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FISHER v. BELL.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

[1961] 1 QB 394, [1960] 3 All ER 731, [1960] 3 WLR 351, 59 LGR 93, 125 JP 101

HEARING-DATES: 10, November 1960

10 November 1960

CATCHWORDS:
Criminal Law -- Dangerous weapons -- Flick knife -- Knife displayed in shop window with price attached
-- Whether "offer for sale" -- Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act, 1959 (7 & 8 Eliz. 2 c. 37), s. 1 (1).

HEADNOTE:
A shopkeeper displayed in his shop window a knife with a price ticket behind it. He was charged with of-
fering for sale a flick knife, contrary to s. 1 (1) * of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act, 1959.

* The relevant terms of s. 1 (1) are printed at p. 732, letter G, post.

Held: the shopkeeper was not guilty of the offense with which he was charged because the displaying of
the knife in the shop window was merely an invitation to treat and the shopkeeper had not thereby offered
the knife for sale, within the meaning of s. 1 (1) of the Act of 1959.
Keating v. Horwood ([1926] All E.R. Rep. 88) and Wiles v. Maddison ([1943] 1 All E.R. 315) distin-
guished.
Appeal dismissed.

NOTES:
As to the meaning of "offer", in the law of contract, see 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS (3rd Edn.) 69, paras. 119;
and for a case on the subject, see 12 DIGEST (Repl.) 57, 314.
For the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act, 1959, s. 1 (1), see 39 HALSBURY'S STATUTES (2nd
Edn.) 260.

CASES-REF-TO:

Keating v. Horwood, [1926] All E.R. Rep. 88; 135 L.T. 290; 90 J.P. 141; Digest Supp.
Magor & St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corpn., [1950] 2 All E.R. 1226; affd. H.L., [1951] 2 All
E.R. 839; [1952] A.C. 189; 115 J.P. 613; 3rd Digest Supp.
Wiles v. Maddison, [1943] 1 All E.R. 315; 168 L.T. 280; 107 J.P. 83; 2nd Digest Supp.

INTRODUCTION:
Case Stated. This was a Case Stated by justices for the City and County of Bristol in respect of their ad-
judication as a magistrates' court sitting in Bristol on Feb. 3, 1960.
On Dec. 14, 1959, an information was preferred by the appellant, a chief inspector of police, against the
respondent charging him with an offence against s. 1 of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act, 1959, in
that, on Oct. 26, 1959, at 15/16, the Arcade, Broadmead, Bristol, he unlawfully offered for sale a knife which
had a blade which opened automatically by hand pressure applied to a device attached to the handle of the
knife. The justices found the following facts.
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The respondent was the occupier of a shop in Bristol (situated at the above address), where he carried
on the business of a retail shopkeeper trading under the name of Bell's Music Shop. On Oct. 26, 1959, a
police constable saw displayed in the window of the shop, among other articles, the knife referred to in the in-
formation. Behind the knife in the window, the police constable also saw a ticket on which were printed the
words "Ejector knife -- 4s." These words referred to the knife. The police constable entered the shop, saw
the respondent and said to him: "I have reason to believe that is a flick knife you have displayed in your shop
window.May I examine it?" The respondent removed the knife from the window and said: "I have had other
policemen in here about the knives". The police constable examined the knife and took it away from the
premises for examination by a superintendent of police. Later the same day the police constable returned to
the respondent's premises and informed the respondent that in his opinion the knife was a "flick knife". The
respondent said: "Why do the manufactures still bring them round for us to sell?" The police constable in-
formed the respondent that he would be reported for offering for sale a flick knife, and the respondent replied:
"Fair enough".
The appellant contended that the respondent, by his action in displaying the knife in the shop window
with the ticket behind it and referring to it, such action being carried out with the object of attracting the atten-
tion of a buyer of such knife and selling the same to such buyer, had offered the knife for sale within the
meaning of the Act of 1959. The respondent contended that, on the facts, he at no time offered the knife for
sale within the meaning of the Act of 1959. The justices were of the opinion that, in the absence of a defini-
tion in the Act of 1959, the words "offer for sale" ought to be construd as they were in the law of contract, so
that, in this instance, the respondent's action was merely an invitation to treat and not a firm offer which
needed but a customer's acceptance to make a binding contract for sale, and, accordingly, they dismissed
the information.

COUNSEL:
J. A. Cox for the appellant. P. Chadd for the respondent.

PANEL:
Lord Parker, C.J., Ashworth and Elwes, JJ.

JUDGMENTBY-1: LORD PARKER, C.J.

JUDGMENT-1:
LORD PARKER, C.J.: This is an appeal by way of Case Stated by justices for the City and County of
Bristol, before whom an information was preferred by the appellant, a chief inspector of police, against the re-
spondent that he on a certain day in a shop unlawfully did offer for sale a knife which was, to use ordinary
terms, a flick knife, contrary to s. 1 of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act, 1959. Section 1 (1) of the
Act provides:
"Any person who manufactures, sells of hires or offers for sale or hire, or lends or gives to any other per-
son -- (a) any knife which has a blade which opens automatically by hand presure applied to a button, spring
or other device in or attached to the handle of the knife, sometimes known as a 'flick knife'... shall be guilty of
an offence..."
The justices, without deciding whether the knife in question was a knife of the kind described in the statute,
decided that the information must be dismissed on the ground that there had not been an offer for sale.
The short facts are these. The respondent keeps a retail shop in Bristol and, in October, 1959, a police
constable, walking past the shop, saw in the window, amongst other articles, one of these knives. Behind
the knife in the window was a ticket with the words "Ejector knife -- 4s." The police officer went in and in-
formed the respondent that he would be reported for offering for sale such knife, and the respondent replied:
"Fair enough".
The sole question is whether the exhibition of that knife in the window with the ticket constituted an offer
for sale within the statute. I think that most lay people would be inclined to the view (as, indeed, I was myself
when I first read these papers), that if a knife were displayed in a window like that with a price attached to it,
it was nonsense to say that that was not offering it for sale. The knife is there inviting people to buy it, and in
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ordinary language it is for sale; but any statute must be looked at in the light of the general law of the country,
for Parliament must be taken to know the generallaw. It is clear that, according to the ordinary law of con-
tract, the display of an article with a price on it in a shop window is merely an invitation to treat. It is in no
sense an offer for sale the acceptance of which constitutes a contract. That is clearly the general law of the
country. Not only is that so, but it is to be observed that, in many statutes and orders which prohibit selling
and offering for sale of goods, it is very common, when it is so desired, to insert the words "offering or expos-
ing for sale", "exposing for sale" being clearly words which would cover the display of goods in a shop win-
dow. Not only that, but it appears that under several statutes -- we have been referred in particular to the
Prices of Goods Act, 1939, and the Goods and Services (Price Control) Act, 1941 -- Parliament, when it de-
sires to enlarge the ordinary meaning of those words, has a definition section enlarging the ordinary meaning
of "offer for sale" to cover other matters including, be it observed exposure of goods for sale with the price at-
tached n(1).

n(1) See s. 20 (4) (a) of the Goods and Services (Price Control) Act, 1941; 26 HLASBURY'S STATUTES (2nd Edn.) 319.

In those circumstances I, for my part, though I confess reluctantly, am driven to the conclusion that no of-
fence was here committed. At first sight it appears absurd that knives of this sort may not be manufactures,
they may not be sold, they may not be hired, they may not be lent, they may not be given, but apparently
they may be displayed in shop windows; but even if this is a casus omissus -- and I am by no means saying
that it is -- it is not for this court to supply the omission. I am mindful of the strong words of LORD SIMONDS
in Magor & St. Mellons Runal District Council v. Newport Corpn. n(2). In that case one of the lords justices in
the Court of Appeal had, in effect, said n(3) that the court, having discovered the supposed intention of Par-
liament, must proceed to fill in the gaps -- what the legislature has not written, the court must write -- and in
answer to that contention LORD SIMONDS in his speech said n(4):

n(2) [1951] 2 All E.R. 839; [1952] A.C. 189.

n(3) [1950] 2 All E.R. at p. 1236.
n(4) [1951] 2 All E.R. at p. 841; [1952] A.C. at p. 191.

"It appears to me to be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpreta-
tion..."
For my part, approaching this matter apart from authority, I find it quite impossible to say that an exhibi-
tion of goods in a shop window is itself an offer for sale. We were, however, referred to several cases, one of
which is Keating v. Horwood n(5), a decision of this court. There, a baker's van was being driven on its
rounds. There was bread in it that had been ordered and bread in it that was for sale, and it was found that
that bread was under weight, contrary to the Sale of Food Order, 1921. That order was an order of the sort
to which I have referred already and which prohibited the offering or exposing for sale. In giving his judg-
ments, LORD HEWART, C.J., said n(6):

n(5) [1926] All E.R. Rep. 88.

n(6) [1926] All E.R. Rep. at p. 89.

"the question is whether, on the facts, there were (i) an offering, and (ii) an exposure, for sale. In my
opinion, there were both."
AVORY, J., agreed. SHEARMAN, J., however, said n(7):

n(7) [1926] All E.R. Rep. at p. 90.

"I am of the same opinion. I am quite clear that this bread was exposed for sale, but have had some
doubt whether it can be said to have been offered for sale until a particular loaf was tended to a particular
customer." There are three matters to observe on that case. The first is that the order plainly contained the
words "expose for sale", and, on any view, there was in that case an exposing for sale. Therefore, the ques-
tion whether there was an offer for sale was unnecessary for decision. Secondly, the principles of general
contract law were never referred to; and thirdly, albeit all part of the second ground, the respondents were
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not represented and there was, in fact, no argument. For my part, I cannot take that as an authority for the
proposition that the display here in a shop window was an offer for sale.
The other case to which I should refer is Wiles v. Maddison n(8). I find it unnecessary to go through the
facts of that case, which was a very different case and where all that was proved was an intention to commit
an offence the next day, but, in the course of his judgments, VISCOUNT CALDECOTE, C.J., said n(9):

n(8) [1943] 1 All E.R. 315.

n(9) [1943] 1 All E.R. at p. 317.

"A person might, for instance, be convicted of making an offer of an article of foot at too high a price by
putting it in his shop window to be sold at an excessive price, although there would be no evidenee of any-
body having passed the shop window or having seen the offer or the exposure of the article for sale at that
price."
Again, be it observed, that was a case where, under the Meat (Maximum Retail Prices) Order, 1940, the
words were: "No person shall sell or offer or expose for sale or buy or offer to buy..." Although LORD CAL-
DECOTE, C.J., does refer to the making of an offer by putting an article in the shop window, before the sen-
tence is closed he has, in fact, turned the phrase to one of exposing the article. I cannot get any assistance
in favour of the appellant from that passage. Accordingly, I have come to the conclusion in this case that the
justices were right, and this appeal must be dismissed.

JUDGMENTBY-2: ASHWORTH, J.

JUDGMENT-2:
ASHWORTH, J.: I agree.

JUDGMENTBY-3: ELWES, J.

JUDGMENT-3:
ELWES, J.: I also agree.

DISPOSITION:
Appeal dismissed.

SOLICITORS:
Robins, Hay & Waters, agents for Town clerk, Bristol (for the appellant); Haslewoods, agents for Cooke,
Painter, Spofforth & Co., Bristol (for the respondent).