CONSCIOUSNESS

AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY

C.O. Evans

John Fudjack

© 1976

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction Paradigms of Consciousness page 1

Part I Presentation of the Attentive Model of Consciousness page 5

Part II An Application of the Model page 41

Part IIIEast and West page 67

Addendum

A The Concept of Generalized Reality Orientation page 91

B The Preconscious and Unconscious in Freud page 93

C Biofeedback Research page 99

D Subliminal Perception Research page 112

E William James' Theory of Consciousness page 134

F The Unconscious and the Concept of the Complex page 145

G Jung and the Archetype page 168

H The Concept of Vasana in Yoga page 179

I Final Discussion page 182

Notes Notes and References page 190

Index Author and Subject Index page 206

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CONSCIOUSNESS

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Introduction[table of contents] [previous] [next]

We wish to put before the reader a model of consciousness which we consider a very important
alternative to some of the models gaining prominence. These latter models have a common form
which we shall characterize by calling them "spotlight" models of consciousness.

The reader cannot pass from such models of consciousness to the alternative which we lay out in
this work without making a paradigm switch in respect of his or her thinking about
consciousness and consciousness-related matters. What we are proposing, then, is a new
paradigm. At the same time it is a very old paradigm, but one that was discarded by behaviorist
psychology and phenomenological philosophy. The current spotlight models are a forced
marriage of the thinking of these two disciplines.

We shall try to demonstrate that the alternative model, which we are naming an attentive model
for reasons which become apparent in the Addendum, has a greater integrative power than do
versions of the spotlight model.

To give the reader some idea of what we mean by integrative power we should bear in mind the
knowledge explosion that is now taking place and the resulting fragmentation of knowledge into
seemingly mutually unrelated parts. This state of affairs has prompted a search for forms of
knowledge synthesis and we see ourselves as continuing the task of
-page 2-

which the following passage heralds the beginning...

In order to be able to construct truly interdisciplinary models of systems, then, it will be

necessary to relate conceptually the variables dealt with in each of the disciplines which should
be involved in systems research. This is a formidable task, but a beginning has been made. 1

Obviously the systems for which the concept of consciousness would be relevant would be living
systems. A successful model of consciousness would be one which would enable us to relate
variables employed in disciplines the subject matter of which is living systems. And the
integrative power of a model of consciousness will ultimately be measured by its success in
synthesizing such currently discipline-specific knowledge.

We believe that the attentive model promises an integration of disciplinary knowledge by

providing a new paradigm perspective on a number of disciplines. We have attempted, in this
study, to introduce the model accordingly. We shall frequently quote passages written by authors
in the old spotlight paradigm and suggest that they be read in the terms of the new paradigm.
Sometimes this is done by suggesting subtle terminological transformations of key terms in the
author's text. By this means an original new comprehension of the meaning of that text and its
significance in a wider textual whole is enjoyed.

However, in doing this we do make demands upon the reader. We ask of the reader that she or he
exercise an ability to read a text written from within the perspective of one paradigm (the old
paradigm) in the light of the perspective of a different paradigm (the new paradigm). It is
impossible for a reader to understand a new paradigm without

-page 3-

changing his or her pattern of thinking. It may consequently appear, upon rapid perusal of our
text, that we have taken passages from other people's texts out of context, doing the author's
intentions an injustice. We feel however that the understanding we give to the isolated passage
taken from an author's text will invite the reading of the remainder of the text with the same
understanding, and insofar as this understanding differs from the author's the difference is the
product of a critique of the author's position rather than a misrepresentation of it. We have, of
course, attempted to make explicit such differences in view and argue for the respective position
we adopt, but insofar as our task demands dealing with a wide range of disciplines and points of
view we have limited our discussion to essential points.

A model of consciousness as we conceive it is something like a conceptual matrix through which

every acceptable theory passes as a transform compatible with any other theory made accessible
by the matrix. That is to say, a model of consciousness enables a knower to pass from the
perspective of one theory to the perspective of any other theory permitted by the matrix without
loss of intellectual contact or production of intellectual contradiction.

The disciplinary perspectives within the purview of our model include Western Psychology,
Eastern Meditation, Psychotherapy, Neurophysiology, and, more encompassingly, the Noetic
Sciences. All these disciplines have a common object of study, namely, attention and operations
of attention. The attentive model provides us with a theory of attention which allows for
translation of the knowledge of attention acquired through one of

-page 4-

these disciplines into terms employed in the explication of knowledge about it acquired in any of
the others.

We would orient the attentive model in respect of other models, two of which we are
immediately turning to consider, by making a distinction between models of conscious systems
(systems in which consciousness or awareness figures as a component and systems-models of
consciousness itself. From this point of view the attentive model is a systems-model of
consciousness itself. Being a model of consciousness itself, the attentive model does not treat
consciousness as an undefined term as is often the case in models in which consciousness or
awareness figures as a component of a living system. The model is an explication of certain
states of consciousness, and by means of it we arrive at a definition of consciousness as it occurs
in such states. But besides being a model of consciousness itself the attentive model makes a
significant though novel use of systems theory and hence exemplifies an approach to modelling
consciousness which can be described as a systems approach despite the fact that it does not
model consciousness as a system. Indeed, we shall show that attempts to model consciousness
itself as a system sometimes result in models of conscious systems.

We shall in the course of the work argue that the attentive model provides us with an explanation
of the nature of altered states of consciousness and a vocabulary for talking about such states.
Some such altered states are given locations within the new paradigm of consciousness being
offered here, and their connections and relationships are shown.

The model of consciousness that we are introducing attempts to take

-page 5-

into account what is left out of the description of consciousness by the spotlight models. We
believe that it reflects more accurately than do the spotlight models the experience of being
conscious; we believe our use of terms to be consistent with common usage and thus do not
consider the model to be introducing a technical vocabulary or jargon. Indeed we believe that in
reflecting more accurately the experience of being conscious it offers, among other things, the
possibility of bridging the gap between Western and Eastern psychological insights such as is
called for in the following passage from Consciousness East and West by Pelletier and Garfield.

There is very little theoretical or research literature that has attempted to interpret the
implications of these [meditative] systems for Western psychology. One major obstacle to such a
dialogue between Eastern and Western systems of psychological insight has been the obscure,
esoteric metaphors of the East on one extreme and the rationalistic, mechanistic, and
reductionistic jargon of the West on the other. 2

The pages that follow constitute our contribution to this theoretical literature.

[table of contents] [previous] [next]

Footnotes
1. R.L. Ackoff, "Systems, organizations and interdisciplinary research." In F.E. Emery (ed.),
Systems thinking (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), p.343.

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2. K.R. Pelletier and C. Garfield, Consciousness east and west (New York: Harper Colophon
Books, 1978), p.119.

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CONSCIOUSNESS

© C.O. Evans & J. Fudjack

Part 1A - The Model [table of contents] [previous] [next]

The need for a model of consciousness has been felt among scientists. The evidence for this is
the fact that two such models have been proposed in the recent scientific literature. We shall
quote from the authors’ summaries of their models and point out that they suffer from a common
drawback. We shall then go on to develop a new model which we believe achieves the objectives
for which these models were designed but which avoids their drawbacks.

A pathfinding model has been proposed by the psychologist Charles Tart. He suggests seeing
consciousness as a system.

While the components of consciousness can be studied in isolation, they exist as parts of a
complex system, consciousness, and can be fully understood only when we see this function in
the overall system. 3

The components of the system are introduced as follows.

To understand the constructed system we call a state of consciousness, we begin with some
theoretical postulates based on human experience. The first postulate is the existence of a basic
awareness. Because some volitional control of the focus of awareness is possible, we generally
refer to it as attention/awareness. We must also recognize the existence of self-awareness, the
awareness of being aware. Further basic postulates deal with structures, those relatively
permanent structures/functions/subsystems of the mind/brain that act on information to transform
it in various ways. 4

Eleven subsystems are identified by experiential criteria, and the model diagrams feedback and
feedforward connections between all these subsystems.. The attention/awareness subsystem has a
central place in the system receiving input from every other subsystem.

There is enough information here about Tart's model to compare it with that proposed by the
neurophysiologist E. Roy John to which we now turn.

Consciousness is a process in which information about multiple individual modalities of

sensation and perception is combined into a unified, multidimensional representation of the state
of the system and its environment and is integrated with information about memories and the
needs of the organism, generating emotional reactions and programs of behavior to adjust the
organism to its environment. Consciousness is third-order information. Many levels of
consciousness can exist, in which these dimensions are present in variable amounts. The content
of consciousness is the momentary constellation of these different types of information.

-page 7-

At the same time that consciousness is the product of an integration of preconscious sensations
and perceptions structured in the light of previous experience and reflecting emotional state,
drive level, and behavioral plans, feedback from consciousness to these more fundamental levels
must take place. Memories are activated, attention is focused, perceptions influenced, emotions
aroused, drive priories altered, and plans of behavior revised as a result of this feedback,
producing a continuous reorganization of basic processes because of the influence of higher-level
integrative and analytical functions. 5

The reference to consciousness as third-order information needs to be place in the context in

which sensation is categorized as first- order information, and perception as second-order
information. About these two lower orders John says,
We choose to define perception, as well as sensation provisionally as preconscious or unfelt
categories of information processing. 6

John's model identifies a fourth, fifth, and sixth order of information which corresponds with
subjective experience, the self, and self-awareness, respectively. While much needs to be said
about these higher orders we have enough information for the purposes in hand.

The drawback shared by both the models of Tart and John is that they run together questions
about the theoretical properties of a living system which are taken to be necessary conditions for
the emergence of consciousness with the question of the nature of consciousness as a
phenomenon experienced by such systems. We shall try to establish this point in the case of both
models.

There is explicit recognition in Tart's model of these two perspectives in the distinction it makes
between the postulate of attention/awareness and postulates of structure. We can understand this
distinction to be a

-page 8-

distinction between the phenomenological content of consciousness and the variety of

structurings which this content undergoes. However, if we so understand it we cannot go on to
entertain the possibility that phenomenological content and structures are subsystems which
interact.

Tart himself recognizes that the postulate of attention/awareness has a very different status from
the postulates of structures as the following remark reveals.

The systems diagram...shows awareness in a distinct place, but it really spreads out through the
various subsystems and so becomes consciousness. 7

On the interpretation here being offered Tart is forced to say this, since it is attention/awareness
which is structured by the subsystems. Accordingly, a model of consciousness should be
modelling attention/awareness itself, and not the structures which are responsible for changes
from one state of attention/awareness to another. We may read the following passage from Tart
as calling for just this.

The systems approach stresses the importance of attention/awareness as an activating energy

within any d-SoC [discrete state of consciousness]. Yet if we ask what awareness is or how we
direct it and so call it attention, we cannot supply satisfactory answers.

We may deal with this problem simply by taking basic awareness for granted, as we are forced to
do at this level even though we do not know what it is. After all, we do not really know what
gravity is in any ultimate sense, but we can measure what it does and from that information
develop, for example, a science of ballistics. We can learn much about d- Socs [discrete states of
consciousness] in the systems approach if we just take basic awareness and attention/awareness
energy for granted, but we must eventually focus on questions about the nature of awareness. 8

A model of consciousness, we are maintaining, is precisely a device to aid our understanding of

what Tart calls 'the nature of awareness'. The model

-page 9-

should be a model of the phenomenological properties of human experiencing and should not
incorporate the structures which constitute a scientific explanation of those properties. This
conclusion should be even more firmly borne in on us when we take note of the fact that our
knowledge of the structures/subsystems to which Tart is referring is derived from our study of
the characteristics of attention/awareness itself. As Tart himself acknowledges,

We acquire data about structures when the structures are functioning utilizing
attention/awareness energy or other kinds of psychological energies. 9

The point stands leaving aside the reference here to other kinds of psychological energy the need
for the postulation of which disappears in the alternative model we shall be proposing.

Turning now to John's model, the first thing to note is that consciousness is identified with a
certain kind of information. Here again we need to distinguish questions about the origins of
information and scientific theories about information from questions about the experience of
information as that information enters a human mind. After all, information can exist in libraries
and such information has no direct connection with consciousness. This distinction is recognized
in the passage quoted from John's work in that he equates consciousness with the transformation
of information into a 'unified, multidimensional representation of the state of the system'. The
key word here is the word 'representation'. Information is represented insofar as it is experienced,
and it is this experiential factor which constitutes consciousness. Thus a key sentence in John's
passage is the one which says that the content of consciousness is the

-page 10-

momentary constellation of these different types of information. However, although John makes
a clear distinction between information and its representation or 'momentary constellation', he
does not have the idea that a model of consciousness needs to model this representation as
distinct from modelling a system in which this representation is itself a component interacting
with other components which are identified only by their scientific properties. To make this
crucial difference clear the following analogy used by Bateson is decisive.

It is, of course, true for the TV set that a satisfactory picture on the screen is an indication that
many parts of the machine are working as they should; and similar considerations apply to the
'screen' of consciousness. But what is provided is only a very indirect report of the working of all
those parts. 10

Using this analogy we can make the point that the models of consciousness offered by Tart and
John are comparable to a model of a TV set in which the screen is one of the parts interacting
with all the others. In contrast, we are maintaining, a model of consciousness should be a model
of nothing but the screen, and should not include the parts of the machine which are physically
responsible for the phenomenon of the screen.

We first need a model of consciousness before we can follow a theory about the biological
function of consciousness, but John offers us a model which runs all these matters together. It
runs together the question of how consciousness comes about and the question of what it is. The
model we shall describe also conceives of consciousness in systems terms, as both John's and
Tart's do, but the components of the system will consist entirely of phenomena of experience;
i.e., it will only have phenomenological properties.
-page 11-

We find that U. Neisser criticizes current models of consciousness very much along the lines we
have just done, only not so explicitly, in such a passage as this.

The villains of the piece are the mechanistic information- processing models, which treat the
mind as a fixed-capacity device for converting discrete and meaningless inputs into conscious
percepts. Because recent experimental studies of attention appear to support these models, it
seemed necessary to suggest another interpretation of their results. 11

Neisser suggests another interpretation, but he does not fully integrate his new interpretation with
a view of consciousness itself. We feel that the adoption of the model of consciousness we are
developing would enable him to do this, and that the model is certainly relevant to the type of
theorizing he is doing.

The model of consciousness we propose as an alternative constitutes a systems approach to

consciousness. Unlike Tart, however, we do not conceive of consciousness as a system. In order
to adequately compare our model with his it is important to understand how his approach models
consciousness as a system.

In explicating his systems approach Tart introduces the new term 'discrete state of consciousness'
or 'd-SoC' and speaks of such discrete states in the following way.

We have now defined a d-SoC for a given individual as a unique configuration or system of
psychological structures or subsystems, a configuration that maintains its integrity or identity as
a recognizable system in spite of various (small) changes in the subsystems. The system, the d-
SoC, maintains its identity because various stabilization processes modify subsystem variations
so that they do not destroy the integrity of the system. 12

-page 12-

What Tart apparently has in mind is that consciousness, as a system, is capable of assuming a
variety of steady states each of which can be referred to as a 'discrete state of consciousness'.
Essentially, Tart is interested in understanding the relationship between various states of
consciousness such as the ordinary waking state and dreaming sleep. He has labeled such states
'discrete states' and is suggesting that it is helpful to conceive of such states as steady states of a
system, consciousness. For to conceive of a particular state of consciousness as a steady state of
a system entails understanding that the state is a product of a variety of contributing factors.
Hence in any attempt to explain phenomena such as the transition from one state of
consciousness to another a variety of stabilization processes that contribute to maintain particular
states despite disruptive forces must be taken into account together with the various forces that
would disrupt a state or interfere with the stabilization processes. In effect, Tart is suggesting that
systems theory can be employed in the study of states of consciousness in such a way as to rule
out the kind of attempt to explain a particular state of consciousness that would over-
simplistically single out a factor contributing to the maintenance or induction of that state as the
cause of the state.

Yet regardless of the reasons Tart has for adopting this systems approach to the study of states of
consciousness it is a strategy that obliges him to conceive of consciousness as a system
comprised of components related to each other as are the parts of a system. In enumerating these
components and describing the relationship between them he is

-page 13-

constructing a model of consciousness. We have objected to the model he constructs in that it

conflates a description of the phenomenological properties of human experiencing - what it is
like to be aware, or attend to something - with a description of information processing structures
of the organism. This confusion is the result of conceiving of both awareness and such
information processing structures as components of consciousness, related to each other as parts
of a system.

Insofar as Tart hedges on his decision to treat attention/awareness as a component of

consciousness or subsystem on a par with the other subsystems we might entertain the possibility
that his model could be corrected if the phenomenological term attention/awareness was deleted
from the list enumerating subsystems, leaving as components only the subsystems of the
information processing type. If such a correction were to be made the model would describe a
system comprised of components or subsystems but could be understood only as modeling a
system we take to be conscious or have experience. At best, in other words, Tart's model can be
understood to describe a conscious system rather than describing consciousness as a system or
giving a systems view of consciousness itself.
The mistake Tart makes in constructing his model of consciousness is essentially the result of an
over-simplistic description of the phenomenological properties of human experiencing. He
assumes that to be conscious is to be aware of something and that a simple distinction can be
made between that which a person at a given time is aware of and that which

-page 14-

the person at that time is not aware of, as if consciousness were merely a spotlight lighting some
part of the world and leaving other parts dark and unexposed. Although he allows that awareness
can be under the control of the person whose awareness it is and accordingly speaks of attention,
the phenomenological terms he employs - 'consciousness', 'awareness', 'attention' - are vague and
hence not conducive to the construction of a model of consciousness itself. Another way of
saying this is that insofar as Tart has a model of consciousness itself it models consciousness as a
'spotlight' in the way we have described. [continued]

Footnotes

3. C.T. Tart, States of consciousness (New York:E.P. Dutton & Co.,1975),. p.3.

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4. Ibid., p.4.

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5. E.R. John, "A model of consciousness," In G.E. Schwartz and D. Shapiro (eds.),
Consciousness and self-regulation, vol.I (New York: Plenum Press, 1976), P.4.

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6. Ibid., p.4.

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7. C.T. Tart, op cit., p.99.

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8. Ibid., p.172.

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9. Ibid., p.21.

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10. G. Bateson, Steps to an ecology of mind (Frogmore, St. Albans, Herts, U.K.: Paladin,1973),
p.116.

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11. U. Neisser, Cognition and reality (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1976), p.10.

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12. C.T. Tart, op.cit., p.62.

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CONSCIOUSNESS

© C.O. Evans & J. Fudjack

Part 1B - The Model [table of contents] [previous] [next]

The model of consciousness we propose offers a subtler understanding of the phenomenological

properties of human experience and describes a more complex relationship between terms like
'consciousness' and 'attention'. It should be said that the philosophical basis for this model has
already been explicated elsewhere and that it therefore constitutes a contribution of philosophy to
this scientific enterprise. 13

The model makes a conceptual distinction missing in Tart's and John's models, a distinction
which allows a description in phenomenological terms of the fundamental structure of
consciousness. We shall present the model in such a way as to make clear in what sense it is to
be understood as constituting a systems view of consciousness. In order to do this we shall adopt
a convention for using the slash (/) that understands this punctuation mark as signifying a special
kind of relationship.

A special usage for the slash was first introduced by Gregory Bateson. He describes its usage in
this way:

An aggregate of events or objects (e.g., a sequence of phonemes, a painting, or a frog, or a

culture) shall be said to contain 'redundancy' or 'pattern' if the aggregate can be divided in any
way by a 'slash mark', such that an observer perceiving only what is on one side of the slash
mark can guess, with better than random success, what is on the other side of the slash mark. 14

-page 15-
as an example he offers:

From a part of an English sentence, delimited by a slash, it is possible to guess at the synthetic
structure of the remainder of the sentence. 15

Varela formalizes the usage of the slash in a related way. The slash, when used as in 'A/B'
signifies a pair (A,B) the elements of which are to be understood as standing in a special kind of
relationship. The element on the left side of the slash mark is understood to be a whole of which
the element on the right side is a part. Yet the element on the left side is not a whole merely in
the sense that it is an aggregate of parts of the type represented by the element on the right side
of the slash. We might best characterize the kind of whole appearing on the left side of the slash
by calling it a 'system'. The element on the right side of the slash in one part of the system-whole
brought into relief by putting it on the right side of the slash. We might speak of the function of
the slash as singling out that part.

What is meant by calling the element on the left side of the slash a 'system' can be understood in
terms of the general system theory developed by Bertalanffy.

A system can be defined mathematically in various ways. For illustration, we choose a system of
simultaneous differential equations. Denoting some measure of elements, pi(i=1,2...n), by Qi,
these, for a finite number of elements and in the simplest case will be of the form:

dQ1/dt = f1(Q1,Q2,...Qn)

dQ2/dt = f2(Q1,Q2,...Qn)

....................

dQn/dt = fn(Q1,Q2,...Qn)

Change of any measure Qi therefore is a function of all Q's, from Q1 to Qn; conversely, change
of any Q entails change of all other measures and of the system as a whole. 16
-page 16 -

Bertalanffy is here offering a mathematical description of a 'system' in terms of a set of

differential equations. The entire set of equations characterizes the system. He interprets the set
of equations, telling us that intuitively it means that a change in any part (any Q) is a function of
all the parts of the system. The first equation tells us, for instance, that change in Q1 with respect
to time is some specific function (f1) of all the parts (Q1,Q2,...Qn) of the system. Although the
equations as a set can be understood to characterize simultaneous interaction between all the
parts, each differential equation, in effect, singles out from the whole a particular part and
describes its behavior as a function of all the parts of the system. In the first differential equation,
for instance, Q1 is singled out. The function of the grammatical symbol '/', as we shall use it, is
analogous to the function of any one of the differential equations of the set characterizing a
system. Just as the behavior of Q1 is understood to be a function of all the Q's and cannot be
described as acting independently, the element on the right side of the slash is understood to be
dependent on the element on the left side. Likewise, just as Q1 is singled out in the first
differential equation and its behavior brought

-page 17-

into relief against the background of all the parts of the system, the element placed on the right
side of the slash is understood to be in relief against the element on the left side. Varela has the
following to say about the relationship between the type of whole which appears on the left side
of the slash and a part of that whole appearing to the right of the slash:

A whole is here a set of simultaneous interactions of parts (components, nodes, subsystems)

which exhibit stability as a totality. The parts are the carriers of particular interactions which we
can chop out from the whole and consider their participation in various sequential processes that
constitute the whole. 17

As we shall use it, 'A/B' is to be interpreted as representing the singling out of a part, B, from the
whole or 'system', A, of which it is a part. Any such part is capable of being 'singled out', but, as
a part of a 'system' of simultaneous interactions between all parts, is capable of being singled out
only insofar as it is understood as carrying with it a particular interaction with the other parts of
the system or whole.
The idea of 'redundancy' which is central in Bateson's description of the usage of the slash can be
understood to be a function of this systems relation between part and whole. Insofar as a part that
is singled out 'carries' within it, so to speak, a particular interaction with the whole - is dependent
on the whole or exhibits behavior not independently specifiable - then consideration of that part
will entail some knowledge of the whole of which it is a part, so that an observer "perceiving
only what is on one side of the slash can guess, with better than random success, what is on the
other side of the slash", as Bateson puts it.

Bateson's example, quoted above, concerning the case of guessing at the synthetic structure of
the remainder of a sentence from a part, describes

-page 18-

a situation that is similar to one we frequently find ourselves in, for example, in the course of
reading. As we attend to words or phrases we hold the whole of which these are parts in mind,
although we are not explicitly aware of that whole. The ordinary way of expressing this is to say
that we are aware of the context for these objects of attention. Such awareness of context,
however, is not explicit awareness in the way in which awareness of the object to which we are
attending is explicit. We can speak of this awareness as subsidiary awareness. And using the
slash according to the convention developed in the preceding pages we can represent the
fundamental structure of consciousness by placing the phenomenological terms 'subsidiary
awareness' and 'object of attention' on the left and right sides of the slash respectively, saying that
consciousness is subsidiary awareness/object of attention. In doing this we represent
consciousness as singling out from a whole in subsidiary awareness a part as object of attention.

We have characterized models of consciousness that treat the terms 'consciousness', 'awareness',
and 'attention' as nearly interchangeable terms by calling them spotlight models of
consciousness. We should like to note at this point that the model we here introduce, which
models consciousness as subsidiary awareness/object of attention, offers a richer description of
what it is like to be conscious and a more complex inter-relationship between such terms. It does
this by making a fundamental distinction of a sort missing in the spotlight models, the distinction
between 'subsidiary awareness' and 'object of attention'.

By explaining the relationship obtaining between these terms we will

-page 19-

proceed to unfold the definition of consciousness as subsidiary awareness/object of attention. We

will do this by comparing this relationship with three polarities represented by the following
parts of terms.

Unnoticed-noticed

Gestalt ground-gestalt figure

Feeling-percept

These polarities can be construed as offering us phenomenological evidence for modeling

consciousness as subsidiary awareness/object of attention. We are making the claim that
consciousness singles out an object of attention from a whole in subsidiary awareness, as we
mention above. But we are also claiming that an object of attention is related to subsidiary
awareness as a part is related to a systems-whole and our reasons for making this claim will
become apparent in the following analyses concerning the three polarities.

(1) Subsidiary awareness is to object of attention as unnoticed is to noticed. Suppose you are
looking for a medicine bottle and that it is the object most immediately in front of your eyes, but
that in spite of this you do not notice the bottle. In that case the bottle may described as
unnoticed, and is in subsidiary awareness. The major claim of this theory of consciousness is that
it is not correct to infer from the fact that something is unnoticed that it is not experienced. The
theory is incompatible with the belief that we only experience objects of attention. It claims that
we also experience what is unnoticed. The first philosopher

-page 20-

to clearly make this claim was M. Polanyi. He chose to describe our experience of the unnoticed
as subsidiary awareness, and his articulation of the concept in the passage which follows makes
it clear that subsidiary awareness refers to that in our experience which is not noticed at the time.
When we are relying on our awareness of something (A) for attending to something else (B), we
are but subsidiarily aware of A. The thing B to which we are thus focally attending, is then the
meaning of A. The focal object B is always identifiable, while things like A, of which we are
subsidiarily aware, may be unidentifiable. The two kinds of awareness are mutually exclusive:
when we switch our attention to something of which we have hitherto been subsidiarily aware, it
loses its previous meaning. Such is briefly, the structure of tacit knowing. 18

A is identical with an element of subsidiary awareness, and B is identical with an object of

attention. It can readily be appreciated that when Polanyi refers to the switching of attention to
something of which we had been subsidiarily aware he means us to understand this as a case of
noticing something, and he maintains that noticing an item changes its experiential value. In
other words, he is saying that we cannot notice what is subsidiary without its thereby ceasing to
be subsidiary, and ceasing at that point to function as it had been while subsidiary.

This phenomenological evidence for the existence of subsidiary awareness is not the only
evidence to which the theory has claim. It can also be backed by evidence which has been
produced in the scientific study of perception. Let us then consider recent scientific findings in
the case of vision. The physicist David Bohm has made an excellent summary of the relevant
material.

The essential point that we wish to emphasize in the work concerning the eye is that nothing is
perceived without movements or variations in the image on the retina of the eye, and that the
characteristic of these variations play a large part in determining the structure that is actually
seen. It is important that such variations shall not only he a result of changes that take place
naturally in the environment, but that (as in the case of tactile perception) they also can be
produced actively by movements in the sense organs of the observer himself. These variations
are not themselves perceived to any appreciable extent. What is perceived is something relatively
invariant, e.g., the outline and form of an object, the straightness of lines, the sizes and shapes of
things, etc., etc. Yet the invariant could not be perceived unless the image were actively varied.
19

-Page 21-

The crucial sentence in this passage which can be understood in the light of the subsidiary
awareness/object of attention model of consciousness is the one which states that the movements
taking place in the sense organs themselves are said not to be themselves perceived to any
appreciable extent. The reason such eye movements are not perceived to any appreciable extent
is that they are only experienced in subsidiary awareness. Thus Bohm's qualification according to
which he does not want to say that such movements are not experienced at all, allows the
interpretation to be given that they are experienced subsidiarily.

Emphasizing the active role of the observer in the case of identifying the shapes of objects by
touch Bohm makes a parallel point about handling the object.

Thus, if one tries to find the shape of an unseen object simply by feeling it, one must handle the
object, turn it round, touch it in various ways, etc. (This problem has been studied by Gibson and
his co-workers.)

In such operations one seldom notices the individual sensations on the fingers, wrist joints, etc.
Rather, one directly perceives the general structure of the object, which emerges, somehow, out
of a very complex change in all the sensations. 20

-Page 22-

The sensations in the fingers, wrist joints, etc., to which Bohm is referring are called kinaesthetic
sensations, and the point he is making is that we need to have them in order for shape recognition
to occur. Nevertheless, we do not experience such kinaesthetic sensations as objects of attention
when they are doing their work. We experience them subsidiarily.

Absolutely crucial to an understanding of the definition of consciousness as subsidiary

awareness/object of attention is a recognition of the claim that both terms are terms having a
phenomenological value. That is to say, subsidiary awareness is as much a term of experience as
is the term object of attention. The definition must not be understood as confining experience to
the right hand term. And yet this is the single most prevailing error of most theories of
consciousness offered today.

We can take the theory of Roy John as a case in point. It will be remembered that John
distinguished two lower orders of information which refer to the occurrence of processes
occurring below the level of consciousness; i.e., non-conscious processes. These he calls the
order of sensation and perception, respectively (see pages 6 and 7). As we have noticed he calls
these orders 'preconscious' and this term is understood to refer to information which a percipient
responds to without being aware of the existence of that information. Roy John may be right in
postulating an order of information which exists at a purely physiological level.21 However, it is
to be questioned whether such information is correctly describable as sensation. Sensation, after
all, is a term of experience.

-Page 23-

and as such a sensation is a component of consciousness. Roy John himself fails to foreclose this
possibility by saying of sensations:

They are a product of the irritability of living matter. 21

Irritability, after all, is experienced. Now if we take the movements we make with our eyes as we
focus them upon an object, these movements will be felt as sensations. However, it does not
follow that we only have these ocular sensations when we are making them themselves objects
of attention, although it is true that we can do this with them, and that when we do, we talk of
noticing the sensations connected with our eye movements. So we presuppose that they have
been singled out as objects of attention when they are referred to as sensations, but it does not
follow that such sensations were in no way experienced when they were not experienced as
objects of attention. On the contrary, they are then experienced as part of the content of
subsidiary awareness. However, when so experienced we cannot actually refer to them as
sensations, since so to call these elements implies their having been singled out as objects of
attention. If we return to the last Bohm statement quoted we can interpret it to be referring to
subsidiary awareness in the manner we have been indicating:

One directly perceives the general structure of the object, which emerges, somehow, out of a
very complex change in all the sensations. 22

This reference to 'a very complex change in all the sensations' receives the interpretation on the
attentive model of consciousness as a reference

-Page 24-
to subsidiary awareness.

All this means that we can see John's reference to preconscious orders to be interpretable as a
reference to subsidiary awareness, and this provides us with the identity that the preconscious is
subsidiary awareness. In other words, we see the relationship between John's first order
information (sensation) and second order information (perception) in terms of the attentive
model which models consciousness as subsidiary awareness/object of attention.

(2) Subsidiary awareness is to object of attention as gestalt ground is to gestalt figure. Despite
the obvious semantic affinities between the terms 'subsidiary' and 'ground' the understanding of
subsidiary awareness as ground has not generally received attention. We believe that the
following explanation gives a reason for this apparent omission, and also explains how the
relationship can be conceived in such a way as to justify the analogy we are making.

The Gestalt pictures which are used to illustrate the figure- ground relationship are all misleading
in one respect. Insofar as it makes sense to discriminate an object of attention as 'out there' or in
the distance, it makes sense to locate subsidiary awareness as 'in here', where the 'in here' is
specified in relation to the body of the subject locating the subsidiary awareness. Now in the
sense in which we have an 'out there' and an 'in here' gestalt diagrams locate both figure and
ground as 'out there'. However, the conception of the ground which the attentive model of
consciousness is mapping locates the ground as 'in here' and not 'out there'. In view of this, it is
satisfying to discover that the

-Page 25-

connection we are arguing for between ground-figure and subsidiary awareness/object of

attention has been made by W.F. Fry.

I refer to the general area of figure-ground relationships and in particular to the attention-
alteration aspects of figure and ground.

....
For each perceived item that sets itself up in the perceived organism's brain as the immediate
figure, there is related material that is perceived though not attended to and hence is the
"ground". Further, the figure and the ground are within the frame of interrelationship (the vase is
the figure against the ground of the rest of the painting, the painting is the figure against the
ground of the wall on which it hangs, the wall is the figure against the ground of the room, the
room is the figure against the ground of the house, etc.).

The extension of this concept from the area of sensory perception to the area of cognitive
perception would seem to be a legitimate extension, though perhaps somewhat deviant. Such an
extension would involve the indication of a communication (perhaps originally sensory) as figure
and the indication of all conscious and unconscious themes implicit to that communication as
ground. 23

It is a perfectly natural interpretation of this passage to see it as backing up the proposition that
subsidiary awareness is to object of attention as ground is to figure.

It is important to see the relationship between subsidiary awareness and object of attention in the
light of the gestalt ground - gestalt figure polarity because it mediates a connection between the
description of consciousness as subsidiary awareness/object of attention and another polarity,
which we shall call the context-content polarity. In the above passage Fry speaks of a
communication and the themes implicit to that communication as standing in a relation of figure
to ground. It is clear that in speaking of a communication Fry has in mind a message, an
utterance, or perhaps even, as he implies, a bit of sensory information. His

-Page 26-

characterization of the communication as gestalt figure warrants identification of it as, in our

terminology, an object of attention. Furthermore, Fry mentions certain themes accompanying the
explicit content of communication describing them as implicit to the communication and as
assuming the role of gestalt ground. We reformulate the distinction he makes between the
explicit content of communication and themes implicit to the communication in terms of the
concepts of content and context by saying, using the terminology of our model, that the person
attending to the content of communication is subsidiarily aware of a context for the
communication, or that he has tacit knowledge of that context. To describe the subject as
subsidiarily aware of the context of communication is to say that the themes that constitute the
context are implicit to the communication for the subject in some experiential sense and this is
what we have in mind in characterizing the consciousness of the subject in the example in terms
of the polarity context-content.

The concept of context is particularly well suited for the use to which we are putting it in this
instance. For it does not go contrary to common usage of the concept of context to say that a
subject's context, if it is experienced by him at all, is experienced subsidiarily, since if his
attention is turned toward that context it is no longer his present context; he has transcended it by
making it explicit. Insofar as the subject is aware of the context as such he is aware of it
subsidiarily. The role of a context is similar to that of a frame, it is that in experience on which
attention is not focused. Bateson formulates the

-Page 27-

concept of context in terms of the concept of psychological frame. In the following passage he
discusses the relationship between attention and frame.

The frame around a picture, if we consider this frame as a message intended to order or organize
the perception of the viewer says, 'Attend to what is within and do not attend to what is outside.'
Figure and ground, as these terms are used by gestalt psychologists, are not symmetrically
related as are the set and non-set of set theory. Perception of the ground must be positively
inhibited and perception of the figure (in this case the picture) must be positively enhanced. 24

However, it is Bateson's understanding that the ground is positively inhibited to such an extent
that it is not experienced at all and instead is described as existing in the subject's unconscious.
25 It is our belief that Bateson was forced to reach the conclusion that the ground exists in the
subject's 'unconscious' because he lacks the concept of subsidiary awareness. It is our claim that
the ground or frame or context is experienced, albeit in such a way that awareness of it is
subsidiary.

We all know what it is to direct attention from an idea or physical object to the context and we
do such things often. We can direct our attention to a wider scope and discover the assumptions
we had made while entertaining the idea or notice the room or surroundings in which the object
we watched was located. We can attend to a picture's frame or notice the temperature in our
present setting. But these descriptions are not descriptions of what it is like to experience a
context as such. What is it to be subsidiarily aware of a context while attending, for instance, to a
message? How are we to characterize our experience of this subsidiary awareness? Without such
a characterization our challenge to

-Page 28-

the position that gestalt ground or psychological frame or context is so positively inhibited in a
subject's awareness as to be not experienced at all is a seemingly hollow or mysterious challenge.

In seeking a characterization of the experience of subsidiary awareness it is helpful to consider

an account of context taken from a textbook on logic. In An Introduction to Symbolic Logic ,
Susan Langer writes,

In ordinary thinking, the context is indefinite, mutable, and tacitly assumed. It grows and shrinks
with every turn of the conversation. You hear a bang, and ask: "Who has just come into the
house?" And all your thoughts are in terms of people, front door, and the relations of closing,
entering, etc.; but let the answer be: "No one; that was the cover of the wood-box you heard,"
and your whole constellation of ideas, your context, has shifted to wood-box, cover, the relations
of dropping, making noise. The person who gave the answer was thinking in your terms and also
in those which his reply presupposes, else he would not have found any sense in your question,
and his answer would have been an irrelevant statement, not an answer at all. So the context in
everyday conversation is always varying, adjusting itself to the interests of many people and
many domains of thought. 26

The italicized phrases in the passage clearly individuate objects of attention. And it is also clear
from the passage that Langer understands context in terms of constellations or sets of such
objects of attention; she introduces the idea of a shift in context by enumerating a different set of
objects of attention. In formulating his concept of context in terms of the concept of
psychological frame Bateson uses a similar approach.

The first step in defining a psychological frame might be to say that it is (or delimits) a class or
set of messages (or meaningful actions). 27

To define context as a set of objects of attention precludes an understanding of context as

experienced since although the objects are
-Page 29-

experienced sequentially the entire set of objects of attention is not experienced as a whole at any
one time. Is there an alternative to this understanding of a context as a set of objects of attention?
Let us reconsider Langer's passage and ask ourselves what she has left out of her account which
might supply us with an answer to this question. Let us consider, specifically, what she has left
out of the experience she is describing such that not merely the content (objects of attention) but
also the context is experienced. The answer is that she has left out of her account any mention of
the feelings of the person who heard the band and asked: "Who has just come into the house?"
She has not mentioned the surprise or apprehension, although her example makes it clear that
such factors are present We claim that Langer has left out precisely the experiential aspect of
context, the way we feel in a situation.

(3) What we want to bring into relief by characterizing subsidiary awareness/object of attention
in terms of a feeling- percept polarity is the claim that subsidiary awareness is experienced as
feeling. When we are entertaining an object of attention our subsidiary awareness of context is
experienced as a feeling about that object. When a person is asked how he is feeling this is the
same as asking him how he is contexting his situation, how he is framing the comment he has
just received or the action he has witnessed. Conversely, how he feels about what he is attending
to will determine which set or which particular object of attention he will proceed to single out.
Above we saw Bateson defining a psychological frame as a set of objects of attention and
intentionally ignored the fact that he also wanted to characterize a psychological frame as
delimiting a

-Page 30-

set of objects of attention. We appreciate that in this further characterization he was exhibiting
his understanding that a frame or context predetermines, for the person whose frame or context it
is, which features of his situation become objects of attention for him, or, using a Bateson term,
how the person will 'punctuate' his situation. We are now at a stage at which we can entertain the
claim that a context 'delimits' a set of objects of attention. The subject's feeling-state will
determine what he will single out as an object of attention.

It is important to understand that a distinction must be made between the particular feelings
which from time to time get singled out and themselves become objects of attention, and the way
we feel as a whole, which cannot as easily or so fully become an object of attention.
Failure to make this distinction has prevented theorists from adequately integrating feeling into
the life of the mind. As a way of explaining the distinction between feeling as the mode in which
subsidiary awareness is experienced and particular feelings which are singled out as objects of
attention we shall try to show how this distinction solves a problem in the analysis of the concept
of feeling put forward by the philosopher G. Ryle. The passage which follows puts forward a
theory about the nature of moods. According to Ryle's theory moods are not feelings, but when
reading this passage put in mind the possibility that mood words identify particular
characterizations of the feeling of subsidiary awareness as a whole.

-Page 31-

Mood words are short-term tendency words, but they differ from motive words, not only in the
short term of their application, but in their use in characterizing the total 'set' of a person during
that short term. Somewhat as the entire ship is cruising south-east, rolling, or vibrating, so the
entire person is nervous, serene, or gloomy. His own corresponding inclination will be to
describe the whole world as menacing, congenial, or grey. If he is jovial, he finds everything
jollier than usual; and if he is sulky, not only his employer's tone of voice and his own knotted
shoelace seems unjust to him, but everything seems to be doing him injustices.

Mood words are commonly classified as the names of feelings. But if the word 'feeling' is used
with any strictness, this classification is erroneous. 28

One of the things to notice about this passage is the beautiful description it offers of the idea of
an overall feeling state through the metaphor of a ship responding to the weather and the sea. Just
as the entire ship is affected by air and sea, so the entire person is affected by the slings and
arrows of outrageous fortune (or, the environment as a whole). We also notice that such overall
states are described by the use of words such as 'nervous', 'serene', and 'gloomy'. It is also crucial
to notice a linguistic fact which Ryle suppresses; namely, that we speak of feeling nervous,
serene, or gloomy. Thus when Ryle concludes by admitting that mood words are commonly
classified as the names of feelings we can take the position that this common classification is
right (with reservations about the description of a concept as a name), and Ryle wrong, and
proceed to consider why Ryle is driven to resist this common classification.
The answer to this question is that Ryle treats all feelings as objects of attention. Only insofar as
a feeling is an object of attention will he concede to classifying it as a feeling. The fact that
feelings are by definition objects of attention for Ryle is clear from the next passage.

-Page 32-

By feelings I refer to the sorts of things which people often describe as thrills, twinges, pangs,
throbs, wrenches, itches, prickings, chills, glows, loads, qualms, hankerings, curdlings, sinkings,
tensions, gnawings and shocks. 29

All the experiences Ryle lists are experiences we notice while having them. They are objects of
attention, in our terminology, and not components of subsidiary awareness. Yet we do not
experience feeling only insofar as we take sensations of the type Ryle lists as objects of attention.
We feel while we are attending to other things and what we feel in these cases is our present life-
quality as a whole.

Thus we see that when Ryle talks of using the word 'feeling' strictly he has in mind references to
noticed feelings or objects of attention. This forces him to conclude that mood words are not
feeling words, became they are not used to describe objects of attention. But if we allow for a
feeling state which is not an object of attention, then we leave open the possibility that mood
words are feeling words which characterize such overall underlying feeling-states.

The fact that Ryle treats feelings as objects of attention is testified to by the fact that he deals
with reports of feeling, and naturally we can only report what comes to our attention. Thus,

Ordinarily, when people report the occurrence of a feeling, they do so in a phrase like 'a throb of
compassion', 'a shock of surprise' or 'a thrill of anticipation'. 30

It is instructive at this point to consider an attempt to describe a feeling in such a way as not to
prejudge whether or not it is at the time an object of attention. The attempt is that of Freud.
We can at any rate note one or two things about the feeling of anxiety. Its unpleasurable
character seems to have a note of its own - something not very obvious, whose presence is
difficult to prove yet which is in all likelihood there. But besides having this special feature
which is difficult to isolate, we notice that anxiety is accompanied by fairly definite physical
sensations which can be referred to particular organs of the body. 31

-Page 33-

Freud speaks of the feeling of anxiety, but a similar point is made about feeling in general by the
philosopher R.G. Collingwood.

A feeling consists of two things closely connected: first, a sensuous element such as color seen, a
sound heard, an odor smelt; secondly; what I call the emotional charge of this sensation: the
cheerfulness with which you see the color, the fear with which you hear the noise, the disgust
with which you smell the odor. 32

Both Freud and Collingwood imply that a feeling has two aspects. We attribute this double-
aspect approach the authors share to the subsidiary awareness - object of attention dichotomy in
the following way. A feeling when it is functioning in its role as subsidiary is not an object of
attention. Its character when it is functioning in this role is 'not very obvious' because the feeling
cannot be 'isolated' as an object of attention and remain subsidiary. It can perhaps best be
described as an 'emotional charge' accompanying an object of attention. Yet we can also attempt
to turn our attention to such an underlying feeling state in order to identify or characterize it. And
it is easy for the subject who does this to land up singling out a particular sensation in its place.
We have seen Ryle, for instance, take a throb for compassion. Moreover, we note Freud speaking
about definite physical sensations accompanying anxiety and Collingwood listing sensations that
are clearly objects of attention in describing the sensuous element of feeling. And it is clear that
sensations can be taken as objects of attention and it is proper to speak

-Page 34-

of feeling them. But we have distinguished between particular feelings such as these, which can
be taken as objects of attention, and underlying feeling-states. Is it possible to succeed in the
attempt to experience the whole underlying feeling-state as an object of attention?
In answering this question let us consider the attempt Ryle makes to describe a particular mood,
laziness. It will be remembered that we have interpreted Ryle's mood words as naming such
underlying feeling wholes and have argued against his position that moods are not feelings. We
will discover, in the following passage, that in order to characterize a mood (and hence an
underlying feeling-state) Ryle finds it necessary to make reference not only to particular
sensations but also to a corresponding situation in which the subject finds himself.

To be in a lazy mood, is, among other things, to tend to have sensations of lassitude in the limbs
when jobs have to be done, to have cozy feelings of relaxation when the deck-chair is resumed,
not to have electricity feelings when the game begins, and so forth. But we are not thinking
primarily of these feelings when we say that we feel lazy; in fact, we seldom pay much heed to
sensations of these kinds, save when they are abnormally acute. 33

So, to merely identify a sensation is not to describe a mood (or feeling-whole). And Ryle would
be in agreement with Freud and Collingwood on this point. But he would not agree with
Collingwood's attempt to fill out the picture by mentioning 'emotional charges'. He would not
seek the necessary something extra in the subject's experience at all, but would rather give a
purely dispositional (or behavioral) analysis. We suggest, however, that the appeal Ryle makes to
the subject's situation in his attempt to describe a lazy mood provides the key for the answer to
the question we pose. This is because, as we understand it, to describe a

-Page 35-

feeling state necessitates a reference to a situation experienced by the subject. In other words,
description of a feeling-state entails describing the subject's experienced context. A situation,
when it is functioning as context for some object of attention, is experienced by the mode of
feeling, but in successfully turning attention to that feeling-state in order to identify or describe
it, one experiences not a feeling as object of attention but a situation as object of attention. One is
widening the scope of attention, so to speak. He is making explicit his formerly subsidiarily
experienced context.

The concept of a feeling whole, or underlying feeling-state, and the claim that subsidiary
awareness is experienced as such a feeling whole is a crucial move in the position we are
elaborating. Consequently it is of importance that there is psychological warrant for the
phenomenological identification of subsidiary awareness as feeling whole, and it is given in this
passage by the psychologist F. Kreuger.
Everything distinguishable in experience is interconnected, embedded within a total-whole that
penetrates and envelops it.

The experience-qualities of this total-whole are the feelings and emotions. -The organized parts
in this totality also have such experience-qualities (or complex-qualities) related to feelings, the
more so the less distinct a part is from the whole. The earliest and most natural way in which we
experience a visuo-motor situation, a change in bodily position, in which we react
psychologically, is determined by such complex-qualities, that is, determined by feeling-like
states. This is true also for all seeking, finding, willing, recognizing, remembering, knowing,
judging, - in short, for all psychological activities. 34

We can see this passage as supporting the phenomenological identification

-Page 36-

of subsidiary awareness as feeling whole, and further see it as in need of the distinction we have
introduced between a single underlying feeling state and particular feelings as objects of
attention since it lacks a way of mentioning feeling except as 'feelings and emotions' which are
easily construed as objects of attention.

Now that we have the concept of a feeling whole we can elaborate on it by saying that the whole
itself is in a continuous process of modification. In psychological terms it is affective; that is, it is
a felt reaction to the environment in which changes in the environment are continually producing
modifications of feeling tone. We are dealing with a system that we experience as a felt whole
and the changes in feeling tone produced by the environment are experienced as changes in
underlying feeling- state. Moreover, our feelings influence which objects of attention are
'relevated' from the whole. 35

Likewise, the appearance of new objects of attention in the environment bring about a change in
underlying feeling-state. Singling out a particular part of the system as object of attention results
in a different underlying feeling-state than would result from singling out some other part. For
we experience part of the whole explicitly and have a feeling for the remainder, so to speak,
which will be different as different parts are singled out.
This relation between feeling and object of attention that we have been describing makes a
synthesis between two opposing theories of emotion possible. The psychologist R.W. Leeper
maintains that "emotional processes operate primarily as motives. It means that they are
processes which arouse, sustain, and direct activity!" 36 In contrast, J.R.S. Wilson states

-Page 37-

that "emotions typically arise from the apprehension of certain characteristics in the object, and
include certain tendencies or impulses to behave with regard to the object." 37 Each theory is
highlighting a different feature of the relationship between feeling-state and object of attention.
On the attentive model, an object of attention is a part of a system which, as background to that
part, is experienced as a feeling-state. The relationship can only be understood as one of mutual
influence. Leeper stresses the influence the feeling-state has by characterizing it as a motive.
Wilson, on the other hand, stresses the influence perceptions have in 'causing' emotions.

The concept of an overall feeling-state and the idea that subsidiary awareness of context is
experienced by the mode of feeling can be related to a significant body of literature by quoting
the works of three authors-- the philosopher Leibniz, the psychologist Muchielli, and the
psychologist Naranjo. In the following quotation Leibniz can be understood to be speaking of
having a feeling of an item in subsidiary awareness:

For all attention requires memory, and often when we are not, so to speak, admonished and
warned to take notice of some of our present perceptions, we let them pass without reflexion and
even without observing them; but if someone directs our attention to them immediately
afterwards, and for instance bids us notice some sound that has just been heard, we remember it,
and we are conscious that we had some feeling of it at the time. 38

Also, the attentive model, in conceiving of subsidiary awareness of context experienced by the
mode of feeling, sheds light on the sense in which a situation can be identified as "one and the
same thing" as a feeling-state, as is done in the following passage by Muchielli, a structural
psychologist.
-Page 38-

In fact, for a subject who has a very special fear of bears, the irruption of the situation of mortal
danger (and therefore of meanings) and fear with its various manifestations and expressions
characteristic of this subject in this kind of situation are one and the same thing. 39

The following passage, also by Muchielli, can be interpreted as claiming that the context for an
object of attention is experienced as a feeling whole.

A subject's perceptive and behavioral field is his own. For example, the significance of a
situation experienced by two or more persons together (as in a family) is not the same for any
two of them. A closely knit system of reference gives each detail a meaning that it possesses only
for the subject equipped with this system; this same detail is perceived by the others with other
meanings because it is incorporated into other systems. When such a system is itself reflected in
a subject's consciousness, it is experienced in the form of a sentiment enveloping a current
content... [italics ours] 40

And finally, we find Naranjo speaking of an affective context or affective background

reminiscent of the idea of an underlying feeling-state in its role as background to an object of
attention.

Any thought, for instance, though principally a cognitive act, arises in an affective context which
influences its form and concatenation (as was shown by Freud in his study of free association).
In the same manner it can be said to reflect our drives, our aversions, and our habits, both in the
sense of automatisms of thinking and in the sense of conditioned preferences. Similarly our
actions and the will or impulse sustaining them are (except for totally reflex actions) influenced
by an affective background (in content, style, or both) and by cognition (in content, strategy, or
both). 41

Let us at this point review the ground we have so far covered in the conceptual development of
the attentive model of consciousness. We have been examining the relationship between
subsidiary awareness/object of

-Page 39-
attention and the feeling-percept polarity. We need to keep in mind the meaning of the slash and
the systems-thinking that has gone into its use. We need to remember that we are using it to
conceptualize a relationship between a certain type of whole and a part of such a whole. We are
dealing with wholes in which any part interacts with all other parts simultaneously, and thus with
the whole; there is a mutual influence between part and whole. According to the attentive model,
each object of attention is to be understood as such a part relevated from a whole which we have
characterized as a felt whole. The felt whole is modified by each object of attention as it gets
relevated as an object of attention and conversely the felt whole will exert an influence on which
objects are singled out by attention. We have also examined the relationship between the feel-
percept polarity and two others, the ground-figure polarity and the context-content polarity. We
have rejected an understanding of context that would construe it as a set of objects of attention
and hence conceive of it as a mechanical type of whole, an aggregate construct in which the
whole is nothing more than the sum of its parts. Our alternative was to conceive of context as
subsidiary awareness experienced by the mode of feeling. This alternative allowed us to see
context as being experienced and to account, in terms of feeling, for the influence context
(whole) has in determining which objects of attention (parts) are relevated. Our intention in
relating the concept of consciousness as subsidiary awareness/object of attention to these
polarities has been to permit an experiential identification to be made of the terms 'subsidiary
awareness' and 'object of attention'. In the process, however, we have also related these polarities
to one another,

-Page 40-

constructing a nexus of concepts to each other through the idea of consciousness as subsidiary
awareness/object of attention.

One final point should be made about the attentive model in respect of systems theory. We have
characterized the type of whole in the whole-part relationship signified by use of the slash as a
'system', and speak of the relationship between system and part. Attempts to explain what a
system is are often made by contrasting such a whole to an aggregation as A. Angyal does in this
passage:

… in an aggregation the parts are added, in wholes the parts are arranged in a system. The
system cannot be derived from its parts; the system is an independent framework in which the
parts are placed. [italics ours] 42
In light of this passage it can be said that in speaking, as we have in the preceding pages, of
subsidiary awareness of context or frame we have connected the concept of subsidiary awareness
with that of frame in such a way as to make it clear that the fundamental structure of
consciousness (as subsidiary awareness/object of attention) is what allows consciousness to
entertain an object of attention as part of a system. For we have described consciousness as
singling out an object or attention from a background, context, or framework in subsidiary
awareness. To describe consciousness in this way is to account for the possibility of systems
thinking in terms of the structure of consciousness, whereas other models have attempted to
connect systems theory with the concept of consciousness by merely construing consciousness as
a system of one sort or other.

[table of contents] [previous] [next]

Footnotes

13. C.O. Evans, The subject of consciousness (New York:Humanities Press, 1970).

back to text

14. G. Bateson, op.cit., p.103.

back to text

15. Ibid., p.104.

back to text
16. L. von Bertalanffy, General systems theory, rev.ed. (New York:George Braziller,1968).p.56.
Inspection of the set of equations shows that the system will be in a steady state or stationary
state when

f1 = f2 = ... = fn = 0. Under certain conditions which can be mathematically specified small

changes in any Q will not change the state of the system: the system, in Tart's terminology, will
'maintain it's integrity or identity in spite of various (small) changes." (See quotation page 11 of
this study.)

back to text

17. F. Varela, "Not one, not two," The Coevolution Quarterly, no.11(1076), p.63

back to text

18. M. Polanyi, Personal knowledge (New York:Harper Torchbooks,1964), p.x. Polanyi's

understanding of the relationship between 'subsidiary awareness' and 'focal object' connects these
terms with the whole-part relationship in the opposite way to the way we have it. He understands
an object of attention to be a whole composed of parts of which we are subsidiarily aware when
attending to the whole. According to Polanyi,

We know a comprehensive whole, for example a dog, by relying on our awareness of its parts for
attending focally to the whole. [M. Polanyi,"Experience and the perception of pattern." in K.M.
Sayre and F.J. Crosson, The modelling of mind (Notre Dame:Univ. of Notre Dame Press,1963),
p.213]

Our argument against Polanyi's position is essentially that we needn't be aware of each part of
the object of attention in some way other than the way we are aware of it when attending to the
entire object of attention. By contrast, in our use of the term 'subsidiary awareness' it can be said
that an object of attention is a part of a whole of which we are subsidiarily aware. To this view
Polanyi takes exception. Consequently, he says,

It is a mistake to identify subsidiary awareness with subconscious or preconscious awareness, or

with the fringe of consciousness described by William James. [Ibid., p. 212.]
But not only do we not see this as a mistake, we shall go on in the addendum of this work to
show that this identification can be successfully made.

back to text

19. D. Bohm, The special theory of relativity (New York:W.A.Benjamin, 1965), p. 201.

back to text

20. Ibid., p. 197.

back to text

21. See B. Brown, New mind, new body (New York:Harper & Row,1974), p. 82, for a
discussion of experimental findings suggesting an order of information existing at a purely
physiological level.

back to text

22. E.R. John, op.cit., p. 3.

back to text

23. W.F. Fry, Sweet madness: a study of humor (Palo Alto: Pacific Books,1963), p. 154

back to text
24. G. Bateson, op.cit., p. 160.

back to text

25. Ibid.

back to text

26. S.K. Langer, An introduction to symbolic logic (New York:Dover,1938), p. 65.

back to text

27. G. Bateson, op.cit., p. 169.

back to text

28. G. Ryle, The concept of mind (London: Hutchinson's Univ. Lib.,1949), p. 100

back to text

29. Ibid., p. 83.

back to text

30. Ibid., p.84.

back to text

31. S. Freud, "Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety." In J. Strachey (ed.), Standard Edition, vol.20
(London:Hogarth Press,1959), p.132.

back to text

32. R.G. Collingwood, The new Leviathan (London:Oxford Univ. Press,1942), P.18.

back to text

33. G. Ryle, op.cit., p.103.

back to text

34. F. Kreuger, "The essence of feeling." In M.B. Arnold (ed.), The nature of emotion
(Baltimore: Penguin Books,1968), p.97.

back to text

35. This use of the word 'relevate' was first introduced by David Bohm who explained it as
meaning "to lift it into attention so that it stands out 'in relief'." We construe the reference to an
'it' to be a reference to an object of attention. D. Bohm, "Quantum theory as an indication of a
new order in physics. B. Implicate and explicate order in physical law," Foundations of Physics,
vol.3, no.2 (1973), p.150.

back to text
36. R.W. Leeper, "The motivational theory of emotion." In M.B. Arnold (ed.), The nature of
emotion (Baltimore: Penguin Books,1968), p.185.

back to text

37. J.R.S. Wilson, Emotion and object (London: Cambridge Univ. Press,1972)

back to text

38. F. Leibniz, The monadology and other philosophical writings, translated by R. Latta
(London: Oxford Univ. Press,1898), p.371.

back to text

39. R. Muchielli, Introduction to structural psychology, translated by S.L. Markmann (New

York: Avon,1970), p.36.

back to text

40. Ibid., p.50.

back to text

41. C. Naranjo, "Vanishing magician-spectator, rabbit, and hat." In T. Tulku (ed.), Reflections of
mind (Emeryville, Ca.:Dharma Publ.,1975), p.46.
back to text

CONSCIOUSNESS

© C.O. Evans & J. Fudjack

Part 2 - An Application [table of contents] [previous] [next]

This section will consist of an analysis that employs our model of consciousness at the stage of
construction reached in Part 1. This analysis will serve as an example of how the understanding
of consciousness we propose applies to current discussions in consciousness-related fields; in
this case, psychotherapy.

Bandler and Grinder propose a model of the therapeutic relationship that would explain and
hence make available to others the techniques of such therapists as Milton Erickson. The model
borrows its essentials, an analysis of language, from transformational grammar. The therapist is
to treat the utterances of clients in therapy as 'surface structure' sentences. In short, the
transformational grammarians assume that each sentence has both a 'surface structure' and a
'deep structure', the surface structure being derived from the deep structure by certain
transformations.

We are demonstrating how, within the transformational model, each sentence is analysed at two
levels of structure corresponding to two consistent kinds of intuition which native speakers have:
Surface Structure - in which their intuitions about constituent structure are given a tree structure
representation - and Deep Structure - in which their intuitions, about what a complete
representation of the logical semantic relations is, are given. Since the model gives two
representations for each sentence (Surface Structure and deep Structure), linguists have the job of
stating explicitly how these two levels are connected. The way in which they represent this
connection is a process of derivation which is a series of transformations. 43

Using as an example the sentence, "The woman bought a truck", the individual words of which
can be diagrammed in tree structure to represent the Surface Structure of the sentence, the
authors suggest a tree diagram which is a representation of the Deep Structure. It diagrams the
words "The woman bought a truck from someone for some money." The Deep Structure in this
-page 42-

example has been transformed into the Surface Structure by employing "one of the two major
classes of transformations", 44 Deletion Transformations. The phrases 'from someone' and 'for
some Money' have been deleted.

The therapist is to treat the utterances of clients as Surface Structures in the following way:

One of the common features of the therapeutic encounter is that the therapist tries to find out
what the client has come to therapy for, what the client wants to change. In our terms, the
therapist is attempting to find out what model of the world the client has. As clients
communicate their models of the world, they do it in Surface Structures. These Surface
Structures will contain deletions such as those described in the last chapter. The way that the
client uses language to communicate his model/representation is subject to the universal
processes of human modelling such as deletion. The Surface Structure itself is a representation
from which it is derived--the Deep Structure. In the case wherein the linguistic process of
deletion has occurred, the resulting verbal description--the Surface Structure--is necessarily
missing [sic, a piece] for the therapist. This piece may also be missing from the client's conscious
model of the world. If the model of the client's experience has pieces missing, it is impoverished.
Impoverished models, as we stated before, imply limited options for behavior. As the missing
pieces are recovered, the process of change in that person begins. 45

The above passage leaves the reader with the impression of a client whose impoverished
experience has something to do with the linguistic transformations, such as Deletion
Transformations, of which transformational grammarians speak. It implies that transformational
grammar can be used by a therapist to enrich the client's experience. Let us inspect the passage
more thoroughly to see if we can understand what the authors mean in speaking of the client's
impoverishment and how this relates to transformational grammar. Let us try to understand in
particular what the

-page 43-

authors mean in speaking about 'the client's model of the world', 'the client's conscious model of
the world', and 'the model of the client's experience'. Are these three equivalent? Or is there a
complex relationship between the three? Let us also try to specify or give a further
characterization of the 'missing piece' of which the authors speak. For the purposes of exposition
we will take the Surface Structure sentence in question in the passage to be the sentence "The
woman bought a truck", and the sentence "The woman bought a truck from someone for some
money" as a fuller or Deep Structure representation of the logical semantic relations of that
sentence. We will identify the 'missing piece' in three different ways.

Comparing the Surface Structure sentence "The woman bought a truck" to the sentence "The
woman bought a truck from someone for some money" we can see that the Surface Structure
sentence is missing the piece 'from someone for some money' by virtue of Deletion
Transformation. If we take the missing piece to be 'from someone for some money' we might
think of the client's conscious model as the summation of all his Surface Structure sentences, as
distinguished from his model, which might be thought of as the summation of all the Deep
Structure representations of his sentences. The claim that the client communicates his model of
the world in Surface Structures can then be understood to mean that the client's sentence will
constitute his conscious model yet indicate or imply the model of the world he has. This is to say
that his conscious model is the part of his model of the world of which he is conscious.

We could take the missing piece to be certain information the

-page 44-

client has but is suppressing - for instance, the information that the woman bought a truck from
John for a hundred dollars. In this case we would identify the missing piece as 'from John for a
hundred dollars' rather than 'from someone for some money.' Notice, first, that the use of the
sentence "The woman bought a truck" although it does imply that "The woman bought a truck
from someone for some money" does not entail that the client know either the identity of the
person from whom the truck was bought or the price paid in the transaction. However, it is
possible that the client does know that the truck was bought from John for a hundred dollars and
in the case in which he does his usage of the Surface Structure sentence "The woman bought a
truck" can be construed as a suppression of that information. If we take the missing piece to be
'from John for a hundred dollars' we might think of the client's model as all the information about
the world that he possesses and his conscious model as the information he reveals in his
communications. But this would lead us to conclude that we all have impoverished models,
insofar as we do not possess all the information about the world it is possible to possess, as well
as impoverished conscious models, in that we do not communicate all the information about the
world we do possess. Do we all suffer, by virtue of this kind of impoverishment, from something
that requires therapy? In other words, in what sense is the therapist to be concerned with the fact
that a client using the sentence "The woman bought a truck" fails to mention explicitly that she
bought the truck from John for a hundred dollars?
Let us step back once more and try to identify the 'missing piece'. In the example we are
considering the information which is

-page 45-

suppressed in using the sentence "The woman bought a truck" is the identity of the person it is
bought from and the price paid. Let us imagine a variety of situations:

(A) When asked "From whom did the woman buy the truck and for what price?" the client
responds "From John for a hundred dollars."

(B) When asked this question the client does not respond although he is privy to the information
that the truck was bought from John for a hundred dollars. We could imagine that the client
either draws a blank, not seeming to understand the question, answers "I don't know" or ignores
or evades the question.

This second case is the significant one and we could choose to say that it is this case which
concerns the therapist qua therapist. But how in this case are we to understand the terms the
authors are using? What is the 'missing piece'? We could say that the missing piece is still 'from
John for a hundred dollars.' But is it missing in the same sense in which it is missing from the
Surface Structure sentence "The woman bought a truck?" It is clear that we would want to say
that it is missing not merely in the sense that it is information which does not appear in the
Surface Structure sentence or is suppressed by the use of a particular Surface Structure sentence,
but that it is information that is habitually suppressed. It is only at this level of description that
we can explain a therapist's interest in the language usage of his client. How are we to understand
the terms model and conscious model? Perhaps we could take the client's model to be the
summation of all the information he has about the world, and his conscious model to be all the
information he has about the world which is not

-page 46-

habitually suppressed.
It is our belief that the authors have adopted a model of consciousness, a conception of what it is
to be conscious, that hampers their exposition in two ways. First, it does not allow them to
explicitly state what is implicit in the third level of description of the client's 'impoverishment'
that we have here reached. We shall explain how this is so in the pages ahead. Second, it allows
them to conflate the three levels of description we have given with the result that the technical
distinction between the Surface and Deep Structure of a sentence assumes a greater significance
in their theory than is warranted.

The model of consciousness that the authors assume is of the spotlight variety which merely
distinguishes between what is in consciousness for a person at a given time and what is not in
consciousness for that person at that time. That this type of model is the one being used by the
authors is indicated, for instance, by their discussion of social and individual 'filters' which filter
out of experience various elements in the same way that a person's physiological apparatus filters
out or is not capable of picking up wavelengths of light, for example, outside of a set range of
wavelengths. In this understanding a person is either aware or unaware of a particular and what
he is aware of is a function of socially imposed filters, filters peculiar to the individual, and
physiological filters. That the authors are using a spotlight model of consciousness is also
indicated by the way they use various words such as 'experience'. The authors speak
interchangeably of a person's model, map, representation,

-page 47-

and experience of the world and imply by such usage that experience can be missing various
pieces, that as a result of filtering "the model of the client's experience has certain pieces
missing."

As an alternative to the spotlight model of consciousness we suggest the model which conceives
consciousness as subsidiary awareness/object of attention. We suggest this as an alternative
because we believe that despite the authors' tendency to speak of consciousness and experience
in terms of the spotlight model the subsidiary awareness/object of attention model is necessary if
sense is to be made of what they say about the impoverishment of the client. In our second
description of the client we found it necessary to refer to 'suppressed information' and in our
third description we made reference to 'habitually suppressed information'. Yet what is it to refer
to information which a client possesses yet is suppressed? It is to say of the client that such
information is a part of his tacit understanding. We can describe the client as tacitly aware of
such information. What we are proposing is that we can see the client as conscious in the sense
that at any particular moment he has an object of attention and subsidiary awareness. We can
then describe any failure on his part of the type that a therapist would be concerned with in terms
of components of his subsidiary awareness which are habitually tacit. If we retain the notions of
conscious model and model we could say that in speaking of a person's model of the world we
are speaking of a characterization of that person's patterns of contexting -- a characterization of
which objects are habitually taken as objects of attention by that person and which elements of
his environment are habitually tacit in his experience.

-page 48-

Instead of speaking of a person's conscious model of the world we could say that certain
components of a person's experience may never be a member of the set of objects of attention for
that person. Insofar as information or a type of information is never explicit for a client, it might
be appropriate to say that his experience is impoverished, if we mean by that that this
information is never an object of attention for that person.

We would not be denying, however, that such information was a component of the client's
experience. For although a person's experience of the world may be experience which never
allows such pieces to become explicit for him, to be entertained as objects of attention, this does
not mean that such pieces are missing from experience altogether, as the authors imply. They
exist implicitly for him in experience in subsidiary awareness. A person can suffer from a
condition in which a tacit component of experience is systematically kept from his attention.
Indeed, we understand that change that the authors intend to bring about by the therapeutic
techniques they propose as a change in the client's habitual patterns of contexting. We would
describe the technique itself as a technique designed to bring the client's attention to parts of his
experience habitually tacit, parts characteristically unnoticed by him and thus not in attention.

In essence, what we are saying is that the model of consciousness we propose, consciousness as
subsidiary awareness/object of attention, supplies the fundamental description of what it is, in
Bandler and Grinder's terminology, for a person to model the world. We have discussed, in
general terms, what would make one person's model different from another's and in what sense
such a model could be construed as impoverished.
-page 49-

We believe that the authors' ready assumption of a model of consciousness of the spotlight
variety has the interesting consequences of making transformational grammar central to their
theory of therapy. They want and need to make a distinction like the one we have made between
subsidiary awareness and object of attention. Carswell and Rommetveit, interested in studying
the context of messages -- the effect of tacit understandings on the 'perception' or processing of
sentences -- argue for "the study of background knowledge of communication settings" in
psycholinguistic research. They here cite Chomsky's introduction of the Deep Structure --
Surface Structure distinction as leading in this direction:

Rommetveit has argued (1970), however, that Chomsky's structural analysis [into Deep and
Surface Structure] exhibits an expansion of scope [of the field of linguistics] as it proceeds from
the surface structure toward deeper strata and verges on involving complex patterns of
communication. The deep structures of the language game may possibly become more and more
visible as we expand our analysis of the utterance from its abstract synthetic form, via its content
[meaning], toward the patterns of communication in which it is embedded. 46

So it is not strange that Bandler and Grinder, wanting to propose a certain theory about therapy
yet hampered by a spotlight model of consciousness and the restrictions this model places on
their use of vocabulary, should resort to the terminology of tranformational grammar, adopting
the distinction between Surface and Deep Structure. The Surface Structure of a sentence could be
understood to function as an object of attention and to say that a sentence has a Deep Structure
would be to say that language users would share certain tacit logical semantic assumptions about
that object of attention. But it is easy to reify these assumptions in characterizing them as a Deep
Structure which the sentence has, ignoring that they are

-page 50-

actually assumptions the language user has in attending to the Surface Structure sentence and
hence part of the experience of that person, albeit experience he is subsidiarily or implicitly
aware of.

In our discussion of the notion of a 'missing piece' we tried to indicate the limit of the usefulness
of employing the actual technical distinction between the Surface Structure and Deep Structure
of a sentence. Let us locate what these limits are in a slightly different way, see to what extent
their theory suffers from the use of the technical vocabulary of transformational grammar, and
indicate the options our alternative opens up.

We have pointed out that a client's use of a sentence like "The woman bought a truck", properly
designated as a Surface Structure, does not entail knowledge on the part of the person using the
sentence about the identity of the person from whom the truck was bought or the price paid. We
have also pointed out that although the client using the sentence in question may not have such
knowledge, insofar as he is using language correctly he can be assumed to understand that the
truck was bought from someone for some money. This assumption can be made by appealing to
what the transformational grammarians tell us -- to be specific, they tell us in this case that native
speakers have consistent intuitions about what a complete representation of the logical semantic
relations of the sentence "The woman bought a truck" is and that a representation of the logical
semantic relations of this sentence is given by the sentence "The woman bought a truck from
someone for some money." Although transformational grammar can tell us that the client using
the sentence "The woman bought

-page 51-

a truck" understands that the woman bought a truck from someone for some money it cannot tell
us that the client understands that the woman bought a truck from John for a hundred dollars. But
in employing the technique suggested by Bandler and Grinder the therapist must assume that
there is a possibility that the client means even more than that the woman bought a truck from
someone for some money by using the sentence "The woman bought a truck". Otherwise, what
sense does it make to speak of Surface Structures as indicating missing information or pieces?
But to what can the therapist appeal to justify his understanding that a Surface Structure sentence
like "The woman bought a truck", or, for that matter, a Deep Structure sentence like "The woman
bought a truck from someone for some money" can be used by a client with the understanding
that the woman bought a truck from John for a hundred dollars? Only some such reference as to
the tacit understandings of the client using the sentence will suffice to explain how the uttered
sentence "The woman bought a truck" is connected for the client with some unspoken or
hypothesized sentence "The woman bought a truck from John for a hundred dollars".

As a matter of fact the client could use the sentence "The woman bought a truck" with the tacit
understanding that the woman was his wife, that she needed the truck because the children
wanted ... etc. The point is that the connection between the sentence "The woman bought a
truck" and the tacit understanding that the woman bought a truck from John for a hundred dollars
is no more privileged a connection, is not of a different type or higher status, than the connection
between the sentence and the wider ranging tacit understanding a client might have in using the
sentence. We are not

-page 52-

maintaining that it is not useful for a therapist to inspect a client's sentences with
transformational grammar in mind for the purposes of ascertaining clues as to the tacit
understandings of the client or suggesting questions that would bring such understandings to the
attention of the client. We are objecting to the role that transformational grammar is playing in
the theoretical justification of the practical procedures suggested.

That this is a significant objection will become more apparent in the following if, at this point,
we entertain the question "To what extent is the therapist, according to Bandler and Grinder, to
depend strictly upon such an analysis of sentences based upon the theories of transformational
grammar?" It is clear that Bandler and Grinder propose a kind of analysis of sentences that is an
extrapolation from this strictly transformational kind of analysis. An example of this kind of
analysis is provided in what the authors call 'checking for the five senses'. It amounts to
inspecting the sentences of the client to see if mention is made of information received through
all the client's sensory apparatus. In the case that such mention is not made the therapist is
warranted in concluding that certain sensory information received by the client is being
suppressed. Such an analysis of the client's sentences is an extension from the kind which we can
call transformational analysis proper, the kind in which the example sentence "The woman
bought a truck" is seen as implying "The woman bought a truck from someone for some money".
The kind of analysis exemplified by 'checking for the five senses' is intended to integrate into the
proposed model for therapy techniques based on all the subtle understandings therapists,

-page 53-

as human experiencers, have of what it is to be conscious and experience the world -- to feel,
perceive, sense, etc. It is an attempt to incorporate into their theory of therapy an analogue to the
'intuitions' the transformational grammarians tell us that we have as language users of what a
complete representation of logical semantic relations is.

We have, as human beings, 'intuition' about what it is like to be conscious experiencers. We

know, for instance, that if our sensory apparatus is not malfunctioning we receive information
through five senses. We are warranted in concluding, then, that if we do not mention the
information gleaned by one or more of the senses in our sentences we have suppressed that
information and may even have failed to be explicitly aware of the existence of that information.
The check for the five senses that the therapist is to make on the client's sentences is clearly only
an extrapolation from transformational analysis proper since the therapist appeals, in making
such a check, to his intuitive understandings about what it is like to be human, intuitions about
which the transformational grammarian as such is not concerned. But we have pointed out that
the use to which even a transformational analysis proper is being put necessitates some reference
to the tacit understandings of the client if that use is to be theoretically justified. And we can say,
similarly, that to check a client's sentences to see if explicit mention is made of information
gathered by all the senses is justified by a reference to the client's subsidiary awareness. This
reference is made when we speak, as we must in such a case, of the client's habitually unnoticed
sensations.

It is misleading to think of the check for the senses as founded on

-page 54-

or derived from the transformational analysis proper although we can give the same description
of the use each is being put to: both the check for the senses and the transformational analysis
proper are ways of inspecting a client's sentences for the purpose of ascertaining clues as to the
character of the tacit components of the client's experience. Yet the authors, in introducing a
special kind of relationship between the client's experience and Deep Structure that is identical to
the relationship between Deep Structure and Surface Structure, obscure and confuse matters.

...each of us as native speakers of our language have consistent intuitions as to what are the full
linguistic representation -- the Deep Structures -- of each sentence or Surface Structure we hear.
As therapists, we can come to know exactly what is missing from the client's Surface Structure
by comparing it to the Deep Structure from which we know it is derived. Thus, by asking for
what is missing, we begin the process of recovering and expanding the client's model -- the
process of change.

We will call the Deep Structure the reference structure for the sentence, or Surface Structure,
which we hear from our clients. It is the reference structure in the sense that the Deep Structure
is the source from which the Surface Structure sentence is derived. The Deep Structure is the
fullest linguistic representation of the world, but it is not the world itself. The Deep Structure
itself is derived from a fuller and richer source. The reference structure for the Deep Structure is
the sum total of all the client's experiences of the world. 47

Just as the Deep Structure is the 'reference structure' for the Surface Structure, the authors are
telling us, the client's experience is the reference structure for the Deep Structure. Let us first
notice that such a description assumes that a client's sentences can be clearly distinguished from
those things called his experiences, when in fact it is not trivial, as we shall indicate, that
sentences are experienced.

Secondly, let us recall that the sentence, "The woman bought a truck",

-page 55-

can be considered a Surface Structure sentence whose complete logical semantic relations, Deep
Structure, can be represented by the sentence "The woman bought a truck from someone for
some money". The first sentence implies, to any native speaker of English, the second. In what
sense does the sentence representing Deep Structure, "The woman bought a truck from someone
for some money" imply anything about the experience of the client using that sentence? The
authors take too literally the metaphor expressed by the words 'derived from' in speaking of the
Deep Structure being the source from which the Surface Structure is derived. We mean by saying
that the sentence "The woman bought a truck" is derived from the sentence "The woman bought
a truck from someone for some money" only that the latter sentence entails the former, whereas
the client's claim that "The woman bought a truck" (or, its equivalent, "The woman bought a
truck from someone for some money") can be thought of as derived from his experience in the
sense that he uses that sentence to express the fact that he witnessed, for instance, his wife
buying the truck from John for a hundred dollars. To speak of the client's experience as being in
relation to his sentences just as the Deep Structure of a sentence is to the Surface Structure is a
metaphor that permeates the authors' formulation of their theory and prejudices their account of
therapy in the following way. The authors state,

While we have not yet developed an explicit structure for the range of human experience, we
have some suggestions about what some of the necessary components of that reference structure
will be. In addition to the check for the five senses we have found it useful to employ a set of
categories developed by Virginia Satir in her dynamic work in family systems and
communication postures. Satir organizes the reference structure into three major components:

The context -- what is happening in the world (i.e., in the client's representation of the world);

-page 56-

The client's feelings about what is happening in the world (as represented);

The client's perceptions of what others are feeling about what is happening in the world (as
represented). 48

The authors' admission to not having developed 'an explicit structure for the range of human
experience' is an admission of having only a vague understanding of how to incorporate into
their theory for therapy the concepts used in describing the range of human experience. Citing
Satir and mentioning the concepts of context, feeling, and perception indicates that they are
aware of the necessity to integrate into their theory such concepts. Yet introducing the awkward
and metaphorical notion of a 'reference structure for Deep Structure' frees them to ignore the
problems such an integration would entail by allowing them to adopt by virtue of the analogy
between 'reference structure for Deep Structure' and 'Deep Structure as reference structure for
Surface Structure' all of the terminology appropriate to the relationship between Deep and
Surface Structure in talking about the relationships between sentences and experience. They are
allowed in this way, for instance, to speak of sensory information which is not represented in a
client's sentences as deleted sensations'. Indeed, they say,

We suggest that the same set of specific concepts and mechanisms [that guided us in recovering
the Deep Structure for the Surface Structure] will continue to guide us in recovering the
reference structure for the Deep Structure. 49
As an alternative to their appeal to the theoretical notion of 'reference structure for Deep
Structure' we offer the model of consciousness presented earlier in this work. We have already
put this model to use in the discussion of Bandler and Grinder's work in the descriptions we
offered which

-page 57-

suggested that the information missing from the explicit content of a client's communications
could be seen as tacitly understood, implicit, or as information about components of the
experienced context in the subsidiary awareness of the client. For consciousness, under the
description of it we propose -- as bifurcated into attention and subsidiary awareness -- can
entertain an object of attention while being subsidiarily aware of the setting or context for that
object. The attentive model of consciousness is an attempt to integrate various of the concepts
that are used in describing human experience. It is important to recognize such concepts as
'context', 'feeling' and 'perception' ought to be employed without discriminating between levels of
structure in the manner proposed by Bandler and Grinder. For assigning them to a special 'level',
as if these concepts were not legitimate ones in a discussion of the relationship between Surface
Structure and Deep Structure, precludes thoroughly integrating these various components of
experience in a model of consciousness or consciousness-related model, as is the model of
therapy we have been considering. To make this point more intuitively obvious we will consider
one last passage from Bandler and Grinder:

...when you ask questions like, "How do you feel about that?" (whatever that might be) you are,
in fact, asking your client for a fuller representation (than even Deep Structure) of your client's
experience of the world. And what you are doing by asking this particular question is asking for
what you know is a necessary component of the client's reference structure. 50

Without rehashing all we have said in presenting our model of consciousness we should like to
point out that it is our understanding that in asking a question like "How do you feel about that?"
you are asking for a description of the context the person experiences in attending to the object
of attention

-page 58-
in question ('that'). And in the sense that you are asking for the client to explicitly describe that
context, which entails his bringing it, or some part of it, to attention, you are requesting a 'fuller
representation' than he has previously offered. In asking for a description of the context the
person experienced you are asking more of the person than that he fill in information omitted by
the use of a Surface Structure sentence although such information is part of his tacit
understanding, information about part of his experienced context. You are not, however, asking
for a description of a component of some other level of structure, you are asking for a wider
description of his experienced context than would be supplied were he to respond by offering a
Deep Structure correlate to a Surface Structure sentence. It is easy to be mislead into thinking
that in asking "How do you feel about that?" you are asking for a description of a thing called a
feeling which, unlike things called sentences, must thus be located as a component of a different
level of structure. But consider the kind of response we take as appropriate to the question "How
do you feel about that?" We do not expect a description of the feeing to qualify it by a list of
adjectives, for instance, in the same way as one might detail a description of a physical object by
adding that it is 'furry', 'lopsided' or whatever. A feeling of the type in question is not a 'thing' at
all. And a description of such a feeling would offer a more detailed account of the context
experienced in attending to the object and this is because, in our terminology, subsidiary
awareness of context is experienced by the mode of feeling.

A further explanation of what it means to say that subsidiary awareness

-page 59-

is experienced by the mode of feeling is supplied if we recollect that the analysis of sentences the
authors call 'checking for the five senses' presupposes the notion of sensory information acquired
but not explicit as an object of attention for the person and hence not 'represented' in his
communications. This possibility, which the authors have in mind in speaking about 'deleted
sensations', can be described as a subsidiary awareness of the environment. And it is not difficult
to conceive of these unnoticed sensations as affecting a person's underlying feeling state: the way
he feels about an object in his environment he is attending to. It may be useful to point out that in
referring in this way to consciousness in terms of both an object of attention and the way one
feels about that object in attending to it we are here describing the, so to speak, primary ability of
consciousness to attend to a particular object of attention while 'keeping the whole in mind'. In
the context of this remark it could be said that it is one's underlying feeling that frees our
attention, allowing it to shift from object to object, by being a representative in consciousness of
the whole of which these objects are parts. In representing the whole it also functions as a
corrective to our attention, which is to say that the way we feel about various objects of attention
will determine how, when, and whether we entertain them as objects of attention. And hence
how, when, or whether we resist entertaining them.

The description we have been giving indicates how a concept of resistance would relate to a
nexus of others, including attention, context, and feeling. The conspicuous lack of such a
discussion of a concept of resistance by Bandler and Grinder is regrettable in itself but also has
the serious

-page 60-

consequences of representing the client's problem to be one of having an 'impoverished mode', a

sin of ignorance, so to speak. Consequently the authors' transformational model per se fails to
prescribe methods by which the therapist can recover, or bring to the client's attention, the
habitually tacit components of his experience other than the method of eliciting the missing
information by direct questioning. Even in the cases in which an indirect procedure is suggested,
the methods cannot be construed as explained by the transformational model per se.

The description we have given of the therapeutic technique proposed by Bandler and Grinder
was in terms of directing the client's attention to habitually tacit components of his experience.
And this description suggests the sense in which this technique is similar to the ones employed
by Milton Erickson. Haley, in the course of exploring in detail the connection between
Erickson's hypnotic techniques and his seemingly unrelated therapeutic techniques says,

Not only does his experience as a hypnotist give him a willingness to take charge, to give
directives, and to control what happens, but like many hypnotists, he has been a specialist in
controlling the conscious awareness of subjects. He tends to conceptualize a person in two parts,
and he controls the flow of unconscious ideas to conscious awareness. 51

If we slightly modify this description by understanding 'conscious awareness' to mean attention

and 'unconscious ideas' to mean habitually tacit components of subsidiary awareness we have a
description of Erickson's technique also in terms of directing a client's attention to habitually
tacit components of subsidiary awareness. Yet Erickson seems to exhibit a greater intuitive
-page 61-

appreciation of the resistance people have for new patterns of contexting and new objects of
attention. Insofar as the Bandler and Grinder exposition does not concern itself with an attempt
to conceptually related resistance to the concepts of feeling, context, etc., it fails to supply an
account of the techniques Erickson uses in overcoming such resistance. Inspection of actual case
descriptions of Erickson's therapies, so vividly presented in Haley's book, allows us to make a
further general description of Erickson's techniques in our terminology. By effecting subtle
changes in the tacit components of a client's experience Erickson has been able to trigger a
sequence of deflections of the client's attention that results in putting the client into previously
unexperienced contexts which consequently encourage him to focus on objects of attention
previously precluded by his habitual patterns of contexting. The shifts produced in the client's
context, the changes in the tacit components of his experience, are effected in a variety of ways
by Erickson. These shifts are part of a procedure which produces an artfully yet intricately
constructed sequence of new contexts that subsidize new objects of attention which become parts
of yet newer contexts, a sequence designed to culminate in putting the client in the position to
notice what he would have initially resisted entertaining if brought to his attention.

We use one of Erickson's cases to illustrate our point, a case which fits the attentive model so
perfectly that it can be looked upon as a paradigm case. We quote in full from Haley's
presentation.

In another quite similar case, Erickson dealt with husband and wife together. He resolved a long-
term marital conflict by a simple instruction that forced a change because of the nature of the
situation.

-page 62-

This husband and wife had been running a restaurant business together for many years and they
were in a constant quarrel about the management of it. The wife insisted that the husband should
manage it, and he protested that she never let him do it. As he put it, "Yes, she keeps telling me I
should run the restaurant. All the time she is running it she tells me I should do it. I'm the bus
boy, I'm the janitor, I scrub the floors. She nags at me about the buying, she nags at me about the
book-keeping, she nags at me because the floor needs scrubbing. I really should hire someone to
scrub the floor, but my wife can't wait until somebody comes in and applies for the job. So I
wind up doing it myself, and then there's no need to hire someone to do it."
The wife took the reasonable position that she wanted her husband to take care of the restaurant
because she would rather be at home. She had sewing she wished to do. And she would like to
serve her husband at least one home-cooked meal a day with special foods he liked. Her husband
replied, "That's what she says. You can hear it, I can hear it. But she'll be in the restaurant
tomorrow morning.!"

I learned that they locked up the restaurant in the evening at about ten o'clock, and they opened
at seven in the morning. I began to deal with the problem by asking the wife who should carry
the keys to the restaurant. She said, "We both carry the keys. I always get there first and open up
while he's parking the car."

I pointed out to her that she ought to see to it that her husband got there half an hour before she
did. They had only one car, but the restaurant was just a few blocks from their home. She could
walk there a half hour later. When we agreed to this arrangement, it solved the conflict.'

Discussing this couple with some colleagues, Erickson put the matter as simply as that. Having
the woman arrive a half hour later than her husband resolved the problem. Since this solution
seemed more obvious to him than to his audience, he went on to explain.

'When the husband arrived a half hour before his wife, he carried the keys. He opened the door.
He unlocked everything. He set up the restaurant for the day. When his wife arrived, she was
completely out of step and way behind. So many things had been set in motion by him, and he
was managing them

Or course, when she remained behind at home that half hour in the morning, it left her with the
breakfast dishes and the housework to do before she left. And if she could be a half hour late, she
could be thirty-five minutes late. In fact, what she hadn't recognized when she agreed to the
arrangement was that she could be forty minutes or even an hour late. In this way, she discovered
that her husband could get along at the restaurant without her. Her husband, in turn, was dis-
-page 63-

covering that he could manage the restaurant.

Once the wife yielded on that half hour in the morning, then she yielded on going home early in
the evening and preparing a bedtime snack for him. This meant he took over the task of getting
the restaurant in shape for the night and closing up.

The wife also was learning to manage the house, which was a more important activity to her. In
their final arrangement she stayed home, but she was available for the cashier's desk or some
other position if an employee was sick or on vacation. At other times she didn't need to be at the
restaurant, and she wasn't.

When discussing the case, a colleague pointed out that this wasn't the individual problem of the
wife; the husband had been busy inviting his wife to take charge in the restaurant, and it was
therefore a game in which both people were involved. Erickson agreed but said that helping the
husband discover his involvement was not necessarily relevant to bring about a change. As he
put it, "I couldn't feel I would get anywhere by telling the husband he was inviting his wife to
manage him into mopping the floor, and so on. He wouldn't have understood that. But he did
begin to understand that he was in charge of the place for a whole half hour. And he was
perfectly comfortable being in charge."

Often it is difficult to get a wife to make a change of this kind and stick to it, particularly when
she is a woman who likes to manage. Commenting upon this, Erickson pointed out that the wife
was willing to accept the idea and follow through on it because of the way it was put. She was
asked to see to it that her husband arrived a half hour earlier than she did. She was put in charge
of the arrangement and so was willing to accept it. 52

Our model would have us single out the reports of feelings of which the text of the case gives
record. The husband mentions his when he says, "She nags at me about the buying, she nags at
me about the bookkeeping, she nags at me because the floor needs scrubbing." The model makes
us notice that the husband is not only displaying the way he feels towards his wife, but in so
doing he is also displaying the way he contexts his relationship with her. The wife alludes to her
feelings when she indicates that she would rather be at home. Finally, Erickson mentions his own
when he remarked to colleagues,
-page 64-

"I couldn't feel I would get anywhere by telling the husband he was inviting his wife to manage
him into mopping the floor and so on." By expressing his implicit understanding of the situation
in terms of the way he felt towards the husband, Erickson exhibits a connection between feeling
and contexting which is precisely the one the attentive model makes explicit.

We also notice that although these references make it clear that feelings play a part in the
couple's relationship, Erickson at no point draws their attention to their feelings. We may
characterize his technique on this occasion by saying that he effects a change in the way they
could feel towards each other by making a change in the way they context their relationship,
rather than attempting to change the way they context their relationship by trying to make them
feel differently towards each other. In the therapeutic encounter the feelings of the couple
towards each other are allowed to remain in subsidiary awareness.

Instead Erickson singles out a component of subsidiary awareness which was to be found in the
experience of both wife and husband, namely the fact that they both carried around with them the
keys to their family business, the restaurant. Now the model requires us to classify the couple's
awareness of the keys as subsidiary to the extent that they are metal objects that are carried
around on one's person and cause certain sensations which are experienced subsidiarily.
Sometimes, indeed, the awareness of the keys is made focal, as when they are in the process of
being used to open doors, etc., but then they are soon returned to subsidiary awareness. The
model invites us to relate the contexting function of the subsidiarily felt sensation of the keys
with the manner in which they come

-page 65-

into focality when they do for each of the parties who use them. Insofar as the keys come into
focality in a different manner for wife and husband they are operating in subsidiary awareness
with different contexting functions. For the wife the keys are a component of subsidiary
awareness which context her relationship to her husband in a pattern of dominance, and they
create the reverse context for the husband.
However, Erickson shows his real brilliance as a therapist by carefully drawing no further
attention to the keys. Had he failed to exercise this caution the keys would have been unmasked
as symbolic of the marital conflict, and alterations of arrangements involving the keys would not
have worked. Thus Erickson brought the keys into focality as objects of attention only long
enough to discover that they were components of subsidiary awareness of both of the partners.
He then contrived to alter the contexting function of this component of their respective
subsidiary awarenesses without again removing it from subsidiary awareness (by drawing
attention to it). Instead, Erickson directed the couple's attention to a plan to have the husband get
to work thirty minutes before his wife. The couple could not make this change without changing
their relationship to the keys, while at the same time this change was all effected at the level of
subsidiary awareness.

By getting the husband to open the restaurant Erickson succeeded in altering the contexting
function of the keys in subsidiary awareness of both wife and husband. This shows itself in the
manner in which the keys now came into focality as objects of attention for the couple. "He
carried the keys. He opened the door. He unlocked everything." The keys had come to have for
the husband the contexting function they used to have for

-page 66-

the wife. At the same time, in the case of the wife they had lost their previous contexting
function, and gained a new one which enabled her to context her husband as the one in charge of
the restaurant. The upshot of the change Erickson made was that the couple's feelings about their
life situations and their feelings towards each other were changed by changing the contexting
function of a component which was common to the respective subsidiary awarenesses of both of
them. "In this way, she discovered that her husband could get along at the restaurant without her.
Her husband, in turn, was discovering that he could manage the restaurant." Thus a small change
made to a component of subsidiary awareness brought about a major change in the couple's
patterns of contexting, and this in turn brought major changes to their lives which added up to a
resolution of their marital conflict.

We would also point out that this case of Erickson's does not lend support to the sort of analysis
Bandler and Grinder offer in terms of deducing Deep Structure from the Surface Structure of
patients' sentences. Information about the keys is directly, although subtly, elicited from the
couple by Erickson. (He asks them who should carry the keys, keeping their thoughts away from
the actualities in respect of the keys.) But his information-use of such a sentence as "We both
carry the keys. I always get there first and open up while he's parking the car" is not the use of it
as a Surface Structure from which a Deep Structure can be derived. We believe that an
explanation of his technique in terms of the distinction between the Surface and Deep Structures
of sentences, being a simplification of the

-page 67-

infinite complexities exhibited in Erickson's technique, will not suffice.

[table of contents] [previous] [next]

Footnotes

43. R. Bandler and J. Grinder, The structure of magic, vol. 1 (Palo Alto: Science and Behavior
Books,1975), p.28.

back to text

44. Ibid., p.31.

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45. Ibid., p.40.

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46. E.A. Carswell and R. Rommetviet, Social contexts of messages (New York:Academic
Press,1871), p.5.

back to text

47. R. Bandler and J. Grinder. op.cit., p.157.

back to text

48. Ibid., p.160.

back to text

49. Ibid., p.158.

back to text

50. Ibid., p.160.

back to text

51. J. Haley, Uncommon therapy (New York:Ballantine Books,1973), p.19. A further

explanation of what it means to say that Erickson conceptualizes a person in two parts is given
by Haley in Advanced techniques of hypnosis and therapy: selected papers of Milton H.
Erickson, M.D. (New York:Grune & Stratton, 1967), p.456.
Erickson's comments about "unconscious awareness" become reasonable from this view. To
have an interchange with another person through an "unconscious" means of communication, we
must at some level be cognizant of what we are doing or we could not correct ourselves or
receive the other person's communication and respond to it. Yet this process can go on without
any conscious awareness of what we are doing. Therefore there must be, at least, two levels of
"awareness" when we are interchanging two levels, at least, of communication.

The reference to 'levels of communication' will receive more attention in the third section of this
work in a discussion of Bateson's concept of meta-message, and the 'unconscious'. We quote the
above passage, with its mention of two levels of awareness, 'conscious awareness' and
'unconscious ideas' in terms of object of attention and subsidiary awareness.

back to text

52. J. Haley, Uncommon therapy, op.cit., p.192.

back to text

CONSCIOUSNESS

© C.O. Evans & J. Fudjack

Part 3 - East and West [table of contents] [previous] [next]

In a recent book called Consciousness East and West, in a chapter devoted to the discussion of
meditational states of consciousness, Pellitier and Garfield assess the literature concerning
meditative systems.

There is very little theoretical or research literature that has attempted to interpret the
implications of these [meditative systems for Western psychology. One major obstacle to such a
dialogue between Eastern and Western systems of psychological insight has been the obscure,
esoteric metaphors of the East on one extreme and the rationalistic, mechanistic, and
reductionistic jargon of the West on the other. 53

If we read this assessment with the attentive model of consciousness in mind we are in a better
position to account for the lack of literature attempting to interpret the implication of Eastern
meditational systems for Western psychology. One of the least esoteric and yet one of the most
fundamental concepts appearing in Eastern descriptions of meditation techniques is the concept
of attention. As Ornstein points out,

There are many clues in other places that meditation is primarily an exercise in deployment of
attention rather than in reason or concept formation. And yet the only major attempt in modern
psychology to discuss the practices of meditation, using the concept of attention as the central
element of analysis, has been that of Arthur Deikman. 54

Yet it is not surprising that psychologists have not taken advantage of the fundamental role of
attention, since in Western psychology the terms 'attention', 'awareness', and 'consciousness' are
nearly interchangeable. At best, the term 'attention' is distinguished from the others by being

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used in such a way as to imply that the awareness or consciousness of a person is being
controlled or wilfully directed by that person. Often the term 'selective attention' is added to
suggest more vividly this control over or delimiting of awareness. In these psychologies
awareness and consciousness are treated as basic undefined terms. In psychological theory as
admittedly concerned with Eastern altered states of consciousness as is Tart's we find
consciousness, awareness, and attention being conceived of in this way (see quote on page 8).
Such psychologies employ a much too simplistic distinction between what is in consciousness
for a person and what is not in consciousness. They use a spotlight model of consciousness and
can be considered reductionistic in the sense that their use of this concept of consciousness with
its oversimple distinction forces them into discussion of subtleties at some other level of
description of the person, often the physiological level, in their attempt to explain, in this case,
meditational techniques.

The attentive model attempts to take into account, by describing consciousness in terms of a
distinction between subsidiary awareness and object of attention, what is left out of the
description of consciousness by the spotlight model. We believe that it reflects more accurately
than does the spotlight model the experience of being conscious; we believe our use of terms to
be consistent with common usage and thus do no consider the model to be introducing a
technical vocabulary or jargon. Indeed we believe that in reflecting more accurately the
experience of being conscious it offers the possibility of bridging the gap between Western and

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Easter psychological insights.

Pelletier and Garfield introduce their chapter on meditation with a short historical review of the
attempts made to relate the schizophrenic experience with the mystic experience. In this context
they state:

More recent investigations, such as Laing (1965,1967) and Bateson (1961), have been criticized
for excessively metaphorical portrayals of the schizophrenic experience. These criticisms are
usually directed against proselytizing for schizophrenia, that is, against viewing it as a
"desirable" experience similar to the psychedelic experience. 55

In a work entitled "Towards a Theory of Schizophrenia", an earlier work than the one cited in the
above passage, Bateson, et. al. introduce the notion of a 'double bind situation' hypothesizing
"that a person caught in the double bind may develop schizophrenic symptoms." The
schizophrenic is compared with the Zen pupil:

We feel that the schizophrenic finds himself continually in the same situation as the pupil, but he
achieves something like disorientation rather than enlightenment. 56

In this section we shall follow this lead by comparing a meditational diagram used in Yoga with
the double bind situation. This comparison will consist of an analysis of each in terms of the
model of consciousness we have presented. We feel that the analyses we are about to offer do not
misconstrue the discussions of either presented by the authorities in the respective fields and will
try to exhibit how each analysis is well-founded in this way. We feel also, however, that these
analyses will bring into relief aspects which are shared by the double bind situation and
meditation with the use of the diagram that are easy to miss in descriptions using a terminology
more akin to a model of consciousness other than the one we propose. In performing the task we
set out there we hope to show that the

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notion of relating schizophrenia to enlightenment by describing them as different reactions to a

similar situation is not farfetched. We will then compare descriptions of the schizophrenic
experience supplied by Pelletier and Garfield with descriptions of the transcendental states of
consciousness of the East. In the course of this comparison we will reveal features of our model
of consciousness we have not discussed previously. Our aim in these two parts is to introduce a
novel approach to the problem of theoretically interpreting the implications of Eastern
meditational systems for Western psychology. That we have confined ourselves to a discussion
of a particular diagram, a particular theory of schizophrenia, and descriptions of the states of
enlightenment and schizophrenia is not, we believe, a result of any inherent limitations of the
approach we are taking. 57 Our decision to proceed in the way outlined above is a product of the
desire to present the approach toward reconciliation of Eastern and Western psychological theory
as concisely as possible.

The diagram we will be concerned with is a yantra or meditational diagram called the Shri
Yantra. 58

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Although the diagram appears frequently in the literature concerning Yoga and the class of
diagrams of which it is a member is discussed by such authorities as Eliade and Wood, 59 the
most thorough analysis of the Shri Yantra itself that we have located is given by Zimmer.

A more dynamic symbol- characteristically Indian in its rendition of growing or expanding form-
is represented by the profoundly eloquent Shri Yantra, "Auspicious Yantra", "Yantra above
Yantras". Though apparently no more than a geometrical device, this intricate linear composition
is conceived and designed as a support to meditation- more precisely, to a concentrated
visualization and intimate inner experience of the polar play and logic-shattering paradox of
eternity and time. 60

After a discussion of the Yantras in general, their purpose, etc., Zimmer returns to an inspection
of the Shri Yantra.

Typical of the whole class are the elements of the Shri Yantra: (1) a square outer frame,
composed of straight lines broken according to a regular pattern, (2) an inclosed arrangement of
concentric circles and stylized lotus petals, (3) a concentric composition of nine interpenetrating
triangles. 61

He embarks upon a discussion of the various components, beginning with the frame, telling the
reader that what the "frame represents is a square sanctuary with four doors opening out to the
four quarters, a landing before each entrance, and a low flight of steps leading..." 62 After a
digression he continues:

Returning now to the Shri Yantra, we may perceive under the abstract linear design this same
primal pair [as is exhibited by a male and female figure 'in close embrace']. There are nine
triangles in the figure, interpenetrating, five pointing downward, four upward. The downward-
pointing triangle is a female symbol corresponding to the yoni; it is called "shakti". The upward-
pointing triangle is the male, the lingam, and is called 'the fire' (vahni). .... Thus the vahni-
triangles denote the male essence of the god, and the shakti-triangles the female essence of his
consort.

-page 72-

The nine signify the primitive revelation of the Absolute as it differentiates into graduated
polarities, the creative activity of the cosmic male and female energies on successive stages of
evolution. Most important is the fact that the Absolute itself, the Really Real, is not represented.
It cannot be represented; for it is beyond form and space. The Absolute is to be visualized by the
concentrating devotee as a vanishing point or dot, "the drop" (bindu), amidst the interplay of all
the triangles. This Bindu is the power- point, the invisible, elusive center from which the entire
diagram expands. And now, whereas four of the shakti- triangles link with their represented
vahni-counterparts, the fifth or inner-most, remains over, to unite with the invisible Point. This is
the Primal Shakti, consort of the transcendental Shiva, creative energy as a female manifestation
of the pure, quiescent Brahman, the Great Original.

Like the Shiva-Shakti images, the Shri Yantra symbolizes Life, both universal life and
individual, as an incessant interaction of co-operating opposites. The five female triangles
expanding from above and the four male emerging from below, signify the continuous process of
creation. Like an uninterrupted series of lightning flashes they delve into each other and mirror
the eternal procreative moment - a dynamism nevertheless exhibited in a static pattern of
geometrical repose. This is the archetypal Hieros Gamos, or "Mystical Marriage", represented in
an abstract diagram - a key to the secret of the phenomenal mirage of the world. [italics ours] 63

We are not advocating Zimmer's analysis of the Shri Yantra. Our reasons for presenting it will
become apparent in due course. We have italicized various of the phrases to highlight the
connection between this detailed description and the more general description appearing in the
first quotation from Zimmer. The 'growing or expanding form' he mentions is identified as the
upward expanding series of triangles and downward expanding series. The polar play of which
he speaks is also explicated in terms of the interpenetration of these two sets of triangles. The
paradox of eternity and time is revealed in a static diagram which nevertheless suggests
movement; what cannot be represented has been represented, in some sense. Let us note that
Zimmer's discussion of the diagram is

-page 73-

eloquently stated, but let us also note that he unfolds the symbolism of the diagram by telling us
that various parts of the diagram represent various things and we may note that the relationship
between that which is represented and that which does the representing is established by
convention. That the square outer frame represents a square sanctuary with four doors ... etc., is,
for example, not obvious by looking at the frame.

We will preface our analysis of the diagram with a brief summary of the essential steps of Yoga
meditation., for this will suggest a way in which the diagram can be viewed.
In The Science of Yoga, a commentary on Patanjali's Yoga-Sutras, Taimni tells us that "In the
basic literature of Yoga, the Yoga-Sutras of Patanjali stand out as the most authoritative and
useful book." 64 He tells us that "The three mental processes of Dharana, Dhyana, and Samadhi
constitute Yoga proper..." 65 "The complete process beginning with Dharana and ending in
Samadhi is called Samyama in Yogic terminology." 66

Learning the bodily postures and techniques for regulating the breath and having undergone
certain intellectual and moral training (involving an effort that we do not mean to understate in
dealing with these topics by mere mention of them) is preparatory to entering into the processes
involved in Yoga proper. Entering into this stage requires fixating attention upon an object-
"First, the series of objects which in the case of the ordinary man occupy the mind, one after
another, are replaced by one chosen object, the 'seed' of Samadhi." 67 This first stage, Dharana,
is explained: "The main work in Dharana therefore consists in keeping the mind continuously

-page 74-

engaged in the consideration of the object and to bring it back immediately as soon as the
connection is broken." 68 In describing the second stage of meditation Taimni employs the
notion of a field of consciousness. "As the mind is capable of holding a large variety of objects
simultaneously a word has to be used to denote all these objects taken together irrespective of
their nature. Pratyaya is a technical word for this total content of the mind." 69 He introduces the
term Pratyaya saying that, "the word Pratyaya ... is generally used for the total content of the
mind which occupies the field of consciousness at a particular time." 70 Using this notion of the
totality of the field of consciousness the second stage is explicated: "...continuity of the Pratyaya
is the only thing that distinguishes Dharana from Dhyana from the technical point of view." 71
We could then distinguish between the first and second stage by saying that in the first stage an
object is held in attention without any shifting of attention to distracting objects while in the
second stage no shifting of attitude toward the object is allowed. In the third stage the attitude
toward the object is pared away. This third stage is to reduce "the subjective role of the mind to
the utmost limit." 72 This stage is described as "...a new kind of movement or transformation of
the mind in which consciousness begins to move in depth, as it were, and the object is denuded
of its coverings or non-essential elements like name or form." 73 If we understand the object's
'coverings' to be the tacit assumptions concerning it, we have a description of the third stage as
purging oneself of the tacit assumptions or attitudes in respect of the object of meditation or
attention.
Returning to the Shri Yantra, how can we conceive of it as an object

-page 75-

for meditation? How is one to fixate attention on the diagram? Well, at first glance the diagram
appears to be a symmetrical geometrical design and we know how to fixate attention on such a
design by starting at the point of symmetry at its center. However, the Shri Yantra does not have
a point around which the design is symmetrically fixed. Zimmer alludes to this by mentioning its
elusive center. So in focusing attention inward toward the center we wind up at a point, line, or
configuration none of which is a satisfactory center of symmetry. We find ourselves
compensating the small center triangle, for instance, by widening our scope of attention to it and
some counterpart that promises symmetry and in this way we are forced to widen our scope of
attention in steps until we are attending to an area wide enough that it suggests symmetry. But
we pass to this wider symmetry- suggestive area by a quantum leap, so to speak - we lose
ourselves and find ourselves staring again at the entire configuration which suggests that the
diagram is, after all, symmetrically composed. So we focus in toward the center again in search
of that elusive point. We either become dissatisfied or distracted by some other activity or we
discover the joke, the trick. The diagram is designed to appear symmetrical when we take it, in
its entirety, as an object of attention, but is also cleverly designed so as not to have a point of
symmetry. It is an illustration of paradox: not so much the paradox of time and eternity as the
paradox of a symmetrical object without a point of symmetry - a logical contradiction.

It is instructive to attempt to reproduce the design, the configuration or triangles. It cannot be

constructed rotely, triangle by triangle, as

-page 76-

has been suggested, 74 with accurate results. A recipe for its accurate construction, we have
discovered, is possible if the illusion to be produced is kept in mind, for the pairs of seemingly
identical triangles of which it is composed are actually slightly different although this difference
is negligible to the eye. (That the diagram is meant to appear symmetrical when it is taken in
totality as an object of attention is evident if a pencil is placed horizontally across the center -
what remains above the pencil is symmetrical with what remains below, or at least apparently so,
since the differences are negligible to the eye.)
In describing the class of diagrams of which the Shri Yantra is a member, Zimmer says:

A yantra may serve as (1) a representation of some personification or aspect of the divine, (2) a
model for the worship of a divinity... (3) a kind of chart or schedule for the gradual evolution of a
vision, while identifying the Self with its slowly varying contents, that is to say, with the divinity
in all its phases of transformations. In this case the yantra contains dynamic elements.

....

The given pattern may suggest a static vision of the divinity to be worshipped, the superhuman
presence to be realized, or it may develop a series of visualizations growing and unfolding from
each other as the links or steps of a process.

The latter is the richer, more interesting type, and makes the greater demands upon the initiate. It
works in two directions: first, forward as a course of evolution, then backwards again as a
process of involution, undoing the visions previously unfolded. 75

Whereas Zimmer's analysis attempts to explicate the Shri Yantra in terms of its dynamic
elements, as a diagram which induces a vision, we have pointed out that his analysis is infected
with an appeal to representation. In contrast, we have been considering the diagram with respect
to

-page 77-

the processes in the individual we believe it to be designed to produce, a focusing of attention

inward toward the center and outward, taking a wider scope, then inward again. The expansion
and shrinking of the scope of attention is cleverly induced by the diagram's design. Let us
explain this in the following way. At first glance, when the diagram in its entirety is the object of
attention, it suggests symmetry and attention is deflected to the part of the diagram, its center,
where we would expect a point about which the rest of the diagram is symmetrical. We attend to
the part with the assumption of symmetry. This assumption is implicit as an attitude toward the
part. That the part we attend to does not constitute such a point of symmetry contradicts our
assumption. But in widening our scope of attention, the disconcertion disappears, the
contradiction eludes us and the diagram as a whole again appears symmetrical. At this stage of
entertaining the diagram we are caught in a paradoxical situation, but the paradox is not
apparent. It is elusive because one cannot shift his attention so as to bring the contradiction into
view. The paradox, however, is felt as a sort of discomfort in trying to fixate attention on the
diagram. The diagram is an illusion or magic trick analogous to a type of trick we might imagine
in which an object changes as we begin to look away from it but returns to its original
appearance when we turn to look toward it. But in the case of the diagram we can say that in
delimiting our attention to an area of lesser scope at the center of the diagram we maintain a
subsidiary awareness of the rest of the diagram, the diagram as a whole, part of which can be
described as the tacit assumption that the diagram is symmetrical. The contradiction which is so
befuddling can then be seen as

-page 78-

a contradiction between an implicit assumption and the explicit part or point we choose to attend
to in looking for the point of symmetry. That the assumption of symmetry is one pole of the
contradiction is difficult to discern because in turning back and entertaining the entire diagram as
an object of attention, the diagram appears symmetrical. We can put this in the following terms.
Something, X, can be part of that which we are subsidiarily aware of, or it can be an object of
attention. Our experience of it as an object of attention will differ from our experience of it as a
component of subsidiary awareness. But if the object itself changes to a Y when we are only
subsidiarily aware of it and consistently changes back again to an X when we take it as an object
of attention we have a peculiar situation in which it is difficult to discern what is wrong but feel
nevertheless that something is wrong. The situation we are describing is a double bind situation
and we shall discuss this classification of it but let us first note how the diagram under such a
description can be seen to 'symbolize' the state of enlightenment. The realization that the diagram
is a trick approximates 'enlightenment' insofar as this realization is concomitant with dropping
the assumption that the diagram is symmetrical, since the third stage of Yoga, as we have
described it, is one of purging oneself of assumptions or attitudes in respect of the object of
meditation, a "reduction of the subjective role of the mind to the utmost limit." We shall say
more about this third stage in the next part of this study. Here we only wish to remark that the
diagram can be seen as inducing a realization (enlightenment of sorts) and in such a way it is a
'symbol' of transcendence.

Bateson et al introduce the notion of the double bind situation in the

-page 79-

following way.

The theory of schizophrenia presented here is based on communications analysis, and

specifically on the Theory of Logical Types. From this theory and from observations of
schizophrenic patients is derived a description, and the necessary conditions for, a situation
called the 'double bind' - a situation in which no matter what a person does, he 'can't win'. It is
hypothesized that a person caught in the double bind may develop schizophrenic symptoms. 76

The double bind situation is usually explicated in terms of a contradiction between a message
and a message about that message, a meta-message. Such a contradictory pair constitutes the
essential component of a double bind situation. For example, the intended receiver of the
message: "Do not do so and so or I will punish you" is double-binded inasmuch as he is also
subject to the meta-message: "Do not submit to my prohibitions."

The meta-message is thought to be communicated in a variety of ways, usually non-verbal.

Posture, gesture, tone of voice, meaningful action and the implications concealed in verbal
comment may all be used to convey this more abstract message. 77

In fact, anything which can function to classify a message can be thought of as conveying a
meta-message.

Among human beings this framing and labelling of messages and meaningful actions reaches
considerable complexity, with the peculiarity that our vocabulary for such discrimination is still
very poorly developed, and we rely preponderantly upon non-verbal media of posture, gesture,
facial expression, intonation, and the context for the communication of these highly abstract, but
vitally important, labels. 78

The context in which a message is communicated is understood to indicate how that message is
to be taken:
There is a gulf between context and message (or between meta- message and message) which is
of the same nature as

-page 80-

the gulf between a thing and the word or sign which stands for it, or between the members of a
class and the name of the class. The context (or meta-message) classifies the message, but can
never meet it on equal terms. 79

We believe that what has not been made clear in previous discussions of the double bind
situation is why a contradiction between message and meta-message has the inescapable effect it
is thought to have. We believe that the term 'meta-message' has confused the issue. It is easy to
think of a meta-message as like a message, differing only in that it is a message about another
message. If it is like a message we would expect that our experience of a meta-message is like
our experience of a message. We can attend to messages and hence we may think of a meta-
message also as a possible object of attention. And as long as such pairs as the sentence pair "Do
not do so and so or I will punish you" - "Do not submit to my prohibitions" are taken as the
paradigm for the double bind situation we shall find it hard to understand why the contradiction
is not apparent to the message receiver. Although later attempts to explicate the double bind rely,
as the quotation above exhibits, on identifying meta-message with context, the ramifications of
this terminological development are not made explicit.

Let us consider the experience of a person caught in a double bind situation and attempt to
describe it, using the terminology of our model of consciousness. First, we can imagine the
person to be attending to a message. Second, we can describe the person as having certain tacit
understandings in respect of that message - we can describe the person as subsidiarily aware of
the context in which the message is received, or attended to. We can call those aspects of the
situation he is aware of, albeit

-page 81-

subsidiarily, the experienced or felt context. Third, insofar as the situation the person is in is a
double bind situation we can understand there to be some contradiction between the context as
he experiences it and the message that he is attending to. With this description it is clear that for
a double bind situation to be effective it is necessary that the experienced context never be
allowed to become an object of attention for the person being double binded. The experienced
context in question must remain in subsidiary awareness if the contradiction is to remain
unexposed. The contradictory context will be experienced as a feeling of disconcertion. Let us
consider a description of a double binding interpersonal interaction offered by Bateson in order
to make clear how a person can be induced not to make explicit that of which he is subsidiarily
aware and hence how he can be 'tricked' into experiencing the contradiction (feeling
disconcerted) without becoming explicitly aware that it is a contradiction that he is experiencing.

A young man, who had fairly well recovered from a acute schizophrenic episode was visited in
the hospital by his mother. He was glad to see her and impulsively put his arm around her
shoulders, whereupon she stiffened. He withdrew his arm and she asked, 'Don't you love me any
more?' He then blushed, and she said, 'Dear, you must not be so easily embarrassed and afraid of
your feelings.' The patient was able to stay with her only a few minutes more and following her
departure he assaulted an orderly and was put in the tubs. 80

Bateson continues:

Obviously, this result could have been avoided if the young man had been able to say, 'Mother, it
is obvious that you become uncomfortable when I put my arm around you, and that you have
difficulty accepting a gesture of affection from me.' However, the schizophrenic patient doesn't
have this possibility open to him. His intense dependency and training prevents him from
commenting on

-page 82-

his mother's communicative behavior, though she comments on his and forces him to accept and
to attempt to deal with the complicated sequence. 81

Bateson here cites the patient's 'dependency and training' as that which prevents him from
commenting on the double binding aspects of his situation, as if the patient's failure was not his
failure to be aware of the double binding aspects of the situation but merely an inability to
express this awareness. As an alternative let us imagine that the son was not explicitly aware of
the mother's stiffening, did not notice it. Let us imagine, rather, that he was subsidiarily aware of
his own kinesthetic sensations consequent upon putting his arm around her. We can understand
then that his withdrawal was motivated by a feeling that something was wrong. We can say that
from his point of view his feelings (experienced context) did not fit, or were not appropriate to,
the object of attention he was entertaining (loveable mother). Yet insofar as he was only
subsidiarily aware of the mother's stiffening he was not aware of it as stiffening on the mother's
part and when he withdraws in reaction to his disconcertion she in effect denies that what he was
subsidiarily aware of was her stiffening. In effect she acknowledges that he experienced feelings
that were incompatible with the object (loving mother) that he was attending to but insinuates
that such feelings were negative feelings about her and hence 'inappropriate'.

We can compare this sequence of events with the experience of meditating on the shri Yantra.
The mother is unintentionally playing the same trick on the son that the designer of the Yantra is
playing on the meditator. Insofar as the mother is the son's object of attention she is lovable,
deserving of love. Yet when the son approaches her, puts his arm around

-page 83-

her, relegating her (or part of her) to subsidiary awareness, she changes in a significant way only
to change back again to her previous behavior when the son becomes explicitly aware of her as
an object of attention. 82 But whereas the meditator becomes aware of the trick and hence the
wiser in realizing the mechanism, how are we to understand the result of the double bind
situation to the schizophrenic?

A significant difference between the meditator and potential schizophrenic is that the meditator
begins meditation with what we will call his attention-deflection habits or mechanisms well
established and intact. We suggest that the potential schizophrenic has been prevented from
establishing such habits, or experiences a breakdown of such mechanisms. What we mean by
attention deflection is the ability to shift attention from one object of attention to another while
maintaining an awareness of the initial object, albeit a subsidiary awareness. This ability is none
other than the ability to hold something in mind while shifting attention to something else. Yet it
is this primitive capability that is retarded by subjecting a person repeatedly and at an early age
to the double bind situation as we have described it. For as we have described it, being subjected
to the double bind situation is being subjected to a situation in which an object, in having its
status shifted from object to attention to component of subsidiary awareness, does not maintain
its identity. Not only is the experience of the object different insofar as it is experienced through
subsidiary awareness rather than as an object of attention - the object itself has systematically
changed, has not maintained its previous identity. Repeated experiences of this type would
suggest to the person undergoing them that
-page 84-

that ability we are calling attention deflection is not possible. The person would, in other words,
be prevented from learning the art of contexting and might be described as experiencing the
world in a state of consciousness employing mere attention shifts, as opposed to attention
deflection. Such a state of consciousness would be like experiencing the world as a sequence of
objects of attention without the underlying continuity of an experienced context. (It is interesting
to note that this state of consciousness most nearly approximates the type of consciousness
described by the model of consciousness we have called the spotlight model. But the spotlight
model also intends to describe normal states of consciousness and it lacks the fine distinction
between subsidiary awareness and object of attention, hence it becomes difficult, using the
spotlight model, to distinguish the schizophrenic and normal states.)

Bateson, in the following, is describing the result of double binding on a subject. Although he
chooses to speak in terms of messages and meta-messages it is not difficult to translate this
terminology and see that he is describing a state of consciousness in which there is a shifting of
attention but no simultaneous experience of context. We have put in italics those parts of the
passage that could be translated in this way in order to bring them into relief.

If an individual has spent his life in the kind of double bind relationship described here, his way
of relating to people after a psychotic break would have a systematic pattern. First, he would not
share with normal people those signals which accompany messages to indicate what a person
means. His metacommunicative system - the communications about communications - would

-page 85-

have broken down, and he would not know what kind of message a message was. 83

The absence of meta-communicative framing which was noted in the case of dreams (15) is
characteristic of the waking communications of the schizophrenic. 84

Bateson is clearly speaking of an absence of the ability to context or frame objects of attention.
What would such an experience be like?
When I move quickly it's a strain on me. Things go too quick for my mind. They get blurred and
it's like being blind. It's as if you were seeing a picture one moment and another picture the next.
I just stop and watch my feet. Everything is all right if I stop, but if I start moving again I lose
control. [Italics ours] 85

The above quotation is a first person account cited by Pelletier and Garfield as exemplifying the
loss of the ability to qualitatively differentiate 'between internal and external stimuli' that occur
in incipient schizophrenia and LSD reactions. Elsewhere the authors mention that:

In brief, individuals in the SSC [Schizophrenic State of Consciousness] do manifest a

hypersensitivity to low-to- moderate range intensity stimulation. Since they are focusing on and
responding to marginal stimuli more intensely, they need protection from maximal-intensity
stimulation. The compensatory adaptation of hypo-responsiveness to the latter range of stimuli
serves as the necessary protective adjustment. [italics ours] 86

We are interpreting this passage to indicate a breakdown of contexting abilities. The

schizophrenic, we suggest, will attempt to attend to all stimulation, having been induced to give
up on the possibility of organizing experience of the world by breaking it down into an object of
attention and a context of which there is subsidiary awareness. 86a (This description obviates the
necessity of appealing to the notion of a 'compensatory adaptation of hypo- responsiveness to ...
maximal intensity stimulation'.)

Consider the following descriptions in this context (italicizing ours):

-page 86-

...a suspension and/or alteration of those psychological mechanisms that 'organize, limit, select
and interpret perceptual stimuli or the undoing of automatic perceptual and cognitive structures
[which] permit a gain in sensory intensity and richness at the expense of abstract categorization
and differentiation.' 87

"(1) Hyperattentiveness to a narrow range of sensory and ideational stimuli and (2)
hypoattentiveness to ordinarily responded to attributes of the environment." 88
As a response to heightened sensory stimulation, both the schizophrenic and the LSD user
experience themselves as bound to incidental stimuli. Often distressing is the fact that these
stimuli may be incidental while compulsion to attend is experienced as intense and
unpredictable. The results of this lack-of-attention inhibition may vary from irritability and
confusion to the experience of dissolution of perceptual gestalts. We agree with Silverman's
(1969) observation that hypersensitivity to minutiae and hypo-responsiveness to logically higher-
order aspects of the perceptual field are, at minimum, antecedents to thought disorder. 89

Behaviour such as maintaining a fixed gaze, closing the eyes, and hiding in corners is an attempt
to avoid interaction. Most patients report a blocking phenomena that is most aptly defined by the
following subjective report: "I don't like dividing my attention at anytime because it leads to
confusion and I don't know where I am or who I am. When this starts I just go into a trance and I
just turn off all my senses and I don't see anything and I don't hear anything." (Chapman, 1966)
90

The schizophrenic is attending to what we normally are only subsidiarily aware of and his lack of
contexting abilities accounts for the lack of continuity which experienced context provides,
hence he appears confused and over-stimulated while at the same time appearing unable to attend
to the attributes of the environment we 'normally' attend to.

Of particular interest is the potential of ASC phenomena to illuminate many mysteries of the
phenomenology of the self, which is the core consideration of any psychological science. 91

-page 87-

So say Pelletier and Garfield who describe the schizophrenic as undergoing an "experienced loss
of an immediate and continuous sense of self." 92 Indeed, they contend that,

What is common to [psychosis, meditative, and drug induced states] is the suspension of the
ordinary conception of identity; this experience, according to all religious tradition, is an
essential prerequisite to comprehending the true nature of the self. 93
In the preceding discussion of Yoga and schizophrenia we have laid the groundwork for
discerning a common feature of the state of enlightenment and schizophrenia. We viewed the
schizophrenic experience in terms of an absence of framing or contexting and we quoted a
description of the third stage of Yoga meditation as a reduction of "the subjective role of the
mind to the utmost limit." 94 We cited a passage from Bateson which compared the relationship
between context and message (or, object of attention) with the relationship between word and
thing, and saw the third stage of Yoga meditation described as "a new kind of movement or
transformation of the mind in which consciousness begins to move in depth, as it were, and the
object is denuded of its coverings or non-essential elements like name or form." 95 The absence
of experienced context, reduction of subjective role, paring away of conceptual attitudes -- such
phrases suggest that what schizophrenia and enlightenment have in common they have in
common by virtue of being types of consciousness that depart from normal or everyday
consciousness in that such states of consciousness do not permit description in terms of a
bifurcation into a subsidiary awareness and an object of attention standing in relation of ground
to figure. It is our contention that such states of consciousness are non-normal or 'altered' insofar
as

-page 88-

they are exceptions to the model of consciousness which conceives of consciousness as

subsidiary awareness/object of attention. 96 It is also our contention that insofar as these states
transcend or eliminate this fundamental bifurcation of consciousness they result in an
'experienced loss of an immediate and continuous sense of self', a 'suspension of the ordinary
conception of identity".

What we are saying, in other words, is that the experience of loss of immediate and continuous
sense of self is a necessary consequence of the absence of experienced context. We are
subsidiarily aware of context and refer to this awareness in speaking of tacit assumptions and
implicit themes. When this awareness of context is attenuated - when there is an absence of
experienced context, a reduction of the subjective role of the mind to its utmost limit, a dropping
off of implicit attitudes toward an object of attention - there will be a concomitant loss-of-self
phenomenon.

We have proposed a model of consciousness which conceives of everyday or normal

consciousness as subsidiary awareness/object of attention and now propose to identify the 'self'
or 'subject' of consciousness with subsidiary awareness. In doing this we add a new dimension to
our model of consciousness and can describe consciousness (normal consciousness) in terms of
the polarity self- object.

Authorities on Eastern religions have in essence identified self with subsidiary awareness. The
third stage of Yoga meditation which is described as a reduction to the utmost limit of the
subjective mind, a denuding the object of attention of its coverings, we have redescribed as a loss
of experienced context, an attenuation of subsidiary awareness. Taimni speaks

-page 89-

of Samadhi, the state which is attained by this process, in terms of "the absence of the mental
self-awareness which makes the object shine in a new light." 97 Eliade speaks of it as follows:

the recovery, through Samadhi, of the original non-duality introduces a new element in respect of
the primordial situation (that which existed before the twofold division of the real into object-
subject). 98

The new element of which Eliade speaks is a freedom from conditioning. The normal
consciousness is 'conditioned' in the sense that in normal consciousness we identify ourselves
with the prevailing condition or situation -- we experience context through subsidiary awareness
but experience it by the mode of feeling. We hold the context in mind while attending to an
object, but experience awareness of the context as a feeling about the object. In a manner of
speaking we are the experienced context. At any given moment we are the tacit assumptions we
make about the object of attention at that moment. Our personalities can be described in terms of
the unique habits each of us as individuals have in contexting objects of attention. And
sometimes, as our analysis of the work of Bandler and Grinder would have it, our patterns of
contexting render certain elements of experience habitually tacit, which can cause self-inflicted
suffering.

Perhaps we can distinguish between the experience of schizophrenia and the experience of
enlightenment by recalling that the enlightenment experience is prepared for by training in what
to expect. The initiate in meditation is told in one form or other to expect a loss-of-self
phenomenon, and is prepared for this by being made to follow the prescriptions that would have
him regulate his desires and fears, assume an attitude of non-attachment to objects and adopt a
stance of non-involvement in his feelings.

-page 90-

The schizophrenic may simply be ill-prepared for this novel state of consciousness and complain
of loss of feeling, loss-of-self, etc.:

Perhaps the most marked contrast between the two ASC's (schizophrenia and enlightenment) is
in the ability of the individual to deal with the dissolution of the ego and with his break with
outer reality. 99

We have been appealing to the East's discussion of transcendental states of consciousness to see
what they can tell us about normal states of consciousness by way of contrast. And in this work
we hope to do no more than indicate that such discussions tend to support the view that normal
consciousness is fundamentally organized into an object of attention and a subsidiary awareness
and that the existence of subsidiary awareness provides for a sense of continuity of self in normal
consciousness. But in identifying the self with subsidiary awareness we also have in mind a
previous work by one of the authors of this present work which proposed a solution to
philosophical problems regarding the nature of the self that have appeared in the Western
tradition and date back to Hume. This solution entailed identifying the self with what in that
work was referred to as 'unprojected conscious- ness' and is here referred to as 'subsidiary
awareness'. 100

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Footnotes

53. K.R. Pelletier and C. Garfield, op.cit., p.119.

back to text

54. C. Naranjo and R.E. Ornstein, On the psychology of meditation (New York:The Viking
Press,1971), p.142.
back to text

55. K.R. Pelletier and C. Garfield, op.cit., p.105.

back to text

56. G Bateson, op.cit., p.179.

back to text

57. We take the space to briefly mention two further possibilities of comparing Eastern and
Western psychological insight using the attentive model. 1) In more thoroughly integrating the
concept of feeling into a discussion of consciousness the model provides a theoretical framework
that offers an opportunity for comparing the role feeling plays in various meditational practices
with its role in various psycho- therapeutic techniques. In the West we find Carl Rogers claiming
that a feeling loses its explosiveness when a client brings that feeling into explicit awareness. [C.
Rogers, On becoming a person (Boston:Houghton Mifflin,1961), p.318-319, for instance.]
Tarthang Tulku, a Tibetan Buddhist, describes a meditational technique designed with a similar
purpose in mind. It amounts to turning attention to "the immediate feeling- tone of each item of
experience." [T. Tulku, ed., Reflections of mind (Emeryville,Ca.:Dharma,1975), p.13.] With the
attentive model in mind we can understand that one could not successfully turn attention to an
underlying feeling state without depriving it of its subsidiary status and hence of its contexting
function. 2) Many of the Eastern meditational schools include techniques in which one's
breathing is taken as an object of attention. Breathing is normally a habitually tacit component of
experience and the East shows a great deal of understanding for the fact that breathing patterns
correspond to thought processes, to the extent, for instance, that it has been suggested that one is
more likely to shift attention from one object to attention to another between exhale and inhale.
On the attentive model, one's breathing, when it is not paid attention to, would be conceived of
as a component of subsidiary awareness having a contexting function. Milton Erickson seems to
be well aware of this as is exemplified by the fact that in inducing hypnosis in one case he
intentionally synchronized his words to a patient's breathing pattern, directing the patient's
attention only to certain sensations corresponding with the patient's inhalations, explaining in
commentary, "nobody notices inspiration and expiration, they're used to that." [J. Haley, ed.,
Advanced techniques of hypnosis and therapy: selected papers of Milton H. Erickson, M.D.
(New York:Grune & Stratton,1967), p.53.]

In the use of another technique Erickson relies on the contexting function unheeded sensations
play in consciousness. In this case Erickson intentionally uses a particular word in his verbal
communications with a subject each time he witnesses a natural decrease in the rapidity of the
subject's eye blink. The subject, who is attending to the verbal communications, does not notice
the sensations accompanying eye blink and is not aware of the correlation between word and rate
of eye blink. But subsequent use of the word by Erickson evokes slower blinking and an
associated drowsy feeling. Essentially Erickson is performing a function similar to the one
performed by a biofeedback instrument in a conditioning experiment of Barbara Brown's which
we shall discuss in the Addendum. (see page 103).[M.H. Erickson, E.L. Rossi and S.I.
Rossi,Hypnotic realities (New York:Irvington Publishers,1976), p.268.]

back to text

58. This illustration is reproduced from M. Eliade, Patanjali and yoga, translated by C.L.
Markmann (New York:Schocken Books,1975), p.94.

back to text

59. Discussions of the Shri Yantra can be found in the following selected works:

M. Eliade, Yoga: immortality and freedom, 2nd ed., translated by W.R. Trask (New
York:Bollingen Foundation,1969).

E. Wood, Yoga (Harmondsworth,Middlesex,England:Penguin Books,1962).

C.G.Jung, Dreams, translated by R.F.C. Hull (Princeton:Princeton Univ. Press,1974).

A. Mookerjee and M. Khanna, The tantric way (Boston:N.Y. Graphic Society,1977).

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60. H. Zimmer, Myths and symbols in Indian art and civilization, edited by J. Campbell (New
York:Pantheon Books,1946),p.140.

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61. Ibid., p,143.

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62. Ibid.

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63. Ibid., p.146.

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64. I.K. Taimni, The science of yoga (Wheaton, III:The Theosophical Publ. House,1967),p.viii.

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65. Ibid., p.291.

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66. Ibid., p.286.

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67. Ibid., p.298.

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68. Ibid., p.278.

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69. Ibid., p.278.

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70. Ibid.

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71. Ibid., p.280.

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72. Ibid., p.283.

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73. Ibid., p.298.

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74. P. Pott, Yoga and yantra, translated by R. Needham (The Hague:M. Nijhoff,1966), p.42.

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75. H. Zimmer, op.cit., p.141.

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76. G. Bateson, op.cit., p.173.

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77. Ibid., p.178.

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78. Ibid., p.174.

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79. Ibid., p.218.

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80. Ibid., p.188.

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81. Ibid.

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82. Indeed, we needn't take too seriously the notion of a sequence in which the mother as son's
object of attention behaves in one way and then as she is relegated to the son's subsidiary
awareness behaves differently. The double bind would be effective as long as, for instance, her
bodily expressions insofar as they were picked up subsidiarily by the son were inconsistent with
her words as he attends to them. In this context it is interesting to note that in a volume not
previously considered in this study, Grinder and Bandler explicitly deny that a person's gestures
and the like can stand in relationship to his verbal communications as met- message to message,
and thy go on to discard the notion of meta-message altogether. This forces them into a spotlight
model in which all messages stand on the same level as 'paramessages', and Bateson's distinction
between a hierarchy of levels in respect of the distinction between meta-message and message is
abandoned along with the term. By contrast if we interpret the distinction between meta-message
and message in terms of the model, subsidiary awareness/object of attention, we preserve the
hierarchical order between meta- message and message because in identifying the meta-message
with experienced context, we show the meta role of the meta- message. In terms of the attentive
model we experience meta- messages subsidiarily, and we experience messages by contrast as
objects of attention. In this way we make sense of the idea rejected by Grinder and Bandler that a
person's gestures and the like can stand in relation to his verbal communications as meta-
message to message; the receiver of the messages is subsidiarily aware of the speaker's gestures.
and aware of his spoken message as an object of attention. Given this understanding of meta-
message it is instructive to read the following passage by Grinder and Bandler understanding its
references to the therapists feelings as references to his subsidiary awareness or meta-messages.
We can then view this passage as one in which Grinder and Bandler, despite themselves, give a
fine example of what it is like to experience a double bind...

First, the therapist may fail to detect (consciously) the incongruities--the non-matching messages
being presented by the client. Our observations of this situation are that, when a therapist fails to
detect incongruities which the client is presenting, the therapist himself, initially, feels confused
and uncertain. The therapist's feelings of uncertainty usually persist and he becomes more and
more uncomfortable. Typically, therapists report feeling as though they were missing something.
(Italics added) J. Grinder and R. Bandler, The structure of magic, vol.2 (Palo Alto:Science and
Behavior Books,1976), p.31.

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83. G. Bateson, op.cit., p.182.

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84. Ibid., p.163.

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85. K.R. Pelletier and G. Garfield, op.cit., p.69.

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86. Ibid., p.95.

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86a. Angyal advanced a similar hypothesis when he suggested that the schizophrenic
characteristically fails in apprehending and constructing frames of reference or "systems" (see
page 40 of this work).

When such a frame of reference is lacking, entirely incongruous elements may be brought
together by the patient. This is quite in agreement with the view I am trying to express. Without
giving any further examples, I think that one is justified in saying that in the realm of intellectual
operations there are certain dimensional media. We may call them fields or realms or frames of
reference or context or universes of discourse or strata. Some such field is necessarily implied in
any system or holistic organization. The schizophrenic thinking disturbance is characterized by a
difficulty in apprehending and constructing such organized fields. [A. Angyal, "Disturbances in
thinking in schizophrenia." In J.S. Kasanin (ed.) Language and thought in schizophrenia (New
York:Norton Library,1944), p.120.]

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87. K.R. Pelletier and G. Garfield, op.cit., p.96.

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88. Ibid., p.94 Pelletier and Garfield quoting J. Silverman.

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89. Ibid., p.68.

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90. Ibid., p.75.

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91. Ibid., p.102.

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92. Ibid., p.54.

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93. Ibid., p.123.

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94. To show that this idea is not only found in the Yoga tradition but also in Buddhism we offer
the following passage in which H. Thera describes the process by which the subject reaches what
he alls 'bare attention'.

For instance, the normal visual perception, if it is of evidence or any interest to the observer, will
rarely present the visual object pure and simple, but the object will appear in the light of added
subjective judgments: beautiful or ugly, pleasant or unpleasant, useful, useless, or harmful. If it
concerns a living being, there will also enter into the preconceived notion: this is a personality,
an ego, just as "I" am, too! ... It is the task of bare attention to eliminate all those alien additions
from the object proper that is then in the field of perception. [C. Naranjo and R.E. Ornstein,
op.cit., p.87.]

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95. I.K. Taimni, op.cit., p.298.

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96. In the following passage Ornstein gives a general characterization of the non-normal states of
consciousness attained by practitioners of Eastern traditions. We note that his description of them
invites understanding them as involving the overcoming of or disappearance of the bifurcation
found in normal states of consciousness which we have modeled as subsidiary awareness/object
of attention.

The three major traditions that we've considered each speak of developing an awareness that
allows every stimulus to enter into consciousness devoid of our normal selection process, devoid
of normal tuning and normal input selection, model-building, and the normal category of
systems. [C. Naranjo and R.E. Ornstein, op.cit., p.194.]

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97. I.K. Taimni, op.cit., p.283.

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98. M. Eliade, The two and the one, translated by J.M. Cohen (New York:Harper
Torchbacks,1965), p.119.

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99. K.R. Pelletier and G. Garfield, op.cit., p.111.

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100. C.O. Evans, op.cit.

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CONSCIOUSNESS

© C.O. Evans & J. Fudjack

Addendum A - The Concept of Generalized

Reality-Orientation [table of contents] [previous] [next]

ADDENDUM

A variety of theories, concepts, and research findings are subject to reconsideration in the light of
a new paradigm of consciousness. A large body of significant literature could be reviewed with
the attentive model in mind. We choose, in this addendum, to consider a small portion of this
work, sketching some of the ramifications of the model we propose. Sections A through H deal
respectively with the concept of Generalized Reality- Orientation as proposed by Shor, Freud's
concepts of the Preconscious and Unconscious, Biofeedback Research and the theoretical
framework used for interpreting its results, research in Subliminal Perception, William James'
model of consciousness, the Unconscious revisited and the concept of the Complex, the
Archetypal Representations of which Jung speaks, and the Yogic concept of Vasana. The
sequence in which these parts are presented is designed to highlight their interrelatedness.

Addendum A

In an article entitled "Hypnosis and the Concept of Generalized Reality-Orientation", R. Schor

speaks of a 'usual orientation to reality', a frame of reference existing in the background of
attention which, as he puts it, "can temporarily disintegrate in special states of mind." 101 In the
following passage he introduces this notion of a 'usual generalized reality- orientation. The point
we understand Shor to be making is that in entertaining an object of attention in normal states of
consciousness we are subsidiarily aware of a frame or context that can consequently be
understood to have an orientational function.

The present work attempts to develop the system of ideas

-page 92-

implicit in White's descriptions of the altered state. A series of twelve propositions has been
formulated in regard to the processes that produce the altered state, along with their implications
and ramifications for hypnosis, related states, and cognitive theory in general.

1. The usual state of consciousness is characterized by the mobilization of a structured frame of

reference in the background of attention which supports, interprets, and gives meaning to all
experiences. This frame of reference will be called the usual generalized reality-orientation.

Perhaps the best way to explain what is meant by this proposition is to describe a state of
consciousness in which the usual generalized reality-orientation is not mobilized, in order to see
more clearly the psychic functions that are imputed to it Many experiences could be cited as
illustrations -- from literature, "mystic" experiences, or pathologic states.

The best of these have the quality of merging of self and world (as in the typical Nirvana
experience), whereas the clearest illustration of our proposition would be an instance of the loss
of self and world entirely. 102

We find this passage consistent with our descriptions of altered states of consciousness in Part
III; note especially that the loss of the usual generalized reality-orientation, its 'temporary
disintegratio' in special states of mind, is connected with a concomitant loss-of-self experience.

Having connected the sense-of-self that we experience in normal states of consciousness with the
presence of the generalized reality-orientation it is not surprising that he should go on to identify
the generalized reality-orientation as the Freudian 'ego' in the following way.
Those who wish to view our discussion in general freudian terminology may consider the
generalized reality-orientation roughly equivalent to the cognitive components of the ego or the
secondary-process orientation. 103

We might recall that for Freud there is a special connection between secondary process and the
preconscious:

We have found that processes in the unconscious or in the id obey different laws from those in
the preconscious ego. We name these laws in their totality the primary process,

-page 93-

in contrast to the secondary process which governs the course of events in the preconscious, in
the ego. 104

We have suggested relating the concept of subsidiary awareness to Shor's concept of generalized
reality-orientation. Now we see that the latter is intimately associated with the notion of the
'preconscious'. Can we expect, then, that the concept of the preconscious could be articulated in
terms of the concept of subsidiary awareness? The next section investigates this possibility and
related matters.

[table of contents] [previous] [next]

Footnotes

101. R.E. Shor, "Hypnosis and the concept of the generalized reality-orientation." In C.T. Tart
(ed.), Altered states of consciousness (Garden City:Anchor Books,1969), p.243.
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102. Ibid., p.242.

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103. Ibid., p.245 note.

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104. S. Freud, "An outline of psycho-analysis." In J. Strachey (ed.), Standard edition, vol. 23
(London:Hogarth Press, 1964), p.164.

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CONSCIOUSNESS

© C.O. Evans & J. Fudjack

Addendum B - The Preconscious and

Unconscious in Freud [table of contents] [previous] [next]

Freud conceived of consciousness as a spotlight. He intended a fundamental distinction between

that which, for a particular individual at a given time, is in consciousness and that which is not.
He had little more to offer on the subject of consciousness per se. Yet he was not content to
speak merely of that-which-is- not-in-consciousness; he wanted to speak of AN unconscious
consisting of contents or processes. And he furthermore wanted to describe these contents or
processes as 'mental' (in contrast to merely physical or physiological ones). In this section we
shall present the view that in positing the existence of an unconscious Freud was compensating
for the deficiencies of the spotlight model of consciousness he tacitly assumed. We take the
position that the attentive model, by describing consciousness in terms of a distinction which is
absent in the spotlight model, the distinction between object of attention and subsidiary
awareness, precludes the necessity of appealing, as Freud does, to the existence of an
unconscious (operating outside the limits of consciousness yet possessing 'mental' attributes) for
the purpose of explaining certain psychological phenomena. At the same time, adopting this
position does not

-page 94-

involve dispensing with the concept of the unconscious altogether, as Freud feared it did.

We are suggesting that the essentials of Freud's model of mind can be restated in terms of a
model of consciousness, the attentive model. Let us proceed, then, by asking if the distinction
between 'the conscious' and 'the unconscious', as Freud uses these terms, can be reformulated in
terms of the concepts 'object of attention' and 'subsidiary awareness'.

The decisive confrontation between the attentive model of consciousness and Freud's theory of
the unconscious comes in a footnote to The Ego and the Id. It contains the remark which at once
allows us to identify the view of consciousness Freud is attacking with the one of which the
attentive model is an explication. "Further", he adds, "to include 'what is unnoticeable' under the
concept of 'what is conscious' is simply to play havoc with the one and only piece of direct and
certain knowledge that we have about the mind." But this is precisely what the attentive model
does when it includes what is felt subsidiarily under the concept of 'what is conscious'. It is
necessary to quote the whole footnote which reads like a review of Freud of, essentially, the
attentive model of consciousness. However, we maintain, it reads like a review of a position in
which the reviewer does not have the benefit of a complete explication. Thus from the
perspective of such an explication a decisive rejoinder to Freud's argument can be offered, a
rejoinder therefore which Freud necessarily failed to consider. It concerns the move made in
Freud's argument from 'what is unnoticed' to 'what is unnoticeable'. These moves should be given
close attention when reading the passage.

-page 95-
A new turn taken by criticisms of the unconscious deserves consideration at this point. Some
investigators, who do not refuse to recognize the facts of psycho-analysis but who are unwilling
to accept the unconscious, find a way out of the difficulty in the fact, which no one contests, that
in consciousness (regarded as a phenomenon) it is possible to distinguish a great variety of
gradations in intensity or clarity. Just as there are processes which are very vividly, glaringly,
and tangibly conscious, so we also experience others which are only faintly, hardly even
noticeably conscious; those that are most faintly conscious are, it is argued, the ones to which
psycho-analysis wishes to apply the unsuitable name 'unconscious'. These too, however (the
argument proceeds), are conscious or 'in consciousness', and can be made fully and intensely
conscious if sufficient attention is paid to them.

In so far as it is possible to influence by arguments the decision of a question of this kind which
depends either on convention or on emotional facts, we make the following comments. The
reference to gradations of clarity in consciousness is in no way conclusive and has no more
evidential value than such analogous statements as: 'There are so very many gradations in
illumination -- from the most glaring and dazzling light to the dimmest glimmer -- therefore
there is n such thing as darkness at all'; or, 'There are varying degrees of vitality, therefore there
is no such thing as death.' Such statements may in a certain way have a meaning, but for practical
purposes they are worthless. This will be seen if one tries to draw particular conclusions from
them, such as, 'there is therefore no need to strike a light', or 'therefore all organisms are
immortal.' Further, to include 'what is unnoticeable' under the concept of 'what is conscious' is
simply to play havoc with the one and only piece of direct and certain knowledge that we have
about the mind. And after all, a consciousness of which one knows nothing seems to me a good
deal more absurd than something mental that is unconscious. Finally, this attempt to equate what
is unnoticed with what is unconscious is obviously made without taking into account the
dynamic conditions involved, which were the decisive factors in forming the psycho-analytic
view. For it ignores two facts: first, that it is exceedingly difficult and requires very great effort
to concentrate enough attention on something unnoticed of this kind; and secondly, that when
this has been achieved the thought which was previously unnoticed is not recognized by
consciousness, but often seems entirely alien and opposed to it and is promptly disavowed by it.
Thus, seeking refuge from the unconscious in what is scarcely noticed or unnoticed is after all
only a derivative of the preconceived belief which regards the identity of the psychical and the
conscious as settled once and for all. 105

-page 96-

Let us then take up the argument with the remark we picked out before quoting the full passage
and notice that in making that remark Freud opted for a spotlight model of consciousness. For he
implies that if 'what is unnoticeable' cannot be included under the concept of 'what is conscious'
then only 'what is noticed' can be so included. In other words, he took the view that only what is
noticed is conscious. Just as an object either is or is not in the spotlight, so a content either is or
is not conscious.

Having adopted the spotlight model Freud was forced to conclude that if whatever is conscious is
noticed then whatever is not noticed is unconscious. But here he came upon two possibilities.
Something may just happen to be unnoticed and be easily capable of becoming conscious by
having attention turned to it, and something may be unnoticed and very difficult if not impossible
to notice. In other words, a distinction must be made between 'what is unnoticed' and 'what is
unnoticeable'. This Freud recognized, and he made it quite clear that the case he was really
interested in was the case of something being not only unnoticed but unnoticeable. He wished to
reserve his concept of the unconscious to refer to 'what is unnoticeable' as distinct from what is
merely unnoticed. He made the distinction by describing the case of 'what is unnoticed' as a case
of what is unconscious in the descriptive sense and the case of 'what is unnoticeable' as a case of
what is unconscious in the dynamic sense. He created the ter 'preconscious' to refer to what is
merely unnoticed or unconscious only in the descriptive sense and reserved the term
'unconscious' for what is unnoticeable or unconscious in the dynamic sense - the unconscious
proper, as he puts it. 106 In our terms we can understand Freud to be making the point that a
distinction

-page 97-

must be made between that which is unconscious in the sense in which 'unconscious' would
mean 'not an object of attention' and the sense in which 'unconscious' would mean 'not easily
capable of becoming an object of attention'. As Freud himself says of the latter, the dynamically
unconscious, "...it is exceedingly difficult and requires very great effort to concentrate enough
attention on something unnoticed of this kind."

Freud's final move against the view of consciousness of his nameless opponents (who, and as we
shall see in a later section, can be identified as Myers, Wundt, and James) is to argue that their
identification of 'what is unnoticed' with 'what is unnoticed-yet-in-consciousness' leaves them
with no way of distinguishing between 'what is unnoticed' and 'what is unnoticeable' - between
the preconscious and the unconscious - since both are equally describable as 'what is unnoticed-
yet-in- consciousness'. Hence the point of the final remark of the footnote in which Freud rejects
the identification of the unconscious proper with 'what is scarcely noticed or unnoticed'.

Let us now consider the rejoinder to Freud's argument which the attentive model makes
available. We construe Freud's references to 'what is unnoticed' as references to subsidiary
awareness, since subsidiary awareness is a concept of 'what is unnoticed-yet-in-consciousness'.
And we suggest that not only references to 'what is unnoticed' but also references to 'what is
unnoticeable' are to be understood to be references to components of subsidiary awareness. The
distinction between 'what is unnoticed' and 'what is unnoticeable' is then understood to be a
distinction between components of subsidiary awareness. The one type of component is one
which is unnoticed but easily capable of becoming noticed. The other is one which is

-page 98-

unnoticed but not easily capable of becoming noticed. That is to say, the reference to 'what is
unnoticeable' is interpreted as a reference to 'what is habitually unnoticed'. Thus, whether we are
talking about the one type or the other, in either case we are referring to subsidiary awareness. If
we now remember that on the attentive model components of subsidiary awareness are ascribed a
contexting function for objects of attention, Freud's distinction between 'unnoticed' and
'unnoticeable' becomes a distinction between a contexting component of subsidiary awareness
which can be made an object of attention by the subject, and a contexting component which
cannot, or only with extreme difficulty. On this interpretation Freud's unconscious proper
becomes the class of habitually unnoticed contexting components of subsidiary awareness. On
this interpretation the class of 'what is unnoticeable' is a subclass of 'what is unnoticed', and the
Freudian concept of the unconscious serves to identify the subclass of habitually unnoticed
contexting components of subsidiary awareness.

It is important to mention that the attentive model of consciousness justifies the continued use of
the concept of the unconscious proper, since it gives it an interpretation according to which
references to the unconscious are construed as references to an extremely important feature of
subsidiary awareness; namely, the fact that there are habitually unnoticed contexting components
of subsidiary awareness. This has to be said, because by implication Freud may be read as
fearing that the view explicated by the attentive model seeks to eliminate the concept of the
unconscious altogether. To the contrary, the attentive model supplies us with a theoretical
conception of
-page 99-

the unconscious proper, and relates it to the preconscious in a way that avoids treating it as
operating outside the limits of consciousness and yet as possessing 'mental attributes'.

Freud's footnote contains one further point which we have left outstanding. It concerns what
happens when (under analysis) 'what is unnoticeable' (unconscious) is brought to attention as
'what is noticed'. We defer coverage of this point until a later section, since our treatment
depends upon material which has to be introduced before a satisfactory statement of so complex
a theory can be articulated. Until we return to this point the present rejoinder to Freud should be
treated as provisional.

[table of contents] [previous] [next]

Footnotes

105. S. Freud, "The ego and the id." In J. Strachey (ed.), Standard edition, vol. 19
(London:Hogarth Press,1961), p.16 note.

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106. Ibid., p.15.

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CONSCIOUSNESS

© C.O. Evans & J. Fudjack

Addendum C -

Biofeedback Research [table of contents] [previous] [next]

In this section and the next we suggest a theoretical interpretation of the data and findings of two
important new areas of scientific research, namely biofeedback research and research into
subliminal perception. We attempt to follow out the theoretical consequences of approaching this
data utilizing the attentive model, and we attempt to show that on analysis it may be concluded
that scientific researchers in both these fields have unconsciously assumed a spotlight model of
consciousness. Our claim is that we can make a lot more sense of the findings in both fields if
they are interpreted from the standpoint of the attentive model of consciousness. We shall
examine biofeedback research in this section, and research on subliminal perception in the next.

To understand what is meant by biofeedback we have to think of a subject as capable of making

an adaptive response when that person's attention is drawn to information about his or her own
physiological processes.

-page 100-

A biofeedback instrument is an instrument which makes this information available to the subject.
This it does when it is connected to the subject's body by means of electrodes. The instrument
measures changes in electrical activity occurring in the region of the body to which the
electrodes are attached. These measures of electrical activity are displayed in such a way that the
subject can make of the display an object of attention. The display may consist of movements of
a needle across a dial, a changing sound, or a fluctuating light.

After a period of biofeedback training a subject learns to control the performance of the
biofeedback instrument. That is to say, the subject learns to keep a needle steady at a point on a
dial (which has been pre-selected), or to reduce the pitch of a sound, or to make a light go out or
change color. In effect the subject has learned to act as the switch for the instrument.
Since the instrument is only registering a particular physiological process (such as heart beat,
brain wave, or skin electrical response), it follows that to exercise control over the instrument is
at the same time self-control of a physiological process.

Biofeedback learning is not complete when the subject has learned to control the performance of
the instrument. It is completed when the subject can dispense with the instrument and alter a
chosen physiological process at will without receiving the information made available by the
instrument.

The question arises, How do subjects do this? The answer must be that

-page 101-

another type of information than information supplied by the instrument is available to the
subject. Subjects testify that this other type of information comes from subjective experience.
107 The attentive model provides us with a possible explanation of how a subject's subjective
experience supplies him or her with this information.

The biofeedback instrument provides the subject (whom we shall suppose to be a woman) with
objects of attention which are only obtained when she is in a particular underlying feeling state.
This means that she cannot have the object of attention and fail at the same time to have the
accompanying feeling state. She can be absolutely certain (for reasons of logical necessity) that
when she experiences a particular object of attention (instrument reading) she is in a given
underlying feeling state (the alpha state of relaxation, for instance). The information then about
her physiological processes received by 'perceptual data' from biofeedback instrument reaches
her in the form of objects of attention. The other kind of information is information she is privy
to by virtue of experiencing the underlying feel state she is in while attending to the reading of
the instrument.

Given the idea of an underlying feeling state -- the experience of the feel or quality of life at a
particular moment - - it is possible to understand how the subject has information about her
physiological processes independently of the information coming from the biofeedback
instrument . This kind of information is information the subject possesses about the way she feels
and is presented only in the form of feeling, not in the form of objects of attention. However, if
an object of attention such as a reading on a dial, is constantly and consistently presented to a
subject when in a particular

-page 102-

feeling state, so that within the subject's experience the two become correlated, a researcher can
identify that feeling state by referring to the corresponding object of attention. The subject then
knows what feeling state the researcher is interested in having reproduced and she can oblige
because she knows how the state feels, can tell when she is in it, and can produce it by
entertaining one of a set of appropriate objects of attention.

So in order for the subject to dispense with the information of the biofeedback instrument she
simply has to find a substitute object of attention to the one offered by the instrument which has
the same property as the latter. The property in question is the property of only being present
when the person is in the required feeling state. The attentive model explains how it is possible to
find such substitute objects of attention. In concrete terms what we are referring to here as object
of attention are such things as mental images, visual or auditory images, perceptual objects,
memories, or thoughts. Some among such objects of attention will have the propensity to change
the subject's underlying feeling state in the direction she determines (the alpha state if that is the
choice). They have this propensity since it is the assumption of the attentive model of
consciousness that every object of attention influences the quality of the underlying feeling state,
and every change in underlying feelings state influences the selection of each succeeding object
of attention. All the subject needs to do, therefore, in learning to manage without the instrument
is to find by trial and error which objects of attention is supplied by the instrument.

Indeed, the desired instrument reading itself, when imagined may be all

-page 103-

that is necessary to induce the appropriate feeling state. For insofar as the subject has been
conditioned to experience that particular object of attention while in the feeling state in question
(and this is insured by the biofeedback equipment set- up) subsequent entertaining of that object
of attention can be expected to induce the desired feeling state. This has been shown in a related
experiment in which Brown conditions subjects to respond to a particular color with a specific
feeling by the simple procedure of having them merely attend to the hue of a light which
(unbeknownst to the subject) shone with that particular color only when, and every time, the
subject happened to be in that specified feeling state (as determined by a biofeedback
instrument). 108 The case in which the subject by imagining a desired dial reading of a
biofeedback instrument is effective in bringing about that reading in reality is not essentially
different though it may appear a more surprising, perhaps magical occurrence. For in principle
we might diagram the process occurring in both cases like this:

object of attention

entertained ——> feeling state

induced ——> dial reading

registered

When the entertained object of attention is the imagined dial reading the process is no different
from when it is something else. And as long as the entertained object of attention, no matter what
it is, induces the requisite feeling state the dial reading will register accordingly. However, when,
in analyzing what happens in the case in which the imagined dial reading brings about the
reading in reality, mention of the intermediate term (the feeling state) is suppressed, it appears as
if the movement of the dial is the immediate effect of thinking it so.

With this understanding of the biofeedback process we arrive at the

-page 104-

conclusion that in biofeedback training we are not learning to do something we have never done
before with consciousness. We are on the contrary learning to do in a new context what we do
with consciousness all the time. We might add, however, that the biofeedback instrument is of
course indispensable for identifying the physiological correlates of particular feeling states. We
have no other way of arriving at the knowledge, for instance, that a particular feeling state is
accompanied by alpha brain waves. We might also add that the biofeedback instrument insures
the experimenter's capability of presenting objects of attention of his choice to the subject which
he can be sure will concur with a particular underlying feeling state. This is because the
instruments supply the experimenter with independent information regarding the subject's feeing
state -- namely, information about her physiological processes. We shall now turn our attention
to a more precise formulation of this relationship that exists between underlying feeling state and
physiological processes.

In order to investigate, in greater detail, how an individual's underlying feeling state is related to
the physiological processes measured by the biofeedback machine, we need to understand, to
begin with, how the measures of different physiological processes relate to one another. At first
thought we could formulate the idea that each biofeedback instrument would give the reading of
a different physiological process, as if they were independent of one another. But another
hypothesis is the supposition that all these physiological measures are really indicating total
changes of response of a single biological system. Thus we can conceive all these measures as
different methods of making a single measure and that measure can then be supposed to

-page 105-

be the measure of the biological system operating as a whole. So interpreted every biological
instrument measures a single factor and that factor is the factor of change in the autonomic
nervous system (ANS). References to the ANS can then be understood to be references to the
single phenomenon every biofeedback instrument gives information about.

Now let us turn attention to the fact that the ANS is a property of a biological system, a person,
and ask whether anything in experience correlates with the total systemic response of the ANS.
The attentive model allow us to formulate the theoretical claim that measures of ANS activity are
measures of changes in underlying feeling state. Here would be a correlation between
physiological process and subjective experience of the sort we are looking for. It would make it
clear that just as measures of ANS activity are measures of changes in a system as a whole, so
also the measures of changes in feeling state are measures of changes in consciousness as a
whole. For a feeling state must be thought of as a state of feeling in which what is felt is the
whole state of the person. It is one and continuous. Of course it may be divided up in distinct
moods and there is reason to mark off different phases which the feeling state undergoes as it
changes in response to changes in objects of attention. However, once different feeling states are
marked off from one another it is easy to overlook the fact that these remain demarcations of a
single continuous process and, overlooking this, to land up with several feeling states which
seem mutually unconnected with one another.
The hypothesis that all biofeedback instruments measure changes in ANS activity is not
explicitly made by Brown in her authoritative general work on

-page 106-

biofeedback, but it is a conclusion which can be drawn from her observations.

It is a curious fact of the marriage between physiology and psychology that only one bit of
physiology and one bit of psychology are studied at one time. In quite separate experiments it
has been found that heart rate, blood pressure, brain waves, muscles (and probably much more)
of the physiologic being all react to dirty words. In the above experiment, however, we are
restrained to the electrical changes in the skin and are not informed about the possible influences
from other bodily changes. 109

And

The skin may be the key to learning how to "feel" the deep interior. While the skin needs
electronic inventions that amplify and record to voice its awareness best, it is the skin that can
serve as the spokesman for the body organs buried underneath. 110

And the claim that from the point of view of subjective experience every biofeedback instrument
also measures changes in feeling state is very compatible with Barbara Brown's description of
the biofeedback process. It is interesting, in this context, that in the above passage she chooses
the word 'feel' to describe one's experience of the deep interior; but it is particularly important to
note that she makes explicit use of the concept of a feeling state in her description of the
biofeedback process. Speaking about a person who has just been connected with a biofeedback
instrument she says,
When the desired brain wave occurs, the monitor faithfully signals its presence. At this point in
time the subject has no prior knowledge of how that particular brain wave relates to his
subjective feelings. He does, however, have a store of memory information by which he can
relate the subjective feeling state present to previous similar subjective feelings when the light
signal is on. 111

But although her observations support the claim that biofeedback instruments measure changes
in ANS activity and although she speaks of feeling

-page 107-

states that correspond to these changes she does not suggest the hypothesis that we have just
suggested; namely, that the changes in the ANS which the biofeedback instrument registers are
subjectively experienced as changes in the subject's underlying feeling state. And this is because,
as shall be proved beyond doubt in what follows, her concept of feeling state is not the concept
of feeling state felt as subsidiary. In other words, she treats the feeling states as objects of
attention according to the spotlight model.

Nevertheless, the attentive model, in providing the concept of an underlying feeling state, invites
a unique interpretation of the following passage. As this interpretation unfolds the advantages
this concept affords in respect of a description of the biofeedback process will become apparent.

Not only can the skin talk profile personality and cultural backgrounds, it also reflects mood, that
emotional tone of the individual around which his more immediate emotional reactions swing.
Like the voice from the larynx, the voice of the skin rises and falls, becomes loud and soft,
hesitates and delays, explodes with vigor. Every emotional nuance is reflected in transposing
relationships of its electrical components, weaving them into ever more complex patterns to be
puzzled over by psychophysiologists. 112

The attentive model invites us to interpret Brown's references to emotional tone, emotional
reaction, and mood, as references to underlying feelings states or to subsidiary awareness. We
might also comment that the model allows us to see the 'complex patterns...puzzled over by
psychophysiologists' in terms of an underlying unity by seeing these complex patterns as the
patterns of functioning of a single biological system, the ANS. It also allows us to understand
that in the case of conscious beings like ourselves (i.e. conscious living systems) we have
experience of the activity of the ANS, and that experience is our experience of an underlying
feeling state. We deduce from

-page 108-

the application of the model that ANS activity is always experienced by the subject whose ANS
is under discussion. It is experienced as the underlying felt quality of being alive. It is the quality
we address ourselves to when we seriously try to tell how we are feeling.

The way we feel-- in which we know the way we are feeling but cannot put it into words for
someone-- is identified in phenomenological terms with a subject's underlying feeling states. The
model makes it clear why we cannot verbalize the way we feel. We can only describe or put into
words an experience which has become an object of attention. But a feeling state experienced as
subsidiary cannot be an object of attention. Hence it cannot be described or put into words.
Notwithstanding this, a subject may make the attempt to put into so many words the way he feels
(the condition of his underlying feeling state). According to the model this attempt to turn
attention to the feeling state itself succeeds only in singling out some feature of it for relevation
as an object of attention. Thus the subject will mention something about his sensations and
feelings. Typically certain sensations will be mentioned;; of pain in certain parts of the body, of
pleasurable sensations, and so forth. Given that the sensation singled out in this manner is
produced when the subject is set upon the task of making his feeling state itself his object of
attention, it is natural, though mistaken, to conclude that the sensation singled out is in fact the
whole of the feeling state. Thinking in this manner, as do those like Brown who have the
spotlight model, it would also be natural to conclude, again mistakenly, that the only occasions
on which feeling states are consciously experienced are occasions on which they are objects of
attention of the sensation variety.

-page 109-

We suggest that these two mistakes are found in a passage in which Brown maintains that we
normally have no conscious awareness of normal ANS activity.
One of the most difficult worlds to achieve awareness of is the autonomic nervous system, the
regulator of automatic, life-supporting body activity. As with brain waves, we rarely have the
opportunity or take the time to see or hear or touch or have any sensation at all of the normal
operation of the ANS. Breathing continues without effort, the heart continues to beat, the gut
digests food, the bladder fills and empties, all with little, if any, conscious awareness and
direction. 113

The crucial sentence in the passage is the one in which she says that mostly we have 'no
sensation at all' of the activity of the ANS. On the spotlight model, the absence of any sensation
at all can only be construed as an absence of any sensation qua object of attention, and this
would imply absence of any conscious awareness of ANS activity. Furthermore, if the researcher
with the spotlight model were to ask subjects for reports of their objects of attention (particularly
their sensations) it would be no surprise to find that ANS activity was not among them. The
spotlight model would then force the researcher to conclude (as we have just seen Brown do) that
the normal subject has no conscious awareness of his or her ANS activity.

But we claim that this would be a complete mistake. From the perspective of the attentive model,
every subject has conscious experience of ANS activity, and the experience of it takes the form
of experiencing an underlying feeling state, or, subsidiary awareness. The attentive model
enables us to understand references to ANS activity to be references to physiological correlates
of subsidiary awareness in the same way in which references to REM states (rapid eye
movements) are understood to be references to physiological correlates

-page 110-

of dream states. 114 Just as a person experiences dreams without knowing of their correlation
with REM states, so too a person experiences subsidiary awareness without knowing of its
correlation with ANS activity. Accordingly, when a subject learns of ANS activity from a
biofeedback instrument she has acquired her first awareness of ANS activity as an object of
attention. This puts her in a position, however, to recognize that she has been familiar with ANS
activity all her life since it is but the physiological correlate of her underlying feeling state.

Suppose we are right about its being a mistake to say that people normally have no sensation at
all of normal ANS activity. How, we might ask, could this mistake show itself in a researcher's
interpretation of subjective reports given by biofeedback trainees? (We assume, of course, that
we are dealing here with a researcher who makes this mistake.) Such a researcher would be
forced to construe a subject's references to feeling as references to objects of attention of the
sensation variety. But considered from this point of view the subject's reference must appear to
the researcher to be insufficiently specific to permit an identification of the sensation. The
researcher would conclude that people are singularly bad at discriminating sensations connected
with ANS activity. It is in this context that we should read the following remark in which Brown
seeks to moderate a dispute which appears to exist between researchers and biofeedback trainees.

It seems to be a bit early in the development of biofeedback to criticize the relative inability of
individuals to describe in fine detail their subjective sensations. 115

While this is doubtless a moderating remark it perpetuates the dispute by assuming that the
deficiency lies in the subjects, and that subjects, in

-page 111-

referring to their feelings, are referring to subjective sensations (conceived as objects of

attention). What is more, Brown foresees the dispute coming to an end when subjects acquire
greater skill in describing in fine detail their subjective sensations. But what effect would a
researcher's request for finer descriptions of sensations be expected to have on a subject who on
her own had come to identify responses of the biofeedback instrument with changes in
underlying feeling state? It could only have the effect of making the subject doubt that she had
been right in believe that the response of the instrument has something to do with her feeling
state. The subject would then be likely to begin looking for new and previously unexperienced
sensations to correlate with the instrument's response. If we are right, however, the researcher's
request for finer descriptions of sensations correlated with instrument readings heads the subject
in the wrong direction entirely, and guarantees a misunderstanding of the biofeedback
experience.

The attentive model helps us to sort out the misunderstanding revealed by Brown's remark. Let
us understand what Brown describes as the subject's failure at accurate reporting to indicate, in
reality, a tacit disagreement between Brown and the subject about the way the biofeedback
experience is to be described. The disagreement can be seen as resulting from the fact that the
parties in disagreement are applying two different models of consciousness to experience. One,
which the attentive model makes explicit, according to which the crucial experience in
biofeedback learning is the experience of underlying feeling states, and the other, which the
spotlight model makes explicit, according to which the crucial experience is one of finer
perception of new objects of attention.

-page 112-

From the point of view of an individual who implicitly adheres to the attentive model of
consciousness the request for more detailed descriptions of subjective sensations would be taken
to miss the whole point about the biofeedback experience; namely, that it is not what occupies
the mind in focal attention that counts, but the underlying feeling state. A subject who
recognized that this was what was important may tacitly understand the researcher's request for
information about her subjective sensations to be a confused request for information about her
underlying feeling state, only to find herself, in attempting to comply with the language of the
request, running into the problem of communicating the ineffable when it comes to feeling.

[table of contents] [previous] [next]

Footnotes

107. K.R. Pelletier, Mind as healer, mind as slayer: a holistic approach to preventing stress
disorders (New York:Delta,1977), ch. 8.

back to text

108. B.Brown, op.cit., ch. 11.

back to text
109. Ibid., p.75 note.

back to text

110. Ibid., p.97.

back to text

111. Ibid., p. 362.

back to text

112. Ibid., p.61.

back to text

113. Ibid., p.96.

back to text

114. R.M Jones, The new psychology of dreaming (New York:Viking Press, 1970). ch. 3.

back to text

115. B.Brown, op.cit., p.337.

back to text

CONSCIOUSNESS

© C.O. Evans & J. Fudjack

Addendum D - Subliminal Perception

Research [table of contents] [previous] [next]

Attempts to account for the phenomena observed in biofeedback research characteristically

appeal to the subject's subjective experience of the process, as we have seen in the previous
section. We have described the 'subjective information' believed to be at the disposal of the
subject in terms of the concept of an underlying feeling state. We hope to have shown the utility
of applying this concept to an explanation of the biofeedback phenomena.

But the concept of an underlying feeling state, being the concept of a feeling whole which is not
itself experienced as an object of attention but nevertheless experienced by the subject, entails a
distinction between two kinds of awareness, so to speak, which we have referred to by the terms
'subsidiary awareness' and 'object of attention'. The attentive model proposes, then, not only a
distinction between object of attention and

-page 113-

underlying feeling state (which we see to be of use in interpreting biofeedback research), it also
proposes that the underlying feeling state is the mode in which a person experiences his or her
subsidiary awareness of the environment. From a different area of research, research in
subliminal perception, we adduce evidence for this further claim that the underlying feeling state
is the mode in which subsidiary awareness is experienced.

Subliminal experiments frequently make use of biofeedback apparatus (such as the EEG
machines and GSR instruments) but without application of the biofeedback principle. We have
the former without the latter when the apparatus is used to supply the researcher with
information about the physical processes of the subject without this information being made
available to the subject. Indeed, a most interesting use of biofeedback apparatus is in detecting
the occurrence of subliminal perception as Barbara Brown tells us in the following description of
a classic experiment in this area of research.

Probably the most interesting use of the skin's orienting response has been in detecting
subliminal perception. Naughty words or other emotion-arousing words were flashed on a screen
so briefly that the subjects could not perceive them intelligently. Mixed in with the arousing
words were some neutral words. Although it was impossible for the subjects to see the words and
so consciously recognize them, something in their brains did recognize every word, and this
recognition was voiced by the skin. For every naughty word there was an orienting response by
the skin, but no response to the neutral or bland words. A number of brain electrical responses
have also been found to occur at the same time, indicating that long before conscious recognition
the body and its subconscious substructure both recognizes and make judgments about what goes
on in the environment. 116

In this experiment a biofeedback instrument detects the occurrence of a

-page 114-

subliminal perception by measuring the response of the skin of a subject. And Brown chooses to
describe the skin response registered by the biofeedback instrument as an 'orienting' response.
But attempts to orient are attempts to context and a person's contexting of the whole situation he
finds himself in is done, according to the attentive model, with subsidiary awareness; conversely,
significant changes in subsidiary awareness could be understood to constitute a re-contexting of
the person's whole situation. Hence we can take Brown's choice of terms as our first indication
that the biofeedback instrument that registers change in skin electrical activity (and by
hypothesis, change in underlying feeling state) also to be indicating change in the subject's
subsidiary awareness of the environment. That the same instrument should simultaneously
perform both these functions is not surprising since, on the attentive model, the underlying
feeling state of the subject is the mode in which the subject's subsidiary awareness of the
environment is experienced.

However, according to Brown's description, the biofeedback instrument in measuring change in

skin electrical activity detects the occurrence of a single subliminal perception; and where there
is no change in skin electrical activity, it might be thought, no subliminal perception has
occurred. We ask the reader to be aware that on our interpretation the absence of change in skin
electrical activity would not indicate a lack of subsidiary awareness on the part of the subject. On
the attentive model, insofar as the subject is a conscious being, subsidiary awareness is present.
The biofeedback instrument, in registering change in skin electrical activity, is not indicating the
momentary presence of subsidiary awareness, but rather the occurrence of

-page 115-

change in an ever-present subsidiary awareness. We can make this point by saying that in the
experiment Brown describes there are two kinds of subliminal stimuli; those with no measurable
effect on the subject as detected by a biofeedback instrument (or by a word association test
which, as we shall see, is also used) and those with a measurable effect. We offer the explanation
that undetectable subliminal stimuli join and reinforce the reigning contexting components of
subsidiary awareness and do not serve to distract the subject from his preoccupation with his
existing objects of attention (prevailing storyline), and detectable stimuli join rival contexting
components of subsidiary awareness, which serve to distract the subject from the concerns
presently engaging his attention and deflect it in some other direction (i.e., toward substitute
objects of attention which are alien to the reigning context). In changing subsidiary awareness in
a significant way the detectable stimuli behave as rival contexting components which, if insistent
enough, would recontext the situation of the subject and change the objects of attention to those
of a different storyline.

From the point of view of the attentive model, then, the subject continually enjoys subsidiary
awareness of his environment and the experiments in subliminal perception such as the above
can be understood as experiments in the detection of the contexting function of components of
subsidiary awareness. Those components whose contexting functions are detected are those
components that serve to recontext the subject's situation, that is - restructure subsidiary
awareness. We might say that the contexting function of the class of stimuli to which the
'naughty' words belong are detectable because they strive to effect a change in subsidiary
awareness which is

-page 116-
reflected in a change in physiological activity and registered by the biofeedback instrument. By
presenting stimuli under unique experimental conditions the subliminal experimenter isolates the
effect of those particular components of subsidiary awareness. And the experiment he performs
can be thought of as stimulating the natural occurrence of components of subsidiary awareness
with strong functions in the service of a rival context.

One last point regarding Brown's description. The words presented the subject in the above
experiment, in being flashed on the screen for an extremely short duration, are obviously being
presented in such a manner that they could not be objects of attention for the subject. However, it
is our contention that the words so presented are experienced in consciousness, albeit
subsidiarily, by the subject. The alternative to this understanding is that they are not experienced
at all, in which case the phenomenon of subliminal perception is one of pure neurophysiological
response. (When we return to these matters we shall discover that Brown's notion of the
'subconscious substructure' of the body merely serves to personify the neurophysiological
processes that she believes to be taking place completely outside the realm of the subject's
consciousness.) We have already presented the theory that there is an experiential correlate to
such physiological processes - the underlying feeing state of the subject. But we shall adduce
further evidence from the experiments in subliminal perception against the hypothesis that we
are dealing with a non-conscious neurophysiological response. For we shall see that specifying
the conditions under which a stimulus can be subliminally perceived entails specifying that the
subject

-page 117-

be engaged in certain well defined activities of consciousness at the time. If the response to a
subliminal perception were a purely neurophysiological phenomenon one would expect it to be a
process independent of the activities of consciousness of the subject.

Our first step in justifying the claim that subliminal experiments can be understood as
experiments in the detection of the contexting function of components of subsidiary awareness is
to point out that it is necessary to know that there are two distinct types of subliminal perception
experiments. One type of experiment is ideally suited for interpretation in the light of the model
which conceives of consciousness as subsidiary awareness/object of attention while the other
type introduces complications which need to be dealt with separately.
The type of experiment to which the model readily applies is the one in which recognizable
shapes are presented to subjects for a long time at levels of intensity too low for them to
immediately achieve status as objects of attention. In such cases there is no difficulty in
following the proposition that the subject of the experiment is subsidiarily aware of the shape
presented. Here is an account of an experiment of this type.

In one of the first experiments carried out on this phenomenon, observers were shown colored
shapes resembling a banana, an orange, a lemon, and a leaf, in very dim light. They were told to
look at the screen on which these shapes were projected, and at the same time imagine each of
them in turn. They then thought that what appeared was in fact a visual image, and were not
conscious that they perceived them at all. However, if they were instructed beforehand that they
would perceive these objects, they did so normally. 117

It is convincing to argue in this case that the subjects were subsidiarily aware of the colored
shapes since they were not too dimly presented to be

-page 118-

turned into objects of attention upon a change in expectation. At the same time it is made clear
that they were not objects of attention for the subjects. We can also argue that the subsidiarily
experienced colored shapes performed specific contexting functions in that they played a part in
switching the attention of the subjects to objects of attention (namely, visual images) which had
definite connections with them (by sharing the same shape or color). Thus we construe the
statement in the passage that the subjects 'were not conscious that they perceived them at all' as
meaning that they had not become objects of attention for them.

It is important for our interpretation to notice that all subliminal perception experiments involve
testing people who are actively engaging their attention. For it is only when attention is engaged
that subliminal perception occurs. In other experiments the subject's attention is directed to the
screens and to what might appear on it. In the case of the above experiment subjects were asked
to create visual images against the background of the screen. The visual image was the object of
attention for the subjects and that which was subliminally perceived (the actual projection on the
screen) was experienced as subsidiary to the object of attention (the visual image). Subliminal
perception can be expected to occur, as will become more evident as we inspect further
experiments in the following pages, only when the stimuli presented is within certain limits
defined by what the subject is actively engaging attention on during the experiment.

The other type of subliminal perception experiment is the type to which the experiment with
naughty words belongs. When words or pictures are flashed on a screen at speeds too fast to
permit deciphering they are said to be

-page 119-

tachistoscopically presented because the instrument used in presenting the words or pictures (at
speeds in the msec. range) is called a tachistoscope. From the point of view that subliminal
perception experiments are experiments in the detection of the contexting function of
components of subsidiary awareness the tachistoscopic experiments have a distinct advantage.
As compared with the low intensity stimulation type experiment, in which a possible component
is presented for a long time, the tachistoscopic experiment presents the component for a very
short duration. This allows us to reach greater certainty that a particular component is performing
a contexting function relative to an object of attention since we can detect the immediate effect
of the subliminal perception upon the subject's shift to a new object of attention. In other words,
because of the short time factor a correlation between a component of subsidiary awareness and
an object of attention can be definitely established. To put it yet another way, we are suggesting
that although both types of experiments are doing the same thing, namely, identifying the
contexting function of components of subsidiary awareness, the experiments in tachistoscopic
perception give us greater control over our study of the process and enable us to be more
confidant in attributing a particular change in object of attention to a particular component of
subsidiary awareness since the experimenter has control over when and whether that component
is a component of subsidiary awareness.

Now that we have approached these experiments under the new paradigm we can point out that
they have universally been understood under the old paradigm of the spotlight model of
consciousness. Our interest in making this point stems from the fact that all experiments
involving subliminal

-page 120-
perception have been surrounded in controversy. Much of the controversy, we hope to show, can
be traced to the confusion created by describing the experiments in terms of the spotlight model
of consciousness. As to the fact of controversy we offer Vernon's opinion.

It is not surprising to find that the results of these experiments were as variable and as much in
disagreement with each other as any we have discussed heretofore. 118

As to the fact that researchers assume the spotlight model we offer the following description as
evidence.

In later experiments, shapes were shown at an intensity supposed to be below the absolute
threshold of vision. Subsequently it was calculated that in may cases in which the observers were
not conscious of having perceived these shapes, their guesses as to what had been presented were
nevertheless more often correct than could have been expected by chance - provided that the
intensity was only slightly below threshold. This phenomenon has been termed 'subliminal
perception', since apparently the observers did in fact perceive at least some of these shapes
without being conscious that they did so. 119

First of all we notice the assumption at work that for anything to be described as consciously
perceived it must necessarily be an object of attention and conversely, every object of attention is
consciously perceived. Hence, evidence of perceiving below the absolute threshold of vision
must be construed as evidence of perception outside the spotlight of conscious perception.

The only way left open by the spotlight model to account for the phenomena of subliminal
perception is the hypothesis that the information must have reached the subject's brain via
unconscious mental processes, or what Brown calls 'subconscious awareness'. Thus Shevrin, a
leading researcher in this field, says,

-page 121-
Subliminal perception has been a fertile source of controversy over the years as well it should be;
the theoretical stakes are high, for if unconscious cognitive processes exist then all efforts to
identify psychology with either conscious experience or observable behavior would be inherently
limited and unsound. 120

Shevrin goes on to quote with approval the conclusions of another research team.

Posner and Boies, on the basis of their work on attention, have concluded that "conscious
awareness is itself rather late in the sequence of mental processing". 121

Both these passages exhibit the same spotlight model in the assumption that if an object is not an
object of attention the subject has no awareness of it. But neither of them raise a question of
fundamental importance for their position and that is the question: Why, if perception can take
place at the level of unconscious cognitive processes is the subject not always exactly right about
the content of the subliminal message presented on the screen? In other words, why not ascribe
perfect vision to the unconscious mind and envisage it as being capable of reading any
subliminally presented message no matter how fine the print?

Shevrin has conducted subliminal perception experiments under conditions which totally
preclude actual seeing of the subliminal message.

In our research we intentionally devised an exposure condition (1 msec) so that subjects were
totally unaware of the stimulus. 122

Describing this condition as the absolute detection threshold Shevrin describes the experience a
subject has when confronted by a message presented below the absolute detection threshold as
follows.

By detection threshold, we mean that under the given conditions subjects do not report seeing
anything but the fixation point and occasionally phenomena associated with the fixation point (it
"wobbles", "drifts", "grows larger", etc.). 123
-page 122-

Under these conditions the subjects were given word association tests to establish whether any of
the tachistoscopically presented words had been recognized, and he found that although the
actual word presented was not often guessed, an approximation of, or association to, the given
word was often produced. The point then is, Why did the subject have such a hazy idea of the
actual word presentation that he could only produce an association and not the presented word
itself? Of course, answers could be proposed to this question, but the fact remains that the
researchers have not explained why there is this inability to produce the actual word. If the word
is picked up at all by these postulated unconscious processes (conceived of as purely
neurophysiological and non- experiential) why is it not picked up accurately?

If Shevrin does not explicitly pose such questions he nevertheless seems to be sensitive to the
problem, and his solution is exactly the one we would expect for anyone who assumes the
spotlight model. To account for the subliminal perception simply postulate anther spotlight! Thus
we find ourselves with a double spotlight model. This also is essentially what Brown does when
she introduces the concept of subconscious awareness. 124 In the next passage we find Shevrin
at first dismissing the possibility we have been exploring, according to which subliminal
perception has the property of perfect fidelity. This possibility he identifies in terms of the
concept of neutral registration which would give the subject complete information about the
visual environment to any degree of detail.

Elsewhere I have hypothesized that the existence of subliminal perception forces us to assume
that attention can be unconscious, and that a concept of neutral registration which does not
involve attention and motivation is untenable. (Shevrin, 1968). It was argued that perception
implies attention, whether it be conscious,

-page 123-

preconscious, or unconscious. No perceptual process is possible without a prior and concomitant

act of attention. 125
What the author is saying is that a subject's unconscious cognitive processes are as selective in
respect of what is noticed of the environment as is conscious perception itself. Thus, appeal to
unconscious attention is an appeal to a second spotlight operating independently of the one
which is conscious awareness.

Our argument is that the spotlight model has forced researchers in subliminal perception to
introduce a double spotlight model in order to account for their findings. It is this whole
approach to consciousness which we wish to replace with the model of consciousness as
subsidiary awareness/object of attention. We shall try to show that the phenomenon of subliminal
perception is amenable to common sense explanation when the findings are interpreted from the
perspective of the attentive model. But before proceeding to this task it is worth observing that
not all researchers are happy with the implications of the double spotlight model. As one review
of the literature points out,

Holzman suggests that Shevrin needs to redefine attention to avoid the intrinsically contradictory
concept of "unconscious processes that are attended to". 126

We agree with Holzman and suggest that the attentive model in fact offers just what he asks for,
a redefinition of attention. But let us try to bring into relief some of the reasons for which one
might be dissatisfied with the double spotlight model and the notion of unconscious attention.
Experiments on subliminal perception are all experiments in the exercise of attention. To
establish this point we go back to the mention of a perceptual threshold in some of the passages
we have been considering. In experiments on subliminal

-page 124-

perception, subjects are characteristically asked to fixate attention on a screen or point on the
screen. The threshold of perception for such a subject is always relative to the object of attention
the subject is actively engaged in fixating. Of significance in this connection was the discovery
that the absolute threshold of detection can change as the subject tries to raise his discrimination
level, and the conclusion was drawn that the threshold varies for each subject according to effort;
which means that at one time a tachistoscopically presented picture will be below the detection
threshold for a subject (and the picture will not be an object of attention) and at another time it
will be above the detection threshold although the speed of presentation of the picture has not
changed. This discovery immediately raises serious doubts as to whether in a given experiment
the phenomenon of subliminal perception is taking place, since what could have begun as below
the threshold may as a result of paying closer attention end up above the threshold.

However, Dixon evolved an ingenious technique for raising and lowering the intensity of the
subliminal stimuli pari passu with the rise and fall of the threshold, so that the former was always
just below the latter.... It may be concluded that it is possible to perceive such stimuli, though not
very accurately, provided that the observer's attention is directed towards their occurrence. 127

Mention of the threshold has relevance in making the case that we are indeed dealing with
attention experiments in which a detection threshold can only be discovered with attention
experiments in which a detection threshold can only be discovered relative to the fixation of
attention. But we also find mention in this passage of the fact that the stimulus, if it is to be
subliminally perceived, must be presented just below the threshold rather than much below it.
Now this fact presents a difficulty, we suggest, for those theorists who postulate unconscious
processes. Why should unconscious processes

-page 125-

be limited by the need to present the stimulus just below the threshold? And this difficulty is not
resolved when the unconscious neurophysiological processes are allowed a degree of selectivity.
For, replacing the idea of 'neutral registration' with the notion of a second spotlight (and the idea
of unconscious attention) does not in itself explain why the selectivity exhibited by the
unconscious spotlight is apparently dependent upon the selectivity exhibited by the conscious
spotlight. In other words, the inter- dependence of the two spotlights remains an anomalous fact
for Shevrin's theory. In contrast, the attentive model is an explicit attempt to integrate the
phenomenon of subliminal perception with a theory of attention. It achieves this by detailing the
relationship between object of attention and subsidiary awareness in terms of such categories as
feeling, context, and physiological process.

We believe that the real significance of Dixon's threshold experiment, then, lies in the fact that it
offers support for the thesis that subliminal perception experiments are experiments in the
detection of the contexting functions of components of subsidiary awareness. This alternative to
the interpretation that postulates a double spotlight proceeds as follows. We interpret the
phenomenon of the fluctuating threshold as the phenomenon of a component of subsidiary
awareness becoming an object of attention (and hence ceasing to be a phenomenon of subsidiary
awareness). From this point, presentation of the subliminal stimulus is the creation of a
component of subsidiary awareness that is at the brink of becoming an object of attention. We
hazard the hypothesis that a subject lowers the threshold by attempting to fixate on the stimulus.

-page 126-

But in Dixon's experiment the component of subsidiary awareness is prevented from becoming
an object of attention because the threshold lowering is counteracted by simultaneously reducing
the intensity of the stimulus being presented as a component of subsidiary awareness, thus
offsetting the greater sensitivity to it brought about by the subject's attempt to fixate it as an
object of attention. 128

Thus by introducing a component of subsidiary awareness in the form of a subliminal stimulus,

and by preventing it from itself becoming an object of attention, the researcher is in a position to
study the contexting function of the introduced component. If we remind the reader that there are
two classes of subliminal stimuli that can be presented, ones which are easily integrated into the
subject's present context and ones which are not, we could speak of the latter as making a
particularly strong demand that attention turn toward it (since it is anomalous to the present
context). But in being deprived of attention it is forced to remain in subsidiary awareness to
perform a contexting function. As anomalous to the subject's present context, however, it cannot
be integrated into that context as a component without changing it significantly and we can
hence construe it to be a contexting component of a rival context. The experimental creation of
such an insistent component of subsidiary awareness which is nevertheless blocked from
becoming an object of attention is tantamount to simulating the phenomenon of repression, but
we shall return to this point later.

The point we wish to stress at this time is that if the rival contexting component is insistent
enough we could expect it to recontext the situation for the subject and change his objects of
attention to those of a different storyline.

-page 127-
And this is exactly what does occur, judging from a type of Experiment in which the subject is
tested for the occurrence of a subliminal perception by means of a word association test.

Dixon presented a series of words, some of which were related to sex, at intensities of
illumination just below the absolute threshold of vision, signalling to the observer each time one
of these was shown. The observer was instructed that when he received the signal, he should say
the first word that came into his head. Though none of the observers were ever conscious of
having seen the stimulus words, and did not in fact report any of them correctly, yet there were
many cases in which the response word had a definite association to the stimulus word. 129

What Dixon takes to be word associations are in fact objects of attention which the subject has in
place of the subliminal stimulus itself becoming the object of attention. The objects of attention
which are entertained in place of an insistent subliminal stimulus occur because the subliminal
stimulus, being forced to remain in its status as subsidiary, nevertheless has the opportunity to
play a role in providing the context for the substitute objects. The subliminal stimulus, in other
words, performs a contexting function which manifests itself in the objects of attention (the
response words) that occur to the subject.

This type of experiment, then, supplies evidence for ascribing a contexting function to the
subliminal stimulus. The attentive model, furthermore, gives us an explanation of the connection
between stimulus word and response word in terms of contexting and not in terms of word
association. We therefore suggest that those responses to subliminal stimuli described in the
following passage as 'based upon some old and well-established associations' are more
accurately described in terms of established patterns of contexting.

-page 128-

Furthermore, experiments of Dixon's showed that a response made to a subliminal stimulus must
be based upon some old and well-established association; it would not occur if the associations
were weak and temporary. 130

The word association test is a test of contexting function: it is not a test of word association. A
theory of context replaces a theory of word association.
It is enjoyable to find recent psychological research supporting a contexting theory such as ours
against a word association theory such as Dixon's and Shevrin's. In his presidential address to the
American Psychological Association Jenkins announced the demise of word association theory
and the rise of contextualism in psychology.

The domain I have chose is memory. Associationism is most dominant and clearly revealed in
this area, and, as I have pointed out, a general associationist account of almost anything leans
heavily on memory.

In place of the traditional analysis, I suggest a contextualist approach. This means not only that
the analysis of memory must deal with contextual variables but also, and this is my point today,
that what memory is depends on context. This view clashes with the associative view, but I hope
that I can convince you that the contextual approach is closer to the truth in the simple sense that
it is in better correspondence with experimental data than the usual associative theory. 131

The relationship between Jenkins' position and the one suggested here can be made clear from
the following passage.

Contextualism holds that experience consists of events. Events have a quality as a whole. By
quality is meant the total meaning of the event. The quality of the event is the resultant of the
interaction of the experiencer and the world, that is, the interaction of the organism and the
physical relations that provide support for the experience. The relations can be thought of and
analyzed into textures. A texture in turn consists of strands lying in a context. 132

On the attentive model the quality of the event is the felt context of the event, and the strands
lying in a context are the contexting components

-page 129-

of subsidiary awareness.
Let us reconsider Dixon's word association test for subliminal perception in the light of Jenkins'
contextualist theory. Every time a different subliminal stimulus is presented something about the
whole event of which it is a part will be different from the whole event of which some other
subliminal stimulus is a part. In the case of both presentations the subject will have an experience
of the context, a feel for the whole event of which the word presentation is a part. Thus the word
association, the object of attention that comes to mind in response to the stimulus word, will be
dependent on the feel of the context of the whole event and not on the isolated perception of the
stimulus word itself. In other words, the object of attention constituting the subject's response
will depend on all the strands forming the texture of a particular context.

According to this understanding a subliminal stimulus is a contexting component in subsidiary

awareness and as such plays a part in subsidizing the object of attention that occurs to the
subject. There is no necessity to postulate total recognition of the word at any level; in other
words, there is no need to postulate a purely physiological level at which the word is recognized
or to conceive of the existence of an unconscious spotlight to account for the hypothesized
unconscious recognition. But Dixon and Shrevin imply that there is such a need by conceiving of
the relationship between stimulus word and response word in associationist terms - for their
assumption is that the unconscious recognizes the stimulus word and an associated word is
brought to the attention of the conscious spotlight. As long as they are thinking in

-page 130-

associationist terms someone or something must recognize the stimulus word as if it were an
object of attention.

This inclination to postulate the existence of some faculty that entertains the stimulus word as an
object of attention is a very natural inclination, but it is one that reveals the tacit assumption of a
spotlight model of consciousness. It is an inclination displayed even by those who are reluctant
to give credence to the existence of an unconscious or subconscious that might perform such a
function. In the following passage, for instance, we find Vernon describing an hypothesis
suggested to account for the results of an experiment in which words were subliminally
presented to a subject yet under less stringent conditions than those imposed by Dixon's
fluctuating threshold apparatus.
It was hypothesized that, before the words were fully grasped, fragments were perceived which
suggested these words and prevented full perception and verbal report. 133

In the suggested hypothesis we see the spotlight model tacitly at work: in order for something to
be perceived it must be perceived as an object of attention. Hence, if a response to the subliminal
stimulus is exhibited at least some fragment of the stimulus must have been perceived as an
object of attention. In the case of this experiment, then, a fragment of the word became an object
of attention preventing the full word from coming to attention. But the point we suggest is that
one needn't conceived of perception according to the spotlight mode. One needn't, in other
words, equate perception of something with taking it as an object of attention. The words in
question may be perceived yet outside the scope of attention and still be thought of as bringing

-page 131-

about an orienting response.

The assumption we are trying to call into question is that the word must be recognized in order
for an orienting response to occur. We see that those who postulate an unconscious spotlight
make this assumption. But we also see those with single spotlight theory forced to adopt it too.
They would contend that, if the entire stimulus is not recognized, some part or fragment if it is
recognized. They thereby believe they explain the initial reaction to the stimulus.

The attentive model is intended as a corrective to the inclination toward explanation of the
orienting response which appeals to 'recognition' of the subliminally presented word either by
consciousness or by a hypothesized unconscious faculty. It conceives of the response to the
stimulus word as different in type from responses to objects of attention which entail recognition;
the response to the stimulus word is a feeling-response in which the subject can best be described
as having a feel or feeling of the subliminal perception.

The following passage is worth considering because in it we see Vernon beginning to drop the
assumption of the spotlight model and turning in the direction we have suggested. She is not
explicit, however, about what motivates her shift.
It seemed therefore that the latter were able to guess at the nature of the taboo words before they
could perceive exactly what they were, a process which has been called 'subception'. Or they
perceived them before they were willing to report them. The former conclusion has been
criticized as claiming that observers were perceiving something in order not to perceive it; just as
in the experiment of Lazarus and McCleary the observers perceived the shocked syllables
sufficiently to react to them in the psychogalvanic reflex before the could perceive them
consciously.

-page 132-

In spite of the apparent absurdity of this claim, it is not impossible that such a process might
occur. People may be capable of perceiving that there is 'something nasty in the woodpile' before
they perceive exactly what it is. 134

The claim that observers perceive something in order not to perceive is apparently absurd only
under the assumption of the spotlight model. For the claim would reduce itself to the claim that
something is being recognized in order that it may remain unrecognized. But if we reject the
spotlight model we are in the position to understand that the claim amounts to saying that what is
perceived needn't be noticed and in being perceived unnoticed may indeed even act to repel
attention and delay or inhibit recognition.

It is interesting, in this context, to note that Freudians have been criticized for alleged absurdities
similar to the one Vernon cites in the above. They are told that for consciousness to affect a
censorship on repressed items it must recognize what it is repressing, in which case, however,
that item cannot be construed as repressed. Our account supplies a counterargument against such
objections which is made available by the role in consciousness we have assigned to feeling. The
view that what is in consciousness needn't be noticed, in which case we would speak of having a
feel for it, is a view which is however unavailable for Freud as long as he is insistent that
consciousness be equated only with what is noticed (as we saw was his desire in the second
section of this addendum). We might also mention that the requisite revision to his view on
consciousness, which we explicated in that section, would also clear up difficulties inherent in
his conception of an unconscious which replicates all the features of

-page 133-
consciousness by speaking of unconscious attention, unconscious feelings, and the like.

But let us return to the argument that people are capable of perceiving before they recognize
what they are perceiving or 'perceive exactly what it is', to use Vernon's phrase. This possibility
receives further explication by Vernon in a passage which reads well in the light of the attentive
model of consciousness.

It is clear that events sometimes occur in the first place outside the central focus of attention, and
they rapidly become focal. It was noted that we may be scarcely conscious of a familiar scene in
which little or no movement or change is occurring. But if some aspect of this scene or some
object in it is altered, and particularly if the change is sudden and involves movement, we
immediately become aware of it, and then direct our attention upon it, investigating it and
responding to it as rapidly as possible. Such events are said to force themselves upon
consciousness. 135

The conditions Vernon describes here certainly fit the case of subliminal perception experiments,
in which subjects are presented with rapid movements. We also draw attention to the
presupposition of the phenomenon of subsidiary awareness in the reference to events which
occur outside the central focus of attention.

In fact, running through Vernon's discussion, and operative in the hypothesizing of some of the
researchers we have been discussing, are themes which make it appear that when these
researchers consult their own experience they articulate it in a way which points to the attentive
model of consciousness and away from the spotlight model. To put the point more starkly, the
researchers when appealing to their own experiences are taking the role of laymen and as laymen
they assume the attentive model of consciousness (tacitly). However, when they switch to the
role of scientists

-page 134-

they assume the spotlight model (again tacitly).

Thus, in the following passage, in which we see Vernon taking the role of the layman we find a
description which is essentially a description of consciousness as defined by the attentive model.

It is clear from everyday experience that we do in fact perceive many things and many aspects of
the visual field without directing attention upon them. In fact, the theory has been put forward
that there is a large number of 'levels of attention', varying from the highest, at which attention is
focused and narrowly concentrated upon a particular part of the field, to the lowest, a bare
consciousness of the marginal parts of the field. It would perhaps be preferable to say that our
awareness of our surroundings varies continually, from place to place and from time to time,
from a maximal to a minimal amount. We have seen that much is known as to the conditions of
maximal awareness. Far less is known with regard to lower degrees of awareness. 136

From the point of view of the attentive model this passages must be read as a description of
subsidiary awareness. In her very next sentence Vernon goes on to describe what we have called
the contexting function of subsidiary awareness.

In discussing the effects of the background upon perception, for instance of size, shape, color,
etc., it was noted that our perception of this background did in fact affect considerably the
manner in which objects attended to were perceived. 137

[table of contents] [previous] [next]

Footnotes

116. Ibid., p.75.

back to text

117. M. Vernon, The psychology of perception, 2nd ed. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex,

England:Penguin Books,1971),p.174.
back to text

118. Ibid., p.194.

back to text

119. Ibid., p.174.

back to text

120. H. Sevrin, "Does the averaged evoked response encode subliminal perception? Yes. A reply
to Schwartz and Rem." Psychophysiology, vol. 12, no. 4 (1975), p.395.

back to text

121. Ibid.

back to text

122. Ibid., p.396.

back to text

123. Ibid.
back to text

124. B. Brown, op.cit., p.83.

back to text

125. H. Sevrin, "Brain wave correlates of subliminal stimulation, unconscious attention, primary-
and secondary-process thinking, and repressiveness." Psychological Issues, vol. 8, no. 2 (1973),
p.71

back to text

126. R.M. Whitman, Review of: "Psychoanalytic research: three approaches to the experimental
study of subliminal processes" [Psychological Issues, vol 8, no. 2 (1973)] American
Psychoanalytic Association Journal, vol. 23, no. 4 (1975), p.663.

back to text

127. M. Vernon, op.cit., p.176.

back to text

128. The processes of attention we have been describing and which we are viewing as deliberate
obstructions to the natural functioning of attention processes have also been investigated in
laboratories using the latest advances in computer technology and brain wave research. However,
no clear-cut correlation has been made between these physiological processes and subjective
experience. The attentive model allows us to formulate one possibility which the research
findings in this area seem to support. It is our hypothesis, then, that measures of average evoked
response (AER) are measure of items becoming objects of attention. What this means is that
experiments in which a subject's AER can be correlated with the presentation of a stimulus are to
be construed as experiments in which a subject's object of attention can be identified by
correlation with a physiological process (AER). Aer decrement, on this hypothesis, becomes the
hypothesis that the decrement is a measure of the swiftness with which an object of attention is
displaced by another object of attention: i.e., retention time as an object of attention. Increment
of AER is a measure of an object of attention gaining in gestalt--increasing retention. Concerning
findings of one experiment, Buchsbaum, one of the experimenters, tell us,

Three different effects were seen: (1) an across- session, "arousal" effect which acted on all
intensities fairly evenly, affecting slope minimally: (2) an "attention" effect which operated
primarily to enhance amplitude for low-intensity stimuli and this lower AER slope; and (3) a
'sensory overload" effect which operated primarily to reduce AER amplitude at high intensities.
Thus reducing appears to be linked to the active phenomena of paying attention and protection
from too- intense levels of sensory input. Habitual tendencies to attend to sensory stimuli may be
reflected in the AER amplitude/intensity slope as well as habitual tendencies to inhibit sensory
input. [M. Buchsbaum, "Self-regulation of stimulus intensity: augmenting/reducing and the
averaged evoked response." In G. E. Schwartz and D. Shapiro, op.cit., p.122.]

Among these effects we single out the second as an identification of the attention process which
in Dixon's experiments is described as threshold lowering. However, in the AER experiments it
was found that people were either reducers or augmenters. Buchsbaum does not suggest that
reducers may be introverts and augmenters may be extroverts, but his findings about reducers
make an interesting connection with the theory of schizophrenia we offered in Part III.

Buchsbaum and Silverman hypothesized that reducers were hypersensitive to low-level sensory
stimuli and thus required some compensatory process to protect them from sensory inundation at
high intensities. Indeed, AER reducers were found to have lower visual threshold ... than AER
augmenters. ...And at low to moderate light levels, reducers had larger amplitude AERs than
augmenters. [Ibid., p.125]

All we need to add, to make the connection we are claiming, is the following passage from
Buchsbaum.

Interestingly, negative reaction/stimulus intensity functions were found by Tizard and Venables
(1956) in schizophrenics--who have been reported to be extreme reducers for both the Petrie
apparatus ... and the AER... [Ibid., p.127.]

We might just conclude this note by suggesting that measures of AER might be fundamentally
different from the biofeedback measures we have dealt with in the section on biofeedback. It
could be that AER measures are measures of central nervous system operations (as Buchsbaum
mentions) as distinct from measures of ANS operations. We then find ourselves in the position of
saying that all measures of CNS operations are measures of changes in objects of attention, and
CNS operations are connected by feedback loops with ANS operations. The attentive model then
suggests that what is subjectively experienced of consciousness as subsidiary awareness/object
of attention instantiates the same structure as autonomic nervous system operations/central
nervous system operations. (For this use of the '/'see p.15.)

back to text

129. M. Vernon, op.cit., p.175.

back to text

130. Ibid.

back to text

131. J. Jenkins, "Remember that old theory of memory? Well, forget it." American Psychologist,
Nov. 1974, p. 768.

back to text

132. Ibid.

back to text

133. M. Vernon, op.cit., p.196.

back to text
134. Ibid., p.195.

back to text

135. Ibid., p.163.

back to text

136. Ibid., p.161.

back to text

137. Ibid., p.162.

back to text

CONSCIOUSNESS

© C.O. Evans & J. Fudjack

Addendum E - William James' Theory

of Consciousness[table of contents] [previous] [next]

In the previous section we discussed the experimental findings in research on subliminal

perception. We discovered that by keeping an item in a person's field of consciousness just below
a certain threshold of awareness experimenters were able to discern effects on the subject's
physiological state and behavior that they attributed to the subject's 'subliminal perception' of the
item in question. We proposed that such 'subliminally
-page 135-

perceived' items be described as items in subsidiary awareness with strong contexting functions.
This suggests that subliminal perception experiments are ones which attempt to isolate the
effects that some particular item in subsidiary awareness has on attention. But this is to take the
experimentally contrived occurrence of a single 'subliminal perception' as indicative of a more
general diffuse ongoing subsidiary awareness of items not in attention and is tantamount to
positing the existence of a 'subliminal consciousness'. It is interesting, then, to note that the idea
of a 'subliminal consciousness' had been introduced as early as 1886 by Frederic Myers and is
acclaimed the forerunner of the present day concept of the unconscious. It is of even more
interest to note that William James acknowledged his indebtedness to Myers and identified his
own idea of a 'transmarginal field of consciousness' with Myers' 'subliminal consciousness', as
Jung tells us in the following passage in which he describes this stage in the historical
development of the concept of the unconscious,

So defined, the unconscious depicts an extremely fluid state of affairs: everything of which I
know, but of which I am not at the moment thinking; everything of which I was once conscious
but have not forgotten; everything perceived by my senses, but not noted by my conscious mind;
everything which, involuntarily and without paying attention to it, I feel, think, remember, want,
and do; al the future things that are taking shape in me and will sometime come to
consciousness: all this is the content of the unconscious. These contents are all more or less
capable, so to speak, of consciousness or were once conscious and may become conscious again
the next moment. Thus far the unconscious is a : fringe of consciousness", as William James put
it ftn.

[ftn: James speaks also of a "transmarginal field" of consciousness and identifies it with the
"subliminal consciousess" of F.W.H. Myers, one of the founders of the British Society for
Psychical Research. Concerning

-page 136-

the "field of consciousness" James says (Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 232): "The
important fact which this 'field' formula commemorates is the indetermination of the margin.
Inattentively realized as is the matter which the margin contains, it is nevertheless there, and
helps both to guide our behaviour and to determine the next movement of our attention. It lies
around us like a 'magnetic field' inside of which our center of energy turns like a compass needle
as the present phase of consciousness alters into its successor. Our whole past store of memories
floats beyond this margin, ready at a touch to come in; and the entire mass or residual powers,
impulses, and knowledges that constitute our empirical self stretches continuously beyond it. So
vaguely drawn are the outlines between what is actual and what is only potential at any moment
of our conscious life, that it is always hard to say of certain mental elements whether we are
conscious of them or not.] 138

In this section we shall show that the description of consciousness offered to us in James'
psychology outline some of the essential features of the attentive model.

If this be the case, it is instructive to consider the inadequacies, in Jung's opinion, of the Jamesian
view. The following passage supplies a hint of Jung's reasons for dissatisfaction with the
psychology of James.

The universal belief in spirits is a direct expression of the complex structure of the unconscious.
Complexes are in truth the living units of the unconscious psyche, and it is only through them
that we are able to deduce its existence and its constitution. The unconscious would in fact be--as
it is in Wundt's psychology--nothing but a vestige of dim or 'obscure' representations, or a "fringe
of consciousness", as William James calls it, were it not for the existence of complexes. That is
why Freud became the real discoverer of the unconscious... 139

We shall pursue this point in the next two sections of the addendum and suggest that the attentive
model is adequate for the purposes of discussing 'complexes'; the implication being that none of
James' essential points about the 'fringe' or 'margin' of consciousness need be withdrawn in the
face of evidence of

-page 137-

the existence of complexes, as naive as James' psychology may be when it comes to the complex
structuring of the 'fringe'. Essentially, we will be following up our discussion of Freud in the
second section of the addendum, for we suggest there that the Freudian unconscious can be
understood in terms of the attentive model. The Freudian findings regarding the dynamics of
repressions needn't be understood as necessitating the positing of an unconscious as a discrete
entity separate from consciousness (conceived as composed of object of attention and subsidiary
awareness), despite Freud's explicit warnings regarding this matter This follow-up discussion
will include a hypothesis we offer regarding the nature of primary process thought and Jungian
'archetypes', a hypothesis which entails explaining 'latent' contents of consciousness in terms of
the structuring of consciousness as opposed to treating them as reifed objects housed in a
separate compartment--a Freudian or Jungian 'unconscious'.

For the present let us return to James.

We note that the margin of which James speaks in the above passage is defined as being that
which though in consciousness is 'inattentively realized'. In constructing the attentive model we
employ the term 'object of attention' and insist on discriminating between it and that which is in
subsidiary awareness. We use this terminology in the attempt to emphasize the fact that
consciousness is structured by attention-- that is, it becomes definitionally impossible to speak of
attending to the margin, fringe, or field of consciousness as such.

We may also notice that in speaking of the matter in the margin as influencing the deployment of
attention James has, in our terminology,

-page 138-

discovered the contexting function of items in subsidiary awareness. This is further emphasized
by the use of the term 'field of consciousness' which he likens to a magnetic field. The essential
attribute of a magnetic field that is of interest in this context is the fact that it can best be
described in systems terminology and characterized by a set of equations describing the mutual
influence changes in parts of the field have on each other. So far, then, we have a picture of
inattentively realized matter composing a field that influences the movement of attention.

We shall cite other passages from James indicating that 1) he conceived of feeling as the mode in
which the fringe or field is experience by the subject, 2) he thought that what we feel at the
fringe of consciousness are relationships that provide a schema which gives the object to which
we are attending a meaning, 3) he conceived of consciousness in terms of a part-whole
relationship and of attention as accentuating (or bringing into relief) some part of a whole in
consciousness.

1) James distinguishes between a 'higher consciousness' about things and the 'mere inarticulate
feeling of their presence'. In the following passage we notice James describing sensations which
are not objects of attention, yet are more than 'Unconscious nerve- currents'. We notice that he
speaks of 'having a feeling' of such sensations even when attention is engaged elsewhere.

Habits depend on sensations not attended to. We have called a, b, c, d, e, f, by the name of
'sensations' If sensations, they are sensations to which we are usually inattentive; but that they
are more than unconscious nerve-currents seems certain, for they catch our attention if they go
wrong. Schneider's account of these sensations deserves to be quoted. In the act of walking, he
says, "even when our attention is entirely absorbed elsewhere, it is doubtful whether we could
preserve equilibrium if no sensation of our body's attitude

-page 139-

were there, and doubtful whether we should advance our leg if we had no sensation of its
movement as executed, and not even a minimal feeling of impulses to set it down. Knitting
appears altogether mechanical, and the knitter keeps up her knitting even while she reads or is
engaged in lively talk. But if we ask her how this is possible, she will hardly reply that the
knitting goes on of itself. She will rather say that she has a feeling of it, that she feels in her
hands that she knits and how she must knit, and that therefore the movements of knitting are
called forth and regulated by the sensations associated therewithal, even when the attention is
called away..." Again: "When a pupil begins to play on the violin, to keep him from raising his
right elbow in playing a book is place under his right armpit, which he is ordered to hold fast by
keeping the upper arm tight against the body. The muscular feelings, and feelings of contact
connected with the book, provoke an impulse to press it tight. But often it happens that the
beginner, whose attention gets absorbed in the production of the notes, lets drop the book. Later,
however, this never happens; the faintest sensations of contact suffice to awaken the impulse to
keep it in its place, and the attention may be wholly absorbed by the notes and the fingering with
the left hand. The simultaneous combination of movements is thus in the first instance
conditioned by the facility with which in us, alongside of intellectual processes, processes of
inattentive feeling may still go on. 140
In the following passage James describes the fringe of consciousness by identifying it with
attitudes we have, attitudes that manifest themselves as feelings.

The object before the mind always has a 'fringe'. There are other unnamed modifications of
consciousness just as important as the transitive states, and just as cognitive as they. Examples
will show what I mean.

Suppose three successive persons say to us: "Wait !" "Hark!" "Look!" Our consciousness is
thrown into three quite different attitudes of expectancy, although no definite object is before it
in any one of the three cases. Probably no one will deny here the existence of a real conscious
affection, a sense of the direction from which an impression is about to come, although no
positive impression is yet there. Meanwhile we have no names for the psychoses in question but
the names of hark, look, and wait.

Suppose we try to recall a forgotten name. The state of our consciousness is peculiar. There is a
gap therein; but no mere gap. It is a gap that is intensely active. A sort of wraith

-page 140-

of the name is in it, beckoning us in a given direction, making us at moments tingle with the
sense of our closeness, and then letting us sink back without the longed-for term If wrong names
are proposed to us, this singularly definite gap acts immediately so as to negate them. They do
not fit into its mould. And the gap of one word does not feel like the gap of another, all empty of
content as both might seem necessarily to be when described as gaps. When I vainly try to recall
the name of Spalding, my consciousness is far removed from what it is when I vainly try to recall
the name of Bowles. There are innumerable consciousnesses of want, no one of which taken in
itself has a name, but all are different from each other. Such a feeling of want is toto coelo other
than a want of feeling: it is an intense feeling. The rhythm of a lost word may be there without a
sound to clothe it; or the evanescent sense of something which is the initial vowel or consonant
may mock us fitfully, without growing more distinct. Every one must know the tantalizing effect
of the blank rhythm of some forgotten verse, restlessly dancing in one's mind, striving to be
filled out with words. 141

2) The following passage suggests that James thought the fringe to be best described as
composed of feelings of relation rather than discrete feelings of unrelated objects. This suggests
the notion of an underlying feeling state as a mode of experiencing the frame or context of the
object attended to and the idea of attention relevating one term or object in the complex system
of relations.

We see, then, that it makes little or no difference in what sort of mind-stuff, in what quality of
imagery, our thinking goes on. The only images intrinsically important are the halting-places, the
substantive conclusions, provisional or final, of the thought. Throughout all the rest of the
stream, the feelings or relation are everything, and the terms related almost naught. These
feelings or relation, these psychic overtones, halos, suffusions, or fringes about the terms, may be
the same in very different systems of imagery. 142

We can see the following passage as getting at the idea that subsidiary awareness of context
determines which possible objects are appropriate objects of attention and that such dispositions
are experienced phenomenologically as a feeling about the 'proposed' object of attention.

-page 141-

In all our voluntary thinking there is some TOPIC or SUBJECT about which all the members of
the thought revolve. Relation to this topic or interest is constantly felt to the fringe, and
particularly the relation of harmony and discord, of furtherance or hindrance of the topic. Any
thought the quality of whose fringe lets us feel ourselves "all right', may be considered a thought
that furthers the topic. Provided we only feel its object to have a place in the scheme of relations
in which the topic also lies, that is sufficient to make of it a relevant and appropriate portion of
our train of idea....The most important element of these fringes is, I repeat, the mere feeling of
harmony or discord, of a right or wrong direction in the thought. 143

James speaks of the thought of an object as "the thought of it- in-those-relations, a thought
suffused with the consciousness of all that dim context" 144 indicating, as we surmised from the
above passages, that the relations we are aware of in the fringe of consciousness are the ones that
make up the context for an object of attention.

3) The following can be seen as describing consciousness as singling out some part of a whole as
its object of attention.
Consciousness is always interested more in one part of its object than in another, and welcomes
and rejects, or chooses, all the while it thinks.

The phenomena of selective attention and of deliberative will are of course patent examples of
this choosing activity. But few of us are aware how incessantly it is at work in operations not
ordinarily called by these names. Accentuation and Emphasis are present in every perception we
have. We find it quite impossible to disperse our attention impartially over a number of
impressions. ...But we do far more than emphasize things, and unite some, and keep others apart.
We actually ignore most of the things before us. 145

And when we supplement this description with the following description of the part played by
the fringe of things ignored or not attended to we discover that it is this fringe that imparts
meaning to the object we do attend to.

The sense of our meaning is an entirely peculiar element of the thought. It is one of those
evanescent and "transitive" facts of mind which introspection cannot turn round upon,

-page 142-

and isolate and hold up for examination, as an entomologist passes round an insect on a pin. In
the (somewhat clumsy) terminology I have used, it has to do with the "fringe" of the object, and
is a "feeling of tendency", whose neutral counterpart is undoubtedly a lot of dawning and dying
processes too faint and complex to be traced. 146

(It is interesting, in passing, to note that what James is saying in speaking about the 'evanescence'
of meaning is that the fringe cannot be made itself an object of attention-- 'cannot be held up for
examination'.) In the following passage we again have the idea that the fringe that surrounds an
object of attention gives it its meaning. But we also have what we might call James' attempt to
describe the spotlight model of consciousness and its inadequacies.

The traditional psychology talks like one who should say a river consists of nothing but pailsful,
spoonsful, quarterpotsful, barrelsful, and other moulded forms of water. Even were the pails and
the pots all actually standing in the stream, still between them the free water would continue to
flow. It is just this free water of consciousness that psychologists resolutely overlook. Every
definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows round it. With it goes
the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to us, the dawning
sense of whither it is to lead. The significance , the value, of the image is all in this halo or
penumbra that surrounds and escorts it, -- or rather that is fused into one with it and has become
bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh; leaving it, it is true, an image of the same thing it was
before, but making it an image of that thing newly taken and freshly understood.

Let us call the consciousness of this halo of relations around the image by the name of the
"psychic overtone" or "fringe". 147

In presenting the above passages from James which can be understood as outlining some of the
major features of the attentive model we do not want to give the appearance that all James says is
consistent with the impression created by these passages. In dealing more explicitly with the
relationship obtaining between subsidiary awareness, feeling, context, system, and such

-page 143-

considerations as the whole-part relation as it pertains to the structuring of consciousness, the

attentive model departs from James' psychological understandings although it may be considered
a refinement of his view. In articulating a distinction between feeling states, for instance, the
groundwork has been laid for an alternative to his theory of emotions which incorporates his
theory into a more complex understanding. The following passages will suffice to present his
theory.

I now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory, which is this: If we fancy some strong
emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily
symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no "mind stuff" out of which the emotion can be
constituted and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains. 148

In like manner of grief: what would it be without its tears, its sobs, its suffocation of the heart, its
pang in the breast bone? A feelingless cognition that certain circumstances are deplorable and
nothing more. 149
The problem with these two passages is that James is totally unclear about whether we are
dealing with references to the fringe of consciousness or with references to sensations singled out
by attention. For instance, we may interpret his reference to 'all the feelings of its bodily
symptoms' to be his way of specifying the content of the fringe of consciousness, and then his
argument that to imagine away the fringe is to imagine away the emotion makes perfectly good
sense. For according to the attentive model what makes an emotion an emotion is precisely its
role as an underlying feeling state functioning outside the focus of attention.

If these references are not references to the fringe of consciousness and its contents then we may
well ask why not? Why would James ignore the fringe when it came to a discussion of emotion
and revert to a spotlight

-page 144-

model in which all reference to feeling and emotion is a reference to sets of items singled out by
attention?

Nevertheless, the fact remains that he does seem to ignore the fringe at precisely the point of its
most crucial applicability: namely, in connection with emotion. On the very same page on which
he asked, What would grief be without its tears, etc.? James makes the following statement,

The more closely I scrutinize my states, the more persuaded I become that whatever "course"
affections and passions I have are in very truth constituted by, and made up of, those bodily
changes which we ordinarily call their expression or consequence... 150

There seems no way of interpreting this statement other than by saying that James is talking
about bodily changes which can be singled out by attention (or noticed). What seems to clinch
the argument for this interpretation is the consideration that the sort of bodily changes which
James mentions as 'expressions' or 'consequences' are precisely the sort of changes which we
notice while in that emotional state. Thus, it would be unlikely for a person to be grief-stricken
and not notice that he was crying, or angry and not notice she was striking the table.
And so if we give this interpretation to James, the answer to his gedanken experiment in which
he asked what would be left of an emotion if the object of attention (the tears) were taken away
is that an underlying feeling state would be left over. With that answer we would refute James'
answer that nothing would be left over. Yet it is important to realize that this answer does not
take us outside James' theory of consciousness, since the answer comes from his theory in terms
of an appeal to the fringe of consciousness. This takes us back to the superiority of the first
interpretation

-page 145-

where we can argue that what James meant to be saying was that there would be nothing left of
the emotion if the underlying feeling state was missing. Surely, James deserves the benefit of the
doubt.

[table of contents] [previous] [next]

Footnotes

138. C.G. Jung, On the nature of the psyche, translated by R.F.C. Hull, (Princeton:Princeton
Univ. Press,1969), p.95.

back to text

139. C.G. Jung, "A review of the complex theory." In Collected works, vol. 8 (New
York:Pantheon Books,1960), p.101.

back to text
140. W. James, Psychology: briefer course (New York:Collier Books,1962), p.157.

back to text

141. Ibid., p.177.

back to text

142. Ibid., p.182.

back to text

143. Ibid., p.181.

back to text

144. Ibid., p.171.

back to text

145. Ibid., p.183.

back to text

146. Ibid., p.249.

back to text

147. Ibid., p.179.

back to text

148. Ibid., p.380.

back to text

149. Ibid., p.381.

back to text

150. Ibid.

back to text

CONSCIOUSNESS

© C.O. Evans & J. Fudjack

Addendum F - The Unconscious and the Concept of the Complex[table of contents] [previous]
[next]

The unconscious, according to Jung, so closely resembles consciousness in the functions it is

capable of and in its manner of operation that the processes of the unconscious are hardly
distinguishable from the activities of consciousness. Indeed, as we shall see, in Jung's view the
unconscious is capable of behaving as if it were a separate consciousness housed in the same
body as consciousness proper. So struck was he by the notion of the similarity of functioning of
the two that he was motivated to say,

There is in my opinion no tenable argument against the hypothesis that psychic functions which
today seem conscious to us were once unconscious and yet worked as if they were conscious.
We could also say that all the psychic phenomena to be found in man were already present in the
natural unconscious state. 151

We shall not here be concerned with his claim that presently conscious psychic functions were
formerly unconscious. We shall, however, concern ourselves with the view this passage suggests,
according to which the unconscious can be thought of as capable of reproducing the kind of
functions and phenomena normally attributed to consciousness. As this position would have it,
the unconscious is no less clear, complex or capable than consciousness and can be thought of as
comprised of the same materials of which consciousness is made-- feelings, thoughts, and the
like. For exponents of this position it is as if the difference between the unconscious and
consciousness was merely a matter of an awareness accompanying processes of consciousness
and missing in the case of processes of the unconscious.

-page 146-

Jung, for instance, continues the train of thought in the above passage by saying,

To this it might be objected that it would then be far from clear why there is such a thing as
consciousness at all. 152

He is apparently concerned that if the awareness accompanying processes of consciousness is the

only mark distinguishing such processes from processes of the unconscious then consciousness
per se would appear, contrary to common belief, dispensable; for the organism could function as
effectively without it.

Jung is not alone in the conviction that the unconscious is capable of the same functions and
phenomena as consciousness. This proposition has been advocated by many, even to the extent
that of late there appears to be a move toward reviving the notion of multiple consciousnesses
residing in one person or body. The multiple consciousness thesis develops quite readily from
the view of the unconscious we ascribe to Jung, and he was favorably disposed toward it. For it
is easy to imagine that an unconscious which is capable of all the functions and phenomena of
consciousness is one capable of functioning independently of consciousness, as a sort of second
consciousness.

The view which attributes the capacity for consciousness-like functioning and phenomena to the
unconscious, in turn, is historically founded upon conceiving of the unconscious as possessing a
complex structuring of its own. As we noted in the previous section, it is Freud, and not his
predecessors, whom Jung credits with the 'discovery' of the unconscious because it was Freud
who first called attention to and attempted to elucidate its complex

-page 147-

nature.

It is our contention that this contribution of Freud's, as necessary and significant a step in the
history of psychology as it may have been, was a costly one. For Freud decreed that psychology
retract models of consciousness of the Jamesian sort, believing the price to be paid for
conceiving of the unconscious as complex and capable of sophisticated activity was a disavowal
of the description of the unconscious, as a 'fringe' of consciousness for instance, that would give
it the appearance of a vague composite of dimly realized perceptions and images. How could the
unconscious be construed as complex if it was merely comprised of all the hazy and ill-framed
contents of consciousness, the inevitable refuse consigned to obscurity as a byproduct of the
selective processes involved in the deployment of attention? Psychology paid the price decreed
by Freud and the metaphor of light on which Freud's predecessors depended too readily in their
descriptions of the unconscious, subconscious, or fringe, was effectively expunged. But the price
was too stiff. Following Freud the unconscious became a separate entity housing all of the same
kind of mental artifacts consciousness was capable of. And all the postulated items thereby
created, the specific feelings, thoughts, and perceptions-- not only circumvented characterization
as dimly represented in consciousness, they were not believed to be experienced in
consciousness at all. This, however, was a theoretical strategy that bewildered many who were
perplexed by the notion of appropriating phenomenologically meaningful terms like 'feeling',
'thought', and 'perception' for use in ways which precluded their having phenomenological
-page 148-

meaning. Objections of this sort to Freud's concept of the unconscious persist to the present day.

The attentive model, as a refinement of the model which Freud's theory sought to replace, has
avoided the metaphor of light that was too readily and frequently appealed to in the explication
and justification of these early models. On the other hand, it takes seriously the prominent role
assigned to attention in the discussion of consciousness. It explicates a relationship between
object of attention and subsidiary awareness in the course of which a comprehensive description
of consciousness is presented, one which brings into relief and integrates insights on the nature
of feeling, context, and the like-- some of which appear but play a less central role in the earlier
models (James' description of consciousness in particular).

We shall, in this section, propose an understanding of what can be called 'the complex nature of
the unconscious' from the standpoint of the attentive model. Insofar as we are successful in this
venture we shall show it to be unnecessary to reify the processes in question by positing an
unconscious, an independent faculty outside of consciousness. This endeavour amounts to
reinstating the Jamesian model in refined form. In which case, furthermore, it will become clear
that the distinguishing mark of Freud's theory is not to be found in its unparalleled capacity to
conceive of unconscious processes as displaying complexity; if it can, in principle, be said to
have an overall distinguishing mark it is to be found in the reification of the process in question
and the separation of the resulting 'unconscious' from consciousness.

In the next section we shall discuss an outstanding contribution of Jung's to the concept of the
unconscious, his idea of 'archetypal

-page 149-

representation'. We hope to show that if Jung's understanding of the unconscious is purged of

residual reificationist tendencies this descriptions of the role and nature of archetypal
representations can be interpreted as insights into the processes involved in inducing the altered
or non-bifurcated state of consciousness we discussed in Part III of this monograph.

The reificationist position we are calling into question was heavily debated during Freud and
Jung's time and is still being debated today. Let us begin, then, by tracing Jung's steps in dealing
with objections to the reificationist view.

In the following passage, written by Jung, we again find Wundt in the role of adversary. He is
adopting an anti-reificationist stance and it is apparent from the passage that his theory of
consciousness bears a resemblance to the attentive model.

Wundt himself is of the opinion that, as regards the "so- called unconscious processes, it is not a
question of unconscious psychic elements, but only of more dimly conscious ones," and that "for
hypothetical unconscious processes we could substitute actually demonstrable or at any rate less
hypothetical conscious processes." This attitude implies a clear rejection of the unconscious as a
psychological hypothesis. 153

With reservations about the stress put on the metaphor of light, we can understand this passage to
be expressing the claim that consciousness conceived as composed of varying 'intensities' or
kinds of awareness obviates postulating the existence of another faculty, the unconscious. But if
this is Wundt's position how would he account for observations suggesting that people can on
occasion behave as if governed by two separate faculties apparently residing in one person
simultaneously? Jung proceeds by posing this question:

-page 150-

The cases of "double consciousness" he explains as "modifications of individual consciousness

which very often occur continuously, in steady succession, and for which, by a violent
misinterpretation of the facts, a plurality of individual consciousness is substituted." The latter,
so Wundt argues, "would have to be simultaneously present in one and the same individual."
This, he says, "is admittedly not the case." 154
Obviously Wundt is here making the point that there exists no evidence for simultaneous
multiple consciousness in the same individual. Jung appeals to the following evidence and we
learn that not everyone would agree with Wundt.

Doubtless it is hardly possible for two consciousness to express themselves simultaneously in a

single individual in a blatantly recognizable way. This is why these states usually alternate. Janet
has shown that while the one consciousness controls the head, so to speak, the other
simultaneously puts itself into communication with the observer by means of a code of
expressive manual movements. Double consciousness may therefore very well be simultaneous.
155

The reader may note at this point that Janet's view is echoed in contemporary psychology by
Bateson who adopts a theory about two levels of communication according to which one's body
language,as expressive of one level of communication, can contradict or be at odds with one's
words, expressive of the other level. And Jung's appeal to Janet's observations in this context is
identical to the appeals made to Bateson's observations and theoretical constructs in support of
contemporary versions of the multiple consciousness thesis. But Bateson distinguishes between
the two levels of communication that he postulates by referring to the communication at one
level as 'meta-messages' in relation to 'messages' occurring at the other level-- the prefix 'meta'
signifying that the metamessage is a message about, or providing a framework for, the message
at the other level. The concept of 'metamessage' and its relationship to messages proper is easily
unfolded in terms of the

-page 151-

concept pair 'context' and 'content' and thus poses no special problem for the attentive model,
which is founded on an analogous distinction between subsidiary awareness and object of
attention. It could be expected, then, that in principle the occurrence of a contradiction between
metamessage (expressed in body language, for instance) and a verbal message would not be a
phenomenon anomalous to the model, although it might deserve further consideration and
explanation, being a special case. In other words, the observation of simultaneous contradictory
messages communicated by one person is not an observation which necessitates the positing of a
separate faculty in the form of a reified unconscious or second consciousness.
It might be mentioned that in his most recent formulations of his theory of hypnosis Erickson has
expressed the opinion that Bateson's theory of two levels of communication provides the
theoretical constructs for a definition of the unconscious that is not subject to the kind of
criticisms Freud met with and failed to quell. 156 We agree with Erickson, as the above
discussion implies, but shall offer a description of the unconscious in terms of concepts more
fundamental than the communications terminology Bateson gives the central place to in his
theory. It is important to note, however, that the concept of 'metamessage' implicitly carries
within it the rudiments of the view of consciousness we shall use in our discussion. This is firmly
brought home when we compare the concept of 'metamessage' with the concept of 'paramessage'
with which Bandler and Grinder propose to replace it. 157 With this suggested revision Bandler
and Grinder underwrite a variety of the multiple consciousness thesis in which each sense
modality is capable of independent information input and output as if, so to speak, there were
separate consciousnesses!

-page 152-

This revision deprives Bateson's theory of the very feature which suggests a corrective to the
much disputed tendency, which we are in the process of investigating, to reify the unconscious.

It is our belief, then, that Wundt needn't have made his position depend upon rejecting the
possibility of the existence of simultaneous contradictory messages. And in this section we shall
grant the possibility Wundt denied. Wundt, it seems, is guilty of complicity in sharing with Freud
the incorrect assumption that acknowledging the complexity of the unconscious (which in this
case manifests itself in the appearance of behaviour at odds with verbal messages that are objects
of attention) is contingent upon rejecting the view that one could theoretically 'substitute
conscious processes for hypothetical unconscious ones'.

We have as yet not considered Wundt's most significant objection to the notion of a reified
unconscious. Jung deals with this objection immediately following the above passage. He says,

Wundt thinks that the idea of a double consciousness, and hence of a "superconsciousness" and
"subconsciousness" in Fechner's sense, is a "survival from the psychological mysticism' of the
Schelling school. He obviously boggles at an unconscious representation being one which
nobody "has". In that case the word "representation" would naturally be obsolete too, since it
suggests a subject to whom something is present or "presented". That is the basic reason for
Wundt's rejection of the unconscious. 158

And this, essentially, is the objection that continues to be raised even today. It occurs frequently
in one form or other in a book of essays on Freud edited by the philosopher, Wollheim, and is
reflected in the following passage from that book.

His [Freud's] second account of consciousness might be called 'the attention theory'. He suggests:
...Becoming conscious is connected with the

-page 153-

application of ... attention ... which, as it seems, is only available in a specific quantity, and this
may have been diverted from the train of thought in question on to some other purpose ... If ...
we come upon an idea which will not bear criticism, we break off: we drop the cathexis of
attention ... (But) the train of thought ... can continue to spin itself out without attention being
turned to it again, unless ... it reaches a specially high degree of intensity which forces attention
to it.

This attention theory is vulnerable to 'Who?' questions and charges of 'multiplying'. Do we direct
our own attention to the ideas running through our minds, or does a mini-agency have this job? Is
this aiming done consciously? Unwittingly? Does the attention directing agency know before
hand what our attention will strike? Who continues thinking our unattended train of thought? Is it
perhaps not entertained by any agency when our attention moves from it? Can it become 'intense'
while there is no one attending to it whom it bothers intensely? 159

We can expect Freud, as an advocate of the spotlight model, to have difficulty with questions
regarding the deployment of attention. For if consciousness is conceived as nothing more than
the spotlight of attention, to attribute control over the selectivity of attention to consciousness
itself is very much like saying that in order to select an object of attention from amongst the
possibilities we must first attend to them all. Thus, as Thalberg, the author of the above passage,
implies, we might expect Freud to appeal to the existence of a hypothetical 'mind-agency' in
order to explain the directing of attention. But an appeal to the existence of an agency outside of
consciousness opens the door to the questions of the kind Thalberg poses: Is the agency itself
conscious? Does it know what attention will strike? Etc.
In contrast, by conceiving of consciousness as subsidiary awareness/object of attention the
selectivity of attention is explained by appealing to subsidiary awareness and the influence the
underlying feeling state, as the

-page 154-

mode in which subsidiary awareness is experienced, has on attention and vice versa. Our
discussion of subliminal perception, for instance, suggests an answer to the question 'Does the
attention directing agency know beforehand what our attention will strike' and it is an answer
that shows the question to be somewhat misdirected. For there is neither a necessity to imagine
an agency outside of consciousness which 'recognizes' the presentation as an object of attention
nor a necessity to suppose that the conscious experience of the presentation which does take
place either is itself the experience of an object of attention or entails 'knowledge' of what the
item experienced is. The subliminal perception, on the account we have presented, is experienced
as a change in underlying feeling state by the person in question.

In providing answers to questions concerning the deployment of attention the attentive model
demands that care be taken in consistently attributing a subsidiary phenomenological status to
components of subsidiary awareness lest we fall into the error of conceiving of them despite
intentions to the contrary, as objects of attention. But this is precisely the error Freud falls into
when he speaks of an unattended train of thought, for example, as though it were identical to a
sequence of objects of attention which is, however, not experienced in attention. The formula the
attentive model offers in the hope of preventing such inconsistencies is the description of
subsidiary awareness as experienced in the mode of feeling.

Having adopted the over-simplistic spotlight model Freud fails to discriminate, as we have done
by distinguishing between underlying feeling state and object of attention, between components
of consciousness of

-page 155-
different phenomenological status. It is not surprising, then, that when he attempts to supplement
the spotlight of attention by introducing a concept of the unconscious he should repeat his
mistake by appropriating all the terms commonly understood to denote objects of attention in
consciousness for use in describing the contents of the hypothetical unconscious. It is reasonable
to ask, as Wundt and Thalberg do, Who experiences these objects of attention I do not
experience? On the one hand Freud wants to answer, 'The unconscious', as if it were a second
consciousness, a second spotlight. This is tantamount to claiming, quite literally, that someone
else experiences such unconscious objects of attention. On the other hand, Freud appears to want
to deny that the processes of the unconscious are experienced at all. This is an attractive
alternative to identifying the subject who experiences the thoughts, feelings, and such, not
experienced in consciousness. But it is at best metaphorical to apply terms with a
phenomenological meaning to processes of the unconscious if these processes are non-
experiential events.

It is Freud's double spotlight account that we wish to replace by the attentive model. We suggest
that the concept of subsidiary awareness, as we have presented it, can be used to explicate a
concept of the 'unconscious' without misusing phenomenological vocabulary. Let us proceed to
investigate how this could be achieved.

Consciousness, as it was our intention to show in this work, has a rich and complex structure. It
relevates an object of attention against a complex background in subsidiary awareness. Yet we
do not submit that its complex contexting abilities alone account for the phenomena which
motivate Freud and Jung to postulate an unconscious. In the previous section we

-page 156-

presented a passage from James in which intricate habitually performed activities such as
knitting are described as happening outside the area of the subject's attention. James conceives of
these activities as depending upon sensations of which the subject is nonetheless aware--
subsidiarily aware, in our terminology. But we recognize that it is not this type of complexity of
consciousness that Jung had in mind when he spoke of unconscious complexes and honored
Freud and not James with the discovery of the unconscious.
Let us inspect what is meant in this context by a 'complex'. At first glance it might appear as if
shifting from the idea of complexity to the more theoretical notion of a 'complex' would present
special difficulties for the task of re-defining the unconscious in terms of the contexting abilities
of subsidiary awareness. But we witness Freud employing the concept as if it were identical to
the idea of an experienced context of which there is subsidiary awareness: in the following
passage, for example, we find his reference to a complex easily interpreted as a reference to an
ideational framework in the background of consciousness influencing the choice of object of
attention. Speaking of Bleuler and Jung's pathfinding association experiments Freud says,

The experiment is as follows: a word (termed the 'stimulus- Word') is called out to the subject
and he replies as quickly as possible with some other word that occurs to him (the so- called
'reaction'), his choice of this reaction not being restricted by anything. ...The experiments ...
acquired their value from the fact that they assumed that the reaction to the stimulus-word could
not be a chance one but must be determined by an ideational content present in the mind of the
reacting subject. It has become customary to speak of an ideational content of this kind, which is
able to influence the reaction to the stimulus-word, as a 'complex'. 160

-page 157-

The passage is reminiscent of the contemporary claims 161 that a subject's background
awareness of context determines the meaning the subject attributes to ambiguous words
presented him. Indeed, Jung speaks of complexes in a way which invites correlating the subject's
background awareness of context with the presence of a complex:

What happens in the association test also happens in every discussion between two people. In
both cases there is an experimental situation which constellates complexes that assimilate the
topic discussed or the situation as a whole, including the parties concerned. 162

But let us further inspect the concept of the complex by considering the following passage in
which Breuer is quoted by Strachey. Incidentally, when Strachey mentions the 'early Zurich
Definitions' of the concept in this passage he is referring to Jung and Bleuler.
Breuer, in the same work seems to lay more stress than these early Zurich definitions on the
factor of unconsciousness, when he writes that 'ideas that are aroused but do not enter
consciousness ... sometimes ... accumulate and form complexes- - mental strata withdrawn from
consciousness.' When at a later period the term became a catchword not only in psychology but
in popular usage, the feature of the group of ideas concerned being 'withdrawn from
consciousness'-- that is to say 'repressed'-- came to form an essential part of the word's
connotation. 163

What Breuer can be taken as emphasizing is that the ideational content, the complex, supposed
by Bleuler and Jung to be present in the mind of the subject in their experiments is not present in
the same way that the stimulus word is present. That is, the complex is not present as an object of
attention. If, accordingly, we understand Breuer's references to the unconscious and
consciousness to be references to subsidiary awareness and object of attention, respectively, we
are supplied in this passage with a description of the complex as a group or set of components of
subsidiary awareness accumulating or

-page 158-

forming a whole, a context, by virtue of their respective contexting functions.

That each of the items forming the group called a complex has a contexting function (that is, that
it is a part of the context experienced in subsidiary awareness and as such plays a role in
directing attention to objects appropriate to that context) is brought into relief in the following
passage in which Freud quotes an experience related by Otto Rank. According to the account
Rank himself unexpectedly prepared to ask for gold from a cashier when he planned to obtain
silver and attributes his mistake to the 'unconscious perception' of an acquaintance named Gold
who happened to be in the vicinity.

Some time ago I myself experienced an unusual variation of the "remarkable coincidence" of
meeting someone I was at the very moment thinking about. Shortly before Christmas I was on
my way to the Austro-Hungarian Bank to get some change in the form of ten new silver kronen
for giving as presents. While I was absorbed in ambitious phantasies which had to do with the
contrast between my small assets and the piles of money stored in the bank building, I turned
into a narrow street in which the bank stood. I saw a car standing at the door and many people
going in and out. I said to myself: No doubt the cashiers will have time even for my few kronen.
In any case I shall be quick about it. I shall put down the banknote I wanted changed and say
"Let me have gold , please." I immediately noticed my error-- I should, of course, have asked for
silver-- and awoke from my phantasies. I was now only a few steps from the entrance and saw a
young man coming toward me whom I thought I recognized, but as I am short- sighted I was not
able to identify him for certain. As he drew nearer I recognized him as a school-friend of my
brother's called Gold. Gold's brother was a well-known writer from whom I had expected
considerable help at the beginning of my literary career. This help, however, had not been
forthcoming, and in consequence I failed to win the material success I had hoped for, which had
been the subject of my phantasy on the way to the bank. While I was absorbed in my phantasies,
therefore, I must have unconsciously perceived the approach of Herr Gold; and this was
represented in my consciousness (which was dreaming of material success) in such a form that I
decided to ask for gold at the counter, instead of the less valuable silver. On the other hand,
however, the paradoxical fact that

-page 159-

my unconscious is able to perceive an object which my eyes can recognize only later seems
partly explained by what Bleuler (1910) terms "complexive preparedness." This was, as we have
seen, directed to material matters and had from the beginning, contrary to my better knowledge,
directed my steps to the building where only gold and paper money is changed. 164

We might speak of Rank as having subliminally perceived Herr Gold, and, in accord with our
discussion of subliminal perception, describe Gold's unrecognized presence as constituting a
component of Rank's subsidiary awareness that displayed a definite contexting function by
shifting Rank's attention from the idea of silver currency to gold currency. The account Rank
gives also supplies us with information regarding a possible explanation of why recognition of
Gold might have been inhibited. For we may assume that if Rank had entertained as an object of
attention this brother of the acquaintance who failed him, the perception would have induced a
certain amount of painful feelings and memories. The substitute object of attention, the gold
currency, was only partially determined by the subliminal presence of the man and we are safe in
assuming that his presence was only one factor influencing Rank's attention-- Rank himself
alludes to other factors when he speaks of his 'ambitious phantasies'. This analysis is in keeping
with the position we outlined in the section on subliminal perception where we argued against
'associationist' analyses of subliminal experiments which suggested a one-to-one causal
correspondence between subliminal stimulus and object of attention response.
It appears, then, that in this case at least, mention of the 'unconscious' can be construed as a
reference to subsidiary awareness. We find further encouragement in the attempt to redescribe
the unconscious in terms of

-page 160-

subsidiary awareness in the words of none other than Jung himself when, in speaking of "the
unfathomable dark recesses of the conscious mind" he says,

For want of a more descriptive term we call this unknown background the unconscious. 165

Indeed, he even speaks of

... a fusion of subliminal elements ... a combination of all the perceptions, thoughts, and feelings
which consciousness has not registered because of their feeble accentuation. 166

This is very similar to the point we made in insisting upon seeing a single subliminal
presentation as one component amongst many in subsidiary awareness, functioning as a part of
the whole in subsidiary awareness and hence merely a factor among many influencing the
directing of attention. The whole, the context experienced in subsidiary awareness, supplies the
meaning for the object of attention experienced in that context. So it is not surprising to find Jung
elsewhere speaking about a technique for ascertaining the meaning of dreams that he calls
"taking up the context". The following is his example of this method:

To give an example: I was working once with a young man who mentioned in his anamnesis that
he was happily engaged, and to a girl of "good" family. In his dreams she frequently appeared in
very unflattering guise. The context showed that the dreamer's unconscious connected the figure
of his bride will all kinds of scandalous stories from quite another source-- which was
incomprehensible to him and naturally also to me. But, from the constant repetition of such
combinations, I had to conclude that, despite his conscious resistance, there existed in him an
unconscious tendency to show his bride in this ambiguous light. He told me that if such a thing
were true it would be a catastrophe. His acute neurosis had set in a short time after his
engagement. Although it was something he could not bear to think about, this suspicion of his
bride seemed to me a point of such capital importance that I advised him to instigate some
inquiries. These showed the suspicion to be well founded, and the shock of the unpleasant
discovery did not kill the patient but, on the

-page 161-

contrary, cured him of his neurosis and also of his bride. Thus, although the taking up of the
context resulted in an "unthinkable" meaning and hence in an apparently nonsensical
interpretation, it proved correct in the light of the facts which were subsequently disclosed. 167

Note that according to Jung the 'unconscious' connected the figure of the bride to storylines
which did not flatter her. He is attributing the negative contexting of the bride to the unconscious
and he is also perhaps implying that the young man was unconsciously aware, during his waking
hours, of clues suggesting the nature of his brides' behavior. But for both of these references to
the unconscious we could easily substitute references to subsidiary awareness. The young man's
feelings toward the woman are expressed in the context in which he fantasizes her, whether or
not he is ever explicitly aware of those feelings or recognizes them. These feelings, conversely,
constitute his experience of the real situation in which he finds himself vis-a-vis his bride- - his
felt experience of the context of which he is subsidiarily aware. His suspicious feelings, in other
words, are his way of experiencing the cues or metamessages he succeeds in suppressing from
attention, and they are expressed in the dream context.

And again, paralleling the incident Rank accounts, the clues the young man suppresses are ones
that are obviously painful to entertain in attention.

What we have as yet to consider is the reason that the young man's suspicious feelings appear to
come into prominence in his dreams and not in his waking experience. In order to do this we
have to remind the reader that in our discussion of subliminal perception we distinguish two
kinds of subliminal presentation: ones which were readily integrated into the prevailing context
and ones which we described as components of subsidiary awareness with

-page 162-
a strong contexting function for a rival context. If we make the further assumption that rival
contexting components can be momentarily inhibited from exerting influence on attention we
could explain the aggregate of clues the young man was subsidiarily aware of as disengaged in
this way during his waking hours but gaining ascendancy in his dreams. In other words, during
waking life the items relegated to subsidiary awareness were anomalous to the prevailing
context, the present patterning of the background of which the young man was subsidiarily
aware. Normally an anomalous item would itself insist upon attention but we might explain why
they did not become objects of attention by appealing to the fact that they could only do so at the
cost of inducing painful feelings the young man did not care to experience. If an anomalous item
is inhibited from attention we might at least expect it to influence attention, distract it from
present concerns to a substitute object of attention, by joining the already present and active
components of subsidiary awareness. And it is likely that this kind of phenomenon occurred, for
Jung mentions the onset of a neurosis at precisely the time one would expect the young man to
first have become subsidiarily aware of his bride's metacommunications.

If, however, consciousness does not, on occasion, readjust itself in this manner to the anomalous
item, and if, furthermore, a host of such anomalous items are allowed to be present in this more
or less 'non-functional' way in subsidiary awareness, they might be construed as constituting an
interrelated system not integrated into the predominant pattern of subsidiary awareness, the
experienced context. We could appropriate Jung's term and call this group a "complex". And to
do so would not depart significantly from Jung's

-page 163-

usage of the term. According to Jung's well known principle the unconscious compensates
consciousness-- unconscious attitudes compensate conscious ones. He says,

As far back as 1907 I pointed out the compensatory relation between consciousness and the split-
off complexes and also emphasized their purposive character. ...As a rule, the unconscious
content contrasts strikingly with the conscious material, particularly when the conscious attitude
tends too exclusively in a direction that would threaten the vital needs of the individual. 168

We may understand Jung to be referring, when he speaks here of the unconscious, not merely to
subsidiary awareness, but to the 'split-off complex', a distinction which parallels Freud's
'preconscious' and 'unconscious proper'. And parallel to our discussion of these Freudian terms
we suggest that the ego-complex is a reference to the prevailing experienced context in
subsidiary awareness. And we suggest that the term 'complex' be reserved for use in denoting the
composite of rival contexting components that are superimposed, so to speak, on the prevailing
context. The complex, then, would be 'split-off' from consciousness only in the sense that it is
comprised of components of subsidiary awareness anomalous to the prevailing context. To use
the term 'complex' in this manner has the advantage of conceiving of the group of anomalous
components as a unit in its own right. Such a complex could be understood to be similar to the
prevalent experienced context with the exception that being 'superimposed on' or 'interspersed
throughout' the prevailing context, it would be prevented from subsidizing an actual object of
attention. And insofar as it does not have an associated object of attention

-page 164-

but might, were it to be unhampered by the presence of the prevailing context, it could be
considered to have a latent object of attention. The latent object corresponding to the complex
needn't be conceived of as existing in a separate faculty independent of consciousness-- an
unconscious, or for that matter, anywhere else (just as we need not postulate the existence of a
land of potential hurricanes). And yet we do not wish to dispute the fact of latency nor contend
that dreams (for instance) have a latent content. We merely wish to describe the latency in terms
of the structuring of consciousness itself. And this is an important point, since the reificationist
concept of the unconscious takes refuge in the belief that it alone can explain the phenomenon of
latent content or latent meaning. Only by positing the existence of an unconscious, a faculty
independent of consciousness, can one make sense of the claim that dreams have a latent content,
an underlying undisclosed meaning-- or so the reificationist would have it. The point we are
making, however, is that there is no need to postulate an unconscious where such latent objects
of attention are located. The fact of latency is to be explained in terms of the complex of
anomalous components of subsidiary awareness.

On the attentive model, then, the complex (and hence, the 'unconscious proper') would have to be
experienced in consciousness. And it would be experienced, as the context itself is, in the mode
of feeling. Jung often speaks of the complex as a feeling-toned complex,. implying that there is
some special connection between feeling and the presence of the complex. And it is not
uncommon to feel that a dream has an undisclosed meaning or experience of feeling that there is
something else to the dream besides its apparent content-- a 'latent' content. With mention of this
type of experience
-page 165-

we identify the kind of feeling corresponding to the presence of the complex. In the case of the
young man who dreams about his bride, Jung alludes to the fact that the man harbored
ambiguous feelings in respect of her, as should be expected, since the complex can be seen as an
incipient context, a rival to the prevailing experienced context, and as such could be expected to
be experienced as a feeling at odds with the feeling produced by the prevailing context.

We have previously suggested that Freud's reference to the unconscious proper be understood in
terms of habitually unnoticed contexting components of subsidiary awareness (see section B).
We are expanding upon that definition by construing references to the unconscious proper as
references to complexes present in consciousness. We are understanding the complex to consist
of components of subsidiary awareness that resist attention and have hypothesized that this is a
function of the painful feeling that would be associated with such components were they to
become objects of attention. This understanding is in accord with the position we presented
earlier in section B. But in conceiving of the complex as an aggregate of components and
characterizing them as anomalous to the prevailing context we add a new feature to the earlier
hypothesis. This further development allows us to suggest that even were attention to be
successfully turned toward any of the particular anomalous components interspersed within the
predominant context (and composing the complex) the 'latent object of attention' corresponding
to the complex would not be revealed. For the latent object is the object of attention that would
be present were the complex itself, as a whole, to become the predominant experienced context.

-page 166-

We might make this clearer by briefly considering Erickson's most recently published discussion
of his hypnotic techniques. Central to his method is the induction of a state of confusion in the
subject by means of a psychological shock or surprise. The effect he is seeking is the
'depotentiation of the conscious set' of the subject, to use his words. Essentially he means by this
phrase the same thing Shor has in mind when he speaks of the temporary disintegration of the
orientational framework in the background of attention. In one of the techniques Erickson
employs, the 'interspersal technique', he intersperses anomalous items (mispronounced words,
inappropriate phrases, absurd references and such) throughout a message intended for his
subject. Such deliberately turgid communications are intended to supply the ulterior regions of
the subject's consciousness with a host of rival contexting components, to use our terminology.
Erickson is artificially manufacturing a complex and when he has supplied the subject with
enough material the complex becomes predominant, overwhelming and replacing the original
experienced-context, or 'conscious set', depotentiating it. What the subject experiences during
this process is a new, unexpected, object of attention-- one that appears, as far as the subject can
tell, to have come 'out of the blue'. The latent object of attention is seeded by Erickson and
becomes manifest, but none of the anomalous contexting components constituting the complex
are revealed as objects of attention. 169 The process, it appears, does not fail when one of the
interspersed elements inadvertently attracts attention and is noticed-- for it is after all only one
component and as such has only a tenuous association with the object of attention Erickson has
designed the process to result in.

-page 167-

For purposes of exposition we have assigned Erickson a greater control over the process and its
end-product than he acknowledges having. And we have omitted mention of references to the
unconscious that would indicate that his understanding of that term is very similar to the one we
are presenting (he speaks of the unconscious, for instance, as a process of feeling). 170 But the
brief description that we have given of his interpersonal technique sheds further light, at any rate,
on the phenomenon we have in mind in referring to the presence of complexes in consciousness.
And it helps in founding an understanding of the difference between habitually tacit components
of subsidiary awareness and a constellation of such components, a complex.

In this section we began by pointing out that many of the references to the unconscious,
unconscious awareness, and complexes could be construed as references to the phenomenon of
subsidiary awareness pure and simple. We then discovered that the notion of 'a complex' and of
'the unconscious proper' could be reserved for a special type of process taking place in
consciousness-- one which, we might mention, renders the term 'the unconscious' a misnomer.

It remains to be said that dreams, symptoms of neurosis, and jokes are amongst the phenomena
for explanation of which Freud postulated the existence of the unconscious proper. The feature
these phenomena have in common, if our hypothesis is correct, is shared by virtue of the
presence, in consciousness, of a complex. Although we shall not, in this paper, embark upon an
analysis of any of these phenomena or present any further evidence that they could be explained
in terms of the presence of a 'complex' as we have construed that terms, we remind the reader
that when Freud stressed that

The interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the
mind. 171

-page 168-

Jung replied,

The via regia to the unconscious, however, is not the dream, as he thought, but the complex,
which is the architect of dreams and of symptoms. 172

[table of contents] [previous] [next]

Footnotes

151. C.C.Jung, On the nature of the psyche. op.cit., p.120.

back to text

152. Ibid.

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153. Ibid., p.74.

back to text

154. Ibid.

back to text

155. Ibid.

back to text

156. M.H.Erickson, E.L. Rossi and S.I. Rossi, Hypnotic realities (New York:Irvington
Publishers,1976), p.75.

"Throughout this discussion of the varieties of double bind the reader may have noted the ease
with which we could use the terms "unconscious" and "metacommunication" in the same place.
These terms may in fact be in the process of becoming interchangeable. This suggests we may be
witnessing a fundamental change in our world view of depth psychology whereby we are
developing a new and more efficient nomenclature. Philosophers have never liked the term
"unconscious', it was the academic and philosophical rejection of this term that impeded the early
acceptance of Freud's psychoanalysis. The use of the term "unconscious" still divides academic
and experimentally oriented psychologists form clinicians as well as doctors in physical
medicine from psychiatry. The term "metacommunication", however, was developed within a
mathematico-logical framework, and as such, it fits in with the world view of the research
scientist as well as the clinician. It may well be that we are on the threshold of a new zeitgeist
wherein we will revise the terms of depth psychology to make for a better fit with current
conceptions in mathematics, cybernetics, and systems theory."

back to text
157. R. Bandler and R. Grinder, The structure of magic, vol. 2 (Palo Alto:Science and Behavior
Books,1976), p.36.

back to text

158. C.G. Jung, On the nature of the psyche, op.cit., p.74.

back to text

159. I. Thalberg, "Freud's anatomies of the self." In R. Wollheim (ed.), Freud: a collection of
critical essays (Garden City:Anchor Books,1974), p.166.

back to text

160. S. Freud, "Psychoanalysis and the establishment of the facts in legal proceedings." In J.
Strachey (ed.), Standard Edition, vol. 9 (London:Hogarth Press,1959), p.103.

back to text

161. E.A. Carswell and R. Rommetveit, op.cit., p.9-11.

back to text

162. C.G. Jung, "A review of the complex theory." op.cit., p.95.

back to text
163. J. Strachey (ed.), Standard edition of the complete works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 9. op.cit.,
p.101.

back to text

164. S. Freud, "The psychopathology of everyday life." In J. Strachey (ed.), Standard Edition,
vol 6 (London:Hogarth Press,1960), p.264.

back to text

165. C.G. Jung, Dreams, translated by R.F.C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press,1974), p.73.

back to text

166. Ibid., p.41.

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167. Ibid., p.72.

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168. Ibid., p.38.

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169. M.H. Erickson, E.L. Rossi and S.I. Rossi, op.cit., p.225-6, 274-5.

back to text

170. Ibid., p.182. Rossi sums up a discussion of the unconscious and feeling by saying, "feelings
come from our unconscious."

back to text

171. S. Freud, The interpretation of dreams (second part). In J. Strachey (ed.), Standard Edition,
vol. 5 (London:Hogarth Press,1953), p.608.

back to text

172. C.G. Jung, "A review of the complex theory." op.cit., p.101.

back to text

CONSCIOUSNESS

© C.O. Evans & J. Fudjack

Addendum G -

Jung and the Archetype[table of contents] [previous] [next]

We shall introduce the concept of the archetype, to which we turn our attention in this section, by
recapitulating a discussion of the unconscious presented by Liliane Frey-Rohn in her book, From
Freud to Jung: a comparative study of the unconscious. In the discussion we have in mind she
begins by reminding the reader that Freud distinguished between a descriptive and dynamic
sense of the unconscious. As we have pointed out (in section B) that which was only
unconscious in the descriptive sense Freud called the preconscious, reserving the term
'unconscious' for that which was unconscious in the dynamic sense, the unconscious proper. In
Frey- Rohn's opinion,

It can readily be seen that the latent unconscious [preconscious] largely coincided with the
"fringe of consciousness", which is close to consciousness, and, at the same time, with the
chiaroscuro of the fringe phenomena of consciousness-- an idea which Jung borrowed from
William James. 173

This reflects our attempt to construe references to the preconscious as references to subsidiary
awareness. However, as Frey Rohn correctly points out,

...as far as Freud was concerned, the unconscious constituted an essentially different agency than
the (pre)conscious. 174

In section B we recognized that it was Freud's desire to conceive of the unconscious proper as a
separate agency and we argued for the possibility of construing the unconscious proper in terms
of subsidiary awareness. Jung referred to Freud's unconscious proper, as distinguished from the
preconscious,

-page 169-

as the 'personal unconscious' for reasons which we shall shortly see, and Frey-Rohn tells us
that...

In contrast [to Freud], Jung could not see a basic difference between the two spheres of
consciousness [the conscious and the preconscious] and the personal unconscious [unconscious
proper], that is, the repressed. 175
Indeed, she mentions...

...Jung's repeated statement reducing Freud's repressed- unconscious [unconscious proper] to

nothing other than "a subliminal appendix to the conscious mind"... 176

Jung, it appears, would have been essentially in agreement with the strategy we adopted in the
last section (F), according to which the unconscious proper was understood in terms of a
complex of rival contexting components of subsidiary awareness. But, we learn, just as soon as it
looks as if all references to the preconscious and unconscious can be construed as references to
subsidiary awareness or some specific feature of subsidiary awareness, Jung reintroduces the
concept of an unconscious separate from consciousness! This unconscious is totally different
from the 'personal unconscious', that is, Freud's unconscious proper. Jung call it the collective
unconscious.

In later life Jung came to see the unconscious as an agency which differed from consciousness.
This seeming contradiction to his earlier statements might be only the consequence of his placing
the dividing line between the two agencies deeper than before (that is, between consciousness
and the collective unconscious), while at the same time, accentuating their differences in content.
177

Jung used the concept of the archetype to identify the content of the collective unconscious.

According to Jung, the archetype resides in the collective unconscious, constituting its content.
The archetype itself never enters consciousness although it can manifest itself in consciousness
in the form of an 'archetypal

-page 170-

representation'. Like the dream which, according to the Freudian analysis, points beyond its
manifest content to a latent content, the archetypal representation points beyond itself and
consciousness to the archetype in the postulated collective unconscious.
In this section we shall offer an interpretation of the archetype which obviates positing the
existence of an agency separate from consciousness, a reified unconscious. In doing this we shall
purge Jung's concept of the unconscious of the residual reificationism exhibited in his
understanding of the collective unconscious.

The archetype, according to Jung, can never enter consciousness. All we know about it we know
by virtue of its manifestations in consciousness in the form of archetypal representations. We
must, according to Jung, be satisfied with such indirect knowledge as it is the product of
inference from such representations.

The archetypal representations (images and ideas) mediated to us by the unconscious should not
be confused with the archetype as such. They are very varied structures which all point back to
one essentially "irrepresentable" basic form. The latter is characterized by certain formal
elements and by certain fundamental meanings, although these can be grasped only
approximately. The archetype as such is a psychoid factor that belongs, as it were, to the
invisible, ultraviolet end of the psychic spectrum. It does not appear, in itself, to be capable of
reaching consciousness. I venture this hypothesis because everything archetypal which is
perceived by consciousness seems to represent a set of variations on a ground theme. One is
most impressed by this act when one studies the endless variations of the mandala motif. 178

Indeed, Jung reasons that since we can only know the archetype indirectly there is little sense in
speaking of archetypes (in the plural -- all one need postulate is the existence of a single
archetype which all archetypal representations can be said to manifest or refer back to.

-page 171-

We must, however, constantly bear in mind that what we mean by "archetype" is in itself
irrepresentable, but has effects which make visualizations of it possible, namely, the archetypal
images and ideas. ...When the existence of two or more irrepresentables is assumed, there is
always the possibility-- which we tend to overlook--that it may not be a question of two or more
factors but of one only. The identity or non-identity of two irrepresentable quantities is
something that cannot be proved. 179

In both passages Jung characterizes the archetype as 'Irrepresentable'. The archetypal

representations, we may conclude, are representations of the irrepresentable. What sense can we
make of this curious notion of 'representing the irrepresentable'? Or must we admit that this is
essentially a paradoxical formulation of a nonsensical notion?

Jung is attempting to describe the relationship between contents of an unconscious agency and
the contents of consciousness in terms of the concepts of archetype and archetypal
representation. We suggest, however, that the relationship he is in fact describing is the
relationship obtaining between the normal or mundane state of consciousness (as bifurcated into
subsidiary awareness and object of attention) and the non-bifurcated or primordial state of
consciousness we discussed in Part III. When Jung says that the archetype is irrepresentable in
consciousness we can understand him to mean that experience in the non- bifurcated state cannot
be represented in normal consciousness because any presentation in normal consciousness occurs
in the fundamental figure-ground form by virtue of the bifurcation of consciousness into
subsidiary awareness and object of attention. Mundane consciousness can, however, point
beyond itself to the non- bifurcated state by entertaining a paradoxical representation, one in
which context and object are in a relationship of contradiction. A paradoxical representation is a
representation of an inconceivable duality, a logically impossible pair. As such, a paradoxical

-page 172-

representation points beyond duality-- indeed, it may induce the dissolution of gestalt and
obscure the figure-ground distinction.

As Jung mentions in the first passage above, the archetypal representation can be studied by
investigating what he calls the mandala motif.

I therefore took up a dream-image or an association of the patient's, and, with this as a point of
departure, set him the task of elaborating or developing his theme by giving free reign to his
fantasy. This, according to the individual's taste and talent, could be done in any number of
ways, dramatic, dialectic, visual, acoustic or in the form of dancing, painting, drawing, or
modeling. The result of this technique was a vast number of complicated designs whose diversity
puzzled me for years, until I was able to recognize that in this method I was witnessing the
spontaneous manifestation of an unconscious process which was merely assisted by the technical
ability of the patient, and to which I later gave the name "individuation process". 180

He describes the complicated designs referred to in the following way:

The chaotic assortment of images that at first confronted me reduced itself in the course of the
work to certain well- defined themes and formal elements, which repeated themselves in
identical or analogous form with the most varied individuals, I mention, as the most salient
characteristics, chaotic multiplicity and order; duality; the opposition of light and dark, upper and
lower, right and left; the union of opposites in a third; the quaternity (square, cross); rotation
(circle, sphere); and finally the centrist process and a radial arrangement that usually followed
some quaternary system. Triadic formations, apart from the complexio oppositorum in a third,
were relatively rare and formed notable exceptions which could be explained by special
conditions. The centering process, is, in my experience, the never-to-be-surpassed climax of the
whole development... 181

The archetype is manifest in the mandala which is characterized by a reconciliation of opposites

in a third-- the Many becomes the One. The nonbifurcated state is represented in normal
consciousness.

In the following passage Jung classifies the mandala as a yantra.

I need say only a few words about the functional significance of the mandala, as I have discussed
this theme several times.

-page 173-

before. Moreover, if we have a little feeling in our fingertips we can guess from these pictures,
painted with the greatest devotion but with unskillful hands, what is the deeper meaning that the
patients tried to put into them and express through them. They are yantras in the Indian sense,
instruments of meditation, concentration, and self-immersion, for the purpose of realizing inner
experience, as I have explained in the Golden Flower. At the same time they serve to produce
inner order-- which is why, when they appear in a series, they often follow chaotic, disordered
states marked by conflict and anxiety. They express the idea of a safe refuge, of inner
reconciliation and wholeness. 182

Again we are presented with the idea of reconciliation of conflict and transcendent wholeness. In
classifying the mandala as a yantra, Jung connects it with the Shri Yantra, the 'yantra of yantras'
which we have analyzed in Part Three. Our analysis of the Shri Yantra is consistent with the
interpretation we are giving to Jung's discussion of the functional significance of the mandala
and we may understand the Shri Yantra as a paradigm of the archetypal representation.

Although the concepts of conflict, opposition, and multiplicity play a part in Jung's descriptions
of such representations, the idea of paradox, which played a major role in our discussion of the
Shri Yantra, is not brought explicitly into relief by Jung (although it is implied by the notion of
'representing the irrepresentable') until Jung mentions

...that pathological analogies of the individuation process are not the only ones. There are
spiritual monuments of quite another kind, and they are positive illustrations of our process.
Above all I would mention the koans of Zen Buddhism, those sublime paradoxes that light up, as
with a flash of lightning, the inscrutable interrelations between ego and self. 183

So far we have been dealing with the various designs and representations produced by
individuals-- the 'infinitely variegated' patterns which, nonetheless, exhibit features characteristic
of the 'mandala motif'.

-page 174-

But we might also mention the archaic ideas and mythological themes which crop up from time
to time in different cultures-- representations considered to have a more or less universal appeal.
For these symbols tend to re-occur in the configurations produced by patients who have,
according to Jung, "only a minimal knowledge of mythology" 184 and they are exemplary
archetypal representations. Erich Neumann, whose study of such symbols was praised by Jung
for having arrived "at conclusions and insights which are among the most important ever to be
reached in this field", 185 will be the primary source of information in our discussion of the
archetypal representation in mythology. It is on the basis of his research that we conclude that
archetypal representations in mythology possess the essential feature of paradox.

It is Neumann's thesis that an archetypal representation or 'primordial image', when it exerts a

power of fascination over a particular individual, achieves its power to do so by virtue of the
stage of ego development that that individual has reached. The uroborus, or symbol of "the
dragon devouring itself tail first" (which Jung first discussed in connection with alchemy), 186
for example, dominates during the infantile phase of ego consciousness, according to Neumann.
187 Some of the other symbols of which Neumann speaks are the son-lover connected with the
image of the Great Mother: "they are loved, slain, buried, and bewailed by her, and are then
reborn through her", 188 the virgin birth associated with the image of the Hero, 189 the image of
the fertile-dead associated with the Transformation Myth, 190 and the mythological formula
expressing the goal of the Hero" "I and the Father are one". 191 Each image is essentially
paradoxical when taken literally. The act of devouring necessitates a devourer separate from the
devouree; to slay is to take life

-page 175-

away, not to give birth to that which one slays; a virgin is not impregnant; to be dead is to be
deprived of the power of fertility; and one does not beget oneself. Of course one can attribute a
metaphorical meaning to any of these ideas, but the point is that when taken literally they
constitute paradoxes.

If, as we have suggested, consciousness intrigues itself with the non-bifurcated or primordial
state by entertaining paradox it could be expected that the specific guise the paradox takes will
indicate an attitude in respect of the non-bifurcated state. In the childhood stage of weak ego
consciousness paradox will have the effect of inducing the primordial undifferentiated state, if
we are to believe Neumann, who speaks of the propensity, at this stage of development, for the
archetypal image to 'knockout' normal consciousness and induce a return to the non-
differentiated state. 192 As the ego gains strength the paradoxical archetypal representations will
indicate a fear of the return to the primordial state (manifest, for instance, as a fear of the Terrible
Mother who gives life by devouring). And in later stages the return to the non-bifurcated state
will once gain be sanctioned by the particular paradox corresponding to that state-- the
transformation image of fertility-in-death.

The non-bifurcated state is represented in normal consciousness by the paradoxical archetypal

image and the guise the paradox assumes will correspond to a stage of development and indicate
an attitude in respect of the non-bifurcated state.

...originally the archetype acted upon the ego en masse, in all the undifferentiated profusion of its
paradoxical nature. This is the chief reason why the ego is over-whelmed, and consciousness
disoriented, by the archetype... 193
-page 176-

But then, as Neumann puts it,

...consciousness learns to protect itself against the effect of the primordial archetype... 194

It does this by treating the paradoxical qualities of the archetypal presentation as elements of a
dialectical process, thereby taking up an attitude towards them which reconciles the initial
paradox.

The antithetical structure of [archetypal representation] makes conscious orientation impossible

and eventually leads to fascination. Consciousness keeps returning to this content, or to the
person who embodies it or carries its projection,and is unable to get away from it. New reactions
are constantly released, consciousness finds itself at a loss, and affective reactions begin to
appear. All bivalent contents that simultaneously attract and repel act in like manner upon the
organism as a whole and release powerfully affective reactions, because consciousness gives
way, regresses, and primitive mechanisms take its place. Affective reactions resulting from
fascination are dangerous; they amount to an invasion by the unconscious.

An advanced consciousness will therefore split the bivalent content into a dialectic of contrary
qualities. Before being so split, the content is not merely good and bad at once; it is beyond good
and evil, attracting and repelling, and therefore irritating to consciousness. But if there is a
division into good and evil, consciousness can then take up an attitude. It accepts and rejects,
orients itself, and thus gets outside the range of fascination. This conscious bias toward one-
sidedness is reinforced by the rationalizing process we have mentioned. 195

The acceptance of some of the paradoxical qualities and the rejection of others, the taking up of
an attitude with the use of which these qualities can be dialectically resolved, is tantamount to
depotentiating the paradox by attributing to it a metaphorical meaning. The idea of a death-
which-is-birth, for instance, which is paradoxical when we take it literally and attribute to one
and the same entity both a coming-into-being and a simultaneous termination of being, turns into
the idea of the death of one entity (or demise of one mode of being) bringing about the birth of
another entity (or

-page 177-
the onset of another mode). Consciousness protects itself against a return to the non-bifurcated
state by attenuating the paradoxical nature of the representations by which the non-differentiated
state gains entry, so to speak, into normal consciousness.

But as consciousness becomes inflexible, overly biased or 'one-sided' to use Neumann's words,
paradox can be used to break the hold habitual patterns of contexting have over the individual.
Inherent in the confusion and interspersal techniques Erickson uses for 'depotentiating the
conscious set' of a subject in order to replace it with an alternative (see page 166) is the
possibility of the use of paradox for the intentional re-organization of personality. These
techniques, in fundamental respects, resemble the individuation process of which Jung speaks, a
process which, by virtue of the production of such archetypal designs as the mandala, a new
wholeness of personality is to be achieved. Both can be analyzed in terms of a process in which
consciousness is presented with a paradox which triggers the altered state in which
consciousness is no longer bifurcated into object of attention and subsidiary awareness. The
altered state, characterized by the dissolution of gestalt, and in these particular cases induced by
paradox, allows for the restructuring of patterns of contexting. For this reason alone, we can
understand why the mythological symbols corresponding to the later stages of life indicate a
more favorable attitude toward the non-bifurcated state than do the earlier stages, which treat it
as inimical to the necessary strengthening of the ego.

All the differentiations and personality components that were built up during the first half of life,
when consciousness was developing, are now unbuilt. 196

-page 178-

This "transformation process" is connected, via the transformation mythology associated with
this stage of development, with the image of the 'fertile-dead'. Speaking of this stage of
development, Neumann says,

The wholeness that comes into being as a result of the individuation process corresponds to a
profound structural change, a new configuration of the personality. Whereas in the first half of
life there was a tendency to differentiation and ever-increasing tension at the expense of
wholeness, the integration process tends towards increased stability and a lowering of tension.
197
Among the traditions which sanction the return to the primordial unity of the non-bifurcated state
stands Yoga. Eliade summarizes the goal to be achieved in the following way.

All this amounts to saying that we are dealing with a coincidentia oppositorum achieved on all
levels of Life and Consciousness. As a result of this union of opposites experience of duality is
abolished and the phenomenal world transcended. 198

And speaking of the undifferentiated state, Eliade says:

...we are dealing with a transcendental situation which, being inconceivable, is expressed by
contradictory or paradoxical metaphors. 199

But we should like to supplement Eliade's discussion by pointing out that the fundamental
differentiation in normal consciousness is between figure and ground-- it occurs when an object
of attention is relevated from the whole which remains in subsidiary awareness. It is this initial
bifurcation of consciousness which produces the subject-object distinction and creates for the
subject his or her 'phenomenal world'. It is an elusive duality underlying everyday experience
precisely because the experience of subsidiary awareness cannot be captured in attention, and yet
subsidiary awareness plays a significant part in experience in influencing the deployment of
attention. It is not surprising, then, that the traditions which advocate a return to

-page 179-

the primordial non-bifurcated state should employ paradox, not merely as a way of speaking
about that state, but as an instrument to achieve it. In the analysis we have given of the Shri
Yantra we described paradox in terms of the double bind phenomena in which the subsidiarily
experienced context in which an object of attention is entertained is incompatible with (or
contradicts) the object. Hence, to seriously entertain a paradoxical representation such as the Shri
Yantra is to make an impossible demand on consciousness structured as subsidiary
awareness/object of attention and to insist upon assumption of the primordial non- bifurcated
state.

Earlier in this paper we quoted a passage which suggested that the 'obscure, esoteric metaphors'
of the East constituted an obstacle for a clear understanding of the insights such metaphors were
intended to express. If, however, we give Eastern systems the benefit of doubt, we might discern
not a mere vagueness of expression which demands clarification, but an indication that the
transcendental state of consciousness which is the primary interest of such systems is
fundamentally different from normal consciousness. That the difference between the two is a
fundamental one becomes apparent when we conceived of normal consciousness as subsidiary
awareness/object of attention and the transcendental state of consciousness as lacking this
characteristic bifurcation. We may then understand the esoteric pronouncements of the East to
reflect both a reluctance to use descriptions which would confuse the altered state with normal
consciousness and an attempt to induce the state in question or a facsimile by the use of paradox.

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Footnotes

173. L. Frey-Rohn, From Freud to Jung, translated by F.E. Engreen and E.K. Engreen (New
York:Dell Publishing,1974) p.119.

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174. Ibid., p.120.

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175. Ibid.

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176. Ibid.

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177. Ibid., p.121.

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178. C.G.Jung, On the nature of the psyche, op.cit., p.123.

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179. Ibid., p.124.

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180. Ibid., p.112.

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181. Ibid., p.113.

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182. C.G. Jung, Mandala symbolism, translated by R.F.C. Hull (Princeton:Princeton Univ.
Press,1972),p.99.

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183. C.G. Jung, On the nature of the psyche, op.cit., p.135.

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184. Ibid., p.113.

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185. E. Neumann, The origins and history of consciousness, translated by R.F.C. Hull
(Princeton:Princeton Univ. Press,1954), p.xiv.

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186. C.G. Jung, Dreams, op.cit., p.200.

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187. E. Neumann, op.cit., p.41.

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188. Ibid., p.46

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189. Ibid., p.133.

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190. Ibid., p.225-227.

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191. Ibid., p.360.

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192. Ibid., p.329.

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193. Ibid., p.322.

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194. Ibid.

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195. Ibid., p.327.

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196. Ibid., p.412.

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197. Ibid., p.416.

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198. M. Eliade, The two and the one, op.cit., p.118.

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199. Ibid., p.121.

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CONSCIOUSNESS

© C.O. Evans & J. Fudjack

Addendum H - The Concept of

Vasana in Yoga[table of contents] [previous] [next]

Throughout this study we have been mostly concerned with the East's
-page 180-

contribution to a discussion of the relationship between the normal or bifurcated state of

consciousness and the transcendent, primordial, or non-bifurcated state about which Western
psychology has had comparatively little to say. We have presented the Eastern approach as
deriving its insights into the structure and functioning of normal consciousness from a contrast
with the transcendent state. We have seen that descriptions of the normal state arrived at in this
manner bring into relief the bifurcated structure of normal consciousness. We haven't however,
concentrated attention on specific descriptions of the normal state the East has to offer. In this
section we shall briefly consider such a description, the one offered by Yoga. We shall give an
interpretation of the concept of vasana that will show the Yogic understanding of the
complexities of the normal state to be compatible with our description of it in terms of subsidiary
awareness/object of attention.

According to this interpretation the Yogic references to vasanas are to be understood to be

references to contexting components of subsidiary awareness. This follows on our model if
Eliade is right in identifying vasanas with subliminal perceptions, since the attentive model
allows us to experientially identify subliminal perceptions as contexting components of
subsidiary awareness, thereby giving them their place in consciousness. The basis for this
interpretation is a passage in Eliade's book Yoga: immortality and freedom. The interpretation
depends upon construing the reference in the passage to 'cittavrittis' to be a reference to 'states of
consciousness'; according to Eliade this is how the term should be translated.

The concept of vasana ... is of primary importance in Yoga psychology; in Patanjali's text, the
term has the meaning

-page 181-

'specific subconscious sensations.' The obstacles that these subliminal forces raise on the path of
liberation are of two kinds; on the one hand, the vasanas constantly feed the psychomental
stream, the infinite series of cittavrittis; on the other hand, and this by reason of their specific
(subliminal, 'germinal') modality, the vasanas constitute an immense obstacle-- for they are in the
highest degree elusive, difficult to control and master. By the very fact that their mode of being
is that of 'potentiality', their own dynamism forces the vasanas to manifest, to 'actualize'
themselves under the form of acts of consciousness. 200

The claim that passage from one state of consciousness to another is induced by vasanas can be
interpreted to mean that the change from one state of consciousness to another is induced by
changes in contexting components of subsidiary awareness. On this interpretation the elusiveness
of vasanas is attributable to the elusiveness of subsidiary awareness. Components of subsidiary
awareness cannot be brought under the scrutiny of attention without losing their subsidiary
status, yet as subsidiary they influence the direction of attention. Another passage from Eliade
makes clear the effect vasanas have on attention and underscores the importance of mastery over
the elusive vasanas if mastery is to be gained over states of consciousness themselves.

Completely at the mercy of associations (themselves produced by sensations and the vasanas),
man passes his days allowing himself to be swept hither and thither by an infinity of disparate
moments that are as it were, external to himself. 201

The methods prescribed for mastering the vasanas and controlling attention are complex. We
shall not discuss these, although we mention that they entail a hierarchy of involved procedures
having to do with life style, attitudes, bodily posturers, and the like, such as one might expect
would have to be employed in the attempt to break into the feedback loop which underlying
feeling state and object of attention comprise.

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Footnotes

200. M.Eliade, Yoga, immortality and freedom, op.cit., p.42.

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201. Ibid., p.47.

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CONSCIOUSNESS

© C.O. Evans & J. Fudjack

Addendum I -

Final Discussion [table of contents] [previous] [next]

We have devoted much space in the preceding pages to presenting the theoretical reasons
favoring adoption of the attentive model. We have argued that certain controversies within
specific areas of science are the product of philosophical prejudices in respect of the nature of
consciousness, and are resolved upon adoption of the model. And we have shown that a variety
of consciousness-related topics could be understood from the common perspective the model
provides.

A model of consciousness provides a language of subjective experience, one which a person can
use to discourse about his or her inner states, feeling states, and consciousness. The success of a
model of consciousness, then, will depend not merely upon what we have called its integrative
power in respect of theory, but upon whether the language it offers is adaptable to handling the
problem of reporting subjective experience. It must therefore, on the one hand, avoid the biases
against the fruitful application of language to descriptions of inner states, feeling states, or
consciousness, and articulate the presuppositions about consciousness embedded in our natural
language. It must on the other hand, provide a perspective for determining the compatibility or
lack of compatibility that technical scientific terms and theoretical constructs have with
subjective experience. For to the extent that such theories have a bearing on reality they will be
found, in direct proportion, to be compatible with descriptions based upon subjective experience.
The perspective the attentive model offers, we suggest, is the one presented by subjective
experience.

As such, it offers a fundamental understanding of the nature of consciousness which can be used
by the individual to come to grips with his
-page 183-

or her life situation, by facilitating a meaningful appropriation by the individual of the theories
which would explain the experiences he or she is living or the therapies or techniques which
would provide instruction in directing the course the experience takes.

We must remember that the therapeutic, meditative, and biofeedback techniques we have been
dealing with are techniques applied to people. They are either people who have come for relief
from some form of stress or suffering, or they are people utilizing the techniques as a means to
self-actualization and ultimate enlightenment. In both cases we are dealing with techniques
which cannot be discussed without taking into consideration the question of how the people to
whom the techniques are applied are affected by them. That is to say, they are techniques
necessarily concerned with subjective experience. Thus a language of mind, a model of
consciousness, an articulation no less of the understanding which their own language
presupposes, makes language available to the subject of these techniques for coming to terms
with the theories underlying these techniques. To show the subject a way in which he can relate
his language and therefore his discourse about inner states, or subjective experience, with the
theories he meets in the course of therapy or meditative training will make it possible for him to
make a cognitive appropriation of those theories, and thus understand his subjective experience
as explained by those theories. It will enable the theories in question to be structured in the
consciousness of the individual, and thus to become presuppositions of his weltanschauung. 202

The people who seek therapeutic benefits from psychotherapy, meditation, or biofeedback
training, are often people who wish to rid themselves

-page 184-

of the symptoms of stress. They are often drawn to such forms of therapy because they have been
persuaded by the argument that stress causes tension and tension causes psychosomatic distress
or pain. The techniques therefore are often described as relaxation techniques, and indeed the
claim that meditative and biofeedback techniques are techniques of relaxation is not only an
established fact, but one of the central discoveries of the biofeedback movement.
Accordingly, if the attentive model of consciousness can help a subject to understand how to
relax, and why or in what sense the technique he is learning to use is a relaxation technique, then
its practical value will have been illustrated. By helping him to understand his relaxation
techniques and integrate them into his life situation it helps him to practice them more
effectively.

Meditative and biofeedback techniques teach the subject that there is something over which the
subject can gain control; the control of which can always be employed to bring about relaxation.
That something the attentive model identifies as subsidiary awareness, and it instructs us that
relaxation comes about as a result of a change in subsidiary awareness. It entails the further
observation that every technique of self-control is a technique of bringing about change in
subsidiary awareness. The model allows us to deduce two further observations, and both of these
relate directly to subjective experience and allow us to understand that the concept of subsidiary
awareness is itself a concept of subjective experience. Changes in subsidiary awareness are
experienced, according to the model, as changes in feeling state. Thus the first observation we
can make is that we learn to relax by

-page 185-

changing the way we feel. Relaxation consists in putting ourselves in a different feeling state.
However, understanding the model means having a very precise understanding of what a feeling
state is. It means understanding that the feeling state is experienced in a different manner than is
an object of attention such as a passing perception, memory, or image. The concept of subsidiary
awareness is a concept of subjective experience because it identifies this different manner in
which a feeling state is experienced.

The subject may understand well enough what we are saying and agree that when he or she is
relaxed his or her feeling state has changed but not know how to bring about the change in
feeling state to the desired feeling of relaxation. The next instruction we get from the attentive
model is that one way to change the feeling state is to change the objects of attention which have
been occupying the subject's mind. It further would direct us to focus on making into objects of
attention that of which one was having subsidiary awareness. In the most typical situation this
would entail directing attention to the subject's body.
This understanding leads us to the second observation which we have asserted could be deduced
from the model; namely, that we change the way we feel by changing the way we context the
situation, since the contexting we do with subsidiary awareness is experienced in the mode of
feeling. Either we can leave the situation (or actively rearrange it) or we can alter our bodily
posture in the situation. According to the attentive model, our bodily posture is an externalization
of the way we are contexting the situation, so if we alter our posture we alter, simultaneously,
both our

-page 186-

attitude or the way we feel in the situation and our contexting of it. By directing attention to
various parts of the body and relaxing them we melt away the contexting achieved through
posturing. The relaxation of the body, measured by physiological indices, is described, at another
level of description, as the dissolution of a pattern of contexting.

Thus, the attentive model, in claiming that bodily posture is experienced subsidiarily as a feeling
state affords us the discovery that we can bring about a change in feeling state (and thus gain
control over it to some extent) by changing bodily posture. What the subject has to do to achieve
this end is make of his bodily postures his objects of attention, with the intention of undoing
them. By undoing her or his postures the subject enters the state of relaxation which is the
prelude to deeper meditative states and more profound psychotherapeutic encounters. For it is the
first step in restructuring consciousness.

But this leads us to a third observation which the model allows us to make. The feedback
relationship between underlying feeling state and object of attention, the mutual influence
between the two, makes the adoption of a holistic approach to self-control obligatory. Control
over bodily postures or physiological processes does not happen independently of the activity in
which the subject's attention is engaged, the storyline of objects of attention he is experiencing.
Attention must cooperate in the venture. Yet the direction attention takes is influenced by the
feeling state the subject is in, the feeling state which is the experiential correlate of the very
physiological processes he is trying to control. When we turn

-page 187-
attention in the ways prescribed for controlling bodily posture or physiological processes, in
other words, we begin to feel silly, distracted, bored, or sleepy. Or when we attempt to prevent
the mind from wandering in desultory fashion from one object of attention to another we soon
discover more 'urgent' matters pre- empting the meditational object. Our feelings, in these cases,
are automatically compensating for transgressing the limits our habitual patterns of contexting
put on the activity of attention.

We are likely to end up telling ourselves in such cases, "I could deploy attention in that fashion if
I felt like it, but I don't, at least not at this moment". And on the attentive model, this statement
makes sense. For it is simply a way of saying that we choose the objects of attention which we
feel appropriate to the situation we are in-- objects of attention, in other words, appropriate to the
contexts we experience. Various tasks which demand particular sequences of attention will be
successfully performed to the degree in which the context is felt to be appropriate for attending
to that sequence of objects of attention. And we might say, analogously to the claim that learning
is state- specific (which means that activities learned in a particular state of consciousness are
more successfully performed in that state) that objects of attention are context-specific. In any
case, although the appeal to feeling might explain the inability to deploy attention in unfamiliar
ways it does not justify the use of such an appeal for rationalizing away the lack of control over
attention. 203

And this is a significant point, since we are apt to believe that we manifest a greater control over
attention than observations from simple

-page 188-

meditational experiments warrant. That is to say, we feel justified in ascribing a greater degree of
control over ourselves by appealing to the fact that we do not 'feel like' turning attention in the
direction in question as long as we do not recognize that our feelings reflect the contexts we
experience. In this context it is important to remember that cultures and societies and their
institutions impose a variety of such contexts on the individual. Individuals have what we might
call a repertoire of socially sanctioned roles, each of which defines for the individual the way in
which he contexts the world about him and, accordingly, achieving relaxation becomes a
political activity, for what may at first glance appear to be a simple procedure for 'relaxation' will
meet with resistance derived from deeply entrenched cultural attitudes implicit in the social
context. It is for this reason that meditative techniques usually are accompanied by more abstract
metaphysical, ethical, and social systems of thought and praxis- - ones which prescribe attitudes
which are correlatives to the deeply entrenched cultural attitudes that the subject is bound to
come up against at some stage in meditation-- the fear of death, the pull of ambition, guilt, or
whatever.

On the attentive model, then, the first stages of the restructuring of consciousness, whether the
process involved is a meditational technique, a biofeedback technique, or one which utilizes
paradox or confusion, is a destructuring stage in which attention is freed from the restrictions of
injurious contexting patterns and the individual gains a degree of freedom to re-learn, re-
associate objects of attention with previously incompatible

-page 189-

or foreign feeling states. The person who has taken cognitive possession of the attentive model of
consciousness can use it as an aid to facilitate use of these established consciousness- expansion
techniques or as a framework for his or her own attempts to cope with over-rigid and repetitious
patterns of contexting and bodily posturing. We offer it in the hope that it can help each one of us
become more like one of Don Juan's uncanny animals which can be told apart from other animals
due to the fact that they have no habits and never take the same path twice. 204

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Footnotes

202. We mean to allude here to Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's tenet, 'Knowledge is structured in
consciousness.' See, D. Postle, Fabric of the universe (New York:Crown Publishers, 1976)

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203. C.O.Evans, "Freewill and attention", Theoria to Theory (1975), p.189-205.

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204. C. Castaneda, Journey to ixtlan (New York:Simon and Schuster,1972), p.101.

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CONSCIOUSNESS

© C.O. Evans & J. Fudjack

Notes and References -[table of contents] [previous] [next]

1. R.L. Ackoff, "Systems, organizations and interdisciplinary research." In F.E. Emery (ed.),
Systems thinking (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), p.343.

2. K.R. Pelletier and C. Garfield, Consciousness east and west (New York: Harper Colophon
Books, 1978), p.119.

3. C.T. Tart, States of consciousness (New York:E.P. Dutton & Co.,1975),. p.3.

4. Ibid., p.4.

5. E.R. John, "A model of consciousness," In G.E. Schwartz and D. Shapiro (eds.),
Consciousness and self-regulation, vol.I (New York: Plenum Press, 1976), P.4.

6. Ibid., p.4.
7. C.T. Tart, op.cit., p.99.

8. Ibid., p.172.

9. Ibid., p.21.

10. G. Bateson, Steps to an ecology of mind (Frogmore, St. Albans, Herts, U.K.: Paladin,1973),
p.116.

11. U. Neisser, Cognition and reality (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1976), p.10.

12. C.T. Tart, op.cit., p.62.

13. C.O. Evans, The subject of Consciousness (New York:Humanities Press, 1970).

14. G. Bateson, op.cit., p.103.

15. Ibid., p.104.

16. L. von Bertalanffy, General systems theory,. rev.ed. (New York:George Braziller,1968).p.56.
Inspection of the set of equations shows that the system will be in a steady state or stationary
state when f1 = f2 = ... = fn = 0. Under certain conditions which can be mathematically specified
small changes in any Q will not change the state of the system: the system, in Tart's terminology,
will 'maintain it's integrity or identity in spite of various (small) changes." (See quotation page 11
of this study.)
-page 191-

17. F. Varela, "Not one, not two," The Coevolution Quarterly, no.11(1076), p.63

18. M. Polanyi, Personal knowledge (New York:Harper Torchbooks,1964), p.x. Polanyi's

understanding of the relationship between 'subsidiary awareness' and 'focal object' connects these
terms with the whole-part relationship in the opposite way to the way we have it. He understands
an object of attention to be a whole composed of parts of which we are subsidiarily aware when
attending to the whole. According to Polanyi,

We know a comprehensive whole, for example a dog, by relying on our awareness of its parts for
attending focally to the whole. [M. Polanyi,"Experience and the perception of pattern." in K.M.
Sayre and F.J. Crosson, The modelling of mind (Notre Dame:Univ. of Notre Dame Press,1963),
p.213]

Our argument against Polanyi's position is essentially that we needn't be aware of each part of
the object of attention in some way other than the way we are aware of it when attending to the
entire object of attention. By contrast, in our use of the term 'subsidiary awareness' it can be said
that an object of attention is a part of a whole of which we are subsidiarily aware. To this view
Polanyi takes exception. Consequently, he says,

It is a mistake to identify subsidiary awareness with subconscious or preconscious awareness, or

with the fringe of consciousness described by William James. [Ibid., p. 212.]

But not only do we not see this as a mistake, we shall go on in the addendum of this work to
show that this identification can be successfully made.

19. D. Bohm, The special theory of relativity (New York:W.A.Benjamin, 1965), p. 201.

20. Ibid., p. 197.

21. See B. Brown, New mind, new body (New York:Harper & Row,1974), p. 82, for a
discussion of experimental findings suggesting an order of information existing at a purely
physiological level.

22. E.R. John, op.cit., p. 3.

23. W.F. Fry, Sweet madness: a study of humor (Palo Alto: Pacific Books,1963), p. 154

24. G. Bateson, op.cit., p. 160.

25. Ibid.

26. S.K. Langer, An introduction to symbolic logic (New York:Dover,1938), p. 65.

27. G. Bateson, op.cit., p. 169.

28. G. Ryle, The concept of mind (London: Hutchinson's Univ. Lib.,1949), p. 100

29. Ibid., p. 83.

30. Ibid., p.84.

-page 192-

31. S. Freud, "Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety." In J. Strachey (ed.), Standard Edition, vol.20
(London:Hogarth Press,1959), p.132.

32. R.G. Collingwood, The new leviathan (London:Oxford Univ. Press,1942), P.18.

33. G. Ryle, op.cit., p.103.

34. F. Kreuger, "The essence of feeling." In M.B. Arnold (ed.), The nature of emotion
(Baltimore: Penguin Books,1968), p.97.

35. This use of the word 'relevate' was first introduced by David Bohm who explained it as
meaning "to lift it into attention so that it stands out 'in relief'." We construe the reference to an
'it' to be a reference to an object of attention.

D. Bohm, "Quantum theory as an indication of a new order in physics. B. Implicate and explicate
order in physical law," Foundations of Physics, vol.3, no.2 (1973), p.150.

36. R.W. Leeper, "The motivational theory of emotion." In M.B. Arnold (ed.), The nature of
emotion (Baltimore: Penguin Books,1968), p.185.

37. J.R.S. Wilson, Emotion and object (London: Cambridge Univ. Press,1972)

38. F. Leibniz, The monadology and other philosophical writings, translated by R. Latta
(London: Oxford Univ. Press,1898), p.371.

39. R. Muchielli, Introduction to structural psychology, translated by S.L. Markmann (New

York: Avon,1970), p.36.

40. Ibid., p.50.

41. C. Naranjo, "Vanishing magician-spectator, rabbit, and hat." In T. Tulku (ed.), Reflections of
mind (Emeryville, Ca.:Dharma Publ.,1975), p.46.

42. A. Angyal, "A logic of systems." In F.E. Emery (ed.), Systems thinking (Baltimore:Penguin
Books,1969), p.27.
43. R. Bandler and J. Grinder, The structure of magic, vol. 1 (Palo Alto: Science and Behavior
Books,1975), p.28.

44. Ibid., p.31.

45. Ibid., p.40.

46. E.A. Carswell and R. Rommetviet, Social contexts of messages (New York:Academic
Press,1871), p.5.

-page 193-

47. R. Bandler and J. Grinder. op.cit., p.157.

48. Ibid., p.160.

49. Ibid., p.158.

50. Ibid., p.160.

51. J. Haley, Uncommon therapy (New York:Ballantine Books,1973), p.19. A further

explanation of what it means to say that Erickson conceptualizes a person in two parts is given
by Haley in Advanced techniques of hypnosis and therapy: selected papers of Milton H.
Erickson, M.D. (New York:Grune & Stratton, 1967), p.456.

Erickson's comments about "unconscious awareness" become reasonable from this view. To
have an interchange with another person through an "unconscious" means of communication, we
must at some level be cognizant of what we are doing or we could not correct ourselves or
receive the other person's communication and respond to it. Yet this process can go on without
any conscious awareness of what we are doing. Therefore there must be, at least, two levels of
"awareness" when we are interchanging two levels, at least, of communication.

The reference to 'levels of communication' will receive more attention in the third section of this
work in a discussion of Bateson's concept of meta-message, and the 'unconscious'. We quote the
above passage, with its mention of two levels of awareness, 'conscious awareness' and
'unconscious ideas' in terms of object of attention and subsidiary awareness.

52. J. Haley, Uncommon therapy, op.cit., p.192.

53. K.R. Pelletier and C. Garfield, op.cit., p.119.

54. C. Naranjo and R.E. Ornstein, On the psychology of meditation (New York:The Viking
Press,1971), p.142.

55. K.R. Pelletier and C. Garfield, op.cit., p.105.

56. G Bateson, op.cit., p.179.

57. We take the space to briefly mention two further possibilities of comparing Eastern and
Western psychological insight using the attentive model. 1) In more thoroughly integrating the
concept of feeling into a discussion of consciousness the model provides a theoretical framework
that offers an opportunity for comparing the role feeling plays in various meditational practices
with its role in various psycho- therapeutic techniques. In the West we find Carl Rogers claiming
that

-page 194-

a feeling loses its explosiveness when a client brings that feeling into explicit awareness. [C.
Rogers, On becoming a person (Boston:Houghton Mifflin,1961), p.318-319, for instance.]
Tarthang Tulku, a Tibetan Buddhist, describes a meditational technique designed with a similar
purpose in mind. It amounts to turning attention to "the immediate feeling- tone of each item of
experience." [T. Tulku, ed., Reflections of mind (Emeryville,Ca.:Dharma,1975), p.13.] With the
attentive model in mind we can understand that one could not successfully turn attention to an
underlying feeling state without depriving it of its subsidiary status and hence of its contexting
function. 2) Many of the Eastern meditational schools include techniques in which one's
breathing is taken as an object of attention. Breathing is normally a habitually tacit component of
experience and the East shows a great deal of understanding for the fact that breathing patterns
correspond to thought processes, to the extent, for instance, that it has been suggested that one is
more likely to shift attention from one object to attention to another between exhale and inhale.
On the attentive model, one's breathing, when it is not paid attention to, would be conceived of
as a component of subsidiary awareness having a contexting function. Milton Erickson seems to
be well aware of this as is exemplified by the fact that in inducing hypnosis in one case he
intentionally synchronized his words to a patient's breathing pattern, directing the patient's
attention only to certain sensations corresponding with the patient's inhalations, explaining in
commentary, "nobody notices inspiration and expiration, they're used to that." [J. Haley, ed.,
Advanced techniques of hypnosis and therapy: selected papers of Milton H. Erickson, M.D.
(New York:Grune & Stratton,1967), p.53.]

In the use of another technique Erickson relies on the contexting function unheeded sensations
play in consciousness. In this case Erickson intentionally uses a particular word in his verbal
communications with a subject each time he witnesses a natural decrease in the rapidity of the
subject's eye blink. The subject, who is attending to the verbal communications, does not notice
the sensations accompanying eye blink and is not aware of the correlation between word and rate
of eye blink. But subsequent use of the word by Erickson evokes slower blinking and an
associated drowsy feeling. Essentially Erickson is performing a function similar to the one
performed by a biofeedback instrument in a conditioning experiment of Barbara Brown's which
we shall discuss in the Addendum. (see page 103). [M.H. Erickson, E.L. Rossi and S.I. Rossi,
Hypnotic realities (New York:Irvington Publishers,1976), p.268.]

58. This illustration is reproduced from M. Eliade, Patanjali and yoga, translated by C.L.
Markmann (New York:Schocken Books,1975), p.94.

59. Discussions of the Shri Yantra can be found in the following selected works: M. Eliade,
Yoga: immortality and freedom, 2nd ed., translated by W.R. Trask (New York:Bollingen
Foundation,1969).
-page 195-

E. Wood, Yoga (Harmondsworth,Middlesex,England:Penguin Books,1962).

C.G.Jung, Dreams, translated by R.F.C. Hull (Princeton:Princeton Univ. Press,1974).

A. Mookerjee and M. Khanna, The tantric way (Boston:N.Y. Graphic Society,1977).

60. H. Zimmer, Myths and symbols in Indian art and civilization, edited by J. Campbell (New
York:Pantheon Books,1946),p.140.

61. Ibid., p,143.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., p.146.

64. I.K. Taimni, The science of yoga (Wheaton, III:The Theosophical Publ. House,1967),p.viii.

65. Ibid., p.291.

66. Ibid., p.286.

67. Ibid., p.298.

68. Ibid., p.278.

69. Ibid., p.278.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., p.280.

72. Ibid., p.283.

73. Ibid., p.298.

74. P. Pott, Yoga and yantra, translated by R. Needham (The Hague:M. Nijhoff,1966), p.42.

75. H. Zimmer, op.cit., p.141.

76. G. Bateson, op.cit., p.173.

77. Ibid., p.178.

78. Ibid., p.174.

79. Ibid., p.218.

80. Ibid., p.188.

-page 196-

81. Ibid.

82. Indeed, we needn't take too seriously the notion of a sequence in which the mother as son's
object of attention behaves in one way and then as she is relegated to the son's subsidiary
awareness behaves differently. The double bind would be effective as long as, for instance, her
bodily expressions insofar as they were picked up subsidiarily by the son were inconsistent with
her words as he attends to them. In this context it is interesting to note that in a volume not
previously considered in this study, Grinder and Bandler explicitly deny that a person's gestures
and the like can stand in relationship to his verbal communications as met- message to message,
and thy go on to discard the notion of meta-message altogether. This forces them into a spotlight
model in which all messages stand on the same level as 'paramessages', and Bateson's distinction
between a hierarchy of levels in respect of the distinction between meta-message and message is
abandoned along with the term. By contrast if we interpret the distinction between meta-message
and message in terms of the model, subsidiary awareness/object of attention, we preserve the
hierarchical order between meta- message and message because in identifying the meta-message
with experienced context, we show the meta role of the meta- message. In terms of the attentive
model we experience meta- messages subsidiarily, and we experience messages by contrast as
objects of attention. In this way we make sense of the idea rejected by Grinder and Bandler that a
person's gestures and the like can stand in relation to his verbal communications as meta-
message to message; the receiver of the messages is subsidiarily aware of the speaker's gestures.
and aware of his spoken message as an object of attention. Given this understanding of meta-
message it is instructive to read the following passage by Grinder and Bandler understanding its
references to the therapists feelings as references to his subsidiary awareness or meta-messages.
We can then view this passage as one in which Grinder and Bandler, despite themselves, give a
fine example of what it is like to experience a double bind...

First, the therapist may fail to detect (consciously) the incongruities--the non-matching messages
being presented by the client. Our observations of this situation are that, when a therapist fails to
detect incongruities which the client is presenting, the therapist himself, initially, feels confused
and uncertain. The therapist's feelings of uncertainty usually persist and he becomes more and
more uncomfortable. Typically, therapists report feeling as though they were missing something.
(Italics added)

J. Grinder and R. Bandler, The structure of magic, vol.2 (Palo Alto:Science and Behavior
Books,1976), p.31.
83. G. Bateson, op.cit., p.182.

84. Ibid., p.163.

-page 197-

85. K.R. Pelletier and G. Garfield, op.cit., p.69.

86. Ibid., p.95.

86a. Angyal advanced a similar hypothesis when he suggested that the schizophrenic
characteristically fails in apprehending and constructing frames of reference or "systems" (see
page 40 of this work).

When such a frame of reference is lacking, entirely incongruous elements may be brought
together by the patient. This is quite in agreement with the view I am trying to express. Without
giving any further examples, I think that one is justified in saying that in the realm of intellectual
operations there are certain dimensional media. We may call them fields or realms or frames of
reference or context or universes of discourse or strata. Some such field is necessarily implied in
any system or holistic organization. The schizophrenic thinking disturbance is characterized by a
difficulty in apprehending and constructing such organized fields. [A. Angyal, "Disturbances in
thinking in schizophrenia." In J.S. Kasanin (ed.) Language and thought in schizophrenia (New
YOrk:Norton Library,1944), p.120.]

87. K.R. Pelletier and G. Garfield, op.cit., p.96.

88. Ibid., p.94 Pelletier and Garfield quoting J. Silverman.

89. Ibid., p.68.

90. Ibid., p.75.

91. Ibid., p.102.

92. Ibid., p.54.

93. Ibid., p.123.

94. To show that this idea is not only found in the Yoga tradition but also in Buddhism we offer
the following passage in which H. Thera describes the process by which the subject reaches what
he calls 'bare attention'.

For instance, the normal visual perception, if it is of evidence or any interest to the observer, will
rarely present the visual object pure and simple, but the object will appear in the light of added
subjective judgments: beautiful or ugly, pleasant or unpleasant, useful, useless, or harmful. If it
concerns a living being, there will

-page 198-

also enter into the preconceived notion: this is a personality, an ego, just as "I" am, too! ... It is
the task of bare attention to eliminate all those alien additions from the object proper that is then
in the field of perception. [C. Naranjo and R.E. Ornstein, op.cit., p.87.]

95. I.K. Taimni, op.cit., p.298. 96. In the following passage Ornstein gives a general
characterization of the non-normal states of consciousness attained by practitioners of Eastern
traditions. We note that his description of them invites understanding them as involving the
overcoming of or disappearance of the bifurcation found in normal states of consciousness which
we have modeled as subsidiary awareness/object of attention. The three major traditions that
we've considered each speak of developing an awareness that allows every stimulus to enter into
consciousness devoid of our normal selection process, devoid of normal tuning and normal input
selection, model-building, and the normal category of systems. [C. Naranjo and R.E. Ornstein,
op.cit., p.194.]

97. I.K. Taimni, op.cit., p.283.

98. M. Eliade, The two and the one, translated by J.M. Cohen (New York:Harper
Torchbacks,1965), p.119.

99. K.R. Pelletier and G. Garfield, op.cit., p.111.

100. C.O. Evans, op.cit.

101. R.E. Shor, "Hypnosis and the concept of the generalized reality-orientation." In C.T. Tart
(ed.), Altered states of consciousness (Garden City:Anchor Books,1969), p.243.

102. Ibid., p.242.

103. Ibid., p.245 note.

104. S. Freud, "An outline of psycho-analysis." In J. Strachey (ed.), Standard edition, vol. 23
(London:Hogarth Press, 1964), p.164.

105. S. Freud, "The ego and the id." In J. Strachey (ed.), Standard edition, vol. 19
(London:Hogarth Press,1961), p.16 note.

106. Ibid., p.15.

107. K.R. Pelletier, Mind as healer, mind as slayer: a holistic approach to preventing stress
disorders (New York:Delta,1977), ch. 8.

-page 199-

108. B.Brown, op.cit., ch. 11.

109. Ibid., p.75 note/

110. Ibid., p.97.

111. Ibid., p. 362.

112. Ibid., p.61.

113. Ibid., p.96.

114. R.M Jones, The new psychology of dreaming (New York:Viking Press, 1970). ch. 3.

115. B.Brown, op.cit., p.337.

116. Ibid., p.75.

117. M. Vernon, The psychology of perception, 2nd ed. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex,

England:Penguin Books,1971),p.174.
118. Ibid., p.194.

119. Ibid., p.174.

120. H. Sevrin, "Does the averaged evoked response encode subliminal perception? Yes. A reply
to Schwartz and Rem." Psychophysiology, vol. 12, no. 4 (1975), p.395.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid., p.396.

123. Ibid.

124. B. Brown, op.cit., p.83.

125. H. Sevrin, "Brain wave correlates of subliminal stimulation, unconscious attention, primary-
and secondary-process thinking, and repressiveness." Psychological Issues, vol. 8, no. 2 (1973),
p.71

126. R.M. Whitman, Review of: "Psychoanalytic research: three approaches to the experimental
study of subliminal processes" [Psychological Issues, vol 8, no. 2 (1973)] American
Psychoanalytic Association Journal, vol. 23, no. 4 (1975), p.663.

127. M. Vernon, op.cit., p.176.

128. The processes of attention we have been describing and which we are
-page 200-

viewing as deliberate obstructions to the natural functioning of attention processes have also
been investigated in laboratories using the latest advances in computer technology and brain
wave research. However, no clear-cut correlation has been made between these physiological
processes and subjective experience. The attentive model allows us to formulate one possibility
which the research findings in this area seem to support. It is our hypothesis, then, that measures
of average evoked response (AER) are measure of items becoming objects of attention. What
this means is that experiments in which a subject's AER can be correlated with the presentation
of a stimulus are to be construed as experiments in which a subject's object of attention can be
identified by correlation with a physiological process (AER). Aer decrement, on this hypothesis,
becomes the hypothesis that the decrement is a measure of the swiftness with which an object of
attention is displaced by another object of attention: i.e., retention time as an object of attention.
Increment of AER is a measure of an object of attention gaining in gestalt--increasing retention.
Concerning findings of one experiment, Buchsbaum, one of the experimenters, tell us,

Three different effects were seen: (1) an across- session, "arousal" effect which acted on all
intensities fairly evenly, affecting slope minimally: (2) an "attention" effect which operated
primarily to enhance amplitude for low-intensity stimuli and this lower AER slope; and (3) a
'sensory overload" effect which operated primarily to reduce AER amplitude at high intensities.
Thus reducing appears to be linked to the active phenomena of paying attention and protection
from too- intense levels of sensory input. Habitual tendencies to attend to sensory stimuli may be
reflected in the AER amplitude/intensity slope as well as habitual tendencies to inhibit sensory
input. [M. Buchsbaum, "Self-regulation of stimulus intensity: augmenting/reducing and the
averaged evoked response." In G. E. Schwartz and D. Shapiro, op.cit., p.122.]

Among these effects we single out the second as an identification of the attention process which
in Dixon's experiments is described as threshold lowering. However, in the AER experiments it
was found that people were either reducers or augmenters. Buchsbaum does not suggest that
reducers may be introverts and augmenters may be extroverts, but his findings about reducers
make an interesting connection with the theory of schizophrenia we offered in Part III.

Buchsbaum and Silverman hypothesized that reducers were hypersensitive to low-level sensory
stimuli and thus required some compensatory process to protect them from sensory inundation at
high intensities. Indeed, AER reducers were found to have lower visual threshold ... than AER
augmenters. ...And at low to moderate light levels, reducers had larger amplitude AERs than
augmenters. [Ibid., p.125]
-page 201-

All we need to add, to make the connection we are claiming, is the following passage from
Buchsbaum.

Interestingly, negative reaction/stimulus intensity functions were found by Tizard and Venables
(1956) in schizophrenics--who have been reported to be extreme reducers for both the Petrie
apparatus ... and the AER... [Ibid., p.127.]

We might just conclude this note by suggesting that measures of AER might be fundamentally
different from the biofeedback measures we have dealt with in the section on biofeedback. It
could be that AER measures are measures of central nervous system operations (as Buchsbaum
mentions) as distinct from measures of ANS operations. We then find ourselves in the position of
saying that all measures of CNS operations are measures of changes in objects of attention, and
CNS operations are connected by feedback loops with ANS operations. The attentive model then
suggests that what is subjectively experienced of consciousness as subsidiary awareness/object
of attention instantiates the same structure as autonomic nervous system operations/central
nervous system operations. (For this use of the '/'see p.15.)

129. M. Vernon, op.cit., p.175.

130. Ibid.

131. J. Jenkins, "Remember that old theory of memory? Well, forget it." American Psychologist,
Nov. 1974, p. 768.

132. Ibid.

133. M. Vernon, op.cit., p.196.

134. Ibid., p.195.

135. Ibid., p.163.

136. Ibid., p.161.

137. Ibid., p.162.

138. C.G. Jung, On the nature of the psyche, translated by R.F.C. Hull, (Princeton:Princeton
Univ. Press,1969), p.95.

139. C.G. Jung, "A review of the complex theory." In Collected works, vol. 8 (New
York:Pantheon Books,1960), p.101.

140. W. James, Psychology: briefer course (New York:Collier Books,1962), p.157.

141. Ibid., p.177.

-page 202-

142. Ibid., p.182.

143. Ibid., p.181.

144. Ibid., p.171.

145. Ibid., p.183.

146. Ibid., p.249.

147. Ibid., p.179.

148. Ibid., p.380.

149. Ibid., p.381.

150. Ibid.

151. C.C.Jung, On the nature of the psyche. op.cit., p.120.

152. Ibid.

153. Ibid., p.74.

154. Ibid.

155. Ibid.

156. M.H.Erickson, E.L. Rossi and S.I. Rossi, Hypnotic realities (New York:Irvington
Publishers,1976), p.75.

"Throughout this discussion of the varieties of double bind the reader may have noted the ease
with which we could use the terms "unconscious" and "metacommunication" in the same place.
These terms may in fact be in the process of becoming interchangeable. This suggests we may be
witnessing a fundamental change in our world view of depth psychology whereby we are
developing a new and more efficient nomenclature. Philosophers have never liked the term
"unconscious', it was the academic and philosophical rejection of this term that impeded the early
acceptance of Freud's psychoanalysis. The use of the term "unconscious" still divides academic
and experimentally oriented psychologists form clinicians as well as doctors in physical
medicine from psychiatry. The term "metacommunication", however, was developed within a
mathematico-logical framework, and as such, it fits in with the world view of the research
scientist as well as the clinician. It may well be that we are on the threshold of a new zeitgeist
wherein we will revise the terms of depth psychology to make for a better fit with current
conceptions in mathematics, cybernetics,

-page 203-

and systems theory."

157. R. Bandler and R. Grinder, The structure of magic, vol. 2 (Palo Alto:Science and Behavior
Books,1976), p.36.

158. C.G. Jung, On the nature of the psyche, op.cit., p.74.

159. I. Thalberg, "Freud's anatomies of the self." In R. Wollheim (ed.), Freud: a collection of
critical essays (Garden City:Anchor Books,1974), p.166.

160. S. Freud, "Psychoanalysis and the establishment of the facts in legal proceedings." In J.
Strachey (ed.), Standard Edition, vol. 9 (London:Hogarth Press,1959), p.103.

161. E.A. Carswell and R. Rommetveit, op.cit., p.9-11.

162. C.G. Jung, "A review of the complex theory." op.cit., p.95.

163. J. Strachey (ed.), Standard edition of the complete works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 9. op.cit.,
p.101.
164. S. Freud, "The psychopathology of everyday life." In J. Strachey (ed.), Standard Edition,
vol 6 (London:Hogarth Press,1960), p.264.

165. C.G. Jung, Dreams, translated by R.F.C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press,1974), p.73.

166. Ibid., p.41.

167. Ibid., p.72.

168. Ibid., p.38.

169. M.H. Erickson, E.L. Rossi and S.I. Rossi, op.cit., p.225-6, 274-5.

170. Ibid., p.182.

Rossi sums up a discussion of the unconscious and feeling by saying, "feelings come from our
unconscious."

171. S. Freud, The interpretation of dreams (second part). In J. Strachey (ed.), Standard Edition,
vol. 5 (London:Hogarth Press,1953), p.608.

172. C.G. Jung, "A review of the complex theory." op.cit., p.101.

173. L. Frey-Rohn, From Freud to Jung, translated by F.E. Engreen and E.K. Engreen (New
York:Dell Publishing,1974) p.119.

174. Ibid., p.120.

-page 204-

175. Ibid.

176. Ibid.

177. Ibid., p.121.

178. C.G.Jung, On the nature of the psyche, op.cit., p.123.

179. Ibid., p.124.

180. Ibid., p.112.

181. Ibid., p.113.

182. C.G. Jung, Mandala symbolism, translated by R.F.C. Hull (Princeton:Princeton Univ.
Press,1972),p.99.

183. C.G. Jung, On the nature of the psyche op.cit., p.135.

184. Ibid., p.113.

185. E. Neumann, The origins and history of consciousness, translated by R.F.C. Hull
(Princeton:Princeton Univ. Press,1954), p.xiv.
186. C.G. Jung, Dreams, op.cit., p.200.

187. E. Neumann, op.cit., p.41.

188. Ibid., p.46

189. Ibid., p.133.

190. Ibid., p.225-227.

191. Ibid., p.360.

192. Ibid., p.329.

193. Ibid., p.322.

194. Ibid.

195. Ibid., p.327.

196. Ibid., p.412.

197. Ibid., p.416.

198. M. Eliade, The two and the one, op.cit., p.118.

-page 205-

199. Ibid., p.121.

200. M.Eliade, Yoga, immortality and freedom, op.cit., p.42.

201. Ibid., p.47.

202. We mean to allude here to Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's tenet,

'Knowledge is structured in consciousness.' See, D. Postle, Fabric of the universe (New

York:Crown Publishers, 1976)

203. C.O.Evans, "Freewill and attention", Theoria to Theory (1975),