The learned Counsel heavily criticised application of
US Law to the contract of insurance which is governed by English Law and submitted
that third system of law i.e. US Law to the arrest of vessel cannot be applied
disregarding (i) the substantive law governing its contractual insurance viz. English law
and (ii) the law of the forum i.e. lex fori viz. Indian Law. He would contend that 1999
Geneva Arrest Convention relating to the arrest of ships does not deserve to be made
applicable to India as the said convention has not yet entered into force and presently
only six countries viz. Bulgaria, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Norway and Pakistan have
signed the same and out of these countries only Bulgaria has ratified it. According to
him, vast majority of trading nations i.e. over 70 in number who command
preponderant of word tonnage has given effect to the 1952 Brussels Arrest Convention
and therefore 1952 Convention has near universal acceptance and can be regarded as
international common law which does not include unpaid insurance premium as
maritime claim. Mr. Bharucha also contended that the Regulations issued by Mumbai
and Calcutta Port Trusts mandating all vessels entering at these ports to have P & I
cover cannot be indicative of the fact that unpaid insurance premia is a "necessary"
under section 5 of the Admiralty Courts Act, 1861. Mr. Bharucha, thus, concluded that
claim for unpaid insurance premia is not "necessary".
6 . Mr. V.C. Kotwal, the learned Senior Counsel who appeared as an intervenor
supported the submissions of Mr. Bharucha and additionally contended that the concept
of "necessaries" contemplated supply of goods or materials to a particular ship for her
operation or maintenance and club cover is not comparable with the concept of
"necessaries" supplied to the ship because upon entering into a ship the owner becomes
a member of the company, who pays the membership fee and undertakes to pay
contribution towards the losses incurred by himself as well as other members of the
club and his liability to pay these contributions is a liability collateral to the
membership. Mr. Kotwal submitted that consideration for payment of the call is the
undertaking to contribute towards losses of other members, management expenses,
reinsurance losses etc. and the foundation of the contract is not the payment of a
premium, but an agreement that each member should bear his aliquot share of the
losses of the year covered by the policy. According to Mr. Kotwal, club cover merely
postulates the ownership being indemnified by the club provided; (a) the managers in
their absolute discretion decided to indemnify the member, (b) the member has fulfilled
all the conditions of giving notice and complying with the directions etc. and (c) the
member makes payment to the person claims against him the pay to be paid Clause.

The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the contract between the member and a club
is thus not a contract for traditional liability insurance much less a compulsory third
party insurance similar to that under the Motor Vehicles Act or a employer's third party
liability insurance under statutes and no third party can directly proceed against the
club and, therefore, there is no basis for attributing to the P & I insurance policy the
status of "necessaries".
7 . Mr. Narichania, the learned Counsel appearing for respondents in Appeal No.
739/2000 adopted the arguments of Mr. Bharucha and Mr. Kotwal and further contended
that the P & I call money required to be paid by ship owner to P & I club does not relate
to cover for his particular ship which is entered with the P & I club. The call money is
paid to indemnify his liability and liability of other members of the club and for the
expenses of management, general expenses, outgoings, investment and reinsurance
premium accrued or anticipated etc. He submitted that unpaid call money is in the
nature of an unpaid contribution from the ship owner towards a common pool/fund
from which liabilities of members are met. According to him, the unpaid P & I call
monies are only unpaid contribution of the member and not the ship and the
necessaries must be identified with the particular ship. He also relied upon The River
"Rima". Mr. Narichania also contended that the circulars issued by Bombay Port Trust
and Calcutta Port Trust making it mandatory for all vessels entering the respective port
to have P & I cover does not make in any manner such P & I cover a necessary supplied
to ship or its voyage because such circulars only relate to entry of vessel at the port but
does not create any debt or monetary liability giving rise to a maritime claim. According
to the learned Counsel such circulars have been issued by the Bombay Port Trust and
Calcutta Port Trust for their own requirement and not for the benefit of the ship or the P
& I club. He also submitted that in view of the "pay to be paid" clause in all P & I clubs
the third party has no recourse directly against the P & I club for recovery of any loss or
damage caused to them and as the P & I cover is solely for the pecuniary benefit of the
ship owner, a claim for unpaid insurance premia in respect of ship cannot be said to be
covered by the expression "necessary supplied" within the meaning of section 5 of the
Admiralty Courts Act, 1861.
8 . On the other hand Mr. Prashant Pratap, the learned Counsel appearing for plaintiff
Association respondent No. 1 in Appeal No. 226/2001 strenuously urged that the
expression "necessaries" occurring in section 5 of the Admiralty Courts Act, 1861 must
be construed in broad and liberal manner keeping in mind the ever changing
requirement of a ship to be able to trade in commerce and in the present day context
the insurance should be considered 'necessary' for the operation of the ship. He
submitted that it is mandatory for a vessel to have a valid P & I insurance cover at
major ports in India and consequently at least as far as India is concerned insurance is
a 'necessary'. The learned Counsel would urge that the absence for valid P & I insurance
cover as required by Port Regulations renders a vessel legally unseaworthy and
consequently in breach of statutory requirements and hence P & I insurance is deemed
to be mandatory and should be considered as a 'necessary' for a vessel. He referred to
the Inland Vessels Act, 1917 (Amendment in 1977), the Merchant Shipping Act, 1956
(Amendment in 1983) and the Multimodal Transportation of Goods Act, 1993
(Amendment in 2000) to show the trend of domestic legislation in India towards making
insurance compulsory and mandatory for ships and multimodal transport operators and
submitted that there is no good reason for holding that insurance is not necessary by
following restricted view of English courts. Mr. Pratap submitted that the provisions of
1999 Geneva Arrest Convention deserves to be applied in the light of the observations
made by the Apex Court in m.v. "Elisabeth", particularly in the absence of any
codification of maritime claims by statutes in India and any domestic legislation to the

contrary. He highlighted during the course of arguments that several common law
countries such as Chanda, South Africa and Australia as well as communist regimes like
China and Korea have given claim for insurance in respect of a ship, the status of a
maritime claim and as the unpaid insurance premium is one of the maritime claims
specified in 1999 Geneva Arrest Convention, there is no reason to not to hold unpaid
insurance premium as a claim falling within the Admiralty jurisdiction of this Court. He
referred to various circulars issued by Bombay Port Trust and Calcutta Port Trust and
also the judgment of American Court in Fred S. James and Co. etc. Equilease
Corporation et al., 793 F.d. 598 5th Cirlj. 1986.
9 . Mr. G.A. Rebello, the learned Counsel appearing for appellants in Appeal No.
739/2000 supported the submissions of Mr. Pratap and further contended that a vast
number of States have legislatively provided for unpaid premia as a maritime claim.
According to him, the United States of America (U.S.A.) has expanded the definition of
"necessaries" to include unpaid premia in the absence of provision under the
enactments. He cited several countries such as South Africa, China, Australia etc. having
stipulated that unpaid premia constitutes into a maritime claim. Mr. Rebello would urge
that P & I cover is in the nature of "necessaries" supplied and/or services rendered if
one looks into the ramifications of a vessel attempting to trade without protection and
indemnity. By referring to the various services extended by the Association, Mr. Rebello
submitted that without P & I cover vessel is not in a position to undertake any maritime
adventure. He also submitted that P & I cover is far reaching as it caters to the
eventualities in respect of the seamen liabilities, passenger liabilities and third party
liabilities attending to the complement, stowaways, supernumeraries, life salvage and
persons in distress and also liabilities arising as a result of collision, damage to the
ships, damage to property, pollution, wreck removal, towage etc. and, therefore, what
are "necessaries" today are entirely different from what were necessaries during
historical times where trading was relatively simple. The learned Counsel submitted that
though India is not signatory to numerous international conventions, in view of the
dictum in m.v. "Elisabeth", the principles can be adopted into our local context. Mr.
Rebello referred to the International Convention on a Civil Liability for oil pollution,
Brussels which requires compulsory insurance. The Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution)
Act, 1961 which makes insurance compulsory, the Major Port Trusts Act which entitles
the major Port Trusts to issue notifications having the force of law and such
notifications issued by Bombay Port Trust and Calcutta Port Trust entitling only ships
having a valid P & I cover to enter into harbour in exercise of the said power. The
Indian Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 (particularly section 352N), The Inland Vessels Act
which requires a compulsory third party risk insurance cover and the most standard
format of charter-parties having printed clause making it mandatory for a vessel to have
a valid protection and indemnity cover to buttress his argument that protection &
indemnity club cover/marine insurance is necessary within the meaning of section 5 of
the Act of 1861. Mr. Rebello relied upon the judgment in Caterpill Finance v. Alential
Chalice, 1994 AMC 1767, m.v. Tiang Yung v. Shaw Wallace, MANU/AP/0212/1988 :
AIR1988AP331 , (m.v. Agios Nikolaos), A.I.R. 1985 Bom 281 and the order dated 18-
10-1995 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Admiralty Suit No. 60/1995
(m.v. "Negotiator"). Mr. Rebello, thus, concluded that in today's modern shipping
context and the expansive jurisdiction trend recommended by Supreme Court in m.v.
"Elisabeth" no doubt is left that claim for unpaid insurance premia is a claim towards
necessary for a ship.
10. In England the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty was exercised in rem in
such matters as from their very nature would give rise to a maritime lien e.g. collision,
salvage, bottomry and arrest of property other than the ship concerned did not enter

into the question. After Admiralty Court Act, 1840, the jurisdiction of High Court of
Admiralty in England was extended to cover certain matters in respect of which there
was no maritime lien i.e. necessaries supplied to a foreign ship. The Supreme Court in
m.v. "Elisabeth" has noted English statues on admiralty jurisdiction and the power
exercised by English Courts over foreign ships and being benefited thereby it would be
sufficient, without ourselves tracing the history of admiralty jurisdiction and legislation,
to refer to paragraphs 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 which read thus:
"35. The Admiralty Court Act, 1840 was the first of a series of statutes
extending and defining the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty in
England. This Act was followed by the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 conferring
larger powers upon the High Court of Admiralty. Section 6 of this Act
empowered the High Court of Admiralty to assume jurisdiction over foreign
ships in respect of claims to cargo carried into any port in England or Wales.
Significantly, the Act did not apply to outward cargo. Section 7 of the Act,
however, conferred jurisdiction on the High Court of Admiralty "over any claim
for damage done by any ship". This Act was followed by the judicature Act of
1873, which came into force in 1875 and which merged the High Court of
Admiralty with the High Court of Justice resulting in a fusion of Admiralty law,
common law and equity. It is of interest to note that the provision contained in
section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 limiting the jurisdiction of the
Admiralty Court to claims respecting inward cargo was discarded by the
Administration of Justice Act, 1920 which extended the jurisdiction of the High
Court to (a) any claim arising out of an agreement relating to the use or hire of
a ship; (b) any claim relating to the carriage of goods in any ship, and; (c) any
claim in tort in respect of goods carried in any ship. The Act thus applied to
both inward and outward cargoes.
3 6 . The Admiralty Court Act, 1861 and the subsequent enactments were
consolidated by the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925. The
admiralty jurisdiction of the English High Court was redefined by this Act to
include various matters such as any claim "for damage done by a ship", any
claim "arising out of an agreement relating to the use or hire of a ship"; or
"relating to the carriage of goods in a ship", or "in tort in respect of goods
carried in a ship". This jurisdiction was, however, not available if "at the time
of the institution of the proceedings any owner or part owner of the ship was
domiciled in England" (See section 22(i), (iv) and (vii). By the Administration
of Justice Act, 1928, the jurisdiction vested in the High Court by the Supreme
Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925 was declared to belong to all
divisions of the High Court. The Admiralty Court was thus empowered to
entertain, apart from actions in rem, any claim in personam which could be
brought in any other division of the High Court.
37. By the Administration of Justice Act, 1956, the admiralty jurisdiction of the
High Court was further widened and redefined so as to include not only the
claims specified under section 1(i) of Part I but also "any other jurisdiction
which either was vested in the High Court of Admiralty immediately before the
date of the commencement of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873 (i.e.
November 1, 1875), or is conferred by or under an Act which came into
operation on or after that date on the High Court as being a Court with
Admiralty jurisdiction and any other jurisdiction connected with ships or aircraft
vested in the High Court apart from this section which is for the time being
assigned by rules of Court to the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division. Sub-

section (4) of this section removed the restriction based on the ownership of
the ship. It says that the jurisdiction applied to all ships or aircraft, "whether
British or not and whether registered or not and wherever the residence or
domicile of their owners may be" and "in relation to all claims wheresoever
arising". The jurisdiction in regard to the questions or claims specified under
section 1(i) includes any claim for damage done by a ship", "any claim for loss
of or damage to goods carried in a ship", "any claim arising out of any
agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a ship or to the use or hire of a
ship". See Clauses (d), (g) and (h).
38. These claims are now specifically mentioned under Clauses (e), (g) and (h)
respectively of section 20(2) of the Supreme Court Act, 1981, amongst other
claims, as falling under the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court. Part II of
this Act is derived substantially form Part I of the 1956 Act which was enacted
to give effect to the Brussels Convention of 1952 relating to the arrest of sea-
going ships and the rules concerning civil jurisdiction in matters of collision
(Cmd 8954).
39. Section 20 of the Supreme Court Act, 1981 enumerates various questions
and claims falling under the admiralty jurisdiction of the English High Court.
Apart from matters covered by the Merchant Shipping Acts, 1894 to 1979
(referred to in sub-section (3)) and certain other matters, various questions and
claims are enumerated in sub-section (2). They include "any claim for loss of or
damage to goods carried in a ship; any claim arising out of any agreement
relating to the carriage of goods in a ship or to the use or hire of a ship; any
claim for damage received by a ship; and any claim for damage done by a
ship."
4 0 . Sub-section (7) of this section specifically provides that the admiralty
jurisdiction of the High Court extends to "all ships or aircrafts, whether British
or not and wherever the residence or domicile of their owners may be, and to
all claims wherever arising". It reads:
(a) in relating to all ships or aircraft, whether British or not and
wherever the residence or domicile of their owners may be;
(b) in relation to all claims, wherever arising (including) in the case of
cargo or wreck salvage, claims in respect of cargo or wreck found on
land; and
(c) so far as they relate to mortgages and charges, to all mortgages or
charges, whether registered or not and whether legal or equitable,
including mortgages and charges created under foreign law;
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be construed as extending the
cases in which money or property is recoverable under any of the provisions of
the Merchant Shipping Acts, 1894 to 1979."
This jurisdiction is wide enough to cover all claims in tort or contract arising
out of any agreement for carriage of goods by sea.
41. The whole jurisdiction of the English High Court is now vested in all the
divisions alike. All divisions of the High Court and all the Judges of that Court
have equal power, authority and jurisdiction, although admiralty actions are

assigned to the Queen's Bench Division and taken up by the Admiralty Court.
The special requirements of an action in personam, namely, the habitual
residence or place of business of the defendant or the cause of action having
their nexus with England and Wales or the determination of a connected matter
in the English High Court or the submission; of the defendant to the jurisdiction
of that Court, are not applicable to a proceeding commenced, as an admiralty
action in rem. See Order 75, Rule 4(3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court,
1965."
11. Section 5 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 provides thus:
"5. As to claims for necessaries.---The High Court of Admiralty shall have
jurisdiction over any claim for necessaries supplied to any ship elsewhere than
in the port to which the ship belongs, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of
the Court that at the time of the institution of the cause any owner or part
owner of the ship is domiciled in England or Wales: Provided always, that if in
any such cause the plaintiff do not recover twenty pounds, he shall not be
entitled to."
12. The important question referred by the learned Single Judge to be decided by us
and which is indeed a vexed and controversial one is as to what is real concept and
purport of the term necessaries used in section 5 of the Act of 1861. Though the
question is confined to whether claim for unpaid insurance premia in respect of ship
amounts to "necessaries supplied" within the meaning of section 5 of the Admiralty
Courts Act, 1861 so as to constitute a maritime claim, but we find the ancillary question
that also arises for determination is whether a claim for unpaid insurance premia in
respect of a ship is otherwise maritime claim giving rise to admiralty cause?
1 3 . Statutorily by the Admiralty Court Act, 1840 the Court of Admiralty acquired
jurisdiction over claims for necessaries supplied to any foreign ship or seagoing vessel.
By the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 in respect of claims for necessaries supplied to any
ship elsewhere than in the port to which the ship belonged, unless it was shown to the
satisfaction of the Court that no owner or part owner of the ship was domiciled in
England or Wales was extended to the jurisdiction of Court of Admiralty. The expression
"necessaries" has not been defined in the Act of 1861. However, it seems in England the
word "necessaries" had acquired by and large definite meaning by judicial
pronouncements. Per Abbott, C.J., in Webster v. Seekamp, 1821 (4) Ald. 352 the term
necessaries has been defined to mean such as are fit and proper for the vessel upon her
voyage and such as a prudent owner himself, if present, would order. In the "Perla"
(swab 352) it has been observed that the word "necessaries" needs to be given a liberal
meaning and where "necessaries" are supplied for the use and benefit of foreign ship,
the presumption is that ship is liable. The question whether the premium for insurance
could be regarded as "necessaries" directly arose in The Heinrich Bjorn. Lord Hannen
opined.
"........I am however of opinion that premiums for insurance cannot be regarded
as necessaries. The expression "necessaries supplied" in 3 & 4 Vict. Clause 65,
section 6, which gave the Admiralty Court jurisdiction over foreign ships,
though it is not to be restricted to things absolutely and immediately necessary
for a ship in order to put out to sea, see The Perla (1), must still be confined to
things directly belonging to the ship's equipment necessary at the time, and
under the then exiting circumstances for the services in which the ship is
engaged see The Alexander. (2) But the insurance of a vessel is something

quite extraneous to its equipment for sea, and however prudent it may be for
an owner to insure it is a prudence exercised for his own protection and not for
the requirements of the vessel, in the sense in which the word "necessaries" is
used in the statute."
14. The Heinrich Bjorn was followed in the Andre Theodore (supra) and it was held by
the Gorell Barnes, J., thus:
".....Lord Hannen took, which seems to be to be quite right, was that there is a
broad distinction between money expended on actually fitting the ship out and
working her for the purpose of her navigation, and moneys which are merely
expended for the purposes of protecting a shipowner in the event of her being
lost. They are not in the least necessary for the ship; they are not supplied or
furnished to the ship: they are mere moneys which are paid to insure the
shipowner against his being out of pocket in case the ship is lost."
15. The Heinrich Bajorn was also followed in Stokes & others v. The Conference (supra)
and it was held that the insurance of a ship is not a necessary. The same view appears
to have been taken by Court of Durban in M.V. Emerald Transporter with reference to
the provisions contained in Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983 wherein it
was held that services which injured solely to the benefit of the shipowner, as was the
position with the contracts of insurance, could not be classed as "necessaries". It may
be said that the observations were made by the Court in Durban in the context of
ranking of claims against a fund comprising of sale proceeds of the vessel M.V. "Emrald
Transporter."
1 6 . Article 1(k) of 1952 Brussels Arrest Convention which incorporates "goods or
materials wherever supplied to a ship for her operation or maintenance" as a maritime
claim came to be considered by the House of Lords in The River Rima. The House of
Lord noted that Article 1(1) of the Convention listed 17 types of claims in paragraphs
lettered (a) to (q) and the list of the types of the claims therein was derived as a whole
from the list of types of claims in section 22 (1)(a) of 1992 Act which gave to the High
Court of Admiralty jurisdiction over claims for "necessaries" which had previously been
given, though not in precisely the same terms, to the High Court of Admiralty, first, by
section 6 of Admiralty Court Act, 1840 and later by section 5 of Admiralty Court Act,
1861. House of Lords held, "In other words, what is now called a claim in respect of
goods or material supplied to a ship for her operation or maintenance is the equivalent
of what used to be called a claim for necessaries, but without the restrictions which
formerly applied to such a claim."
1 7 . The expression "goods supplied to a ship for her operation and maintenance"
occurring in Article 1(k) of 1952 Brussels Convention was dealt with by Singapore High
Court in Golden Petroleum (supra) and it was held thus:
"Having regard to all the authorities referred to, I am of the view that the
phrase operation of the ship even if construed liberally, would necessarily entail
an aspect of consumption or an element of internal activity, function, utility or
exploitation of the goods supplied, within or by the ship. Lest it is
misunderstood. I hasten to add that by internal function or activity, et seq. I am
not attempting to restrict the meaning of the word operation only to the ship's
mechanical or motility aspects which enable her to move from port to port. I
accept Mr. Selvadurai's contention that no distinction can be drawn between
necessaries for the ship and necessaries for the voyage and all things

reasonably requisite for the particular adventure on which the ship is bound are
comprised in this category see William Fleming v. Equator, at pp. 2-3.
Nevertheless, the historical background referred to by Lord Brandon in The
River Rima and the observations by Sir John Donaldson MR and Nourse LJ in
the Court of Appeal, connote that the goods supplied to the ship must be linked
to the working or running of that ship. In my opinion, bunker oil supplied to
the ship for sale to other ships could not be conceived as goods supplied for
her operation. The phrase operation of the ship should not be equated with the
business activities of the shipowner and the section as enacted could not cover
goods which are loaded onto the ship only to be unloaded or disposed of soon
thereafter by sale."
1 8 . The question with which we are faced is whether the construction of the word
"necessaries" given in The Heinrich Bjorn, The Andre Theodore, Stokes etc. could be
accepted and followed by us, albeit we are not bound by such view, in so far as the
claim towards insurance premium is concerned in the changing times when shipping
industry has grown tremendously. Whatever be the misgivings of the Admiralty
jurisdiction of the Indian High Courts earlier and restrictions put by themselves, after
the authoritative pronouncement by the Apex Court in m.v. "Elisabeth", no doubt is left
that though Colonial statutes continue to remain in force by reason of Article 372 of the
Constitution of India but that does not stultify the growth of law or blinker its vision or
fetter its arms. In m.v. "Elisabeth" it has been held that the fact that the High Court
continues to enjoy the same jurisdiction as it had immediately before the
commencement of the constitution does not mean that a matter which is covered by
Admiralty Court Act, 1861 cannot be otherwise dealt with by the High Court in exercise
of its manifold jurisdiction which is unless barred, unlimited. The Supreme Court went
on to observe that to the extent not barred expressly or by necessary implication, the
judicial sovereignty of this country is manifested in the jurisdiction vested in the High
Courts as superior courts. There is, therefore, neither reason nor logic in imposing a
fetter on the jurisdiction of these High Courts by limiting it to the provisions of an
imperial statute of 1861 and freezing any further growth of jurisdiction. This is all the
more true because the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 was in substance repealed in England
a long time ago. The Supreme Court went on to observe. "Maritime law is as much a
part of the general legal system as any other branch of the law. With the merger of the
Admiralty and common Law Courts in England in 1875 and the fusion of their legal
precepts and concepts, this branch of the law, despite its peculiarities about actions in
rem, is no longer treated as a separate and independent branch. It is not the exclusive
preserve of the English High Court, for certain country courts in that country are
specially authorised to exercise this jurisdiction. This is much more true of the civil law
system where no distinction is drawn between maritime law and other branches of the
law, and they are administered alike by the same courts or tribunals." In tracing the
history of admiralty law in India, the Apex Court held, "it is likewise misleading and
incorrect to confine it to statutes. Statutes have been codifications of rules of law as
developed by usage, practice and custom". The Apex Court further held:
"64. Where statutes are silent and remedy has to be sought by recourse to basic
principles, it is the duty of the Court to devise procedural rules by analogy and
expediency. Actions in rem, as seen above, were resorted to by courts as a
device to overcome the difficulty of personal service on the defendant by
compelling him to enter appearance and accept service of summons with a view
to furnishing security for the release of the res; or, in his absence, proceed
against the res itself, by attributing to it a personality for the purpose of
entering a decree and executing the same by sale of the res. This is a practical

procedural decide developed by the courts with a view to rendering justice in
accordance with substantive law not only in cases of collision and salvage, but
also in cases of other maritime liens and claims arising by reason of breach of
contract for the hire of vessels or the carriage of goods or other maritime
transactions or tortious acts, such as conversion or negligence occurring in
connection with the carriage of goods. Where substantive law demands justice
for the party aggrieved and the statute has not provided the remedy, it is the
duty of the Court to devise procedure by drawing analogy from other systems
of law and practice. To the courts of the "civil law countries" in Europe and
other places, like problems seldom arise, for all persons and things within their
territories (including their waters) fall within their competence to deal with.
They do not have to draw any distinction; between an action in rem and an
action in personam.
65. It is likewise within the competence of the appropriate Indian Courts to
deal in accordance with the general principles of maritime law and the
applicable provisions of statutory law, with all persons and things found within
their jurisdiction. The power of the Court is plenary and unlimited unless it is
expressly or by necessary implication curtailed. Absent such curtailment of
jurisdiction, all remedies which are available to the courts to administer justice
are available to a claimant against a foreign ship and its owner found within the
jurisdiction of the High Court concerned. This power of the Court to render
justice must necessarily include the power to make interlocutory orders for
arrest and attachment before judgment."
19. The Supreme Court did observe that Indian statutes leg behind any development of
international law and though the Supreme Court Act, 1981 of England has catalogued
maritime claims with reference to the unified rules adopted by the Brussels Convention
of 1952 on the arrest of Seagoing ships and although India has not adopted the various
conventions, the provisions of these conventions are the result of international
unification and development of the maritime laws of the world and can, therefore, be
regarded as the international common law or transitional law rooted in and evolved out
of the general principles of national laws, which, in the absence of specific statutory
provisions, can be adopted and adapted by courts to supplement and complement
national statutes on the subject. In paragraph 89 of report the Apex Court observed
thus:
"89. All persons and thing within the waters of a State fall within its jurisdiction
unless specifically curtailed or regulated by rules of international law. The
power to arrest a foreign vessel, while in the waters of a coastal State, in
respect of a maritime claim, wherever arising, is a demonstrable manifestation
and an essential attribute of territorial sovereignty. This power is recognised by
several international conventions. These conventions contain the unified rules
of law drawn from different legal systems. Although many of these conventions
have yet to be ratified by India, they embody principles of law recognised by
the generality of maritime states, and can therefore be regarded as part of our
common law. The want of ratification of these conventions is apparently not
because of any policy disagreement, as is clear from active and fruitful Indian
participation in the formulation of rules adopted by the conventions, but
perhaps because of other circumstances, such as lack of an adequate and
specialised machinery for implementation of the various international
conventions by coordinating for the purpose the departments concerned of the
Government. Such a specialised body of legal and technical experts can

facilitate adoption of internationally unified rules by national legislation. It is
appropriate that sufficient attention is paid to this aspect of the matter by the
authorities concerned. Perhaps the Law Commission of India, endowed as it
ought to be with sufficient authority, status and independence, as is the
position in England, can render valuable help in this regard. Delay in the
adoption of international conventions which are intended to facilitate trade
hinders the economic growth of the nation."
20. At this stage it would be advantageous to appreciate the nature of the P & I club
and the insurance cover provided by such clubs. In the beginning P & I clubs were loose
associations of shipowners with no collective rights or exposure to outside legal action
but today P & I club is definitely a corporation. All P & I clubs in UK are registered
companies limited companies with no share capital because essentially these are non-
profit making companies. Upon entering the ship the owner becomes member of the P &
I club and he pays the membership fee and undertakes to pay contribution towards the
losses incurred by other members of the club which are payable by the Company. In
other words the concept of guarantee is based upon a reciprocal system, that each
member is cast under a duty to refund the damages suffered by any one of them and
pay, on mutual basis, each other's claims. In mutual insurance association or P & I
clubs each member would be both the assured and insurer. The member is insured as to
his own property in the club by all other members in proportion to their respective
properties in it and at the same time he would be an insurer in the proportion of his
own property in the club for the property of each of others. Mutual insurance
associations or P & I clubs indemnify the members against certain liabilities which are
not covered by ordinary form of policy, such as, liabilities for claims by members of the
crew, for life salvage, for the loss or damage to goods carried on their ships, for wreck
removal, for damage to piers, jetties etc., Some Associations also undertake the
conduct of legal proceedings in respect of such matters as the recovery of freight, dead
freight and demurrage, and claims by cargo owners. The Associations also provide
protection against war risks. These mutual insurance are made subject to memorandum
and Articles of Association and to the mutual insurance association's rules and
regulations which are usually by express reference incorporated in the policy. All clubs
both with large tonnages and small have established a net work of correspondents (or
representatives) familiar with P & I matters in all significant ports of the world. Under
the principle of mutuality members share each others liabilities, contribute only towards
the total cost of claims and cost of administration and reinsurance. The members, by
supporting one another, have a direct interest in preventing and reducing claims. Each
member is required to contribute to the funds of the club on the basis of an initial
estimated total cost for a policy year. This contribution is made partly as advance call
and partly as supplementary call or calls, determined by the directors as needed to meet
the overall liabilities of the club.
21. In India, it may be noted that major ports like Bombay and Calcutta have issued
circulars in exercise of the powers conferred upon them that all ships calling at the
concerned port must have a valid P & I cover or equivalent cover and a certificate of the
entry of the vessel with such P & I club should be submitted to the port and the vessel
which does not have such cover will be denied entry to the port. Without multiplying
such circulars, we reproduce one of such circulars issued by Mumbai Port Trust on 8-8-
1996 and other by the Calcutta Port Trust on 26-6-2001. Mumbai Port Trust's circular
dated 8-8-1996 read thus:
"MUMBAI PORT TRUST"

Deputy Conservator's Office
Port House, 1st floor,
Shoorji Vallabhdas Marg,
Mumbai-400 001.
CIRCULAR
To,
Ship Owners/Stevedores/Vessel/Agents
The Secretary
Bombay & Nhave/Sheva Ship-Intermodel
Agents Association,
3, Rex Chambers Ground floor,
Valchand Hirachand Marg,
Ballard Estate, Mumbai-400 001
The Secretary
The Bombay Stevedores Association Ltd.,
Janmabhoomi Chambers, 2nd floor,
Valchand Hirachand Marg,
Ballard Estate, Mumbai 400 001.
Subsequent to the Circular Nos. DC/C-SH/7200 dated 4th October, 1995 and
DC/C-SH/2/3661 dated 9th July, 1996 and in view of recent experience
gathered from the storm which hit the harbour on 18th and 19th June, 1996. It
has been decided that vessels which do not possess valid P & I club cover or
suitable insurance cover will not be decked. The intention of the port is to
eliminate all sub-standard vessels or ships without insurance cover, making
Mumbai a port of call, because a mishap to such a vessel will render the port
liable for expenses of wreck removal or other damages caused.
2 . Therefore, notice is hereby given that from 1st November, 1996, ships,
which do not possess valued insurance cover will not be given an anchorage
berth in the Mumbai port for cargo work or for any other purpose, this notice
period is given so that the owners, agents and shippers proposing to load cargo
have sufficient time to ensure that such cargoes will be loaded on duly
protected ships.
Sd/-
Deputy Conservators."
The Circular dated 26-06-2001 issued
by Calcutta Port Trust reads thus:
"CALCUTTA PORT TRUST"
HARBOUR MASTER (PORT) S OFFICE
CIRCULAR NO. 10 DATED 26-6-2001.
To
All Shipping Agents,
To safeguard port interest for damage cost of repairs due marine accident or
otherwise, it is mandatory for the agents to declare along with Berthing
Application the details of P & I Club Coverage including period of validity and a
declaration that insurance provides comprehensive coverage inter alia the

following risks:
1. 3rd party liability claims
2. Claim arising out of injury/death etc.
3. Claims arising out of damage to port properties.
4. Claims against environmental damage owing to pollution caused by the ship
or its personnel.
5. Removal of the wreck comprehensively.
The above details required to be submitted along with Berthing application to
Harbour Master (River) & Harbour Master (Port).
Sd/-
(D.K. Rao)
Harbour Master (Port).
copy to: DMD/TMN/FA
& CAO/Secretary/H.M. (R)."
22. The P & I Association amongst others extend services like:-
(a) The club is immediately advised in respect of any incident which takes place
in any port in any country either directly by the association or through their
local correspondents who have been appointed in various parts of the world:
(b) The assistance to the Master and the complement in relation to the port,
customs and other municipal regulations that may be prevalent in a particular
port, by engaging legal advisors in the matter:
(c) Appointing experts, surveyors or inspectors as the case may be when the
vessel is faced with problems with the port or other authorities or in her
navigation such as in case of grounding etc. who inspect and/or take survey of
the situation not only in respect of the vessel, but also in respect of the goods
carried on board the vessel.
(d) Appointing lawyers, participating in the proceedings in various courts, such
as enquiries and investigations under the provisions of Merchant Shipping Act,
1958, supervising all that is required to be supervised in the process of ships
voyage and/or her employment in a particular port in any matter touching
therewith and
(e) Rendering services to the complement on board viz. to the Master as and
when he faces difficulties to assist him in lodging notes of protest before
notaries or other legal advisors, arrange for the repatriation of stowaways,
initiating release of vessels from arrest and give the clubs letter of indemnity
which are accepted in various ports of the world, arrange for surveyors to
attend to investigation, quantifying the damage that may be caused either to
the cargo or to the vessel or in case of an accident to any of the crew members
attend to hospitalisation and medical needs and variety of other situational
exigencies that may arise from time to time as though the owners themselves
were attending to these problems.
22-A. It has also been brought to our notice by the plaintiff association that the Western

India Shippers Association which is an association of shippers to export cargo has
issued directives to its members viz. shippers to ensure that only vessels which have
been insured for hull and machinery and entered with the P & I Association are used for
shipment of export cargo port and custom authorities also look to protection and
indemnity clubs for giving indemnities on behalf of the vessels for all situational and
potential claims against the vessel while she is in port and that the vessel which does
not have P & I cover is reluctantly dealt with by charterers, shippers, consignors,
consignees, traders and port and custom authorities.
23. In the aforesaid background and for a ship to be able to trade in commerce and in
the present time context, we feel that the term "necessaries" has to be given broad and
liberal meaning. The maritime law has developed over a period of many centuries and is
still in process of development. It cannot be confined to historical characteristic
principles, rules and practices in fast developing international trade and commerce. The
expression necessaries has to be given meaning within the modern context of shipping
and commerce and commercial expedience cannot be over looked and ignored
altogether. Maritime law, to a great extent is international law and it is important for
commercial reasons that the courts in interpreting its principles and terms have regard
to broader global view and felt necessities. The expression 'necessaries' or in other
words "goods and materials supplied or services rendered to a ship for her operation
and maintenance" needs to be construed keeping aforesaid position in mind. The test to
be applied, which we feel is a reasonable test, is that goods supplied or services
rendered to the ship must be sufficiently and proximately connected with the operation
of the ship. The words operation of the ship cannot be construed narrowly and must be
viewed as a complete commercial operation. All things reasonably requisite for a voyage
or maritime adventure on which the ship is bound to be covered and held to come
within the term necessaries. The operation of the ship would necessarily include
operation of ship necessary for voyage. Even in England no distinction is drawn
between the necessaries for the ship and necessaries for the voyage. The said test when
applied in the context of P & I insurance cover would leave no manner of doubt that P &
I insurance, which is mandatorily required by some of the major ports in India to enable
such ships to enter respective port, can be construed to be necessary within the
meaning of section 5 of Admiralty Courts Act, 1861. It is true that in England the
concept of cover given by P & I Association has not been accepted as necessary, but
several other countries such as South Africa, China and Australia statutorily provide that
unpaid premia constitutes into a maritime claim. So far as U.S.A. is concerned, it has
expanded the definition of "necessaries" to include unpaid premia in the absence of
provisions under the enactments. In Equilease Corporation, in the appeals arising from
United States Statutes District Court for the Eastern District of Louistana, the Circuit
Judge held thus:
"(3) Equilease next argues that no maritime lien arises in favour of James
because insurance is not a "necessary" and therefore neither general admiralty
law nor the Act provides a maritime lien for unpaid insurance premiums.
Equilease relies on Learned and on Gro v. Steel Gas Screw Lorraine K, 310 Fd
547 for this proposition. The Grow Court stated in one sentence without
elaboration that there is no federal maritime lien for insurance premiums. 310
F. 2d at 549, and went on to grant the plaintiff insurance broker a lien under
Michigan State Law. Grow is thus not of much aid to us here. We focus instead
on Learned.
As a mortgage creditor of the steamboat liberty, Learned argued to this Court in
1899 that policies of insurance on the Liberty were for the sole and exclusive

benefit and use of the owners of the vessel, in no way inuring to the benefit of
the ship itself. This Court agreed with Learned and held that no lien arose on
the vessel for premiums due on the insurance policies. The Court reasoned that
because the policies were solely for the benefit of the vessel's owners, they did
not benefit the ship and 604 the ship could therefore not be held accountable
for them.
Learned was based on an interpretation of State law prior to the passage of the
Federal Maritime Lien Act, General Maritime Law in 1899 denied a lien for
materials and services rendered in the waters of the vessel's home state. (The
Roanoke), 189 U.S. 185, 2 3 S. Ct. 491, 47 L.Ed. 770. Since the Liberty
travelled only in a Louisiana bayou, it fell within this "home port" doctrine and
no federal maritime lien could attach for insurance premiums or for any other
supplies and materials furnished in the home port upon the credit of the
owners. The learned Court also held that no lien arose in favour of the insurer's
under either federal law or Louisiana law, because it deemed the insurance
policy to be a contract "written for the sole and exclusive benefit of the owners
of the steamboat." Learned, 94 F. at 883. See also (The Prilla), 21 Supp. 383;
2 7 9 F. 921. Equilease urges us to apply Learned and to find that marine
insurance in 1986 inures solely to the benefit of a ship's owner, in no way
aiding, the ship, and therefore that no federal lien can be held for unpaid
insurance premiums. This we cannot do.
In the nineteenth century, an insurance policy on a ship was viewed as a
contract for the personal Indemnity of the insured ship's owner. Under this
reasoning, no lien against the ship itself could possibly arise as the result of an
insurance policy; "unless the ship is benefited the ship should not pay". In Re
Petition of (Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania), 2 2 F. 109, off 4 sub nom.
Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. The Proceeds of the Sale of the Barge
Waubauschene, 24 F. 559. It is no longer appropriate, however, to view
maritime insurance this way. Even a vessel that simply sits at a dock without
making any attempt to ply the waters must today have hull protection and
indemnity insurance. As the district Court noted, insurance is something that
every vessel today needs just to carry on its normal business. Equilease, 568 F.
Supp. 1263. Equilease itself required all of its affiliate companies to carry
adequate insurance and would not do business with any company that failed to
do so. Equilease, 568 F. Supp. 1263. The Bareboat Charter Party entered into
by the Equilease shelf" corporations with Dunnamis required that throughout
the term of the charter "the charterer shall, at his own expense, keep the vessel
insured against ... risks .... in an amount ... not less than the greater of the
initial cost of the vessel or the full commercial value of the vessel .... The
agreement specifically required insurance coverage for property damage,
personal injury and death to third parties and crew, breach of warrant,
pollution, cargo and tower's liability, and provided that war risk hull and
indemnity insurance would be required at the owner's discretion. The Charter
Party also mandated that any insurance payments for losses greater than $
10.000 (but less than total loss of the vessel) were to be made to the owner, or
to a designated mortgagee, who was required to apply such funds directly for
repairs, liabilities, salvage, claims or other charges and expenses, or to
reimburse the charter for any money he had advanced for repairs and claims
covered by the policy. In the light of this type of agreement, the nineteenth
century view of marine insurance as an optional contract, entered into by a ship
owner at his own discretion solely for his own personal indemnity, must fade

into the shadows of history.
We therefore hold that because insurance is essential to keep a vessel in
commerce, insurance is a "necessary" under 46 U.S.C. Sec. 971 and unpaid
insurance premiums to give rise to a maritime lien under the FMLA."
24. We feel persuaded by the reasoning in Equilease which is more in conformity with
commercial expediency. The view which has been taken in the Heinrich Bjorn and
followed in other cases cited supra that monies which are expended on the insurance of
the ship is for the purpose of protecting the ship owner and not for the ship, can hardly
be accepted in the present times, particularly in the Indian context where quite a few
major port Trusts have notified that no ship shall be permitted to enter respective port
without having P.& I cover to have a maritime adventure and the voyage and the ship is
required by many agencies to have P & I cover and, therefore, such ship today needs,
P.& I cover before they deal with the ship. The ships which are entered with P & I clubs
are operated for commercial purposes and as pointed out above they need P & I cover
to carry on its normal business and complete commercial operation and, therefore, it
cannot be said that P & I cover is meant for the benefit of the ship owner alone and not
for the ship. In growing trade and commerce and the changing requirement of the ship
to have P & I cover by various agencies including statutory authorities as well as
charterers, shippers, etc., P & I insurance is a must to keep vessel in commerce and,
therefore, has to be held as a necessary to the ship also and not to the ship owner
alone. The law must march ahead and the term "necessary" as understood in maritime
law cannot be left stagnant and has to be construed liberally and in a broad manner to
meet the present needs and contexts particularly in the country like India where
maritime claims are not catalogued. Even in England the definition of the word
"necessaries" which was earlier confined to indispensable repairs, cables, sales and
provisions have been given wider significance and gradually amplified by modern
requirements inasmuch as Canal dues, dock dues, custom house and immigration
services fee etc., which prevent the ship from sailing have been treated as covered by
the expression "necessaries"; a fortiori in the Indian context where some of the major
ports do not permit an entry to the vessel which do not have P & I cover, there is no
reason why such insurance premium be not treated as "necessaries" for the ship as only
such insurance would enable the vessel to enter into some major ports in the country.
In other words, P & I cover of a vessel seems to be not only an act of prudence of the
ship owner, traditionally which had been the view in England, but without such cover
the vessel is not in a position to undertake complete maritime adventure and, thus it
can safely be said that what was considered earlier to be prudent act to have insurance
of the ship centuries ago, has now in the changing time become necessity and,
therefore, a necessary for the ship. Be it noted that the International Convention on a
Civil Liability, Brussels requires compulsory insurance . The Merchant Shipping (Oil)
Pollution Act, 1961 make insurance compulsory. The Indian Merchant Shipping Act,
1958 makes the insurance compulsory under section 352-N. The standard format
charter parties mostly have printed clauses making it mandatory for a vessel to have a
valid protection and indemnity cover for want of which such vessels are not accepted
for charter. When the various legislations require insurance of the ship, in modern day
connotation, it is not possible to hold that P & I cover is not necessary for a ship for her
operation. As a matter of fact, the ship having been given legal personality, her rights
and obligations many a time overlap the rights and obligations of her owner and what is
for the benefit of the ship owner also become for the benefit of the ship as well.
25. Before the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court, inter alia, the question
was whether the amount paid by the plaintiff towards the liability of a foreign owner of

charterer towards income tax on freight, as contemplated by section 172(3)(6) of
Income Tax Act to enable the ship to move out of the harbour can be recovered in a suit
under admiralty jurisdiction akin to the "necessaries supplied" for the ship. The Division
Bench held that law on the subject in our country has been stagnating since 1890 and
though section 1 of Administration of Justice Act, 1956 in England does not show that
amount paid by agent to a charterer towards Income Tax liability on a freight payable
by the charterer can be recovered under that section, yet it is necessary for our law to
keep abreast with the developments in the other fields of activity and, therefore, it will
be unjust to deny the inclusion of such claim in a suit under the admiralty jurisdiction.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court, thus, construed the expression "necessaries" in a broad
manner to make the maritime law in this country more effective by including even claim
towards Income Tax liability on a freight payable by the charterer covered under the
expression "necessaries" supplied to the ship. The Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh
High Court held thus:
"The short controversy is whether such a payment of income tax by the
plaintiffs as agents of the charterer could be recovered by them in an action; in
admiralty jurisdiction as is akin to the supply of necessaries to keep the ship a
float and moving. According to the law in England in the 19th century, various
liens were being added to the list of the necessary supplied to the ship which
could be recovered in an action in admiralty jurisdiction subsequently statutory
provisions have been made specifying items which can be claimed under this
head under the admiralty jurisdiction. Section 1 of the Administration of Justice
Act, 1956 in England specify the various claims which can be entertained by the
Court under admiralty jurisdiction. However, the law on this subject in our
country has been stagnating since 1890. Though section 1 of the English Act
does not show that an amount paid by an Agent to a Charterer towards income
tax liability on a freight payable by the Charterer can be recovered under the
section, but unless the various statutory provisions of that country are
considered it will be difficult to say whether it can recover in England today or
not. However, it is necessary that our law keeps abreast with the developments
in the other fields of activity. It will be unjust to deny the inclusion of such
claim in a suit under the admiralty jurisdiction. Otherwise the plaintiff will be
left without an effective remedy against foreign owners or charters of the ship."
26. The Geneva Arrest of Ship Convention, 1999, provides under Article 1(1)(q) claims
for insurance premium (including mutual insurance calls) in respect of the ship payable
by or on behalf of ship owner or demise charterer as maritime claim. The Geneva Arrest
Convention, 1999 was adopted on March 12, 1999. Before its adoption a draft revision
of Brussels Arrest Convention 1952 was adopted by the Committee Maritime
International (CMI) at its Conference in Lisbon in 1985. Lisbon draft was submitted by
CMI to the International Maritime Association (IMA) and United Nations Conference of
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The Joint Internal Group of Experts on maritime
liens and mortgages and related subjects (JIGE) recommended in 1989 that further
work on revising arrest Convention 1952 be postponed pending the adoption of new
maritime lien and mortgages convention. Following the adoption of maritime mortgages
and liens 1993, work resumed within JIGE on revising the Brussels Arrest Convention
1952. The JIGE concluded its consideration of revision to the Arrest Convention at its
9th Session held in Geneva on December 1 to 16, 1996 and requested the secretariat of
IMA and UNCTAD in consolation with the JIGE Chairman to prepare a set of draft
articles on the basis of the decision taken by the group. The draft articles for a
Convention on Arrest of Ships dated April 14, 1997 were prepared for submission to
diplomatic conference requested by JIGE, which was subsequently scheduled for March

1 to 12, 1999 in Geneva and accordingly text of the International Convention of the
Arrest of Ships, 1999 was adopted at Geneva on March 12, 1999. The Convention
remained open for signature from September 1, 1999 to August 31, 2000 and thereafter
for accession and it would come into force six moths after the date ten States have
expressed their consent to be bound by it. The Geneva Arrest Convention 1999 has not
come into force as such but there cannot be any doubt that the 1999 Geneva Arrest
Convention reflects the global view on the subject. In our view, what has been observed
by the Apex Court regarding the applicability of International Convention relating to the
Arrest of Sea-going Ships, Brussels 1952 to India is equally applicable to the Geneva
Arrest Convention, 1999. India had not adopted the Brussels Arrest Convention, 1952
but the Apex Court observed that though India seems to be lagging behind many other
countries in ratifying and adopting the beneficial provisions of various Conventions in
India to facilitate international trade and have not adopted these conventions, yet the
principles incorporated in the conference which are themselves derived from the
common law of nations as embodying the felt necessities of international trade and are
as such part of the common Law of India and applicable for the enforcement of
maritime claims against foreign ships is equally applicable to the Geneva Arrest
Convention, 1999 which embodies also necessities of the international trade and,
therefore, is applicable for enforcement of maritime claims against foreign ships and
can be regarded as a pat of our common law. Though Mr. Bharucha, the learned
Counsel for the appellants, strenuously urged that the Geneva Arrest Convention 1999
has not been come into force as even 10 States have not give their consent to be bound
by it and, therefore, cannot be said to embody the principles of law recognised by the
generality of maritime States but we find it difficult to accept his submission. We have
already given brief account of the exercise undertaken for about 14 years by various
International Organisations including IMO and UNCTAD which does reflect the view and
principles of law propounded by international community of maritime States and, thus,
the basis for regarding the principles of law mentioned in Geneva Arrest Convention,
1999 as a part of our common law. It is true that the Geneva Arrest Convention, 1999
separately under Article 1(1)(q) provides for claim for insurance premiums (include
mutual insurance calls) in respect of the ship, payable by or on behalf of the ship owner
or demise charterer as maritime claim but that is to make such claim more specific and
unambiguously maritime claim.
2 7 . We may now turn to the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the United
Kingdom Mutual Steamship Assurance Association (Bermuda) Ltd v. m.v. 'Humber' and
another, decided on 23-12-1999. The learned Single Judge in m.v. Humber apparently
proceeded on an erroneous premise and misread the judgment of the Apex Court in
m.v. "Elisabeth" when he observed. "It is clear from the observations of the Supreme
Court quoted above that the admiralty jurisdiction of this Court is to be exercised in
consonance with the provisions of the Admiralty Courts Act, 1861". The Apex Court in
m.v. "Elisabeth" on the other hand in an unequivocal terms held," The High Court were
declared to be competent to regulate their procedure and practice in exercise of
admiralty jurisdiction in accordance with the rules made in that behalf. There is,
therefore, neither reason nor logic in imposing a fetter on the jurisdiction of these High
Courts by limiting it to the provisions of an imperial statute of 1861 and freezing any
further growth of jurisdiction. This is all the more true because the Admiralty Courts
Act, 1861 was in substance repealed in England a long time ago. .... There is no reason
why jurisdiction of the Indian High Courts should have been considered to have frozen
and atrophied on the date of the Colonial Courts Act on Admiralty Act, 1890 ..... Where
statutes are silent and remedy has to be sought by recourse to basic principles, it is the
duty of the Court to devise procedural rules by analogy and expediency. .....The High
Courts in India are superior Courts of record. They have original and appellate

jurisdiction. They have inherent and plenary powers. Unless expressly or impliedly
barred and subject to the appellate or discretionary jurisdiction of this Court, the High
Courts have unlimited jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction to determine their own
powers. .... In equating the admiralty jurisdiction of the Indian High Court to that of
English High Court the Colonial Court of Admiralty Act, 1890, significantly refers to the
admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court in England whether existing by virtue of any
statute or otherwise. This is an enabling statute, and not a statute of limitation of
power. It aids, and does not fetter, the growth of jurisdiction. ......It is time to take a
fresh look at the old precedents." We are constrained to hold for what we have held
above which we need not repeat that the judgment of the learned Single Judge in m.v.
"Humber" does not lay down the correct law in holding that a claim for unpaid
insurance premium cannot be considered to be a necessary supplied to a ship.
2 8 . The contention that call money to be paid by ship owner does not relate in a
manner for coverage of the particular ship entered by a ship owner with the club and it
is in the nature of an unpaid contribution from the ship owner towards a common
pool/fund from which liabilities of member are met and, therefore, such unpaid call
money cannot be construed to be necessaries supplied to a ship is too narrow and
pedantic construction of the term "necessaries" in the modern world of shipping
industry which we have already highlighted above. As a matter of fact, the entire
argument on behalf of the defendants that P & I claims are not "necessaries" is based
on English law, but in our view, and that is what has been held by the Apex Court in
m.v. "Elisabeth" that India being sovereign State is not bound by the laws of England
on the basis of the laws which were enacted when India was in British possession and
such laws continue to exist by virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution of India having
not been repealed by appropriate law. The argument that P & I clubs also in their own
rules have provided that British law is to apply for any dispute between the parties and,
therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of British P & I club to plead that Indian Courts
should widen the definition of the term "necessaries" to protect the interest of P & I
clubs for recovery of unpaid call money is also not meritorious as right to proceed in
rem against a vessel is determined by Lex fori i.e. law of the forum. If the foreign ship
is in territorial waters of India and a maritime claim is made under the admiralty
jurisdiction of High Court, it is irrelevant where cause of action arose or defendant
resides or carries on business or nationality of the ship, such maritime claim is triable
by the concerned High Court and such maritime claim cannot be thrown out if not
berried expressly or impliedly under the domestic laws of the country on the ground
that such claim is not entertainable in the country where contract or insurance was
entered into.
29. For the reasons discussed above, we do not find any difficulty and rather have no
hesitation in holding that unpaid insurance premia in respect of the ship amounts to
"necessaries supplied" within the meaning of section 5 of the Admiralty Courts Act,
1861 so as to constitute maritime claim. In any case such claim is maritime claim giving
rise to admiralty cause.
30. Having answered the question referred to us by the learned Single Judge, we now
deal with the Appeal No. 226/2001 filed by the vessel m.v. "Sea Success I" and her
owner. Mr. Prashant Pratap, the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs- P & I
Association raised objection about the maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal. The
submission of Mr. Pratap is that the order passed by the learned Single Judge refusing
to reject the plaint for failure to disclose a cause of action under Order 7, Rule 11(a) of
Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) is not appealable as it is not a judgment within the
meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Mr. Pratap submitted that the impugned

order does not conclusively or finally determine any of appellants rights and that no
prejudice whatsoever is caused to the appellants by the impugned order of the learned
Single Judge refusing to reject the plaint as all issues have been left open to be decided
at the trial of the suit. To substantiate his submission about non-maintainability of
appeal, Mr. Pratap relied upon, (i) Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas
Company (Limited), 1872 (8) BLR 433, (ii) Shri Goverdhanlalji Maharaj v. Shri
Chandraprahavati, A.I.R. 1926 Bom 156, and (iii) Central Mine Planning and Design
Institution Ltd. v. Union of India and another MANU/SC/0053/2001 : (2001)ILL J1069SC
. Mr. Pratap also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v.
Jayaben D. Kania & another MANU/SC/0036/1981 : [1982]1SCR187 .
31. Mr. Z.P. Bharucha, per contra strenuously urged that the impugned order passed by
the learned Single Judge refusing to reject plaint under Order 7, Rule 11(1) of C.P.C. is
definitely a preliminary judgment one of the categories of the judgment carved out by
the Apex Court in Shah B. Khimji's case (supra) and, therefore, appealable under Clause
15 of Letters Patent. According to him, the objection raised by the learned Counsel for
respondent No. 1 about maintainability of appeal has no substance and squarely falls
within the ratio Shah Babu Lal Khimji particularly enumerated in paragraph 113 read
with paragraph 120.
32. Order 7, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. provides for rejection of the plaint and Clause (a)
there of runs thus:
Order 7
Rule 11-
Rejection of plaint-the plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:-
(a) Where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) ..........
(c) ..........
(d) .........."
33. The aforesaid provision empowers the Court to reject the plaint at threshold where
cause of action is not disclosed. This is one of salutary provision made in C.P.C. to save
the defendant from being harassed unnecessarily and put to trial in a cause which does
not disclose cause of action against him. It serves the public purpose in ensuring that
the litigation where the plaint even if non-traversed would not entitle the plaintiff to the
relief should be thrown out without enquiry and Court as well as the defendant must be
saved from meaningless exercise. With reference to Order 7, Rule 11(a) C.P.C. the Apex
Court in Azhar Hussein v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp. S.C. 315 observed. "The powers in
this behalf are meant to be exercised to serve the purpose for which the same have
been conferred on the competent Court so that the litigation comes to an end at the
earliest and the concerned litigants are relieved of the psychological burden of the
litigation so as to be free to follow their ordinary pursuits and discharge their duties.
And so that they can adjust their affairs on the footing that the litigation will not make
demands on their time or resources, will not impede their future work, and they are free
to undertake and fulfil other commitments.". Thus, it would be seen that the order
refusing to reject plaint for failure to disclose a cause of action can cause grave
prejudice and loss to a defendant and if defendant's objection for rejection of plaint for

failure to disclose the cause of action is accepted that would save the defendant from
worry and expense of being put to trial.
34. In this backdrop, we straightway refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in Shah
Babulal Khimji (supra). In paragraphs 80, 81 and 82 of the report, the Apex Court
considered the judgment of Calcutta High Court in the case of The Justices of the Peace
for Calcutta and held that the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court through its Chief
Justice Couch, C.J. has taken very narrow view of the meaning of the expression
"judgment" within Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and the Court is not justified in
interpreting a legal term which amounts to complete distortion of the word "judgment".
Instead of discussing the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Justices of
the Peace for Calcutta independently we feel the discussion of the said judgment by the
Apex Court in Shah Babulal Khimji, particularly paragraphs 80, 81 and 82 would suffice
which read thus:
80. We now proceed to deal with the main controversy as to what is the true
scope, meaning and purport of the word "judgment" used in Clause 15 of the
Letters Patent. Numerous authorities on both sides were cited before us in the
course of the very able arguments advanced by Counsel for the parties and it
appears that there are three leading judgments which have spelt out certain
tests to determine as to when an order passed by a trial Judge can be said to be
a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. A very
narrow view on this point, was taken by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High
Court in the case of the Justices of the Peace for Calcutta where Sir Couch, C.J.,
on an interpretation of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent observed thus:
We think that "judgment" in Clause 15 means a decision which affects the
merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or
liability. It may be either final, or preliminary, or interlocutory, the difference
between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit,
and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it,
leaving other matters to be determined.
81. An analysis of the observations of the Chief Justice would reveal that the
following tests were laid down by him in order to decide whether or not an
order passed by the trial Court would be a judgment:
(1) a decision which affects the merits of the question; between the
parties;
(2) by determining some right or liability;
(3) the order determining the right or liability may be final, preliminary
or interlocutory, but the determination must be final or one which
decides even a part of the controversy finally leaving other matters to
be decided later.
82. Thus, examining the tests laid down by Sir Richard Couch, C.J., it seems to
us that the view taken by the learned Chief Justice appears to place a very strict
and narrow interpretation on the word 'judgment' under which orders deciding
matters of moment or valuable right of the parties without finally deciding the
suit may not amount to a judgment and hence, not appealable. In giving this
interpretation the learned Chief Justice was guided by two considerations:

(1) that a liberal interpretation may allow vexed litigants to carry any
discretionary order of the trial Court in appeal; and
(2) that it would confer more extensive right to appeal against the
Judge sitting on the Original Side than the right of appeal given to a
trial Judge sitting in the mofussil.
We are doubtless impressed with the argument of the Chief Justice and fully
appreciate the force of the reasons given by him but we feel that despite those
considerations the law must be interpreted as it stands and a Court is not
justified in; interpreting a legal term which amounts to a complete distortion of
the word "judgment" so as to deny appeals even against unjust orders to
litigants having genuine grievances so as to make them scapegoats in the garb
of protecting vexatious appeals. In such cases, a just balance must be struck so
as to advance the object of the statute and give the desired relief to the
litigants, if possible. Although it is true that this decision is practically the locus
classicus so far as the Calcutta High Court is concerned and has been
consistently followed by later decisions at the same time it cannot be denied
that in a number of cases the conscience of the Judges was so shocked that
they tried to whittle down or soften the rigours of this decision so much so that
in one case the observations of the Chief Justice were not only not followed but
were described as antiquated and in other cases the Judges strongly expressed
themselves laid down by the learned Chief Justice. It is not necessary for us to
burden this judgment with later decisions of the Calcutta High Court in trying to
comment on the correctness of the principles laid down by Sir Couch, C.J., but
a few instances may be quite revealing."
35. In Goverdhanlalji (supra) the Divisional Bench of this Court relied upon the Justices
of the Peace for Calcutta and held that a decision on an issue to the effect that the trial
of the suit should proceed, can never amount to judgment. However, in our view, the
said decision of the Division Bench of this Court cannot be said to be good law to the
extent it is inconsistent with the judgment of the Apex Court in Shah Babulal Khimji. In
paragraph 113 of the report in Shah Babulal Khimji the Apex Court observed that the
concept of the judgment under the C.P.C. which is narrow and limited cannot be
imported into the definition of the word "judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of
the Letters Patent.
36. The Supreme Court in paragraph 113 of the report held thus:
"113. Thus, under the Code of Civil Procedure, a judgment consists of the
reasons and grounds for a decree passed by a Court. As a judgment constitutes
the reasons for the decree it follows as a matter of course that the judgment
must be a formal adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the
parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy.
The concepts of a judgment as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure seems to
be rather narrow and the limitations engrafted by sub-section (2) of section 2
cannot be physically imported into the definition of the word judgment as used
in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent because the Letters Patent has advisedly not
used the terms order or decree anywhere. The intention, therefore, of the givers
of the Letters Patent was that the word judgment should receive a much wider
and more liberal interpretation than the word judgment used in the Code of
Civil Procedure. At the same time, it cannot be said that any order passed by a

trial Judge would amount to a judgment; otherwise there will be no end to the
number of orders which would be appealable under the Letters Patent. It seems
to us that the word judgment has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader
and not a narrower sense. In other words, a judgment can be of three kinds:
(1) A final judgment.- A judgment which decides all the questions or
issues in controversy so far as the trial Judge is concerned and leaves
nothing else to be decided. This would mean that by virtue of the
judgment, the suit or action brought by the plaintiff is dismissed or
decreed in part or in full. Such an order passed by the trial Judge
indisputably and unquestionably is a judgment within the meaning of
the Letters Patent and even amounts to a decree so that an appeal
would lie from such a judgment to a Division Bench.
(2) A preliminary judgment.---This kind of a judgment may take two
forms---(a) where the trial Judge by an order dismisses the suit
without going into the merits of the suit but only on a preliminary
objection raised by the defendant or the party opposing on the ground
that the suit is not maintainable. Here also, as the suit is finally decided
one way or the other, the order passed by the trial Judge would be a
judgment finally deciding the cause so far as the trial Judge is
concerned and therefore appealable to the larger Bench, (b) Another
shape which a preliminary judgment may take is that where the trial
Judge passes an order after hearing the preliminary objections raised
by the defendant relating to maintainability of the suit e.g. bar of
jurisdiction, res judicata, a manifest defect in the suit, absence of
notice under section 80 and the like, and these objections are decided
by the trial Judge against the defendant, the suit is not terminated but
continues and has to be tried on merits but the order of the trial Judge
rejecting the objections doubtless adversely affects a valuable right of
the defendant who, if his objections are valid, is entitled to get the suit
dismissed on preliminary grounds. Thus, such an order even though it
keeps the suit alive undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the
trial which affects a vital right of the defendant and must, therefore, be
construed to be a judgment so as to be appealable to a larger Bench.
(3) Intermediary or interlocutory judgment-Most of the interlocutory
orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in
Clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and have already been held by
us to be judgments within the meaning of the Letters Patent and,
therefore appealable. There may also be interlocutory orders which are
not covered by Order 43, Rule 1 but which also possess the
characteristics and trappings of finality in that, the orders may
adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an important
aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding. Before such an order can
be a judgment the adverse effect on the party concerned must be direct
and immediate rather than indirect or remote. For instance, where the
trial Judge in a suit under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure
refuses the defendant leave to defend the suit, the order directly affects
the defendant because he losses a valuable right to defend the suit and
his remedy is confined only to contest the plaintiff's case on his own
evidence without being given a chance to rebut that evidence. As such
an order vitally affects a valuable right of the defendant it will

undoubtedly be treated as a judgment within the meaning of the Letters
Patent so as to be appealable to a larger Bench. Take the converse case
in a similar suit where the trial Judge allows the defendant to defend
the suit in which case although the plaintiff is adversely affected but
the damage or prejudice caused to him is not direct or immediate but
of a minimal nature and rather too remote because the plaintiff still
possesses his full right to show that the defence is false and succeed in
the suit. Thus, such an order passed by the trial Judge would not
amount to a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters
Patent but will be purely an interlocutory order. Similarly suppose the
trial Judge passes an order setting aside an ex parte decree against the
defendant, which is not appealable under any of the Clauses of Order
43 Rule 1 though an order rejecting an application to set aside the
decree passed ex parte falls within Order 43, Rule 1 Clause (d) and is
appealable, the serious question that arises is whether or not the order
first mentioned is a judgment within the meaning of Letters Patent. The
fact, however, remains that the order setting aside the ex parte decree
puts the defendant to a great advantage and works serious injustice to
the plaintiff because as a consequence of the order, the plaintiff has
now to contest the suit and is deprived of the fruits of the decree
passed in his favour. In these circumstances, therefore, the order
passed by the trial Judge setting aside the ex parte decree vitally
affects the valuable rights of the plaintiff and hence amounts to an
interlocutory judgment and is therefore appealable to a larger Bench.
37. In paragraphs 119 and 120 in Shah Babulal Khimji, the Supreme Court held thus:
"119. Apart from the tests laid down by Sir White C.H. the following
considerations must prevail with the Court:
(1) That the trial Judge being a Senior Court with vast experience of a
various branches of law occupying a very high status should be trusted
to pass discretionary or interlocutory orders with due regard to the well
settled principles of civil justice. Thus, any discretion exercised or
routine orders passed by the trial Judge in the course of the suit which
may cause some inconvenience or, to some extent prejudice to one
party or the other cannot be treated as a judgment otherwise the
Appellate Court (Division Bench) will be flooded with appeals from all
kinds of orders passed by the trial Judge. The courts must give
sufficient allowance to the trial Judge and raise a presumption; that any
discretionary order which he passes must be presumed to be correct
unless it is ex facie legally erroneous or causes grave and substantial
injustice.
(2) That the interlocutory order in order to be a judgment must contain
the traits and trappings of finality either when the order decides the
questions in controversy in an ancillary proceeding or in the suit itself
or in a part of the proceedings.
(3) The tests laid down by Sir White, C.J., as also by Sir Couch C.J., as
modified by later decisions of the Calcutta High Court itself which have
been dealt with by us elaborately should be borne in mind.

1 2 0 . Thus, these are some of the principles which might guide a Division
Bench in deciding whether an order passed by the trial Judge amounts to a
judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent. We might, however, at the
risk of repetition give illustrations of interlocutory orders which may be treated
as judgments:
(1) An order granting leave to amend the plaint by introducing a new
cause of action which completely alters the nature of the suit and takes
away a vested right of limitation or any other valuable right accrued to
the defendant.
(2) An order rejecting the plaint.
(3) An order refusing leave to defend the suit in an action under Order
37, Code of Civil Procedure.
(4) An order rescinding leave of the trial Judge granted by him under
Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.
(5) An order deciding a preliminary objection to the maintainability of
the suit on the ground of limitation, absence of notice under section
80, bar against competency of the suit against the defendant even
though the suit is kept alive.
(6) An order rejecting an application; for a judgment on admission;
under Order 12, Rule 6.
(7) An order refusing to add necessary parties in a suit under section
92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(8) An order varying or amending a decree.
(9) An order refusing leave to sue in forma pauperis.
(10) An order granting review.
(11) An order allowing withdrawal of the suit with liberty to file fresh
one.
(12) An order holding that the defendants are not agriculturists within
the meaning of the special law.
(13) An order staying or refusing to stay a suit under section 10 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
(14) An order granting or refusing to stay execution of the decree.
(15) An order deciding payment of Court fees against the plaintiff."
3 8 . Though Mr. Pratap, learned Counsel for original plaintiffs-respondent No. 1 in
Appeal No. 226/2001 submitted that in paragraph 120 the Supreme Court has
catalogued the interlocutory orders which may be treated as judgments and an order
rejecting the plaint has been held to be judgment by the order refusing to reject the
plaint does not find place therein, and, therefore, the impugned order is not a
judgment, but we find that such reading of paragraph 120 of the Supreme Court

judgment is misplaced. Paragraph 120 only gives illustration of interlocutory orders
which may be treated as judgments but the said list is not exhaustive as the very
terminology used by the Apex Court in paragraph 120 indicates that the list of
interlocutory orders mentioned by the Apex Court in the said paragraph is only
illustrative. Moreover paragraph 120 has to be read with earlier discussion made in the
decision, particularly para 113. There cannot be any doubt that the word "judgment"
has a concept of finality in a broad and not narrow sense and that is what the Supreme
Court held in Shah Babulal Khimji. In the words of the Supreme Court, judgment having
concept of finality are of three types, (1) a final judgment, (2) a preliminary judgment
and (3) intermediary or interlocutory judgment. In our opinion, the order refusing to
reject the plaint falls in the category of a preliminary judgment and is covered by the
second category carved out by the Apex Court. The Apex Court observed, "Another
shape which a preliminary judgment may take is that whether the trial Judge passes an
order after hearing the preliminary objections raised by the defendant relating to
maintainability of the suit e.g. bar of jurisdiction, res judicata a manifest defect in the
suit, absence of notice under section 80 and the like, and these objections are decided
by the trial Judge against the defendant, the suit is not terminated but continues and
has to be tried on merits but the order of the trial Judge rejecting the objections
doubtless adversely affects a valuable right of the defendant who, if his objections are
valid, is entitled to get the suit dismissed on preliminary grounds. Thus, such an order
even though it keeps the suit alive, undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the trial
which affects a vital right of the defendant and must, therefore, be construed to be a
judgment so as to be appealable to a larger Bench". Refusing to reject the plaint which
does not disclose cause of action though covered under Order 7, Rule 11(a) and which
obligates the trial Court to do so definitely affects a very valuable right of the defendant
since if such objection is upheld and lis is thrown out at the threshold, the defendant is
spared from the agony of delay, expenses and mental torture. The decision by the trial
Judge adversely to the defendant on the application made by him for rejection of plaint
for want of disclosure of cause of action decides an important aspect of the trial
affecting the very valuable right of the defendant and even though the suit is kept alive,
such order has to be construed to be preliminary judgment and, therefore, appealable
within the meaning of Clause 15 of Letters Patent. The judgment of the Apex Court in
Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd. v. Union of India and another (supra)
cited by the learned Counsel for original plaintiff respondent No. 1 to buttress his
argument that Letters Patent Appeal against the order refusing to reject the plaint is not
maintainable, rather supporting him supports the view which we have taken. The Apex
Court in that case was seized of the question; whether order passed by the Single Judge
on application under section 17-B of Industrial Disputes Act directing the employer to
pay full back wages is a judgment within the meaning of the Clause 10 of Letters Patent
of Patna or not and by relying upon its earlier judgment of that Court in Shah Babulal
Khimji held that such order was judgment for the purposes of Letters Patent. We,
therefore, overrule the objection raised by the learned Counsel for original plaintiff-
respondent No. 1 and hold that the Letter Patent Appeal attacking order passed by the
learned Single Judge refusing to reject the plaint for want of disclosure of cause of
action is maintainable under Clause 15 of Letters Patent as the impugned order is
judgment within the meaning of the said clause.
39. Now we come to the question whether the learned Single Judge was justified in
rejecting the application made by defendant No. 1 vessel m.v. "Sea Success I" and her
owners for rejection of plaint under Order 7, Rule 11(a) C.P.C. The learned Single Judge
held that at this stage it is not possible to conclude that plaint does not disclose a cause
of action. According to learned Single Judge the averments made in the plaint are
sufficient to indicate existence of cause of action which need to be investigated at the

trial and, therefore, the power under Order 7, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. cannot be exercised
at the threshold and the suit cannot be regarded as vexatious or meritless in the sense
of not disclosing a clear right to sue. Mr. Bharucha, the learned Counsel for the
appellants submitted that plaint is required to be read in a meaningful rather than
formal manner to ascertain whether in fact a cause of action has been disclosed and to
probe the cause of action in order to ascertain whether the same gives rise to legally
recognised claim and while probing the allegations at the threshold, Court has a duty to
ascertain whether plaintiff's claim is bound to fail or not. By referring to the relevant
pleadings made in paras 1 and 14 of the plaint, Mr. Bharucha submitted that upon
meaningful reading of the said pleadings relating to the appellants vessel being
sistership, reveal two averments central to plaintiff's case; (i) that the defendant No. 2
is, according to plaintiffs rules of Association, the owner of vessels "Sea Ranger" and
"Sea Glory" viz. the two vessels in respect of which the original plaintiff-respondent No.
1 claims amount due towards unpaid release calls: and (ii) the defendant No. 2 is
owner (beneficial or otherwise of the defendant No. 1 vessel "Sea Success I". Hence the
deduction that the original plaintiff attempts to draw from the aforesaid averments is
that the vessels "Sea Ranger" and "Sea Glory" are sisterships of the vessels "Sea
Success I" by virtue of being commonly owned by defendant No. 2. The submission of
Mr. Bharucha is such deduction is rested on the assertion that the vessel "Sea Success
I" (defendant No. 1) is owned/controlled by defendant No. 2 through its 100% wholly
owned subsidiary S.S. Shipping Corporation Inc. of Monrovia, Liberia but such
deduction is wholly misconceived and erroneous as the shareholder has no assets of the
company in which it owns shares. Mr. Bharucha submitted that the exercise of piercing
the veil is undertaken only in specified circumstances and are exceptions to the rule of
the doctrine of incorporation and such specified circumstances have to be pleaded and
particularised which have not been made in the plaint at all. The learned Counsel for
appellants submitted that the title/ownership of a vessel is recognised in a person
described as a beneficial owner of the shares in the ship and expression "beneficial
owner" in the context of title to a vessel as being vested in a person having right to sell,
dispose of or alienate the shares in the ship. Mr. Bharucha submitted that there is no
averment in the plaint that the defendant No. 2 is the entity that has right to sell,
dispose of or alienate the shares in the defendant No. 1 vessel "Sea Success I". Mr.
Bharucha also argued that a person having complete control and management of a
vessel is not deemed to be beneficial owner of such vessel unless it holds the shares in
the vessel. He submitted that in the present case satisfying the Court on the beneficial
ownership of the shares in the vessel "Sea Success I" is an essential element to the
invocation of the admiralty jurisdiction of the Court and the remedy of arrest and on the
facts and material pleaded no cause of action cognisable under the admiralty
jurisdiction is made out and, therefore, plaint is liable to be rejected. He also submitted
that as plaint can always be rejected against one or some of the defendants to a suit
and as the plaint fails to disclose a cause of action against the defendant No. 1 vessel,
the plaint is liable to be rejected. In support of his contentions. Mr. Bharucha relied
upon the judgment of the Apex Court in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal
MANU/SC/0034/1977 : [1978]1SCR742 , Shakthi Sugars v. Union of India,
MANU/DE/0220/1980 : AIR1981Delhi212 , I.T.C. Limited v. Debts Recovery Appellate
Tr i b u n a l MANU/SC/0968/1998 : AIR1998SC634 , Bacha Guzder v. CIT
MANU/SC/0072/1954 : [1955]27ITR1(SC) , Saloman v. Saloman,1897 A.C. 22,
Freewheels India Ltd. v. Dr. Veda Mitra, MANU/DE/0097/1968 : AIR1969Delhi258 ,
Spencer & Co. v. CWT, MANU/TN/0217/1969 : [1969]72ITR33(Mad) , the judgment
delivered by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in James Hardie Coy Pty. Ltd. v.
Putt, 1998 NSWLR 434, (The St. Merriel), 1963 Pro 247, (The Permina 3001), 1979 (1)
LLR 327, (I Congresso Del Partido), 1978 QB 500., (Father Thames), 1979 (2) LLR 364,

(The Union Darwin), 1983 HKLR 248, (The Looiersgracht), 1995 (2) LLR 411,
Ramprasad Chimanlal v. Hazarimal Lalchand MANU/WB/0271/1930 : AIR1931Cal458 ,
Phool Sundri v. Gurbans Singh, MANU/RH/0038/1957, National Insurance Co. v.
Navrom Constkantza MANU/WB/0031/1988 : AIR1988Cal155 . (The Aventicum),1978
(1) LL R 184, (The Temasek Eagle), 1999 (4) SLR 250, the judgment of New Zealand
Court of Appeal in Vastock Shipping v. Confederation Limited, 1999 NZ C.A. 22 and
(The Beldis), 1936 Pro 51.
40. On the other hand Mr Pratap, the learned Counsel for original plaintiff-respondent
No. 1 supported the view of the learned Single Judge and contended that paragraphs 1
and 14 of the plaint does disclose cause of action against the defendants. According to
him, the pleadings made in paragraphs 1 and 14 clearly disclose cause of action for
proceeding with the trial in the suit. Mr. Pratap argued that plea of want of cause of
action is required to be taken at demurer i.e., on the basis that all averments made in
the plaint are correct and treated as such and only when the Court finds that the said
averments do not disclose any cause of action then Court can reject the plaint and not
otherwise. Mr. Pratap submitted that the relationship between the defendant No. 2 and
S.S. Shipping Company Inc. i.e., between the holding and subsidiary company
respectively has to be seen by lifting the corporate veil to render justice irrespective of
legal efficacy. He submitted that averments in the plaint cannot be examined on merits
at this stage. It is the contention of Mr. Pratap that where there is a dispute as to
beneficial ownership of the vessel the Court in all cases could and in some cases should
look behind the registered owner to determine the true beneficial owner and where
beneficial ownership is disputed, it has right to investigate the true beneficial
ownership. He submitted that where the arrest of a ship beneficial owned is permitted,
it is intended that the power of the Court shall not be the limited to a consideration of
who is registered owner or who is the person having legal ownership of the shares in
the ship but to find the beneficial ownership. According to Mr. Pratap when the law
allows the arrest of sistership, then it is sufficient for the plaintiff to plead that the
defendant-ship is a sistership in order for the plaint to disclose a cause of action. He
also contended that so long as the claim discloses some cause of action or raises some
questions fit to be decided by a Judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely
to succeed is no ground for striking it out. He submitted that purport failure of the
pleading to disclose the cause of action is entirely distinct from the absence of full
particulars. In support of his submissions Mr. Pratap relied upon D. Ramchandran v R.V.
Janakiraman & others, MANU/SC/0154/1999 : [1999]1SCR983 , Mohan Rawale v.
Damodar Tatyaba MANU/SC/0637/1994 : (1994)2SCC392 , Ranjeet Mal v. Poonam
C h an d MANU/RH/0001/1983, State of Orissa v. Klockner & Company & others
MANU/SC/1460/1996 : AIR1996SC2140 Gaganmal Ramchand v. The Hongkong &
Sanghai Banking Corporation, MANU/MH/0013/1950 : AIR1950Bom345 , Vijay Pratap
Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh MANU/SC/0394/1962 : AIR1962SC941 , British
Airways v. Artworks Export Ltd., MANU/WB/0022/1986 : AIR1986Cal120 , (Saudi
Prince), 1982 (2) LLR 255 and State of U.P. & others v. Renusagar Power Company
MANU/SC/0505/1988 : AIR1988SC1737 .
41. The approach of the Court in consideration of the application for rejection of plaint
for failure to disclose cause of action has come up for discussion in various cases but
we deem proper to refer to some of the cases cited at bar in that regard. In T.
Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal MANU/SC/0034/1977 : [1978]1SCR742 the Supreme
Court observed thus:
"......If on a meaningful-not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly
vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the

trial Court should exercise its power under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. taking care
to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled."
42. The Delhi High Court in M/s. Sakthi Sugars Limited v. Union of India and another,
MANU/DE/0220/1980 : AIR1981Delhi212 relying upon the aforesaid observations of the
Supreme Court held thus:-
"12. But the law in this respect is laid down by the Supreme Court in T.
Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal MANU/SC/0034/1977 : [1978]1SCR742 . It is
laid down that if on a meaningful and not formal reading of a plaint it is
manifest that the plaint is vexatious or meritless in the sense of not disclosing a
clear right to sue trial Court should exercise its power under Order VII, Rule 11,
Code of Civil Procedure, and should reject the plaint. So it is meaningful
reading of the plaint which is required. It is to be seen if actually according to
law, on the allegations contained in the plaint, defendant No. 2 was agent of
the Union of India or not. Mere formal allegation of the plaintiff that defendant
No. 2 was agent of the Union of India is not to be accepted. In view of the
Supreme Court authority, it is the duty of the Court to probe whether
allegations made in the plaint make defendant No. 2 as agent and the Union of
India as the principal according to law. I have already held that according to
law defendant No. 2 was not agent of the Union of India and that being so
plaint does not disclose any cause of action against the latter."
4 3 . The Apex Court in Azhar Hussein v. Rajiv Gandhi MANU/SC/0284/1986 :
[1986]2SCR782 , though while dealing with the question relating to rejection of an
election petition with reference to Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. held that the purpose of
conferment of power of rejection of plaint is to ensure that a litigation which is
meaningless and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of
the Court and the concerned litigants are relieved of the psychological burden of the
litigation. The Apex Court observed that since the Court has the power to act at the
threshold, the power must be exercised at the threshold itself in case the Court is
satisfied that it is a fit case for the exercise of such power.
44. In a recent judgment the Apex Court in ITC Limited v. Debts Recovery Appellate
Tribunal & others, MANU/SC/0968/1998 : AIR1998SC634 while referring to its earlier
judgment in T. Arivandandam observed. "The question is whether a real cause of action
has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view
to get out of Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. Clever drafting creating illusions of cause of action
are not permitted in law and a clear right to sue should be shown in the plaint."
45. In Mohan Rawale v. Damodar Tatyaba, MANU/SC/0637/1994 : (1994)2SCC392 , the
Apex Court held that if some cause of action is disclosed, a pleading cannot be struck
out merely because the case is weak and not likely to succeed. The Apex Court drew
distinction between "material facts" and "full particulars" with reference to the
provisions of section 83(1)(a) and (b) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 and
further held that the distinction between "material facts" and "full particulars" is not
sharp, but is one of degree. The material facts are those which a party relies upon and
which, if he does not prove, he fails at that time.
46. In William v. Wilcox, 1838 (8) Ad & EI 331, Lord Denman, C.J., said thus:
"It is an elementary rule in pleading that, when a state of facts is relied it is
enough to allege it simply, without setting out the subordinate facts which are
the means of providing it, or the evidence sustaining the allegations."

47. The learned Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court in Ranjeet Mal v. Poonam Chand
and another, MANU/RH/0001/1983, held, "what is to be determined by the Court at the
stage of deciding as to whether the plaint discloses any cause of action or not, is to find
out from the allegations of the plaint itself as to whether a bogus, wholly vexatious or
frivolous litigation was sought to be initiated under the garb of ingenious drafting of the
plaint and to guard against the mischief of a litigant misusing the process of the Court,
by entering into a false litigation, merely for the purposes of harassing the other party
and obtaining undue advantage of the process of the Court by adopting tactics and in
starting sham and shady actions."
4 8 . The Apex Court in State of Orissa v. Klockner and Company and others.
MANU/SC/1460/1996 : AIR1996SC2140 , approved the view of the High Court holding
that plea that plaint does not disclose cause of action is different from plea that there
was no cause of action for the suit and that for determining that the suit deserves to be
wiped out under Rule 11(a) of Order 7 C.P.C., the averments in the plaint are required
to be looked into.
49. While dealing with the provisions of Order 33, Rule 5 Clause (a), the Apex Court in
Vijay Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, MANU/SC/0394/1962 : AIR1962SC941 ,
held in paragraph 9 of the report thus:
"(9).........By the express terms of Rule 5, Clause (d), the Court is concerned to
ascertain whether the allegations made in the petition show a cause of action.
The Court has not to see whether the claim made by the petitioner is likely to
succeed; it has merely to satisfy itself that the allegations made in the petition,
if accepted as true, would entitle the petitioner to the relief he claims. If
accepting those allegations as true no case is made out for granting relief no
cause of action would be shown and the petition must be rejected. But in
ascertaining whether the petition shows a cause of action the Court does not
enter upon a trial of the issues affecting the merits of the claim made by the
petitioner. It cannot take into consideration the defences which the defendant
may raise upon the merits: nor is the Court competent to make an elaborate
enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. If the allegations
in the petition prima facie, show a cause of action, the Court cannot embark
upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact, or whether the
petitioner will succeed in the claims made by him. By the statute, the
jurisdiction of the Court is restricted to ascertaining whether on the allegations
a cause of action is shown the jurisdiction does not extend to trial of issues
which must fairly be left for decision at the hearing of the suit."
50. In British Airways v. Artworks Export Ltd. MANU/WB/0022/1986 : AIR1986Cal120 ,
the Calcutta High Court followed the consistent view that ground embodied in Clause
(a) of Rule 11 of Order 7 C.P.C. for rejection of plaint must appear on the face of the
plaint and the correctness or otherwise of the allegation constituting cause of action is
beyond the purview of Clause (b) of Order 7, Rule 11.
51. The cause of action has a well defined legal connotation, though not defined, which
means bundle of essential facts, if traversed, has to be proved by the plaintiff to entitle
him to the relief. It reflects to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to
arrive at a conclusion in his favour. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which
is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved to entitle
the plaintiff to the decree. The consistent legal position which is also mandatorily
enacted by Order 7, Rule 11(a) C.P.C. is, that the Court must reject the plaint which

does not disclose cause of action. Obviously there is a difference between the
nondisclosure of cause of action in the plaint and the absence of cause of action for the
suit. The ground for rejection of plaint is failure to disclose a cause of action and not
that there is no cause of action for the suit. It is not competent for the Court to go into
the correctness or otherwise of the allegations constituting the cause of action. In other
words, the correctness or otherwise of the allegations constituting the cause of action is
beyond the purview of Order 7 Rule 11(a) C.P.C. However, to find out whether the
plaint discloses cause of action or not, the Court has to consider the allegations made in
the plaint intelligently and meaningfully and need not be influenced by ingenious and
clever drafting creating illusion of cause of action. The ritual of repeating a word or
creation of an illusion in the plaint can certainly be unravelled and exposed by the Court
while dealing with an application under Order 7, Rule 11(a). The Court must scan and
scrutinise the allegations made in the plaint to find out whether forensic cleverness
while drafting the plaint has been employed to get out of clutches of Order 7 Rule 11
C.P.C. and if on a careful scan and scrutiny of the pleading the conclusion of the Court
is in affirmative, the consequence of rejection of plaint must follow. The Court has to
see while exercising its power for rejection of plaint, which it must, whether the
allegations in the plaint as they stand, fail to prove the cause of action. While
considering the question whether the plaint discloses any cause of action or not the
Court has to find out from the allegations made in the plaint itself and not beyond it as
to whether a bogus, wholly vexatious or frivolous litigation has been initiated by the
plaintiff or that the claim made by the plaintiff is a legally recognisable claim. What is
required to be disclosed by the plaintiff is a clear right to sue and failure to do so must
necessarily entail in rejection of the plaint.
52. In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal position we have to see whether the plaint in
Admiralty Suit No. 32 of 2000 discloses cause of action or not.
5 3 . The two relevant paragraphs which have been highlighted by the Counsel for
original plaintiff respondent No. 1 to show that plaint discloses cause of action are
paragraphs 1 and 14 of the plaint. The material portion of paragraphs 1 and 14 runs
thus:
"1...................... The 1st defendant vessel m.v. "See Success I" sistership of
the vessel "Sea Ranger" and "Sea Glory" which were entered for P & I risks with
the plaintiff Association. The said two vessels were entered into the plaintiff's
Association for the policy year 1999-2000 by defendant No. 2, Singapore Soviet
Shipping Co Pte. who, as per the terms of the insurance and rules of the
Plaintiff Association, were recognised and considered to be the owners of the
said two vessels and the assured under the policy of insurance. The 1st
defendant vessel is owned and/or controlled by defendant No. 2 through its
wholly owned 100% subsidiary. Singapore Soviet Shipping Corporation Inc.
Monrovia. The 1st defendant vessel is presently at the port and harbour of
Mumbai within the territorial waters of India and within the Admiralty
jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. The 2nd defendant is the owner of the 1st
defendant and is also inter alia the party liable in personam in respect of the
plaintiff's claim.
14. The plaintiff submits as more particularly stated in paragraph 1 above, that
the 1st defendant vessel is a sistership of the two vessels "Sea Glory" and "Sea
Ranger" in view of the beneficial ownership, management and control of all
three vessels having vested in defendant No. 2. The plaintiff further submits
that defendant No. 2 is liable in personam in respect of the unpaid insurance

premium in respect of the two vessels "Sea Glory" and "Sea Ranger".
Consequently the plaintiff is entitled to arrest any other vessel in the ownership
of defendant No. 2. The 1st defendant vessel is owned by defendant No. 2
through its 100% subsidiary S.S. Shipping Co. Inc. In the circumstances, the
plaintiff submits that they are entitled to proceed against the defendant vessel
in rem and are entitled to an order of arrest, detention and sale of the vessel
for recovery of their outstanding dues in respect of insurance premium as more
particularly stated above."
54. A meaningful analysis of the aforesaid averments made in the plaint would reveal
that according to the plaintiffs, defendant No. 2 is the owner of the vessels "Sea
Ranger" and "Sea Glory" namely, the two vessels in respect of which the plaintiffs claim
amounts due towards unpaid insurance premium (release calls) as per the Rules of
Plaintiffs Association and that the defendant No. 2 is owner of defendant No. 1 vessel
Sea Success I through its 100% wholly owned subsidiary S.S. Shipping Corporation
Inc. of Monrovia, Liberia and, thus, the defendant No. 1 vessel Sea Success I is a sister
ship of "Sea Ranger" and "Sea Glory". The basis of the allegations that defendant No. 1
vessel Sea Success I is owned and/or controlled by defendant No. 2 is that the
defendant No. 2 is holding company of the subsidiary company S.S. Shipping
Corporation Inc., Monrovia. In other words, the basis on which plaintiff's case rests
against the defendant No. 1 vessel Sea Success I is that the defendant No. 2 by virtue
of being the sole and controlling shareholder of S.S. Shipping Corporation Inc. of
Monrovia is the owner of defendant No. 1 vessel Sea Success-I. The defendant No. 1
vessel Sea Success-I is alleged to be sistership of two vessels "Sea Glory" and "Sea
Ranger" in view of the beneficial ownership, management and control of all three
vessels having vested in defendant No. 2. The question is whether the aforesaid
allegations disclose the legal recognisable claim against the defendant No. 1 vessel Sea
Success-I. Section 25(a) of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 provides that
property in a ship shall be divided into ten shares. In maritime law worldwide
ownership of a ship denoted by the concept of the owner of the shares in a ship. The
shares in the defendant No. 1 vessel "Sea Success I" are not alleged in the plaint to be
owned by defendant No. 2 viz. Singapore Soviet Shipping Co. Pte. Ltd. The ownership
of the defendant No. 1 ship by defendant No. 2 is alleged to be on the basis of the
defendant No. 2 wholly owning subsidiary S.S. Shipping Corporation Inc.
Fundamentally each company incorporated in law is a distinct legal entity and mere
incorporation of 100% subsidiary company by its parent company cannot lead to the
conclusion that the assets of the former belong to and are owned by parent company. In
Mrs. Bacha F. Guzdar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, MANU/SC/0072/1954 :
[1955]27ITR1(SC) , the Apex Court observed, "there is nothing in the Indian law to
warrant the assumption that a shareholder who buys shares buys any interest in the
property of the company which is juristic person entirely distinct from the
shareholders". No doubt law recognises certain situations in which the corporate veil is
pierced such as fraud, or trading with the enemy or when required by the particular
words of a statute, but then there has to be specific pleading to that effect as veil
piercing is not a rule, but an exception which is undertaken, only in certain specified
circumstances. It is not that in all cases a subsidiary company must be treated as an
asset of the holding company. If that be so, the subsidiary company shall have no
independent identity and such subsidiary company will crack not under the pressure of
its own uncongenial shareholders, but also of the pressure of the shareholders and
creditors of the holding company. The view of Madras High Court in Spencer & Co. v.
CWT MANU/TN/0217/1969 : [1969]72ITR33(Mad) , is to the same effect wherein it was
held, "Merely because a company purchases almost the entirety of the shares in another
company, it will not serve as a means of putting an end to the corporate character of

the other company or the controlling company acquiring the ownership of the controlled
company, so as to treat them as one entity for purposes of right and liabilities". The
Madras High Court went on to hold further, "It is well settled that an incorporated
company is a legal person and it cannot equate to its shareholders. The position
continues to be the same even if the number of the shareholders is reduced to one by
accident or otherwise. The act of the company cannot, therefore, be regarded as that of
any of the shareholder and vice versa. It is true that occasionally the corporate veil of a
company is pierced though in order to find out the substance but that is only where it is
permitted by a statute or in exceptional cases of fraud". It can, therefore, be said that
the distinction between the parent and subsidiary company in law is fundamental. Mr.
Pratap, learned Counsel for the original plaintiff respondent No. 1 relied upon the
judgment of the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co.,
MANU/SC/0505/1988 : AIR1988SC1737 , in support of his proposition for lifting the
corporate veil in the context of a holding and subsidiary company. However, we are
afraid the said judgment is of no help to the plaintiff as we find that the facts necessary
for lifting corporate veil have not been pleaded in the plaint and at this stage we are
only concerned with the question whether the plaint discloses cause of action or not and
we have to go by the allegations made in the plaint only. Save and except the bald
statement made in the plaint that the defendant No. 1 vessel is owned and/or controlled
by defendant No. 2 through its wholly owned 100% subsidiary S.S. Shipping
Corporation Inc. Monrovia, material facts have not been pleaded warranting exercise of
piercing the corporate veil. When in law the S.S. Shipping Company Inc. Monrovia is
separate and distinct entity which holds the shares in defendant No. 1 vessel Sea
Success I, the inference drawn in paragraphs 1 and 14 of the plaint that defendant No.
2 by virtue of being the sole and controlling shareholder of S.S. Shipping Corporation
Inc. of Monrovia is the owner of defendant No. 1 vessel cannot on the intelligent
analysis of the plaint be held to be disclosing legally recognisable claim against the
defendant No. 1 vessel Sea Success I.
55. Admittedly the defendant No. 1 vessel "Sea Success I" is not the offending vessel
or in other words claim of unpaid insurance premium is not towards the defendant No.
1 vessel. The action in rem under admiralty jurisdiction has been initiated by the
plaintiffs against the defendant No. 1 vessel Sea Success-I on the basis of allegations of
it being a sistership i.e. a ship in the same beneficial ownership as the ships "Sea
Glory" and "Sea Ranger" in regard to which the claim arose. In case of m.v. Mariner IV,
a Foreign Flag Vessel v. Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd., MANU/MH/0484/1998 :
1998(5)BomCR312 , the Division Bench of this Court held. "The admiralty jurisdiction
could be invoked not only against the offending ship in question but also against a
sistership in regard to which the claim arose", and this legal position is not disputed
before us but the question is whether the allegations made in the plaint, particularly
paragraphs 1 and 14 which are only relevant paragraphs in that regard by themselves
prove that defendant No. 1 vessel "Sea Success I" is the sister ship of the vessel "Sea
Glory" and "Sea Ranger". The answer is clearly no as the only pleading in respect of the
defendant No. 1 vessel "Sea Success I" being sister ship of "Sea Ranger" and "Sea
Glory" is that vessel "Sea Success I" is owned/controlled by defendant No. 2 through its
100% wholly owned subsidiary S.S. Shipping Corporation Inc. of Monrovia and we have
already indicated above that on that basis defendant No. 2 cannot be held to be owner
of the vessel "Sea Success I" since the ownership of a vessel is denoted by the shares
in the ship and there is no allegation worth the name in the entire plaint that the
defendant No. 2 owns the shares in the defendant No. 1 vessel Sea Success I. The ships
are deemed to be in the same ownership when all the shares are owned by the same
person or persons (Article 3(2) of 1952 Brussels Arrest Convention). In paragraph 14 of
the plaint it is averred that as stated in paragraph 1 of the plaint, the defendant No. 1

vessel is a sister ship of the two vessels "Sea Glory" and "Sea Ranger" in view of the
beneficial ownership, management and control of all three vessels having vested in
defendant No. 2. The basis of this deduction by the plaintiff in the plaint is that the
defendant No. 1 vessel is owned by defendant No. 2 through its 100% subsidiary S.S.
Shipping Corporation Inc., Monrovia. The contention of Mr. Pratap that when the law
allows the arrest of sister ship then it is sufficient for the plaintiff to plead that the
defendant ship is sister ship in order for the plaint to disclose a cause of action and as
law also permits the plaintiff to arrest a ship which is beneficially owned by defendant
No. 2, then it is sufficient for the plaintiff to plead that defendant No. 2 is a beneficially
owner of defendant No. 1 ship in order for the plaint to disclose a cause of action and
all other facts would be subordinate facts cannot be accepted in abstract. If the law
allows the arrest of sister ship then it is required of the plaintiff to plead material facts
sufficiently about the relationship of the offending ship and the ship against which
admiralty jurisdiction is sought to be invoked on the basis of such defendant ship being
sister ship of offending ship. A bald statement in the pleading that the defendant ship is
the sister ship of offending ship or the inference that the defendant ship is a sistership
for the reasons disclosed which is legally not sustainable cannot be held to be sufficient
to disclose a cause of action. Similarly though the law permits the plaintiff to arrest a
ship which is beneficially owned by the defendant No. 2 then the plaintiff is required to
plead the material facts which discloses the beneficial ownership of the defendant No. 2
over the ship which is to be arrested and an inference drawn by itself in the pleading
about beneficial ownership which is legally unsustainable cannot be said to disclose a
cause of action. It is true that while ascertaining whether the plaint discloses a cause of
action or not, the Court is not required to make any enquiry into doubtful or
complicated questions of fact or law and that the Court proceeds with the assumption
that the facts stated therein true but then those facts as they stand must disclose
plaintiffs right to sue. In the present case the plaintiff has averred that the beneficial
ownership, management and control of all three vessels viz., Sea Glory, Sea Ranger and
Sea Success-I vest in the defendant No. 2, but the deduction drawn in the plaint in that
regard is fundamentally bad in law. As a person to be recognised in law as a rightful
owner of a ship, he must be the owner of the shares in the ship i.e. the person having a
right to sell, dispose of or alienate the shares in the ship and not the beneficial owner
of shares in a company which in turn owns the ship. The expression "management and
control" used by the plaintiff in paragraph 14 of the plaint on an intelligible reading of
the said paragraph relate to management and control of defendant No. 2 over defendant
No. 1 ship on the basis of defendant No. 2's holding 100% shares of its subsidiary S.S.
Shipping Corporation Inc. Monrovia which we have already indicated is not legally
tenable and cannot be said to be disclosing legally cognizable claim against the
defendant No. 1 vessel. The expression "management and control" as pleaded in
paragraph 14 of the plaint as covering the case of managers/operators of the vessel
"Sea Success I" cannot help the plaintiff legally as the manager/operators of the vessel
which is not the offending vessel cannot be deemed to be beneficial owner of such
vessel. Though the plaintiff sought to rely upon the judgment of Brandon, J. in Medway
Drydock & Engineering Company Ltd. v. The "Andrea Ursule", 1971 (1) LLR 145,
wherein the word "beneficially owned" as occurring in section 3(4)(d) to (r) of
Administration of Justice Act, 1956 was construed to mean owned by any person with
complete possession and control of the vessel who might thereby become liable, we
find that the said judgment of Brandon, J., was ex parte and has not been followed and
rather clearly dissented as not laying down correct law in subsequent cases. In
Congresso Del Partido, 1978 QB 500, Goff, J., while construing the expression
"beneficially owned as respects all the shares therein" in section 3(4) of the
Administration of Justice Act, 1956 equated it to equitable ownership, whether or not

accompanied by legal ownership but clearly held that the said expression did not
include possession and control however complete without such ownership. Goff, J., in I
Congresso Del Partido did not follow the judgment of Brandon J. in Andre Ursula and
held that Andre Ursula does not lay down the correct law:
56. The view expressed in I Congresso Del Partido has been followed in the United
Kingdom in the "Father Thames" 1979 (2) LLR 364. The said view has also been
followed by Singapore Court of Appeal in the Permina 1979 (1) LR 327 and the Hong
Kong High Court in the case of The Union: Darwin 1983 HKLR 248 and by the Federal
Court of Canada in Canadian Case The Looiersgracht1995 (2) LR 411. The broad
consensual legal position seems to be that the concept of beneficial ownership of the
shares in a ship does not include possession and control of the vessel and the test of
the beneficial ownership is a right of that person to sell, dispose of or alienate the
shares in the ship. On a proper analysis and scrutiny of the allegations made in the
plaint, particularly paragraphs 1 and 14, appears, thus, that the deduction drawn by the
plaintiff in the plaint that defendant No. 1 vessel Sea Success-I is sister ship of the
vessels "Sea Glory" and "Sea Ranger" in respect of which the claim is made is not
legally supported and cannot be said to be showing sustainable right of the plaintiff to
sue against the defendant No. 1 vessel Sea Success-I even assuming the averments
made therein to be true. We have not gone into the merits of the ownership of the
defendant No. 1 ship. We clarify, on the basis of any averments made by defendant No.
1 to the contrary, but we have proceeded to examine the same on the basis of the
averments made in the plaint to find out whether, as they stand, prove the defendant
No. 1 vessel Sea Success-I to be sister ship of vessels "Sea Glory" and "Sea Ranger"
being beneficially owned by defendant No. 2. We have already indicated above that the
allegations made in the plaint by themselves do not prove factum of defendant No. 1
Sea Success-I being sister ship of vessels "Sea Glory" and "Sea Ranger" in respect of
whom the claim has been raised in the suit. We find it difficult to approve the view of
the learned Single Judge in this regard. If cannot be overlooked that ship is a valuable
commercial chattel and her arrest undeservingly severely prejudices third parties
innocently as well as affect the interest of owner; crew member, cargo owner, shipper
etc. adversely and, therefore, it is all the more necessary to analyse the plaint
meaningfully at the threshold to find out whether it discloses cause of action or not and
not on technical and formal reading that it discloses cause of action and wait for trial.
57. We do not find any legal bar under Order 7, Rule 11 in rejecting the plaint against
some of the defendants. In ITC (supra) the Apex Court rejected plaint against one of the
defendants. The Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in Phool Sundri v. Gurbans
Singh, MANU/RH/0038/1957 also held that it is possible for the Court to reject the
entire plaint so far as some of the defendants are concerned and that would be a proper
order under Order 7, Rule 11(a). The Delhi High Court in Sakthi Sugar (supra) rejected
the plaint against one of defendants i.e. Union of India. The Calcutta High Court in
National Insurance Company v. Navrom Constantza, MANU/WB/0031/1988 :
AIR1988Cal155 , also rejected the plaint against some of the defendants for failure to
disclose a cause of action. We, therefore, hold that the plaint does not disclose a cause
of action against the defendant No. 1 vessel and the plaint in its entirety deserves to be
rejected against the defendant No. 1 vessel Sea Success-I.
5 8 . In so far as Appeal No. 739/2000 is concerned, the learned Counsel for the
appellants did not argue any other point save and except challenging the finding
recorded by the learned Single Judge that the claim of unpaid insurance premium
cannot be considered as a necessary or supply of necessaries to the vessel m.v. Allisa.
We have already held that a claim towards unpaid insurance premium of a maritime

vessel made by P & I Association is necessary as contemplated under section 5 of the
Admiralty Courts Act, 1861 so as to constitute maritime claim and even otherwise is a
maritime claim giving rise to admiralty cause.
59. In the result, we dispose of the two appeals by the following order:-
(a) The question referred to by the learned Single Judge while disposing of
Notice of Motion No. 2455/2000 in Admiralty Suit No. 32/2000 as to whether a
claim for unpaid insurance premia in respect of a ship amounts to necessaries
supplied within the meaning of section 5 of Admiralty Courts Act, 1861 so as to
constitute a maritime claim is answered in the affirmative and we further hold
that even otherwise such claim for unpaid insurance premia in respect of a ship
is a maritime claim giving rise to admiralty cause.
(b) The objection of the respondent No. 1 original plaintiff in Appeal No.
225/2001 about is maintainability is overruled and appeal is held maintainable.
(c) The order dated 1st/2nd February 2001 passed by the learned Single Judge
in Notice of Motion No. 2455/2000 in Admiralty Suit No. 32/2000 impugned in
Appeal No. 226/2001 to the extent, dismissed. Notice of Motion with reference
to Clause (a) thereof is set aside and Notice of Motion No. 2455/2000 taken out
by defendant No. 1 vessel Sea Success-I and her owner is granted in terms of
prayer Clause (a) and, accordingly, the plaint is rejected against them for non-
disclosure of cause of action.
(d) All interim orders passed against the defendant No. 1 vessel m.v. "Sea
Success I" in Admiralty Suit No. 32/2000 stand discharged and Bank of
Guarantee dated 8-8-2000 furnished by the owners of defendant No. 1 vessel is
cancelled and Prothonotary and Senior Master is directed to return the same to
the owners of the defendant No. 1 vessel.
(e) Appeal No. 739/2000 arising out of Notice of Motion No. 1376/1998 in
Admiralty Suit No. 30/1998 is dismissed and order dated 29-8-200 passed by
the learned Single Judge in Notice of Motion No. 1376/1998 in Admiralty Suit
No. 30/1998 is maintained, save and except the finding recorded therein that a
claim of unpaid insurance premia is not necessaries supplied to the ship.
60. Parties to bear their own costs.
© Manupatra Information Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

MV Sea Success I Vs Liverpool and London SteamshipM010824COM19951

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

MV Sea Success I Vs Liverpool and London SteamshipM010824COM19951

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

MV Sea Success I Vs Liverpool and London SteamshipM010824COM19951

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

MANU/MH/0842/2001

Equivalent Citation: AIR2002Bom151, 2002(2)BomC R537

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

11-07-2023 (Page 1 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 2 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 3 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 4 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 5 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 6 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 7 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 8 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 9 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 10 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 11 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 12 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 13 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 14 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 15 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 16 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 17 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 18 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 19 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 20 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 21 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 22 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 23 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 24 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 25 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 26 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 27 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 28 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 29 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 30 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 31 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 32 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 33 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 34 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 35 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 36 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 37 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

11-07-2023 (Page 38 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

© Manupatra Information Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

11-07-2023 (Page 39 of 39) www.manupatra.com Bharat B Sawhney

You might also like