Electric Power Systems Research 220 (2023) 109271

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Electric Power Systems Research

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/epsr

Vulnerability risk assessment of electrical energy transmission systems with

the approach of identifying the initial events of cascading failures
Mojtaba Fekri a, Javad Nikoukar a, *, Gevork B. Gharehpetian b
a
Department of Electrical Engineering, Islamic Azad University, Saveh Branch, Saveh, 3919715179 Iran
b
Department of Electrical Engineering, Amirkabir University of Technology,Tehran, Iran

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: One of the important and basic parameters in electric energy production and transmission systems is maintaining
Initial events the stability and security of the power system. Transmission lines are vital elements in transferring power from
Cascading failure generation plants to load centers. Therefore, transmission line overload can be regarded as a main cause of
Failure modes and effects analysis (fmea)
consecutive outages and power system blackouts. In this paper, through a proposed cascading failure model
Risk priority number
Vulnerability
based on transmission line thermal limit, hazardous high-probability scenarios of N-K (1< K ≤ 3) contingencies
Risk level assessment are extracted and analyzed. The proposed fault evaluation method is then employed for risk assessment of
Operation mode cascading failures and identification of their initial events. The proposed approach for risk assessment of
cascading scenarios considers vulnerability criteria and operation constraints. The results of application to the
standard IEEE 39-bus test system verify the efficiency and accuracy of the proposed approach.

different modes of power system operation.

1. Introduction
Increasing energy demand requires the scale of modern power grid to
be developed both technically and economically to dispatch tremendous
amount of power through long distances and extra high voltage levels.
Also, high installation, operation and maintenance costs along with
market competition push the power systems to be operated near their
maximum capacity. These conditions along with vast geographical
spread, exposes power systems to significant natural and/ or technical
incidents. Thus, the outage of generation plants, substations, trans­
mission lines, power transformers etc., is most likely. Sometimes the
outage of one power system element can lead to an overload on other
system elements and initiate a cascade failure. Cascading failures are a
chain of consecutive events of major equipment failures. In a cascading
failure, every new outage further weakens the system increasing the
possibility of new outages [1].
Several research studies have been dedicated to the initial event
identification of cascading failures. Some of these methods along with
their capabilities and shortcomings are mentioned in Table 1.
A detailed review of the mentioned approaches reveals that the main
strategy common to all methods is only to identify the critical and
vulnerable branches to save the system stability, and there is no risk
assessment to identify and rank the cascading failure scenarios in
Thus, if the initiating events of cascade failures are identified with
adequate precision and accuracy, commensurate corrective measures
such as load shedding, generation reduction, islanding etc. can help
prevent cascade failures. This further highlights the significance of
initiating event identification. In this paper, using a new identification
method based on maximum current limit of transmission line for all
probable N-K (1<K ≤ 3) contingencies, a diverse set of scenarios is
explored to obtain all possible initiating events. For this purpose, the
failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is utilized.
FMEA is one of the most well-known and widely-used techniques to
systematically analyze the system reliability and equipment failure
modes. This method can be applied to actively examine the effect of
different element failures on the relevant process. FMEA can be carried
out at any project stage to gain an improved system design and mitigate
possible future failure hazards. FMEA analysts apply this method for
identification of weak elements, corrective measure provisions and risk-
based classification of failures and prevent system malfunction [20].
FMEA mechanism and procedure for power system reliability analysis
has been the subject of standards such as IEC 60,812 and BS EN 60,812
(EU adopted version of IEC60812) [21,22].
In [23], the FMEA approach has been employed to assess failure
modes in order to obtain an optimal repair and maintenance to guar­
antee reliability and system security in IEEE 30-bus test system. It has

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: Javad.Nikoukar@iau.ac.ir (J. Nikoukar).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.epsr.2023.109271
Received 21 September 2022; Received in revised form 26 January 2023; Accepted 2 March 2023
Available online 14 March 2023
0378-7796/© 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
M. Fekri et al. Electric Power Systems Research 220 (2023) 109271

Nomenclature Tlow Low average conductor temperature for which ac

resistance is specified [ ◦ C]
qc Emitted heat by convection [W/m] Tavg Average temperature of aluminum strand layers [ ◦ C]
qr Amount of heat radiated from conductor surface [W/m] F Vulnerability objective function
qs The heat generated on the line by direct sunlight [W/m] LLI Line loading index
R(Tavg ) AC resistance of conductor at temperature, Tavg [ohms/m] TLI Transformer loading index
I The permissible current of the line conductor [A] VI Bus voltage index
τ The thermal time constant of the line conductor [min] α, β and ζ Weighting factors of the vulnerability objective function
Ti Steady-state temperature before step-change in conductor n Number of network lines
current [ ◦ C] Si percentage loading of the line
Tf Conductor temperature after the step current change [ ◦ C] Li length of the line in km
mCp The thermal capacity of conductor alloy [ J/(m- ◦ C)] m Number of network transformers
R( Tc ) Conductor resistance at mean conductor temperature, MVAi Transformer capacity [MVA]
[ohms/m] Vi Operating voltage of the bus
Ii Permissible conductor current [A] Vset Planned (set) voltage of the bus
If The thermal current limit of the conductor [A] ΔLLI Percentage line loading
ρf Density of air [kg/m3 ] ΔTLI percentage transformer loading
D0 Outside diameter of conductor [m] ΔVI per unit variation in bus voltages
Ts Conductor surface temperature [ ◦ C] CR Consistency ratio
Ta Ambient air temperature [ ◦ C] CI Consistency index
ε Emissivity (0.23 to 0.91) RI Random consistency index
λmax Largest eigenvalue of the criteria comparison matrix
A Projected area of conductor [m2/linear m]
′

u Number of criteria
α Solar absorptivity (0.23 to 0.91)
wj Weight coefficients
Qsc Total solar and sky radiated heat intensity corrected for
akj Matrix element
elevation [ W/m2 ]
RPN Risk priority number
θ Effective angle of incidence of the sun’s rays [deg]
SEV Severity indicating the impact of the hazard or failure on
Hc Altitude of sun (0 to 90) [deg]
system performance
Zc Azimuth of sun [deg]
OCC probability of occurrence indicating the number of failures
Z1 Azimuth of line [deg]
DET is the detection probability for the given failure indicating
R(Thigh ) Conductor resistance at average high temperature [ohms/
how likely it is to detect the failure before its occurrence
m]
x The mathematical mean of the risk priority number
R(Tlow ) Conductor resistance at average low temperature [ohms/
δ The standard deviation of the risk priority number
m]
xi Value of the risk priority number
Thigh High average conductor temperature for which ac
N Number of cascading failure scenarios
resistance is specified [ ◦ C]

also been used to identify possible failure conditions in the design of the
third windings for 400/230/34 kV power transformers [24] as well as
failure modes and hazards identifications in distribution grids [25].
The proposed FMEA approach in this paper has the following ad­
vantages over previous methods:
1 The indices used in [12] suffer from computational complexity to
identify the critical network lines. But, the proposed approach of the
current paper has a simple and routine computation procedure.
2 In [6,7], the clustering method used suffers from significant limita­
tions such as scalability problems and sensitivity to initial parame­
ters. This leads to long computation times as well as restrictions in
identification of initiating events. But, in the proposed approach of
the current research the initiating events are identified with superior
efficiency and accuracy.
3 In the proposed method, the results are validated using enumeration
technique. Moreover, another unique feature of the current research
is the detailed comparison of the proposed method in terms of pro­
ficiency and efficiency in initial event identification with other
techniques proposed in the literature.
4 In [2] and [13–15], maximum flow methods as well as complex
theory-based on the network topology and graph theory have been
proposed for identifying critical and vulnerable lines as the initiating
events. In this paper, however, the proposed method which is based
on risk evaluation, is not only capable of identifying these lines but
can also address failure modes such as system overloads conse­
quently leading to line outage.
5 FMEA technique has been applied to the test system in [26] in which
failure modes including line overloads and abnormal voltage con­
ditions have been considered. Further to these criteria, the proposed
scheme of the current work also takes into account the network
operation condition (Alert, Emergency and Extremis states) to pro­
vide a more accurate analysis of the chain of cascade failures.
It must be emphasized that the main goals of the introduced
approach in this paper are, as follows:
1 Proposal of a cascade failure analysis method based on maximum
line flow aimed to reduce the search space of high-risk cascade
failure scenarios based on probable N-K (1<K ≤ 3) contingencies.
2 Presentation of a multi-objective function aimed to extract the most
pertinent cascade failure scenarios.
3 Risk-based evaluation and ranking of cascade failure scenarios in
different power system operation modes using failure mode and ef­
fects analysis (FMEA) aimed to identify the most dangerous initiating
events which can potentially lead to cascade failures and blackouts.
4 Validation of the efficiency and accuracy of the proposed method
against other previously-used methods for initiating event identifi­
cation as applied on the IEEE 39-bus system.
Since the main cause of most cascade failures is the overloading of

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M. Fekri et al. Electric Power Systems Research 220 (2023) 109271

Table 1 Table 1 (continued )

Summarized advantages and disadvantages of the initial event identification Item Cascading failure Advantage Disadvantage
methods for cascading failures. identification
Item Cascading failure Advantage Disadvantage method
identification Dynamic It considers most of the Due to the fact that it
method Simulation Model network dynamic considers many details
1 Maximum Flow Based on simple graph Based on DC power [18] mechanisms such as: load in the simulation of
Method [2,3] theory and the flow and therefore changes, protection and cascading failure, its
calculation of maximum unable to describe exciter of generators in calculation speed is
flowing current in the outage spread in real the simulation of challenging.
graph which identifies networks cascading failures, so it
the critical network has the ability to
elements within short accurately predict the
time. occurrence of cascading
2 Enumeration High reliability and Very time-consuming failures.
Method [4,5] accuracy with and difficult to 13 Fast Frequency This method, by The rapid power
consideration of every implement Response (FFR) adjusting the frequency, injection, in this
single scenario Method [19] helps to reduce the risk of method, may cause
3 Clustering Analyzes overloaded Low scalability and very cascading failure and the rotor angle instability.
Method [6,7] lines and transformers on sensitive to initial risk of shutdown in
network cutsets to parameter values. Also, severe cases.
identify and sort cascade the computations are
failure initiation in highly time-consuming
offline and online modes. and can only partly some network lines, this research focuses on identifying these types of
identify the initiating elements. The proposed model is applied to an IEEE 39-bus system to
events. extract lines which can fall into critical state under N-2 or N-3 contin­
4 Classified Neural Used for accurate cascade High computation time
Network (CNN) event identification relative to decision tree
gencies due to weather- or human-related incidents leading to consec­
Method [8] rooted in renewable algorithm. utive failures and blackouts. The failures of such overloaded
resources such as wind transmission lines are identified be the initiating events of cascade
power plants with lower failures.
errors compared to
In summary, the main contributions of the paper include the
conventional neural
network methods. following:
5 Cascading Fault Describes the cascade Difficult to implement
Graph (CFG) failure in a simple on large-scale power 1 Efficient and practical model for cascading failures based on thermal
Method [9] comprehensible way systems. current limit of heavily-loaded transmission lines attempting to
6 Parallel Corridor High computation speed Does not take into
Search Method in cascade failure account line impedance
confine the search space of hazardous scenarios as compared to
[10] identification or reactance enumeration methods.
7 Cross-Space Using two indices, Requires significant 2 Presenting a tri-objective function for finding the most vulnerable
Cascade Failure namely attack graph path supervision mechanism scenarios leading to cascade failures or critical operational
Analysis Method of the cascade failure and as well as other machine
conditions.
[11] the curtailed power learning considerations
mathematical model, it to properly and 3 A method for risk assessment quantification and ranking of cascading
identifies and evaluates accurately evaluate the failure scenarios aimed to confine the search space and increase the
mutual attacks in cyber cascading failures accuracy of initial event identification.
physical power system
(CPPS) space
8 Effective Graph Using two linear overload The mathematics of EGR
In the rest of this paper, the mathematical models and methods are
Resistance (EGR) indices as well as the is complex and difficult. presented in Section 2 followed by the flowchart of the proposed model
Method [12] mathematical model of and method in Section 3. Section 4 presents the simulation results on
effective graph case studies and Section 5 draws a comprehensive comparison between
resistance, it identifies
the proposed and previous approaches. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
the critical lines with
highest participation in paper.
cascading failures.
9 OPA Model [13] Focused on management Based on DC power 2. Material and methods
of outages resulted from flow and therefore
contact with vegetation unable to describe
plants outage spread in real 2.1. Proposed model for cascading failures
networks
10 Complex Theory A topological model Requires detailed The proposed model includes proper indices based on performed
Method [10] which uses the physical electrical characteristics
simulations of all probable N-K (1< K ≤ 3) contingencies leading to line
[13–15], configuration of network of many network
elements to determine elements including overload to generate necessary scenarios required to identify the initial
line and transformer impedance or reactance events of cascading failures.
vulnerability based on and line capacity to As initial elements, highly loaded lines are regarded among the main
graph theory and edge yield credible results. causes of cascading failures. In the proposed cascading failure model,
betweenness centrality.
11 Screening Method Through omitting the The details of cascade
the thermal current limit index is employed. The permissible current
[16,17] cascade failure dynamics, failures are ignored. limit is the maximum current that can flow in a line without influencing
it predicts the outages its electrical properties. This current value is a function of transmission
and cascade failures line loading. Currents above the permissible limit, especially during hot
faster than the dynamic
seasons, result in higher losses and increases line sags initially forcing
methods.
12 the line outage and consequently leading to cascading failures [27,28].
According to IEEE std. 738, the permissible current of ACSR conductor is
given by [29]:

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M. Fekri et al. Electric Power Systems Research 220 (2023) 109271

√̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
qc + qr − qs In this paper, the conductor current exceeding its thermal limits is
I= ( ) (1) regarded as the threshold for relay action and the start of cascading
R Tavg
failures. In fact, relays take action, almost instantaneously, upon sensing
this current level removing the line from the live network.
where qc is the emitted heat by convection in W/m ,which depends on
several factors such as air pressure, conductor diameter, difference be­
tween the ambient and conductor surface temperatures, and the wind
2.2. Vulnerability objective function
velocity. qc is defined as follows:

qc = 3.645.ρ0.5 0.75 1.25

(2) In order to evaluate the vulnerability of cascading failure scenarios,
f .D0 .(Ts − Ta )
or indeed the network’s susceptibility upon the outage of any line or
where ρf is the density of air in kg/m3 and D0 is the outside diameter of transformer, three criteria are integrated into a single vulnerability
conductor in m. Also, Ts is the conductor surface temperature in ◦ C, and function as:
Ta is the ambient air temperature in ◦ C . F = α(LLI) + β(TLI) + ζ(VI) (8)
qr is the amount of heat radiated from conductor surface in W/m.
This amount is determined by the surface coefficient, conductor tem­ This function takes into account three main indices namely the line
perature, ambient conditions and conductor diameter. qr is defined as loading index (LLI), transformer loading index (TLI) and bus voltage
follows: index (VI) through the weighting factors α, β and ζ. The value of this
[( function is determined by operational and topological conditions of the
)4 ( )4 ]
Ts + 273 Ta + 273 network. As the function value approaches unity, the network operation
qr = 17.8.D0 .ε. − (3)
100 100 conditions become more hazardous. Using this function, the potential of
each overloaded line or transformer to cause cascading failures is
where ε is the emissivity (0.23 to 0.91) and D0 is the outside diameter of evaluated [30,31]. The indices used in (8) are defined in (9) to (11),
conductor in m. Also, Ts is the conductor surface temperature in ◦ C, and respectively.
Ta is the ambient air temperature in ◦ C . ∑n
L S
qs is the heat generated on the line by direct sunlight in W/m. This is LLI = i=1 ∑ni . i (9)
i=1 Li
determined by the sun’s radiation angle which hugely impacts the
conductor temperature. qs is defined as follows: where n is the number of network lines, Si and Li are the percentage
qs = α.Qsc .sin(θ). A
′
(4) loading and the length of the line in km, respectively. The lines with
higher loadings and higher lengths are the most critical ones. Indeed,
where A is the projected area of conductor in m2/linear m and α is the
′
higher line lengths lead to more forced outages.
solar absorptivity (0.23 to 0.91). Also, Qsc is the total solar and sky ∑m
MVA S
radiated heat intensity corrected for elevation in W/m2 and θ is the TLI = i=1 ∑m i . i (10)
i=1 MVAi
effective angle of incidence of the sun’s rays in deg. θ is defined as
follows: where m is the number of network transformers and MVAi is transformer
θ = arccos[cos(Hc ).cos(Zc − Z1 )] (5) capacity in MVA.
∑
VI = |Vi − Vset | (11)
where Hc is the Altitude of sun (0 to 90) in deg while Zc is the azimuth of i
sun and Z1 is the zimuth of line, both in deg as well.
R(Tavg ) is the ac resistance of conductor at temperature, Tavg in where Vi and Vset are the operating voltage and the planned (set) voltage
ohms/m. This parameter is obtained by linear interpolation based on the of the bus. Note that Vset varies for PV buses and the generation unit
difference of resistance at upper and lower limits of conductor temper­ buses in particular.
ature. R(Tavg ) is defined as follows: The constraints considered for the vulnerability function are the
[ ( ) ] percentage line loading, transformer loading and the per unit variation
( ) R Thigh − R(Tlow ) ( )
R Tavg = . Tavg − Tlow + R(Tlow ) (6) in bus voltages as defined below, respectively:
Thigh − Tlow
0 < ΔLLI < %70 , 0 < ΔTLI < %70 , 0 < ΔVI < %10 (12)
where R(Thigh ) is the conductor resistance at average high temperature
Based on these constraints, the effect of cascading failure vulnera­
and R(Tlow ) is the conductor resistance at average low temperature. Also,
bility on network operational status can be described by defining three
Thigh is the high average conductor temperature for which ac resistance
operation modes as below:
and Tlow is the low average conductor temperature for which ac resis­
tance, both in ◦ C. Also, Tavg is the average temperature of aluminum
• Alert state: some limits are reached but the power supply is
strand layers in ◦ C. maintained.
Based on the permissible conductor current, its thermal time con­ • Emergency state: some limits are exceeded and the system conditions
stant is defined as: are unsustainable.
( ) • Extremis state: loads are curtailed; all limits are exceeded; possibility
Tf − Ti .mCp
τ= ( ) (7) of a total blackout exists.
R( Tc ). If2 − Ii2
Accordingly, the criticality of the cascading failure or indeed the
where Ti is the steady-state temperature before step change in conductor vulnerability function of scenarios likely to end up in cascading failures
current and Tf is the conductor temperature after the step current is evaluated based on the network’s operational conditions.
change, both in ◦ C. Also, mCp is the thermal capacity of conductor alloy Weighting factors of the indices in (8) are calculated using analytic
in J/(m- ◦ C), and R(Tc ) is the conductor resistance at mean conductor hierarchy process (AHP). This method is a powerful tool for qualitative
temperature, in ohms/m. Also, Ii is the permissible conductor current and quantitative evaluation of multi-parameter problems. It is based on
and If is the thermal current limit of the conductor. The conductor’s time pairwise comparison which effectively assigns a point from 1 to 9 to the
constant, τ is a short time of a few minutes [29]. compared pairs, as shown in Table 2 [32,33].

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M. Fekri et al. Electric Power Systems Research 220 (2023) 109271

Table 2 identifying cascade failure initiating events as follows:

Scoring of pair-wise comparison in AHP method.
Score Degree of importance in Score Degree of importancein pair-wise
pair-wise comparison comparison 1 In the proposed approach, qualitative and quantitative risk com­
1 The same importance 6 The value of superiority is high to parison between contingencies provides the highest accuracy with
very high respect to other approaches in risk evaluation and initiating event
2 Equal to average superiority 7 The value of superiority is very identification of cascade failure scenarios.
value high 2 The proposed method is highly efficient in risk assessment and
3 Medium superiority value 8 The value of superiority is too
much to the maximum
scenario ranking in terms of the high-risk initiating events of
4 Medium to high superiority 9 Maximum superiority value cascade failures.
value 3 Based on the accurate analysis and identification of vulnerable
5 High superiority value elements, the approach provides a correct hint at the required
remedial actions and network expansion planning.
4 The effect of remedial actions on the vulnerable parts and pre­
In the pairwise criteria comparison matrix of Table 3, each matrix
vention of cascade failures can be readily evaluated by the
element is determined by the pairwise comparison of Table 2. The di­
method.
agonal elements of this matrix are 1 as each criterion has the same value
5 The proposed approach utilizes simple rules of risk quantifications
compared to itself. Also, in the criteria comparison matrix aij is the in­
through multiplying the severity, the occurrence probability and
verse of aji .
the detection probability of the considered contingency. Thus, to
After creating this matrix, the consistency ratio (CR) factor is used to
identify the cascade failure, the probability of the contingency
determine the accuracy of obtained coefficients.This determines the
occurrence as a result of each element outage should be specified.
reliability degree of the obtained coefficients. A consistency ratio below
0.1 is acceptable, otherwise comparisons should be carried out over
In this paper, the risk assessment of cascading failure scenarios is
again. The consistency ratio is obtained by dividing the consistency
obtained as:
index (CI) by the random consistency index (RI) as:
RPN = SEV × OCC × DET (16)
CI
CR = (13)
RI
where SEV is the severity indicating the impact of the hazard or failure
The consistency index is given by: on system performance. OCC is the probability of occurrence indicating
λmax − u the number of failures. Also, DET is the detection probability for the
CI = (14) given failure indicating how likely it is to detect the failure before its
u− 1
occurrence. RPN is the risk priority number which, by calculation, falls
where λmax is the largest eigenvalue of the criteria comparison matrix, between 1 and 1000. The larger the RPN, the greater risk associated with
as fairly approximated by: a given failure.
( ) In Table 6, the risk assessment indices are ranked from 1 to 10. The
∑u ∑
u
λmax = akj .wj (15) severity and occurrence probability increase when SEV and OCC indices
j=1 k=1 increase, respectively, whereas the failure detection and control prob­
ability decreases with increasing DET. A high RPN indicates a high-
where u is the number of criteria, wj denotes the weight coefficients and probability failure requiring consideration [20,26].
akj is the matrix element. Tables 7, 8 and 9 show priority ranking of the method’s indices
RI is a random index whose values are given in Table 4 based on which are then used to calculate risk priorities of cascading failure
random scoring method [20]. scenarios based on weighted vulnerability function, occurrence proba­
The weighting factors of the mentioned criteria are normalized with bility of N-K (1< K ≤ 3) contingencies and the network operation state.
respect to the sum of each matrix column in Table 3 and calculated by In general, there is no benchmark RPN in the proposed method for
AHP as given in Table 5. Based on Table 5, λmax is calculated as 3.0378. data comparison and cascading failure risk assessment. Therefore, the
For n = 3, the consistency ratio becomes 0.0189. Based on the number of upper and lower risk limits of the scenarios are calculated according to
criteria, the random index is calculated as 0.58 which results in Eqs. (17)–(20) using SPSS software.
CR=0.0326<0.1. Thus, the coefficients obtained from criteria matrix
are considered reliable. Therefore, the index coefficients for line 1 ∑N
x= xi (17)
loading, transformer loading and bus voltages are obtained as α=0.633, N i=1
β=0.26 and ζ=0.106, respectively. √̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
√
√1 ∑ N
δ=√ (xi − x) 2 (18)
N i=1
2.3. Proposed method

The failure modes and effect analysis (FMEA) is a risk assessment Upper − risk limit = δ + x (19)
technique which can be used to assess the risk of different cascading
Lower − risk limit = δ − x (20)
failure scenarios thus identifying the underlying initial events.
We have given five main reasons for using the proposed approach in where x , δ ,and xi are the mathematical mean, standard deviation and
value of the risk priority number for each scenario respectively, while N
Table 3 is the number of cascading failure scenarios.
Comparative matrix of criteria.
Criteria α β ζ 3. Theory/calculation
α 1 3 5
β 0.33 1 3 Fig. 1 shows the flowchart of the proposed cascading failure analysis
ζ 0.2 0.33 1 model and the relevant initial event identification method. This

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M. Fekri et al. Electric Power Systems Research 220 (2023) 109271

Table 4
RI random index for random scores.
Number of criteria 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

RI 0 0 0.58 0.9 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49

Table 5 Table 9
Results of comparison of criteria by AHP method. Rating for detection (DET).
Criteria α β ζ Mean Operation Criteria Failure detection Rating
state
α 0.652 0.693 0.555 0.633
β 0.217 0.231 0.333 0.26 Extremis Uncontrolled Absolutely 10
ζ 0.13 0.077 0.111 0.106 impossible
Total 1 1 1 1 Emergency Unlikely to control Very remote 9
Alert A moderate chance of controlling Moderate 5
the next failure

Table 6
Evaluation indicators of risk priority number calculations [30]. 4 (steps 11 to 14), the risk assessment of the cascading failure scenarios
Index name Scoring based on the proposed FMEA method is carried out to identify the
Severity (SEV) 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
respective initial events. The initial events are ranked according to the
Max Low results from the risk priority number of the related scenarios. In the last
Occurrence probability (OCC) 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 step, the precision and accuracy of the proposed method are weighed
Max Low against those of other initial event identification methods.
Detection probability (DET) 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Fig. 2 illustrates the blackout build-up steps caused by cascading
Low Max
failures [34]. As shown, the initial events are often the N-2 or N-3
contingencies which are mainly caused by weather or human factors.
Therefore, it is necessary for power utilities to take necessary measures
Table 7 to prevent these events even in their lowest probabilities.
Rating for severity (SEV).
Weighted Effect Rating Weighted Effect Rating 4. Simulation results
vulnerability vulnerability
objective objective
function function
The IEEE 39-bus test system is used to test and simulate the proposed
cascading failure and initial event identification approach. The sce­
F>1 Hazardous 10 0.6<F ≤ 0.7 Moderate 6
narios leading to cascading failures are modeled in Digsilent software
without
warning [35]. Network planning tasks usually consider single-failure events such
0.9<F ≤ 1 Hazardous 9 0.5<F ≤ 0.6 Low 5 that the network is capable of maintaining secure powe supply. This is
with so-called N-1 security criteria. The tested network includes 34 lines, 12
warning
transformers, 10 generating units and 19 load buses. The total installed
0.8<F ≤ 0.9 Very High 8 0.4<F ≤ 0.5 Very low 4
0.7<F ≤ 0.8 High 7 0.3<F ≤ 0.4 Minor 3 capacity of generating units is 6138 MW and total load is 6097 MW.
Also, the losses are 41.23 MW.

4.1. Cascading failure simulation model

Table 8
Rating for occurrence (OCC).
According to the flowchart in Fig. 1, the proposed cascading failure
Occurrence Probability Rating Occurrence Probability Rating
simulation model is fairly capable of identifying a chain of failures that
probability of of failure probability of of failure
probable N-K probable N-K can potentially lead to a blackout in the network, as shown in Fig. 2. In
(1< K ≤ 3) (1< K ≤ 3) this model, the conductor thermal current limit violation is considered
contingencies contingencies as the cause of line outage.
≥1 in 2 Extremely 10 1 in 400 Moderate 5 Considering ACSR conductor for transmission lines and using Eqs.
high (1) - (7), and [27–29,35] as well as the data in Table 10, the permissible
1 in 3 Very high 9 1 in 2000 Relatively 4 thermal current limit of the line conductor (I) and the thermal time
low
constant of the conductor (τ ) is calculated.
1 in 8 Repeated 8 1 in 15,000 Low 3
failures Using (1) and Table 10 data, the conductor’s thermal current limit is
1 in 20 High 7 1 in 150,000 Remote 2 obtained as 1372A. Also, based on (7) and Table 10, this current level
1 in 80 Moderately 6 ≤1 in Nearly 1 can be tolerated by the conductor for a time of about 4 min. Assuming a
high 150,000 impossible
permissible current of 1000A, an overload factor of 1.37 is considered
for the outage of this line causing a cascading failure during N-2 or N-3
procedure consists of five main parts in 15 steps. In part 1 (steps 1 to 4), contingencies. Out of the total of 16,215 probable N-2 or N-3 contin­
the scenarios identified by N-2 or N-3 contingency analysis with AC gencies, the enumeration method identifies 242 scenarios with a po­
power flow causing line overloads and further branch outages are ob­ tential of cascading failure. By effectively confining the search space,
tained. In part 2 (steps 5 to 7), through simulation studies, scenarios our proposed model identifies 129 scenarios with potential cascading
having the proposed cascading failure criteria are identified as the failure, thus reducing the number of scenarios and initial events by 47%.
cascading failure scenarios. In part 3 (steps 8 to 10), the weighted
vulnerability functions related to the cascading scenarios are calculated 4.2. Vulnerability function calculation
by AHP and classified based on network operational constraints. In part
Using Eqs. (8) - (12), the vulnerability function is obtained, as shown

6
M. Fekri et al.
Fig. 1. Flowchart of the proposed FMEA-based identification method for initial events of cascading failure.
in Table 10, for the 129 cascading failure scenarios. The scenarios are
prioritized considering a resolution of 0.1 in vulnerability function
values and also the three operating modes of the network.
Based on Table 11 and Fig. 3, nearly 48 percent of the studied sce­
narios put the network in critical or extremis operating conditions. In
this case, the power system is very likely to experience voltage collapse
and consequently a major blackout. When the network enters the alert
7
Electric Power Systems Research 220 (2023) 109271
state, the system operators can prevent further faults through modifying
the generation and transmission patterns. For these situations, suitable
trainings are necessary to instruct operators for timely fault identifica­
tions and fast proper actions to preserve the system stability and sus­
tained power supply. In cases when fast transition occurs between the
alert and emergency states, no effective action can be taken by the
operators.
M. Fekri et al. Electric Power Systems Research 220 (2023) 109271

Fig. 2. Cascading failure progress leading to blackout.

Table 10
Calculated parameters of Eqs. (1) and (7).
Primary data
Row Symbol SI units value Row Symbol SI units value

1 ρf kg/m3 1.029 9 Zc deg 114

2 D0 m 0.04068m 10 Z1 deg 90
3 Ts ◦
C 100 11 θ deg 76.1
4 Ta ◦
C 40 12 Tavg ◦
C 100
5 ε&α — 0.8 13 Thigh ◦
C 80
6 A
′
m2/linear m 0.0614 14 Tlow ◦
C 20
7 Qsc W/m2 1023 15 R(Thigh ) ohm/m 0.00003993
8 Hc deg 74.8 16 R(Tlow ) ohm/m 0.00003216
Calculated parameters of Eq. (1)
qc 55.93 W/m qs 32.44 W/m
qr 56.53 W/m R(Tavg ) 0.00004253 ohm/m
Calculated parameters of Eq. (7)
Tf 100 ◦ C mCp 399 J/(m- ◦ C)
Ti 80 ◦ C If 1372A
R( Tc ) 0.00004253 ohm/m Ii 1000A

Table 11
Classification of cascading failure scenarios based on the weighted vulnerability function and the network operating state.
Weighted vulnerability objective function 0.3<F ≤ 0.4 0.4<F ≤ 0.5 0.5<F ≤ 0.6 0.6<F ≤ 0.7 0.7<F ≤ 0.8 0.8<F ≤ 0.9 0.9<F ≤ 1 F>1 sTotal
scenario

Number of scenarios with N-2 12 4 6 9 9 0 0 0 40

contingency
Number of scenarios with N-3 0 4 22 24 24 7 5 3 89
contingency
Total 12 8 28 33 33 7 5 3 129
Extremis state 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 7
Emergency state 0 0 3 15 30 5 2 0 55
Alert state 12 8 25 18 3 1 0 0 67

4.3. Implementation of the proposed method priority number.

In this section, the risk assessment of the cascading failures is per­
formed based on FMEA indices of Tables 7-9 and the risk priority
number obtained by (16) so as to identify the main initial events. Then,
using Eqs. (17)- (20) as well as the SPSS software tool, first a risk con­
fidence interval is specified based on which the risk level of the scenarios
is determined. Table 12 shows the lower and upper-risk limits of
different scenarios based on the mean and standard deviation of the risk
Considering the results of Table 12, the cascading failure scenarios
are classified into three levels in terms of their risk, namely low-risk,
moderate-risk and high-risk scenarios. For N-2 contingencies, the
lowest and highest risk priority numbers are 75 and 315, respectively,
while those of N-3 contingencies are 60 and 300.
The percentage of the risk levels for cascading failure scenarios in N-
2 and N-3 contingencies is shown in Fig. 4. As seen, nearly 27 percent of
the cascading failures are in low-risk level. These scenarios often lead to

8
M. Fekri et al. Electric Power Systems Research 220 (2023) 109271

emergency and, or extremis states and eventual blackouts fall into

Fig. 3. Network operating states during cascading failure scenarios.
Table 12
Risk level of scenarios based on risk priority number.
Number of cascading failure
scenarios
Mean risk priority number
(x)
Standard deviation of risk
priority number (δ)
The upper limit of the risk
priority number
The lower limit of the risk
priority number
moderate and high-risk levels.
The risk rating of the hazardous cascading failure scenarios using the
proposed approach is given in Table 13. Accordingly, a total of 94
moderate- or high-risk scenarios are nominated for the study of initial
events. These scenarios are indeed a chain of events that can lead to
technically hazardous states and violate operation constraints. As
shown, the highest priority number for a moderate risk is 243 and that of
high risk is 315.
Table 14 shows four cases of cascading failure steps with high risk.
These scenarios with N-2 and N-3 contingencies result in an initial event
and consequently, through relay action and the violation of operation
constraints (12), lead to power flow divergence and cascading failures.
For example, scenario 2 begins with the outage of the overloaded line
4–5 and in the fourth step, unacceptable voltage drop occurs in bus 4
down to 0.81 pu leading to a complete cascading failure in step 5.
Table 15 lists the ranking of lines as the initial events of cascading
Occurrence of the N-2 Occurrence of the N-3
failures based on the number of participation and efficiency coefficient.
contingency contingency
40 89
Here, the efficiency coefficients are calculated based on the risk priority
number of the scenarios in Table 13. A higher efficiency coefficient for a
175.1 180.45
line indicates its more critical importance in the propagation of
99.5 70.77 cascading failures. For instance, the efficiency coefficient for line 6–11
participating in three scenarios with risk priority numbers of 120, 120
274.63 251.22 and 140 is calculated as (140+120+120)/315=1.21. As validated by
enumeration method, about 62 percent of the evaluated lines are iden­
75.63 109.68
tified by the proposed approach as the initial elements for cascading
failures. These initial events are ranked 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 11th
and 12th in Table 15. In this table, line 4–5 is identified as the most
vulnerable element with an efficiency coefficient of 20.78.

5. Discussion

As explained in [13], cascading failures have a complex nature and

Fig. 4. Percentage of risk levels associated with cascading failure scenarios.
the alert state. Since remedial actions can often be performed in the alert
state, these scenarios are not further considered in cascading failure
studies. This is also justified by the fact that the most vulnerable initial
events which can cause a chain of failures and put system into
can be initiated by different weather or human factors. Thus, an effective
preventive measure is to accurately predict these failures. Through
proper remedial actions, the severity and cost of failures can be signif­
icantly reduced. Given the importance of the search space confinement
for accurate identification of initial events, the results of different
techniques implemented on the test system are compared in Table 16
and Figs. 5 and 6. According to the results, the proposed method proves
more suitable than previous approaches. 6 out of the top 10 events
identified by the proposed approach are actually the initial events of
cascading failures whereas the cascading faults graph and clustering
methods can only identify 3 and 1 initial events, respectively. This
proves the high accuracy of the proposed method in identifying the most
hazardous initial events. Furthermore, by managing to reduce the
enumeration search space of 16,215 for N-2 and N-3 contingencies down

Table 13
Risk rating for hazardous cascading failure scenarios.
Risk Weighted vulnerability objective function Contingency SEV OCC DET RPN Number of scenarios Total scenario

Moderate risk 0.9<F ≤ 1 N-3 9 3 9 243 2 58

0.8<F ≤ 0.9 N-3 8 3 10 240 1
8 3 9 216 5
8 3 5 120 1
0.7<F ≤ 0.8 N-3 7 4 5 140 3
0.6<F ≤ 0.7 N-3 6 4 9 216 12
6 4 5 120 12
N-2 6 5 9 270 6
6 5 5 150 5
0.5<F ≤ 0.6 N-2 5 5 5 125 4
N-3 5 4 9 180 3
0.4<F ≤ 0.5 N-2 4 5 5 100 4
High risk F>1 N-3 10 3 10 300 3 36
0.9<F ≤ 1 N-3 9 3 10 270 3
0.7<F ≤ 0.8 N-2 7 5 9 315 9
N-3 7 4 9 252 21

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M. Fekri et al. Electric Power Systems Research 220 (2023) 109271

Table 14
Some cases of high-risk cascading failure steps.
RPN Scenario Occurrence of N-2 or N-3 The first initial The second event The third event The fourth event The fifth
number contingency event event

315 1 The outage of The outage of line The outage of line 13–14 Power flow
transformers 29–38 and 4–5 with 155% with 264% overload divergence
19–33 overload
315 2 The outage of transformer The outage of line The outage of line 8–9 The outage of line Unacceptable voltage drop Power flow
25–37 and line 13–14 4–5 with 132% with 179% overload 1–2 with 144% of bus 4 to 0.81 pu Δ divergence
overload overload V>10%
270 3 The outage of transformer The outage of line Power flow divergence
20–34 and lines 13–14 and 2–3 with 179%
4–5 overload
300 4 The outage of transformer The outage of line Unacceptable voltage drop Power flow
22–35 and lines 26–27 and 4–5 with 166% of bus 4 to 0.76 pu Δ divergence
2–3 overload V>10%

Table 15
Initial event identification and ranking based on the proposed approach.
Rank Line name Number of participations in scenarios Efficiency coefficient Rank Line name Number of participations in scenarios Efficiency coefficient

1 4–5 27 20.78 8 11–12 1 0.8

2 13–14 20 13.25 9 2–25 1 0.77
3 2–3 16 10.08 10 3–4 1 0.397
4 6–7 9 6.64 11 16–17 1 0.381
5 23–24 7 4.37 12 5–8 1 0.317
6 8–9 6 3.56 13 17–27 1 0.317
7 6–11 3 1.21

Table 16
Comparison of proposed method to other initial event identification techniques.
Item Method Initial event identification Total initial events Percentage of correct identifications validated by Calculation time
identified enumeration method (s)

ss1 Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA)
2 Cascading Faults Graph (CFG)
3 Parallel Corridor Search
Method
4 Cross Entropy-Based Method
5 Multi-Criteria Index Evaluation
Method
6 Clustering Method
Six initial events among top 10 8 47 3.53
identified events
Three initial events among top 10 3 18 20.52
identified events
Five initial events among top 10 5 29 7.93
identified events
Four initial events among top 10 6 35 59.95
identified events
Five initial events among top 10 5 29 5.94
identified events
One initial events among top 10 1 6 13.83
identified events

Fig. 5. Accuracy Comparison between initial event identification methods.

to 129 cases, the proposed method successfully identifies 47 percent of identify the initial events as it takes 3.53 s to extract the ranking list of
the total initial events in a maximum of 13 iterations. As a comparison, initial events. To calculate the provided times in Table 16, a computer
the entropy method only identifies 35 percent of initial events through with an Intel Core i7, 2.3 GHz, 8 GB RAM processor is used and the
15 iterations. Also, the proposed method is one of the fastest methods to programs are implemented in MATLAB software environment.

10
M. Fekri et al.
Fig. 6. Validated Percentage of correct initial event identification.
6. Conclusions and recommendations for future works
In this paper, a new approach was introduced to identify critical and
highly-loaded lines whose failure can lead to cascading failures in power
systems. The approach is based on the thermal current limit modeling of
the lines and aims to reduce the search space of the initial events of
cascading failures for N-2 and N-3 contingencies as compared to
enumeration method. The hazardous scenarios leading to cascading
failures and emergency and extremis states in the network are obtained
through a vulnerability function which includes three indices, namely
line loading, transformer loading and bus voltage profiles. Then, based
on a proposed FMEA-based technique, a risk assessment is carried out on
the nominated cascading scenarios. This method is capable of qualita­
tive assessment of the indices related to the events as well as statistical
calculation of risk priorities which can be used to identify and rank the
initial events of cascading failures in offline mode and then be used to
take preventive measures against them in realtime system operation.
Through vulnerability index evaluation and statistical risk analysis, the
presented approach is also capable of identifying the most hazardous
scenarios leading to emergency and extremis states. This method was
implemented on an IEEE 39-bus test system to identify the branches with
highest failure risks.
The following statistics demonstrate the greater accuracy and speed
of the proposed approach relative to other methods in identifying the
significant initiating events:
• The proposed approach determines 8 initiating events which is
higher number than that by other methods by a minimum of 12
and maximum of 41 percent.
• 35 percent of the most significant initiating events are listed in the
top 10 scenarios while for other approaches the maximum per­
centage of correct identification within the top 10 scenarios is 29
percent obtained by the parallel corridor search and multi-criteria
methods.
• The most critical initiating event, i.e., the outage of the line 4–5 is
ranked first in the list whereas it is ranked 2nd to 5th by other
methods.
• The simulation results in this network show that the new method
can detect about 47% of the initial events of cascading failures in a
time of about 3.5 s whereas other methods take longer times and
their detection percentage is lower.
In this research, the lines 4–5 and 13–14 of the test system were
identified to have the highest contribution in high-risk cascade failure
scenarios with 50 and 22 percent, respectively. Therefore, these ele­
ments are designated as the most vulnerable points in the test network.
Future works can focus on the optimal adoption of remedial action
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Electric Power Systems Research 220 (2023) 109271
schemes and proper network expansion measures and assess their
impact on the reduction of cascade failures through re-evaluation of the
risk priority number.
Credit author statement
(Mojtaba Fekri) developed the main idea and concept along with
preliminary simulations. (Javad Nikoukar) further developed and
enhanced case studies and validation procedures while writing down the
manuscript. (Gevork B. Gharehpetian) reviewed and verified the whole
work and performed final paper organization.
Declaration of Competing Interest
Herewith, I would like to declare that I, Mojtaba Fekri, the author of
this paper, am PhD student and the other coauthors are my supervisor
and advisor, who are university professors, and their primary function is
research and education in the university. Also, we are not representative
of government.
Data availability
No data was used for the research described in the article.
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