Politics Power and The Chinese Maritime Customs

Politics, Power and the Chinese Maritime Customs: The Qing Restoration and the Ascent
of Robert Hart
Author(s): Richard S. Horowitz
Source: Modern Asian Studies , Jul., 2006, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Jul., 2006), pp. 549-581
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3876538
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Modern Asian Studies 40, 3 (2006) pp. 549-581. ? 2006 Cambridge University Press
doi:10.1017/S0026749X06002113 Printed in the United Kingdom
Politics, Power and the Chinese Maritime

Customs: the Qing Restoration and the
Ascent ofRobert Hart
RICHARD S. HOROWITZ
California State University, Northridge
On 6 November 1865, Robert Hart, the 30o-year-old In

(I.G.) of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service, pr
supervisors in the Zongli Yamen, the Qing Empire's new
a long memorandum critiquing Chinese administrati
offering suggestions for improvement. He criticized
inefficiency at all levels of government, called for tax
specialization and better technical education of offi
contacts with the outside world, and promoting foreig
technology. The memorandum, written in Chinese,
'Bystander's View' (juwai pangguan lun). A few mon
submitted by the Zongli Yamen to the throne, and
similar tract by British diplomat Thomas Wade, dist
Qing officials for comment. It had little impact at the
years later, when the Empress Dowager Cixi reportedly
that she wished she had followed his advice, it beca
stone of the mythology of Robert Hart, a symbol of t
Qing court to take full advantage of the Portadown
Hart's premise, encapsulated in the title, was that a
the Qing system he could see problems that insider
true face of Mount Lu can only be seen in its entir
1 Juliet Bredon, Sir Robert Hart: The Romance of a Great Career (

19o09), 111. This paper was presented at the Workshop on Sir R
University Belfast, September 2003. I am grateful to the org
participants at the workshop for their comments, to my collea
Department, California State University, Northridge for ideas
at an early stage, and to Hans van de Ven for many concrete sug
improve this essay.
oo26-749X/o6/$7.50+ $o. 1o
549

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550 RICHARD S. HOROWITZ
stands away from it.'2 But the memorandum

was uncharacteristic of Hart. It was too blunt for a man admired for
his diplomacy, and too broadly conceived and rhetorical for a man
whose successes-at least until the end of the century-were built on
quiet actions within the bureaucratic system. Moreover, when Hart
identified himself as bystander, he was striking a pose. By the mid
186os he was deeply enmeshed in the politics of the time, and his skill
at managing political alliances was a key ingredient to his rise from
a minor consular functionary to the figure often described at the turn
of the century as the most influential foreigner in China.
In what is now close to a century since Robert Hart's death, there
has been an impressive amount written about the I. G. But Hart
is presented in a limited set of roles. The first was perhaps the
most unlikely: Juliet Bredon's paean to her uncle presented him
as a romantic figure who had led a life 'as useful as varied, as
romantic as successful', a questionable description of a man who spent
47 years running a tax agency-even one as diverse in its activities
as the Customs Service.3 H. B. Morse who worked for Hart for
35 years emphasized his role as a wise and discreet advisor to the
Qing government and as a diplomatic intermediary settling disputes.4
Stanley Wright wrote Hart's life as expressed in the methodical
development of the Customs Service into an efficient modern tax
bureaucracy, declaring that 'As an administrative genius Hart stands
high in the ranks of the great British administrators'5 In their
superbly edited editions of Hart's early journals, John K. Fairbank,
Richard Smith and Katherine Bruner opened up Hart's private life
to examination, and emphasized Hart's 'bicultural achievement' in
adapting to Chinese cultural and behavioral expectations to win
2 Choubanyiwu shimo, tongzhi chao (Taipei reprint, n.d.) 40:13b [hereafter YWSM-
TZ] For a more detailed discussion of the memorandum see Richard J. Smith, John
K. Fairbank, Katherine F. Bruner, Robert Hart and China's Early Modernization: His
Journals, 1863-1866 (Cambridge MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard
University, 1991), 284-92, and Mary Clabaugh Wright, Last Stand of Chinese
Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874 (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1957), 263-8.
3 Bredon, 5 andpassim.
' Hosea Ballou Morse, International Relations of the Chinese Empire (London:
Longmans, Green & co., 1910-1918) 2:138-41, 190-1, 364-7.
5 Stanley F. Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast: Win. Mullan, 1950),
855. See also a similar account by the last foreign Inspector General L. K. Little
'Introduction' in The I. G. in Peking: Letters of Robert Hart Chinese Maritime Customs,
1868-90o7, ed. John King Fairbank, Katherine Frost Bruner, Elizabeth MacLeod
Matheson (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1975) Vol. 1, 1-34.

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CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS 551
the confidence of his Chinese overseers.6 These works share a basic

assumption that Hart was largely apolitical: he served his Chinese
masters by running the Customs with efficiency and providing useful
advice, and periodically stepped into international disputes as a
trusted honest broker. To do this, Hart remained above the fray of
political struggles and the aggressive diplomacy of the day.
This paper will present a different angle on Hart's career in the
186os and early 187os. Hart was a political man who leavened
his principled arguments for an independent Customs service and
administrative honesty with an ample concern for his own self interest.
While the I. G. avoided taking overtly political positions, he adroitly
adapted to the political circumstances and used them to his advantage.
Hart aligned himself with a group of Beijing officials lead by Prince
Gong (Yixin), a member of the imperial family, and the Manchu
statesman Wenxiang who were the leaders of Zongli Yamen. He
organized and managed the Customs Service to maximize the Yamen's
authority vis-a-vis provincial officials, finance pet projects, and provide
confidential advice. Their sponsorship enabled Hart to set up the
Customs in a manner that gave him extraordinary and unchecked
authority. He would wield this power to the very end, and this would
allow for many of the administrative peculiarities of the service.
Just as he smoothly adapted to the Qing political situation, Hart
took advantage of unusually moderate British diplomacy in China
during the 186os. Led by the first Minister to Beijing, Frederick
Bruce, British diplomacy demanded from the Qing government strict
adherence to the treaties and the establishment of free trade. But
Bruce also supported the Qing government's efforts to suppress
rebellion, and pursued policies aimed at strengthening the authority
of the central government in Beijing.7 Hart created an organization
that served the interests of British free trade policies, and which
conspicuously supported authorities in Beijing-a close fit for Bruce's
vision. But Hart's Customs also remained sufficiently international in
its personnel and free of direct British influence to avoid becoming a
target for other powers. In a semi-colonial realm in which the power
of the Qing state was precariously balanced against British hegemony
6 Katherine Bruner, John K. Fairbank, Richard J. Smith, Entering China's Service:

Robert Hart's Journals, 1854-1863 (Cambridge MA: Council on East Asian Studies,
Harvard University, 1986), 324-32.
Mary Clabaugh Wright, 21-42; Britten Dean, China and Great Britain: The
Diplomacy of Commercial Relations, I86O-1864 (Cambridge, Mass: East Asian Research
Center, 1974), 128-36.

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and threats from other powers, deft politica

Hart's autonomy and authority.8
In the summer of 1861 Robert Hart made his first important political
alliances. He traveled to Beijing in place of his boss, H. N. Lay, who
had departed on leave to England. Hart stayed at the new British
Legation as the guest of British Minister Frederick Bruce, whose
support would later be crucial to Hart's promotion to the position of
Inspector General. Even more importantly he had numerous meetings
with Wenxiang, a Grand Councilor and the working leader of the new
Zongli Yamen, and briefer sessions with Prince Gong, which gave Hart
a chance to explain the operations of the Customs Service and discuss
plans for its expansion to new treaty ports.9 The evidence available
suggests that they hit it off exceptionally well. Although Hart probably
did not realize it at the time, he had happened into ideal sponsors: for
the pair were a rising force in Qing politics.
Less than a year earlier, in the August and September of 186o,
the Qing dynasty had been in the midst of its greatest crisis. After
four years of off and on fighting, the Arrow War (also known as the
second Opium War) was approaching a denouement, as a combined
British and French force seized the Dagu fortresses, which protected
the seaborne approaches to Tianjin, and in early September marched
towards Beijing repeatedly defeating Qing armies on the battlefield.
The foreign invasion of the north coincided with a resurgence of the
Taiping rebellion in the lower Yangzi region, with major rebellions
festering on the north China plain and in the Southwest. For anyone
remotely familiar with history, the eerie combination of domestic
uprising and foreign invasion, bore all of the characteristics of a
dynastic collapse.
8 The concept of semi-colonialism (and its alter ego informal empire) is system-
atically developed in Jurgen Osterhammel, 'Semi-Colonalism and Informal Empire
in Twentieth Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis' in Imperialism and
After: Continuities andDiscontinuities, ed. Wolfgang Mommsen andJurgen Osterhammel
(London: 1986); see also Osterhammel, 'Britain and China 1842-1914' in The Oxford
History ofthe British Empire, Volume III: The Nineteenth Century, ed. Andrew Porter (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 146-69.
9 Bruner et al., 240-4; Richard S. Horowitz, 'Mandarins and Customs Inspectors,'
Papers on Chinese History, 7 (1998): 43-4-

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As the situation deteriorated at the end of the

debate broke out at court over whether the emperor
Beijing, or flee to the Imperial hunting retreat at
of the retreat, including the leading Grand Coun
the General Senggelinqin, insisted that such an ap
the emperor out of harm's way and avoid humili
including Wenxiang, then an obscure Manchu
been appointed to the Emperor's chief advisory b
Council, two years earlier, feared that the emperor's
induce panic and government authority might dis
implication would induce a dynastic collapse.'0 An
would later recall, with no easily defensible passe
and Rehe, 'where we could go, they could go. Our str
inadequate."' After vacillating briefly, the Xianfen
to flee accompanied by the bulk of his senior official
Wenxiang asked for permission to remain in the capi
The Emperor assented, placing Wenxiang in charg
Gendarmerie, and assigned him, together with P
Emperor's younger brother), and a veteran officia
Gong's father-in-law) to negotiate a settlement w
forces.
This was a precarious assignment to say the leas

Emperor's departure Wenxiang returned to the city a
troops had not received rations for days, and 'I could
people seething with insurrection from among the sm
city], and already there was looting.' Wenxiang ope
and issued rations, and ordered the gendarmes to
execute them on the spot.'2 Order was gradually
the walled city, although banditry persisted outs
Wenxiang and Guiliang established an ad hoc P
office, drafting into service middle and lower ran
had remained in Beijing. The Peace Commission n
hand with the British and French, and on the other w
who had taken advantage of the situation to press
redefining the northern boundaries. The negotiations
10 The documents for this debate are in Chouban yiwu shimo

Zhonghua shuju, 1980) [hereafter YWSM-XF] 7:2269-2301.
11 Wenxiang, 'Wen wenzhong gong ziding nianpu' in idem., Wen
(n.p. 1882), 2:32-32b.
12 Ibid., 2:33.

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smoothly, and the Conventions of Beijing were s

While the British and French looted the Yu
foreigners now call the old summer palace) n
and the British later burned it as punishment fo
of prisoners, the commissioners skillfully avoide
occupation of Beijing itself. By November foreig
Tianjin.13
At this point, much to the frustration of his officials, the Emperor
simply refused to return to Beijing, preventing a return to normal
politics, and leaving the Peace Commission to manage the situation
in the capital. The commissioners took advantage of the opportunity.
In January of 1861, they submitted a series of memorials proposing
reforms and advocating a new strategic and foreign policy outlook. In
the most famous of these they made the following assessment:
The Taiping and Nian bandits multiply and are like an illness of the heart
and abdomen. Russia, whose territory adjoins ours is determined to nibble
away at our land like a silkworm, and is therefore like a threat to the arm and
shoulder. England's purpose is trade but she acts harshly and without regard
for human decency, and if we do not act to restrict her, then we will be unable
to stand on our own, and thus it is like an affliction of the legs. Therefore,
first we should suppress the Taiping and Nian bandits, next put the Russians
in order, and then deal with England.14
Wenxiang and Prince Gong were calling for a conciliatory policy

toward the Western powers, to give the Qing state space to suppress
the internal crises. In other proposals, they began to call for 'self-
strengthening,' a term that called to mind the Neo-Confucian ideas of
moral self-cultivation, but in this context emphasized the introduction
of new techniques, particularly western military technology which
had proved far superior to what the Qing armies had to offer. They
recognized that while it would take years to match European military
capabilities, Western guns could offer tremendous aid in their efforts
to defeat internal rebellions. Around this time, provincial leaders like
Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang fighting the Taipings, were coming to
similar conclusions, and in the ensuing fifteen years this would form
13 On the negotiations, see Masataka Banno, China and the West 1858--861, The
Origins ofthe Tsungli Yamen (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), 170-
201.
14 YWSM-XF, vol. 7, 2674-

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the core strategy of what has become known a

Restoration, and the first stage of the effort for
The Peace Commissioners also found a way
their position. To better manage foreign relati
creation of a foreign office, called the Zongli Yam
geguo shiwuyamen 'office for general managemen
various countries'), Once approved, Prince Gon
aged and would die shortly thereafter), and We
to run this office, and it quickly became their pow
many of the men who had served the Peace C
new office. Two of these in particular, Baoyu
who later became a Grand Councilor and President of the Board of
Finance and Dong Xun a Chinese official and statecraft scholar who
would become the Yamen's resident intellectual, would be frequent
interlocutors with Robert Hart over the following two decades The new
office had a very broadly defined role, dealing not only with diplomatic
relations with the foreign legations established in Beijing, but also
almost anything to do with yangwu, 'foreign matters,' including the
Customs Administration.16
The experience of the Peace Commission was the defining moment
in the careers of these statesmen, and in subsequent years their
memorials calling for reforms or criticizing imperial decisions
inevitable recalled the experience, almost as a talisman. Prince
Gong had little political experience before 186o. But with a genial
personality and a moderate approach to diplomacy, he was well liked
by foreign diplomats, and the events of i86o gave him some gravitas
and political connections to go with his royal birth. Wenxiang, a
Manchu official had risen rapidly (reportedly due to patronage of
Grand Councilor Sushun), but his performance in September 186o
won him widespread respect. Foreigners found him intelligent, with
15 'Self-strengthening' was used by the Peace Commissioners in a memorial in

January 1861 referring specifically to military reform though in time it was used much
more broadly, see YWSM-XF, vol. 8, 2700-2702. The self-strengthening movement
is a term conventionally used by historians to refer to the efforts to adapt western
technology between 186o and 1894. The term 'restoration' began to be used by
officials in the late 186os, as a celebratory description of the revival from during the
Tongzhi reign (1862-1874) from the crises of the preceding fifteen years.: See Mary
Clabaugh Wright, 43-6 for a discussion of the concept of restoration andpassim for a
magisterial overview.
16 The preceding paragraphs are summarized from Richard S. Horowitz, 'Central
Power and State Making: the Zongli Yamen and Self-Strengthening in China, 1860-
1880,' Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1998, 34-60.

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a remarkable grasp of detail, and a pragmatic ou
Wenxiang, not Prince Gong, who ran the Zongli Ya
to-day basis, and his long conversations with Hart in Ju
1861 quickly made him realize the potential of the C
On 21 August 1861 the Xianfeng Emperor died in
never returned to the capital. His only son, a five-ye
the undisputed heir to the throne. A council of eight
princes as well as most of the Grand Councilors, was
the boy emperor, while the two empresses dowager
emperor's chief consort) and Cixi (the mother of th
and famous and infamous 'Old Buddha' who would dominate the
throne until 19o8), wielded the imperial seal for the child.
new reign was to be called qixiang (meaning 'good fortune').
regency quickly broke down. We can imagine that rulership by
committee of eight plus two Empresses-Dowager was clumsy. T
Council of Regents was entirely made up of men who had gone w
the emperor on his retreat, and left out those who had stayed behin
in the capital and picked up the pieces, engendering a split betw
Rehe and Beijing. Taking advantage of the crisis, the Empresses
Dowager connived with Prince Gong and military leaders in
vicinity of Beijing. When the imperial entourage returned to Bei
at the beginning of November, the Council of eight was arrest
The leading Grand Councilor Sushun was executed, the two princ
were generously invited to commit suicide to avoid a similar fa
(the privileges of royal birth!), and the remainder were cashier
It was claimed that Sushun had forged the late emperor's valedict
edict and usurped power. Taking a political 'mulligan,' a new re
name was proclaimed (Tongzhi, which Wenxiang told Thomas Wa
meant by way classical allusion something like 'return to order'),
two Empresses-Dowager were made co-regents, and Prince Gong
given the special title of Deliberative Prince, and placed on the Gran
Council. A new group of Grand Councilors was appointed, with t
exception of Wenxiang who had not been part of the 'usurping' cliqu
in Rehe.18
17 Mary Clabaugh Wright, 70-1.

18 The account of the coup follows Luke S. K. Kwong, 'Imperial Authority in Crisis:
An Interpretation of the Coup D'e'tat of 1861'Modern Asian Studies 17.2 (1983): 221-
38; see also Mary Clabaugh Wright, 16-20. A useful political narrative from standard
published primary sources is Xu Liding, Xianfeng tongzhi di (Changchun: Jilin wen shi
chubanshe, 1993), 241-94.

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The coup d'6tat placed the Peace Commissio

stronger political position. The Zongli Yamen was g
and Prince Gong and Wenxiang continued to
representatives to forge a cooperative policy: fo
Qing efforts to suppress rebellion as benefitting th
and the Yamen, together with provincial officials
agreements. Prince Gong's ascendancy was brie
of corruption, he was briefly stripped of his posts
Dowager solidified their control of the regency
all but the title of deliberative prince, he was weak
an influential figure. Wenxiang, a cautious but p
reform, would remain a key figure until his prem
Where most other foreigners who did substa
the Qing government in the Tongzhi era we
progressive provincial leaders-Charles 'Chinese' Gordon and
Halliday Macartney with Li Hongzhang, Prosper Giquel with Zuo
Zongtang-Hart made his most important connections in Beijing.
The Customs Service became an agent of the central government,
and subordinate to the Zongli Yamen. The alliance between the Peace
Commission group and Hart would bring benefits flowing both ways.
II
Robert Hart handled his early relations with the Peace Commission
group in Beijing with great cultural sensitivity. John Fairbank,
Katherine Bruner and Richard Smith make a convincing case
for Hart's 'bicultural achievement' in dealing so effectively with
his Manchu and Chinese overseers.19 But curiously missing
from their characterization is the notion of cultivating personal
relationships. In Chinese culture, at least in recent centuries,
the cultivation of personal relationships has been of exceptional
importance. Relationships bring with them expectations of mutual
assistance, and are understood to imply strong sense of reciprocity.
While direct evidence of the political implications of personal
connections is hard to come by, Chinese generally assume that
they form an important underlying structure to political activity.20
19 Bruner, et al., 324-32.

20 For example see Lien-sheng Yang, 'The Concept of Pao as a Basis for Social
Relations in China' in Chinese Thought and Institutions, ed.John K. Fairbank (Chicago:

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Hart (never reluctant to use personal connections in
with non-Chinese in the Customs) would surely hav
of this. Hart does not speak explicitly of the benefit
relationships with the Zongli Yamen, and nor is this obv
materials I have read. But the record of Hart's involvement with the
Zongli Yamen leadership in the 186os points to the development of a
strong and mutually beneficial relationship.
From the beginning, Hart brought more than good manners and an
amiable persona, he had tangible benefits to offer. There is little
evidence that before 1861 Qing central government officials had
much understanding of the revenue potential of the foreign Customs
Service. In the pre-Opium war era, Canton maritime customs revenues
that made it to Beijing disappeared into the coffers of the Imperial
Household Department, which through its appointed 'Hoppo' the
Customs Superintendent maintained a primary role in overseeing
foreign trade. Indeed, in 1858 Guiliang offered to eliminate all
customs duties if the British and French would withdraw their demand
to establish legations in Beijing.21
Hart not only made clear that these revenues were substantial,
but was able to place effective control over them into the hands
of Qing central administration. For other kinds of taxes (like land
and grain taxes) provincial officials fulfilled preset quotas and could
retain whatever surplus they could extract (as long as they were not
so excessive as to induce impeachment by another official or open
rebellion). In 1861 Hart informed Wenxiang that the Customs Service
would provide quarterly revenue returns to the Zongli Yamen.22
This was particularly valuable, for while the foreign Customs Service
assessed taxes, it did not actually collect them. Merchants received
an invoice and they paid taxes owed into a Chinese Customs Bank,
which then transferred the funds as ordered by the Qing government.
Given this separation of assessment and collection of the import and
export taxes, the quarterly reports provided the central authorities
with a picture of actual customs revenues; and local officials could be
compelled to transfer funds as needed. Thus the central government
University of Chicago Press, 1957), 291-309; and Ambrose Yeo-chi King, 'Kuan-hsi
and Network Building: a Sociological Interpretation,' Daedalus 120.2 (1991): 63-84.
21 See Preston Torbert, The Ch'ing Imperial Household Department: a Study of its
Organization andPrincipal Functions, 1662- z796 (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1977), ch. 4.; Banno, 27-8.
22 YWSM-XF, vol. 8, 2918-2924.

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authorities could assert control over a new and ba

revenue. Two years later, when H. N. Lay, the
open dispute with the Zongli Yamen about his
relationship with Qing authorities, his threat
collection of taxes and insist on a veto on how th
contributed to his firing.23
Two examples from the 186os illustrate the
facilitated the work of the Zongli Yamen, and its
the summer of 1862, during Hart's second visit t
received permission to establish an interpreter's s
to train interpreters and future diplomats. The f
came from an obscure part of the Customs re
collected from each ship entering treaty ports-
at Hart's suggestion. The Yamen received 30%
an amount which ranged over the next twenty
just under 45,000 treasury (kuping) taels in 186
93,000 in 1882-83. This dwarfed the regular pay
of Finance (which ranged between 7ooo and 8oo
excess of the needs of the new Interpreter's Scho
were used for a variety of pet Zongli Yamen p
the everyday needs of a new administrative offic
watchmen and providing money for tea and ot
It funded an archives bureau to organize and m
were regular contributions to pet projects: the Fi
ying referred to by foreigners as the Peking Fiel
division of Banner troops, equipped with Russian
and trained by British drillmasters, which wa
defense of the capital. When Wenxiang took sever
and other troops to suppress a rebellion in so
1866, major contributions for the campaign cam
reserves, which originated in the 30% tonnage du
A second example of Hart's contribution t
comes from his intervention in foreign loan n
in the 1850s, provincial authorities had borrowed
23 Horowitz, 'Mandarins and Customs Inspectors,' 44-7.

24 For a breakdown of income and expenditures, see C
zongli yamen ji qi jingfei' Zhongguo jindai jingji shi yan
For 1864-66 the reports in the Grand Council files of th
Archives in Beijing provide more detail, see junjichu luf
31, 9431-2 . On the Firearms Division in the Manchurian
3:48-54.

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merchants, pledged Customs returns as security.
system occasionally produced problems, but worked
for foreign merchants to continue to lend.25 Bu
Zongli Yamen received a letter from an outraged Ze
Governor-General of Jiangnan and Jiangxi. The Sh
Commissioner, George FitzRoy had refused to sign a
foreign loan negotiated by Zuo Zongtang to provide
financing for his campaign against Muslim rebels in
Apparently FitzRoy believed that signing these notes w
personally responsible for the loan repayment. Desc
action as 'inexcusably pigheaded' Zeng demanded th
order Hart to resolve the problem. The Yamen, in m
terms referred the issue to Hart, urging quick action.2
with a fascinating letter, which both accepted the Ya
turned Qing foreign loan policy in a new direction. If t
he wrote,
has urgent and important matters to deal with and no other resources with
which to meet the need, then negotiating loans among the people is truly
not something which could be said to be dishonorable. Indeed borrowing the
peoples' wealth to be able to firmly administer affairs also has benefits for the
people and indeed proceeds from the public interest. Furthermore, people
who lend money to the government will want to bless the country with eternal
glory. But if the loans are not repaid this is dishonorable.
Hart goes on to comment on interest rates, pointing out that local

governments had paid interest as high as 6% p.a. on foreign loans,
equivalent to the rate paid by Chinese merchants for emergency loans.
By contrast, he asserts, in Europe information on interest rates in
all countries is readily available, and if investors heard of a secured
short-term bond issue paying 6% interest 'they could not help quietly
smiling at each other.' Hart concludes by reassuring the Yamen that
he would write FitzRoy telling him that the loan was approved by the
throne and he must endorse it. Further, Hart states that he would
2" The number of these loans is open to debate, Zhongguo renmin yinhang, comp,
Zhongguo Qingdai waizhai shi ziliao (Beijing : Zhongguojin rong chu ban she, 1991), 137
lists eighteen, but the evidence is fragmentary (see the documentation pp. 1-23).
26 Zongli Yamen Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taipei
[hereafter ZY] 01-32/1 (1), Zeng-Guofan-Zongli Yamen, TZ6.6.5 (July 6, 1867).
Zongli Yamen-Hede (Robert Hart) TZ6.6.13 (July 14, 1867). On FitzRoy's concerns
see China, Mlaritime Customs, Documents Illustrative of the Origin, Development and
Activities of the Chinese Customs Service (Shanghai: Statistical Department of the Ins-
pectorate General of Customs, 1937-194o), vi, 228.

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inform all Customs Commissioners that they must not e
loan guarantees without having received orders to this ef
the Inspector General, who would do so on the orders of
Yamen.27 The Yamen in a letter urged Zeng Guofan tha
the Customs Commissioners should be employed to help
the loans, and Hart should be informed of the arrangeme
he could prevent a repeat of the situation.28 Hart used th
to implement a new policy: local loans could only be guar
foreign Customs Officials with Zongli Yamen approval. A
all Customs Officials on this matter was issued 9 Septem
There was a very important consequence: the Zongli Yam
have to be consulted on any future use of loans guaranteed b
revenues.
Hart's motivations were twofold. First, he was s

central authority. Put more cynically, he was str
of his Zongli Yamen patrons vis-a-vis the leadin
But Hart was also hoping that the Qing governm
foreign loans more extensively and systematically
and that the Customs would get to play a major r
loans on the London financial markets. The Zongl
new influence with alacrity, moving on two occa
they believed were negotiated at above market ra
and his agent Hu Guangyong. But while they c
these issues regularly, they were not willing to t
to him. Hart, while disappointed, didn't press the
In the 186os Hart was an extremely valuable
Yamen. He was, unlike his predecessor, H. N. L
ing of his subordinate position. Indeed, at a t
leaders were getting much of the attention from
strengthen the position of the Zongli Yamen. Wh
27 ZY 01-32/1 (1), Hede (Robert Hart)-Zongli Yamen T

28 ZY 01-32/1 (1), Zongli Yamen-Zeng Guofan, TZ 6.7.
29 A circular to all Customs commissioners on this matt
1867. See China, Imperial Maritime Customs: Inspector General
1867 (Shanghai, 1878), p. 122. Hart to FitzRoy 22January
Customs, Documents Illustrative ofthe Origin, Development andAc
Service (Shanghai: Statistical Department of the Inspect
1937-1940), vi, 228.
so On Hart's attitudes see also Stanley F. Wright, 363-5
Kong and Shanghai Bank in the Qing foreign loans see F
KongBank in Late Imperial China (Cambridge: Cambridge U
62. On the Zongli Yamen's intervention, Horowitz, 'Cent

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make good arguments about the importance of streng
authority, this also very neatly fitted Chinese patterns
and using networks of patronage. Wenxiang, Prince
other veterans of the peace commission who ran th
reciprocated.
III
The Zongli Yamen leaders took to Hart from the beginning-as

as 1861 Prince Gong was calling the young man 'our Hart.'31 W
the Lay-Osborn flotilla project metaphorically ran aground in
they fired Lay. But they not only failed to jettison Hart, who
played a crucial role in its initial stages of the project, they promo
him, and within a few years asked him to set up his headquar
in Beijing. Hart's consistent reinforcement of the interests o
Peace Commission group, and his willingness to accept neg
responses without appealing to British diplomats for help clea
made him a valued ally. For Hart, his service to the Yamen and
Peace Commission group brought reciprocal benefits: in particu
willingness to give him a free hand in running the Customs Servic
In 1864, newly anointed as the Inspector General, Robert Ha
began to establish formal regulations for the Customs Service defi
the distribution of power within the service, and its relation
to the Qing state. At the same time Hart began to build patte
of bureaucratic communication, and policies for recruiting
promoting personnel. These efforts enabled Hart to fundamen
reshape the Customs Service, and firmly establish his grasp ove
organization.
The Customs Regulations were submitted to the Zongli Yamen
August of 1864, and were approved with slight modifications
Regulations state clearly that the Inspector General serves at
pleasure of the Zongli Yamen, and while officials on the coast a
be kept informed, the Customs reports to the Yamen. These po
had already been worked out in practice and the ultimate authority
the Zongli Yamen was made clear by the termination of H. N. Lay
previous year. But more striking is the exclusive right of appointm
of Customs Commissioners in each port to the Inspector Gene
3' David F. Rennie, Peking and the Pekinese During the First Year of the British Emba
Peking (London:John Murray, 1864), vol. 1, 264.

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and the statement that the Inspector General is alone to
responsible:
The Inspector General is responsible for the appointment, raising and

lowering of salaries, transfer among the various ports, and the dismissal
of all foreigners serving in the tax administration. If one of the
commissioners of assistants should be inattentive to his responsibilities,
then the Superintendent of Customs [the Chinese official responsible for
Customs operations at each port] should inform the Zongli Yamen and the
Superintendent for Northern or Southern ports and at the same time write
to the Inspector General to investigate and deal with the matter.32
A later section states that if the Customs Commissioners 'are not up to

their official tasks and make a mistake, then the Inspector General is to
be held accountable.' These regulations offer no space for any regular
review or oversight by the Zongli Yamen or any other body (including,
it should be noted, foreign diplomats) of anyone other than Hart. What
makes this especially odd is the fact that the regulations also indicate
that commissioners in each of the ports were to deal regularly with
local officials, and that doing so effectively would be central to their
success. In other words, contrary to L. K. Little's assessment, Hart was
not the only Customs official 'recognized' by the Qing government.33
But the regulations established the I. G. as the absolute authority
over the service. This peculiarity of the Customs Service was very much
of Hart's devising. Qing administrative practices went to considerable
lengths to spread authority and insure oversight over individual
officials. The censorate was specifically enjoined to watch over the
activities of line officials, and responsibilities and disciplinary rules
were enshrined in statute. In each the major ministries in Beijing,
control was in the hands of a six-man executive committee. All senior
provincial officials were granted the right to submit memorials directly
to the Throne, in part to insure that questioning voices reached the
imperial ear. Hart's unchecked position cannot therefore be assigned
to regular Qing practice.34
32 Xi Yufu, et al., comps., Huangchao zhengdian leizuan (n.p., 1903), o10:1-4b. I have
not found an English translation of the regulations.
33 L. K. Little, 11. This follows Hart's view in Circular No. 8 discussed below-but
ignores subsequent experience.
34 On institutional controls see Thomas Metzger, Internal Organizations of the Ching
Bureaucracy: Legal, Normative, and Communications Aspects (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1973), on the communications system, Silas Hsiu-liang Wu 'The
Memorial Systems of The Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911).' Harvard Journal of Asiatic
Studies, 27. (1967): 7-75.

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It is tempting to suggest that Hart was an analog
chieftains (tusi) and begs who were appointed to positio
in frontier areas, where they governed over and served
between Qing line officials and minority peoples o
This fits John Fairbank's model of the treaty syste
of 'synarchy,' joint Sino-Foreign rule in China, in w
governed foreigners. But research on the Qing governm
points to systematic efforts to control local chiefta
them under official oversight and at times trying t
by requiring sons of chieftains to attend Confucian sch
unlike local chieftains who operated in a limited are
group of people, the Customs spread its influence from
treaty ports.35
Another possible model was the private staff (m
In Qing China provincial governors had mainta
staff of secretaries, legal specialists and other advi
their extensive administrative responsibilities. Dur
rebellion, as prominent civil officials took on key milit
vastly expanded the use of private staffs to provide
work and the logistics of military operations. Men wer
through personal associations and recommendations,
at the pleasure of the official. Government staff work
accepted profession for educated young men, and staff
from place to place. Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang
private staffs recruiting talented intellectuals and
included a few foreigners. These private staffs had
in the Qing state, and the official who hired and m
was ultimately responsible for their activities.36 The C
at first glance seems similar, only it served the Zong
than a provincial leader. The I. G.'s frequent claims t
state on an advisory basis also seems to support th
3' I'm grateful to Peter Perdue for pressing me on the comparison

ago.John K. Fairbank, 'Synarchy Under the Treaties' in Chinese Thou
ed. John K. Fairbank (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19
'Empire in the Southwest: Early Qing Reforms to the Native C
Journal ofAsian Studies, 56.1 (1997): 47-74: James Millward, Beyon
Ethnicity and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864 (Stanford:
Press, 1998), 33.
36 On the mufu system see Kenneth Folsom, Friends, Guests
Mu-fu System in Late Ching China (Berkeley: University of Cal
andJonathan Porter, Tseng Kuo-fan's Private Bureaucracy(Berkeley
Studies, 1972).

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comparison does not stand up to close examination. The Custom
national (indeed international) in its geographical scope of act
and it had had legal recognition and public legitimacy that p
staffs did not. In the long term it survived personnel shifts
Zongli Yamen and became a recognized institution of govern
Where a staff organization disappeared with the official who
it, the Customs remained in place, long outlasting the Qing E
it was created to serve. In short, the Customs was an innovatio
had no parallels in late imperial Chinese administrative practic
Hart's assertion of his own authority within the foreign Cu
Service, was tempered by a sensitivity about the concerns of his
bosses. He made clear in the regulations that participation in
was an unacceptable conflict of interest for Customs officia
asserted that Customs officials were Qing employees and mus
their Chinese counterparts with respect-and that junior off
interested in rising positions of authority should study spok
written Chinese. Hart pointed out that while Customs officials
need to deal with foreign diplomatic officials; in so doing they
not compromise their role in serving the Chinese government. A
introducing new methods from the West, the regulations stat
if Customs officers are 'on cordial terms with local officials discuss
and experiment with [these methods] it is the proper expression of
their common humanity, but still on examination these are ancillary
activities' and must take a back seat to properly administering the
business of the Customs Administration.38 The regulations were a
Chinese language counterpart to the famous Circular Number Eight
he had issued in late June of 1864 which expressed similar ideas in
vivid Victorian English, including the famous declaration:
Whatever other foreigners in this country deem themselves entitled to do

from their position, or fancied superiority to the Chinese, or in the way
of showing their superior enlightenment by riding rough-shod over the
prejudices, and by evincing a general contempt for customs differing from
their own, it is to be expected from those who take the pay, and who are
the servants of the Chinese government, that they, at least, will so act as
37 The relationship between individual Customs officers and the private staffs
of provincial officials deserves more attention. Gustav Detring was very close to
Li Hongzhang, and at Li's request, remained commissioner at Tianjin for two decades
and was sometimes viewed as a member of Li's mufu.
38 Huangchao zhengdian leizuan, 10 1o: i b-2.

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to neither offend the susceptibilities, nor excite jealousie
dislike.39
Hart was no cultural relativist-he went on to remind his subordinates

that they were representatives 'of a civilisation of a progressive
kind'-but he was far more sympathetic to Chinese culture and the
concerns of Qing officials than other foreigners in China at the time.
He also realized that gaining the confidence of the Chinese was
very much in the interests of the Customs Service as he conceived
it.
The regulations and the standards for behavior of Customs officials

were directly connected to personnel and recruitment policies Hart
introduced very early in his reign as Inspector General. Hart quickly
initiated a policy of recruiting young men by examination, usually
held at the London office run by James Duncan Campbell. Early on,
Hart also leaned on his friendship with American minister Anson
Burlingame, asking for nominations of young men from Harvard, Yale
and Burlingame's own Union College. Hart's justification was that
men of the caliber he wanted were not available on the China coast, and
the need to get a more international service also required a broader
search for talent. Hart very deliberately hired younger men, who he
believed would be better able to learn Chinese and would have the
emotional and personal flexibility to deal with China.40 The benef
of this policy have long been discussed: the Customs built a core
men who learned Chinese, and who built professional careers in t
Customs, and had an intense loyalty to the organization. In man
respects this built a service modeled on Hart himself.
These policies also strengthened Hart's authority. The new offic
would naturally see Hart as their senior, and were unlikely to be read
to supersede Hart for some time. Hart in the meantime cleared o
the only logical competitor within the service. George FitzRoy, w
had arrived in China with Lord Elgin's military expedition, in t
39 Robert Hart 'Circular No. 8 of 1864,' in China, Imperial Maritime Customs, IV, Ser
Series No. 7: Inspector General's Circulars: First Series, 1861-1 875 (Shanghai: Inspector
General of Customs 1879), 4. Another important expression of essentially the s
ideas were the Provisional Instructions for the Guidance of the In-Door Staff (Shangh
1878). The copy at UCLA's Young Research Library was originally in the possess
of Customs Commissioner Alfred Hippisley, and marginal notations indicate it
taken very seriously.
40 Burlingame to Seward, 5July 1864 in Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs Accompanyin
the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session Thirty-Eight Congress, Par
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1865), 436-7; Little, 12-13.

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early i86os shared with Hart co-proprietorship of the Custom
H. N. Lay was on leave in Britain. But FitzRoy apparently
speak Chinese and allowed Hart to manage relations with th
Yamen and the opening of Customs Houses in new treaty ports.
Hart became I. G., FitzRoy remained the Customs Comm
in Shanghai, the most important of the ports. In 1867-
and FitzRoy got into a dispute over foreign loans. FitzRoy's
to sign loan certificates, mentioned above, arose from his
about the nature of the commitment that this signature repres
FitzRoy initially gave in and signed the certificates. But the
continued, and when FitzRoy declared that he would not sig
loan certificates, Hart apparently dismissed him.41 By the la
when the first Service Lists were published, the Customs ha
handful of officers who had been appointed before Hart's pr
to I. G.-and no one who could see himself as Hart's peer.42
In a few key years in the mid-186os Hart created the blu
for his Customs Service. Given a free rein by his supervis
were confident in their relationship with him-he took adv
to establish total authority over the service, and move aside po
challengers to him. The I. G. remained mindful of Qing sensitiv
ethnocentric arrogance and foreign bullying, and he used his in
on Qing policy circumspectly-perhaps learning from the l
ecstatic response to the Bystanders View, he operated mor
thereafter. Hart was aware of the fact that in the 186os a
his position was dependent on his continued good relations w
Zongli Yamen, and Qing officials generally. But for better
worse, Hart had gained an extraordinary amount of auton
used this freedom to reshape the Customs and force its off
differentiate themselves from other treaty port foreigners. Har
standards and expectations undoubtedly had a tremendous im
the Service. But in the longer term problems emerged: as one o
admirers, H. B. Morse would write: 'While Sir R. Hart's position
41 The precise circumstances of FitzRoy's departure are somewhat unc

coincide with the dispute with Hart over the loans. While Hart dismissed
concerns about legal liability, they deserve a closer look. The commission
not recipients of actual revenues, so they were simply not in a position
loan payments. Moreover, Hans van de Ven has pointed out the odd leg
of Customs Commissioners -Customs House property was in their name. Do
Illustrative of the Origin, Development andActivities of the Chinese Customs Service
42 For example, see China. Maritime Customs, Service List (Shanghai: S
Department of the Inspectorate General, 1884).

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the Chinese government was one of great influence, bu
over the Customs Service his power was unsupervised
unchecked.' While Morse believed Hart had kept himself
imposed restraint' in the earlier years, later on he was m
leaning more and more on relatives and personal re
appointments. 'Toward the end of his dissatisfaction
was very great ... no criticism served to modify the
rule.'43
IV
While the I. G. and the Maritime Customs Service were ultimately

responsible to the Zongli Yamen in Beijing and dependent on its
patronage, maintaining good relationships with provincial and local
officials was also important. The Customs establishments in each
Treaty Port needed to work with Chinese officials in carrying out its
responsibilities. Moreover, if the Customs was to have the 'progressive'
role in bringing change to China that Hart imagined for it, officials
outside of the capital had to be comfortable in dealing with Customs
Commissioners, and be willing to refer to them rather than the foreign
specialists on their own staffs. Establishing these relations required
negotiation with local officials as Hart set up Customs Houses in new
treaty ports. Thereafter, it required careful attention on the part of
Commissioners to ensure that the foreign Customs asserted authority
while maintaining a cordial relationship with Qing officials.
While Hart and some of his senior subordinates had quite frequent
contact with provincial Governors-General, the most powerful
provincial officials in the late nineteenth century, the nub of the
conflicts were at a lower level. The foreign Customs Commissioner
in each treaty port (the Chinese title was haiguan shuiwu si) appointed
by Hart had a Chinese counterpart, the Superintendent of Customs
(haiguan jiandu), usually a position held concurrently by a Circuit
Intendant (daotai). The Superintendent was also responsible for
overseeing the collection of the 'native' customs collected from the
still voluminous junk traffic in which Hart's Service at this point
had no connection. The relationship between the Superintendent
and the Commissioner was ambiguous-neither had any authority
'" Morse, International Relations, 3: 404.

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over the other. In practice the Commissioner ran the C
House and managed the assessment (but not collection)
on foreign trade. But the Superintendent had to put his
many regular documents, such as 'drawback' certificates, a
certificate of credit for Customs Duties paid on goods whi
subsequently re-exported. Hart in his June 1864 Circul
asserted that the Customs Commissioner was both an executive over
the Customs establishment, but at the same time an advisor to the
Superintendent: 'it is the Superintendent of Customs at each port
who is, in point of fact, officially sensible for the proper discharg
of the duties of that port. The position of the Commissioner i
accordingly of necessity subordinate to that of the Superintendent
At the same time, Hart asserted that the Commissioner was the
Inspector General's delegate, ultimately responsible to Hart and the
I. G.'s superiors. He gave no indication that the Commissioner was t
take the orders of the Superintendent. During the early years of th
Customs system, this dual arrangement was fraught with difficulties4
Conflicts at the backwater treaty port Jiujiang (Kiukiang) during
the 186os provide some insight into these problems, and Hart'
effort to carve out a more secure position for the Maritime Custom
Service.
In late July of 1864, Hart received a letter from Li Hongzhang

declaring that he had ordered the Customs superintendent to dismiss
J.L. Hammond, an American then in charge atJiujiang. Hart wrote in
his journal that Li insisted that while the I. G. could move personnel
from port to port, the Superintendent retained the authority to
dismiss foreign personnel. Hart's response to this threatened incursion
on his authority was immediate 'This is a fix, certainly: if this
principle be allowed, the Customs' Service must fall through as a
service.' Hart mused on the tendency of the Qing system to shift
responsibility to local authority, and wrote that he should try to get
the Superintendents 'disassociated from local offices, & appointed
direct by the Tsungli Yamen [Zongli Yamen].'45 The Zongli Yamen,
while evidently not willing to press for a change of status of the
Superintendent, was supportive of Hart's key point-that only he could
dismiss a foreign commissioner or employee, and in doing so he was
responsible to the Yamen. Li's efforts were at least one motivation for
4 Hart, 'Circular No. 8,' 5. See Stanley Wright, 262-7. For a retrospective account
see Little, 15-17.
5 Smith, Fairbank, Bruner, 161-2, 164, 166.

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Hart to finish the Chinese regulations for

regulations-quoted above-while by no me
roles of the Commissioners and Superinte
defacto equality. The Commissioners wer
through him the Zongli Yamen, and if
problems, they were to contact those author
regulations, approved with slight modific
secured Hart's authority over the service.46
But the realities of the relationships be
sioners and their Qing counterparts in th
to resolve. A remarkable pair of dispatch
Drew in 1868 gives unusual insight into t
been recruited to the Customs upon his gr
1864, learned Chinese in Beijing, and judg
of their correspondence and the rapid
ranks, quickly became a favorite of the I
Hart appointed Drew to the position of C
at Jiujiang. While Jiujiang was a smaller p
seem a natural place to send a new commis
deeply troubled, and Hart's choice of Drew
in such a young and inexperienced officer
two dispatches. The first, a formal appoin
suggestion of difficulties, and gave a set o
no doubt standard in every such letter: th
responsible for the efficient running of
maintain 'strict discipline' among his sub
report all matters of importance to Hart,
to me once a fortnight, and keeping me
doings and occurrences, supplement your
the fullest extent.' Hart also asserted that Drew should 'bear in
mind the instructions contained in Circular No 8 of 1864.
will endeavour to cultivate and maintain the most friendly rel
with your Chinese colleague, the superintendent, and indeed w
Chinese officials whose acquaintance your position may enable y
form.' The Commissioner must also get along with foreign consuls
cultivate good relation with the 'mercantile community, both
and foreign' for 'you cannot aid the interests of the revenue better
46 Ibid., 162-7, 184. Huangchao zhengdian leizuan, 10o1:1-2.

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by furthering the interests of commerce.'47 This w

of the commissioner: the honest and fair officia
both Qing and foreign officials, promoting comme
But a second dispatch sent the same day indicated
was far messier.48 The previous commissioner,
had gotten into a public dispute with the Chines
Customs, and had left his post to and gone to
was evidently no longer able to manage the situa
work with the Superintendent. The origins of the
own work. When he had created the Jiujiang Cu
the local Customs Superintendent had sought to
three subordinate deputies (weiyuan) in the Cust
agreed, and each was given a specific responsib
the indoor office and dealt with forms that were
Superintendent who was preoccupied with his m
Intendant, an important territorial official, and
on a day-to-day basis. The second was to accomp
and attend the examination of ships as an observ
be general factotum on the water, and available
to be done outside of normal business hours. Hart claims that he was
initially 'much pleased with the division of work, and thought that in
a short time [Jiujiang] would become a model office,' and that on the
whole such an arrangement with the Superintendent, when properly
managed, worked to the benefit of the Customs.49
But things had not worked out so well. According to Hart's account,
during the subsequent years, a series of foreign Commissioners who
could not speak Chinese had served in the port, and the three Chinese
deputies had used this situation and 'day after day took more and more
upon themselves the direction of affairs, and succeeded in making
themselves looked up to by the Chinese paid thro' the commissioner
as their real chiefs, and regarded by the [Circuit Intendant] as
so well acquainted with business that he might refer all things to
them, and trouble himself about nothing.' The Chinese, it seems,
had effectively usurped much of the Commissioner's proper role in
47 Robert Hart to E. B. Drew, 5 August 1868, No. 18 Kiukiang Series, in the E.

B. Drew collection, Department of Rare Books and Manuscripts, Harvard-Yenching
Library.
48 The account of the Jiujiang affair in the following paragraphs is based on Hart
to Drew, 5 August 1868, No. 19 Kiukiang Series, in the E. B. Drew Collection
Department of Rare Books and Manuscripts, Harvard-Yenching Library.
49 Ibid.

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running the Customs House and in carryi

Superintendent to the point that one trus
Hannen, had reported to Hart that 'The po
Jiujiang seemed to have become simply a kin
the Superintendent.' Commissioner Kleinw
1868 and 'found the office disorderly, dis
and power of the weiyuen [deputies] incon
of his own duties.'50
The new Commissioner, by Hart's accoun
affair. Ignoring the I. G.'s instructions to bi
immediately attempted to bypass the depu
the Superintendent. This caused serious co
tried to prevent the Superintendent fro
to fill in for him on everyday matters.
Superintendent himself came one day th
forms, an activity clearly beneath the dig
official. To make the situation worse, Kleinw
some forms were missing, had been so disre
the Superintendent's desk. By the end of
contraband forms in the Superintendent's
position was now impossible, Kleinwdichter
to one of his foreign assistants and depart
the situation. While Hart insisted that Kleinwdichter's actions were
technically correct, his judgment was poor. Hart informed Drew that
he must bide his time: 'let your reforms be of the silent and progressive
kind, rather than striking and complete at the outset.' The deputies
must be quietly edged out over a period of time, and Drew must
assiduously cultivate good relations with Chinese officials and local
Chinese elites. 'The Chinese mind has a great respect for reason and
a great dislike for violence,' 'Hart declared,' 'and in its preference
of right to might you must find the cue for the action you ought to
take.' Whatever action Drew took evidently satisfied Hart, for his star
continued to rise.51
The Jiujiang affair points to some contradictions in Hart's public
image as the great administrator, working seamlessly for the benefit of
his Chinese supervisors. Clearly, Hart was willing to make a deal with
a Customs Superintendent in 1863 to facilitate the creation of a new
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid. For praise of Drew's performance in Jiujiang see Hart-Campbell, 26
February, 1869, in Fairbank, Bruner and Matheson, 47.

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Customs House-a deal which seems hard to squa

notion of efficient administrative practice, for th
were predictable. When the arrangements he m
undermine the position of the foreign Customs
not to use his authority bluntly, and risk confl
side by backing Kleinwdichter and trying to sim
offending deputies. Nor did he admit that his
been a key cause of subsequent events. He defe
Drew: 'Employed by the Chinese Government a
Chinese officials for the performance of Chine
some extent respect the prejudices and to some
the ways of our fellow workers.'52 Beneath the
this remark was the reality that Hart and the Cus
in a subtle power struggle. The regulations wer
about the relative roles of the foreign Customs Co
Chinese Superintendent. Hart's expressions of se
government and the importance of understandin
not meant to imply a capitulation of real autho
only claim such authority with the backing of the
depending too often on their support was risky. Th
compromising on administrative principle in or
friendly relations and real autonomy.
There is another important implication of th
that Hart's insistence on the importance of foreign
learning Chinese was not just an expression of r
counterparts, it was also intimately related to
retaining authority for the foreign Customs Servi
for influencing China's adaptation to the moder
that the cause of the problems at Jiujiang arose fr
Commissioners who did not speak Chinese, and wh
the mercy of Chinese subordinates. A foreign Com
not assert authority over Chinese staff could no
the Customs House. Both Hart's insistence on m
of Custom's business and Hart's ambitions to se
change required a more cordial relationship betw
its Chinese overseers. When he advised Drew and other subordinates
to move beyond the foreign community and get to know Qing officials,
Chinese Customs assistants, and local Chinese merchants and gentry,
52 Hart to Drew, 5 August, 1868, No. 19.

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he was concerned about keeping the foreign

of Customs business, and establishing Chin
officials as advisors on fiscal and other matters.
The realities of the semi-colonial system meant that Hart could not
depend on Qing patronage alone to establish and retain a position
of influence. In the 186os Britain remained unchallenged as the
preeminent western power in Asia, and British concurrence was
essential to making the treaty system work. However well he might
work with his Chinese bosses, Hart knew that the British had to accept
the way that he ran the Customs Service, or pressure for his ouster and
demands to renegotiate the treaties would quickly follow. Maintaining
good relations with British diplomats was as important to the I. G. as
his dealings with Qing authorities. Hart was well equipped for this.
Having begun his career as a British consul, Hart knew British policy
and practices, and did not hesitate to express his loyalty as a British
subject. But Hart was also fortunate that his ascent to the leadership
of the Customs occurred when it did. Both Sir Frederick Bruce
(who served from 186o to 1864), and his successor, Sir Ruthe
Alcock (1864-1869) approached diplomacy in China with un
moderation among nineteenth-century British diplomats. The
saw increasingly aggressive diplomacy aimed at opening China
foreigners, concluding with consul Harry Parkes manufacturin
Arrow incident and John Bowring turning it into a reason for
Following Alcock's departure in 1869, the brilliant Sinologue Th
Wade bombarded the Zongli Yamen with incessant protests
minor issues, and twisted the Margary Affair, a sad incident in w
a British official traveling overland to Burma had been murdered,
reason for extorting further concessions. It is hard to imagine
with either regime, Hart would have been allowed the free han
got from Bruce and Alcock. Hart took advantage of the situa
creating an organization that was relentlessly making the
to both Ministers that the Customs served British and Chinese
interests; meanwhile he discreetly avoided taking public positio
British policy.53
* Thirty years later in the aftermath of the Boxer War, Hart did play a
trying to shape British opinion and to moderate the vengeful attitude of poli

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By the end of the Arrow War British diplomats in

in particular had decided that strengthening the h
government in Beijing was very much in the Britis
as that government was receptive to dealing with for
treaties and initiating reforms. In part this arose from
with dealing with provincial and local officials on the
dismay at the ideology of the rebel cause, and in part
that a breakdown of central authority would make for
and interfere with expanding markets for British
186os the British were impressed with Prince Gon
and dismayed by their opponents in the late Xianf
So Hart's ability to work with the Zongli Yamen was
his efforts to link the Customs in with the Zongli Ya
with British policy. Hart's emphasis on the Custo
service also met with approval by diplomats who saw
future Qing reforms. When H.N. Lay arrived struttin
and making excessive demands in the summer of
unwilling to back him up. The Zongli Yamen used A
Anson Burlingame, a friend of Hart, to serve as a mid
British in disposing of Lay and promoting Hart.54
Upon his appointment as Inspector General, H
aggressive approach that had brought down Lay.
of the role of Customs was a close fit for the coope
Bruce had inaugurated. Indeed, in 1864, when Bru
to leave China, he asked Hart to write a memorand
articulate why the Customs Service worked in the int
for Bruce to submit to London. The memorandum
1865 as a Parliamentary Blue Book, aimed at convi
and more importantly Members of Parliament of
service to Britain. Hart noted in his journal that
careful instructions on what to write, telling him
the Customs 'was a necessary supplement' to the tr
186o, for the Qing would otherwise been unable t
elements of them. Hart's views were clearly in acc
suggestions.55
and the press. His essays were later collected in the volume Thesef
(London: Chapman, 1903).
54 Horowitz, 'Mandarins and Customs Inspectors.,' 44-7.
" Smith, Fairbank, and Bruner, 142.

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Hart's memorandum was a lucid and spirited defense o
Service. Hart asserted that the Customs constituted
on its Chinese antecedents, and vigorously defen
against accusations of unfairness and corruption-su
merchants, used to paying off Chinese tax officials,
kindly to the Inspectorate's higher standards. He d
the Customs was short of qualified personnel, but
his new personnel policies would quickly resolve su
Most remarkable was Hart's concluding section 'Con
of the advantages that accrue to the public from th
Here, Hart defined the 'public' broadly, to include
not only British, but also the Chinese government
country nationals. The Customs Service, he insisted, o
to all of them. It provided to the Qing state 'funds f
unappreciated source, and that too, to an extent ne
before.' Consequently Chinese officials had quickly c
the Customs Service.57 Furthermore, he believed th
Service also presented to Qing officials a model of efficie
administration, and inspiration for reforms along west
the same time the I.G. insisted that by its transparent
assessment of import and export duties, the Customs 's
for, and ensures protection to, the honest merchant
merchants might not care for taxation, he implied
functioned in perfect harmony with British goals of fre
along the lines Bruce suggested, Hart argued that the C
enabled the Qing government to fulfill its obligatio
treaties signed in 1858 and 1860.59
The central argument of the memorandum to B
Customs Service was an institution that served the common interests
of Britain and China-would become an enduring theme for Hart. It
served several needs: politically it aligned the Customs with British
diplomacy in China; it was sufficiently appealing to a British audience
to help to insure the persistence of the Customs as Hart had envisioned
it, and psychologically it assuaged any problems of split loyalties.
56 Robert Hart, 'The Foreign Customs Establishment in China,' Great Britain,

House of Commons, Sessional Papers 1865. China No. 1.
57 Ibid., 1 1.
58 Ibid., 12.
59 Ibid., i1.

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Hart's deft approach with British diplomats would

Alcock. This was particularly apparent a few years
1869, when Hart played an important role in the disc
revision, which would produce the agreement kno
Convention.60 Hart served (as a Qing representativ
of officials including representatives of the British L
Zongli Yamen which handled the initial discussions
treaty language. But he also maintained a volumino
with Rutherford Alcock on the issues at hand (both we
presumably writing did not provoke suspicion that
Meanwhile he had frequent discussions with Wenxi
treaty revision. The documents suggest that Hart w
roles in a complicated game: he was officially ser
representative on the Joint Commission undertak
he was privately advising Alcock on both the subst
under discussion and the attitudes of the Zongli Y
also playing the role of an informal intermediary bet
Wenxiang.
If Hart saw a conflict of interest, he did not let on. Rather, he sought
to promote a compromise that would maintain the post-Arrow War
entente which had been essential to the growth of the Customs. In a
letter to Alcock on 29 May 1868, Hart wrote: 'British interests differ
from other interests, for, that they may flourish, they require that
Chinese interests shall flourish too.'61 On 13 June, he reported that
Wenxiang 'is entirely for a policy of conciliation, mutual goodwill and
mutual benefit, and is indisposed to do anything that would keep open
old sores or develop new ones.'62 Seeing an opening, Hart vigorously
pursued a compromise. In mid-June, Hart was relaying the content of
several long letters from Alcock to the Zongli Yamen, and describing
Wenxiang's private comments in detail to the British Minister.63
60 For a careful account of these negotiations, see Mary Clabaugh Wright, Last
Stand of Chinese Conservatism, 279-95.
61 British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office
Confidential Prints Part I, Series E., volume 20 China's Rehabilitation and Treaty Revision,
1866-1869 (Silver Spring: University Publications, 1994), 275.
62 British Documents, 276. See also the entry for 12 June 1868 in the unpublished
manuscript Journal of Robert Hart, Department of Special Collections, Queen's
University Library, Belfast.
63 British Documents, 285. Entries in Hart's unpublished Journal for the months
of June and July indicates frequent meetings with the Yamen, and assessments of
Wenxiang's positions that coincide with the opinions expressed in the letters sent to

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Hart's approach was by no means one sided. While he
the Zongli Yamen that the British were not going to back
existing concessions, he also pressed Alcock to understand
realities that the Zongli Yamen faced and avoid push
too far. For example, on one of the issues Alcock felt
about was the unfairness of likin (lijin) a transit tax on i
introduced during the Taiping Rebellion which he argued
the 1858 Tianjin agreement. But Hart presented a spi
from the Qing point of view, or more precisely Wenx
view:
The Yamen wishes it to be remembered that China ha

great troubles during the last quarter of a century; thre
extraordinary internal convulsion have disturbed the re
to such and extent that special taxes have had to be r
to the proposal, and cease to collect taxes at the Trea
suicidal act on the part of the Government.64
Hart strongly urged Alcock to back off, and he d

even so moderate a character as Wenxiang might pr
death by financial starvation.65 Later on other i
desire to loosen restrictions on foreign residence ri
Treaty powers, Hart would support Wenxiang's posi
the Alcock Convention was so moderate in its demands on China that it
drew stiff opposition from British merchants who lobbied Parliament.
The convention was never ratified.67
Hart's involvement in these negotiations was rooted in the belief
that Britain and China had common interests, and the Customs
Service supported them. Hart made sure to reassure Alcock (and
anyone else who saw their correspondence) that he had not 'gone
native.' In one of the last letters on the negotiations, Hart wrote
to Alcock 'Your Excellency knows well that there is no one [who]
chafes more at the slowness of movement in China, no one who is
more anxious to see them go a-head, and no one who is more alive to
the shortcomings, stupidities and behind-the-agedness of the Chinese
Alcock a day or two later.Journal of Robert Hart, entries for 12June, 29June, i July,
4July, 13July, 15July, l7July 1868.
64 British Documents, 287-88.
65 British Documents, 288.
66 British Documents, 30o-3. Wenxiang argued that foreign residence could only be
allowed outside the Treaty Ports if they were subject to Chinese law.
67 Mary Clabaugh Wright, 290o-5.

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than myself, and I can therefore write freely wha

matters without fear of being thought ultra-Ch
urged Alcock to resist pressure from the merch
press on the China coast to insist on more from th
demands of foreign newspapers in China, he argue
a threat to stability than an aid to good policy: 'Fa
foreign press in] China to howl that you have done
you to march in its van over beaten bodies of men
Wen Hsiang, for the true interests and defend the
country.'68 Hart was sufficiently sure ofAlcock's i
his views, and to make the case for resisting tre
the short run, to gain benefits down the line.
Hart was in a delicate situation. He sought
interests, but needed to do so without sacrificing
his superiors at the Zongli Yamen. He wanted t
that British interests were not served by unprovo
also needed to make it clear that he had not become too Chinese.
Hart needed the British to support his efforts to create a Custo
Service that was part of the Chinese government, international
predominantly British) in its personnel, and largely autonomou
the 186os his personal diplomacy with Bruce and Alcock wor
perfectly to achieve these goals. By the time more aggressive Br
diplomats took over the Legation in Beijing, Hart was firmly in con
of the Customs, and had created an institution which had been
accepted by all parties. As long as he remained in command, had
support of his Qing supervisors, and the respect of British diploma
the institution he created in the 186os would endure with relati
little interference.
VI
When Hart's 'Bystanders View', along with Wade's even more blunt
treatise was circulated among senior Qing officials in 1866, the
response, even from those most ardent advocates of self-strengthening
reforms, was overwhelmingly negative. Guanwen, a veteran Manchu
official then serving as the Governor General of Hunan and Hubei
noted that the main beneficiaries of these proposals would be
68 British Documents, 303-4.

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non-merchant foreigners like Hart: '[They say] we m
methods. If we must use these methods, we must use th
use these men, we must reward them generously'.69 It w
to assert that material self-interest was Hart's prima
but Guanwen had a point. Hart's activities in th
to maximize his influence and provide a comfort
materially and institutionally-for himself and those wh
in the Customs Service.
Robert Hart was a master at playing politics, both international, and

Chinese, without appearing to have his own ambitions or to represent
a particular interest. In a world in which nation-states were the playe
in global politics, and national identity served to mark each individual
as a natural supporter of the interests of a particular nation state
the I.G. battled for a condominium arrangement in China defined b
treaties. In this arrangement Britain got free trade and hegemony
China maintained sovereign independence in order to pursue i
own modern transformation, and many others including America
merchants, French missionaries, German scholars and administrators,
and even Russian imperial expansionists had enough of a stake to
tolerate and even support the system. But the individual who had the
most personal stake in it was Robert Hart. As talented as he was, h
rose from obscurity through the Customs service. If he needed an
reminder of this he could look at his predecessor H. N. Lay, whos
dismissal in China was followed by a breakneck fall back to obscurity,
and eventually humiliating poverty. Hart worked not only to defen
the foreign Customs, but also his particular vision of the Custom
service, and one that he was particularly suited to lead.
Hart built the Customs with the care and competence that Stanle
Wright so admired, but ran it in a most unusual way. Using carefully
cultivated personal relationships with both the Zongli Yamen and
the British Ministers in the 186os, he structured the institution t
maximize his own power over it, while calmly accepting the Yamen
supervision. He also struggled to insure that Customs Commissione
would be sympathetic to but not be subordinates of Chinese officia
in the Treaty Ports, and would have both authority and respect. H
recruited and trained new officers who could play this intermediar
role much as he did. But in the long term internal problems wer
inevitable. By the 189os Hart's subordinates, trained in his image
69 YWSM-TZ 41:41-41b.

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retained both a profound loyalty to the service and increas
mixed feelings about Hart's management of it. As they were shu
from post to post with little hope of career advancement b
the level of Commissioner, they watched with frustration
promoted favorites, some of them relatives, others relatives of f
to positions of prominence. At the same time, dissatisfaction
Chinese political elites with the colonial implications of the C
was on the rise. But Hart handled the politics around the f
Customs Service with such consummate skill that they could do
but wait for him to retire.70
In suggesting that Hart's construction of the Customs Service
186os involved the careful manipulation of political relationsh
that aspects of this process were self-serving, I do not wish to de
the I.G. He remains in many ways a very attractive figure-one o
few foreigners who foresaw that later generations would ver
not look kindly on the European imperial project. But the c
Hart, to borrow Hans van de Ven's phrase, created in the lat
of his career, perpetuated by his proteges, successors and som
serious modern scholars, has obscured much about Hart's motiva
Hart did not, as L. K. Little would argue, do everything with
benefit in mind, nor, as Chinese Marxist scholars insist, was he
a tool of British mercantile imperialism.7' Hart was human
with ambitions, desires, prejudices, insecurities and weaknes
saw the world and assessed both China's and Britain's needs t
those particular lenses.
70 Morse, 3: 404-5.
71 Little, 3; Hu Sheng, Imperialism and Chinese Politics (Beijing: Foreign La
Press, 1981), 62-9.

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Politics Power and The Chinese Maritime Customs

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Politics, Power and the Chinese Maritime Customs: The Qing Restoration and the Ascent

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