ARTICLE XIV - EDUCATION, SCIENCE ETC.

CASE DIGEST

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., G.R. No. 127980

EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD
HOLMES, JUDE DELA TORRE,
AMPARO RIO, CARMELITA Present:
QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO
and JAMES YAP, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Petitioners, Chairperson,
QUISUMBING,​*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,​**​ and
REYES, JJ.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of Branch 36,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE
COMMISSION ON HIGHER
EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND
SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES
PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD
REVERENTE and ROBERTO Promulgated:
VALDES, JR.,
Respondents. December 19, 2007

FACTS:
1. Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. who were members of
Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde
(CSB) Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to James
Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity
2. The penalty penalty of expulsion was issued on May 3, 1995 and on June 5, 1995 Aguilar filed a petition
with the RTC Manila to annul the the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board
3. The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO directing DLSU, its subordinates,
agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist from
implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to immediately
desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.
4. Despite the order, DLSU refused the enrollment of Aguilar. Aguilar then filed an urgent motion to reiterate
the preliminary injunction. Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to conditionally enroll in
petitioner DLSU, subject to the continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25,
1995 and to the outcome of Civil Case No. 95-74122.
5. On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) from the CHED. Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS, not CHED, which has
jurisdiction over expulsion case

ISSUES:
1.Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of institutions of higher
learning that impose disciplinary action on their students found violating disciplinary rules.
2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents.
2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is proportionate to their misdeed.

HELD:
I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the
power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions
of higher learning.
- It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private educational institution which offers tertiary degree
programs. Hence, it is under the CHED authority.

2.
2a. Private respondents were accorded due process of law.

- due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to
those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice

2b. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academic freedom which includes
determination of who to admit for study.

- Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom.
This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims
and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when
the overriding public interest calls for some restraint
- Academic freedom on the part of the school includes the power to determine:
1. who may teach;
2. what may be taught;
3. how it shall be taugh;
4. who may be admitted to study.

3. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is disproportionate to their misdeed.

- under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the acts
committed by private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents
lasted only for few seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury
- The Supreme Court, however, while conceding the power of the school over its students held that the
penalty of expulsion is too harsh a penalty. It should be EXCLUSION, meaning, they are not allowed to
enroll at the De La Salle but they should be given transfer credentials so that they may enroll in another
school.

* 111. May a school punish its students for illegal acts committed outside the school premises and beyond
school hours but within the semester where they are enrolled?
 Yes because they still carry the name of the school and their actuations affect the reputation of the school.
(ANGELES VS. SISON, 112 SCRA 26) This rule was reiterated in the cased of DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY
VS. CA (2008) where a rumble between members of two fraternities took place outside the school campus
but the students involved were EXPELLED by the school.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On August 15-17, 1986,. Jerome Bailen, Professor of the University of the Philippines (UP)
Department of Anthropology and UP history professor, Zeus Salazar attended the "International Conference
on the Tasaday Controversy and Other Urgent Anthropological Issues". They presented that the "Tasaday
Folio"a collection of studies on Tasadays done by leading anthropologists were fabricated.
Almost a year later or in July 1988, UP allegedly sent Salazar and Bailen to Zagreb, Yugoslavia to attend the
12th International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences. There, Salazar and Bailen
reiterated their claim that the Tasaday find was a hoax. Their allegations were widely publicized in several
dailies.
Elizalde and Tasaday representatives Balayem, Mahayag, Dul and Lobo, filed a complaint for damages and
declaratory relief against Salazar and Bailen.
The University of the Philippines intervened in the issue of their faculty members.
ISSUE: WON, a) the acts of defendants subject of the complaint are protected by the mantle of the
institutional academic freedom of the University of the Philippines; and (b) the statements made in the
exercise of academic freedom are privileged.
HELD:Bailen and Salazar acts and utterances allegedly besmirched the reputation of the plaintiffs as they
were shown therein to have staged a fraud. The fact that the "hoax" was played up in the media allegedly
aggravated the situation. The alleged damaging acts and utterances of Bailen and Salazar were
circumscribed by the constitutionally-protected principle of academic freedom.
Also as observed by the lower court, the complaint does not even show that UP authorized Bailen and
Salazar to conduct a study on the Tasaday. Neither does it even appear that the trip to Zagreb, Yugoslavia
of Bailen and Salazar was sanctioned or sponsored by UP.
The Order of May 15, 1989 merely "denied" petitioner's affirmative defenses as grounds for a motion to
dismiss.
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order of the lower court and the Decision of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED.

[G.R. No. 134625. August 31, 1999]

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS​, CHANCELLOR ROGER POSADAS, DR.
EMERLINDA ROMAN, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, DR. ISAGANI MEDINA, DR. MARIA SERENA DIOKNO,
DR. OLIVIA CAOILI, DR. FRANCISCO NEMENZO II, DEAN PACIFICO AGABIN, CARMELITA GUNO, and
MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners, ​vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM
MARGARET CELINE​, respondents.

FACTS:
· ​Ms. Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine​ – Indian citizen; enrolled ​doctoral program in
Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy
(UP CSSP)​ Diliman, QC.
 · July 1991 – Ms. Arokiaswamy start working with her ​dissertation entitled “Tamil Influences in
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines”​.
· Ms. Arokiaswamy had finished her dissertation and was ready for her ​oral defense​ scheduled on
February 5, 1993.
· The panel members are Dr. Arsenio Manuel, Dr. Serafin Quiason, Dr. Sri Skandarajah, Dr. Noel Teodoro,
and Dr. Isagani Medina, as dean’s representative.
· ​4 out of 5 panelists​ gave Ms. Arokiaswamy a passing mark for her oral defense; Dr. Medina informed
CSSP Dean Consuelo Joaquin-Paz that there was a portion in dissertation that was lifted, without proper
acknowledgment.
· ​Dr. Medina​: “Pipirmahan ko ang pagsang-ayon/di pagsang-ayon kapag nakita ko na ang mga revisions
ng dissertation”
· March 5, 1993 - Ms. Arokiaswamy requested a meeting with the panel members to discuss amendments
· March 24, 1993 – ​CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved Ms. Arokiaswamy graduation and
included her to the list of graduates
· April 1993 - Ms. Arokiaswamy submitted copies of her supposedly revised dissertation however she did
not incorporate the revisions suggested by the panel members in the final copies of her dissertation
· Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form
· April 17, 1993 – University Council met to ​approve the list of candidates for graduation for 2​nd
Semester of school year 1992-1993. The list included Ms. Arokiaswamy’s name​. The list was
endorsed to the Board of Regents for final approval.
· April 21, 1993 – Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe (Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs)
requesting ​the exclusion of Ms. Arokiaswamy’s name from the list of candidates for graduation​ –
pending clarification problems regarding her dissertation. The ​letter did not reach the Board of
Regents on time​.
· April 22, 1993 – ​Board of Regents approved University Council’s recommendation for the
graduation including Ms. Arokiaswamy’s name
· ​April 24, 1993 - Ms. Arokiaswamy graduated with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Anthropology
· May 1, 1993 – ​Dr. Medina charged Ms. Arokiaswamy with plagiarism and that her doctorate be
withdrawn
· Dean Paz formed Ad Hoc Committee (Ventura Committee) to investigate and they informed Ms.
Arokiaswamy of the charges against her thru a letter
· Ventura Committee reported that ​at least 90 instances or portions are without proper or due
acknowledgment (intellectual dishonesty)
· July 28, 1993 – CSSP College Assembly unanimously ​approved to withdraw her doctorate degree
and endorsed the recommendation to the Board of Regents
· The Committee summon Ms. Arokiaswamy to meet the committee and give her a written explanation
· Ms. Arokiaswamy’s contention – the UP administration were playing politics in her case. She is deprived
of due process and that they can no longer withdraw her degree
· Ms. Arokiaswamy also sent letter to the Commission on Human Rights for the commission intervention in
her case

Held:
· ​Ms. Arokiaswamy’s doctorate degree was withdrawn
Academic Freedom includes the power of a University to REVOKE a degree or honor it has
conferred to a student after it was found out that the student’s graduation was obtained through
fraud.
Academic freedom is given a wide sphere of authority. If an institution of higher learning can decide on who
can and cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of
being its graduates.
Academic Freedom—It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the four essential freedom of a university to
determine for itself on academic grounds:
a. who may teach,
b. what may be taught,
c. how it shall be taught, and
d. who may be admitted to study”‘ (Emphasis supplied; citing Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 491, (1962)
and the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire (354 US 234 [1957]).

Montemayor vs Araneta University Foundation GR 44251 31 May 1977

Facts:​ Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On 7/8/74, he was found guilty of
making homosexual advances on one Leonardo De Lara by a faculty investigating committee. On 11/8/74,
another committee was appointed to investigate another charge of a similar nature against petitioner.
Petitioner, through counsel, asked for the postponement of the hearing set for 11/18 and 19, 1974, but the
motion was denied. The committee then pr​o​ceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and on
12/5/74, submitted its report recommending the separation of petitioner from the University. On 12/12/74,
the University applied w/ the NLRC for clearance to terminate petitioner's employment. Meanwhile, petitioner
filed a complaint w/ the NLRC for reinstatement and backwages. Judgement was rendered in petitioner's
favor, but on appeal to the Sec. of Labor, the latter found petitioner's dismissal to be justified. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: ​Does academic freedom include the right of schools to dismiss teachers?
RULING:
Yes. Institutional academic freedom was vindicated in this case, where, against the plea of academic
freedom and security of tenure of a professor, the school was allowed to separate a professor who after due
process had been found guilty of violating behavioral standards.
The stand taken by petitioner as to his being entitled to security of tenure is reinforced by the provision on
academic freedom which, as noted, is found in the Constitution. It was pointed out in Garcia v. The Faculty
Admission, Committee that academic freedom "is more often Identified with the right of a faculty member to
pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his
endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found
distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic
establishments. For the sociologist, Robert Maclver, it is 'a right claimed by the accredited educator, as
teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being
subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable to
some constituted authority within or beyond the institution.” Tenure, according to him, is of the essence of
such freedom. For him, without tenure that assures a faculty member "against dismissal or professional
penalization on grounds other than professional incompetence or conduct that in the judgment of his
colleagues renders him unfit" for membership in the faculty, the academic right becomes non-existent,
Security of tenure, for another scholar, Love joy, is "the chief practical requisite for academic freedom" of a
university professor. As with Maclver, he did not rule out removal but only "for some grave cause," Identified
by him as "proved incompetence or moral delinquency."
 VILLAR VS TIP

FACTS:
Petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression
against the respondents, in their refusal to admit the said petitioners at the Technological Institute of the
Philippines. However, reference was made to some of the petitioners' school records. Petitioners Rufino
Salcon Jr., Romeo Guilatco, Venecio​ ​ Villar, Inocencio Recitis had failed in one or two of their subjectsin
1983-1985. However, petitioner Noverto Baretto had five failing grades in the first semester in the first
school year, six failing grades in the second semester of 1984-1985. Petitioner Edgardo de Leon Jr. had
three failing grades, one passing grade and one subject dropped in the first semester of school year
1984-1985. Petitioner Regloben Laxamana had five failing grade with no passing grade in the first semester
of 1984-1985 school year. Petitioners Barreto, de Leon Jr. and Laxamana could be denied enrollment in
view of such failing grades.
SPECIAL CIVIC ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the TIP Board.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of certain students of the respondent
Technological Institute of​ ​ the Philippines could be a basis for their being barred from enrollment.

HELD:
NO, as is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, theinvocation of the right to freedom of
peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise
beendisregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom ofexpression, which is identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and
which `is not limited, much less denied, except on a showing * * * of clear and present danger of substantive
evil that the state has the right to prevent.' They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker
v. Des Moines Community School District, `shed their constitutionalrights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.'

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted to petitioners VenecioVillar, Inocencio F. Recitis, Rufino G.
Salcon, Jr. and Romeo Guilatco, Jr. to nullify the action taken by respondents in violation of their
constitutional rights. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted to such petitioners to enjoin respondents from
the acts of surveillance, black listing, suspension and refusal to allow them to enroll in the coming academic
year 1985-1986, if so minded. The petition is dismissed as to Noverto Barreto, Edgrado de Leon Jr. and
Regloben Laxamana. No costs.

MALABANAN V RAMENTO
Facts:
 Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of Respondent University. They
sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8am to
12am. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the
Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science (VMAS) Basketball Court. The place indicated in such
permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated, but at the second floor lobby. At such
gathering, they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed
merger of the Institute of Animal Science. They continued their language severely critical of the
university authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance
of classes being held. Also, non academic employees within hearing distance, stopped their
work because of noise created. They were asked to explain why they should not be held liable
for holding an assembly.

Issue:
Whether or not the suspension of students for one academic year was violative of the
constitutional rights of freedom of assembly and free speech?
Decision:
Yes, necessarily their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public
interest is not subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a
showing of clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.
The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy or disorder. If
assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities
who are devoid to deny such request. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the
time and place of an assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of
non-academic personnel. However, in violation of terms, penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.

ALCUAZ V PSBA

Facts:
Petitioners are all bonafide students of PSBA-QC who conducted demonstrations. The said demonstrations
were tumultuous. During the regular enrolment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were
allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of school year 1986-1987. The
President of the Student Council filed a complaint with the Director of the MECS against the PSBA for
barring the enrolment of the Student Council Officers and student leaders. The student council wrote the
President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement of the school’s decision regarding their
enrolment. Another demand letter was made by Counsel for the students to the President, Board of
Trustees, to enrol his clients within 48 hours. All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming,
hence this petition.

Issue​:
Whether or not students were denied of due process for failing to give notice and hearing (procedural) and
failing to decide without bias or prejudice (substantive)?
 Decision:
Petition dismissed. a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester. It is
provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student registers
in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Thus after the close of the first
semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening
teachers. The charge of denial of due process is untenable, there is no more contract to speak of. The
school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers.
Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to
those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings may be summary and
cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by
the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are: (1) the students must be informed in writing
of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide
the case. Records show that the proceedings in the case at bar, at the outset satisfied conditions No. 1 and
2, but, without a hearing, conditions No. 3, 4 and 5 had evidently not been completed with.

Tangonan v. Paño, 137 SCRA 246 (June 27, 1985)

FACTS:
1. Mely Tangonan brought suit for mandamus to compel the Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing to
admit her for the academic year 1976- 1977.

2. She had been previously provisionally admitted the previous school year, but she failed in
Psychiatric Nursing. She tried to take the course again in another school, but she was refused
admission because she tried to bribe the dean of the school.

3. When she tried to re-enrol at the Capitol Medical Center, she was denied admission. She brought
the matter on certiorari.

ISSUE:​ Whether the school can be compelled by the Court to re-admit a student.

HELD:
No, Any duty on the part of the school to enroll a student is not merely a ministerial duty but one
which involves the exercise of discretion not compellable by Mandamus. Capitol was perfectly justified in
refusing to admit her, its refusal being sanctioned by the Manual of Regulations of Private Schools which
considers academic delinquency & violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing
enrollment of a student.
Further, to grant relief to the student petioner would be doing violence to the academic freedom
enjoyed by Capitol enshrined under Art XV, sec. 8 (2) Constitution. Academic freedom includes not only the
freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish & teach the truth as they see it in the
field of their competence subject to no control or authority except of rational methods by which truths and
conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines, but also the right of the school or college to
decide for itself how best to attain them.
The grant being to institutions of higher learning, free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the over-riding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide spread of autonomy
 certainly extending to the choice of students. Said constitutional provision is not to be construed in a
niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent

G.R. No. L-45551 February 16, 1982

JOSE S. ANGELES and GILBERTO G. MERCADO, in his capacity as Dean of Institute of Technology,
FEU,petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL S. SISON, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, EDGARDO PICAR and
WILFREDO PATAWARAN, represented by his father WENCESLAO PATAWARAN, respondents.

(Where the right of a school to take disciplinary action against students for out of campus is recognized)

Sometime in Nov 1975, Jose Angeles (Petitioner), a prof of the Institute of Technology of FEU file an
administrative case against his 2 students (Mech Eng): Edgardo Picar and Wilfredo Patawaran before the
office of the Dean ( Gilberto Mercado) for allegedly assaulting him at the Oak Barrel Restaurant located at P.
Gomez Street, Quiapo, Manila on the occasion of the birthday party of Professor Alfonso Bernabe, the
Secretary of the Institute. Taking action, Dean Mercado created a committee that will investigate the
complaint.

The 2 respondents questioned the authority of Mercado and his committee to conduct investigation on the
basis of jurisdiction since the alleged assault happened outside the school premises. They contend that the
Dean's authority to investigate under the Code of Conduct of FEU (as amended) from where he derives that
power, is limited to acts done or committed within the premises of the compound of the University.

The Dean and his committee proceeded to conduct the challenged administrative investigation. Thus the
private respondents, Picar and Patawaran, the latter being then a minor, was represented by his father,
Wenceslao Patawaran, filed on February 13, 1976 in the Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint with
petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from proceeding with the
administrative investigation against the private respondents.
Main Issue: is whether a school through its duly authorized representative has the jurisdiction to investigate
its student or students for an alleged misconduct committed outside the school premises and beyond school
hours.
Held:
Yes. A college or any school has a dual responsibility to its students:
1. Is to provide opportunities for learning
2. Is to help them grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the
community.
Discipline is one of the means to carry out the second responsibility.
The respondent judge correctly stated that the general rule is that the authority of the school is coextensive
with its territorial jurisdiction, or its school grounds, so that any action taken for acts committed outside the
school premises should, in general, be left to the police authorities, the courts of justice, and the family
concerned.

*Furthermore, the true test of a school's right to investigate, or otherwise, suspend or expel a student for a
misconduct committed outside the school premises and beyond school hours is not the time or place of the
offense, but its effect upon the morale and efficiency of the school and whether it, in fact, is adverse to the
school's good order welfare and the advancement of its students.
There are instances when the school might be called upon to exercise its power over its student or students
for acts committed outside the school and beyond school hours in the following:

1. In cases of violations of school policies or regulations occurring in connection with a school sponsored
activity off-campus;
2. In cases where the misconduct of the student involves his status as a student or affects the good name
or
reputation of the school.

The establishment of an educational institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance
of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning.
These are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property.

The power of school officials to investigate, an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel, is a necessary
corollary to the enforcement of such rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly
educational environment conducive to learning.

Common sense dictates that the school retains its power to compel its students in or off campus to a norm
of conduct compatible with their standing as members of the academic community.

Hence, when as the case at bar, the conduct complained of directly affects the suitability of the alleged
violators as students, there is no reason why the school cannot impose the same disciplinary action as when
the act took place inside the campus.

COLEGIO DEL STO. NINO DE CEBU

vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and ANDREA OSORIO and PAZ JARANILLA, G.R. No. 96301.

Facts
Andrea Osoria and Paz Jaranilla were working as teachers at the Colegio del Sto. Nino de Cebu. Everything
was smooth-sailing until in 1988 when their rector advised their dismissal from service on grounds of
incompetence, misconduct and insubordination. Learning of such dismissal and to their disagreement, the
teachers filed a complaint against the petitioner-school in the NLRC and demanded their reinstatement plus
refund of illegal deductions from their salaries.

The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the private respondent-teachers. Both parties appealed, with the
respondents asking for moral and exemplary damages and a recomputation of the back wages,and the
 petitioner justifying the dismissal of the two. NLRC rendered its decision sustaining the teachers and
dismissing Colegio’s appeal.

The petitioner-school went to the Supreme Court to file a Temporary Restraining Order which the court
granted. However, in a succeeding action, the petitioner failed to file their appeal within the 10-day
reglementary period. Nevertheless, the court considered looking into the merits of the petitioner’s brief.

Issue

Were the private respondents justifiably dismissed from service?

In connection to the first issue, is the academic freedom enjoyed by schools absolute?
If not, up to what extent?

Held

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

First, the Supreme Court did not believe the evaluation of the teachers allegedly collected by the Evaluation
Committee presented as evidence by the petitioners. Not only were they unsupported with testimonial
evidences of the parents who allegedly complained against the private respondents, it seemed to the high
court that they created the Evaluation Committee for the purpose of the trial at hand.

Second, The petitioner’s contention that the respondents-teachers did not ask for the refund of the illegal
deductions and the implementation of the wage adjustment under RA 6640 was dismissed by the court to be
a farce, considering the private-respondents’ submission found in Annex 1 of their comment.

On the issue of educational freedom, the court had this to say:

“the Court does not deny petitioner its academic freedom, which includes the power to choose its own
faculty and the education of its students according to its own standards and objectives and pursuant to the
purposes of the Constitution. But that freedom does not give it absolute authority over its employees or
exempt it from the requirements of due process in its dealing with them. The institution of learning has a
special duty to provide a fitting example to its pupils in the proper observance of the law and the rudiments
of fair play. There is no question it must refrain from any conduct that will detract from the ideal and model of
the enlightened student as a just and law-abiding citizen.”

(The academic freedom is not absolute. The institution’s power over its employees is limited by the latter’s
right to the due process of the law.)

Article XIV

G.R. No. L-11154 ​ arch 21, 1916

M
E. MERRITT,​ ​plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,​ ​defendant-appellant.
Crossfield and O’Brien for plaintiff.
 Attorney-General Avanceña for defendant..
By: Xtine K. :)
Full Case
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor
of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) “in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff
suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint,” and (2) “in limiting the time when
plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in the
sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint.”
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the
collision between the plaintiff’s motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the
negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the
damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to
the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
The trial court’s findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as follows:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was
going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to
twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern
intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning
toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is
prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before
reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or
horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from
the post place there.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who
examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a
depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in the back part of his head, while
blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain was
had suffered material injury. At ten o’clock of the night in question, which was the time set for performing the
operation, his pulse was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little hope that he would live.
His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer skin in such manner that it
might be regarded as double and the wound be exposed to infection, for which reason it was of the most
serious nature.
At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed that the plaintiff’s leg showed
a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of
the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and
nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental
condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor,
especially when he attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations.
According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff’s mental and physical condition
prior to the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his
 physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability
that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings
and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost
50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders
and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the building.
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor, he had to
dissolved the partnership he had formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he was incapacitated from
making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his mental faculties, and he
had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building.”
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between
the plaintiff’s motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the
chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a)
P5,000, the award awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of
wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the
record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and
the trial court so found, that the plaintiff’s services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court,
however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the
hospital. In this we think there was error, because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly
incapacitated for a period of six months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two months and
twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery
for the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any
fault on his part, is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the
Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting
therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing
the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of
Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the amount of
damages, if any, to which the claimant is entitled; and
Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommended that an Act be passed by the
Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that said
questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:
SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any,
to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the Philippine
 Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said
Islands, to defendant said Government at the same.
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, February 3, 1915.
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also
concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new
cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or extended the defendant’s liability to any case not previously
recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. It
is also admitted that the instant case is one against the Government. As the consent of the Government to
be sued by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the
consent, and render judgment accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government “in order to fix the responsibility for
the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the
amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . .” These
were the two questions submitted to the court for determination. The Act was passed “in order that said
questions may be decided.” We have “decided” that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the
chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of
damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the
Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been “modeled after the Federal and State Governments
in the United States,” we may look to the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining
the purpose and scope of Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom
it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. “The Government,”
says Justice Story, “does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents
whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and
losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.” (​Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491,
citing ​U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and ​Beers vs. States, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed.,
991.)
In the case of ​Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the state for
personal injuries received on account of the negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state
institution created by the legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural and kindred industries; to
disseminate information calculated to educate and benefit the industrial classes; and to advance by such
means the material interests of the state, being objects similar to those sought by the public school system.
In passing upon the question of the state’s liability for the negligent acts of its officers or agents, the court
said:
No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laches, or
unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents. (Citing ​Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall., 269; ​Clodfelter
vs. State, 86 N. C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; ​Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158;
Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29; ​Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on Agency, sec.
319.)
 As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action
arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of
the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
In ​Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which
authorized the bringing of this suit, read:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town of Summit, Waukesha County,
Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised for the
purpose of settling and determining all controversies which he may now have with the State of Wisconsin, or
its duly authorized officers and agents, relative to the mill property of said George Apfelbacher, the fish
hatchery of the State of Wisconsin on the Bark River, and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the lower
end of Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of the waters of said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake, all in
the county of Waukesha, Wisconsin.
In determining the scope of this act, the court said:
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state for
the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is
difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state’s immunity from suit. It
simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff’s controversies with the estate.
Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall
depart from well established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be
settled. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability, but
left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state’s immunity from suit. If the Legislature had
intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare liability on the part of the state,
it would not have left so important a matter to mere inference, but would have done so in express terms.
(​Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.)
In ​Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied upon and considered, are as
follows:
All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for negligence against the state not
allowed by the state board of examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions herein
contained, to bring suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent jurisdiction,
and prosecute the same to final judgment. The rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to such suits,
except as herein otherwise provided.
And the court said:
This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising under different facts, and in both
it was held that said statute did not create any liability or cause of action against the state where none
existed before, but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have existed if the
statute had not been enacted. (​Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; ​Melvin vs. State,
121 Cal., 16.)
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court “jurisdiction of all claims against the
commonwealth, whether at law or in equity,” with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In
construing this statute the court, in ​Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:
 The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the state a new and heretofore
unrecognized class of liabilities, but only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized
existing liabilities can be adjudicated.
In ​Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had, by the terms of the statute of
New York, jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in the management of the canals such as the
plaintiff had sustained, Chief Justice Ruger remarks: “It must be conceded that the state can be made liable
for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or servants, only by force of some positive statute
assuming such liability.”
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government’s liability to any cause not
previously recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant’s liability for the
negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have
been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
The Supreme Court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or
negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by
his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It
follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages
suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of
the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the
contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service
serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the
state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where
the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of
Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or
negligence; and whereas in the first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down that
where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence, shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly or
indirectly cause the damage, the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation
upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage,
because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or
negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to proof, however, because, as held in
the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons
mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are
found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and owners or directors of an
establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts through the agency of a special
agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this
kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902
respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or
negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of the
state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet said
article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners ​by an
executive official, acting in the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain
property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts ​through a special
agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite
and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so
that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided
to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration
and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his
office and which are regulated by law and the regulations.” (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur.
Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision,
among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that
which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a ​definite order or commission to perform
some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is
based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office
who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility.
Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages,
caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions
of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to
the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees
when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the
chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance.
Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth,
which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative
enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter
rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
Case Digest:
Political Law – Non-Suability of the State – Waiver of Non-Suability is Not Admission of Liability
The facts of the case took place in the 1910’s. E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work.
One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government
ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to have been negligent. Because of the incident,
Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never
perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized Merritt to
sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring
suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to
appear in said suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government
to pay the same.
 ISSUE:​ Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the
ambulance.
HELD: ​No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause
not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state,
by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office,
because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of
branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through
a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives
a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the
trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a
special agent hence, there can be no liability from the government. “The Government does not undertake to
guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in
all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public
interest.”

MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY vs JUDGE DUMDUM

G.R.No. 168289 March 22,2010-BONN☺

FACTS:
A complaint was filed by Lim Chao against the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan for collection of sum
of money and damages. The compalint alleged that a contract was entered into by Lim Chao and the
Municipality for the delivery of motor vehicles, which supposedly were needed to carry out certain
development undertakings in the municipality. Lim Chao then delivered to the Municipality of Hagonoy 21
motor vehicles amounting to 5,820,000. However, despite having made several deliveries, the municipality
allegedly did not heed Lim Chao's claim for payment. Thus, she filed a complaint for full payment of the said
amount, with interest and damages and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment directing
the sheriff to “attach the estate, real and personal properties.” Of the Municipality
The Municipality filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the claim on which the action had been
brought was unenforceable under the statute of frauds pointing out that there was no written contract or
document that would evince the supposed agreement they entered into with respondent. It is also filed a
Motion to dissolve and Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment Already issued, invoking, among
others, immunity of the state from suit. The municipality argued that as municipal corporation, its immune
from suit, and that its properties are by law exempt from execution and garnishment. Lim Chao on her part,
counters that the municipality's claim of immunity from suit is negated by the Local Government Code ,
which vests the municipal corporations with the power to sue and to be sued. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's order.
 ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the Municipality og Hagonoy is valid

HELD:
No. The rule where the state gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special
law, it may limit the claimants action “only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution” and that the power of the Courts end when the judgment is rendered. Since government funds
and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgment is based
on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursement of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriations as required by law. The functions and the public services rendered by the
state cannot be allowed to paralyze or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects.
PART XIV
ARTICLE XVI – GENERAL PROVISIONS

G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916

E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
Crossfield and O’Brien for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Avanceña for defendant..

Full case:

USA VS JUDGE GUINTO, ET AL. FEBRUARY 26, 1990 AND THE CASES CITED THEREIN
G.R. No. 76607
USA, Frederick M. Smouse and Yvonne Reeves
vs.
Hon. Eliodoro Guinto, Roberto T. Valencia, Emerciana Tanglao, and Pablo Del Pilar
G.R. No. 794770
USA, Anthony LAmachia, T/SGT. USAF, Wilfredo Belsa, Peter Orascion, and Rose Cartalla
vs.
Hon. Rodolfo Rodrigo and Fabian Genove
USA, Tomi J. Kingi, Darel Dye, and Steven Bostick
vs.
Hon. Ceballos and Luis Bautista
G.R. No. 80258
USA, Major General Michael Carns, AIC Ernest Rivenburgh, Sgt. Thomas Mitchell, Sgt. Wayne Benjamin, et
al.
vs.
Hon. Vergara and Ricky Sanchez, Freddie Sanchez aka Freddie Rivera, Edwin Mariano aka Jessie Dolores
Sangalang et al.

FACTS:
These cases are consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity.
GR 76607
Valencia,Tanglao and Del Pilar are suing several officers of the US Airforce stationed in Clark Airbase in
connection with the bidding conducted by them for barber services in the said base. The Western Pacific
 Contracting Office through James Shaw solicited bids for such contracts. Valencia, Tanglao and Del Pilar
submitted their bids, but the bidding was won by Ramon Dizon who even claimed that he had made a bid for
4 facilities including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bid. Upon the
complaint and objection of the three private respondents, the Philippine Area Exchange that the Civil
Engineering concession was not awarded to Dizon, yet Dizon was already operating it as the NCO club
concession.
The private respondents then filed a complaint in the court to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to
cancel the award to Dizon, conduct a rebidding of the barbershop concessions. In answer, the petitioners
opposed the complaint filed by Valencia, Tanglao and Del Pilar on the ground that the action was in effect a
suit against USA which had not waived its non-suability.
G.R. 79470
Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages in the RTC of BAguio against Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo
Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Airforce Recreation Center at
the John Hay Airbase, B.C. Apparently, Genove poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the
vegetables served to the club customers. The defendants, joined the USA, moved to dismiss the complaint
alleging that Lamachia, being an officer of the US Airforce was immune from suit for the acts done by him in
his official capacity arguing that the suit was in effect against the USA, which had not given its consent to be
sued.
G.R. 80018
Luis Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O’Donnell – extension of Clark Airbase – was arrested following a
buy-bust operation conducted by Tomi King, Darrel Dye and Stepehen Bostick who were officers of the US
Air Force and special agents of the Airforce of Special Investigators. As a result, Bautista was dismissed
from his employment. This prompted him to file a complaint against the individual petitioners arguing that
because of their acts Bautista was removed. King, Dye and Bostick allege that they were only performing
their duties in the enforcement of Philippine laws inside the American Base, pursuant to the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement. They further claim that the complaint was against the USA without its consent.
G.R. 80258
Private respondents Ricky Sanchez, Freddie Sanchez and Edwin Mariano filed a complaint for damages
against Major General Michael Carns, AIC Ernest Rivenburgh, Sgt. Thomas Mitchell, Sgt. Wayne Benjamin,
et al.. Accordingly, the latter beat them up, handcuffed and unleashed dogs on them. Michael Carns et al.
denied the action and claimed that Sanchez et al. were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs
because they resisted the arrest. They further claim that the suit filed by the group of Sanchez was a suit
against the USA which had not given its consent and that they were also immune from suit under the RP-US
Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.
ISSUE
W/N THE SUITS ARE IN EFFECT SUITS AGAINST THE USA WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.
W/N THE DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT FOR ACTING WITHIN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY.
HELD:
GR 76607
No, the barbershop concessions are commercial enterprises operated by private individuals. They are not
agencies of the US Armed Forces. Hence, petitioners cannot plead immunity
G.R. 79470
NO, the petitioners are not immune from suit and cannot invoke state immunity since the restaurants are
commercial enterprises. When they entered into the employment contract with Genove, it impliedly divested
itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
G.R. 80018
YES, since the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions. They have discharged their
duties as agents of the USA and they cannot be directly impleaded for acts attributable to the US, which has
 not given its consent to be sued.
G.R. 80258
The Court held that since there are contradictory factual allegations, the case deserves a closer study. The
lower court must make the inquiry first. Only then can it be known in what capacity the petitioners were
acting at the time of the incident.
*May Ann*

G.R. No. L-56180 October 16, 1986

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, p ​ etitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES ROMEO G. GUANZON and TERESITA REGALADO,
respondents.
Ernesto P. Pangalangan for petitioner.
Mirano, Mirano & Associates for private respondents.

FULL CASE:
GUTIERREZ, JR., J ​ .:
In a letter-complaint dated December 13, 1967 addressed to Rev. William Welsh S.J., Dean of Men, Dean of
Resident Students, and Chairman of the Board of Discipline, College of Arts and Sciences, Ateneo de
Manila, Carmelita Mateo, a waitress in the cafeteria of Cervini Hall inside the university campus charged
Juan Ramon Guanzon, son of private respondents Romeo Guanzon and Teresita Regalado, and a boarder
and first year student of the university with unbecoming conduct committed on December 12, 1967 at about
5:15 in the evening at the Cervini Hall's cafeteria, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Guanzon, a boarder at Cervini who I think comes from Bacolod, was asking for "siopao." I was at the
counter and I told him that the "siopao" had still to be heated and asked him to wait for a while. Then Mr.
Guanzon started mumbling bad words directed to me, in the hearing presence of other boarders. I asked
him to stop cursing, and he told me that was none of my business. Since he seemed impatient, I was going
to give back his money without any contempt. (sic) He retorted that he did not like to accept the money. He
got madder and started to curse again. Then he threatened to strike me with his fist. I tried to avoid this. But
then he actually struck me in my left temple. Before he could strike again, his fellow boarders held him and
Dr. Bella and Leyes coaxed him to stop; I got hold of a bottle so I could dodge him. It was then that Fr.
Campbell arrived. The incident was hidden from Fr. Campbell by the boarders. I could not tell him myself as
I had gone into the kitchen crying because I was hurt.
The university conducted an investigation of the slapping incident. On the basis of the investigation results,
Juan Ramon was dismissed from the university.
The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the filing of a complaint for damages by his parents against the
university in the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City. The complaint states that
Juan Ramon was expelled from school without giving him a fair trial in violation of his right to due process
and that they are prominent and well known residents of Bacolod City, with the unceremonious expulsion of
their son causing them actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
In its answer, the university denied the material allegations of the complaint and justified the dismissal of
Juan Ramon on the ground that his unbecoming behavior is contrary to good morals, proper decorum, and
civility, that such behavior subjected him as a student to the university's disciplinary regulations' action and
sanction and that the university has the sole prerogative and authority at any time to drop from the school a
student found to be undesirable in order to preserve and maintain its integrity and discipline so
indispensable for its existence as an institution of learning.
 After due trial, the lower court found for the Guanzons and ordered the university to pay them P92.00 as
actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs of the
suit.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the trial court's decision was initially reversed and set
aside. The complaint was dismissed.
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons, the appellate court reversed its decision
and set it aside through a special division of five. In the resolution issued by the appellate court, the lower
court's decision was reinstated. The motion for reconsideration had to be referred to a special division of five
in view of the failure to reach unanimity on the resolution of the motion, the vote of the regular division
having become 2 to 1.
The petitioner now asks us to review and reverse the resolution of the division of five on the following
grounds:
ONE
THE RESOLUTION OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR OF LAW
IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT AFFORDED DUE PROCESS IN THE
DISCIPLINE CASE AGAINST THEIR SON, JUAN RAMON GUANZON.
TWO
THE RESOLUTION OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE RESORT TO
JUDICIAL REMEDY BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE RULE ON FINALITY OF
ADMINISTRATION ACTION OR EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
THREE
THE FINDING AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE ARE TAINTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, OR ARE CONFLICTING, OR CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE
IN THE CASE.
In reversing its own decision, the appellate court relied heavily on the findings of the Director of Private
Schools affirmed by the Minister of Education and the findings of the lower Court to the effect that due
process of law was not observed by the petitioner when it dismissed the private respondents' son Juan
Ramon. The resolution invoked the rule that findings of facts by administrative officers in matters falling
within their competence will not generally be reviewed by the courts, as well as the principle that findings of
facts of the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal.
The conclusions of the Court of Appeals in its split decision are not sustained by the facts on record.
The statement regarding the finality given to factual findings of trial courts and administrative tribunals is
correct if treated as a general principle. The general principle, however, is subject to well established
exceptions.
We disregard the factual findings of trial courts when-(l) the conclusion is a finding grounded on
speculations, surmises, and conjectures; (2) the inferences made are manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) there is a misapprehension of facts; and (5) the
court, in arriving at its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the
admissions of the parties or the evidence presented. (Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 135 SCRA
620; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 514; Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc.,
97 SCRA 734; and Bacayo v. Genato, 135 SCRA 668).
A similar rule applies to administrative agencies.
By reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific matters falling under
their respective jurisdictions, we ordinarily accord respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative
tribunals. However, there are exceptions to this rule and judicial power asserts itself whenever the factual
findings are not supported by evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition, or collusion;
where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or
when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. (International Hardwood and
 Veneer Co., of the Philippines v. Leogardo, 117 SCRA 967; Baguio Country Club Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 118 SCRA 557; Sichangco v. Commissioner of Immigration, 94 SCRA 61; and
Eusebio v. Sociedad Agricola de Balarin, 16 SCRA 569).
The Court of Appeals ruled that Juan Ramon Guanzon was not accorded due process. We fail to see what,
in the records, made the respondent court reverse its earlier and correct finding that there was due process.
The original decision, penned by then Associate and now Presiding Justice Emilio A. Gancayco reviews the
facts on record to show that the procedures in the expulsion case were fair, open, exhaustive, and
adequate.
The decision states:
First, after the slapping incident which happened on December 12, 1967, Fr. Welsh in his capacity as
Chairman of the Board of Discipline upon receipt of the letter-complaint (Exh. 2) of Carmelita Mateo
conducted a preliminary inquiry by interviewing the companions and friends of Juan Ramon Guanzon who
were also at the cafeteria. They confirmed the incident in question. (Exhs. 5, 6, 7 and 9).
Second, Fr. Welsh, finding that there was probable cause against Mr. Guanzon, prepared a memorandum to
the members of the Board of Discipline dated December 16, 1967 (Exh. 8) and delivered a copy each to Fr.
Francisco Perez, Dr. Amada Capawan, Mr. Piccio and Dr. Reyes.
Third, on December 14, 1967, Mr. Guanzon was fully informed of the accusation against him when Fr.
Welsh read the letter-complaint of Carmelita Mateo and he admitted the truth of the charge. (tsn., pp. 38-39,
May 9, 1970; Exh. 4).
Fourth, Fr. Welsh also sent separate letters to Rev. Antonio Cuna, Student Counselor of the College of Arts
and Sciences dated December 18, 1967 and Rev. James Culligan, Director of Guidance of the College of
Arts and Sciences dated December 18, 1967 seeking any information for guidance in the action of the Board
of Discipline regarding the case of Mr. Guanzon. (Exhs. 10-11)
Fifth, notice of the meeting of the Board of Discipline set on December 19, 1967 was posted at the Bulletin
Board of the College of Arts and Sciences and also at Dormitory Halls (tsn., pp. 21-22, July 21, 1970) The
Secretary of the Dean of Discipline personally notified Mr. Guanzon of the meeting of the Board on
December 19, 1967, he was told to seek the help of his guardians, parents and friends including the student
counsellors in the residence halls and College of Arts and Sciences. (tsn., p. 18, July 21, 1970)
Sixth, despite notice of the Board of Discipline on December 19, 1967, Mr. Guanzon did not care to inform
his parents or guardian knowing fully well the seriousness of the offense he had committed and instead he
spoke for himself and admitted to have slapped Carmelita Mateo. He then asked that he be excused as he
wanted to catch the boat for Bacolod City for the Christmas vacation.
Seventh, the decision of the Board of Discipline was unanimous in dropping from the rolls of students Mr.
Guanzon (Exh. 12) which was elevated to the office of the Dean of Arts and Sciences, Rev. Joseph A.
Galdon, who after a review of the case found no ground to reverse the decision of the Board of Discipline.
(Exh. 13) The case was finally elevated to the President of the Ateneo University who sustained the decision
of the Board of Discipline (Exh. 21-A, p. 6) A motion for reconsideration was filed by the President of the
Student Council in behalf of Mr. Guanzon (Exh. 15) but the same was denied by the President of the
University.
Eighth, when the decision of the Board of Discipline was about to be carried out, Mr. Guanzon voluntarily
applied for honorable dismissal. He went around to the officials of the university to obtain his clearance and
this was approved on January 8, 1968. (Exh. 3, tsn., p. 58, May 6, 1970)
Ninth, Mr. Romeo Guanzon, father of Juan Ramon Guanzon arranged for full and complete refund of his
tuition fee for the entire second semester of the school year 1967-68. Juan Ramon was never out of school.
He was admitted at the De la Salle College of Bacolod City and later transferred to another Jesuit School.
From the above proceedings that transpired it can not be said that Juan Ramon Guanzon was denied due
proems of law. On the contrary, we find that he was given the full opportunity to be heard to be fully informed
of the charge against him and to be confronted of the witnesses face to face. And since he chose to remain
 silent and did not bother to inform his parents or guardian about the disciplinary action taken against him by
the defendant university, neither he nor his parents should find reason to complain.
xxx xxx xxx
When the letter-complaint was read to Juan Ramon, he admitted the altercation with the waitress and his
slapping her on the face. Rev. Welsh did not stop with the admission. He interviewed Eric Tagle, Danny Go,
Roberto Beriber, and Jose Reyes, friends of Juan Ramon who were present during the incident.
The Board of Discipline was made up of distinguished members of the faculty-Fr. Francisco Perez, Biology
Department Chairman; Dr. Amando Capawan, a Chemistry professor; Assistant Dean Piccio of the College;
and Dr. Reyes of the same College. There is nothing in the records to cast any doubt on their competence
and impartiality insofar as this disciplinary investigation is concerned.
Juan Ramon himself appeared before the Board of Discipline. He admitted the slapping incident, then
begged to be excused so he could catch the boat for Bacolod City. Juan Ramon, therefore, was given notice
of the proceedings; he actually appeared to present his side; the investigating board acted fairly and
objectively; and all requisites of administrative due process were met.
We do not share the appellate court's view that there was no due process because the private respondents,
the parents of Juan Ramon were not given any notice of the proceedings.
Juan Ramon, who at the time was 18 years of age, was already a college student, intelligent and mature
enough to know his responsibilities. In fact, in the interview with Rev. Welsh, he even asked if he would be
expelled because of the incident. He was fully cognizant of the gravity of the offense he committed. When
informed about the December 19, 1967 meeting of the Board of Discipline, he was asked to seek advice and
assistance from his guardian and/or parents.
In the natural course of things, Juan Ramon is assumed to have reported this serious matter to his parents.
The fact that he chose to remain silent and did not inform them about his case, not even when he went
home to Bacolod City for his Christmas vacation, was not the fault of the petitioner university.
Moreover, notwithstanding the non-participation of the private respondents, the university, as stated earlier,
undertook a fair and objective investigation of the slapping incident.
Due process in administrative proceedings also requires consideration of the evidence presented and the
existence of evidence to support the decision (Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112).
While it may be true that Carmelita Mateo was not entirely blameless for what happened to her because she
also shouted at Juan Ramon and tried to hit him with a cardboard box top, this did not justify Juan Ramon's
slapping her in the face. The evidence clearly shows that the altercation started with Juan Ramon's
utterance of the offensive language "bilat ni bay," an Ilongo phrase which means sex organ of a woman. It
was but normal on the part of Mateo to react to the nasty remark. Moreover, Roberto Beriber, a friend of
Juan Ramon who was present during the incident told Rev. Welsh during the investigation of the case that
Juan Ramon made threatening gestures at Mateo prompting her to pick up a cardboard box top which she
threw at Juan Ramon. The incident was in public thus adding to the humiliation of Carmelita Mateo. There
was "unbecoming conduct" and pursuant to the Rules of Discipline and Code of Ethics of the university,
specifically under the 1967-1969 Catalog containing the rules and academic regulations (Exhibit 19), this
offense constituted a ground for dismissal from the college. The action of the petitioner is sanctioned by law.
Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools recognizes violation of disciplinary regulations
as valid ground for refusing re-enrollment of a student (Tangonan v. Pano, 137 SCRA 245).
Before Juan Ramon was admitted to enroll, he received (1) the College of Arts and Sciences Handbook
containing the general regulations of the school and the 1967-1969 catalog of the College of Arts and
Sciences containing the disciplinary rules and academic regulations and (2) a copy of the Rules and
Regulations of the Cervini-Elizo Halls of the petitioner university one of the provisions of which is as follows:
under the title "Dining Room"-"The kitchen help and server should always be treated with civility." Miss
Mateo was employed as a waitress and precisely because of her service to boarders, not to mention her
sex, she deserved more respect and gracious treatment.
 The petitioner is correct in stating that there was a serious error of law in the appellate court's ruling on due
process.
The petitioner raises the issue of "exhaustion of administrative remedies" in view of its pending appeal from
the decision of the Ministry of Education to the President of the Philippines. It argues that the private
respondents' complaint for recovery of damages filed in the lower court was premature.
The issue raised in court was whether or not the private respondents can recover damages as a result of the
dismissal of their son from the petitioner university. This is a purely legal question and nothing of an
administrative nature is to or can be done. (Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230; Tapales v. University of
the Philippines, 7 SCRA 553; Limoico v. Board of Administrators, (PVA), 133 SCRA 43; Malabanan v.
Ramonte, 129 SCRA 359). The case was brought pursuant to the law on damages provided in the Civil
Code. The jurisdiction to try the case belongs to the civil courts.
There was no need to await action from Malacañang.
This brings us to the final issue which is whether or not the private respondents are entitled to damages.
There is no basis for the recovery of damages. Juan Ramon was afforded due process of law. The penalty is
based on reasonable rules and regulations applicable to all students guilty of the same offense. He never
was out of school. Before the decision could be implemented, Juan Ramon asked for an honorable
dismissal which was granted. He then enrolled at the De la Salle University of Bacolod City and later
transferred to another Jesuit school Moreover, his full and complete tuition fees for the second semester
were refunded through the representation of Mr. Romeo Guanzon, Juan Ramon's father.
It is unfortunate of the parents suffered some embarrassment because of the incident. However, their
predicament arose from the misconduct of their own son who, in the exuberance of youth and unfortunate
loss of self control, did something which he must have, later, regretted. There was no bad faith on the part of
the university. In fact, the college authorities deferred any undue action until a definitive decision had been
rendered. The whole procedure of the disciplinary process was set up to protect the privacy of the student
involved. There is absolutely no indication ot malice,. fraud, and improper or willful motives or conduct on the
part of the Ateneo de Manila University in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The appellate court's resolution dated January 26,
1981 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The appellate court's decision dated March 15, 1979 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Ateneo vs CA, Digest

FACTS:​ Juan Ramon Guanzon was dismissed from Ateneo De Manila University on the basis of the
complaint filed Carmelita Mateo, a school waitress. Carmelita wrote a letter addressed to Rev. William
Welsh S.J., Dean of Men, Dean of Resident Students, and Chairman of the Board of Discipline, College of
Arts and Sciences, Ateneo de Manila. The letter contained the following:
Mr. Guanzon, a boarder at Cervini who I think comes from Bacolod, was asking for "siopao." I was at the
counter and I told him that the "siopao" had still to be heated and asked him to wait for a while. Then Mr.
Guanzon started mumbling bad words directed to me, in the hearing presence of other boarders. I
asked him to stop cursing, and he told me that was none of my business. Since he seemed impatient, I
was going to give back his money without any contempt. (sic) He retorted that he did not like to accept
the money. He got madder and started to curse again. Then he threatened to strike me with his fist. I
tried to avoid this. But then he actually struck me in my left temple. Before he could strike again, his
fellow boarders held him and Dr. Bella and Leyes coaxed him to stop; I got hold of a bottle so I could
dodge him. It was then that Fr. Campbell arrived. The incident was hidden from Fr. Campbell by the
boarders. I could not tell him myself as I had gone into the kitchen crying because I was hurt.
 An investigation was conducted and Guanzon was dismissed due to his unbecoming behavior which is
contrary to good morals, proper decorum, and civility and that such behavior subjected him as a student to
the university's disciplinary regulations' action and sanction.
ISSUE:
1. WON Guanzon was deprived of due process of law
2. WON private respondents are entitled to damages
3. WON Ateneo can validly dismiss a student
HELD:
1. There was no deprivation of due process. Juan Ramon himself appeared before the Board of
Discipline. He admitted the slapping incident, then begged to be excused so he could catch the boat for
Bacolod City. Juan Ramon, therefore, was given notice of the proceedings; he actually appeared to
present his side; the investigating board acted fairly and objectively; and all requisites of administrative
due process were met.
2. There is no basis for the recovery of damages. Juan Ramon was afforded due process of law. The
penalty is based on reasonable rules and regulations applicable to all students guilty of the same offense.
He never was out of school. Before the decision could be implemented, Juan Ramon asked for an
honorable dismissal which was granted. He then enrolled at the De la Salle University of Bacolod City and
later transferred to another Jesuit school Moreover, his full and complete tuition fees for the second
semester were refunded through the representation of Mr. Romeo Guanzon, Juan Ramon's father.
3. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of
disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by this Court.
This institutional academic freedom includes not only the freedom of professionally qualified persons to
inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence subject to no
control or authority except of rational methods by which truths and conclusions are sought and established
in their disciplines, but also the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its ms and objectives, and
how best to attain them the grant being to institutions of higher learning-free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint

GUZMAN VS NU
G.R. No. L-68288 - July 11, 1986
142 SCRA 699
(Political Law – Bill of Rights – Due Process – Due Process in Educational Institutions)

FACTS:
In 1984, Diosdado Guzman and two others complained that the National University (NU) barred them from
enrolling in the said university. NU argued that their failure to enroll was due to the students’ fault. It was
alleged that Guzman et al spearheaded illegal mass actions within the university premises; that such mass
actions were violative of school policies; that due to their mass actions, Guzman et al incurred bad grades;
that Guzman et al hated NU anyway so why should they be allowed to enroll; that it is in the best interest of
both parties for the students not to be enrolled.
1) that "petitioners' failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year
1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their allegedexercise of their
constitutional and human rights;"
2) that petitioner Urbiztondo, sought to re-enroll only
 on July 5, 1986 "when the enrollment period was already closed;
3) that as regards petitioner Guzman, his “academic showing” was “poor”, “due to his activities in leading
boycotts of classes”; that when his father was notified of this development sometime in August, 1982, the
latter had demanded that his son “reform or else we will recall him to the province”; "
4) that as regards petitioner Ramacula, like Guzman “he continued to lead or actively participate, contrary to
the spirit of the Resolution dated November 23, 1983 of this … Court (in G.R. No. 65443 in which he was
also one of the petitioners) and to university rules and regulations, within university premises but without
permit from university officials in activities that disturbed or disrupted classes;” and
5) that petitioners have “failures in their records, (and) are not of good scholastic standing. “

On October 2, 1984 this Court issued a resolution reading as follows: ... Acting on the
Comment submitted by respondent, the Court Resolved to NOTE the same and to
require a REPLY to such Comment. The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a MANDATORY
INJUNCTION, enjoining respondent to allow the enrolment of petitioners for the coming
semester without prejudice to any disciplinary proceeding to which any or all of them
may be subjected with their right to lawful defense recognized and respected. As
regards petitioner Diosdado Guzman, even if it be a fact that there is a pending
criminal charge against him for malicious mischief, the Court nonetheless is of the
opinion that, as above-noted, without prejudice to the continuation of any disciplinary
proceeding against him, that he be allowed to resume his studies in the meanwhile. As
shown in Annex 2 of the petition itself, Mr. Juan P. Guzman, father of said petitioner, is
extending full cooperation with petitioners to assure that whatever protest or
grievance petitioner Guzman may have would be ventilated in a lawful and peaceful
manner.

ISSUE​:
Whether or not National University may not admit the Diosdado Guzman et al in the case at bar.
HELD​:
No. Guzman et al were deprived of due process. In the first place, NU never showed which school policies
or duly published rules did Guzman et al violate upon which they may be expelled from. NU failed to show
that it conducted any sort of proceedings (not necessarily a trial type one) to determine Guzman et al’s
liability or alleged participation in the said mass actions.
Under the Education Act of 1982, Guzman et al, as students, have the right among others “to freely choose
their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except
in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.” Guzman et al were being denied this
right, or being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
which provides that “no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in the
Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall
have been conducted.”
Therefore, in effect, NU, by barring the enrollment of Guzman et al imposed sanction upon the students
without due investigation – such act is illegal.
The Supreme Court also emphasized the minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process; and these are:
1. That the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
2. That they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired;
3. That they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. That they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
5. That the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case

ATENEO v JUDGE CAPULONG May 27, 1993

FACTS:

●Aquila Legis, a law fraternity in ADMU, conducted its initiation rights on February 8, 9, and 10 of
1991
● One neophyte, Leonardo Villa, died and one, Bienvenido Marquez, was hospitalized due to serious
physical injuries.
● The Disciplinary Board formed by Ateneo found seven students guilty of violating Rule 3 of the
Rules on Discipline in a resolution dated March 9, 1991.
● Fr. Joaquin Bernas, then president of Ateneo, on the basis of the findings, ordered the expulsion of
the seven students.
● Judge Ignacio Capulong of the Makati RTC, upon the students’ petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus, ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and reinstate the said students on May 17,
1991.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the Ateneo Law School has power to dismiss such students pursuant to its rules.

HELD:

● Ateneo has the power to dismiss its erring students and therefore it had validly exercised such
power.
● This is academic freedom on the part of the school which includes: freedom to determine who may
teach; freedom to determine what may be taught; freedom to determine how it shall be taught;
freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.